February 3, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

I am saddened and a little discouraged by the enclosed clipping. I have tried my best to cooperate with McNutt in the difficult problems which confront us and we have succeeded in thus solving some of these problems by our making on our side concessions which we consider important. I believe that all differences can be thus rightly and fairly decided without bothering you. Only yesterday Knox, who feels as I do, joined with me in sending a long letter to McNutt carefully going over matters which might give rise to differences and presenting what we think a reasonable solution.

But we have asked him not to go to you for an ex parte decision without allowing us a simultaneous opportunity to be heard. His announcement yesterday indicates that he is unwilling to do this.

I reluctantly, therefore, must ask you on behalf of both Knox and myself not to close your mind on the subject until you have heard our side of the remaining issues. We believe that our position is reasonable and elementary.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
McNutt Says Services To 'Get' 10 of Every 14 in Draft by End of '43

Status of Men 18 to 38 Discussed at Hearing on College Program

War Manpower Commissioner McNutt told the House Military Affairs Committee today that by the end of this year 10 out of every 14 of the able-bodied men between 18 and 38 will be in the armed services.

Mr. McNutt made the statement during discussion of the college training program being worked out for the armed services.

In reply to questions of committee members, he stipulated that the men in that age group would be serving "as fighting men" by the end of this year.

He explained that his figures included only "those who can pass the physical requirements of the armed services."

In Conflict With Stimson

Mr. McNutt also informed the committee that he and Secretary of War Stimson are "in sharp conflict" over the college training of young men in the armed forces and that "I intend to make the matter up with the President tomorrow."

Mr. McNutt said he had a luncheon engagement with the President and that he planned to discuss his program to keep the youths in school instead of inducting them into the Army. He declared that Mr. Stimson did not agree with this plan.

He urged young men, in view of this conflict, "to stay where you are until you are called."

Quizzed by Thomas

Mr. Thomas reminded Mr. McNutt that the armed forces had made representations that young men between 18 and 20 were urgently needed in the armed forces and that Congress had authorized their induction through selective service.

Mr. Thomas then asked, "What is most important now—winning the war or educating the youth of the country?"

"Winning the war," Mr. McNutt replied.

Quizzed by Thomas

Asked if there existed such a sharp difference of opinion between Secretary Stimson and himself, "Why didn't you take the matter up with the assistant President, Mr. Byrnes, during the President's absence?"

Mr. McNutt replied, "Mr. Byrnes has no authority over the War Manpower Commission."

"He is in charge of the rubber program, is he not?" Mr. McNutt was asked.

"Well, he may be, but he is not in charge of my program," Mr. McNutt replied, adding that:

"I report direct to the President of the United States."

Quizzed by Thomas

Gives Views on Colleges

The manpower chairman said the Army and Navy planned to utilize 400 to 500 of the 1,700 institutions of higher learning in the country for specialized training of young men and "I am in favor of utilizing all the 1,700 institutions." He declared the small liberal arts colleges "have a place in our life and certainly they can make a contribution to the proposed training programs."

Mr. McNutt said the Army and Navy planned to train 140,000 young men in these schools. Informed by a member of the committee that the services had presented testimony indicating 250,000 would be trained, which would not include 37,500 WAACS, Mr. McNutt replied that the 140,000 figure had been the only one presented to him.

"Who would pay for your training program?" he was asked.

"That would be up to Congress," he replied.

Asked, if he had really formulated a plan, he replied that he had one under consideration which he intended to submit to the full Manpower Commission. Pressed to reveal it to the committee, he declined on the grounds that he should not reveal it until it had been formally presented to the commission.

He intimated that the program would deal mainly with the training of young men in the medical and engineering professions.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EDWIN M. WATSON:

Subject: Award of the Distinguished Service Medal.

Submitted herewith for the approval of the President is a proposed award of the Distinguished Service Medal to Edward V. Rickenbacker, formerly Colonel, Air Corps, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility in the South Pacific Area.

I recommend that the President give approval to this award.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Inclusion
REPORT OF DECORATIONS BOARD

Convended pursuant to Paragraph 47, S.O. 167-0, War Department, 1921, and Paragraph 1, S.O. 64, War Department, 1942.

W. D., Washington, D. C.,
(date) February 18, 1943.

1. The board having been properly convened and organized, has considered the record in the case of

<table>
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<th>Surname</th>
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2. By decision of a majority of the board, the above-named individual is recommended for the award of the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL with citation substantially as follows:

Edward V. Rickenbacker, formerly colonel, Air Corps, United States Army. For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great responsibility in the South Pacific area from October to December, 1942. As Special Consultant and the personal representative of the Secretary of War, Colonel Rickenbacker successfully completed a highly important military mission despite extreme hardship and grave personal danger. During the course of his journey, his plane was forced down at sea and for approximately three weeks he and his companions were adrift on small rubber life boats suffering acutely from hunger, thirst and the effects of the elements. Throughout this lengthy ordeal, Colonel Rickenbacker's superb courage and unflagging faith in ultimate rescue served as an inspiration to his companions and undoubtedly helped them to survive. After being rescued, and with little more than two weeks of convalescence from this rigorous experience, he proceeded to New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and other battle zones and concluded his mission. Colonel Rickenbacker's devotion to duty and unwavering fortitude in the face of danger and adversity exemplifies the finest traditions of the United States Army.

Approved:

E. L. Hiss
Major General, U.S.A.,
President

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Approved: By order of the Secretary of War:

Assistant Chief of Staff
REPORT OF DECORATIONS BOARD

Convened pursuant to Paragraph 47, S. O. 167-0, War Department, 1921, and Paragraph 1, S. O. 64, War Department, 1942.

W. D., Washington, D. C.,
(date) February 13, 1943.

1. The board having been properly convened and organized, has considered the record in the case of

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Approved:

Major General, U.S.A.,
President

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Colonel, A.D.G., Recorder.

Copy for The White House

Approved: By order of the Secretary of War:

M. G. WHITE
Assistant Chief of Staff
My dear Mr. President:

Your inquiry of March 18, 1943, of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the C of C of the U.S. Fleet in respect to submarine warfare and their reply thereto have been brought to my attention.

This inquiry impacts directly upon a subject to which I have been giving close personal attention for over a year, namely the possibilities of land-based air power in furnishing an offensive complement to the defensive work of the Navy in convoying our shipping. My interest in the subject was initiated by my personal visit to Panama and my study of the work of our big bombers over the sea in assisting that defense. It led to a continuous study on my part of the rapidly developing new inventions of ASV, MAD, and other forms of the use of microwaves which, in connection with the work of land-based airplanes over the sea, could make them more effective not only as patrols but as destroyers of surface and submarine vessels.

As a result, in April on my initiative there was established at Langley Field an experimental unit to develop these weapons and to apply them to such of our planes as might be used in helping to combat the submarine sinkings which were
at that period overwhelming our shipping along our coast. About May 1st I secured some of the very first of the new American ASV-10's and mounted them in some of our short-range B-18 bombers which, being slow and obsolescent for fighting, happened to be available for my experiment. This unit was set at work on the anti-submarine patrol along our coast. Its success was so striking and immediate that the unit was continued and in the following autumn expanded into the present Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, which is now acting under the general operations control of the Navy along our coast and down into the Caribbean Sea.

I have had prepared chart records of all the submarine sinkings on the North and South American coast which I wish to show you. These charts prove so clearly what our Air Force has accomplished and our result is so parallel to the earlier experience of the Coastal Command of the British R.A.F. in driving submarines away from British shores as to demonstrate that we have in our hands now the possibility of an air weapon which I firmly believe can meet the present urgent emergency you mention in your above mentioned letter to the Chief of Staff. The inventions necessary to give it increased efficiency in navigation and in combat are also at hand and in production. I refer to Loran, the MAD retro bomb and Fido. My inquiries lead me to believe that, if we can keep a sufficient number of our long distance bombers from being diverted to other purposes and put to this work, those
bombers could be equipped with the improved instruments of search and combat and the regional Loran directories established by at least the middle of this summer. This would mean that we could probably begin a respectable offensive against the submarine at least six months before the time when the Navy will have perfected its system of defensive convoys. See Admiral King's statement last week to the anti-submarine conference.

The technical instruments necessary to meet your request for an anti-submarine offensive are thus at hand. The only thing that is necessary is organization. Such an offensive will not work unless it is placed under the direct operational command of an air man who thoroughly believes in it. He must also be given the freedom and initiative necessary for attacks in any warfare. It also means of course that he must be furnished with the information as to the movement of submarines and of other vessels on the sea which the Navy now collects and collates.

The present operating relations between the Coastal Command of the British R.A.F. and the Admiralty of the British Navy in which, although the Navy has a general operational command, the Coastal Command of the R.A.F. is left free to formulate its own plans for anti-submarine offensive operations by aircraft, show that such cooperation is not impossible. It seems to me that this experiment is well worth trying.
As I pointed out, we have in the Army Air Forces a nucleus already in operation. We have available for commanders men whose offensive spirit and initiative have been amply demonstrated in other theatres and crews which have operated in the R.A.F. Coastal Command. I believe that the absence of such an offensive spirit in anti-submarine warfare is our major obstacle today for success. If that obstacle and the minor technical obstacles above mentioned are removed, I believe that we shall be on our way to a victorious solution of this problem. At all events we shall gain immense knowledge by the experiment.

Won't you let me show you the charts and other studies upon which my confidence is based? I believe that they will greatly interest you. I have talked this over with Marshall and with Arnold and they agree that I ought to see you.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
April 1, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

Last Friday after Cabinet I had a talk with you about the possibility of establishing effective offensive action against enemy submarines through the medium of land-based airplanes operated as a task force under the present Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, which Command has been for some months at work under the general operational command of the Navy. I pointed out our reasons for believing that such offensive action, if given the increased efficiency in navigation and combat which could be obtained by certain recent inventions and the extension of improved lines of communication, could be made very much more effective in destroying submarines than has been possible thus far.

You seemed to be favorably impressed and asked me to confer with Secretary Knox about it. I therefore have spent several days in having carefully worked out by General Marshall, General Arnold, and the Operations Division of the General Staff, a letter to Secretary Knox which will give in as careful detail as possible such a plan. I am informed that the proposed task force could be activated with the twenty-seven planes mentioned in this letter and in operation by the first of next July.

I have just had a long talk with Secretary Knox in which I have discussed this whole situation and have given him this letter together with a copy of the letter which I handed to you last Friday.
Knox promised to go over this carefully with his staff and to let us know their reaction as quickly as possible.

I enclose to you herewith a copy of this letter from me to Knox and of my letter to you of last Friday in order to keep you au courant with the matter which we thus discussed.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-13-57
Signature- Carl F. Spicer
The Honorable,
The Secretary of Navy.

Date: 3-13-43

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know I have devoted myself for some time to studying ways and means by which the Army can best contribute to the campaign against the submarine menace to our shipping, particularly that which directly affects our military effort, and have given close personal attention to the possibilities of land-based air power in furnishing an offensive complement to the work the Navy is doing in convoying our shipping.

As a result, in May 1942 I caused to be established at Langley Field, an experimental unit to develop ASV, MAD and other forms of use of the microwaves and to adapt them to successful employment in aerial anti-submarine warfare. The present Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, which was a product of that experimental unit, has been doing good service under Naval operational control. I now feel that the ever increasing submarine menace justifies a reorganization of the existing Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, creating within it a Special Anti-Submarine Task Force to conduct air offensives against hostile submarines in selected localities, with priority consideration to those which are in favorable position to threaten our vital sea lanes. Operations conducted by this Special Task Force would supplement current Army Air Forces anti-submarine defensive convoy operations conducted under operational control of the Navy.

To accomplish the foregoing I propose to assign an outstandingly
qualified air officer to the duty of reorganizing and commanding the
Army Anti-Submarine Command and to organize, equip, train and operate
within it, the Special Task Force above mentioned. As a general guide
relative to operation of the Special Task Force, I have in mind the
following to be included in his directive:

"Co ordination. Your operations must be closely coordinated
with naval activities, particularly those involved in anti-sub-
marine measures and escorts. You are charged specifically with
the responsibility for effecting the greatest degree of coopera-
tion with appropriate naval authorities. As a rule, the Navy
should recommend the areas most profitable for your operations,
and furnish to you full information regarding hostile submarine
locations and activities. The detailed methods and plans for
your operations against these submarines are your responsibility.
However, each specific operation must be coordinated with naval
activities in the area to avoid confusion, to prevent duplication,
and to insure that neither of the forces - your own or naval -
interferes with the other.

"Mobility and Base Facilities. You will so organize your
forces as to provide for rapidly changing the deployment thereof
as required by the situation. Army and Navy base commanders will
cooperate fully in providing, upon your application, such base
facilities and services as may be needed for your operations.

"Communications and Air Navigation facilities required for
your operations will be determined and established by you. In
so doing you will arrange for full utilisation by your forces of existing facilities which can be procured for your use.

"Intelligence. All available information bearing on hostile submarine operations will be furnished you by all U. S. sources upon your application direct to the agencies concerned. Arrangements for securing like information from Allied sources will be accomplished through liaison therewith."

Since the commander of this force must have the utmost freedom to deploy and redeploy his aircraft to meet rapidly changing situations, it is imperative that he be permitted to utilize base facilities and services of either the Army or the Navy as required. Consequently it seems desirable that his directive be issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the initial implementation of my plan it is proposed, out of the 75 Army airplanes set up at the 78th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

g. To leave the two ASW squadrons now operating from Gibraltar in their present assignment as long as the need therefor continues to exist.

h. As first priority to replace, with VLR B-24 aircraft, the B-17 aircraft now assigned to the two squadrons working under the operational control of the Navy in Newfoundland; and to send an additional VLR B-24 squadron to Newfoundland also to work under operational control of the Navy. Each anti-submarine squadron to have an initial allocation of nine planes. The B-17's withdrawn
from Newfoundland to be used to replace less efficient planes in anti-submarine squadrons now operating where the range of the presently assigned planes is inadequate.

g. As second priority, to form three anti-submarine squadrons of nine VLR B-24 airplanes each, and assign them to the Special Task Force.

d. The remainder of the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command to continue to function as at present.

Your early comments on the above will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
My dear Mr. President:

Your inquiry of March 18, 1943, of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the C of C of the U.S. Fleet in respect to submarine warfare and their reply thereto have been brought to my attention.

This inquiry impacts directly upon a subject to which I have been giving close personal attention for over a year, namely the possibilities of land-based air power in furnishing an offensive complement to the defensive work of the Navy in convoysing our shipping. My interest in the subject was initiated by my personal visit to Panama and my study of the work of our big bombers over the sea in assisting that defense.

It led to a continuous study on my part of the rapidly developing new inventions of ASV, MAD, and other forms of the use of microwaves which, in connection with the work of land-based airplanes over the sea, could make them more effective not only as patrols but as destroyers of surface and submarine vessels.

As a result, in April on my initiative there was established at Langley Field an experimental unit to develop these weapons and to apply them to such of our planes as might be used in helping to combat the submarine sinkings which were
at that period overwhelming our shipping along our coast. About May 1st I secured some of the very first of the new American B-37-10's and mounted them in some of our short-range bombers which, being slow and obsolescent for fighting, I set at work on the anti-submarine patrol along our coast. The success was so striking and immediate that the unit was continued and in the following autumn expanded into the present Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, which is now active under the general operations control of the Navy along our coast and in the E.A.F. In driving submarines away from British shores to the earlier experience of the Coastal Command of the British Air Force has accomplished and our result is so parallel to the present urgent demand for an air weapon which I firmly believe can meet the present urgent need if we can keep a sufficient number of our long-distance bombers from being diverted to other purposes to perform the necessary tasks.

Mr. Jansen led me to believe that, if we can keep a sufficient number of our long-distance bombers from being diverted to other purposes to perform the necessary tasks, our submarines can be driven away from British shores to the early experience of the Coastal Command of the British Air Force has accomplished and our result is so parallel to the present urgent demand for an air weapon which I firmly believe can meet the present urgent need if we can keep a sufficient number of our long-distance bombers from being diverted to other purposes to perform the necessary tasks.
purposes and put to this work, those bombers could be equipped with the improved instruments of search and combat and the regional Loran directories established by at least the middle of this summer. This would mean that we could probably begin a respectable offensive against the submarine at least six months before the time when the Navy will have perfected its system of defensive convoys. See Admiral King's statement last week to the anti-submarine conference.

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we have in the Army Air Forces a nucleus already in operation. We have available for commander men whose offensive spirit and initiative have been amply demonstrated in other theatres and crews which have operated in the R.A.F. Coastal Command. I believe that the absence of such an offensive spirit in anti-submarine warfare is our major obstacle today for success. If that obstacle and the minor technical obstacles above mentioned are removed, I believe, that we shall be on our way to a victorious solution of this problem. At all events we shall gain immense knowledge by the experiment.

Won't you let me show you the charts and other studies upon which my confidence is based? I believe that they will greatly interest you. I have talked this over with Marshall and with Arnold and they agree that I ought to see you.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
the organization for whom we work.

Very short period before that operation in order to perfect
what you and I know about what would need to be done.

I agree, and I think

In other words,

In other words, not for the same operation -- and I think

In other words, the same position in operation. Explain

I don't agree to explanation wanting him. I don't.

The other basis.

These extractions were part on a something

and in that case the words as you use them in this case

And in the case, for decent motives, to do in the Army

never interested in being a soldier and more than they did.

You have taken in many people who

I do not like your telling the about. Entertaining

I do not like your being detailed.

In that sense of the word, you have a great many

I do not like your second paragraph where you

and this covers many things.

in the same where they are necessary responsibilities.

In any of my knowledge of the Army.

I do not agree with your paragraph.

business at work.

I think you have the information.

April 6, 1932.

P.S. "
That business of his being a Brigadier General may have originated in the War Department. It is the only place I can think of, and may well have been started by somebody in the War Department who hates LaGuardia's guts.

I do not think that LaGuardia wants "adventure". I think that is imputing a motive to him which is not strictly fair to him. Like most people with red blood, he does hope he can get war service.

In other words, I am very certain that LaGuardia fully and unreservedly accepts the recommendation that he go to Charlottesville; that he is not interested in rank.

F.D.R.
April 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

On the request of Marshall after his talk with you, I had an interview with LaGuardia this morning. I have known him many years and talked with him with the utmost frankness.

1. I told him that there were two lines, of which he could follow either but not both. He could be a soldier or he could be a propagandist. He couldn't do both. The Army does not handle propaganda.

2. As a friend I strongly advised him to remain in his present pulpit of the mayoralty and to use his influence with Italians from there; that his words would carry much further than if he was a civilian soldier, let alone a make-believe General.

3. If he insisted on being a soldier, we would give him a commission as Colonel. As such he would have two alternatives:
   a. To do what other former flyers were doing, i.e. enter the ground forces of the Air Force;
   b. Go to the Charlottesville School and prepare to use his experience in government if and when the time came when such experience would be useful to us abroad.

4. When he said that he thought that Eisenhower had asked for him personally, I told him he was mistaken; that I had looked into it personally and that Eisenhower did not want him in Africa until the fighting was over.

He then said that ended it for he wouldn't dream of going if he was not wanted by Eisenhower.
He also told me that he had never asked for any particular rank from you and could not imagine how the story had broken in the press of his being chosen to be a Brigadier General. I told him that I could not answer that question but that the entire question of what rank he should get had been left to us and had been decided by Marshall.

I told him that whether he remained Mayor or became Colonel we should undoubtedly be glad to avail ourselves of his peculiar knowledge of Italians but that, if he came into the Army, such matters must be handled in the regular way and through military channels.

He did not seem particularly interested in helping us in that way but frankly admitted that he was eager for war service and adventure. He asked if we could not find him a place in China if not in Africa. I pointed out to him how absurd that was in view of the smallness of our forces in China.

He ended up by saying that he would be a good soldier and accept our decision. Nevertheless I think he will call on you and perhaps attempt to reopen the matter. I hope this will not be done for it is now settled.

Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of April 8th and am deeply

grieved that, from my own fault in part at least, I should have caused

you the distress of mind which your letter evidences.

After my interview with LaGuardia I tried to get over to the

White House to see you at once for he had told me that he expected to

call you up and I wanted you to know as fully as I could what actually

had happened. General Watson told me that you were making no appoint-

ments for the rest of the day and advised me to send him a brief

memorandum instead. My memorandum was therefore dictated hastily and

I made no attempt to quote the language of our interview on either side

but merely to give you in a page and a half the substance and results

of a talk that had lasted the better part of an hour. For brevity I

used brief expressions which did not attempt to repeat the words

actually used.

For instance, the term "make-believe general" was never used

in this talk. Instead I pointed out to LaGuardia, who prior to his

talk with me had expressed surprise to McCloy that he was not to receive

a commission as general, that Mayor Mitchell who also had had some

military training and had been a very good mayor had accepted in the

last war a captaincy as appropriate. My hasty use of the term

"make-believe general" in my memorandum to you was particularly unfair

to you in view of the fact that you had, as I well knew, appointed with

practical unanimity all the new general officers in the Army entirely
upon the proposals of your military advisers. My actual opinion has long been that the record of your Administration in this respect is unique in American war history for its scrupulous abstention from personal and political pressure. Perhaps you will not object to my adding, in view of your retort on this subject in your letter, that my own record in accepting these military proposals for general officers is also good. Out of over 900 general officers appointed during my administration, the Secretary of War has proposed just one name, and that name was recommended to me by the Army commander under whom the appointee had served.

Furthermore I did not dictate to Mr. LaGuardia that he should have only the choice of being a soldier or a propagandist. He himself told me that those were the two things that he wished to combine and I merely pointed out to him that under our present set-up the Army was excluded from propaganda which was entirely relegated to OWI.

But the chief thing which I wish if possible to dispel from your mind is any idea that hostile animus towards Mayor LaGuardia entered into any part of this transaction with which I am familiar. The matter was brought to me by General Marshall and Mr. McCloy.

Marshall told me that he had determined with you that LaGuardia might have a colonel's commission and, if he accepted it, would go to the Charlottesville school for training. Marshall also told me that he had ascertained from Eisenhower that Eisenhower did not wish to have LaGuardia come to him until the fighting in Tunisia was over. McCloy subsequently came to me and told me that he had had telephone conversations with
LaGuardia in which he had informed LaGuardia of these decisions and that LaGuardia had pressed him as to why he could not go to Africa immediately and why there had been a change of rank from general to colonel. McCloy then explained to him that, owing to military secrecy, he could not discuss in detail these matters by telephone. LaGuardia then proposed coming down to Washington to find out. I was then asked to see him when he came and talk the matter over with him. I had no information as to the origins of the arrangements, if any, between you and Mr. LaGuardia which led up to these proposed arrangements respecting LaGuardia, although I had of course read the speculations in the press which I had regarded as quite unreliable. From it all I had gained the impression that the proposition for a commission came from him and I had heard from LaGuardia's close friend, Mr. Burlingham, in New York that for some time LaGuardia had become restless with his job and was trying to get into the Army for that reason.

I told LaGuardia explicitly that he could be commissioned as a colonel and that this rank had been fixed by General Marshall; and secondly, that if he accepted such a commission he could go to the Charlottesville school until a time came for his assignment to specific duty. He then said that he had understood that General Eisenhower wished to have him come over to him immediately. I then told him that he was mistaken; I had looked that point up particularly and that General Eisenhower did not wish him to come until after the fighting was over. Hardly waiting for me to finish my sentence, he said "That ends it all. I had thought it was all settled. I do not wish to go if Eisenhower doesn't want me now".
In the course of the conversation he also told me that he was tired of desk work; that if he went into the Army he did not want to do desk work but wished to be more actively employed; and, although during our conversation we talked at considerable length over the entire subject and I told him that whatever he did;--whether he became a soldier or not;--we wished to have the benefit of his peculiar knowledge of Italians and of matters of government in general, he never retracted his announcement that he did not wish to accept the commission if Eisenhower did not wish him at once.

I not only discussed the matter with him officially and in terms of the present proposals but I talked with him as a friend and in so doing I did not conceal but frankly avowed my clearly held opinion that as Mayor of the greatest city in this country he held a pulpit for influencing the people of Italy which in my opinion was far more effective than any pulpit he could have as a soldier and I urged him not to lose that pulpit. I felt very strongly about this matter for reasons which I did not, however, express to him. I felt that if he pressed forward with his present impulse to leave the service of the city and go into the Army, he would greatly disappoint the great bulk of the electorate who had put him into office. I believed that the mass of the electorate confided in him as a man who for over nine years has been a very good mayor of the City of New York, serving efficiently and without any scandals. I also knew that less than a year and a half ago he had sought the votes of his fellow citizens for a third four-year term, knowing
full well that a time of great national crisis was coming on and
daily getting more serious. I strongly felt that when, under these
conditions, he had accepted a third term of office, he had placed
himself under the strongest moral obligations to carry on for the
length of that term. I personally felt that under these circum-
stances, if he should abandon his office for a commission in which his
power of utterance and influence would be far less than what he had as
mayor, he would greatly disappoint and impair the faith of the people
who had elected him.

While as I have above stated I did not present these arguments
to him, they influenced my own feeling in strongly advising him to stick
to the pulpit he now has. I did not know of any counter-arrangements
which he may have had privately with you. My knowledge consisted of
the facts that I have given you in this letter. Nevertheless, in con-
considering the future of what has to be done, now that he has on his own
initiative rejected the offer made to him by the War Department, I hope
you will consider the effect which I feel sure his leaving the mayoralty
would have upon his great influence for stability in New York and con-
sequently upon the defense of that city. I tell you this also in order
that you may fully understand the part which I have taken in this matter.

In the light of all this I beg you to remember that I have never
had a face to face talk with you on this subject. Before we go any further
with the matter, may I not have such a talk? It will at least be of use
to me in the guidance of my future official duties therein.

Faithfully yours,

The President,
The White House.

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
April 8, 1943.

Dear Harry:

I want you to reconsider the tentative selection made two or three weeks ago for Surgeon General of the Army. My best advice is that he is a good Doctor but that he would not be regarded as an outstanding choice by the medical profession.

As you know, I am in much closer touch with the medical profession in all its ramifications than most people are, and I believe that some other selection could be made which would do more credit to all of us.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

I have read a telegram about
the attitude of soldiers toward the strike
with great interest. This is AGWAR
No. W1165. I think that you can properly
find ways and means of getting the gist
of this to the public, even if the strike
fails to materialize on Monday.

F.D.R.

(AGWAR No. W1165 was returned to the
Secretary of War, 6-5-43)
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

22 June 1943.

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

We have lately reduced to a minimum the active means of air defense along the East and West coasts. This we have done partly in the interest of conserving manpower, but principally to release fighting troops and equipment for offensive operations overseas. We have thereby assumed the calculated risk that limited small-scale air raids may meet with a measure of success. This policy we believe to be fully justified because by such offensive operations overseas we shall bring the war's end months closer.

Although continuous large-scale bombing of the United States is not at present an enemy capability, due to the strategic situation, limited nuisance raids are still possible. Such attacks might be launched against either coast from submarines carrying float planes, or possibly from a carrier. The East coast might be attacked by long-range land-based suicide bombers, although fuel requirements would preclude maximum bomb loads.

The physical destruction caused by such attacks would be comparatively slight. But even a moderately successful nuisance raid could be made of material aid to our enemies, if as a result, we were required, by uninformed popular clamor, to divert more than a limited amount of our powerful, offensive means to the conduct of defense along our coasts.

A Congress and press informed in advance would constitute our best defense against enemy attempts thus to divert our offensive strength. It is my recommendation that selected Congressional leaders and selected publishers and editors be informed in confidence of enemy capabilities of air attack against the continental United States, of the calculated risks we have assumed in reducing our planned air defenses, and of the good reasons therefor.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

FOR REPORT.

F.D.R.

Secret message from Steinhardt, Ankara, 6-18-43, regarding Rickenbacker, now in Tehran, and his possible flight to Ankara to request of Turkish Govt. permission to Allies to use airfields.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
and HON. J. EDGAR HOOVER

For your information and
please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Letter which the President received from the Secretary of War, 6/24/43, advising that the War Department is taking every step within its means to prevent the escape of prisoners of war, sent to the Attorney General; copy of the President's memorandum and explanation of enclosure sent to the Hon. J. Edgar Hoover.
TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

To: The Secretary of War

I hope you will lunch with me on Tuesday. Glad to have your memoranda.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

August 8, 1943
Dear Mr. President:

During my trip overseas I had some talks with Mr. Churchill and with other members of the British government and military authorities, and also with Generals Eisenhower, Devers, Eaker, Spaatz and many others of our own commanders. I believe it might be helpful to you at the coming Quebec conference if you had an opportunity to let me talk them over with you and tell you about them.

I have written a memorandum of some of these talks bearing upon the future of the war in Italy and of Overlord (which in this memorandum for secrecy sake I have continued to call Roundhammer). I am sending this memorandum to you through Harry Hopkins in order that you may know the general purport of the conversations.

The Prime Minister also brought up to me two other matters not relating to these but of extreme secrecy and major importance, about which he wished that I should talk with you, and as to one of which he gave me a memorandum for you. If you care to talk them over with me before he arrives, I shall be very glad to fly up to you at such time as you may suggest.

I hope you are having a good rest.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

The President,
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/62)

Date- 9-7-66
Signature- Carl L. spacer
September 20, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

In re General Eisenhower's telegram
#W381/6510 of September 18th (NAV. 409 or 410)

Eisenhower's request for relaxation of the terms of the long armistice agreement so as to permit him to treat in certain matters with the Badoglio administration as a belligerent has been considered by me with Secretary Hull and a draft reply has been agreed to and cleared by him and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will reach you in due course.

In view of the possible doctrinaire objections of some of our citizens which may reach us in this matter as they did in the matter of the arrangement with Darlan, I thought you would be interested in the following appraisal of the government of Piedmont and the Victor Emmanuel of 1860 as given by the historian Trevelyan:

"When on New Year's Day, 1859, the Emperor Napoleon III startled Europe by a few polite but ominous words spoken to the Austrian Ambassador, Italy of the Italians was still confined to the small state of Piedmont nestling between the Alps and the sea. Strong not in the numbers but in the character of its citizens, it enjoyed the respect of Europe, the sympathy of France and England, and the wistful affection of the inhabitants of the other states of the peninsula -- sentiments inspired by the well ordered parliamentary government of King Victor Emmanuel and his minister Cavour".

