PSF

War Department; Henry L. Stimson 1942
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1-12-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of War asked me to give this to you personally on your return.

E.M.W.
E.M.W.
Dear Mr. President:

Although you have not directly questioned me on the subject, my views on the problem of speeding up the production of munitions I am sure will not be deemed by you to be officious on my part. The subject of course has been in my mind ever since you appointed me Secretary of War. So here goes for a very rough sketch of the impressions I have formed on that subject during the past year and a half:

1. In the first place, contrary to critics, we have not done badly as to speed but on the contrary have done very well, considering that our people were not at war and consequently and naturally did not want to make too deep sacrifices. History shows that it takes from one year and a half to two years to transform the industrial organization of a great peaceful nation like the United States to a war machine. We are not behind this schedule but are ahead of it, judged by 1917-1918.

2. My estimate charts which I have been following for a year, and which have proved substantially accurate, show that in the next six months our curve of production, which is already rising rapidly, will rise gigantically. The spur of war psychosis will join with the fact that we are now at last reaching full production, in producing this result. All this will silence most critics if we use our great output prudently, intelligently, and effectively. It will also give anyone whom you might make dictator of munitions an enormous reputation whether he earned it or not.

3. Nevertheless this is no reason for not seeking such improvements in the organization as we can make. But it is a reason for going very carefully in making changes.

   a. The creation of a new statutory and separate department for the entire job of making munitions would be a fundamental and catastrophic change from the system which this country has evolved historically and legally. For quite a long period the mere transformation involved would greatly slow up our output at a critical and vital period of the war.

   b. I have, however, always been in favor of the concentration of executive power into a single head on the business side of munition making. I favored it at the time you created OPM and SPAB, although I loyally accepted each of those steps as an improvement on their predecessor. But I feel there are far too many "checks and balances" remaining within the present structure.
4. In spite of his obstacles and in spite of the fact that he is not himself a ruthless initiator and driver, I think Knudsen has done a fine job. He has the confidence of business, labor, and the country, as having done such a job, although they think it can be speeded up. I think a reorganization which wholly dropped him out of the organization would be a grave mistake.

5. Anyone whom you now made a dictator of the munitions making aggregation should have two qualifications:

   a. The inherent innate genius of being able to initiate and drive forward production.

   b. An acquaintanceship with the methods and instruments which he must use in making such a drive. He must have an acquaintanceship with the methods of industry and the confidence of American industry. Such acquaintance and confidence could not be acquired unless he had himself been a manufacturer or at least spent his life in executive work which brought him into close contact with it.

To sum up all these considerations, if you are going to put in such a new man as a driver of industry, I think you should (a) not move until you are dead sure of your man; (b) not select any man, however brilliant, unless he has been evolved by American industry.

I have talked with and listened to suggestions of my associates. They have put forward names of men who they think would be effective. But, as I have not been personally acquainted with such men, I do not repeat the suggestions. I could get such suggestions for you if you wanted them.

The foregoing analysis represents the best I can do for you. I hope the analysis may be of some possible help to you.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
January 13, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

As requested, I return to you herewith your memorandum in regard to Colonel Lindbergh together with Knox's letter attached thereto. I am glad you have taken such an attitude towards this troublesome matter. I heartily agree with you.

Colonel Lindbergh having requested an interview with me, I saw him yesterday afternoon. I had previously inquired as to his past contacts with the War Department and found that several years ago when we were extremely short of news as to the progress of aviation in Germany, he had rendered a really valuable service by placing at our disposal facts which he had acquired from his visit to Germany and his examination of their airports and planes.

When he came in yesterday he told me that he was thinking of going into the business of airplane manufacture but that he did not wish to do so until he had offered his government to help it in the present emergency in any way that he could. I thanked him and told him of my own position on this matter as announced the other day at my press conference, namely that I would welcome any information or suggestions that might come to me from him or any other American and which would help us in our work in the Department. I told him that to that end I would arrange for his meeting with Arnold and Lovett to work out details of his relations with us. But I also told him that I would not be frank if I did not make it clear to him now that from my reading of his speeches it was clear to me that he took a very different view of our friends and our enemies in the present war from not only that of myself but a great majority of our countrymen, and that he evidently lacked faith in the righteousness of our cause. I told him that we were going to have a very difficult and a hard war on our hands and that I should personally be unwilling to place in command of our troops as a commissioned officer any man who had such a lack of faith in our cause as he had shown in his speeches.

I then sent for Lovett and turned him over to Lovett to talk over his suggestions in detail. Although evidently rather set back by my frankness, he thanked me cordially for seeing him and for giving him this opportunity for even limited service.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
January 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I think Frank Knox is right. For the time being the matter can be possibly maintained "under consideration". Please return for my files.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Yesterday Steve Early, at your request, sent me a copy of a letter someone had written you concerning Lindberg's offer of his services to the Army. I read the thing over yesterday and again today and I give you my sober reflection for that it may be worth.

If I were in your place, I would not become involved in any discussion about Lindberg but would leave it to the Army to handle. If it were a Navy question and were put up to me, I would offer Lindberg an opportunity to enlist as an air cadet, like anybody else would have to do. He has had no training as an officer and ought to earn his commission.

[Signature]

Frank Knox
January 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

What can I tell the Secretary of War in the morning? I think immediate action to reinforce Curacao is vital.

F.D.R.

Secret from the Secy. of War re Curacao
February 5, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of November 8, the Department gave careful study and consideration to the matters reported by Mr. C. B. Munson in his memorandum covering the Japanese situation on the West Coast.

Since you are generally aware of the radical steps which have been taken since December 7 to control the situation on the West Coast and particularly the guarding of the key points in that area by Federal troops, I see little need of commenting on the report I have before me. The California state authorities are still somewhat confused as to the steps they wish to take to form units to guard local property generally, but I understand a number of interests are endeavoring to reach some solution of the problem. In the meantime, General DeWitt's forces continue to guard many of the more important strategic points and installations.

We have worked out with the Attorney General a more expeditious legal method than formerly prevailed in the Western theatre of operations in connection with the search and seizure of enemy aliens and their property.

I may add that our officials have consulted with Mr. Munson on the matter of the defense of the West Coast against enemy agents.

As requested in your memorandum, I am returning Mr. Munson's report.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War

The President
The White House

Encs.:
1. Report
2. Memorandum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Please read this and let me have it back. There is nothing much new in the first four paragraphs on Page #1 but paragraph five relating to the guarding of key points should be examined into.

F. D. R.

NOV 10 1941

WAR DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
MEMORANDUM ON C.B. MUNSON'S REPORT "JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST"

Attached herewith is the report, with supplementary reports on Lower California and British Columbia. The report, though lengthy, is worth reading in its entirety. Salient passages are:

1) "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of themselves... but today they are few".

2) "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will be undoubtedly some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'."

3) "The dangerous part of their espionage is that they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships...is concerned."

4) "For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs."

5) "Your reporter...is horrified to note that dams, bridges, harbors, power stations etc. are wholly unguarded everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California might actually die of thirst... One railway bridge at the exit from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four main railroads".

J.F.C.
JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST

(C. B. Munson)

GROUND COVERED

In reporting on the Japanese 'problem' on the West Coast the facts are, on the whole, fairly clear and opinion toward the problem exceedingly uniform. In reporting, the main difficulty is to know where to leave off and what to leave out. One could gather data for fifteen years with fifteen men and still be in the position of the Walrus and the Carpenter:

If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year —
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?

Whisking up the grains of sand is the wrong approach, yet when your reporter declares there is a sea and a shore and some sand, and that he has sampled the general quality of sand in many varying beaches, do not be too hard in your judgment for him if he has stopped far short of sorting out each layer or tint or even each beach. You have to feel this problem — not figure it out with your pencil. We only cite the sand that our reader may never forget the complexities of even a shovel full of sand.

Your reporter spent about a week each in the 11th, 12th and 13th Naval Districts with the full cooperation of...
the Naval and Army intelligences and the F.B.I. Some mention should also be made of the assistance rendered from time to time by the British Intelligence. Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the last ten or fifteen years. Your reporter commenced in the 12th Naval District, which covers Northern California, from thence to the 13th, covering Washington and Oregon, winding up his observations in the 11th Naval District, covering Southern California, where to his mind the whole 'problem' finally focuses. Your reporter also turned the corner into British Columbia through a member of the R.C.M.P. and the corner into Mexico through a conference with our Consul at Tijuana.

Opinions of the various services were obtained, also of business, employees, universities, fellow white workers, students, fish packers, lettuce packers, farmers, religious groups, etc. etc. The opinion expressed with minor differences was uniform. Select Japanese in all groups were sampled. To mix indiscriminately with the Japanese was not considered advisable chiefly because the opinions of many loyal white Americans who had made this their life work for the last fifteen years were available and it was foolish to suppose your reporter could add to the sum of knowledge in three weeks by running through the topmost twigs of a forest.

BACKGROUND

Unless familiar with the religious and family background of the Japanese, this rough background summary should
be skimmed over as it has a bearing on the Japanese question. If the reader is familiar with the Japanese background, it may be omitted.

An American wit once said, "You cannot tell the truth about Japan without lying." This same criticism might be made with reference to the Japanese people, but, like all generalizations, it needs a corrective explanation. A study of Japan is a study in the category of social fully as much as of political science. The study of the Japanese people is one of absorbing interest.

Who are the Japanese people? From whence did they come and what emotional concepts did they bring with them? While there might not be unanimity of opinion as to the various strains that go to make up the Japanese of today, one leading anthropologist, Dr. Frederick Star of the University of Chicago, a number of years ago said to the writer, "the Japanese are the most mixed race of people that I have ever studied". The Malay strain is pronounced in the Japanese, especially in the Province of Kumamoto. The Mongol is very pronounced in the upper middle as well as in the so-called higher brackets of society. Then there is the Aryan strain still to be seen in its unmixed form in the 17,000 and more Ainu who inhabit portions of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. These latter are related to the Aryan group in physiognomy and in language. These three strains have produced the Japanese of today.

The Ainu, in so far as we know, was the aboriginal. His social status was changed from time to time as conquering groups drove him farther and farther to the North. These
conquering groups came from China via Korea. Japanese history begins with the conqueror Jimnu Tenno, who arrived on a 'Floating Bridge of Heaven' – a poetical expression for his coming to Japan by boat. He found a tribal people with a primitive animistic faith of nature worship. He had a superior religion and he was shrewd. He told the conquered people that their reverence for the tribal chief was a true reverence and that he also revered the head of his clan which was the Sun Goddess, whose beneficent rule was seen in her health-giving rays. Thus began what is known as 'Shinto' ('The Way of the Gods'), as we know it today. From the days of Jimnu (the first Japanese Emperor) to the present, all Japanese have revered the Emperor as a descendant of the Sun Goddess, whose appearance in Japanese mythology is too complicated to be discussed here.

Another cultural element in Japanese life stems from the introduction of Buddhism in Japan in the sixth and seventh centuries. Buddhism is a foreign religion and made little progress in Japan, even though it was fostered by the Emperor Prince Shotoku. Buddhism had a very difficult time until some wise propagandist hit upon the idea of incorporating the Shinto Gods into the Buddhist Pantheon. All the Shinto deities were recognized as avatars of Buddha and we have continuing in Japan until the days of the Restoration what is known as two-fold Buddhism – a union of Shinto and Buddhism – a union so intricate that Buddhist God shelves in the home have unmistakable Shinto deities and Shinto God shelves have unmistakable Buddhist
deities. Japan can never repay Buddhism for its contribution to the cultural life of the people. Its temples were schools wherein those who wished might be taught. It developed the arts and crafts, and was the developer and preserver of much that is beautiful in the cultural life of the Nation today.

While the Shinto and the Buddhist influence, separate and co-mingled, were moving forward, there developed in Japan a feudal type of society. This society was organized under the rule of a tribal person known as 'The Great Name' (a land baron). He had warriors or knights known as Samurai. They, the Samurai, preserved order and fought battles to maintain the existence of the clan. Besides the Samurai there was the farmer who raised the food, the artisan who fashioned and fabricated the tools, not only of the farmer but also of the warrior, and there was the merchant; below them there was the eta, and lower still the hinin - those who for misconduct or through capture had been reduced in status until they were not considered men, as the term 'hinin' implies.

For nearly 1,000 years, this state of society existed with internecine wars of all too frequent and carnal occurrence until early in the seventeenth century when a great man, Ieyasu, appeared, and became the founder of what is known as the Tokugawa family. The story of this period is interesting, but time and space do not permit the telling of it here, other than to say it was a period of about 250 years of great peace.

During the Tokugawa period, Confucianism had great vogue. The Samurai children were privileged to attend the few
schools which were maintained and where the principles of Confucian ethics were taught, but with one great characteristic change - the Japanese substituted for the chief virtue, loyalty for filial piety. Chugi (loyalty) is loyalty, not to an idea nor an ideal, but to a person. In this feudal society, personal relationships were supreme, and loyalty was the cardinal virtue.

In the feudal state, as well as throughout all Japanese history, the individual as an individual did not exist. He existed only as a member of the family and the family existed as a member of the clan. The family could dispose of individuals at will, should occasion merit such action. Even life itself could be taken, after the case had been submitted to the family council. In this connection, one should not overlook the tremendous influence of the dead. The living succeed or fail, are happy or sad, through the influence of the dead who live in the tombs of the village or hover over their familiar haunts. It is well to keep this in mind when estimating Japanese activity. The Japanese believe that the dead remain in the World and that all dead become Gods with supernatural powers, and that happiness of the dead depends upon respectful services that are rendered them by the living.

In a feudal society, the merchant cuts a very poor figure. He was looked down upon by the Samurai and he was inferior to the farmer and the artisan. It is significant that but a very few families of merchants have maintained a good social position. Of these there are the Mitsui, the
Iwasaki (this latter being represented by what we know as the Mitsubishi), and also the Sumitomo family.

With the Coming of Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, feudalism began to pass away and within 20 years was abolished by Government edict. Although the feudal social system was legally abolished, its influence continues even today.

With the Restoration there appeared a new influence in Japanese life and that was the coming of the Christian missionary with his doctrine of individual responsibility to deity. This was something new to the Japanese system of society. Heretofore religion centered in the family, and family culture and family faith were a collective thing and not individual. The success of the missionary movement in Japan is remarkable because it brings this new element into the social picture. Wherever Christianity succeeds, it also succeeds in breaking the old family ties and hang-overs of a feudal order. Japan's advance in Government, its development educationally and the vast improvements that we see in society today have been furthered by the application of Western methods of teaching, of Government, etc. But, the Christian influence must not be underestimated nor should one go too far in over-stressing its great importance. Christianity is individualistic, and that is one reason why the 'powers that be' in Japan today are endeavoring to regulate its activities, if not to change some of its tenets. The Christian Japanese understand America better than any other group because they have been more and more weaned away from the influence of feudalism.
The Japanese are a perplexing people and their study is a very interesting and very enlightening one. They follow the leader - they have done this throughout all the years of their history. Even today, personal ties are stronger than legal ones.

No estimate of the elements characteristic of the Japanese is complete without a word about 'giri'. There is no accurate English word for 'giri'. The nearest approach to an understanding of the term is our word 'obligation', which is very inadequate and altogether too weak. Favors or kindnesses done to a Japanese are never forgotten but are stored up in memory and in due time an adequate quid pro quo must be rendered in return. The clever and none-too-scrupulous individual often hangs 'giri' upon the unsuspecting, to their hurt and harm. 'Giri' is the great political tool. To understand 'giri' is to understand the Japanese.

ASSOCIATIONS

The Japanese is the greatest joiner in the world. To take care of this passion he has furnished himself with ample associations to join. There are around 1563 of these in the United States. Your reporter has before him a Japanese publication entitled "The Japanese-American Directory of 1941" at least two inches thick listing the Japanese associations in fine print. Your reporter also has before him lists furnished him in the various Naval Districts of some of the leading associations considered the most important, with full descriptions of their activities as far as known. It is
endless to clutter up this report with them.

FAMILY SET-UP IN UNITED STATES

In the United States there are four divisions of Japanese to be considered:

1. The ISSEI - First generation Japanese. Entire cultural background Japanese. Probably loyal romantically to Japan. They must be considered, however, as other races. They have made this their home. They have brought up children here, their wealth accumulated by hard labor is here, and many would have become American citizens had they been allowed to do so. They are for the most part simple people. Their age group is largely 55 to 65, fairly old for a hard-working Japanese.

2. The NISEI: Second generation who have received their whole education in the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age group - 1 to 30 years.

3. The KIBEI - This is an important division of the NISEI. This is the term used by the Japanese to signify those American born Japanese who received part or all of their education in Japan. In any consideration of the KIBEI they should be again divided into
two classes, i.e. THOSE WHO RECEIVED THEIR EDUCATION IN JAPAN FROM CHILDHOOD TO ABOUT 17 YEARS OF AGE and THOSE WHO RECEIVED THEIR EARLY FORMATIVE EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND RETURNED TO JAPAN FOR FOUR OR FIVE YEARS OF JAPANESE EDUCATION. The Kibei are considered the most dangerous element and closer to the Issei with especial reference to those who received their early education in Japan. It must be noted, however, that many of those who visited Japan subsequent to their early American education come back with an added loyalty to the United States. In fact it is a saying that all a Nisei needs is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him. The American educated Japanese is a boor in Japan and treated as a foreigner and with a certain amount of contempt there. His trip is usually a painful experience.

4. The SANSEI - The third generation Japanese is a baby and may be disregarded for the purposes of our survey.

We must now think back to the paragraph entitled BACKGROUND. This is tied into the family of which the Issei is the head with more authority and hold over his family than an old New England Bible-thumbing pioneer. Their family life is disciplined and honorable. The children are obedient and the girls virtuous. We must think also of the Associations, some sinister, some emanating from Imperial Japan, some with Japanese Consular contacts. It all weaves up into a sinister
pattern on paper. This pattern has been set up in a secret
document entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in
the 11th Naval District", and may be scrutinized with proper
authorization in the Navy Department in Washington. We only
suggest this to our reader in case our words have not built up
the proper Hallowe'en atmosphere. It is like looking at the
'punkin' itself. There is real fire in it, yet in many ways
it is hollow and dusty. However, your reporter desires to
have you know that all this exists before he goes on to the
main body of his report on how the Japanese in the United
States are liable to react in case of war with Japan.

THE TOKIO-SUN GOD-RELIGIOUS-FAMILY-ASSOCIATION PLUS ORIENTAL
MIND SET-UP SHOWS SIGNS OF THE HONORABLE PASSAGE OF TIME.

There are still Japanese in the United States who
will tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb
out of themselves. We grant this but today they are few. Many
things indicate that very many joints in the Japanese set-up
show age and many elements are not what they used to be. The
weakest from a Japanese standpoint are the Nisei. They are
universally estimated from 90 to 98% loyal to the United States
if the Japanese educated element of the Kibei is excluded.
The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They
are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan.
Though American citizens they are not accepted by Americans,
largely because they look differently and can be easily recog-
nized. The Japanese American citizens League should be en-
couraged, the while an eye is kept open, to see that Tokio
does not get its finger in this pie - which it has in a few
cases attempted to do. The loyal Nisei hardly know where to
turn. Some gesture of protection or wholehearted acceptance
of this group would go a long way to swinging them away from
any last romantic hankering after old Japan. They are not
oriental or mysterious, they are very American and are one of
a proud, self-respecting race suffering from a little inferior-
ity complex and a lack of contact with the white boys they
went to school with. They are eager for this contact and to
work alongside them.

The Issei or first generation is considerably weak-
ened in their loyalty to Japan by the fact that they have
chosen to make this their home and have brought up their
children here. They expect to die here. They are quite fear-
ful of being put in a concentration camp. Many would take
out American citizenship if allowed to do so. The haste of
this report does not allow us to go into this more fully.
The Issei have to break with their religion, their god and
Emperor, their family, their ancestors and their after-life
in order to be loyal to the United States. They are also
still legally Japanese. Yet they do break, and send their
boys off to the Army with pride and tears. They are good
neighbors. They are old men fifty-five to sixty-five, for
the most part simple and dignified. Roughly they were Japan-
ese lower middle class about analogous to the pilgrim fathers.
They were largely farmers and fishermen. Today the Japanese
is farmer, fisherman and businessman. They get very attached
to the land they work or own (through the second generation),
they like their own business, they do not work at industrial jobs nor for others except as a stepping stone to becoming independent.

The Kibei, educated from childhood to seventeen, are still the element most to be watched.

