

● P.S.F. Subject File

James F. Byrnes

Box 121

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*PSF. Byrnes folder
1-42*

Subject File

October 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DIRECTOR BYRNES:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Memo to the Pres. from Ed Pauley Oct. 5
suggesting that 2 farmer representatives
on Byrnes' board be people reflecting
the Administration's viewpoint.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 29, 1942

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

*PSF: Byrnes folder
1-42*

*Subject
File*

*file
personal*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to your proposal that a person be appointed to perfect plans for distribution of food for relief of people in occupied countries immediately upon cessation of hostilities, an objection was offered that the army would be in control at that time.

Would it not be possible to commission your appointee so that he could immediately carry into effect through the army of occupation his predetermined plans for relief?

J. F. B.



PSF: Rymon J. Miller
Subj: Fish
1-44

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON


NOV - 2 1942

My dear Mr. President:

A recent letter from the Chairman of the War Production Board informed me that the entire question of food was undergoing a comprehensive study. The Washington newspapers of October 31 and November 1, 1942, mentioned that the appointment of a food administrator had been recommended by the Chairman of the War Production Board, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. Having had no part either in the study of the food problem or in drafting the above recommendation, I must urge that consideration be given to certain aspects of the Nation's food resources and production, as well as the administration thereof, that involve responsibilities and functions of the Department of the Interior. These duties do not appear to be well understood by the present Food Requirements Committee of the War Production Board, nor are they recognized appropriately in any food programs that have been initiated or developed up to the present time.

The commercial fisheries of the United States and Alaska produce annually about five billion pounds of fish and fishery products, the bulk of which is used for food. This important source of protein food ranks second in volume, following pork and beef, among the various sources of animal protein. The fisheries also provide our only source of Vitamin-A oils, industrial oils used in manufacturing war materials and munitions, fish meal for animal feeding, and other essential by-products that cannot be derived from other sources in adequate quantities if at all. The Department of the Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service, is responsible for the maintenance, conservation, and development of the fishery resources of the Nation. Although its regulatory functions are limited to the fisheries of Alaska, the Department is responsible for biological and technological research, economic development, and the formulation of over-all policies and programs for the fisheries. However, the States rely on the Department to provide the scientific and economic foundation for their regulatory and administrative functions.

You recognized the importance of the fisheries in the war program and the responsibilities of the Department of the Interior by designating the Secretary of the Interior as Coordinator of Fisheries and by establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries in Executive Order No. 9204, dated July 21, 1942. This additional responsibility has been discharged diligently. I report with considerable regret, however, that the lack of direct representation of the Department of the Interior on the Food Requirements Committee established by the Chairman of the War Production Board on June 4, 1942, has resulted in con-



orig. with MR. Rymon, 10/10/42 to Secy. Interior + Genl. filed in War file

siderable confusion and duplication of effort in the handling of fishery and other food matters of direct concern to the Department.

In addition to the Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries and the Fish and Wildlife Service, functions and responsibilities directly concerned with problems of food production and allocation are exercised by the Office of Indian Affairs, the Grazing Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, all of the Department of the Interior.

In order that the Department of the Interior may carry out its duties in producing and maintaining food supplies essential for the war program, I respectfully request an opportunity to present the claims of the Department for direct participation in planning before final action is taken on the appointment of a food administrator, or the establishment of any new or revised food-planning organization. This request is prompted by my earnest desire to insure that the Department functions efficiently and that its responsibilities and interests in the Nation's food program are coordinated effectively with those of other Departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HAROLD L. ICKES

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

PSF: Byrnes folder
Subject File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File on Bankhead Bill

8.660

MBZ O, 4 2

21 of Byrnes 3/31/43

PSF: Byrnes folder
Subject File 2-43

file
personal



RESORT HOTEL IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

The SHOREHAM

Connecticut Avenue at Calvert Street

Washington, D.C.

Meems.

Davis said would accept, but had to tell his Board of Directors on Tuesday.

I do not think you can tell Patten until you have told Wickard. Patten would tell someone in confidence, and Wickard would learn of change through newspapers. I suggest for conference:

1. Your plan to confer with leaders, Wickard.
2. Patten sent you an elaborate Farm Program. You have not had time to study details, but had asked me to talk with you about it. Ask him about it.
3. What he thinks of furloughing Dairy Workers.