Garibaldi and the Thousand, p.1
Again in writing of the crisis between Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon III in respect to the Orsini crisis on which Napoleon had demanded that Piedmont expel the liberal refugees who had taken refuge within Piedmont and the silencing of the democratic press, Trevelyan writes:

"The moment was one of extreme peril. But now as on several later occasions, the king came to the rescue of his great minister. In a spirited but friendly letter Victor Emmanuel stated the position with a wise frankness:

'If the Emperor wishes me to use violence in my kingdom, let him know that I should lose all my influence, and he all the sympathies of a generous and noble nation; **** that I have never endured violence from anyone; that I follow the path of honor without reproach and am responsible for that honor only to God and my people; that our house has carried its head high for 850 years and that no one will make me bow it; and that with all this I desire to be nothing but his friend.'

Victor Emmanuel came of a royal stock so ancient and so honorable that it could afford to have democratic sympathies without losing caste. Like the warrior of Navarre, who, two centuries earlier, had done for France a work somewhat similar to that which he himself was doing for Italy, he had been nursed to hardihood as a mountaineer and hunter, and had early learned, by the discipline of evil times, to estimate men and things as they were and not as they seemed when viewed from palace windows. Though of rougher speech and blunter manners than the 'Gentle Henry', he too was loved by the common people whose welfare he had at heart and whose company he was always glad to share in war and in the chase.

"Garibaldi and the Thousand", pp. 72-73

I call this appraisal of the Piedmont government to your attention because I have seen some very cheap condemnations of it in the current press by commentators who are evidently short on history.
It would be a mistake for us to try to impose from outside too hastily a modern democracy upon a government which has had such a history of free parliamentary government.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
20 Sept/43
Send in first packet
W.H.
November 10, 1943.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Although other agencies of the Government are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connecting with the relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies. This will not only be the case in the event that active military operations are under way, but also in the event of a German collapse. I envisage that in the event of a German collapse, the need for the Army to undertake this work will be all the more apparent.

Therefore, I direct that you have the Army undertake the planning necessary to enable it to carry out this task to the end that it shall be prepared to perform this function, pending such time as civilian agencies must be prepared to carry out the longer range program of relief.

You may take this letter as my authority to you to call upon all other agencies of the Government for such plans and assistance as you may need. For all matters of policy that have to be determined in connection with this work, you will consult with the State Department for any political advice; and upon the Treasury for such economic and fiscal direction as you may need.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Attached is a copy of the letter that the President signed this afternoon to the Secretary of War for your files. Please pardon my not leaving it with you, but I inadvertently put all the copies in my folder as I left the White House with the President on the way to the airport.

[Signature]
November 12, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of November 10th directing the Army to undertake the planning necessary to enable it to assume the initial burden of the relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas has been received.

This work has already been begun and will be expeditiously carried out as you direct.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
November 11, 1943.

Dear Harry:

I wish much that I could come to that party on December eighth. I fear, however, that I will be away from Washington!

Always sincerely,

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the pleasure of inviting you to address the civilian and military personnel of the War Department on December 8, 1943.

On that day approximately 750,000 civilian employees of the Department located in the thousands of military establishments throughout the United States will be presented with emblems in token of their service in the war effort and in furtherance of maintaining their highest productivity until victory is achieved. I am attaching a copy of the order establishing the award of these emblems.

It is planned that here at the Pentagon Building there will be an initial ceremony participated in by high ranking officials representing the various components of the War Department. Should you honor us with your presence we should like to have a few civilians selected to whom you can present the emblem in gesture to all those entitled to the emblem.

Tentatively the ceremony is scheduled for 11:30 A.M. but we will of course set the time to meet your convenience. Should it not be possible for you to appear in person would you consent to making a statement from the White House transmitted by radio directly to the assembly at the Pentagon?

I feel that the day for awarding service emblems will be a suitable occasion for recognizing what civilians in the War Department and civilians all over the nation are doing to back up the Armed Services. It will afford an opportunity likewise to stress the necessity for no letdown in our war effort.

It is my hope that you will find it possible to join us in this presentation ceremony.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Harry S. Truman
WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington 25, D. C.  

5 October 1943.

ORDERS N

Subject: Award of emblems to civilian employees for faithful, meritorious, and exceptional service.

1. Civilian employees of the War Department are contributing significantly to the successful prosecution of the war. In furtherance of the Department's policy to encourage the continuance of the highest individual effort and to recognize those civilians who have served faithfully, meritoriously, and exceptionally, and pursuant to the authority of Congress establishing the use of nonmonetary awards (Section 20, Public Law 108, 78th Congress, 1 July 1943), I hereby authorize the establishment of the following emblems:
   a. Emblem for Civilian Service--presented for six consecutive months of satisfactory service.
   b. Emblem for Meritorious Civilian Service--presented for meritorious service in line of duty.
   c. Emblem for Exceptional Civilian Service--presented in special recognition of exceptionally meritorious service within and beyond the call of duty.

2. The Emblem for Civilian Service will be a ribbon bearing a device which will identify the recipient with his employment in either the Office of the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces. The Emblems for Meritorious and Exceptional Civilian Service will be distinguished by the addition of appropriate braiding to the ribbons.

3. Awarding authority for each of the emblems described above is designated as follows:
   a. Emblem for Civilian Service.--The Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces are hereby authorized to confer Emblems for Civilian Service upon eligible civilian personnel currently employed in all elements within their jurisdiction. This authority may, in the discretion of the officers named above, be redelegated to chiefs of major elements within their organizations with authority for further redelegation to appropriate officials.
   b. Emblem for Meritorious Civilian Service.--The Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces, or such persons on their headquarters staffs as may be specifically designated for the purpose, are hereby authorized to confer the Emblem for Meritorious Civilian Service on eligible civilian personnel employed in all elements under their jurisdiction.
   c. Authority to confer the Emblem for Civilian Service and the Emblem for Meritorious Civilian Service to eligible employees in the Office of the Secretary of War and the Office of the Chief of Staff will be vested in such persons as the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff may designate for their respective offices.

24-53088
4. Emblem for Exceptional Civilian Service.--The Secretary of War, or such person as he may designate to act for him, will confer the Emblem for Exceptional Civilian Service upon recommendation by the War Department Board on Civilian Awards.

4. The criteria for the awarding of these emblems, as well as the description of identifying ribbons, will be provided for by proper Regulations.

/S/ Henry L. Stimson,
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Chief:

This is not a letter to be read while you are feeling low with your cold but I hope it will be read just as quickly as you feel a little more pep. I certainly hope it will not be pushed aside under the pile.

Contrary to her usual custom, the Goddess Opportunity is knocking for the second time at your door on the subject of the National Service Act. She did so last summer and some of your wisest advisers have recently expressed the view to me that if we had welcomed her then we could have passed the bill. Now she is here again, I fear for the last time.

Our war production has for months been harassed by a series of minor strikes. These have now become greater and more ominous. Some of them are aimed at increasing the scale of wages and would thus gravely threaten the dam which we are trying to maintain for the purpose of price stabilisation. Very many of them arise fundamentally from the general failure of our people to sufficiently recognize the necessity for war sacrifice.

The combined effect of these strikes is to stir an ominous wave of resentment against organised labor both in the Armed Forces and, to an almost equal extent, in the non-organized members
of the community. This resentment is concentrating, first, on union labor itself and, second, on your Administration for being, as the critics think, unfairly favorable to labor.

The primary resentment which I wish to emphasize is that of the Armed Forces. The fundamental fact is that the country is finding itself divided into two great basic divisions: on the one side, the men who, under the compulsion of the Selective Service Act, have been forced to demonstrate their patriotism in the Armed Forces, and on the other side, those who have been left free from all compulsions to serve their country, although the need of equal service by them on the home front is now being clearly demonstrated. In other words, America sees the impact of democratic obligation falling unequally on its citizens and the injustice of this is being driven home more forceably every moment. Scarcely a letter which crosses my desk from our men overseas is not full of resentful comment on the action of labor. Such a situation bodes ill for a united nation in the hard post-war work of reconstruction when these men come home.