WHAT WILL THE JAPANESE DO

SABOTAGE

Now that we have roughly given a background and a description of the Japanese elements in the United States the question naturally arises - what will these people do in case of a war between the United States and Japan? As interview after interview piled up, those bringing in results began to call it the same old tune. Such it was with only minor differences. These contacts ranged all the way from two-day sessions with Intelligence Services, through business men, to Roman Catholic priests who were frankly not interested in the United States and were only interested in making as many Catholics as possible. The story was all the same. There is no Japanese 'problem' on the Coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported agents or agents already imported. There will be the odd case of fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'. In each Naval District there are about 250 to 300 suspects under surveillance. It is easy to get on the suspect list, merely a speech in favor of Japan at some banquet, being sufficient to land one there. The Intelligence Services are generous with the title of suspect and are taking no chances. Privately, they
believe that only 50 or 60 in each district can be classed as really dangerous. The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of their easily recognized physical appearance. It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow up if it is guarded. There is far more danger from Communists and people of the Bridges type on the Coast than there is from Japanese. The Japanese here is almost exclusively a farmer, a fisherman or a small business man. He has no entree to plants or intricate machinery.

**ESPIONAGE**

The Japanese, if undisturbed and disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious physical espionage. A great part of this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio years ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the Coast. They are probably familiar with the location of every building and garage including Mike O'Flarety's out-house in the Siskiyous with all trails leading thereto. An experienced Captain in Navy Intelligence, who has from time to time and over a period of years intercepted information Tokio bound, said he would certainly hate to be a Japanese coordinator of information in Tokio. He stated that the mass of useless information was unbelievable. This would be fine for a fifth column in Belgium or Holland with the German army ready to march in over the border, but though the local Japanese could spare a man who intimately knew the country for each Japanese invasion squad, there would at least have to be a terrific American Naval disaster before his brown brothers would need his services. The dangerous part of their espionage is that
they would be very effective as far as movement of supplies, movement of troops and movement of ships out of harbor mouths and over railroads is concerned. They occupy only rarely positions where they can get to confidential papers or in plants. They are usually, when rarely so placed, a subject of perpetual watch and suspicion by their fellow workers. They would have to buy most of this type of information from white people.

PROPAGANDA

Their direct propaganda is poor and rather ineffective on the whole. Their indirect is more successful. By indirect we mean propaganda preaching the beauties of Japan and the sweet innocence of the Japanese race to susceptible Americans.

SUMMARY

Japan will commit some sabotage largely depending on imported Japanese as they are afraid of and do not trust the Nisei. There will be no wholehearted response from Japanese in the United States. They may get some helpers from certain Kibei. They will be in a position to pick up information on troop, supply and ship movements from local Japanese.

For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs. We do not believe that they would be at least any more disloyal than any other racial group in the United States with
whom we went to war. Those being here are on a spot and they
know it. This is a hurried, preliminary report as our boat
sails soon for Honolulu. We have not had a moment even to
sort out our voluminous material since we came west. Your
reporter is very satisfied he has told you what to expect
from the local Japanese, but is horrified to note that dams,
bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded
everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire
completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study
in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower
California might actuality die of thirst, not to mention the
damage to the food supply. One railway bridge at the exit
from the mountains in some cases could tie up three or four
main railroads. The Navy has to crawl around San Pedro on
its marrow bones from oil company to oil company, from lumber
yard to harbor board, to city fathers, to politicians in lieu
of a centralized authority, in order to strive albeit only
partially to protect the conglomeration of oil tanks, lumber,
gas tanks and heaven knows what else. And this is the second
greatest port in the United States! This is the home base of
at least the South Pacific Fleet! This is the greatest
collection of inflammable material we have ever seen in our
lifetime concentrated in a small vulnerable area! We do not
suspect the local Japanese above anyone else or as much as
the Communists or the Nazis, but before or on the outbreak
of war in the South Pacific someone will set fire to this.
If they do not they are fools. The Navy or some unified
authority should have complete control of the harbor of Los Angeles, known as San Pedro and Long Beach, from the water's edge in a twenty-five mile radius inland, before the outbreak of war with Japan. That time is now.

We will re-work this report for final submittal later. We have missed a great deal through haste. We believe we have given the high points to the best of our ability. The Japanese are loyal on the whole, but we are wide open to sabotage on this Coast and as far inland as the mountains, and while this one fact goes unrectified I cannot unqualifiedly state that there is no danger from the Japanese living in the United States which otherwise I would be willing to state.

\[\text{Signed:}\]
\[\text{Witt} B. \text{Ake}\]
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON BRITISH COLUMBIA

The following information was furnished by a reliable source but it has not been verified and cannot be vouched for.

The total population of Japanese in Canada is estimated as between 25,000 and 30,000 of whom 23,000 reside in British Columbia. A few of these Japanese are naturalized but the great majority are either native born Canadians or immigrants.

The Japanese population is suspected of having a predilection for Japan although the exact feelings of most of them is unknown. They are not believed to be a serious threat from a standpoint of armed uprisings in the event of war although there are probably a number of individuals in the group who would engage in subversive activity.

From a strategic point of view these Japanese are dangerously located in event of war between Canada and Japan. They are situated at the mouths of important rivers and around the entrances of harbors. There are many of them located in the vicinities of important air bases in British Columbia. Japanese communities exist at most of the strategic points throughout the province. They own a total of 2,144 vessels in Provincial waters, 211 of these vessels being over ten tons. As a race they generally look to the Japanese Consul for their guidance in matters pertaining to their welfare and political position in the community.
February 17, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Last Friday at Cabinet you asked advice on whether you should include a public warning against sabotage in your coming speech.

I referred it to General Marshall who, like myself, did not have any very strong inclination for the making of such a warning. He referred it to General Lee, the head of G-2, and General Lee is quite strongly in favor of making the warning. We all think that it should not, however, indicate any particular time as the period of danger but should simply refer to the step as a necessary general step in the direction of citizenship duty in time of war.

I enclose a draft of suggested remarks which has been prepared by G-2 for your use.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Incl.

The President,
The White House.
SUGGESTED REMARKS FOR INCLUSION IN ADDRESS

OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON FEBRUARY 23, 1942

Since the seventh of December, 1941, when we were so
treacherously attacked at Pearl Harbor, the United States has faced
two grave dangers. The obvious one, which we all recognize, is that
of the armed forces of our enemies. The more subtle and lurking dan-
ger, however, is that of enemies within. The whole resources of our
nation are being devoted to the task of furnishing the materials of
war for our armed forces. We Americans have responded unanimously
to the task. Every man, woman and child is conscious of the gigan-
tic effort to produce, in order that we may translate that production
into action to defeat our enemies wherever they may be.

How many of us realize, however, the great and secret dan-
ger that remains out of our sight. This danger, which each of us
can and must help to defeat is the danger of sabotage. Not only is
the enemy organized outside our country with armies, air forces and
fleets, but he is sure to attempt deeds of sabotage within our coun-
try. Our traditional hospitality, our laws, our very freedom, all of
the principles which we are fighting to preserve, have contributed to
make it easy for a treacherous and subtle foe to take advantage of us.

We know that both the Germans and the Japanese have for
years striven to organize a fifth column within the United States.

Powerful and effective agencies of the Government are using
every means to watch and safeguard your lives and properties, to
protect your public utilities, your transportation systems and your
production plants. Widespread measures have been taken to prevent
sudden and widespread sabotage designed, at a critical moment, to im-
pede our military effort. But this is not enough. No matter how
efficient, no matter how numerous your Government's measures, the only
real force which can defeat this enemy within our gates is the Ameri-
can people.

You have been asked to contribute to the national war ef-
fort. You have been asked to submit to higher taxes, to rationing,
and to discomfort and personal inconvenience. All this and more you
are cheerfully doing. Now I ask you personally to contribute more
actively to winning the war. I ask you to become acutely aware of
your duties and responsibilities as American citizens. I ask every
one of you, not just for the present, but for the duration, to join
the vast army of American citizens which will always be on the alert
to detect and to report to the proper authorities any suspi-
cious or
subversive actions which you may observe. Each American man, woman
or child, is a soldier in this inner army.

There are three kinds of sabotage which we can expect: in-
dustrial sabotage designed to destroy our war potential and to slow
down production; sabotage of public utilities, such as water supply
systems, electric power lines or communications by land or sea; and
military sabotage aimed at destroying the equipment and armament of
our armed forces. Although all three are being guarded against, it
may be possible for a desperate enemy to do some damage.
The fact that there has been little or no sabotage in the United States so far, should not mislead us into any false sense of security. On the contrary, it is an indication that the enemy waits only for the occasion most favorable to him. When he strikes it may be at many critical and widely separated points.

Such a campaign, however, on a scale large enough to cripple our war effort, cannot be kept absolutely secret. Someone, somewhere, will hear some word or observe some suspicious action, or know some individual connected with such an effort. If these things are promptly reported to the proper authorities timely measures can be taken to defeat them.

If you hear or learn of anything suspicious, don't wait for George to do it. Go at once to your nearest police precinct or to the nearest FBI, Army or Navy authorities and report what you know. If you are a worker in a factory, go to your supervisor. If you are in a Government office, go directly to your chief. Don't think that it is not your business, that someone else will take care of it. Do it now! Do it yourself!

This is not witch hunting. This is not tattling. It is deadly serious. The Government is organized not only to investigate promptly what you report and to run down the saboteur, but also to protect the innocent and to prevent injustice or unwarranted suspicion. Information placed in the hands of proper authorities will be acted upon promptly.

Every American must be acutely aware of his responsibility to defend his country. Your Army and your Navy are guarding us from the foe without. All good citizens must help to guard from the foe within.
February 22° 1942
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

My Dear Chief,

This is just a line to tell you how sorry I am that you have had another cold to contend with, on top of all your responsibilities. Please be careful and husband your strength for the coming offensive. We need you too much to permit any order to be taken.

We are moving along alright in this old department.
I am pressing hard on the Panama defenses, and spending a good deal of time on the West Coast. But most of all, Marshall and I are reflecting on and discussing the future overall strategy in the light of the lessons of the past three months.

God be with you.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

[Date]
Memorandum for the President:

You will be interested in the performance of the Ford Company in aircraft production.

In the fall of 1940 we engaged Ford to make the Pratt & Whitney aircraft engine R-2800. This engine is now being produced at the River Rouge plant at the rate of 12 a day. They could produce 25 a day if they could get enough aluminum forgings.

Last spring we engaged Ford to produce the Consolidated B-24 heavy bomber and also to make the parts and sub-assemblies for production of this plane at the Tulsa and Fort Worth plants. Ford put up a new plant at Willow Run and is already shipping sub-assemblies to Tulsa and Fort Worth. The first plane should be out in 60 days.