J. F. B.

(966)

*PSF: Byrnes folder
Subject File*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND FILE.

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Chester C. Davis, 4/13/43, to the President, returning confidential communications in re Mexican Farm Labor Program, etc. Copy of Mr. Davis' letter retained for our files.

Food Production and Distribution Administration

April 13, 1943

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the confidential communications you sent me and I am very glad to have had the opportunity to read them. They were neither shown nor mentioned to anyone.

The writer of these communications was, I believe, unduly apprehensive; most if not all of his fears will prove groundless.

Here is my comment on a few of the points raised:

1. Col. Taylor is not seeking any modification in the contract with Mexico. On the contrary, he is advising such grower groups as have favored modification that we do not go along with them.
2. The Mr. Robertson referred to is not being placed in charge of the Mexico City office, although he is checking on some features of operations there for Col. Taylor under a temporary appointment. Mr. Robertson is a friend of C. C. Teague; I do not know his politics; I am advised that he was born in Mexico, knows Mexican people, and is now a reputable and successful farmer in California.
3. Our office in Mexico City is being operated by Mark Brown of the Farm Security Administration in Texas. Col. Taylor believes Mr. Brown is an excellent man for this work and says Brown is doing a good job.
4. So far as I know, no one connected with our Farm Labor Administration is in favor of throwing the border open for more or less uncontrolled movement of labor over the international line. I have questioned Col. Taylor particularly about this and he favors carrying on with the existing international agreement.

2-The President-April 13, 1943

5. There is no intention of creating "labor pools" to create surplus labor conditions in areas of farm employment. The policy is to arrange for importation of labor only where bona fide employment orders are on hand.
6. My position on H. J. Res. 96 and the Senate amendment thereto was set forth in my testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee a few days after I arrived here. I opposed H. J. Res. 96 on the ground that it was too restrictive, all funds being allotted, in effect, to the State offices in Agricultural Extension Service, leaving the Administrator little or no freedom to use other agencies where and how they would be more efficient and desirable. I would have opposed similarly any legislation placing the entire management in the hands of the Farm Security Administration. I asked the Senate Committee to consider making funds available to the Administrator, under suitable safeguards, leaving him free to use all of the agencies for that part of the work which each is qualified to do best.

I would welcome the opportunity to bring Col. Taylor to call on you and discuss any of these matters with you. He is very much of a doer and I am sure many of the things he and I attempt here will not be completely satisfactory to the Farm Security Administration and probably will not be satisfactory either to any of the other agencies involved.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed) Chester C. Davis

Administrator

*PSF Byrnes folder
Subject file 2-43*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
personal*

April 20, 1943

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES F. BYRNES *J.F.B.*

Since you left the city, the press has continued to write of the censorship planned for the Food Conference. It is surprising that they have succeeded in arousing as much opposition as they have in this trivial matter.

Sunday the Newspaper Publishers Association and the Associated Press met at New York. Roy Roberts, in his first speech as President, criticized what he called the censorship. I learned that later they would consider a resolution criticizing the plan to deny the American people the opportunity to know what was being done about their food supplies. There have also been criticisms in the Congress.

One point made by the critics made an impression. They declared that if our newspaper men were not given the news, the British representatives would cable the news to Britain and our people would receive the news from the British press.

This morning I got Hasset to show me the transcript of your press conference. The only two questions asked you were answered in a humorous way, each answer provoking laughter. I concluded it would be best for Jones to give out the enclosed statement. I talked to Hull, and he thought it would be all right. Acheson has been before Congressional committees the last two days and has stated that final arrangements had not been made. The advantage of injecting Jones into it is that he has not been quoted in any of the statements previously made by the State Department, and his having been a member of the Congress may cause them to believe that he may give them more favorable consideration than if the matter is left entirely with Hull and the State Department.

Jones can be relied upon to say nothing until he has conferred with Hull as to plans. However, he thinks that a plan could be worked out whereby the press would not be admitted to the meetings, but that at the conclusion of each meeting the Chairmen of the various committees could be authorized to make statements to the press.

Harry Hopkins and I concluded it was the wise thing to do and that it should be done promptly so as to make those newspaper orators in New York get some other bone to chew on. I think we have destroyed several prepared speeches, at least hope so.



FOR THE PRESS

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OES-12
APRIL 20, 1943

Statement of Judge Marvin Jones, Chairman of the Delegation from the United States to the International Food Conference.

I think that the press reports about the secrecy of the Food Conference, whether intentional or not, are making a mountain out of a mole hill.

I have taken the trouble to read the transcript of the President's Press Conference when the subject was discussed on March nineteenth. The President was asked whether newspapermen would be permitted to cover the food conference when it occurred.

The President replied facetiously that he hoped not, and his reply was greeted with laughter.

This report indicates the humor in which the President replied to the question. In any event, the President has never expressed to me as Chairman of the Delegation any views as to the publicity of the conference. I expect to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull and I have not the slightest doubt that arrangements will be made which, while not permitting representatives of the press to attend executive sessions, at the same time will give to the press all the information as to the proceedings that our newspaper representatives would believe right under the circumstances.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF: Byrnes folder
Subject File
file
personal
2-43
[5/3/43]

JAMES F. BYRNES

Director

DEAR GRACE:

I told the President over the telephone the contents of the enclosed memorandum, but I want you to have this for your files.

J. F. B.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 3, 1943

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES F. BYRNES

IN RE: CONNALLY BILL

This morning I made to Tom Connally the following statement which I had previously written in shorthand:

"Last night I spoke to the President about your bill. He said that having appealed to the miners to return to work today and being advised that Lewis had ordered the miners back to work Tuesday, he did not want to propose the introduction of anti-strike legislation or to express an opinion as to such legislation."

Connally stated that he understood and it was all right, and asked, "Why wouldn't it be wise for the President to just lay off the subject entirely and let us go ahead and do what we please?"

I told him I was sure that was your attitude. He asked if I would send him the memorandum I had previously prepared for use in case it was determined to be necessary. I told him I would gladly do so but I would want him to consider it confidential and that I would not want to be quoted in connection with any legislation. He said he would, of course, respect my views and that he intended to have the Legislative Counsel draft an amendment for him and wanted my memorandum solely as a suggestion.

I submit this statement for your files.



file Personal BF Byrnes folder
Sent to J. F. Byrnes
Subject file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

May 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Anna Rosenberg just phoned to say that Bill Green had asked her to get a message to you that he hoped very much that the interpretation on the Executive Order with reference to the Little Steel Formula could be gotten out as speedily as possible because he does not believe he can hold his people in line much longer.

JLL

PSF

Byrnes folder
Subject 2-43
File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

I would like to talk this
over with you tomorrow morning, if
possible.

F.D.R.

Memo for the Pres. from Dr. Lubin
re current cost of living. May 8th

PSF *Byrnes folder*
Subject File *file* *2-43*
Confidential

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 19, 1943

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Federal Security Agency includes the following:

Social Security Board
Public Health Service
United States Office of Education
Federal Advisory Board for Vocational Education
Civilian Conservation Corps
Food and Drug Administration
Columbia Institution for the Deaf
Freedmen's Hospital
St. Elizabeths Hospital
Howard University

Arthur J. Altmeyer is Chairman of the Social Security Board and has no jurisdiction over the other divisions within the Social Security Agency. He was for a while Deputy to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, but, as I recall, he resigned from that post last winter.

The change you consider making could, therefore, be effected by having McNutt resign as the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, retaining his post as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

While the New Federal Security Administration would be subject to the directives of the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, that should present no insuperable difficulties. Some of the divisions in the Labor Department are now subject to such directives.

James F. Byrnes



PSF: Byrnes folder
2-43

file
Personal

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 26, 1943

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: JAMES F. BYRNES *JFB*

IN RE: TAX BILL

You told me to tell Doughton that if the Democratic conferees decided the best they could do was to compromise by splitting the difference between 50% and 75% forgiveness, you would approve the bill.

I determined that Doughton was so anxious to get a bill that if I made this statement to him, he would be encouraged to compromise at a higher percentage. I, therefore, told him that reluctantly you had agreed that if the Democratic conferees agreed on 50% forgiveness you would approve the bill.

Later Jere Cooper and Doughton came to see me stating that in their opinion the only way to secure a bill would be for the House conferees to agree to 75% forgiveness and 100% forgiveness for taxpayers paying \$50.00 or less. Cooper was not in favor of agreeing to anything higher than 50%. He agreed this position would mean no bill.

Doughton later advised me that Vandenberg and Knutson had agreed that the Republicans when they went back to Senate and House would move to instruct conferees to agree to the 75% forgiveness. The House, which had come within eight votes of instructing its conferees to agree to the Senate Ruml plan, would certainly concur in the 75% forgiveness. Doughton thought this would be a more difficult bill for you to veto.

I emphasized to Doughton that I had no authority to say that you would sign any bill higher than 50%. In my conference with Doughton and Cooper, I did tell them that if the Democrats agreed to 60%, I would take it up with you and present their views, but I knew it would be a waste of your time and mine for me to present to you a request to sign a bill higher than 60%.

Mid-day Tuesday Doughton wanted me to meet with the House conferees. I told him I could not do so. He said the Senate conferees would not budge from the 75%. He wanted me to advise you. I told him I could not get to see you Tuesday afternoon and even if I could, I knew it would be useless to present that proposal, because 50% was all you had ever committed yourself to approve.

I tell you all this so that you may know you are not committed by any statement of mine to approve the bill as agreed upon and, therefore, you are free to take whatever course you think best.



T-103

PSF Byrnes folder
Subject File
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY
FILES.

F.D.R.

Confidential memorandum to the President,
May 26, 1943, from Mr. Lubin, re cost of
living.

BSF *Byrnes folder*
Subject File *2-43*
file
personal

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 29, 1943

JAMES F. BYRNES
Director

Dear Mr. President:

You certainly punished Arthur Krock. His friends needled him about his doghouse story. I think his come-back will give you a laugh. Here's the telegram:

"Anytime you think I can turn a doghouse into the White House itself, just let me know. It doesn't seem impossible now. Highest regards."

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes
JAMES F. BYRNES.

The President,
White House



2nd DRAFT

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on a sound basis of well-considered legislation.

PSF
Byrnes
Subject File

To convert America back to peace will be costly, very costly -- as it was costly to convert it originally to war. The price we shall have to pay is a part of the cost of the war; and, in the Nation's bookkeeping, it should be charged as a part of the cost of the war.

But no matter how many billions it may cost, it will still be cheap compared with the cost in reduced national income and in human suffering and misery, which would result if we were to allow our vast plants to remain idle and our tens of millions of war workers and service men to be demobilized into unemployment.

I again urge on the Congress the necessity for speedy action along these lines.

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file PSF. Byrnes folder
Subject File 12-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Jimmy Byrnes telephoned to say that the Conferees have agreed on the Anti-Strike Bill. Jimay thinks it is a bill that you can sign. He says it looks all right. It will be taken up tomorrow.

GGT

(1279)

hw

*BF Byrnes folder
Subject File*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

Will you speak to me about
this at your convenience?

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, 6/14/43, in reference to memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, 6/8/43, and memorandum left by Admiral Leahy with the Secretary of State on 6/11/43, regarding foreign petroleum reserves. This memorandum begins "(1) For many years past the Department of State has recognized the imperative necessity, now set forth in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that this country possess adequate foreign petroleum reserves - both in peace and war situations"

PSF Byrnes folder
2-43
Subject File

June 26, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

As an outcome of discussion held in the Office of Justice Byrnes, representatives of State, Navy, War and Interior Departments met to consider the situation presented by our prospective shortage of domestic petroleum reserves and the consequent imperative need to assure adequate foreign reserves, and the best means of proceeding to that end. They in addition gave particular attention to the situation in Saudi Arabia. They have agreed upon a signed report which we are transmitting to you. We concur and support this report. You will note that if one of its main recommendations is to be put into effect, that is, the creation of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, it would be most desirable that this action

be

The President,

The White House.

Orig. copies filed in George Jones folder, dr. 2-43.

(Report sent to Secy. of Commerce, 6-29-43 as per memo attached to orig. copies.)

- 2 -

be taken before July 1.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

James Forrestal
Acting Secretary of the Navy

Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior

Enclosure:
Report.

EA:HF:LWW

Covales

PSF *Byrnes folder* 2-43
Subject File
July 16, 1943

Under the President's new Executive Order directing the Office of War Mobilization to unify and coordinate the foreign activities of our civilian war agencies to make them conform with State Department policy, there is a chance to clear up many of the things that have caused confusion and ineffectiveness in the past.

I believe that all men traveling abroad for the civilian war agencies should travel on State Department auxiliary passports and probably should be technically employes of the State Department.

All instructions from the civilian agencies to their representatives abroad should go through the State Department channel to the area director in the field and through him to the mission members.

The area economic director for a foreign field should have almost as great freedom of action within his sphere of authority as the commanding general has in his.

The area economic director should have full authority to shift the duties of, transfer, or send home any civilian working under him. Although the different Washington agencies should initially provide the personnel for most of the functions, once the men reach foreign soil they should be working only for the United States and under the area director's instructions rather than for any particular agency.

*PSF Byrnes folder
Subject File
File 2-43
personal*

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 23, 1943

James F. Byrnes
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

The President might be interested in
the enclosed letter from Bennett Clark.

J.F.B.



WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
DAVID I. WALSH, MASS.
ALBION W. BARKLEY, KY.
TOM CONNALLY, TEX.
JOSIAH W. BAILEY, N. C.
BENNETT CHAMP CLARK, MO.
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA.
PETER S. SERRI, R. I.
JOSEPH P. SUFFEY, PA.
EDWIN C. JOHNSON, COLO.
GEORGE L. RADCLIFFE, MD.
SCOTT W. LUCAS, ILL.

ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., WIS.
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH.
JAMES J. DAVIS, PA.
HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., MASS.
JOHN A. DANAHER, CONN.
ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO
JOHN THOMAS, IDAHO
HUGH A. BUTLER, NEBR.
EUGENE D. HILLIKH, COLO.

CHRISTIE S. KENNEDY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

Washington, D. C.
July 20, 1943

Honorable James F. Byrnes
Director of War Mobilization
The White House

Dear Jim:

As I told you the other day, it seems to me a very peculiar fact that Milo Perkins called me up on the morning that Henry Wallace's blast on Jesse Jones was being given out to urge me to read this diatribe before I went to the floor. As a matter of fact he called my office sometime before I got in. You may recall that the Senate was meeting at 11:00 o'clock during the closing days of the session. Owing to the illness of my wife, with which you are familiar, I did not arrive in my office until about 9:30. I then received a message that Mr. Perkins had called me with the urgent request that I call him as soon as I came in. Mr. Perkins said he was sending a statement to me by special messenger and made the urgent request that I read it before I went to the Senate with the plain implication that I might wish to say something about it on the floor. I agreed to read the release and did actually read part of it. Inasmuch as it comprised some thirty-eight pages closely mimeographed, I did not have an opportunity of reading the whole of it before I went to the Senate.

I had never been well acquainted with Mr. Perkins in fact had only met him on two or three occasions. I am not a member of the Appropriations Committee and have never been involved in this fight. The only reason I can think of why Mr. Perkins might have concluded that it was desirable for me to read this release before the Senate met that day was that in the heat of debate a couple of days before I had taken a few free cracks at Jesse Jones. Evidently Mr. Perkins concluded that there was some feud going on between Jesse and myself which would lead me to take advantage of the BEW release of that day for further attack on Jesse.

Honorable James F. Byrnes

-2-

7/20/43

I am as much mystified about the whole business as you were when I told you about it.

I think the President did a swell job in his order cleaning up the situation.

With affectionate regards, I am

Your friend,

Rec.

bcc:k

PSF: *Byrnes folder*
Subject File 2-43

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

James F. Byrnes
Director

file

September 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

FROM JAMES F. BYRNES.

Let the President know that this morning I talked to Nelson and as a result he has agreed to send for Dewey at once, appoint him Rubber Director, and agree to work with him. Dewey has promised to meet Nelson in the same spirit. I do not know how long it will last but while it lasts, we are fortunate. I have destroyed the letter appointing Dewey.



OFFICE OF MR

PSF: Byrnes folder

file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

FROM: JIMMY BYRNES

Let the President know that this morning I talked to Nelson and as a result he has agreed to send for Dewey at once, appoint him Rubber Director and agree to work with him. Dewey has promised to meet Nelson in the same spirit. I do not know how long it will last but while it lasts we are fortunate. I have destroyed the letter appointing Dewey.

*File
Byrnes*

*PSF Byrnes folder
Subject File*

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

September 21, 1943

James F. Byrnes
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM JAMES F. BYRNES: *JFB*

It occurs to me, now that Russia's approval of the organization of UNRHA has been secured, that it should be possible to effect the much needed unification of our foreign economic activities in a single agency. A few shifts, which could now be made in the top officials of the various agencies involved would facilitate this unification.

My thoughts are running along the following lines:

1. If you have not definitely decided the appointment of the Under-Secretary of State, move Stettinius to that post.

In his business, Stettinius demonstrated executive ability. Through his Lend-Lease experience he has had an opportunity to study our foreign policies. In Lend-Lease he has surprised us by developing an organization which has functioned without internal dissension and has won the confidence of the Congress. He got a unanimous vote in both Houses extending the Lend-Lease law, which was the subject of bitter controversy when originally passed.

He is a Democrat and has been loyal to you. He has not been very active politically and would not antagonize any particular groups.

2. With Stettinius out of Lend-Lease, create an enlarged agency, which should include Lend-Lease, OEW, OFEC and OFRHO. In this agency would be centered virtually all the foreign economic operations of the



United States. This would greatly lessen if it did not put an end to the intolerable conflicts abroad. It would be an independent agency but subject to the foreign policies of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State.

Make Leo Crowley the head of this agency. He is on good terms with Hull.

3. Make Lehman a Special Assistant to you with direction to organize immediately the United Nations' Relief Agency. That is what you originally had in mind that he should do. Stalin having agreed to the State Department plan for the United Nations' organization, Lehman could now proceed to perfect the International organization. Many details will have to be settled. Let him take only a small staff to help in the negotiations with the United Nations necessary to get UNRHA started. Make plain to him that while he is doing this, he should not assume any administrative responsibility for OFRHO. That is an American and not a United Nations unit. Because it is an American unit, it will be a division of the agency of which Crowley would be head. That agency would apply to Congress for the funds to be contributed to the United Nations' organization which Lehman would head. Crowley could get money for the purpose easier than could Lehman. Certainly, Lehman as head of the United Nations organization could not also be the head of a division of the State Department or Lend-Lease and he could not expect Congress to directly appropriate money to the United Nations organization.

4. When UNRHA is actually organized and ready for operations, so much of OFRHO staff as Lehman wishes to use in UNRHA could be transferred to UNRHA.

5. OFEC is a new division of the State Department, established to coordinate the activities of these several economic agencies.

It has some very capable persons in the small organization established to date. They should be transferred to Crowley's Lend-Lease -- OFW outfit.

(2193)

Amo

RSF Byrnes folder 2-43
Subject File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

I think Nelson must appoint
Cooke. Maury Maverick's appoint-
ment would be very badly received.
Please tell him so.

F.D.R.

Memorandum from Hon. James F. Byrnes,
12/17/43, in re Smaller War Plants
Corporation. Refers to letter which the
President received from Sen. Murray
recommending appt. of Morris L. Cooke
to head the Corporation. Mr. Byrnes
states that his own opinion is that if
Nelson does not want to appoint Cooke,
Maverick's appt. is about the best dispo-
sition.

PSF: *Byrnes/edu*
Subject File 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

JUSTICE BYRNES

I think that is fine about
Hannegan and we should go ahead
and put it through as quickly as
possible. Please arrange to
have him come in to see me,
preferably with you.

F. D. R.

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

*fill
personal
Sunday*

James F. Byrnes
Director

Memo. for the President:

Jack Cochran knows Hannegan intimately. Says that the only criticism that could be made of him, is that two years ago he, along with the State Chairman and other Democratic leaders tried to prevent the seating of the present Republican Governor who had won by about 3500 votes. It seems the Legislature has to announce the election of a Governor and the Democrats were in charge of the Legislature and kept the Governor out of office for about 50 days. It does not impress me. Hannegan was only Chairman of the St. Louis organization, not State Chairman.

Jack says Hannegan's personal life is beyond criticism. He is a lawyer, and had an income the last few years of about \$40,000. When the question is asked why he took the job of Collector, the answer is that the man's name is Hannegan. He is politically minded. Having been in the political game, he wanted political recognition. Will tell you more about him later.

I am satisfied he is the best available man.

J.F.B. *J.F.B.*

Since writing above, I talked with Bennett Clark. He is most enthusiastic about Hannegan. Says he does not want him to accept Chairmanship; would rather have him as Commissioner. Hannegan however has talked to him about it and says if the President wants him to take it, he will accept.

The above indicates I can still operate a typewriter - but the old grey mare is not what she used to be. J.F.B.



PSF: *Byrnes folder*
Subject File 2-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

JUSTICE BYRNES

I wish to heaven that our
friends and colleagues would not
contribute to the Dewey Campaign
Fund.

F. D. R.

Merry-Go-Round - July 12, 1944 which
appeared in Louisville, Ky Courier
Journal "Dewey Campaign Backer Has
Job Inside White House" (Fred Seals, Jr)

*PSF: Byrnes folder
Subject File 2-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

This is just one of those little pieces of gossip. Please tear it up.

However, you might cast an eye over what Commander Hyatt is alleged to have done with Crowley's overseas surpluses.

F. D. R.

Unsigned memorandum or excerpts from letter written to Mrs. Roosevelt.

PSF: Byrnes folder 2-41
Subject File
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1944.

PRIVATE

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

The enclosed is one of those
brainstorms that happens to hit the
bull's eye. It is, of course, premature
even to talk about it at this moment
but things are going so fast that the
need of something like this is apparent.
The trouble is that I cannot cut you in
two, using one half here and one half
in Europe without detriment to your
comfort.

Tell Maude she can get a new Paris
bonnet in Paris.

F.D.R.

One of the most important and difficult tasks confronting us on the defeat of Germany will be the economic controls to be established over that country and the reorganization of German economy as a means of preventing any future German aggression. This would include the reconversion of German industry from war production to the needs of reparations and peace time uses and the possible dismantling of certain industries altogether. It is presumably our intention to divide the large landed Junker estates and to break up the powerful German industrial combines. To do this, in cooperation with our Allies, will require the appointment on the American side of a man with outstanding qualifications. I can think of no one better equipped for this task than Mr. James F. Byrnes.

He should be given the personal rank of Ambassador and sent to London to work with the nucleus planning group which General Eisenhower has set up and move into Germany later. The importance and difficulties of the job cannot be over-emphasized.

(Taken from memorandum from Sec Hall.)

Subj. file

PSF Byrnes folder 2-44

file personal

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.



JAMES F. BYRNES
DIRECTOR

September 13, 1944

Dear Mr. President:

I have not previously replied to your memorandum as to the appointment of High Commissioner to Germany because last Saturday afternoon Harry called to ask my decision. I assumed that he was asking at your request and when I gave him my answer, concluded it was not necessary to bother you with a letter as you were leaving for Quebec.

I want you to know, however, that I greatly appreciate your offering me the appointment. I did not accept because I do not think that I have any special qualifications for that particular service. I do not speak German and from my experiences in Germany, I realize how dependent one is upon an interpreter. This would be particularly true where one was acting in an administrative capacity. I think there are many others more competent for that particular post.

One difficulty I anticipate is the ratification of a treaty providing machinery for the preservation of peace. I was interested in that cause in 1919 and am still interested. If in the Senate we should have the difficulties I anticipate, as Commissioner in Germany, I could be of no service. As a private citizen, speaking, writing, and conferring with my former colleagues in the Senate, I may be able to render a service that others would not be in position to render.

But the purpose of this letter is to express my appreciation of your kind offer to appoint me.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes
JAMES F. BYRNES.

The President
The White House

PSF - Byrnes folder 2-44
Subject File

October 4, 1944.

Dear Jim:

I did not have the slightest idea that you were going abroad until this moment and now you are about to leave. I had assumed from what you said to me that you were going away for just a few days. I hope you have a wonderful trip and wish much that I could go over too.

As soon as I get back from Hyde Park, where I hope to get over this rotten cold, I will get the lists out for the new appointments, but I doubt if I do anything about it before you get back.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Director, Office of War Mobilization,
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file preserved . *BF Byrnes folder* 2-44
Subject File

October 18, 1944.

Dear Jimmy:-

Now that you are back I do hope that you can act favorably on some of the many demands for you as a speaker. I have known of several places that wanted you and while you were away I told them all they would have to "hold their horses" until you returned. I think you ought to decide on dates fairly soon because, as you know, I want you, of course, in the campaign and you can speak not only well but authoratively.

As ever yours,

Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Director of War Mobilization,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

October 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Leo Crowley called this morning to say they have Jimmy Byrnes scheduled to make a speech on October 23rd from 10:30 to 11:00. