The New Cabinet Appointments

Imbued with patriotism over politics, President Roosevelt has appointed Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox to his cabinet as secretaries of War and Navy respectively. Upsetting all precedent, the President appointed two Republicans, first because of their wide experience as executives in a military way, and secondly to unite the people of this country as a single unit working toward a definite end in this time of World emergency.

The Democrat approves the appointments of the President, realizing that in times like these today, there is no time for politics and party differences, but that it is the duty of every American citizen to back the government as a unit for the common cause. After the World has again settled down, we know not when, then, and only then, can our two great National parties settle their differences.

Why did the President appoint two Republicans to his cabinet? This is a common question on the lips of many people in the country, and again we reiterate the President’s stand of placing patriotism over politics.

No doubt the President through various diplomatic and governmental channels has information leading him to believe that the United States is in danger or might soon be in danger of invasion. The defeat of Great Britain, with its large and mighty fleet, would immediately put this country on the spot. Therefore the military and naval posts in the cabinet must be filled with men of wide experience, dynamic in character, men who can conduct with quick results the offices for the best interests of our national defense and security. Men who in case of emergency have the military ability to protect our country; who have the ability to execute the building for this country of a large and powerful army, navy and air force, second to none. When this program is completed, it will be the country’s greatest safeguard for peace.
Can I see you a moment after cabinet? Yes
May 21, 1940.

My dear Harry Stimson:

Ever so many thanks. That kind of a note helps to keep a fellow going.

I, too, sense an enormous growth in national unity in the past week, but I am worried both by "fifth column" activities over here and also by the large number of college student groups who are not only isolationists but completely pacifist.

When I read Lindbergh's speech I felt that it could not have been better put if it had been written by Goebbels himself. What a pity that this youngster has completely abandoned his belief in our form of government and has accepted Nazi methods because apparently they are efficient.

I hope to see you soon.

As ever yours,

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
32 Liberty Street,
New York, N. Y.
Personal

My dear Mr. President:

This is just a line to express my most hearty sympathy and approval of what you said to Congress day before yesterday. I sincerely hope that those of our fellow countrymen who have been asleep thus far have at last awakened. Certainly those in my immediate neighborhood show every evidence of it.

Felix told me that even when you addressed the Pan American Union last week there was a large percentage of disapproving reaction from last ditch isolationists. I am convinced that the events in France of the last few days must have converted even them.

I am much gratified to see what appear to be the evidences of a truly united national feeling springing up over the country, and I feel confident that you will meet and cooperate with such a feeling.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
July 19, 1940

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

My dear Mr. President-

I have just read your statement of acceptance of the nomination at Chicago. I have lived too near the burdens of the Presidency, at different times in my life, not to fully appreciate the sincerity of your desire to be relieved from such burdens, – particularly at such a time as the present. I am sad and filled with personal sympathy for you that your conscience has not permitted you to lay them
down at the close of your term.

So long as I may occupy my present post I shall do my best to alleviate the weight of those burdens for you, in a full understanding of the spirit in which you have decided to carry them on.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Memo. for Mr. Forster:

Telegraphed to Hyde Park as per attached request.

Tel. & Tel.

mc-

5:25 P.M.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1940.

Mr. Rudolph Forster,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.

Dear Mr. Forster:

Will you please put the enclosed radio on
the President's private telegraph wire at Hyde Park,
and send it to him at once.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
Mr. Rudolph Forster,

Executive Clerk,

The White House.
FROM: DEWITT, Presidio of San Francisco, July 23, 1940.

TO: The Adjutant General.

Report which is unquestionably reliable indicates practical corner of aviation gasoline market is being affected by Japan and that approaches have been made to practically every Pacific and Gulf Coast Oil Company and contracts for one million two hundred thousand drums have been let or tendered for. Insist upon earliest practicable delivery to be made by September 1st 1940 as nearly as possible. Delivery by November 1940 are requested on practically all contracts let or tendered. For delivery in 1941 only small quantity is asked for. Gasoline in tin drums are requested by practically all contracts. Market will be stripped by quantities being bought and productive capacity for months to come likewise effected. Should Army and Navy need it in quantity during next six to nine months there would be significant shortage of aviation gasoline if these purchases are all consumed.
The White House
Washington

The President

July 24 1940

Following is paraphrase of radiogram from Dewitt, Presidio of San Francisco, July 23, 1940 to the Adjutant General:

"Report which is unquestionably reliable indicates practical corner of aviation gasoline market is being affected by Japan and that approaches have been made to practically every Pacific and Gulf coast oil company and contracts for one million two hundred thousand drums have been let or tendered for. Insist upon earliest practicable delivery to be made by September 1st., 1940, as nearly as possible. Delivery by November 1940 are requested on practically all contracts let or tendered. For delivery in 1941 only small quantities is asked for. Gasoline in tin drums are requested by practically all contracts. Market will be stripped by quantities being bought and productive capacity for months to come likewise effected. Should army and navy need it in quantity during next six to nine months there would be shortage of aviation gasoline if these purchases are all consummated."

Stimson.

610pm/d

This wire rec'd at Nyde PK
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9-16-40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is Secretary Stimson's explanation of his desire to remain in Washington instead of going to Jasper this afternoon.

E.M.W.

E.M.W.
Sept 15th 1940

"WOODLEY"
3000 CATHEDRAL AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I am going to ask you to excuse me from going to Jasper with you tomorrow. I had planned to devote myself pretty vigorously, during the next few days to the preparation of the details for the draft and to tell the truth, I also dread the train of two sleepless nights on the train — for I am tired and do not travel easily by night.

I shall of course be with you at the services in the Capitol.

If you think my presence at Jasper
is sufficiently important to you to have me go in spite of these considerations, let me know through Mr. Watson; but I hope you won't.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Sheppard
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Before leaving tonight I am enclosing the letters from Chairman Sheppard and Chairman May.

How would it do to make Major General Gullion the Director and to make Major General McCoy and Lieutenant Colonel Hershey his two assistants, or else the heads of two separate functions of the Draft—one of them perhaps the selection itself by the Selection Boards, and the other the coordination of the induction in connection with the readiness of the camps to receive the draftees as inducted?

P.D.R.

Inclosures.

Letters from Cong. A. J. May, Chairman, House Committee on Military Affairs, 9/19/40, and Sen Morris Sheppard, 9/19/40 recommending Major General Allen Gullion as Director of the National Selective Service Administration.

For the original of this memo and carbon copy of A. J. May's letter

See: War Draft folder-Drawer 1-1940
Memorandum for The President


1. General Emmons, Commanding GHQ Air Force, and General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, who left for England on August 6 as War Department observers, have returned to Washington and have submitted their report, the essential features of which are summarized as follows:

a. British morale is high. Both Government and public are confident, perhaps over confident, that they can defeat decisively any attempts at invasion by Axis Powers. They display an equal confidence in their ultimate victory.

b. Internally England is united behind Churchill. Externally the situation is fluid. The chief British concerns aside from invasion of England are the Mediterranean, the Near East and the Far East. They regard it as to their best interests that the American Navy remain in the Pacific.

c. Industrially the situation is not bad at the present. British policy is to utilize to the utmost the material resources of the Empire and of the United States. Production, particularly in aircraft is increasing, but their factories are very vulnerable to attack and have suffered some damage since September 7. Production of armament is not so satisfactory due largely to shortage of machine tools. Until September 7 industrial production had been hampered but little by air raids, after that date it decreased markedly in some lines, dropping for instance 60% in the Ford factory. The British do not know their full combined requirements for munitions, nor do they know their own actual or potential production capabilities. They have
nothing comparable to our Industrial Mobilization Plan, nor have they the data on which to base such a plan. Their procurement from us is on a hand-to-mouth basis. They desire us to assure at our expense their material requirements. If they use the facilities thus established they will pay if possible, if not then we must foot the bill.

d. The financial outlook is dubious if not distinctly bad. On September 2 Lord Beaverbrook, with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, stated that their gold supply, including the French gold, the amount and legal status of which is debatable, amounted to $750,000,000. This statement, as pointed out at the time by the American Ambassador is not consistent with Treasury statements.

e. The shipping situation is serious, due to shortage of destroyers, flying-boats and light craft with which to meet the apparently increasing submarine menace, which is resulting in losses of tonnage that will be crippling if not promptly controlled.

f. The military situation is fair insofar as the British Isles are concerned. If invasion be delayed until after October 15 the situation will improve decidedly during the winter. The lack of fully trained troops and armament, and the diversion of troops to the Near East has spread defensive means dangerously thin. The most vulnerable areas, whose loss would be very serious are Egypt and Gibraltar. The British are hopeful that they can be successfully defended.

g. The air situation is not too bad. The Fighter Command has done magnificent work, but as yet has not faced
more than 25% of German air strength. The Bomber Command
has and is making many profitable sorties into Germany and
Italy. The actual operating strength of the Royal Air
Force is weak and losses have been heavy but quality,
morale and confidence remain high. The production of
trained combat crews, including pilots, is the bottle
neck with the Royal Air Force now and will be for some
time.

h. The naval situation is unfavorable at the
present time, due to lack of destroyers and the relative
weakness of the Naval air arm. Losses in naval material,
due to submarines and bombing, have been heavy but have
not affected morale nor apparently the combat efficiency
of the Fleet. The problem of safeguarding the shipping
lanes has not been solved in spite of the fact that the
Royal Navy has supreme confidence in its ability to main-
tain control of the seas.

i. The present defensive phase existing since
Dunkirk has been essentially an air war, the Army and
Navy playing subordinate roles. Coordination of the three
arms is effected by mutual cooperation. Just how this
cooperation would work in the face of a combined German
land, sea and air attack is problematical. How it will
work in combined operations in an offensive in an overseas
theater is questionable in view of British failures in
Norway, Belgium and France.

j. The outstanding lessons of the war for us
appear to be as follows:
(1) Our air program must be radically revised. Observation aviation as a type must be scrapped. It cannot function under modern battle conditions. In its place must be a fast light bomber, well armed, capable of carrying an attack bomb load and fitted with means for aerial photography and de-icing equipment. The firepower of pursuit and bombers must be increased. Bomb bays must be provided for handling the maximum number of bombs of all sizes that the airplane can carry.