A similar feeling, not so profanely emphatic, is very generally cropping up towards what is alleged to be the labor policy of your Administration. Since Monday I have been carefully reading press reaction towards the taking over of the railroads. I believe that that was one of the best things you have ever done, perfectly timed and admirably executed by the officers of the Army. I had hoped to find a cordial reaction to your fine leadership. I did not. Instead
there is quite a general line of argument taken that your alleged policy towards "coddling labor" has gone so far that it is really responsible for the strikes and the gradual unsettlement of price stabilization, and that taking over the railroads was a bold but unsuccessful attempt by you to conceal the previous error.

Of course, such criticism is highly untrue and unfair. And it is often voiced by critics who are themselves as lacking in a willingness to share the war effort and war sacrifice as the most unscrupulous strike leader. But it is widespread enough, in my opinion, to make advisable on your part a step which will clearly show your true democracy and your real leadership.

That step would be to immediately ask the Congress for the enactment of a law which will make this country's attitude towards the war truly democratic and universally fair, that is, a National Service Act. My advice is that you should do this while the members of Congress are still at home getting the direct impact of the views of their constituents. I think that impact will be tremendously on the side of such a law. The Gallup Poll has shown an overwhelming and rising majority in favor of it and a percentage which is equally strong among those who would be affected by the law as among those who would not.

I well know the arguments in opposition that will be made to it but I believe they will be swamped in the general ground swell.
You will wish, however, to avoid opposition which is unnecessary. You will wish to make it clear that you will put the control of such a law in the hands of nobody who can be made a target for political suspicion, even though unfounded. The fact that in the Austin-Wadsworth Bill there is a good proposal already pending which has received the benefit of Committee hearings and discussion and which with a few easy amendments can be made satisfactory in the light of the experience which we gathered from other nations ought to make your success easier and quicker.

I hope this letter will not offend but will help you.

In the three years and a half that we have been together I have never written more earnestly.

As always,

Faithfully yours,

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
Sec. War

Fort Schuyler - N.Y.
Leave to state of N.Y. for as long a period as possible - leave to for Merchant Marine Academy with right to State to sacrifice for all but not too need to hit at N.Y. for sake.
Jan 11/44

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

My dear Mr. President,

I have just finished reading your message to Congress. In tone, in argument and in high courage it is, in my opinion, the best message you have ever sent to Congress.

I thank you and congratulate you, from the bottom of my heart, you have done more, in a great crisis of the war, to keep up the high purposes and morale of the Country than could be done.
in any way. The whole message
braches a noble spirit of courage,
patriotism and non-partisan leadership,
which should have tremendous
influence in checking the spirit
of declination which has worried
us all. God bless you for it.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Mr. Hopkins asked me to send the attached cable to Winant to the President for his approval, together with a draft of a letter to Secy. Stimson, with copy for Secy. Knox, for the President's signature.

I am also attaching the cable from Winant for the President's information.

D.J. Krauss
Secy. to H.H.

encls.
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

January 13, 1944

Dear Harry:

I hear from Winant that permission has been given by General Ulio to allow American newspapers who can find printing facilities in England to distribute their newspapers to the troops, subject to the ruling of the General in command of the theatre.

As a result of this ruling the Chicago Tribune is planning to send paper to England and print an edition there for the American soldiers. The Chicago Sun has recently asked for similar approval and I have no doubt other newspapers will be doing the same thing.

I certainly strenuously object to the Chicago Tribune being delivered to our troops anywhere in the world in view of their attitude on war.

I think the best way out would be to prohibit all American newspapers from being reprinted in the theatres of war.

Sincerely yours,

S.

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson
The Secretary of War
rm 3E200 Pentagon Bg
Washington, D.C.

CC-The Hon. Frank Knox
The Secretary of the Navy
Navy Bg.

(Longhand) Aside from the close to seditious attitude of the Chicago Tribune and their inability to tell the truth, I don't see why our ships should carry their newsprint at the expense of munitions.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

(Copy filed-Knox folder, 2-44)
JANUARY 13, 1944

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR WINANT FROM HOPKINS

THE PRESIDENT HAS ADVISED STIMSON THAT
HE IS OPPOSED TO ANY AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS BEING
REPRINTED FOR DISTRIBUTION TO OUR TROOPS IN
THEATRES OF WAR.

HARRY HOPKINS
12 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number
Filed 1737/12

Personal and secret for Harry Hopkins from Winant.

Since the Daily Mail has established an edition in the United States, the Chicago Sun has asked for facilities in England to publish a paper here, limited to a circulation of 5,000.

I have also found that General Ulio, Adjutant General, made a ruling on December 16th that all American commercial papers, who were willing to provide their own paper from their PWE quote, and who could find printing facilities in England, will receive Army aid in shipping their paper to this country. The Army, according to General Ulio's ruling, will distribute their newspapers or magazines to the troops, subject to the ruling of the general in command of the theater.

As a result of this ruling, the Chicago Tribune is now planning to send paper to England and to print an edition here for the American troops. I am told that they have been successful in finding printing facilities in the British Isles.

I am told that General Barr, Chief of Staff in ETO, has protested to Washington, saying that he does not think the general in command
in a theater of operations should be asked to decide what American newspapers may or may not be printed in his area.

I am not at all certain that these suggested publications do not lend themselves to a propaganda campaign that would be detrimental rather than helpful to establishing unity of purpose to forward our primary objective of making war on a common enemy.

I would appreciate your advice and counsel and also support in such action as you feel necessary.

No Sig
Mr. Secretary of War

The Secretary of War

My dear Chief,

Your letter of sympathy has just reached me. You are always kind and understanding and this manifestation of it is of great help at a time of keen sorrow. I am very grateful.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S.I.R.

To speak to me about this
today.

F.D.R.

Secret letter to the President, 3-4-44, from Hon. Henry L. Stimson, re problem of refusal by the Govt. Agency Review Bd. to defer vital personnel engaged in secret work carried on for most part by Office of Scientific Research and Development. Submits two possible solutions to this. Attached is suggested draft of letter for the President to send to Mr. Edgar F. Puryear, Chm., Review Committee on Deferment of Govt. Employees, War Manpower Comm.
Dear Harry:

Yes and No!

I think it would be grand if you could take a "look see" in Great Britain at the present time and it would do a lot of good for the morale of our officers and men; and also it would give you a chance to see if you find any weak spots that should be bolstered before it is too late.

On the other hand, a flight at this time is not something to be passed over lightly. I know you are well and that you could do it safely, but at your age -- or mine, for that matter -- it is a strain and I most certainly want you on deck here when May comes. You know the terrain and the problems and it is not as if the operation is wholly new to you.

If it would break your heart or make you definitely unhappy not to go -- then go by all means.

But, on the other hand, from the wholly personal point of view, I vote to have you here -- and in this vote Mrs. Stimson joins me.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.
March 30, 1944.

Personel and Secret

Dear Mr. President:

I have a rather strong feeling that it is up to me to fly over to Great Britain now and take a look around over the preparations in time to get back and give you my impressions before any final conference which you may be intending to have.

In view of my relations to the Army and this project which it now faces, I fear I should have a feeling of having left something undone if I did not make this effort. It is not what you would call a vacation trip for me at my age, but I am perfectly well and think I could do it safely. I have talked it over with Marshall and he is inclined to think I should do it.

I should like to know whether you would like to have me go. If I go, I should start very quickly for the time is short.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
July 27 1944

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

My Dear Mr. President—

I was flying back across the Atlantic while you were being renominated and therefore could not very well send you my good wishes. Not only the Atlantic Ocean, but the Western Hemisphere was between us! So I am sending you this little message to await your return.

