The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Reference is made to your secret memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations of August 10, 1936, copy of which is attached hereto.

The espionage report from Hawaii to which your memorandum referred is now being studied by the Joint Board. Two other matters not covered in that report, but which were mentioned in your memorandum, are within the cognizance of the War Department. The Navy Department has therefore requested the War Department to give you the information you desire thereon.

The plans relating to the Japanese population of the Hawaiian Islands, so far as that population would affect our defense of those Islands in war, are believed to be up-to-date and to be based on sound principles. In general, the Joint Defense Plan drawn up by the responsible Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii assigns the control of aliens and alien sympathizers in all the islands to the Army. This control will be exercised by the Army through an organization known as the "Service Command," recently established by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The Service Command is organized in time of peace in skeleton form under a senior officer on the staff of the Department Commander. In war that Command would be the link between the military and the civil control forces in the Territory. It will be charged with the control of the civil population and the prevention of sabotage, of civil disturbances, or of local uprisings. It will function on all the islands, utilizing certain National Guard units, police, other civilian organizations, and units of "limited service men" when mobilized. It should be greatly aided in its control of potentially hostile Japanese by the local knowledge of its agents. It will, when necessary, receive the backing of Regular Army units.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-17-59

Signature- Carl I. Spier
At the instigation of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the question of the defense of the island of Hawaii and other outlying islands against landing parties has recently been studied by the General Staff. As a result of that study, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, has been informed that the War Department considers the garrisoning of these islands in time of peace to be impracticable from an economic standpoint and to be of doubtful value from the point of view of the defense of Oahu. It is a pleasure to note that your comment on this matter, relative to the difference between the mere occupation of the outlying islands by an enemy and their use by him as a base of operations, closely parallels a line of reasoning which led to the War Department's decision not to attempt to garrison those islands in time of peace.

Should we be able, however, very materially to reinforce the Hawaiian Islands immediately before a major war in the Pacific or in the early part of such a war, as is contemplated in our plans for that emergency, a different situation would be presented. Under this situation the War Department has informed the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that he may use a part of his war garrison on such of the outlying islands as the situation may warrant.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary of War.

Enclosure

Copy of Memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, August 10, 1936.
SECRET

August 10, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

In regard to enclosed memorandum of June thirtieth:

1. Has the local Joint Planning Committee (Hawaii) any recommendation to make?

2. One obvious thought occurs to me -- that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.

3. As I told you verbally today, I think a Joint Board should consider and adopt plans relating to the Japanese population of all the islands. Decision should be made as to whether the island of Hawaii could or should be defended against landing parties. From my personal observation I should say offhand that it would be extraordinarily difficult, as the Island is quite far from Oahu. The chief objective should be to prevent its occupation as a base of operations against Oahu and other islands. Its mere occupation, without the possibility of making it a base, would accomplish little for an enemy. As I remember it, there is only one small harbor -- large enough perhaps for a few destroyers and submarines -- and that other anchorages are merely open roadsteads.

Please let me have further recommendations after studies have been made.

F.D.R.
Please accept my appreciation of your appointment as conveyed in your message just received stop I fully understand and approve the temporary designation stop my wish and desire has been that you would take only such action which gave paramount consideration to your best interests for November stop my loyalty my service my gratitude = harry h woodring.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 19, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Will you speak to me
about this?

F. D. R.

Memorandum from the Chief of Staff
in re Vacancy for Commander of
Second Corps Area, together with
memorandum from Colonel Watson.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET
May 22, 1937.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I do not think that this report is satisfactory. It is based wholly on deductions rather than on first-hand information.

Just as an example, the citation of visits of naval vessels to the coast line of lower California as evidenced is wholly absurd — the officers and men see nothing of what goes on one hundred feet back from the beach.

I should think G-2 could arrange for some individual or individuals to cover the whole of lower California and procure a careful check. It should not cost much or take any great length of time.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reported Movement of Japanese to Lower California.

1. In view of a current report concerning recent movement of Japanese to Lower California in excessive numbers it is believed that the following information is of interest:

Japanese immigration to Mexico, beginning in 1897, prospered until 1910 after which time it stagnated as a result of domestic disturbances following the overthrow of the Diaz regime.

According to Mexican official statistics there were some 3,623 Japanese living in Mexico in 1927, 4,310 in 1930, and 4,563 in 1933. Of the 1933 total there were approximately 1,200 in Lower California. In 1934, according to a Japanese official source, the total number of Japanese in Mexico was 5,360. However, in the same year (1934) reliable information indicated that the Mexican Government computed the actual total number of Japanese in Mexico as 8,609, including those entering the country illegally. Therefore, if we include an additional 116 Japanese who were granted Mexican citizenship in 1933, it is probable that there were approximately 8,800 Japanese residing in Mexico in 1934. Later statistics on the subject are not available but a fair estimate, based on the assumption as to 1934, would give a total number of from 10,000 to 12,000 Japanese living in Mexico at the present time.

It is known that the Japanese continue to seek colonization privileges in Mexico, and that during the last three years there has been a considerable increase in apparently legitimate fishing activities on the West Coast - particularly in the Gulf of California; however, there are no reliable indications that the Japanese are entering Lower California or any other port of Mexico in abnormally large numbers.

In view of the aridity of Lower California, the
clandestine influx of large numbers of Japanese into areas other than developed localities is not probable without an accompanying importation of foodstuffs and other materials necessary to sustain life. The movements of such materials have not been detected by the usual reliable sources of information available to the War Department.

The Mexican Government is promoting a colonization plan in Lower California which contemplates a million colonists there, 100,000 to be composed of foreigners. This plan emphasizes that all foreigners must be susceptible of easy assimilation by the Mexican race - a condition which would seem to be difficult of attainment by the Japanese. The plan also provides that most of the colonists are to be indigent Mexicans now living in southwestern United States and Agrarians from the densely populated regions of Central Mexico. Up to the present little actual progress has been made in bringing settlers to Lower California.

2. Considering the alertness of the United States Consul on the West Coast of Mexico, the periodic visits of our naval vessels to the coast line of Lower California (the last one was in April, 1937), and the continued watchfulness of the War Department agencies both in Mexico City and on the United States - Mexico international boundary, it is believed that there are no reliable indications of any large influx of Japanese into Lower California.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 11 - 37

Mr. President:
I have gone over Mr. Wirtwettl's
record - I am convinced
he is admirably fitted
& qualified as to business
ability to fill that duty. War.
As to political - etc. I
have not investigated.

Henry M. Treadwell
To the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Franklin:

I read in last Friday's edition of the New York Times an editorial about the position of Assistant Secretary of War. Immediately I "knew the answer". On Saturday I telephoned Jim about Good Neighbor League matters and in the course of the conversation asked him to suggest to you the name of General William I. Westervelt, now vice-president of Sears, Roebuck & Co., one of the clearest thinkers and one of the most ardent New Dealers that I know. General Westervelt is a West Pointer with a brilliant war record. He retired shortly after the War and went to Sears, Roebuck & Co. with General Wood. He lives in Winnetka and is a close friend of mine. He is 59 years old, a man of pre-eminent organizing abilities and great experience in purchasing and merchandising. In 1933 he was loaned by Sears, Roebuck to Secretary Wallace and helped organize the A A A. Secretary Wallace knows him well and so does Chester Davis. I know that he is about to retire from Sears, Roebuck & Co. and believe that he is available for public service.

Yours sincerely,

James L. Houghteling

June 7, 1937
Memorandum for the President
From Sec. Woodring
July 2, 1937.

In re-Japanese Activities in Mexico, Central America
and Panama.

Letter from Welles to Pres. on top in re-Des Portes letter.

SEE--Japan folder-(S) Drawer 2--1937
August 6, 1937

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Please read this letter from Congressman O'lason, which I have acknowledged, especially the "amendment" which he states was "suggested" by the War Department.

In view of the fact that it was well known to the Engineer Corps that this matter, for the past two weeks, has been in process of being worked out by the President in cooperation with the War Department, the Federal Power Commission and leaders in both branches of the Congress, I cannot understand the process of reasoning by which the Engineers proposed an amendment to a member of the Congress, which they have apparently worked out themselves.

If this thing keeps up, I shall have to ask you to issue an order to the Corps of Engineers that no communications or suggestions will be
made by the Engineers to individual members of the Congress except through the Secretary of War and the President.

The Corps of Engineers is not only under the Secretary of War and the President as a part of the administrative branch of the Government, but it is also under the Secretary of War and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, by virtue of their being part of the Army of the United States.

F. D. R.
August 5, 1937

Franklin D. Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Since writing to you on August 4, 1937, relative to the Connecticut River Flood Control Compact, it has been suggested to me that the amendment proposed by the War Department to H.J. Resolution 435 for the consent of Congress to this interstate Compact might be made broad enough to include the Federal Power Commission, in such terms as to protect all rights of the Federal Government. The amendment suggested by the War Department is as follows:

"AND WHEREAS, the said compact has been approved by the legislatures of each of the States as provided therein: Therefore be it

RESOLVED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, That the consent of Congress is hereby given to the compact hereinbefore recited: PROVIDED that nothing therein contained shall be construed as impairing, diminishing, or in any manner affecting the jurisdiction duties, rights and powers committed to and vested in the War Department by the Flood Control Act approved June 22, 1936, and amendments thereof, or by any other law of the United States, with respect to the matters dealt with in the compact.

Sec. 2. That the right to alter, amend or repeal this joint resolution is hereby expressly reserved."
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

August 5, 1937

Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States.

The proviso therein contained is in effect the new matter suggested by the amendment.

Letters which have already been received from the Commissioners for Vermont and Connecticut indicate clearly that the Commissioners from the various states did not intend through the Compact to abridge in any way the rights and powers of the Federal Government, its Departments and Commissions. I, therefore, believe that such a provision as suggested by the War Department, broadened to include the Federal Power Commission and any other affected body, might well be satisfactory.

Realizing that this matter is of outstanding importance to the people of the Connecticut Valley, I am again writing to you on this subject, following my letter of August 4.

Respectfully yours,

Charles R. Clason
Sept. 8, 1937.
Memo from Woodring

Report of status of Airplanes due under contract with the War Department.

SEE--War Dept. folder-Drawer 1--1937
August 24, 1937

Letters in re-recalling of Gen. MacArthur from Phillipines by Craig.
Letter from Steve Early to Sec. of War attached.

SEE--War Dept. folder----Drawer 1---1937
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum containing a detailed report as to numbers of Japanese and their distribution and activities in Lower California and on the West Coast of Mexico.

It will be noted that there appears to have been no recent material increase in numbers, and the total numbers in the area designated do not appear to exceed 3,200.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

1 Incl. - Memorandum
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Japanese Nationals in Mexico and Reported Movement of Japanese to Lower California and the West Coast of Mexico.

References: a. Special Map of Mexico (Attached).
b. War Department Memorandum for the President, dated 5/21/37.
c. War Department Memorandum for the President, dated 7/2/37.

1. Pursuant to the indicated wishes of the President, the War Department has been engaged since June 9, 1937, in gathering factual information through its own agents, operating in Mexico, relative to the number and activities of Japanese in Lower California and on the West Coast of Mexico. The results of this investigation, conducted by three secret agents from the United States, have just been secured, and the area covered by these agents (see map) comprises Lower California and the West Coast Mexican States of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit. In addition to the foregoing, the State Department, in compliance with a request made by the War Department on April 29, 1937, completed, as of July 14, 1937, a survey of this subject by American Consuls to include the entire Republic of Mexico, but with special reference to Lower California and West Coast Mexico. This survey is referred to below.

2. As a result of the War Department secret-agent activities the following information on the number of Japanese in the below indicated areas has been developed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Investigated</th>
<th>Verified No.</th>
<th>Additional No. (Estimated)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Lower California (less Mexicali Consular District)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mexicali Consular District</td>
<td>(1210)(^x)</td>
<td>2000(^x)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. West Coast of Mexico (States of Sonora, Sinaloa and Nayarit)</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>2163</td>
<td>2674</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^x\)Agent carried no written records therefore this number is indefinite but included in the total 2,000.
The agent to Lower California (exclusive of the Mexicali Consular District) was in the field two months, covered a travel distance of 3,880 miles (from Tijuana L.C. to Cape San Lucas L.C., - an air-line distance of 750 miles) of which 3,490 miles was by motor, 350 miles by mule back, and 40 miles by boat, and visited 88 localities well distributed throughout the area.

The agent to the Mexicali Consular District reported that he made an exhaustive survey of that entire area by visiting most of the habitable localities and securing definite reports from the more remote places.

The Agent in the West Coast of Mexico area was in the field 2½ months, traversed the entire length of the area, and visited 111 localities generally distributed throughout the three states of Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit.