(2) Antiaircraft guns, heavy and light, must be provided for all bases, airfields, vital installations and mobile columns. Such armament must be capable of horizontal fire against ground targets. Ground machine guns must be furnished with adapters for antiaircraft fire.

(3) A high proportion of engineer troops must be available for repairs to roads, landing fields, for executing demolitions, for construction of defense works, and for making anti-tank obstacles.

(4) Dependable multiple improvement of communications must be furnished all echelons.

(5) More effective combined training between air, ground and naval forces must be established as a routine matter.

(6) More rigorous physical and disciplinary training must be given both commissioned and enlisted personnel. A state of high physical training is essential to modern operations.
SECRET

(7) A high degree of tactical indoctrination of officers and non-commissioned officers and a correspondingly local decentralization of responsibility for subordinate commanders is strongly indicated.

(8) There is a marked need for more effective and rapid radio communication in code.

(9) A marked increase in anti-tank defensive power in Divisions is necessary.

On September 7 Mr. Churchill asked these officers to convey to you the following statement of his urgent needs:

(1) Expediting the manufacture and shipment of machine tools already under order, it being vital to British production that these tools, particularly capstans and millers, be furnished with the least practicable delay.

(2) Flying-boats (Swedish contract) which are essential for combating the present submarine menace. In addition Mr. Churchill desires 50 ZEY's over and above those that are on order. They are needed at once.

(3) Motor torpedo boats. Twenty of these are urgently needed for policing the Channel in the event of an attempted German invasion, in order to combat the German E-boats.

(4) Rifles. Mr. Churchill stated that he feels the urgent need of every rifle that we can spare over and above the 275,000 Lee-Enfields (evidently referring to the 250,000 now being shipped) which
SECRET

had not been shipped by September 2.

(5) Anything that can be done to expedite the manufacture and delivery of airplanes now on contract would be a distinct contribution to meeting the serious shortage of combat planes which now exists.

(6) 16" Coast Defense guns. Mr. Churchill expressed himself as urgently desiring two (2) coast defense guns of a range of approximately 45,000 yards for counter battery work against the German big gun installations opposite Dover.

(7) As many pilots, trained by the Army or Navy, as will volunteer. Mr. Churchill stated that he would provide any Army or Navy pilot on a leave of absence status for a few months, a wonderful training by giving them actual combat experience.

1. On September 16 during a farewell call on Lord Beaverbrook, the latter stated he was much concerned over the extortionate action of the Stinson airplane people in delaying prospective delivery of 100 0-74 Stinson planes unless an increased price of $5,000 per plane were paid. Lord Beaverbrook desires priority on 100 of these planes now being delivered to the United States Government.

Lord Beaverbrook is also very anxious to get at once from the United States Government, 32 "Flying Fortresses" to use in long range bombing operations against Germany and Italy during the coming winter. He intimated that conversations had already taken place with the President on this subject. In addition, Lord Beaverbrook desires that
SECRET

the release of turbo-superchargers be expedited.

2. A complete copy of the report of these officers will be available if desired, in a day or two.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
Mr. Forster:

The word "Secret" was written on these letters in the President's own handwriting at the time he signed them, and they were sent under confidential cover to the addressees.

M. A. Johnston
My dear Mr. Administrator:

I have allocated to the War Department from the emergency fund for the President provided by the Military Appropriation Act, 1941, approved June 13, 1940, the sum of $12,000,000 for the purpose of developing or assisting in the development of airfields and other facilities for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. In developing these facilities, it is contemplated that Pan American Airports Corporation, or such other person or corporation as shall do the work, will need loans or advances from time to time as the work proceeds.

It is requested that you arrange for these loans or advances up to but not exceeding $12,000,000.

I am directing the Secretary of War to repay out of the $12,000,000 fund allotted to him for this purpose the amount that may be thus loaned or advanced.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Jesse H. Jones,
Administrator,
Federal Loan Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Davis JUN 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OCT 10 1940

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In connection with the $12,000,000 which has been allotted to the War Department out of the emergency fund for the President provided by the Military Appropriation Act, 1941, approved June 13, 1940, for the purpose of developing and assisting in the development of airfields and other facilities for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, it is requested that you provide in the contract which you will make with Pan American Airways Corporation, or such other person or corporation as shall do the work, for repayment from this fund of loans and advances arranged, with your approval, through the Federal Loan Agency for such purposes.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith Secretary Stimson's letter in which he makes certain suggestions about the use of the Fleet.

I have talked the matter over with Secretary Stimson and gathered the impression that he was satisfied that a demonstration in that quarter in less strength than he suggests would meet all the requirements.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:

I think you will acquit me of any habit of butting into matters which are not my business. Since entering the War Department this summer I have tried to attend strictly to my own knitting. But for some time I have been oppressed by the feeling that we have reached one of those crises of history when the fate of the world depends upon a grave decision, so I have decided to tell you frankly what is running through my head.

In May, 1898 after Dewey's victory at Manila Bay Admiral von Dietrich, who commanded the German squadron in that harbor, became truculent and threatening to the American commander. According to my recollection, at one critical moment when the German threat had reached a point when an actual clash seemed imminent Commodore Chichester, who commanded the British squadron in the harbor, moved his ships over and placed them on the side of Dewey and between him and the Germans. No war existed between Britain and Germany, and no war resulted. But the action was sufficient to prevent a clash which might have resulted in such a war.

That action in miniature seems to me to indicate what we might do today.

Let us suppose the American Fleet, fully equipped and with its train of supplies complete, moved across the Pacific by a non-provocative route which would avoid the Marshall and Caroline Islands and accepted the pending invitation of the British to establish itself at Singapore.

It would thereby place itself between the Japanese Fleet and any possible union with the Italian Fleet and the other Axis forces in the Mediterranean and near East. The present opportunity to make such an interposition may not last long and may be the last opportunity to do so.

What would be the result of such a move.

A. Defensively:

1. The morale of the British Empire would be immeasurably increased.
2. The American Fleet would be based upon the strongest base in the southwestern Pacific, having ample facilities for dockage and the power to maintain itself in first-class fighting condition.

3. In any of its movements in the southwestern Pacific it would undoubtedly have the friendly resources of Australia and the New Zealand Islands.

4. If any naval hostilities against our coast or possessions in Hawaii or the Philippines should result it would produce a situation in which the Japanese were the avowed aggressors and any resulting action by our naval forces would have behind them the full sentiment of sympathy from our population.

5. If the Japanese should be foolish enough to attack Hawaii or the American coast they would give our Navy an Heaven sent opportunity for Fleet action far away from the Japanese bases. Therefore, nothing more than raids need probably be expected, and raids would be comparatively impotent and easily disposed of.

6. Even a Japanese attack upon the Philippines would give our Navy a far better opportunity for successful action than would be presented if we should wait until Japan took the offensive with our Fleet remaining in American waters.

B. Offensively:

1. Our Naval forces would command all the vital sea lanes used or usable by Japanese commerce, including both those to the westward and the Indian Ocean, and eastward around Cape Horn. By closing those lanes, and, at the same time, cutting off all American commerce with Japan we should eventually reduce that country to comparative impotency. Japan would be in a similar position to which Great Britain would be at the present moment if Germany controlled the sea with a fleet much superior to that of Great Britain.

2. The power of China would be immensely increased in her military operations against Japan.

3. Air bases in China could be established within easy bombing reach of Japan.

4. The military power of Australia and New Zealand, being safeguarded, would develop into an important factor in the result of the general war.

5. The French Islands of the southern Pacific, e.g., New Caledonia, Tahiti, etc., would be preserved from Axis control.
6. A reasonably safe line of communication with the United States through the southern Pacific could be maintained, and our position in the southern and western Pacific could be indefinitely maintained.