In producing these items the Ford outfit has developed production methods which will materially increase airplane and engine deliveries. Among these developments are a series of mass production jigs and dies; a new method of centrifugally casting cylinder sleeves in place of forging; a cast nose wheel strut that eliminates the choke point on forging hammers; a strengthened rear turret suspension; special magnesium castings. They are working now on turbo superchargers, and there is reason to believe that they will simplify this complicated job.

The Army Air Forces pay high tribute to their planning, engineering and ingenuity.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
March 17, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

I have your memorandum of March 16th in regard to the use of aerial torpedoes in the south-western Pacific.

General Marshall, General Arnold, and I have this morning had a conference on this subject with Secretary Knox, Admiral King, and Admiral Towers. We have reached agreement upon a plan for the use of the torpedoes in that area within the next ninety days which I think will be satisfactory to you.

You may rest assured that Mr. Knox and I will see this thing carried out according to your directive.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

I return to you herewith the papers which you sent me in this matter.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This will reply to your memorandum of March 12 to which was attached the correspondence with Secretary Stimson concerning aerial torpedoes for the Army.

I think since Secretary Stimson wrote the letter to you of February 12, the matter has been pretty thoroughly cleared up. In order to do this, I have not only answered all of his letters promptly and had Blandy supply him with additional technical information, but I went over personally and went over the whole subject with him in thoroughgoing fashion.

The principal point I made in this discussion with the Secretary of War was to point out that all successful aerial torpedoeing done by the British has been done by the Navy aviation branch of the British Fleet. None of this has been done by the R.A.F. Apparently, the Secretary did not, until I had a good talk with him, appreciate that there is a vast difference between an aerial torpedo and an ordinary bomb. An aerial torpedo, as you so well know, is one of the most delicately manufactured articles in all of our ordnance equipment. It might accurately be described as a no-man submarine, as skillfully built in its mechanism as a watch. It is an instrument which must carry within itself ability to manufacture power and use that power to drive the torpedo toward its target, to maintain itself at the proper depth and to even change its direction in case that is desired. It takes about nine or ten months to a year to manufacture one and the total costs are about $10,000.

I mention these things to emphasize how vastly different an aerial torpedo is from a mere bomb. To operate with aerial torpedoes successfully requires long training. The fliers of the Army Aviation have none of this training save that which we have been able to give them, which does not amount to much.

The maintenance is even more important than the launching in the air and the Army has no men trained for maintenance. It would be sheer waste of expensive war material to turn aerial torpedoes over to the Army until they have trained maintenance men and supplied themselves with equipment for maintenance and operation which is also a
very vital feature. The Army has no such equipment at all.

As you understand thoroughly, the manufacture of aerial torpedoes can never be put on the basis of production of bombs. Our total output of aerial torpedoes is now about two hundred per month. We are seeking to increase this supply by sub-contracting in the Newport Torpedo Plant, which will provide us with the quickest results. In addition, we have provided for four new plants to manufacture torpedoes, including aerial torpedoes. These new plants are located at St. Louis, Chicago, Pontiac, Michigan, and Springfield, Ohio. We expect the first torpedoes from the St. Louis plant by September first. The others we hope to have in production by the first of next year.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, we had on hand at Cavite 23 of these aerial torpedoes. Some are now at the Australian bases - just how many we don't know. We do know that 60 arrived at Sydney, that 24 more are somewhere else in Australia and 30 are en route. The Army is perfectly free to use any of these as they desire. Only nine have been fired by the Navy since the war began and, incidentally, six of these hit their targets. We had about 1000 aerial torpedoes on hand when the war began.

I think it might be well to convince the Secretary of War, if you can, that to use untrained Army aviators to launch aerial torpedoes would be a tremendous waste of a very scarce item of ordnance and that long before he can adequately train Army fliers to use torpedoes in any numbers, our production will be sufficient to supply them.

I am returning the correspondence as you desired.

Attachment
February 12, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Confirming my telephone message to you a few minutes ago, I am sending you herewith the following papers:

1. Magic for January 31, 1942, giving Air Marshal Goering's estimate of the value of torpedo bombers as well as the probable purposes of our enemies for the future in that weapon. May I ask you to return this very secret paper to me by hand when you have finished with it?

2. A memorandum by General Arnold giving our plans for torpedo bombers (B-26) in the ABDA area, our present supplies and our requirements for torpedoes for their use. Attached to Arnold's letter are a copy of a letter from me to the Secretary of the Navy on January 5th asking for help on this subject, and one by Bob Lovett to Assistant Secretary Gates on February 4th on the same subject. Neither of these letters has brought any information to us so far as I could find.

From Arnold's letters you will see the pitiful supply now in Australia or on the way there. Our B-26's are now starting to fly to the area from Hawaii. We expect to have 115 there by the end of March. From this you can see that we shall need a big lot of torpedoes from the Navy to be shipped at once. We have never manufactured them ourselves because the Navy has always opposed our doing it. In view of the fact that the chief fighting of this sort in narrow seas such as the East Indies must be done by land-based planes, this attitude by the Navy is to me incomprehensible. According to the best of my information, the bulk of the big killings of naval vessels in this war has been by naval torpedoes, including the Bismark, the Italian battleships at Taranto, the Prince of Wales, and the Repulse, and the bulk of the damage recently done to the Mediterranean British fleet. According to a recent report which I have read of a conversation with Admiral Cunningham of that fleet, it was said that he and his officers put their estimate as follows: They feared high bombing practically not at all; dive bombing, somewhat; aerial torpedo bombing, most of all. So I think we should take some very drastic steps to improve our own position in respect to this deadly weapon. In the naval battle for the control of the seas this present year I feel sure it will play a very prominent part.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR the Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

Subject: Aircraft Torpedoes.

Reference: (a) Ass't SecWar for Air memo to Ass't SecNav for Air dated 4 Feb., 1942.

1. Regarding the questions contained in paragraph 1 of reference (a), the following information is furnished:

(a) All aircraft torpedoes which were available to our forces in the Abda area on 7 December, 1941, have either been expended or destroyed.

(b) Sixty (60) Mk. 13-1 aircraft torpedoes assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, are believed to have arrived at Brisbane, Australia, via the S.S. PANAY on 5 January 1942.

(c) Twenty-four (24) more aircraft torpedoes are now enroute to the Abda area. A complete outfit of equipment necessary for the establishment of facilities for the maintenance of these torpedoes accompanied the shipment.

(d) Thirty (30) more will be shipped from Norfolk, Virginia, about 1 March, 1942, after which no additional aircraft torpedoes will be available for shipment until about 1 May 1942.

(e) Beginning after 1 May, 1942, the total output of new aircraft torpedoes available for distribution will be approximately as follows:

- 1 May  50 torpedoes
- 1 June 150 torpedoes
- 1 July 250 torpedoes, etc.

(f) The decision as to what portion of the total local supply of aircraft torpedoes is made available to the Army Air Corps has been vested in the Officer-in-Chief of the combined Army and Navy forces present, in this case the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: Aircraft Torpedoes.

2. As previously stated by the Secretary of the Navy in his secret letter to the Secretary of War dated 15 January, 1942, the Navy is prepared to undertake a long range program of manufacture of aircraft torpedoes for the Army Air Corps. Since the successful development and production of torpedoes requires an extensive background of knowledge on the subject, it is my opinion and that of Rear Admiral Blandy that a steady adequate supply of torpedoes for the Army Air Corps can be made available in the shortest time and most economically by expanding the new facilities now being established in St. Louis and Chicago by the Navy and yet to be established from additional potential sources now being investigated.

3. If the Army Air Corps decides not to undertake the independent production of aircraft torpedoes, the Bureau of Ordnance will be glad to investigate the competency of the possible additional sources of torpedo production referred to in paragraph 2 of reference (a).

4. The practicability of re-enforcing the Mk. 13-1 aircraft torpedo to withstand launchings at higher speeds and at increased altitudes is being investigated at high priority by the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island.

ARTEMUS L. GATES

Mr Gates says that he informed Mr. Lanett at the time this went over that he and Adm. Blandy would be glad to discuss this further if Mr. Lanett wished. However nothing further was heard concerning this.
Note;

The President says the secret enclosures may have been given to McCrea or put in "Box".
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I wish you would confer on this.

I have only one objective in mind. The crux of the use of aerial torpedoes in the Southwest Pacific is from now for the next ninety days. I do not care who fires the torpedoes - Army fliers or Navy fliers. The point is that they must be fired at Japanese ships. This is the critical time for the use of these torpedoes. I do not give a continental about the use of these torpedoes after the next ninety days. I cannot work that out. But I want you both to plan immediately - Army or Navy or both - this use being based, not on use or availability after ninety days, but on use and availability for the next ninety days.

I am sending this as Commander-in-Chief of both Services and I require that it be carried out by both Services. In other words, this is a directive for joint action.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Do not disclose the source of this inquiry, but will you try your hardest to get some torpedoes to the Army for their torpedo bombers? It is, of course, actually a fact that the Navy, up to a year ago, had consistently fallen down on the development of torpedo bombers, and it is rather a sore subject with them.

Let me know what I can tell Stimson.

Please return enclosure for my files.

F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 14, 1942

SECRET

Date - 3-10-42

SECRET

This will reply to your memorandum of March 12 to which was attached the correspondence with Secretary Stimson concerning aerial torpedoes for the Army.

I think since Secretary Stimson wrote the letter to you of February 12, the matter has been pretty thoroughly cleared up. In order to do this, I have not only answered all of his letters promptly and had Blandy supply him with additional technical information, but I went over personally and went over the whole subject with him in thoroughgoing fashion.

The principal point I made in this discussion with the Secretary of War was to point out that all successful aerial torpedoing done by the British has been done by the Navy aviation branch of the British Fleet. None of this has been done by the R.A.F. Apparently, the Secretary did not, until I had a good talk with him, appreciate that there is a vast difference between an aerial torpedo and an ordinary bomb. An aerial torpedo, as you so well know, is one of the most delicately manufactured articles in all of our ordnance equipment. It might accurately be described as a no-man submarine, as skillfully built in its mechanism as a watch. It is an instrument which must carry within itself ability to manufacture power and use that power to drive the torpedo toward its target, to maintain itself at the proper depth, and to even change its direction in case that is desired. It takes about nine or ten months to a year to manufacture one and the total costs are about $10,000.

I mention these things to emphasize how vastly different an aerial torpedo is from a mere bomb. To operate with aerial torpedoes successfully requires long training. The fliers of the Army Aviation have none of this training save that which we have been able to give them, which does not amount to much.