None of the three agents reported any indication of any recent appreciable influx of Japanese in any of the areas visited, and all reported that the general Mexican attitude toward the Japanese was hostile except in labor council activities.

The peninsula in the vicinity of Turtle Bay (circled in red, Area 1 on Map) was not visited by the agent in that area due to its inaccessibility by means of land or small boat routes. The situation in this locality is therefore unknown, but our Navy Department has been requested to secure definite data on this isolated portion of Lower California as soon as practicable.

In Lower California it appears that the occupations of the 88 Japanese are as follows: 31 ranchers, 1 mining engineer, 2 tanners, 12 transients (in Tijuana), and 42 sailors of whom 30 (3 believed naval officers) are at Cape San Lucas and 12 (all believed to be naval officers) are at Magdalena Bay. Of the 118 additional Japanese estimated to be in this area, 100 were ostensibly engaged in fishing activities along the west coast between San Quintin and Cape San Lucas, and the remaining 18 were engaged in pearl fishing in or near La Paz.

The agent to the Mexicali Consular District reported his positive conclusion that there were not over 2,000 Japanese in that area and that the large majority of these live in the irrigated portions of the Mexicali Valley where most of them are engaged in agricultural pursuits; some few are shopkeepers in Mexicali and Tijuana, and some are engaged in fishing along the Gulf of California coast.

The agent to the West Coast of Mexico area reported that very few of the Japanese residents there are farmers (due to the Mexican Agrarian Movement) and that, in general, they are engaged in such occupa-
tions as barbers, doctors of medicine and of dentistry, photographers, fishermen, and small shopkeepers. At Guaymas, Sonora, about 50 Japanese are engaged in a fishing activity.

3. Although the War Department's secret agents have confined their activities to investigating Lower California and the Western Coastal States of Mexico, the American Consul General in Mexico reported on July 14, 1937, that the estimated total number of Japanese in all of Mexico is 5,300 (1,650 in Lower California and 1,000 along the west Coast of Mexico proper) and that the total number of Japanese immigrating to Mexico between January, 1931, and November, 1936, was 689. Also, this estimate indicates that during the past two years (1935-36) only 215 Japanese have entered Mexico (155 of these entered Lower California). Incidentally, in this connection, neither War Department agents nor our Consuls in Mexico have found any indications of recent clandestine entry into Mexico by the Japanese.

In his report, the Consul General calls attention to the fact that it was impossible for all Consuls to obtain accurate figures, but that the stated totals (see Inset on Map) were considered to be fairly accurate. Due to the fact that the Consul General's 1937 report gives the total number of Japanese in Mexico as nearly 700 less than the 1930 Census (5,997) of the Japanese Consul General in Mexico, the 1937 report of the former is considered to be too small. However, since the estimate is the result of a survey of the past 90 days (the data in each Consular District being developed independently), it is believed to be a fairly reliable indication that no large increase in numbers of Japanese has occurred in any portion of Mexico during the past two years. The reports of the three War Department secret agents confirm this estimate.

4. Undoubtedly there has been a considerable increase, during the past three years, in the apparently legitimate Japanese fishing activities in Lower California and in the Gulf of California (especially at Guaymas, Sonora). Also, there are indications of Japanese activities in Labor Councils; of their recent attempts to secure concessions of various kinds (one being an unsuccessful attempt to get control of a cannery near Magdalena Bay; another an attempt now being made for a salt-bed concession at Scammon's Lagoon (near Turtle Bay); of their entering the harbors along the Pacific coast of Lower California, ostensibly surveying fish cannery sites; and of such activities as were reported (but unconfirmed by the War Department agent) in the Mexicali Consular District to the effect that a Japanese Man-of-War anchored near the mouth of the Colorado River two years ago (1935?) and sent landing parties ashore, the members of which studied the terrain through field glasses and made written notes on their observations.

It is indicated that the areas bordering the Gulf of California are frequently subjected to the usual Japanese trait of gathering
information of actual (or assumed) military value. It is also indicated that there are frequent circulating visits among West Coast Japanese residents by individuals who appear to be "floaters" from one community to another and have no known occupation. Since the Sino-Japanese armed conflict began, all Japanese nationals on the West Coast of Mexico appear to have been canvassed by agents collecting funds "for the war in China."