While the foregoing are the reflections of an amateur civilian, and should be thoroughly checked up with your Naval advisers, it is only fair to say that since 1911 I have had periodic occasions to study officially and unofficially the strategy of the Pacific, and that I am a graduate of the Army General Staff College, in respect to the general principles of warfare. I think it is a time when you should study these possibilities thoroughly, and with the aid of young as well as elderly Naval advisers.

Forgive me if I have trespassed.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,

The White House.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

Referring to my talk with you yesterday in reference to transporting some of our heavy bombers to the British as a means of obtaining for our use a test of efficiency of such bombers under combat conditions, I am enclosing a memorandum which the Chief of Staff has made on this subject. I think you will find this helpful for your purpose.

In the absence of the Attorney General, I got in touch with Judge Townsend of his office yesterday and the latter is now in conference with the Chief of Staff with a view to working out, if possible, a certificate on this subject which will be sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Walsh Amendment of last June. I also talked with the Secretary of State yesterday afternoon on the subject and he recognizes thoroughly the importance of these efforts. He suggested that it might be feasible to obtain from the Congress an Amendment of the Walsh Amendment which would broaden the scope of the required certificate by the Chief of Staff and thus more adequately conform to our requirements in our efforts in preparing for national defense.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM for the President:

Subject: Test of Flying Fortress Aircraft.

Our aviation program includes the construction of a large number of long range bombers of the Flying Fortress type. These airplanes, which we consider of paramount importance to successful Hemisphere defense, have been given extensive technical tests, but thus far no airplane having comparable characteristics has been used in war.

The determination of the combat efficiency of this airplane would be of great value to us, as this would permit improvements to be incorporated in later deliveries under present contracts.

With this purpose in mind, I suggest that if a way can be found, legally and diplomatically acceptable, to secure such a test of these planes, that the necessary arrangements be made to so do.
My Dear Mr. President,

I am very grateful this Christmas. I have been given an opportunity to try to serve my country at a time of life when I had no right to expect such a chance. Instead of being on the sidelines I am busy with what I hope will be useful activity in this great crisis of the world, and my heart turns to you with thankfulness for giving me such a chance.

I pray that I may not be an occasion of failure or disaster.

As a small token of Christmas
I am sending you a Philippin cameo to which there is a little history.

When I was Governor-General it was given to me by a Moro princess - a niece of the Sultan of Sulun - as a token of loyalty and allegiance to the American Government.

May it carry the same pledge from me to you in the great task in which we are engaged this coming year.

With my very best wishes for a Happy Christmas and New Year to both you and Mrs. Roosevelt, I am

Very faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
1-2-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

These are three memos which arrived while I was sick. Secretary Stimson phoned me today and asked that I see to it that you had them in your hands. He spoke to you about this matter today.

EWM

E.M.W.
3. I: "I suppose that Ambassador Stahmer has informed you as to why we went ahead and recognised the Wang regime."

Von Ribbentrop: "Yes, I can understand why you recognised Nanking, but as far as I can see, this leaves us without any way to approach Chungking to try to make peace between you and Chiang."

I: "You know, some time ago we got a German report from Chungking to the effect that Chiang still desires peace more than ever. Well, Chinese psychology is not simple."

Von Ribbentrop: "Hereafter I am going to leave this entirely in the hands of Stahmer."

4. I: "The United States is adopting every possible measure to give the war a favorable turn for England by furnishing her with war materials and supplies; also, she is taking this opportunity to expand her own national defense. If, however, it becomes apparent to her, because of the course of the war that there is no way to save England, she will suddenly become realistic and act entirely differently."

Von Ribbentrop: "If circumstances are favorable, early next year I hope to make a diplomatic speech, referring to the United States and saying that if that country joins in this struggle, the whole globe will be enveloped in its conflagration and it will be one immense tragedy for human kind. I hope further to tell the Americans that they cannot possibly give England assistance in time and that we Germans harbor no enmity toward them. Recently his Excellency, your Foreign Minister, made a speech in which he said he harbored no ill will toward the United States. What do you think about the feelings of the Americans? I ask because I wish to avoid confusing them unnecessarily."

5. I: "I hear rumors that subsequent to his speech of the 19th, Churchill may make some peace speech."

Von Ribbentrop: "I don't know anything about that, but in any case I don't see how Germany can talk sense with a nation made up of one man, that man being Winston Churchill. Chancellor Hitler, too, can see no alternative but to fight it out. Following her present course, in the end there will be no alternative for England but to accept our demands as they stand. In other words, there is no road open to England save that of capitulation."
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[Redacted]
Germany's most urgent problems are in its southern sector, in the Balkans and in its relations with the Soviet Union. The British, on the other hand, are more concerned with the possibility of a German invasion of their own territories.

In this context, the British are considering the possibility of a direct approach to the Soviet Union. The British believe that the Soviet Union is not prepared for war and that a direct approach would be more likely to succeed. The British are also considering the possibility of a direct approach to the United States, but they believe that this would be more difficult and would require a stronger relationship between the two countries.

In conclusion, the British believe that a direct approach to the Soviet Union is the best way to achieve their objectives. The British are also considering the possibility of a direct approach to the United States, but they believe that this would be more difficult and would require a stronger relationship between the two countries.
MEMORANDUM

Report on the situation in the United States dated December 25, 1940 from Charge d'Affaires Morishima to Foreign Minister Matsuoka:

1. As I have reported previously, the paramount question today in the United States is that of giving aid to Britain. Whereas in the past the expansion of national defense by the United States was considered of equal importance with giving assistance to Britain, recently the emphasis has gradually shifted to the latter. This may be regarded as a great change. Roosevelt's advocacy of lending Great Britain both airplanes and ships is only an indication of this tendency. Knudsen's voicing the need of accelerating arms production is also deserving of our attention from this point of view.

2. Inasmuch as the increasing preponderance of British naval power in the Mediterranean has had no direct effect on Germany, the United States is still quite attentive to the cry of the British for more airplanes and ships. However, at the present rate of arms production (production is being slowed up lately on account of shortage of aluminum and coke), there is no prospect of giving Britain effective aid by supplying her with these arms by next spring when she will be most in need of them. Roosevelt's proposal is regarded as one for supplying Great Britain with arms which the United States expects to have in the future, as well as those which the United States Army and Navy possess at present. In fact, some of the ships now under construction will be transferred to Britain under the pretext that plans are being altered. (Statements appearing in speeches by United States Government officials to the effect that Great Britain is fighting for the United States may be said to be contributing towards preparing American public opinion for the execution of the aforementioned transference.)

3. Of course, some of the members of the Congress, as well as a part of the public, strongly oppose this plan on the ground that such an act could not but be regarded as an act of war. Among the members of the Congress such men as Wheeler and Nye have voiced their objection and among the people there is a committee called America First doing very active work. However, the oppositionists are still in the minority and the majority are increasingly in favor of giving active assistance and, therefore, we may expect the majority to support the plan successfully in case the question is put to a vote.
The document contains text in a language that is not clearly visible due to the nature of the image. It appears to be a page from a confidential or sensitive document, given the repeated watermark or stamp at the top of the page. The text is not legible enough to transcribe accurately.
war, when the victory of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean has had no effect in weakening Germany, could not be established unless Great Britain compromises to a great extent. It seems that they are going on the assumption that if they could endure the crisis and thereby make the war a drawn-out affair, the prospect of victory on the side of the United States and Great Britain would become a certainty.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR AND THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

February 20, 1941

There is something mysterious about the original letter of June 10, 1940 ostensibly addressed to me by Secretary of War Woodring and Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison.

The Basic Plan refers to the draft of September 2, 1939 and encloses a Joint Board letter of October 11, 1939. With it is a letter dated October 11, 1939 to the Secretary of War signed by H. R. Stark, Senior Member Present (of the Joint Board).

What makes the whole thing look fishy to me is that to the best of my knowledge and belief the original of this letter was never received by me or by the White House.

Two facts lead to the latter assertion. First the fact that the original is not in the White House files nor is any letter referring it somewhere else. Secondly, if I had ever received a letter of this kind, I would most certainly remember it which I do not. That is because the alleged letter of June 4, 1940 refers to a form of complete censorship of publications, radio and motion pictures within the U. S. A. set forth in a detailed plan calling for an initial appropriation of $50,000,000.

Obviously I would have remembered any wild idea like that, I am, therefore, lumping this whole thing back into your arms and those of the Joint Board.

Obviously none of the three of us can possibly approve a plan such as this one which was set up by the Joint Board.

Equally obviously, the Joint Board knows nothing about what the American public will think of the American press would say to a thing like this.

The item of $75,000,000 for the reorganization of the Army's Information Section along intelligent lines is, of course, something else. There should be a full discussion of this subject between all of the Intelligence services and then a conference with me.