The maintenance is even more important than the launching in the air and the Army has no men trained for maintenance. It would be sheer waste of expensive war material to turn aerial torpedoes over to the Army until they have trained maintenance men and supplied themselves with equipment for maintenance and operation which is also a very vital feature. The Army has no such equipment at all.
As you understand thoroughly, the manufacture of aerial torpedoes can never be put on the basis of production of bombs. Our total output of aerial torpedoes is now about two hundred per month. We are seeking to increase this supply by sub-contracting in the Newport Torpedo Plant, which will provide us with the quickest results. In addition, we have provided for four new plants to manufacture torpedoes, including aerial torpedoes. These new plants are located at St. Louis, Chicago, Pontiac, Michigan, and Springfield, Ohio. We expect the first torpedoes from the St. Louis plant by September first. The others we hope to have in production by the first of next year.

At the time of the outbreak of the war, we had on hand at Cavite 23 of these aerial torpedoes. Some are now at the Australian bases - just how many we don't know. We do know that 60 arrived at Sydney, that 24 more are somewhere else in Australia and 30 are en route. The Army is perfectly free to use any of these as they desire. Only nine have been fired by the Navy since the war began and, incidentally, six of these hit their targets. We had about 1000 aerial torpedoes on hand when the war began.

I think it might be well to convince the Secretary of War, if you can, that to use untrained Army aviators to launch aerial torpedoes would be a tremendous waste of a very scarce item of ordnance and that long before he can adequately train Army fliers to use torpedoes in any numbers, our production will be sufficient to supply them.

I am returning the correspondence as you desired.

s/ FRANK KNOX

Attachment
Dear Mr. President:

Confirming my telephone message to you a few minutes ago, I am sending you herewith the following papers:

1. Magic for January 31, 1942, giving Air Marshal Goering's estimate of the value of torpedo bombers as well as the probable purposes of our enemies for the future in that weapon. May I ask you to return this very secret paper to me by hand when you have finished with it?

2. A memorandum by General Arnold giving our plans for torpedo bombers (B-26) in the ABDA area, our present supplies and our requirements for torpedoes for their use. Attached to Arnold's letter are a copy of a letter from me to the Secretary of the Navy on January 5th asking for help on this subject, and one by Bob Lovett to Assistant Secretary Gates on February 4th on the same subject. Neither of these letters has brought any information to us so far as I could find.

From Arnold's letters you will see the pitiful supply now in Australia or on the way there. Our B-26's are now starting to fly to the area from Hawaii. We expect to have 115 there by the end of March. From this you can see that we shall need a big lot of torpedoes from the Navy to be shipped at once. We have never manufactured them ourselves because the Navy has always opposed our doing it. In view of the fact that the chief fighting of this sort in narrow seas such as the East Indies must be done by land-based planes, this attitude by the Navy is to me incomprehensible. According to the best of my information, the bulk of the big killings of naval vessels in this war has been by naval torpedoes, including the Bismark, the Italian battleships at Taranto, the Prince of Wales, and the Repulse, and the bulk of the damage recently done to the Mediterranean British fleet. According to a recent report which I have read of a conversation with Admiral Cunningham of that fleet, it was said that he and his officers put their estimate as follows: They feared high bombing practically not at all; dive bombing, somewhat, aerial torpedo bombing, most of all. So I think we should take some very drastic steps to improve our own position in respect to this deadly weapon. In the naval battle for the control of the seas this present year I feel sure it will play a very prominent part.

Faithfully yours,

s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Do not disclose the source of this inquiry, but will you try your hardest to get some torpedoes to the Army for their torpedo bombers? It is, of course, actually a fact that the Navy, up to a year ago, had consistently fallen down on the development of torpedo bombers, and it is rather a sore subject with them.

Let me know what I can tell Stimson.

Please return enclosures for my files.

F. D. R.

From Stimson to the Pres. 2/12/42
re Arnolds's letters and secret papers giving Air Marshal Goering's estimate of value of torpedo bombers.
Returned for the president's files.

Berney
March 21, 1942.

The President,  
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

In regard to your letter of March 13, 1942, copy attached, there is enclosed a schedule of the Estimated Monthly Deliveries of Airplanes for the calendar years 1942 and 1943.

Present scheduled production of airplanes for which funds have been appropriated provides for delivery as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162,000</td>
<td>129,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Procurement of all of these 162,000 airplanes is covered by formal contracts or letters of intent to the aircraft manufacturers.

A budget estimate is being processed covering an additional 23,000 airplanes for the War Department. These airplanes will require approximately four new aircraft plants, two new engine plants, one propeller plant and either the construction or conversion of a number of smaller plants for the manufacture of accessories, in addition to the creation of new facilities for the materials and tools required. These 23,000 airplanes cannot be scheduled until it is determined when the materials and tools can be made available.

Based on the best information obtainable as to the availability of labor, machine tools and raw materials (such as, aluminum, magnesium, nickel, steel and copper) and the facilities necessary for their production, the budget estimate is as follows:

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.3 (8/27/58)

Date- 3-10-59
Signature- Carl S. Spencer
The President

their fabrication, the War Production Board Schedule 8-I indicates 51,000 airplanes, plus 20% spares, as the estimate of production for 1942 and 84,000 airplanes, plus 20% spares, in 1943. These estimates are based on present priorities and estimates of available materials and machine tools. If the 1942 figure is to be taken as a minimum goal, expansion beyond it would appear to depend on the amount of tools and materials which can be diverted from other elements of the Armed Services.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

2 Encls.

1 - Ltr. fr. the
    President, 3-13-42

2 - Sched. Est. Mo. Deliv.
    of Airp. for '42 & '43
March 13, 1942

Dear Harry:

I should like to see the schedule of production and proposed deliveries based on my letter to you of January 3, by months. What I am anxious to get is the estimated monthly delivery of these airplanes.

Incidentally, are there adequate funds to let contracts for all of these items and how many of each item have actually been contracted for?

Very sincerely yours,

/8/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.
MATERIEL COMMAND ESTIMATED DELIVERIES, 1942
(All Customers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>1504</td>
<td>3214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>3111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>3335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>2195</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>3603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2369</td>
<td>1416</td>
<td>3785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2584</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>4068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2672</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>4137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>2968</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>4477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>3324</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>4833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>3707</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>5220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>3909</td>
<td>1537</td>
<td>5446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>4043</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>5791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33366</td>
<td>17654</td>
<td>51020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Materiel Command, AAF
March 18, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-10-59
Signature- Carl S. Spieser

CONFIDENTIAL
### MATERIEL COMMAND ESTIMATED DELIVERIES, 1943

(All Customers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>3983</td>
<td>2234</td>
<td>6217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>4155</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>6305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>4586</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>4696</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4922</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>5158</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>7065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>5377</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>7266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>5490</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>7367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>5693</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>7572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>5703</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>7598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>5526</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>7400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>5142</td>
<td>1797</td>
<td>6939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,431</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,385</strong></td>
<td><strong>83,816</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14
Materiel Command, AAF
March 16, 1942

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-10-59

CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

Personal & confidential memo from Bob Sherwood 3/19/42 re Bill Donovan and the Office of Coordinator of Information being put under Army or Navy, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

John Sherman said in 1877, "The only way to resume specie payments is to resume". Similarly, the only way to get the initiative in this war is to take it.

My advice is: As soon as your Chiefs of Staff have completed the plans for the northern offensive to your satisfaction, you should send them by a most trusted messenger and advocate to Churchill and his War Council as the American plan which you propose and intend to go ahead with if accepted by Britain. You should not submit it to the secondary British Chiefs of Staff here for amendment. They know about it and, if they have comment, they can send their comment independently to Great Britain.

And then having done that, you should lean with all your strength on the ruthless rearrangement of shipping allotments and the preparation of landing gear for the ultimate invasion. That latter work is now going on at a rather dilettante pace. It should be pushed with the fever of war action, aimed at a definite date of completion not later than September. The rate of construction of a number of landing barges should not be allowed to lose the crisis of the World War. And yet that is the only objection to the offensive that, after talks with British critics here, I have heard made.

If such decisive action is once taken by you, further successful dispersion of our strength will automatically be terminated. We shall have an affirmative answer against which to measure all such demands; while, on the other hand, so long as we remain without our own plan of offensive, our forces will inevitably be dispersed and wasted.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DO D DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date 3/10/59

Signature: Carl S. Speier
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

This can be filed. It doesn't require an answer.

H.L.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I approve the enclosed charts and plans but with the distinct proviso that the protocol agreement with Russia be lived up to. Also, the total supplies to be sent to Russia between July first and January first must be at least as great as today and actually increased as much as possible. This does not mean that the total of each item must be the same, so long as the total of all items is greater.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President, dated April 1, 1942, from General Marshall giving detailed examination of production schedules for tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and machine guns. The President okayed the letter and returned it with charts to the Secretary of War.
My dear Mr. President:

I should like to discuss the attached letter with you at your convenience.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:

Last December, in a conference with you, it was agreed that it was within our economic potential to produce completed munitions, war facilities and military construction to the value of $40 billions in calendar year 1942 and $60 billions in 1943. We feel certain that these are feasible goals although, at the time when they were set, many doubted that they were attainable. At that time, the production schedules for all items, extended at peak, represented commitments amounting only to $27 billions for 1942 and $34 billions for 1943. Thus there was, according to our calculations, margin for additional requirements amounting to approximately $13 billions for 1942, and $26 billions for 1943.

The specific objectives which you set for airplanes, tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and merchant shipping were accomplishable within the margin between the then existing production programs and the production possibilities of this Nation.

Since that date the programs which have been formulated by the Army, the Navy, and the Maritime Commission have expanded far beyond the $40 billion and $60 billion estimates. As these programs now stand, they represent munitions and war construction outlays totaling some $62 billions for 1942 and $110 billions for 1943.

The War Department has advised me that it is submitting recommendations to you for the modification of certain of the specific objectives which you have set which would permit the production of armored cars, self-propelled artillery weapons and other arms necessary to provide a balanced equipment for the Army. As you realize, I do not feel qualified to pass on the relative urgency of weapons desired by the Army. However, I have examined the production possibilities and must report that, in my judgment, it will not be possible to provide all of the items set forth in your list of objectives, and at the same time produce everything else now called for under the programs of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and Defense Aid, which would call for the total outlays of $62 and $110 billions as stated above.
It is of critical importance that the Board should have a clear mandate of the items that are to be procured under a maximum economic effort. If requirements are defined short of our utmost potential our planning will, of necessity, fall short of providing for a complete mobilization of our resources. If requirements are set of a dimension far beyond attainment, we shall find ourselves with overexpanded facilities for which there are insufficient raw materials, with many finished items and components for which necessary complements are missing, and with general economic confusion and dislocation.