In general, however, the bulk of information gathered by the War Department agents conducting this investigation, and the survey of the American Consul General as well, indicate that there are no recent concentrations of Japanese nationals in any particular area, that the Japanese agriculturists are hard pressed by the present Mexican Agrarian Movement, and that those Japanese who live in the towns are engaged in vocations such as doctors, dentists, photographers, and small shopkeepers, with a certain amount of circulation which may or may not be of a business nature.

5. In view of the facts gathered during the past three months by the secret agents of the War Department, and also from the recent survey of the American Consul General in Mexico, it is believed that there has been no recent large Japanese influx in any part of Mexico and that at the present time there are probably not more than 2,200 Japanese in Lower California and 1,000 along the West Coast of Mexico. It is further believed that the War Department estimate of from 10,000 to 12,000 Japanese in Mexico is a liberal one and that this number, according to the American Consul General may be as low as 5,300.

6. This subject will continue to have the special attention of the War Department and, in addition to the liaison which now exists with the State Department, the cooperation of our Navy Department has been requested in order that the War Department may be informed as to the situation in the coastal area (Turtle Bay) of Lower California which, due to lack of facilities and natural obstacles, the War Department Secret Agent was unable to visit either by boat or by overland travel.

Any material change in the situation on this subject will be reported promptly to the President.

1 encl.

Secretary of War.
Director of Procurement,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Director:

In compliance with your letter dated September 8, 1937, Subject: Aeroplanes due under contract, there is attached hereto a report of the Status of Airplanes Due Under Contract with the War Department.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Secretary of War.

Incl.
![Image](https://example.com/)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Contractor</th>
<th>Quantity Contracted For</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Plane</th>
<th>Price Per Engine</th>
<th>G.F.E.</th>
<th>Delivered</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
<th>Estimated Date of Delivery</th>
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<td>100</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
<td>$9,422</td>
<td>$4,400</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>16,408</td>
<td>15,617</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>June 1938</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jan. 1939</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bombers</td>
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<td>Feb. 1938</td>
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<td>Seversky Aircraft Corp.</td>
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<td>Pursuit</td>
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<td>9,598</td>
<td>4,189</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Stearman Aircraft Company</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>Trainers</td>
<td>14,445</td>
<td>5,263</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>July 1938</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Nov. 1938</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Combat</td>
<td>28,914</td>
<td>7,799</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Jan. 1938</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Observation</td>
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<td>Jan. 1938</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-Place</td>
<td>10,686.90</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>Jan. 1938</td>
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<td>Amphibian</td>
<td>114,868</td>
<td>13,892</td>
<td>7,029</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Apr. 1938</td>
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<td>Autogiro</td>
<td>34,782.42</td>
<td>****</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Delivery indefinite due to strike.

** 117 Regular Army, 33 Organised Reserves, 40 Navy.

***Estimated.

**** Airplane Complete.

This report does not include four experimental airplanes which are being purchased under secret contracts.

Total amount of unobligated balance of funds available for new planes yet to be contracted for is $16,294,060, see next page.
### ADDITIONAL CONTRACTS IN PROGRESS OF PROCUREMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Contractor</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Estimated Price Completed</th>
<th>Price Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Curtiss Airplane Co.</td>
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<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>$83,835</td>
<td>Service Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell Aircraft Co.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>292,661</td>
<td>Service Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Aviation, Inc.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bombers-2-eng.</td>
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<td>Exercise Option</td>
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<td>Bombers-4-eng.</td>
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<td>Northrop Corporation</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Attack</td>
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<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Transport 2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Circular Proposal opens 12/28/37</td>
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<td>Amphibian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Basic Trainers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Stearman Aircraft Co.</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Observation</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Basic Combat</td>
<td>24,457</td>
<td>Exercise Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Basic Combat</td>
<td>24,457</td>
<td>Exercise Option</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*National Guard  
**Organized Reserves

The procurement of these airplanes will leave no unobligated balance.
An American National Policy that is
Unqualifiedly Pro-American

1. It is evident that the influences which led America into
the World War are again at work. The arguments used are somewhat
altered. The objective is the same — to commit the United States
to the employment of armed force to any extent necessary to support
British policy in the present world situation. The proponents of
this policy assume that the fate of America depends upon that of
the British Empire. They do not know and they do not enquire what
sacrifices in American life and resources will be involved.

2. The argument is, of course, fallacious. The United States
are a natural economic and military entity. No nation is so little
dependent upon the fate of others. The strategic isolation of our
position combined with our continental resources give us a unique
position — one that can be defended successfully against the re-
mainder of the world. The technical military improvements discussed
hereinafter which have lessened our ability to intervene overseas,
have increased our capabilities for defense at home.

To this natural economic and military self-sufficiency, the
British Empire presents a complete antithesis. It is a highly artificial
structure, its elements widely dispersed about the globe. It was created,
largely through force, under world conditions that no longer obtain.
To assume that it can continue to survive indefinitely in its present
scope, embracing a quarter of the world's land surface, is illogical.
3. What sacrifices in life and resources will America be called upon to make if it is to underwrite the British Empire in a major conflict? Under favorable circumstances they may not exceed those incurred in the World War. A result more likely in view of probable prospective alignments, will be the exhaustion of America. Conditions will differ notably from those that obtained in the World War, because of:

a. The re-alignments among military Powers and the changes in national military strengths.

b. The technical developments in means of defense. These seem likely to have the far-reaching result of segregating the world into distinct strategic areas, not easily penetrable by military (including naval) force from another area. Examples (discussed below) are afforded by the immunity of Japan to armed intervention in China by any Power other than Russia, and by the situation in the Mediterranean.

4. By the fortification of the Luchu, Formosa, and Pescadores Islands, Japan has created a strong bastion enclosing the East China Sea and converting it into a Japanese lake. A penetration in force of that sea could not be undertaken until after the capture of the Japanese bases, an operation which in each case would resemble that at Gallipoli. If American forces are to be employed an earlier obstacle has to be overcome, that presented by the Mandated Islands. In brief, armed intervention in China by American, or Anglo-American, forces, would involve a war of at least several years' duration, of a magnitude such that the cost in life and money is incalculable, and one that short of the subsequent armed
The occupation of Japan would be unlikely to yield permanent results.

5. Until recently the control of the Mediterranean was determined by supremacy in capital ships, supported by suitable bases. British control not only sufficed to assure it for their own use, but enabled them to deny it to others. This situation has been irrevocably changed by the advent of aviation and the submarine. Any Power bordering on the Mediterranean can render that sea an unsafe highway for others.

This change in the strategic aspects of the Mediterranean is one of notable significance in its bearing not only upon European but upon World developments. It accounts in large part for the comparative impotence of the British vis-à-vis the present Far Eastern situation.

6. In view of the foregoing it is relevant to point out:

a. The foreign policy of every country save our own has been based solely on self-interest. In each the foreign service personnel is made up of men who are intensely realistic, motivated solely by the interests of their own country; who are historically well informed and aware of the military implications of every proposed political action; and who are not susceptible to the flattery, social or otherwise, of the nations to which they are accredited.

b. Our own representatives abroad have not always shown an equal singleness of purpose in support of American interests. At times they have accepted the point of view of the nations to which they were accredited, unaware of or ignoring its bearing upon American interests.

More today than in the past it is essential that all our representatives abroad be strongly American in character, distinctly pro-American in their point of view, and alert to detect in foreign proposals
any feature having a tendency to involve America in war over an issue not vital to American interests.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

November 27, 1937.

I am sorry but it is at last necessary to cut the Gordian knot relating to space for the State Department.

I understand that the Director of the Budget is arranging to move out of about 40,000 square feet of space heretofore occupied by him in the Munitions building.

This space should be occupied either by the Adjutant General's office or by such other space now occupied by the War Department in the State, War and Navy Building as the Secretary of War may determine.

I am fully conversant with the desirability of having the Adjutant General in fairly close proximity to the office of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, but something has to be done to relieve the present situation, and either the Adjutant General or other Officers of the Army should move to the Munitions building.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

As soon as this is done the
State Department can occupy absolutely
essential space vacated by the Army
in the State, War and Navy Building.

F. D. R.

Copy to:
The Acting Director of the Budget
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1938.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In our conversation on the 20th instant you indicated that you would give consideration to the addition, in your Supplemental Message to Congress on the "Needs of the National Defense", of certain matters most essential towards forwarding the readiness of the Army, as well as that of the Navy, to operate promptly and effectively.