F. D. R.

Enclosures
Returning to Sec. of War their copy Secret let. to the President 6/10/40
signed by Secretary of War Harry Woodring and Secretary of the Navy Charles
Edison enclosing "Basic Plan for Public Relations Administration" prepared
under direction of the Joint Board. Plan provides for a public relations
administration to serve as a central agency for disseminating at home and
abroad the official, educational, and informative matter pertaining to the
prosecution of the war and to prevent the dissemination or reception of
information which might be useful to the enemy. States that on
10/24/39 Sec. of War approved this action of the Joint Board and on 11/6/39
asked Sec. of Navy addressed Joint Board "In approving the basic Plan for
Public Relations Administration, draft of 3 September 1939, I do so in the interest
of having some plan in existence in a complete shape. Such an approval must
not be considered as approving the specific plan for adoption in time of war.
The President has a plan of his own with which the subject plan is not in
entire harmony." Submit plan approved by Joint Board to be advised of the
features that are not in harmony with the President's ideas.
Basic Plan for Public Relations Administrator in 3 parts; General Organization
II Publicity and Propaganda III Censorship with annexes - Proposed Legislation,
Presidential proclamations and Executive Orders.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President—

This is the only copy besides the original which seems to be lost. The Army asks that it be returned to them. Do you wish to take any action on it or should we just return it?

S.
Copy attached.

War Dept. requests to return as it is the Dept's file and only copy.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

The paragraph in the attached to which you referred—"Article 327"—means just what you feared. It is only one item, however, in an elaborate, detailed plan (initial appropriation, $50,000,000) for complete censorship of publications, radio and motion pictures within the U.S., as well as communications with other countries. Actually, of course, the proposed Director of Censorship would be a civilian, operating under a civilian Administrator of Public Relations, but I believe the whole theory is wrong. I do not believe the Basic Plan should have the approval requested in this letter.

The item of $75,000 which I mentioned merely provides funds needed to carry out the reorganization of the Army's (and War Department(s) information section along intelligent lines. It should forestall further efforts to put this "Basic Plan" in effect.

Lowell Mellett

(Attached also memo re item on $75,000)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BUDGET OFFICER OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT:

Subject: Funds for War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

1. It is requested that arrangements be made for allocation of $75,000 from the Emergency Fund for the President, War, 1940-1942 to the War Department Bureau of Public Relations for use, under control of the Director, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, in disseminating information to the public concerning National Defense.

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Director, Bureau of Public Relations.

Approved:

GM
February 1, 1941.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

On June 10, 1940, there was transmitted to you by a joint letter signed by Mr. Woodring, Secretary of War, and Mr. Edison, Secretary of the Navy, the draft of a Basic Plan for Public Relations Administration which was prepared under direction of The Joint Board. To date you have given no indication of your approval of this Plan.

In the meantime, The Joint Board, in order to facilitate the administration of the plan and to eliminate an incongruity appearing in the original draft, has proposed two changes to that document. The changes proposed are as follows:

a. Section 5, Item IV, Annex B — Revise the section so as to make it read as follows:

"5. In addition to the personnel provided herein above, the administration is hereby authorized and empowered to employ such clerical force, with or without regard to Civil Service laws, to rent such office space, and procure such facilities, supplies, and equipment, with or without advertising, as may be required by the existing exigency, and authorized by the President."

b. Article 3327 — Change the Article by adding, following the word "publications," the following phrase in parenthesis: "except in foreign languages," so as to make the article read:

"Article 3327 — This Division, operated by Army personnel, assisted by civilian personnel as required, will censor all publications (except in foreign languages), motion picture film, and radio broadcasting within the United States."

We have approved the changes proposed by The Joint Board,
SECRET

and recommend that, if the draft of the plan, submitted to you June 10, 1940, meets with your approval, the changes proposed herein also be approved.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy.
April 4, 1941.

Dear General Watson:

I have your memorandum of March 17, stating that the War Department is establishing a military district, known as the District of Sault Sainte Marie, for the protection of the St. Mary's Falls Canal and locks and that part of the waterway between Lakes Superior and Huron, and requesting that Federal agencies operating in that vicinity cooperate fully with the commanding officer of that District in any assistance which he may deem necessary for the protection of the canal, locks, and waterway.

The officials of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Weather Bureau have been in consultation with the War Department officials, and their activities in this area are so planned as to meet the War Department's requirements. The other agencies of this Department who may have activities in this area likewise have been advised to cooperate fully and render any assistance which may be required by the commanding officer of that District.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Secretary of Commerce.

Gen. Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
Department of Justice
Washington

April 4, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON

Please be advised that the information contained in your secret memorandum of March 17, concerning the establishment of the District of Sault Sainte Marie, has been carefully noted and has been brought to the attention of Mr. Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Major Schofield of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of this Department.

Matthew F. McGuire
The Assistant to the Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House

CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum for General Watson,
Secretary to the President:

For the Secretary I wish to acknowledge receipt of your secret memorandum of March 17, with regard to the establishment by the War Department of a military district, known as the District of Sault Sainte Marie.

The necessary orders have been issued to the Coast Guard and to the Bureau of Customs of this Department to render the fullest possible cooperation to the War Department District Commander.

Herbert E. Gaston
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
March 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Admiral Waesche,  
Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard.

Mr. W. R. Johnson,  
Commissioner of Customs.

FROM: Mr. Gaston

Attached is a secret memorandum of March 17 from General Watson, Secretary to the President, stating that the War Department has established a military district, known as the District of Sault Sainte Marie, for the better protection of the St. Mary's Falls Canal and locks and that part of the waterway between Lakes Superior and Huron within the said district.

Please issue the necessary instructions so that the fullest possible cooperation will be extended to the War Department District Commander.

FCR/mah

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of 70.160

By  Date JUN 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of War
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of Commerce

The War Department has established a military district, known as the District of Sault Sainte Marie, coterminous with Chippewa County, Michigan, for the better protection of the St. Mary's Falls Canal and locks and that part of the waterway between Lakes Superior and Huron within the said district. The Secretary of War has detailed an officer for duty as commanding officer of that district. It will be the duty of the district commander to prescribe the necessary regulations and, with the cooperation of other services of the Federal Government in the vicinity, to take all appropriate and lawful measures for the protection of the canal, locks, and waterway mentioned from obstruction or injury from any source.

It is the President's desire that every Government department and the personnel of their services operating in the vicinity mentioned cooperate fully with the commanding officer of the district in any assistance he may deem necessary for the protection of the canal, locks, and waterway.

By direction of the President:

[Signature]

EDWIN H. WATSON
Secretary to the President

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-14-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached was gotten out of the President files on request of the Secretary of War.

He asks that the President be again shown this paper, with the earnest request that he authorize the signature of the Secretary to the President to the prepared letter setting up a military district at Sault Sainte Marie, on account of the importance of mineral deposits in this region.
The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I desire to call to your attention the serious situation existing at the St. Mary's Falls Canal at Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan. This canal is of vital importance to our national defense program, in that a large part of the iron and copper ore mined in the Lake Superior region passes through this canal in vessels bound for eastern ports. The Lake Superior district produces eighty-five percent of the iron and ten percent of the copper mined in the United States.

Steps have been taken to establish a military district at Sault Sainte Marie embracing Chippewa County, Michigan, with its contiguous waters, Fort Brady, Michigan, and St. Mary's Falls Canal, for the purpose of providing better protection for the canal and waterway and to provide an agency for coordinating the activities of the various departments of the Government interested in this canal.

The following executive departments of the Government have representatives at Sault Sainte Marie, or in the immediate vicinity, who carry on their duties in connection with the canal independently and without coordination: the War Department is charged with its protection and, through the Corps of Engineers, with its operation; the Treasury Department, through the Coast Guard, furnishes a water patrol for the canal and waterway; the Navy Department, through a branch Hydrographic office, transmits the orders issued for the protection of the canal to the masters of ships using the canal; the Department of Commerce is represented by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, and the Department of Justice by the Immigration Service.
I believe that there should be some coordinating head at Sault Sainte Marie to insure the full cooperation of the representatives of all the Government departments in the safeguarding and protecting of the canal. With this in view, I am ordering a senior officer to Sault Sainte Marie for duty as district commander.

In order that the district commander will have full power to coordinate the activities of the various representatives of the executive departments on duty in connection with this canal, I request that you have a memorandum issued, substantially as the draft attached.

Respectfully yours,

Secretary of War

1 Enclosure:
Draft of memorandum
MEMORANDUM FOR
   The Secretary of State
   The Secretary of the Treasury
   The Secretary of War
   The Attorney General
   The Secretary of the Navy
   The Secretary of Commerce

The War Department has established a military district, known as the District of Sault Sainte Marie, coterminous with Chippewa County, Michigan, for the better protection of the St. Mary's Falls Canal and locks and that part of the waterway between Lakes Superior and Huron within the said district. The Secretary of War has detailed an officer for duty as commanding officer of that district. It will be the duty of the district commander to prescribe the necessary regulations and, with the cooperation of other services of the Federal Government in the vicinity, to take all appropriate and lawful measures for the protection of the canal, locks, and waterway mentioned from obstruction or injury from any source.

It is the President's desire that every Government department and the personnel of their services operating in the vicinity mentioned cooperate fully with the commanding officer of the district in any assistance he may deem necessary for the protection of the canal, locks, and waterway.