I should feel myself negligent in duty if I did not point out that we are at an impasse in our production planning, in that we still are without definition of a full list of requirements that are consistent with what we have defined as, and still believe to be, practicable overall goals.

Under these circumstances, I feel that I must come to you for instruction upon what is clearly a matter of major policy.

Respectfully,

Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. DONALD NELSON:

Will you let me have your confidential comment on the enclosed?

F.D.R.

From General Marshall in regard to tanks marked Secret.
Give to the President when Donald Nelson comes in for lunch tomorrow.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Somervell telephoned that General Marshall gave the President a memorandum last week describing certain requirements, tanks, etc., that were changed on account of recent allocations. Somervell says the President approved the changes and that Don Nelson said he had talked to the President about it and the President was in accord. However, Somervell wants the actual paper back as soon as convenient. It seems that he cannot act until he actually gets the President's approval.

E. M. W.
Mr. President,

Did Donald Nelson return this memorandum to you?
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

By accident I picked up these charts which I showed to you and brought them away with me. I understood that you wanted to have a chance to look over them with the other paper which I left with you.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

Cable from Cairo April 13 No. 574 for the Pres. from Henry Grady in which he says he has been advised that equipment for radio station at Asmara is not available by the War Dept.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF WAR:

I fully approve the gradual
removal of the families of army personnel
stationed in Puerto Rico (except, of
course, families regularly living in
Puerto Rico). I was under the impression
that I had, at the time, approved the
recommendation of December 24th, last.

F.D.R.

Memo returned to Stimson
April 15, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

The Secretary of the Navy has protested to me against the discrimination which he tells me exists in reference to the evacuation of the dependents of military and naval personnel stationed in Puerto Rico.

Last December directions were simultaneously issued by both the War and Navy Departments providing for the evacuation of all such dependents stationed at defense commands and bases outside the United States.

On December 22, as a result of the protest from the Governor of Puerto Rico, this order as to Army dependents in Puerto Rico was suspended by your direction telephoned to the Chief of Staff.

On December 24, I sent you a memorandum recommending that the evacuation of military dependents from Puerto Rico (except in respect to native Puerto Ricans) should be placed upon the same basis as that for all other bases of defense command, but that the evacuation should be carried out more deliberately to avoid hardship upon the evacuees. No action has yet been taken on that memorandum. The Secretary of the Navy now tells me that, the dependents of naval personnel having been evacuated in December, apparent discrimination as to Army personnel has caused ill feeling and trouble for his department. It seems to me that this protest is well taken.

I submit to you herewith the memorandum I received from the Acting Chief of Staff on this subject and also an order, which I submit for your approval, placing Puerto Rico on the same status as our other overseas bases with respect to the evacuation of the dependents of military personnel.

Faithfully yours,

HLS/shg

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
April 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS
NEEDED ANY ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

H.L.H.
April 12, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

For some time I have been carefully considering the question of the development of our Air Force. I have come to the conclusion that a complete reorientation of our thought towards it is necessary if we are to carry out our present general strategic objective.

It is no longer a question of merely trimming off future diversions. That would not suffice. We must use our coming increase of production primarily for the purpose of establishing as quickly as possible a powerful American Air Force.

We are no longer a mere arsenal for other nations. We are ourselves in desperate danger. Nothing but our own power will suffice to meet that danger.

Fortunately our production of most other munitions will permit us to continue our present rate of allocation to other nations. This is not true as to our airplane production. In respect to airplanes, there must be a complete redistribution of production in which we shall obtain a very much larger percentage than now.

I.

Some reasons why this augmentation of American Air Force is vital

1. Never before have we faced such a widely dispersed necessity for American military forces. No other war in which we have been engaged has approached this in the number and spread of the terrains
where our power must be exerted. Never before have we faced the necessity of quick action in so many widely separated localities.

2. Air power is both a defensive and offensive weapon.

a. We are using it today to supplement or replace our Navy in the following vital key points of defense:

- Panama and the Caribbean, where the big bomber is the only effective outer patrol vessel.
- Hawaii (where it is at present the chief defense).
- The west coast where it is the chief defensive power today.
- The east coast where it is the chief warning weapon of submarine activities today.

b. We are proposing to use it as the beginning of our offensive next summer to help Russia.

3. Thus in all of our primary activities today, air is a more prominent factor than either the Navy or the ground forces.

4. In the most vital secondary theatres it is also most important.

a. In the present emergency in India and the mid-East our air forces are the only forces which can render efficient aid to stop the Japanese attack and to assist the Chinese and British forces.

b. In the important though less vital theatre of Australia it is being earnestly sought, although there Australia alone is probably safe without much further assistance.

c. Even in the proposed limited naval offenses in the South Pacific the Navy is pressing for the assistance of our air force to facilitate the proposed naval advances.
II.

1. In the face of all these requirements today we are running into a coming shortage of over 9000 planes for the American Air Force as of December 31, 1942, if we carry out our present commitments. This was shown by the memorandum of General Arnold of April 8, 1942, which I left with you on Thursday last.

2. This is not an exaggerated shortage. The proposed first line program of our Air Forces for December 31, 1942, of 9568 tactical aircraft is modest compared with the air forces of the enemies we shall face. Germany has 11,000 such first line planes; Japan, 3400; total, 14,400.

3. Nor is the reserve of substantially 100% for attrition and technical and training reserves at all exaggerated. On the contrary, it is based upon the exact proportions now allowed by the British in their experience of two years of war.

III.

The vital elements of time for tactical training.

1. This is a factor which we have all been neglecting. I know I have. I think you have. It is now being pressed upon my attention by every report I get from airmen arriving from the combat area in the Philippines and Java. The easy victory of the Japanese over the
best we have been able to do has been principally accomplished by two things: first, their immense superiority in numbers; second, their equally pronounced superiority in **tactical training**. This last has been constantly emphasized. The gallantry of our men has made them superior to the Japanese in individual dog fights; but the trained, steady, and sound tactics of the enemy have enabled them to hit their strategic objective and accomplish its destruction with hardly a mistake or failure in spite of the individual losses which they have sustained. Such skillful tactics can be only attained by careful training.

2. We have been inclined to think that as soon as an airplane rolled off the assembly line it could be put in the hands of our pilots and begin effective action against the enemy. This is a fundamental error. Operational group training is at least as important in air troops as it is in ground troops or naval forces. You are familiar with how long it takes to get a ship ready for action after it has been commissioned and how much longer it takes to train a squadron or fleet to action. I know how long it takes to train a regiment of cavalry or artillery, let alone an army. It is the same in the air. Arnold tells me that at a minimum it requires from four to six months of **operational** training to get a group ready for combat after each pilot has become an accomplished flyer. In the case of the four engine bombers it requires nearly a year. In the Southwest Pacific we have had very respectably sized air forces wiped out in a few weeks because they were sent into action imperfectly trained and without the necessary trained base
forces to support them. I am having a personal experience today in
the length of time it takes to train even a single element of Radar crews.

IV.

1. The sum and substance of all this is that, unless we
are to court disaster in our coming efforts of "holding" and "striking"
during this year of crisis, we must at once lend our major effort to
accumulating and training the Air Force which we have planned for the
purpose of holding our vital indispensable key positions and striking
the blow which we hope will save Russia. Not an hour can be spared.
Not a plane can be unnecessarily given away. We are so far behind that
it will require Herculean efforts to catch up.

2. The charts which I left with you last Thursday show the
disproportionate number of planes which Britain is now getting from the
combined Anglo-American pool of production. I am informed that the
British staff here recognizes the justice of this demand on our part.
It must be a radical reallocation.

3. All requests for planes for areas not essential to our
own plans must be refused. The time is past for all gifts of planes —
all gifts of planes based upon sentimental or good will development
purposes. The time may even soon come when we will have to determine
whether more effective efforts to save Russia will be made through our
own air forces rather than through the planes turned over to her air forces.
4. I am leaving with you three graphic charts showing our present method of training in the Air Force. They will show you at a glance the time and effort consumed in preparing one class (our heavy bombers) of our airplane fleet.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. McINTIRE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter (secret) from the Secy. of War to the Pres. April 29 re serious dangers to this country that might arise described as "Biological Warfare".
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I am returning the highly confidential document which you sent to me two weeks ago relating to Bolero. Thus I have no copy in my files!

F. D. R.
May 21, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

You are assured that a complete investigation will be made before favorable consideration is given an application for a commission in the Army of the United States by Merwin K. Hart, Jr., of Utica, New York.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

I am told that Merwin K. Hart, Jr. is being considered for a commission in G-2. I think G-2 should know that his father, Merwin K. Hart of Utica, was in my class at college and is a good personal friend of mine. Nevertheless, I do not hesitate to say that he has for many years been a complete isolationist and has been guilty of the kind of publicity and statements and writings which, even in peace time, came very close to being seditious.

I do not know his son, but in view of the father's public record, a very close check should be made on the opinions and general attitude of the boy.

F.D.R.
May 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Yurwin

I have heard that the K. Hart's son (with the same name) is being considered for a commission in the Intelligence Service of the Army. I thought you might be interested in this item.

Samuel I. Rosenman
Dear Mr. President:

I do not think Willie Clark should return to the Antipodes. He is a little unstable and emotional and landed up here nursing a story of the wrongs which were being done to MacArthur by an unfeeling Chief of Staff and other Washington conspirators.

He wants to go back and to take somebody along with him but, after reflection, I do not think he should go. It would be simply laying the seed of future trouble to have him there. Unless you overrule me, I shall try to find a more sedative climate somewhere to which I can send him. I have seen him personally and done my best to smooth him down, but the Australian atmosphere is I think a little too strong medicine for him.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

What do you think of a statement
by me along these lines at my next
Press Conference?

F. D. R.
SUGGESTED PRODUCTION STATEMENT
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

We ordinarily don't release production figures because they might give aid and comfort to the enemy. I am going to give today just a few which are definitely going to give the Axis just the opposite of "aid and comfort".

We are well on our way towards achieving the rate of production which will bring us to our goals.

In May, we produced nearly 4,000 planes (preliminary figures 3,919) and over 1,500 tanks (903 mediums, 635 lights.) We also produced nearly 2,000 artillery and anti-tank guns (exact figures 1,967). This is exclusive of anti-aircraft guns and guns to be mounted in tanks.