I take the liberty of pointing out that already, due to previous assumptions in the press that the Navy only was to be considered, there has been marked inquiry from Members of Congress as to why Army needs, particularly in items essential to properly support the Navy, were not also to be recommended. I believe the inclusion of certain items, vital to more rapid preparedness, not only will still these inquiries and guide the thought of the Congress in the right direction, but is truly justified under the present world situation.

To present these items succinctly, I attach a suggested paragraph for inclusion in your message. The items therein total $30,000,000; however they are mentioned in priority so that a lesser amount could be included should you so desire.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

encl.
Suggested paragraph for President's Message.
NEEDS OF THE ARMY

There are certain things also necessary to be done at this time for the Army, which are not included in the estimates of the War Department for the fiscal year 1939 now before the Congress. The majority of these items contribute immediately towards the ability of the Army to cooperate with the Navy. It would be unwise not to consider these matters from the broad viewpoint of the National Defense as a whole.

The fact that numerically our Regular Army is one of the weakest in the world renders it all the more imperative that in equipment and organization it be kept abreast of modern developments.

To meet the more pressing deficiencies I recommend to Congress a program, which the War Department will substantiate in detail, totaling approximately $30,000,000.

Such a program should include urgent deficiencies in anti-aircraft materiel, $8,880,000.

It should provide authorization for and the initiation of a system of reserves which would bring the Regular Army from its peace strength of one hundred and sixty-five thousand enlisted men to its war strength in a very short time. We have many fine young trained soldiers, including many valuable technicians, annually discharged from the Regular Army, who would be glad to come back to serve their country on a moment's notice in an emergency. A small retainer fee, once accepted, would serve to make this inclination binding, definite and immediate. Seventy-five thousand such reservists would add immeasurably to the effectiveness of the forces available in the earliest days of an emergency. Such a system would require but
$450,000 for the first year. It would stabilize in four years at
$1,800,000.

To enable our arsenals and factories more rapidly to produce
the munitions of which there are now considerable shortages, we should
employ at this time a minimum of 6,080,000 for gauges, dies and aids to
manufacture. This is by no means the total needed for this purpose but
it will shorten considerably the period before production matches demand.

For miscellaneous ordnance equipment, exclusive of anti-aircraft
material, but including semi-automatic rifles, machine guns and mortars,
anti-tank weapons, certain new howitzers, medium tanks and fire-control
equipment for field, coast and railway guns, $6,200,000.

To ameliorate certain deficiencies in the ammunition situation,
previously explained to the Congress, I recommend $8,470,000.

While the sum of $90,000,000 is far from meeting the needs of
the Army at the outbreak of an emergency, it will more adequately equip
our earliest needed forces; insure more rapid production if need be; and
considerably strengthen the military arm of the national defense in its
ability to support the Navy. Only critical items unobtainable commercially
in the time or quantity required at the outbreak of an emergency are in-
cluded.
The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

With further reference to my letter of January 24, 1938, enclosing a suggested draft of a paragraph for your supplemental message on National Defense, and with particular reference to the items of the program detailed therein, the War Department estimates withdrawals from the Treasury as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For the program of antiaircraft materiel</td>
<td>$6,800,000</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Reserve</td>
<td>450,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauges, dies and aids to manufacture</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous ordnance equipment exclusive of antiaircraft</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>materiel</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deficiencies in ammunition</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>1,970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td><strong>$23,650,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,350,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total for the fiscal year 1940 withdrawals would not be completed until after six months, as a minimum, had elapsed.

Respectfully yours,

Secretary of War.

[Signature]
Very Conf.
From President
Memo to the Secretary of War and Navy

Attaches telegram for their information in re-German
and Italian planes bombing in Spain.

SEE--Navy folder-Drawer 1--1938

Feb. 29, 1938.
Dear Mr. President—

Christmas I received such a good looking pair of suspenders that I had a pair made for you—by Elizabeth Hawes, my designer—and when she found they were for you she sends them with her compliments added—

Cordially,

Army Day—April 6th, 1938—

Mary—
April 29, 1938.

Confidential Telegram from Wilson--Germany

To Cordell Hull

In re-Helium

Attached letter from Cordell Hull to President and copy of his letters to Sec. of the Interior, copy of Sec. Swamson's letter to Sec. of Interior and copy of Sec. Woodring's letter to Sec. of Interior. All dealing with the exportation of helium.

SEE--Hugh Wilson-Foreign file-Drawer 2--1938