By direction of the President:

[Signature]
Secretary to the President

DECLASIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

NEWFOUNDLAND:

The half battery referred to might better be expressed as a 2-gun battery of 8" railway guns. These two guns are all that are considered necessary for the purpose, i.e., repelling raids. They will be shipped to Newfoundland on their railway mounts and placed on a short spur of track at the gun position.

This is considered the quickest and cheapest way of getting some coast defense guns installed, as these 8" guns have armor-piercing shell. Eventually they will be replaced or added to by the installation of some new 7" coast defense guns.

BERMUDA:

Four similar 8" railway guns will be placed in Bermuda, as well as a battery of 155 guns.

No planes are being sent to Bermuda at the present time because there are no landing facilities there. As soon as these facilities can be prepared, we will send planes.

TRINIDAD:

War Plans Division thinks reinforcement of planes at Trinidad is the most effective, as there are operating facilities available. Consequently we will send a medium bombardment squadron.

The two batteries of 155 GPF guns are for coast defense, and they are very effective for this purpose against such light vessels as destroyers, etc.

The Infantry Company is for the local beach protection of gun positions.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Defence of Atlantic Bases.

Careful consideration has been given to the possibility of enemy raids by naval vessels against Newfoundland, Bermuda and Trinidad.

Giving full weight to the existing defenses at these localities, the War Department recommends that the following forces be dispatched, as indicated below, in order to meet the threat of such naval action:

Newfoundland, April 16.

One-half battery of 6-inch guns and one squadron consisting of three medium and three heavy bombardment airplanes, totalling approximately 57 officers and 575 men.

Bermuda, April 27.

One battery 8-inch guns; one battery 155 mm guns; and one company of infantry; with necessary services, totalling approximately 50 officers and 975 men.

Trinidad, April 20-28.

One squadron of medium bombardment totalling approximately 46 officers and 305 men (from Panama), and two batteries of 155 mm guns and one company of infantry with necessary services, totalling approximately 75 officers and 1100 men (from United States).

Transports can be made available for movement on dates indicated. Camp sites are available or can be prepared for the accommodation of these forces, except at Bermuda. At the latter place, probably an unoccupied hotel can be leased until camp facilities are available.

Subject to your approval, agreement with the British Government will be sought for the temporary stationing of these units outside leased areas.

"H. L. S. OK but heavy Bermuda. That's necessary. FDR"

P.S. Not planes there as soon as any plane can be prepared. 7 DR"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Directive to Army Base Commanders
Newfoundland, Bermuda and Trinidad.

Under date of April 7 you directed the immediate rein-
forcement of Army garrisons at Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad
for the purpose of defending these bases against German raiders.
Army forces commenced the necessary movements on April 18, including
the movement of bombardment aviation to Newfoundland and Trinidad.

Detailed and specific instructions are now in preparation
to govern the action of Army forces in consonance with Navy Western
Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1. Ad interim instructions to Base
Commanders are essential, so that these commanders may clearly under-
stand the action they are to take in case a raid is attempted.

Accordingly, I propose to direct them substantially as
follows:

"Any war vessel or aircraft of belligerent powers,
other than of those powers which have sovereignty over
Western Hemisphere territory, which approaches within 25
miles of the shores of any British possession on which a
United States base is located, will be viewed as having an
intention immediately to attack such possession and to
threaten the safety of United States bases. War vessels
or aircraft of the category described will be warned by
radio or other available means and if the warning is not
heeded, will be immediately attacked with all available
means."

Your approval is requested.

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

H. L. S.

O.K. — Show to Navy

F. D. R. Copy to Accompany Original

SECRETED

OSD letter, 5-3-72
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Architectural Design of Hospital for Army Base at Quidi Vidi (St. John's, Newfoundland).

1. You will recall that on April 30th, you gave your approval to the proposed design of certain buildings to be constructed at the Army Base at Quidi Vidi, near St. John's, Newfoundland. At that time you withheld your approval of the proposed design of the hospital building for that base and directed the Chief of Engineers to submit revised plans in accordance with certain suggestions that you made.

2. New drawings and plans have now been completed and are submitted herewith for your consideration.

3. If these drawings meet with your approval, I will so inform the Chief of Engineers and direct him immediately to prepare construction drawings for the buildings.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

Incl.
Drawings

DECLASSIFIED
B8D DIR. 5200.9 (2/27/68)
Date: 4-22-66
Signature: [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Military Construction at the Army Base in Bermuda.

1. This case contains five colored drawings showing the general design proposed for structures to be erected at the Army Base in Bermuda. Brief descriptive notes of each building appear on the face of the drawings.

2. If these drawings meet with your approval, I will so inform the Chief of Engineers and direct him immediately to prepare construction drawings for the buildings to be constructed at this base.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

Incl.
Case of drawings.
May 4, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I believe that we should get our big bomber program up to a monthly rate of 500 a month and that that should be the general objective. The British are asking for very large numbers of additional bombers and, inasmuch as they are all standard type, they could, of course, be used by our Army as well as the British.

Very sincerely yours,

FDR

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/1mb
Dear Mr. President:

I have your two letters of May 4th. As was made clear in the discussions which have passed between us on this subject prior to your letters, I believe that our big bomber program can be brought up to the monthly rate which you mention by the middle of 1943.

But, as has been clearly pointed out, this cannot be done with a priority rating of less than A-1-b for the facilities and materials required for the production of the airplanes and their components, coupled with an A-1-a preference rating on facilities to manufacture machine tools and critical materials.

With that condition satisfied, I am confident that the objective can be attained.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
May 9, 1941.

Dear Harry:

Instead of writing a letter to the President, I think I will write this to you. If he feels well enough and you think well enough of it, you can show it to him.

I have been reflecting hard over the situation and have been reading as far as I could the avalanche of letters that have come in to me since my speech, trying to think what advice I would give the President, if he asked me, in regard to what he should do next.

Between two and three weeks ago, which was the last time I talked with him alone on this subject, I mentioned the deterioration in the situation which had taken place since the passage of the Lease and Land Act, and urged him to make some statement (other than press conferences which I thought were inappropriate pulpits), which would give him leadership again of the situation. Since then a good deal has happened and this has served to change my views of the requirements now as to a statement from him. The situation has moved very rapidly and badly abroad. Hull, Knox, Wickard, and I of the Cabinet, Willkie and many others from outside, have spoken in efforts to make clear the issue and what is demanded to meet it. I am inclined now to think that another speech by the President is not what is wanted. I am inclined to think that the people who are well disposed to his leadership want action rather than words. I should say this was the prevailing current in the great bulk of my friendly letters. I certainly do not think that the President should say anything about what he is going to do — particularly anything which Hitler might at once move to forestall.

Keeping in mind the tone of these letters, my feeling is that, if it should suddenly appear in the press that a squadron of the American Pacific fleet had appeared at the Canal and was crossing through it into the Atlantic, that would be the most welcome and relevant news that his friends in these letters could get. That would be an action completely within his constitutional power. It would not commit him to any specific or further act but would be regarded simply as getting our defense into a position of readiness — which it is his constitutional duty to do. His friends would accept it with joy and his opponents could have no valid criticism. Upon both his foreign friends and enemies I believe it would have far more potent effect than any words. But it ought to happen very soon.
I am having an examination and some sort of a digest made of the letters so that, if you and he want to see any of them, I can get them for you.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stevenson

Following your suggestion to send a few samples from people the President knows, I enclose two from Congressmen and one from Kenneth Spencer. Also one from Groton.

Hon. Harry L. Hopkins,
The White House.
May 28, 1941

Dear Mr. "Secretary:

I wish you would take the full responsibility for delivering planes, other than the PBYs, that are to be flown to England to the point of ultimate take-off.

I am convinced that we can speed up the process of getting these bombers to England and I am anxious to cut through all of the formalities that are not legally prohibitive and help the British get this job done with dispatch.

I think that Lend-Lease funds can be used to some extent in connection with fields in Canada and Bermuda.

For your confidential information I am suggesting that the R.A.F. take the responsibility for the planes at the point of ultimate take-off but whether this suggestion of mine is approved by the British Government or not I want the Army to make sure that these planes are delivered speedily.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/lmb
My dear Mr. President:

For the past thirty hours I have done little but reflect upon the German-Russian war and its effect upon our immediate policy. To clarify my own views I have spent today in conference with the Chief of Staff and the men in the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I am glad to say that I find substantial unanimity upon the fundamental policy which they think should be followed by us. I am even more relieved that their views coincide so entirely with my own.

First: Here is their estimate of controlling facts:

1. Germany will be thoroughly occupied in beating Russia for a minimum of one month and a possible maximum of three months.

2. During this period Germany must give up or slack up on

   a. Any invasion of the British Isles.

   b. Any attempt to attack herself or prevent us from occupying Iceland.

   c. Her pressure on West Africa, Dakar and South America.

   d. Any attempt to envelop the British right flank in Egypt by way of Iraq, Syria or Persia.

   e. Probably her pressure in Libya and the Mediterranean.