And here is a figure which the Axis will not be very happy to hear -- in that one month alone we produced over 50,000 machine guns of all types (exact figure -- 50,658 -- including infantry, aircraft and anti-aircraft.) That does not include sub-machine guns. If we add those in, the total is well over 100,000 (sub-machine guns -- 56,384.) All these figures are only for one single month.

While these figures give you some idea of our production accomplishments, this is no time for the American people to get over-confident. We can't rest on our oars. We need more and more, and we will make more and more. And we must also remember that there are plenty of serious production problems ahead -- particularly some serious shortages in raw materials, which are receiving the closest consideration of the Government and industry.

June 11, 1942
Sirs:

Hope this is more of less what you want for the press conference this morning.

[Signature]
SUGGESTED PRODUCTION STATEMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE

We ordinarily don't release production figures because they might give aid and comfort to the enemy. I am going to give today just a few which are definitely going to give the Axis just the opposite of "aid and comfort".

We are well on our way towards achieving the rate of production which will bring us to our goals.

In May we produced nearly 4,000 planes (preliminary figures 3,918), and over 1,500 tanks (503 medium, 635 light). We also produced nearly 2,000 artillery and anti-tank guns (exact figures 1,967). This is exclusive of anti-aircraft guns and guns to be mounted in tanks.

And here is a figure which the Axis will not be very happy to hear—in that one month alone we produced over 50,000 machine guns of all types (exact figure—50,998—excluding infantry, aircraft and anti-aircraft). That does not include sub-machine guns. If we add those in, the total is well over 100,000 (Sub-machine guns—56,347). All these figures are only for one single month.

While these figures give you some idea of our production accomplishments, this is no time for the American people to get over-confident. We can't rest on our oars. We need more and more, and we will make more and more. And we must also remember that there are plenty of serious production problems ahead—particularly some serious shortages in raw materials, which are receiving the closest consideration of the Government and industry.

June 11, 1942
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Temporary promotions.

The following promotions are urgently required due to the activation of four new Infantry divisions, two new armored divisions, and to fill vacancies which have developed during the past month incident to the expansion of the Army.

To be Major Generals (temporary), Army of the United States:

- Brigadier General Charles W. Ryder - commanding the 34th Infantry Division overseas (vice General Hartle, transferred to command the V Army Corps in Ireland).
- Brigadier General Edwin P. Parker, Jr. - commanding the new 78th Infantry Division.
- Brigadier General Charles H. Gerhardt - commanding the new 91st Infantry Division.
- Brigadier General James L. Bradley - commanding the new 96th Infantry Division.
- Brigadier General Terry de la M. Allen - now commanding 1st Infantry Division, moving to Base Port for shipment to England (vice General Cubbison, transferred to command the Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina).
- Brigadier General John S. Wood - commanding 4th Armored Division (vice General Baird, to be retired).
- Brigadier General Geoffrey Keyes - commanding new 9th Armored Division (an original vacancy).
- Brigadier General Paul W. Newgarden - commanding new 10th Armored Division (an original vacancy).
- Brigadier General Roscoe E. Woodruff - commanding 77th Infantry Division (vice General Eichelberger assigned to command I Army Corps, vice General Thompson, relieved).

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 3-3-59

Signature: Carl S. Spaatz
To be Brigadier Generals (temporary), Army of the United States:

- Colonel Troy H. Middleton, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 45th Infantry Division (vice General Mahin, transferred to command the 33rd Infantry Division).
- Colonel Charles S. Kilburn, Cavalry - commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (vice General Coulter, transferred to command the Second Cavalry Division).
- Colonel John T. Pierce, Cavalry - commanding the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (vice General Gerhardt, transferred to command the 91st Infantry Division).
- Colonel William E. Chambers, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 5th Infantry Division (vice General Abraham, relieved and reduced).
- Colonel William K. Harrison, Cavalry - Assistant Division Commander, new 78th Infantry Division.
- Colonel Floyd L. Parks, Infantry - Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces (vice General Clark, transferred to command the "Boleto" Army Corps).
- Colonel A. Franklin Kibler, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, new 78th Infantry Division.
- Colonel William C. McMahon, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, new 83rd Infantry Division.
- Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Montague, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, new 83rd Infantry Division.
- Colonel Wilton B. Persons, Signal Corps - Office of the Chief of Staff, Chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division, and personal representative of the Chief of Staff to effect coordination between the War Department and all other Government agencies (an original vacancy).
Colonel Percy W. Clarkson, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, new 91st Infantry Division.

Colonel Edward S. Ott, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, new 91st Infantry Division.

Colonel William M. Miley, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, new 96th Infantry Division.

Colonel Paul V. Kane, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, new 96th Infantry Division.

Colonel Samuel L. McCroskey, Coast Artillery Corps - commanding the 38th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) (vice General Lewis, transferred to command the Washington Military District).

Colonel Fred W. Miller, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 30th Infantry Division (vice General Marchant, transferred to command the Sault Ste. Marie Military District).

Colonel Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Coast Artillery Corps - commanding the 34th Coast Artillery Brigade (vice General Thiele, transferred to duty overseas).

Colonel Thomas L. Martin, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 2nd Infantry Division (vice General Robertson, promoted to command the Division).

Colonel Alan W. Jones, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 90th Infantry Division (vice General Ryder, transferred to command the 34th Infantry Division).

Colonel Willard S. Paul, Infantry - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Army Ground Forces (an original vacancy).

Colonel Joseph C. McHaffey, Corps of Engineers - Engineer of Maintenance, The Panama Canal (an original vacancy).

Colonel Robert LeG. Walsh, Air Corps - commanding South Atlantic Division, Ferry Command (an original vacancy).
Colonel Allen F. Kingman, Infantry - combat commander, 2nd Armored Division (vice General Newgarden, transferred to command the 10th Armored Division).

Colonel Harold W. Blakeley, Field Artillery - combat commander, 5th Armored Division (vice General Wood, transferred to command the 4th Armored Division).

Colonel Donald Wilson, Air Corps - to be Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (vice General Hilldring, transferred to a division command).

Colonel James Taylor, Infantry - combat commander, 6th Armored Division (vice General Brewer, transferred to temporary duty with the 10th Armored Division).

Colonel Holmes E. Dager, Infantry - combat commander, 8th Armored Division (vice General Grow, transferred to duty with the 10th Armored Division).

Colonel John W. Leonard, Infantry - combat commander, new 9th Armored Division (an original vacancy).

Colonel Jesmond D. Balmer, Field Artillery - to command the Field Artillery School (vice General Allin, retired).

Colonel Harry R. Kutz, Ordnance Department, to be Assistant Chief of Ordnance (vice General McFarland, transferred to command Springfield Armory).

Colonel David N. W. Grant, Medical Corps - Chief Surgeon, Army Air Forces.

Colonel John R. Hodge, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii (vice General Cook, transferred to command the new 104th Infantry Division).

Colonel Lawrence H. Hedrick, Judge Advocate General's Department - The Judge Advocate General in the British Isles.
Colonel Carl Raymond Gray, Jr., Corps of Engineers (Reserve) - General Manager, Railway Service, Engineer Headquarters, Railway (an original vacancy).

Colonel David G. Barr, Infantry - Chief of Staff, Armored Force (vice General Harmon, transferred to be combat commander, 9th Armored Division).

Colonel Henry B. Lewis, Adjutant General's Department - Assistant Adjutant General (vice General Carter, retiring).

Colonel James R. Alfonso, Quartermaster Corps - Chief, Clothing and Equipage Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General (vice General Littlejohn, transferred to Headquarters, Services of Supply, U. S. Army Forces in the British Isles).

Colonel Raymond F. Fowler, Corps of Engineers - Chief of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers (an original vacancy).

Colonel William H. Harrison, Army of the United States - Director, Procurement and Distribution Division, Services of Supply (vice Brigadier General Charles D. Young, to retire June 30, 1942).

Colonel Allen R. Kimball, Quartermaster Corps - commanding the Quartermaster Depot, Jeffersonville, Indiana (vice General Luberoff, retired).

Colonel Robert C. Candeo, Air Corps - Support Commander, 8th Air Force (an original vacancy).


The following are at General MacArthur's urgent request:

Colonel Charles P. Stivers, Infantry - Chief of Operations in Australia.

Colonel Charles A. Willoughby, Infantry - Chief of Military Intelligence in Australia.
CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel Lester J. Whitlock, Field Artillery - G-4 (Supply) in Australia.

4 A.G.O.
JUN 28 1942
RECEIVED

Secretary of War.

Nomination received June 22, 1942, forwarded to White House.
Nomination received and confirmed by Senate June 25, 1942.

[Handwritten notes]

So G.O. 1 from 6/25/42 to be placed in proper hands.

Milton A. W.

7-3-42
Outstanding

PSF

Robertson

HH 9c

6
July 15
On the plane to Washington

Dear Mr. President,

Here is the narrative of an historical parallel to the present attempted diversion from Bolero by our British friends, which is so accurate and so clearly analyzed that I beg you to read it without delay and before you decide upon your present action — To aid you I have marked in red the cardinal passages.

Yrs H.Z.S.

You need only read 15 or 20 pages of this Chapter III of the book —
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Temporary promotions.

The promotion of the officers listed below is recommended to fill vacancies created during the past month by the increased participation of the air forces in combat operations, the monthly activation of new units by the ground forces, including two infantry divisions, two armored divisions, three amphibious brigades, and numerous tank destroyer battalions, and the corresponding expansion of Service of Supply activities.

To be Lieutenant General (temporary), Army of the United States:

Major General Jacob L. Devers - commanding the Armored Force (11 armored divisions and many separate units, with a strength in excess of 160,000 officers and men).

To be Major Generals (temporary), Army of the United States:

Brigadier General John H. Hilldring - commanding the 84th Infantry Division since July.

Brigadier General Edward M. Almond - commanding the 92d Infantry Division since July.

Brigadier General John B. Wogan - commanding the 13th Armored Division since July.

Brigadier General Frank W. Milburn - commanding the 83d Infantry Division (vice General Millikin, transferred to command the 33rd Division).

Brigadier General Paul J. Mueller - commanding the 81st Infantry Division (vice General Franke, ill in hospital).

Brigadier General Leroy H. Watson - commanding the 3rd Armored Division (vice General Walker, transferred to command the IV Armored Corps).

Brigadier General Vernon E. Profit - commanding the 14th Armored Division since July.
Brigadier General Leland S. Hobbs - commanding the 30th Infantry Division (vice General Simpson, commanding the new XII Army Corps).


Brigadier General Henry S. Aurand - commanding the Sixth Corps Area (vice General Grunert, transferred to be Chief of the Administrative Services, Services of Supply).