I am too familiar with the cares and anxieties which surround the Presidency, to be able to anticipate...
much pleasure for you in the four additional years which probably lie before you now. But I thoroughly agree with the position you have publicly taken, namely, that you could no more decline the duty which is laid before you now, than a soldier could refuse to go on in the face of the enemy. It seems to me that that position is not open to argument, in the light of the struggle which faces our country today. Therefore all I do is to send you my most heartfelt good wishes for your health and strength and to pray
that the Lord will guide and preserve you through it all.
Even faithfully,

Henry l. Steenson
In re your memorandum of October 25, 1944. I think it vitally important that MacArthur should continue in military command at least until the Philippine Archipelago has been freed of the enemy and American operations, ground or air, to the south and southwest in the Netherlands East Indies have been completed. It must be remembered that his present theater includes Java and Sumatra, exclusive of Sumatra, to the borders of Malaysia and Indo China. The fall of Manila will probably not finish the job for which we are relying upon his high capabilities. If therefore he is appointed High Commissioner, it should not in any event terminate his functions of military command.

Furthermore, if you decide to appoint him High Commissioner, I think it would be wise to hold this as a highly confidential matter until the actual time of appointment. No one can tell at this time just what the picture will be when we come to the last phase of the Philippine campaign.

Your second suggestion as to another unofficial appointment causes me much anxiety. I foresee trouble and should like a chance to talk it over with you personally for five minutes before any commitments are made.

H.S.
H.I.S.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE

October 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

What would you think of my making MacArthur High Commissioner to the Philippines just as soon as we get to Manila and at the same time giving Admiral Yarnell a position where he could report in a way that the High Commissioner could not do -- sort of unofficial?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of the Interior called and said that you would recall that Gen. MacArthur did not want you to send a High Commissioner over to the Philippines. The Secretary said he thought you agreed with that at that time and also the War Department was of the same mind. However, he feels there should be a special representative of the President in the Philippines and he suggests Admiral Yarnell. He says Admiral Yarnell knows the Far East and would be a good man.

GGT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Work Conducted at NYEP During World War I and World War II.

1. The data requested during your visit to the New York Port of Embarkation has been compiled. The following tabulation indicates the comparative volume of work conducted at the Port during World War I and World War II.

| Cargo Shipped to European Theater of Operations and North African Theater of Operations M/T | World War I | 8,883,297 | 51.8 | NYEP as % of All Ports | 42,259,465 | 58.2 |
| Troops Shipped to European Theater of Operations and North African Theater of Operations | 2,052,830 | 80.7 | 3,062,217 | 70.6 |
| Cargo Shipped to all Theaters M/T | 8,883,297 | 51.8 | 76,357,577 | 33.8 |
| Troops Shipped to all Theaters | 2,052,830 | 80.7 | 4,901,147 | 44.9 |

2. The above information was obtained from the following sources:


b. Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Reports.

c. Transportation, Comparative Data, World War I, World War II, Office of the Chief of Transportation, War Department, July 1943.

d. New York Port of Embarkation Monthly Progress and Activities Reports.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

Respectfully yours,

Date: 3-18-59

Signature: Carl M. Sneed

Secretary of War.
November 22, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed draft goes as far in condensation as I believe I can properly go. To say merely that I believe that the facts do not warrant the institution of any proceedings against any officer of the Army would, I believe, inevitably give the impression that I was trying entirely to absolve all Army officers from any criticism including General Short, who has already after a careful and public review been held by the Roberts Board responsible for dereliction of duty. That is an impression I am unwilling to father.

I also believe that a statement as to the future disposition of the papers along the line of my last paragraph would relieve the impression which otherwise might arise that we are trying to keep the whole matter permanently from the country.

Yours very sincerely,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House;
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and examined such parts of the evidence taken as I deemed necessary. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a prompt decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be insti-
tuted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a present and final disposition of the matter. So far as they may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that certain officers in the field and in the War Department did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. With some but not all of these conclusions I agree.

In my opinion, the error of judgment of the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, in not adequately alerting his command, was of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This in itself is a serious result to any conscientious and sensitive officer, as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, it is sufficient action.

My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the facts do not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public at the present time the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the evidence on which it is based. Furthermore, to publish merely portions of the Board's report would
necessarily distort the facts and the conclusions, which would like-wise be against the public interest.

The report of the Board together with the record upon which it is based and together with all documents concerned with my investi-gation will be sealed and filed until, after the close of the war, competent authority may determine that the publication of these papers is in the public interest.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Date - 3-18-49
Signature - Carl S. Spaer

November 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Letter expressing gratitude to underground helpers.

General Eisenhower has requested authority to issue certificates such as the attached to members of the French, Belgian, Dutch, and Danish underground who were instrumental in effecting the escape of our personnel from enemy-controlled territory.

The British plan to issue similar certificates to those who aided their personnel, and General Eisenhower deems it highly desirable that both nations award the certificates simultaneously.

The Department of State informally agrees to this proposal, and your approval is requested.

Hugh Steimson
Secretary of War.

Inclosure.

"HLS
OK
PDR"

Carbon of this memo & the enclosure returned to the Secy. of War via Major Dulie
11/30/44
AMS

SECRET
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
HAS DIRECTED ME TO EXPRESS TO

THE GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE FOR GALLANT SERVICE IN ASSISTING THE
ESCAPE OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS FROM THE ENEMY

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army
Commanding European Theater of Operations

"OK
FDR"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The favorable progress of the war in the Pacific, as well as other developments, has resulted in a determination by the War Department that the continued mass exclusion from the West Coast of persons of Japanese ancestry is no longer a matter of military necessity.

As you know, that program was instituted at a time when an attack on the West Coast was a definite probability and an invasion on a large scale had to be considered as a real possibility. Experience in Europe had given warning of the danger of the fifth column and had shown that residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy are a greater source of danger than those of different ancestry. The vast majority of persons of Japanese descent in the United States resided in the West Coast region. Social, economic and political conditions had intensified their solidarity, strengthened their ties with Japan, and had retarded their assimilation with the rest of the population. Although the majority were undoubtedly loyal to this country, it was known that
there was a disloyal group whose number and strength could not be quickly ascertained, and who could not be isolated and separately dealt with. Under these circumstances mass exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast was felt to be a necessary military precaution.

Since that time it has been possible to examine our population of Japanese descent and to separate those who have indicated that they are loyal to Japan from those whom the military authorities have determined no longer need be excluded. This latter group will include over 90% of the population of Japanese ancestry. A considerable number of this latter group have proved their loyalty to this country in the most exacting of all tests—the field of battle. American soldiers of Japanese ancestry, fighting with courage and devotion in Italy, in France, and in the Pacific, have shown that loyalty to America is a matter of mind and heart, not of race. Many of these men were recruited from relocation centers. Many of them have families in those centers. The War Department has a definite interest in the morale of these men and feels that from this point of view alone, it is most desirable that the mass restrictions against persons of Japanese descent be not continued a moment longer than is necessary.
The present capabilities of the enemy on the West Coast include the execution of minor ground raids by air-borne or submarine-borne units, carrier-borne air attacks on a small scale, sabotage, espionage and possibly some incitement of civil disturbance. As our own military activities close in on Japan and bring the war to Japan proper, the well-known face-saving attitude of the Japanese may provoke action of some sort against our West Coast. The Pacific Coast Area remains a critical area because of the large number of important war plants which are located there and because it is the base of our supply line to the active theaters of the Pacific War. It is essential therefore that those persons of Japanese descent who have shown their strong pro-Japanese bias shall be effectively prevented from performing acts of sabotage or working with or assisting the enemy in the planning or execution of any incursion.

After due consideration of all the factors involved, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command assures me that if adequate safeguards are maintained as outlined herein, the return of the vast majority of persons of Japanese ancestry to the West Coast can be permitted without adverse effect on our
war effort.

Among these safeguards are measures to insure that the return is accomplished gradually. It is also felt to be important that there should be no let up in the efforts which are being made to relocate persons of Japanese descent in other parts of the country.