Second: They were unanimously of the belief that this precious and unforeseen period of respite should be used to push with the utmost vigor our movements in the Atlantic theater of operations. They were unanimously of the feeling that such pressure on our part was the right way to help Britain, to discourage Germany, and to strengthen our own position of defense against our most imminent danger.
As you know, Marshall and I have been troubled by the fear lest we be prematurely dragged into two major operations in the Atlantic, one in the northeast and the other in Brazil, with an insufficiency of Atlantic naval and shipping strength and an insufficient demonstrated superiority of American seapower to hold politics steady in South America. By getting into this war with Russia Germany has much relieved our anxiety, provided we act promptly and get the initial dangers over before Germany gets her legs disentangled from the Russian mire.

To me in my knowledge of your program which we discussed last week of going to Congress with a report and a request for ratification and authority as soon as the Iceland project is public, Germany's action seems like an almost providential occurrence. By this final demonstration of Nazi ambition and perfidy, the door is opened wide for you to lead directly towards the winning of the battle of the North Atlantic and the protection of our hemisphere in the South Atlantic, while at the same time your leadership is assured of success as fully as any future program can well be made.

My discussions with my Staff have covered much broader grounds, embracing the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, but nothing has been developed to throw any doubt upon our views of the imperative importance of seizing at once the above mentioned opportunity for action and following it through to its logical and effective conclusion.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

I received yesterday your personal and confidential letter in regard to cooperation with the British on tank design and the production of new tanks.

We already have a Joint Anglo-American Board set up for the purpose of controlling and coordinating such designs and production; and its success last summer and autumn in coordinating British and American designs, including the establishment of the turret in our tanks, was hailed by everybody as the outstanding success in British-American cooperation. I think that this already existing Board should be made the basis of the organization for imbibing the new lessons of recent combat.

If the British have any new suggestions which they wish to bring before it through personal witnesses, this can easily be accomplished by bringing such witnesses over here and bringing them into conference or substituting them for existing British members. It seems to me that the creation of an entirely new Board would add greatly to the complexity of the general set-up which has been working extremely well.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

The President
The White House.
Personal & Confidential

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have a private message from the Prime Minister urging that a joint Anglo-American board be set up representing the Ordnance Department, Canadian and British representatives for the purpose of controlling and coordinating tank design and production as regards new types.

The Prime Minister obviously lays great stress on the importance of tanks and it seems to me his proposal has merit. Of course the final decisions relative to our tanks must rest with us but I can see how a joint enterprise of this kind might be helpful.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

In longhand:

What do you think?

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/1mb
7/6/41
July 9, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am very anxious that we substantially increase our output of tanks and that we do it as promptly as possible.

I wish you would get together immediately with Mr. Knudsen and Mr. Hillman to work out a program utilizing the maximum tank capacity in America. I am particularly anxious that the program include as much increase as possible in the planned production for the balance of the year.

As you know there is an immediate and urgent need on the part of the British for tanks. I know how difficult it is for anyone to try to indicate the exact number of tanks which are needed by the British and ourselves and it seems to me, therefore, that the criterion should be, for the next year or so at least, that the only limiting factor should be the ability of industry to produce the tanks.

I assume there will be a need for machine tools and I want to stress again the importance of getting as many of these tools as possible from existing consumer goods plants.

I am sure that your Department has given serious consideration to the increased production of tanks and I am, therefore, asking if you will let me have your general recommendations by Friday of this week.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
July 9, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish that you or appropriate representatives designated by you would join with the Secretary of War and his representatives in exploring at once the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.

I realize that this report involves the making of appropriate assumptions as to our probable friends and enemies and to the conceivable theatres of operation which will be required.

I wish you would explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require.

I am not suggesting a detailed report but one that, while general in scope, would cover the most critical items in our defense and which could then be related by the OPM into practical realities of production facilities. It seems to me we need to know now our program in its entirety, even though at a later date it may be amended.

I believe that the confidential report which I am asking you to make to me would be of great assistance, not only in the efficient utilization of our productive facilities, but would afford an adequate
opportunity for planning for the greatly increased speed of delivery which our defense program requires.

I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences. I would appreciate it if you could take the initiative in these conferences.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.
Dear Mr. President:

The chief thing that I am anxious to have a talk with you about is in relation to the efforts I have been making to carry out your letter of July 9th last asking for an exploration of "the over all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies".

Your request has brought up such fundamental and far reaching questions that it has required very considerable work on my part, aided by much exploration by the Chiefs and General Staff officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Corps. It also involves (as you forecast in your letter) basic and possibly varying assumptions which in turn would produce widely varying results. To illustrate, I think the most fundamental assumption which is required is whether

1. This country itself promptly engages in an avowed all out military effort against our chief potential enemy, the German Reich; or

2. We continue our present policy of assisting the nations which are fighting against the Axis powers with munitions, transport, and naval help; and strive to limit our military (as distinguished from naval) operations to passive defense against such reprisals as may be incurred by such assistance to the actual belligerents.

I find that the assumption one way or the other of this basic question produces most far reaching differences in the estimates of our advisers upon such matters as the following:

1. The speed with which we can produce munitions and the quantity therefore that we can produce at a given time.

2. The size of the land forces that we should and can raise and the speed with which that can be done.

3. The terrains where operations should be promptly undertaken and the possibility of our taking the initiative in such terrains.
4. Most important of all, the probability of eventual success in the objective which you have set, viz: inflicting an actual military defeat upon our potential enemies.

I find that there is practically no difference in the views of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, as to the general strategy involved in the present world situation or in the character and location of the different theatres of possible operation. But I find that they are also united in believing that the "principal strategic method" to be employed by the United States in the immediate future should be the reinforcement of the present military operations against Germany by active participation in the war against Germany by the United States; while at the same time they believe that, in default of such participation, the British and their allies cannot defeat Germany, and that the resistance of the United Kingdom cannot continue indefinitely, no matter what industrial effort is put forth by us.

These views of our various advisers have gone far enough to have resulted in a Joint Board estimate of the Army and Navy as to the over all production requirements based upon the first of these two basic assumptions, prompt military participation, and a similar separate estimate as to the requirements of the air forces. I have also received statements of the production requirements of the British government but the latter do not go into the supporting reasoning upon which these estimates are based. Manifestly this could hardly be done without mutual conferences between the high commands of the two countries.

While all of these estimates are necessarily tentative in character on account of other basic assumptions which are involved, my study and participation in their making has been very illuminating to me. I think that it is the first time that an appraisal so broad and careful in character has been made. I hesitate to impose a personal perusal of all of these papers upon you, but I hope you will be able to talk them over with me and also if possible with some of the gentlemen who have been involved in their production as soon as you conveniently can. Until we get your views on the work thus far, it is rather difficult to proceed with the work of assembling a consolidated estimate of munitions which is the essential requirement of your letter of July 9th.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
July 9, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am convinced that if we are going to get production where it must be during the coming months that it is essential that we utilize for defense purposes a substantial part of the large durable goods factories in America that are now manufacturing items to meet consumer needs.

I am convinced that we must have the services of the foremen, the skilled workers, existing engineering departments and, in fact, the going organization of these great plants if we are to get on as rapidly as our national interest requires.

I realize there will be some delay in the change over of manufacturing and there must inevitably be a cost, which in the last analysis must be borne by the Government.

I am anxious that you arrange through appropriate conferences to put this proposal into effect at once. I am prepared to take whatever executive actions are necessary in order to accomplish this objective.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/1mb
July 9th, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am convinced that if we are going to get production where it must be during the coming months that it is essential that we utilize for defense purposes a substantial part of the large durable goods factories in America that are now manufacturing items to meet consumer needs.

I am convinced that we must have the services of the foremen, the skilled workers, existing engineering departments and, in fact, the going organization of these great plants if we are to get on as rapidly as our national interest requires.

I realize there will be some delay in the change over of manufacturing and there must inevitably be a cost, which in the last analysis must be borne by the Government.

I am anxious that you arrange through appropriate conferences to put this proposal into effect at once. I am prepared to take whatever executive actions are necessary in order to accomplish this objective.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 22nd, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 9th, relative to utilization of the large durable goods industry for defense production has received careful study by the War Department.

The policy of converting our productive capacity into defense economy will be vigorously pushed. As a first step, the chiefs of the supply arms of the Army have been directed to continue with unabated energy the placing of contracts for munitions and the commitment of all available Army and Defense Aid funds. These orders will be placed with prime contractors and subcontractors so as to utilize increasing proportions of available manufacturing capacity not heretofore engaged in defense production.

A special study is now being made of plants qualified to make munitions which have no orders, or very small orders at the present time. A study is also being made as to the possibility of breaking complete items of munitions down into subgroups, smaller than has been considered prudent in the past, this with the thought of attaining a wider distribution of orders for components and subassemblies.

We are also making a survey of our procurement offices in the field, to see to what extent our directions as to subcontracting are being carried out.