Brigadier General Kenneth T. Blood - commanding the New England Sector, North Atlantic Coastal Frontier (vice General Terry, transferred to command the Second Corps Area).

Brigadier General Barney McK. Giles - commanding the 4th Air Force (vice General Kenney, transferred to command the Allied Air Forces in Australia).

Brigadier General Leven C. Allen - Commandant, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia (16,000 students, 14,000 troops).

Brigadier General Andrew D. Bruce - commanding the Tank Destroyer Center, Camp Hood, Texas, a command of over 25,000, including a school, basic training center, unit training center, officer candidate school, and a replacement training center.

Brigadier General Frank F. Scowden - Chief, Storage and Distribution Division, Office of The Quartermaster General.

Brigadier General Clifford L. Corbin - Chief, Procurement Division, Office of The Quartermaster General.

Brigadier General Frederick Gilbreath - commanding the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, involving responsibility for the supply of United States forces in Hawaii, Australia, and other island bases, operation of supports at Los Angeles and Portland, and administration of five ports with a capacity of over 35,000.

Brigadier General Charles H. Corlett - to command the ground forces in Alaska.
To be Brigadier Generals (temporary), Army of the United States:

Colonel Nelson M. Walker, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 84th Infantry Division, since July.

Colonel Ivan L. Foster, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, 84th Infantry Division, since July.

Colonel William H. Colbern, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, 92d Infantry Division, since July.

Colonel John E. Copeland, Infantry - commanding over 5,000 United States Army troops on the Seward Peninsula, Alaska, an area of great strategic importance.

Colonel Robert W. Hasbrouck, Field Artillery - combat commander, 8th Armored Division (vice General Dager, transferred to the 4th Armored Division).

Colonel John M. Lentz, Field Artillery - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Army Ground Forces (vice General Brown, transferred to the 102d Infantry Division).

Colonel Donald J. Myers, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 33rd Division (vice General D. S. Myers, reduced).

Colonel William R. White, Quartermaster Corps - Chief Quartermaster and Director of Food Control in Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Lawrence C. Jaynes, Infantry - combat commander, 13th Armored Division, since July.

Colonel Guy H. Drewry, Ordnance Department - commanding Springfield Ordnance District, responsible for making contracts, and supervising production and delivery of ordnance items in a large section of the New England States.

Colonel George Homen, Infantry - Chief of Staff, Third Army (vice General Gruenther, transferred to Headquarters, European Theater).

Colonel Russell E. Randall, Air Corps - commanding 6th Air Force Fighter Command (vice General Gilkeson, transferred to command a Fighter Command, European Theater).
Colonel Henry C. Wolfe, Corps of Engineers - commanding the new 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade.

Colonel Herman F. Safford, Ordnance Department - Chief, Service Branch, Industrial Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance (vice General Case, reduced and retired).

Colonel Frank A. Allen, Jr., Cavalry - combat commander, 9th Armored Division (vice General Harmon, transferred to command the 2d Armored Division).

Colonel Remi P. Hueper, Finance Department - Assistant Chief of Finance.

Colonel Everett S. Hughes, Ordnance Department - Chief of Ordnance, Headquarters, European Theater.

Colonel Eley P. Denson, Infantry - commanding Seattle Port of Embarkation, and responsible for the supply of United States forces in Alaska, the operation of subports of Juneau and Prince Rupert, and administration of three posts with a capacity of 11,000.

Colonel Rufus S. Ramey, Cavalry - Commandant, Cavalry School (vice General Rodgers, transferred to command the 2d Cavalry Brigade).

Colonel John L. McKee, Infantry - Assistant Division Commander, 8th Motorized Division (vice General Milburn, transferred to command the 83rd Division).

Colonel Clayton S. Adams, Adjutant General's Department-Reserve - Chief of the Army Postal Service - a tremendous organization, of great importance to morale.

Colonel Frederick H. Black, Field Artillery - Artillery Commander, 26th Infantry Division (vice General Howe, reduced).

Colonel Doyle O. Hickey, Field Artillery - combat commander, 3d Armored Division (vice General Shugg, transferred to the Office of the Chief of Ordnance).

Colonel James F. C. Hyde, Corps of Engineers - Chief of Service of Supply activities, United States Army Forces in Central Africa.
Colonel Evarts W. Opie, Infantry-National Guard of the United States - to be Assistant Division Commander, 76th Division (vice General Smith, to command the 6th Division).

Colonel Norman Randolph, Infantry - Chief of Staff, Second Army (vice General Mueller, transferred to command the 81st Division).

Colonel Vernon Evans, Infantry - combat commander, 13th Armored Division (vice General Crawford, transferred to the 8th Armored Division).

Colonel Walter A. Wood, Jr., Corps of Engineers - Director, Requirements Division, Headquarters, Services of Supply.

Colonel Paul R. Hawley, Medical Corps - Chief Surgeon, Headquarters, European Theater.

Colonel Albert C. Smith, Cavalry - combat commander, 14th Armored Division, since July.

Colonel Edwin W. Fiburn, Infantry - combat commander, 14th Armored Division, since July.

Colonel Gordon R. Young, Corps of Engineers - Chief Engineer, Caribbean Defense Command.

Colonel Alfred R. Glancy, Army of the United States - Chief, Ordnance Automotive Center, Detroit, Michigan, responsible for policies affecting the motor industry, and supervision of development, procurement, supply and maintenance of tanks, combat cars, and transport vehicles.

Colonel William F. Heavey, Corps of Engineers - commanding the new 2d Engineer Amphibian Brigade.

Colonel David A. D. Ogden, Corps of Engineers - commanding the new 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade.

Colonel Harry F. Haslett, Infantry - Chief of Training, Headquarters, Replacement and School Command, Birmingham, Alabama (over 200,000 men).

Colonel Francis W. Rollins, Field Artillery-National Guard of the United States - to command the 74th Field Artillery Brigade (vice General Barkalow, transferred to be Artillery Commander, 87th Division).
Colonel Robert W. Douglass, Jr., Air Corps - commanding 7th Fighter Command, Hawaii (vice General Davidson, relieved due to illness).

Colonel George H. Weems, Infantry - Assistant Commandant, Infantry School (16,000 students, 14,000 troops).

Colonel Fred S. Borum, Air Corps - commanding Troop Carrier Command, Army Air Forces, which provides air transportation for all airborne and paratroops.

Colonel Henry C. Newton, Infantry-National Guard of the United States - to command Training Group, Armored Force Replacement Training Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky (15,000 troops).

Colonel Raymond E. O'Neill, Air Corps - Commandant, Army Air Forces Technical School, and Commanding Officer, Chanute Field, Illinois (20,000 troops).

Colonel Richard G. Tindall, Infantry - commanding Tank Destroyer Unit Training Center (14,000 troops).

Colonel Robert B. Williams, Air Corps - commanding the 2d Bomber Command (vice General Dubank, transferred to Headquarters, Army Air Forces).

Colonel James A. O'Connor, Corps of Engineers - commanding the Northwest Service Command (20,000 troops), and responsible for the coordination, regulation and expediting of all highway, rail, air and inland waterway traffic to Alaska.

Colonel Robert M. Webster, Air Corps - commanding the 1st Ground Air Support Command (vice General Kepner, transferred to command the 4th Fighter Command).

Colonel Frederick M. Hopkins, Jr., Air Corps - commanding the 3d Ground Air Support Command (vice General Lynd, transferred to command the Bomber Command in Hawaii).

Colonel Owen Summers, Infantry - commanding the Trinidad Mobile Force, and second in command of the Trinidad Sector, with a garrison of over 15,000.

Colonel Howard K. Ramsey, Air Corps - commanding the 4th Bomber Command (vice General Giles, transferred to command the 4th Air Force).
Colonel Harvey S. Burwell, Air Corps - Commandant, Army Air Forces Technical School, and Commanding Officer, Lowry Field, Denver, Colorado (16,000 troops).

Colonel Edward M. Morris, Air Corps - commanding the 3d Fighter Command (vice General Wash, commanding the 3rd Air Force).

Colonel George J. Forster, Infantry - Chief of Staff, Iceland Base Command (vice General Homer, transferred to command the New York-Philadelphia Sector, North Atlantic Coastal Frontier).

Colonel William W. Welsh, Air Corps - Chief of Staff, Southeast Air Force Training Center (20,000 students and 45,000 troops).

Colonel Fred A. Safay, Infantry-National Guard of the United States - to command Training Group, Infantry Replacement Training Center, Camp Croft, South Carolina (16,000 troops).

Colonel Orvil A. Anderson, Air Corps - Chief of Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

Colonel Hans Kramer, Corps of Engineers - Chief Engineer, Hawaiian Department (vice General Lyman, deceased).

Colonel Robert V. Ignico, Air Corps - commanding the Air Force Service Command, Alaska.

Colonel Alden H. Waitt, Chemical Warfare Service - commanding the Chemical Warfare School, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland (vice General Shekerjian, transferred to command the Chemical Warfare Replacement Training Center, Gadsden, Alabama).

Colonel Walter S. Fulton, Infantry - Commanding Officer, Fort Benning, Georgia (50,000 troops).

Colonel Julian B. Haddon, Air Corps - commanding the Combined Technical School and Replacement Training Center, Keesler Field, Mississippi (27,000 officers and troops).
Colonel Miller G. White, Infantry-National Guard of the United States - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (vice General Wilson, transferred to duty overseas).

Colonel Leslie R. Groves, Engineer Corps, to head a special project.

Secretary of War.

Harry L. Stimson
Nov. 29, 1942.

Dear Harry: -

O.K. for you to move into the Pentateuch Building on Tuesday. Sorry the plan with the Navy fell through.

I hope the Army can move out of the Munitions Building to the extent the Navy can use it. This would tend to consolidate each Service in the same location.

Yours,

F. D. R.
December 24 1942

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

My dear Mr. President,

As Christmas comes, my heart is full of gratitude for the opportunity to serve my country which you gave me nearly two and a half ago, as well as for the unfailing personal kindness that you have constantly shown me ever since. I hope that the weight of your own burdens have been a little lightened by the events of the past two months.
And that in spite of the magnitude and danger of the tasks ahead, the rays of sunshine which have recently come to us, will prove themselves true auguries of a coming victory.

As I eat behind you during the Thanksgiving Services in the White House, my mind was flooded with a realization of the importance to the country of having at its helm a man whose insight into spiritual faculties was
as true as yours. I have the same feeling this Christmas.
May God bless and keep you throughout this long crisis
dutifully and affectionately, yours

Henry L. Stimson