The responsibility for the actual mechanics of relocation is, of course, in the civilian agencies of government. The decision of the War Department in this matter has been communicated to the Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior. The War Department understands that the Department of the Interior intends to put into effect a program based on a gradual and orderly return to the West Coast and a vigorous continuation of the efforts to relocate persons of Japanese descent throughout the entire United States. As our part of the program, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command will be prepared, on or about December 15, 1944, to announce the termination, effective approximately a week thereafter, of mass exclusion of persons of Japanese descent and the designation of those whose present status of exclusion is to be maintained. The determination of those who will be excluded will be made as a result of an examination and an evaluation of the information which the various agencies have accumulated relating to persons
of Japanese ancestry. Persons to be excluded will be those against whom information is available showing their pro-Japanese attitude. It is expected that less than ten thousand persons will be excluded in this manner. The cases of the persons who are excluded will be automatically reviewed from time to time and such persons will be entitled to request a hearing and present evidence in their behalf.

The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command in recommending this program, and the War Department in approving it, are not unmindful of the problem presented by individuals of the type of the segregation who in the main are located at the Tule Lake Segregation Center. Among the persons detained at this camp there is a militant group composed of individuals strongly pro-Japanese in their sympathies and who in fact not only have continued to maintain and inculcate Japanese doctrines to an alarming degree, but also have shown their willingness to return to Japan to assist its war effort. No program can be put into effect without considering the possible damage which might be done if this group were permitted to be at large. The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command is preparing a list of those persons of Japanese ancestry who will not be
permitted to leave the centers because they fall within the category described above or for other reasons, pending the further examination of their cases individually. The cases of persons who are on this list will be automatically reviewed by the Western Defense Command and all such persons will be entitled to request a hearing and present evidence on their behalf. When the final determinations have been made, the War Relocation Authority will transfer all persons to be detained to a segregation center. It is understood that the Department of Justice will ultimately, to the extent that the law permits, take over the responsibility for such detention and for determining which individuals should be released from detention. The War Department and the War Relocation Authority will, of course, furnish the Department of Justice with all available information which is requested relating to the individuals concerned.

The possibility that disorders might occur when persons of Japanese descent return to the West Coast has been considered. Some initial opposition is to be expected. The War Department is interested in this question because any serious trouble might result in
retaliation against American soldiers who are held as prisoners of war by the Japanese. The return should be facilitated by an announcement which the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, plans to make, to the effect that only those persons who are cleared by the military authorities are being permitted to return. When this is known, I am confident that the common sense and good citizenship of the people of the West Coast is such that the inauguration of this program will not be marred by serious incidents or disorders.

The matter is now the subject of litigation in the Federal Courts and in view of the fact that military necessity no longer requires the continuation of mass exclusion it seems unlikely that it can be continued in effect for any considerable period. The institution of the system which permits the orderly return of the bulk of the people subject to the safeguards outlined above seems preferable to the alternative of risking an unfavorable court decision with the confusion and disorder which would attend a sudden and unplanned return.

[Signature]

Secretary of War
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
COPY OF LONGHAND MEMO WRITTEN BY
THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF
WAR AND SENT HIM DECEMBER 18, 1942

Dear Harry:

In regard to the W. M. C.
I think McCloy should represent the War Dept. This is after very mature thinking on my part. Will you please put him on.

F. D. R.

(A copy of this memorandum has been given to Mr. Anglin for his files, as per Mr.'s instructions.)
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Dear Mr. President,

I have never been heard by you on this matter of the W.M.C.

The reasons against McClay serving there are of major importance to me and to the War Dept., not to the W.M.C. I really think I should be heard.

Can I see you alone for a moment before you go?

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

1725.
Dec. 20, 1944

NOTE:

Tell President of conversation with Stimson.

[Signature]

P.S. F. Stimson

War
Memorandum for the President.

There is attached a statement on the need of the Army for more nurses.

I recommend that the Selective Service Act be extended to cover registered nurses between the ages of 19 and 45, with certain exceptions based on unusual hardship. A draft of appropriate legislation is attached.

I recommend also that in a public statement or in a message to Congress you call attention to the need for more nurses for the Army and recommend legislation extending Selective Service to cover registered nurses.

The Red Cross is starting a drive to get us more nurses. While I appreciate this effort, I believe that it will not get results in sufficient time to fill the need.

Enclosures

Thurston

Secretary of War.
### Army Nurse Corps Strength with Monthly Accessions and Separations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Strength as of Approximately Last of Month</th>
<th>Number Procured During Month</th>
<th>Separations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>37,050</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>198</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>38,085</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>157</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>38,896</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>197</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>39,671</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>40,026</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>204</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>40,140</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40,453</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>42,112 <strong>Δ</strong></td>
<td>900 <strong>Δ</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Δ** As of 22 December 1944.

**Δ** Estimated at 900.
AN ACT TO INSURE ADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
UNITED STATES of AMERICA in Congress Assembled, That Congress hereby de-
clares that to provide adequate medical care for the Armed Forces of the
United States it is imperative to secure immediately the services of addi-
tional trained and skilled women Nurses.

2. Every woman residing in the United States who on any day set for
registration shall be between the ages of nineteen and forty-five years and
who shall at that time have been registered for and admitted to the practice
of nursing by any State, Territory or Possession of the United States or by
the District of Columbia is hereby made subject to registration and selection
for and induction into the land and naval forces of the United States under
the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. Except as other-
wise provided herein or by regulations under said Act, such registration, se-
lection and induction shall proceed in accordance with the same procedures and
be subject to the same exemptions, rights and obligations provided for male
registrants by said Act and regulations thereunder.

3. No such woman registrant who is married and not living apart from
her husband or who has a child under eighteen years of age or whose induction
would otherwise occasion unreasonable hardship shall be liable to induction
and no such registrant who is pregnant shall be accepted for induction or re-
tained in Service.
4. In the selection of registrants for induction in a manner which will best preserve adequate civilian medical care the Selective Service System will avail itself of the advice and assistance of the Procurement and Assignment Service of the War Manpower Commission.

5. Any such registrant inducted into the Land or Naval Forces shall be assigned only to medical duty in which her special professional skills and training will be used in accordance with military requirements.

6. This Act shall not affect the voluntary recruitment of qualified women for the Army or Navy Nurse Corps or the appointment of members of such Corps as officers in the Army or Navy as now provided by law.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

I had no intention of sending the Universal Training message to Congress until about two months from now at the earliest period. Will you tell General Marshall?

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Both General Marshall and I feel it is imperative in the interest of maintaining the proper public perspective toward the supreme seriousness of the war effort and the necessity of devoting all of our attention to its vigorous prosecution, that at this time there be no public discussion of post-war matters such as universal military training. We have advised the appropriate Committees of Congress of our convictions on this subject and have been assured of their cooperation.

In order not to embarrass the Congress, and particularly the Woodrum Committee on Post-War Planning, it is recommended that you withhold your promised message to the Congress on universal military training until the current manpower and production crisis has eased.

If you desire further details as to the War Department's position in this matter, I should be glad to present them to you personally.

[Signature]

Secretary of War.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

If you have any urgent messages which you wish to get to me, I suggest you send them through the White House Map Room. However, only absolutely urgent messages should be sent via the Map Room. May I ask that you make them as brief as possible in order not to tie up communications. If you have very lengthy messages the Map Room officer will have to exercise his discretion as to whether it is physically possible to send them by radio or whether they will have to be sent by pouch.

F.D.R.

(Identical memos sent to all Cabinet Members. Memo, 1/19/45, from Adm. Brown re this is filed - Adm. Brown folder, 2-45.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

I think you should read this. Please speak to me about it at your convenience.

F.D.R.

Secret memo for the Pres., 3-3-45 from Hon. Jas. F. Byrnes, re expenditures for the Manhattan project and no assurance of production.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. JUN 6 1972
By L. J. Stewart Date