I trust that I may report at a later date, when the efficacy of these measures may be reviewed.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson
The Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing Parts I and II of Mr. Hopkins' report of his trip to Moscow. They include certain hitherto undisclosed military information.

I wish this report to be carefully restricted.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

Identical letter also sent to Secy. of State & Navy

HLH/lmb
8/20/41
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

AUG 29 1941

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I have for acknowledgement your letter of August 27th, relating to the question of spares for the pursuit planes released to the Soviet Government.

Given below are the facts in this connection:

a. Spare Engines. At a meeting in General Moore's office, attended by the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Oumansky, and his staff, the critical situation with respect to spare parts and spare engines was presented. Mr. Oumansky stated that airplane spare parts were not a problem and he would be satisfied if the Russians were given spare engines and engine spare parts. Experience indicates that 20 per cent spare engines are ample, and 12 spare engines had been forwarded to the Amtorg Corporation to be included with the shipment of planes. Furthermore, a full complement of engine spare parts with the exception of generators and starters have been furnished.

b. Tools. In addition to the spare tools which are normally furnished with the airplanes and engines, a complement of miscellaneous tools required went forward for shipment with the airplanes.

c. Fuels, Lubricants, etc. The Amtorg Corporation was advised as to fuels, lubricants, anti-freeze compounds and other operating supplies. That Corporation is making direct procurement of these supplies. All of the facilities of the War Department were placed at their disposal to assist them in every way possible.

d. Airplane Spares. Although Mr. Oumansky stated that airplane spares were not a matter of immediate concern, necessary action has been taken to insure that a full complement of airplane spares will be shipped within 30 days.

I trust that you will agree, after examining the above facts, that we have taken such steps as are possible at this time to meet the request from the Soviet Government, which has come at a time when, largely
as a result of urgent British demands for Middle East use, there are no spares in existence.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

What should I do?

F. D. R.
September 16, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

ALL THIS NEEDS IS TO BE FILED IF IT IS A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO YOUR LETTER. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE IT IS A COMPLETE ANSWER AND CAN BE FILED.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. [ ]. The Far East
page [ ]. General, Soviet Union
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

As you know, I recently sent Mr. Harry Hopkins to Moscow, to inquire into Russian needs for munitions that might be obtained from American production, and to inform the U.S.S.R. that this Government is willing to help with such supplies to the extent of its ability.

As a result of that visit, and Mr. Hopkins' report to Mr. Churchill and myself, a suggestion was sent to the U.S.S.R. that a conference be held in Russia in the near future, to be attended by representatives of Russia, Great Britain and this country, to have as its objective the formulation of definite munitions aid programs, to assist Russia in its war efforts, and which might be supplied by Great Britain and the United States.

Russia has accepted that suggestion, and the representatives of the various countries are to meet in Russia by October 1, 1941.

I deem it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of America that all reasonable munitions help be provided for Russia, not only immediately but as long as she continues to fight the Axis powers effectively. I am convinced that substantial and comprehensive commitments of such character must be made to Russia by Great Britain and the United States at the proposed conference.

It is obvious that early help must be given primarily from production already provided for. I desire that your Department working in cooperation with the Navy Department, submit to me by September 10 next your recommendations of distribution of expected United States production of munitions of war, as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and the other countries to be aided -- by important items, quantity time schedules and approximate values, for the period from the present time until June 30, 1942.
I also desire your general conclusions as to the overall production effort of important items needed for victory, on the general assumption that the reservoir of munitions power available to the United States and her friends is sufficiently superior to that available to the Axis powers, to insure defeat of the latter.

The distribution of production from existing production after June 30, 1942, and the distribution of the Victory Production Objective will obviously have to be decided at a later date, in the light of the then existing circumstances.

After the above reports and recommendations are submitted, I propose to arrange with the Prime Minister of England for a conference of high military officials, for the purpose of discussing the above two recommendations, as well as the aid to be provided by England to Russia. In view of the date on which the conference is to be held in Russia, it is important that the recommendations resulting from this British conference reach me not later than September 20 next.

With the knowledge of these recommendations, and after further consultation with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, I will be able to instruct the mission going to Russia as to the aid which will be supplied by this country. Should adjustments to this program of assistance be necessary, they will be recommended to me by the mission to Russia, after due consultation with the Russians and the British on the spot.

S/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
August 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KNUDSEN:

I am enclosing, for your information and guidance, a copy of a memorandum just sent to the Secretary of War.

In conformity with the policy outlined in that memorandum, will you please submit to me not later than September 10, 1941, and after consultation with Army and Navy officials, your recommendations as to the amount of aid in the form of raw materials, intermediate materials, and manufacturing equipment that can be made available to Russia, prior to June 30, 1942.

Information as to the stated needs of the U.S.S.R. will be made available by the Division of Defense Aids report.

F. D. R.
August 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I am enclosing herewith, for your information and guidance, a copy of a memorandum just sent to the Secretary of War.

Will you please cooperate with the War Department in preparing the recommendations called for.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Please read and speak to me about this. I am a bit bewildered.

F.D.R.

Confidential letter to the Pres. from Secy. of War 10/21 re question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four-engine bombers. Also re atten. to the prompt development of a well-armed and well-trained Amer. air force.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Please read this and let me have it back. There is nothing much new in the first four paragraphs on Page #1 but paragraph five relating to the guarding of key points should be examined into.

F. D. R.

C. B. Munson's report "Japanese on the West Coast" with memorandum from John Franklin Carter.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.
November 12, 1941.

Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of November 7th suggesting that we make our recent excess in production of light tanks available to the British for use in the Middle East came just after General Marshall and I had acceded to a request coming from General Dill for three hundred fifty medium tanks. Dill sent this request direct to Marshall and his letter set out such a situation that we felt his request should be granted at once and we took the responsibility of so doing. But this meant turning over to the British the entire November and December production of medium tanks and, unless we retain this unexpected excess of the light tanks to which your letter refers to use with our own units for training in the place of the medium tanks which we have thus given to Dill, we will be faced with a very unfortunate situation with our own troops.

Furthermore we will have exhausted all our possible excess of ammunition to go with the medium tanks I have just mentioned and we would have none for use with the light tanks if we gave them.

The present transfer schedule to Russia, calling for 376 Thompson sub-machine guns in November, and 19,000 in December can be reversed. However, the two million rounds of ammunition scheduled for transfer to Russia in November was taken from the British allotment and is all that can be transferred without further impairing the British schedule. Since the British have transferred to Russia from Great Britain 23,000 of these guns with 1,000 rounds of ammunition per gun, it is believed that no further inroads should be made on the amount now scheduled for the British.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STimson
Secretary of War.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
DECLASSIFIED
BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

The President,
The White House.

HLS:ECN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1941

Dear Harry:

You have undoubtedly seen the attached wire from the Middle East. Is there any chance of anything being done in regard to this?

If it were possible to send all or any part of these P-40E's to the fighting front I think it would be a desirable thing to do.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed)  FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1661  Dated: 10-29-41
From: Cairo  Rec'd: 10-30-41, 12:01 p.m.

An appeal has been made to me by Lyttelton for 72 completely outfitted Kittyhawks on the ground that reequipment of certain squadrons of Hurricane one planes must be made. The first deliveries of Kittyhawks will be without equipment, according to his statement, and, he states further, that the 71 which are expected to arrive on November 19 are unerected and carry no guns or accessories so that it would be impossible before January 15 to place them into squadrons. The point is stressed by Lyttelton that the 72 fully equipped Kittyhawks should be delivered immediately, and he recommends that an aircraft carrier be used in sending them. The maintenance of sufficient reserves for sustained operations will be affected, he states, by subsequent shipments.

I might add, in this connection, that I understand from other sources that both the Hurricane one and the Tomahawk are being outperformed by the new Messerschmitts now

now
now in use by the Germans in the western desert, and this development may be related to Lyttelton's urgent appeal for the Kittyhawks.

It would be farthest from my mind to underrate the prior demands from other areas, but as I can and must speak for this particular theater I can only repeat that the conviction previously expressed that with adequate equipment blows to the Axis could have been and still can be delivered from here, would not only in themselves inflict serious damage, both material and moral, but would also serve indirectly to benefit more active fronts by relieving pressure on them. In addition, the gravest consequences would result from any future defensive or offensive operations in this sector which would prove unsuccessful, and I refer you to my 1630 of October 23 and previous messages in this connection. If favorable action cannot be taken, therefore, on Lyttelton's request for the immediate delivery of 72 completely equipped Kittyhawks to the Middle East, I sincerely hope that unsurmountable physical impossibility will be
be made the grounds for such a decision.

KIRK

Copies to:
Mr. Hopkins (6)
Mr. Harriman (2)
Captain James Roosevelt (1)
Gen. Burns (4)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

PLEASE READ AND RETURN.

F. D. R.

Memorandum which the President received from Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, 11/12/41, with attached clipping "Army Not Yet Ready, Gen. Grimes Asserts", which was published at Canton, N.Y., 11/11/41. (Brig. Gen. William M. Grimes). The memorandum reads - "I think statements like this are beginning to do us a good deal of harm. I think many people hesitate to go all the way with you because they feel the Army is not ready to fight. I can't see any useful purpose in Army officers continuing to make statements like this."
Mr. Hopkins has read and this can be filed.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Letter from the Secretary of War, 11/12/41 to the President, in reply to President's letter of 11/10/41, with which was enclosed the wire from Kirk dated 10/29/41, requesting the immediate diversion to the Middle East of 72 fully equipped Kitty Hawks (P-40E's). States it will be impossible to meet Mr. Kirk's request unless the allocation to Russia is modified.
November 12, 1941.

Dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 10, 1941, enclosing the wire from Kirk dated October 29, 1941, requesting the immediate diversion to the Middle East of seventy-two (72) fully equipped Kitty Hawks (P-40E's). A copy of this wire had not previously been transmitted to this office.

All production of Army Air Corps P-40E's between now and July 1, 1942, has been committed to Russia. This action was taken as a result of a directive issued in accordance with the agreement reached by the American Mission to Russia. The British, of course, concurred in and approved this action.

From the foregoing you will see that it is impossible to meet Mr. Kirk's request unless the allocation to Russia is modified.

The British are scheduled to receive under their own contracts 168 Kitty Hawks in November and 22 in December, completing this contract. Under Army Defense Aid they are scheduled to receive 94 in December. This makes a total of 284 planes of this type in these two months presently scheduled for delivery to the British.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

In other there ain't no Kittyhawks for the poor Army to give you. The British and the Russians already have them all!

The President,
The White House.
November 26, 1941.

Personal and confidential

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending herewith

1. Another memo about the Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai. This is highly abbreviated from the verbal information given me but it will give you the substance.

2. The British estimate as to Japanese intentions of which I spoke to you and of which you asked me to send you a copy.

Will you kindly return this last paper when you have read it?

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement.

Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.

[Signature]
Secretary of War.
The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Roosevelt (undated).

Memorandum containing suggestions for the proposed message to Congress on the subject of relations with Japan.


[Notations on original: "About Nov. 27, 1941." : "Draft received by the Secretary of State from the Secretary of War for possible inclusion in the proposed message to the Congress on the subject of relations with Japan."]
Memorandum for Miss Tully:

In the light of what has happened in the last day or two this letter may be filed. It is not important for the President to take any further action on this matter at this time.

H.L.H.
October 21, 1941.

Strictly personal and confidential.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 14th in which you raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four-engine bombers. In order to answer as carefully as possible the questions you raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the head of the Air Forces and the head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I have also been assisted in forming my views by the conferences which I recently had with these gentlemen and their subordinates in which we have gone over these same problems of strategy for the purpose of answering your inquiry of last July as to the means necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All of these labors have had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in your present letter. I hope that you will discuss this question fully with your military advisers before you make up your own mind upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall try to give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to your letter of October 14th. I do not think that they vary in any substantial particular from those of the gentlemen with whom I have consulted.

1. Essentially, this question of the distribution of these planes is really not a static but a dynamic question. It is not to be solved by taking a map and computing how many planes shall be allocated to certain geographical positions. These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied.

These planes themselves are not individually a finished element of such power. They must be manned with crews, trained first in individual operation and then in group operation, before they become the vital elements of this pool of power. The process of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning a battleship, and you know how long that takes. The melancholy list of casualties which have recently occurred to our planes in the hands of British pilots is a reminder of the danger of trying to shorten this time and to use such planes with hastily trained crews.
The United States and the United Nations, with all the resources of the United Nations, have been working together to find a peaceful solution to the Korean conflict. The United Nations has been instrumental in bringing the parties to the negotiating table. The Korean conflict has been a test of the United Nations' ability to maintain peace and stability in the region. The United Nations has been working to ensure that the peace agreement is implemented and that the rights of all parties are respected.
Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportunity, another such chance is opening in the northwestern Pacific. Vladivostok is one of three gateways to Russia. The Archangel gate may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf gate is insignificant in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula and the facilities which we believe (although we have not yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, present us with the opportunity for another use of these bombers supplementary to the one I have just described in the south. That locality can possibly form the base of a northern pincer movement of American influence and power, this time not only to protect against aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of Russia in Europe. Its operation would fit into and supplement the operation from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which would greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, after passing over Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to safety in the north in a way similar to the sweeps which Germany is now employing through the North Atlantic from Norway to France. The power of such a completed north and south operation can hardly be over-estimated. The control over the Western Pacific which it would open could hardly fail to have immense powers of warning to Japan as well as of assurance to Russia. It might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. But it will require the existence of an adequate force of these bombers — even greater I believe than the minimum requirements stated in my letter to you of September 22nd. At present under the system of allocation we are planning but one group for Alaska. That I believe would be quite inadequate. And my feeling is strongly reinforced by information which I have just received from General DeWitt who is responsible for the Alaska station. Today there are not more than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska.

2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because that is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we are already in actual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers which we have proposed to place in Newfoundland are not designed to repose idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emergency. They are to form the reserve component of a team of such four-engine bombers of which the advance unit is to be in Iceland, only seven hours away by air. This takes on an added importance with the approach of the coming winter during which
time the long range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North Atlantic and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the harbors where they ordinarily land. In other words, we contemplate the possibility of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes and have planned to place them in these separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base. Our past deferments to Great Britain of the B-24 bombers have contributed to the delay in the establishment of these two bases. Six of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfoundland. None is yet at Iceland.

The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic is evidenced only too clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. As you know from our talk the other day when General Embick was present, I am much concerned that steps should be taken as promptly as possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in the northeast, namely the British Isles. That safety will not be secured by a comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unmanned, and unorganized for battle formation. The situation requires far more radical treatment than that. It requires treatment which will make safe beyond peradventure a favorable decision of the battle of the Atlantic as well as the defense against invasion of the British Isles. I have already stated my views to you on that subject and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think the time is coming rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. Otherwise I fear lest some morning we be caught napping by a surprise German attack. All that is germane for me to say in respect to my present letter is that I believe, in the light of this situation and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in the world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a few additional planes.

Quite apart from that, there remains the question of the possible impairment of the defensive power of our own country which it is always our first duty to secure. Giving full tribute to the enormous service which has been rendered and will continue to be rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that the moment has now come when we should give our primary attention to the prompt development of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well-trained American air force. And I have, after using the most careful consideration and study, reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to divert further production from the Army air forces until such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of September 22nd are fully completed.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR:

This relates to Army morale
in Alaska. This is just for your private
information. Please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. from the Secy. of the
Interior enclosing letter from Dr. Ruth
Gruber, Anchorage, Alaska, re conditions
of morale in Alaska.

file in files folder 1-41
December 25, 1941.

Dear Mr. President:

Before the present conferences finish I want to ask again for the reconsideration of one matter which, though minor militarily, is in my opinion very important from the standpoint of the morale of our troops. I refer to the garrison of Iceland.

You will remember that before Churchill arrived I suggested at one of our conferences that it would be better to let the British take over the entire military garrison of Iceland. Admiral King objected on the ground that it would interfere with his convoy duties in the North Atlantic. I then did not press it further. On reflection I do not think King's reason was valid, for he can have a naval base in Iceland even if the entire military garrison is British. Admiral Pound is planning to do just that thing in case we garrison it. He will retain a naval base.

Now the importance of my point is this: It is much more difficult for American troops to garrison Iceland permanently than it is for British troops. The British are nearer home, and the monotony of the life can be relieved by alternating tours of duty or brief leaves in their homes; whereas to Americans no such means of relief are possible. Our men must be there for the duration. I have received already some reports on the morale of our garrison in Alaska which is similar to Iceland in its winter lack of sunshine. And I remember very well myself that during the Great War the British and the French troops had a great advantage in sustaining their morale over ours in their seven day leaves at home, while we were all in a strange land for the duration of the war. Luckily it then did not last long; but, if you think that you can keep American troops in Iceland for a couple of winters without psychological trouble, I think you will find yourself mistaken. And now is the time to fix that. Iceland is a most dreary place and especially so to a sunshine loving American in winter. They much prefer the rigors of battle to the rigors of boredom in such a climate!

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE
INFORMATION.

F. D. R.

Memo from Jack Carter, dated Dec. 23, 1941, re "New" method of attack on San Pedro Harbor. Munson thinks the attack contemplated is the release of gas off-shore with a favoring wind or fog. He reports there are no gas masks on the West Coast for the civilian population.
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON LOWER CALIFORNIA
AND NORTHWESTERN MEXICO

In a conference with the U. S. Consul from Tijuana, he stated that there was no Japanese problem in his district as there were very few Japanese left there. One Rodriguez, former Governor for many years of Lower California, and very partial to the United States, abetted by the American Navy, has set up a shrimp fishing monopoly in the Gulf of California thereby eliminating Japanese fishing (Japan-controlled) in this area. The Consul states that he has sent full reports to the State Department covering the situation there. There is evidently nothing in the Japanese problem across the border about which to be exercised.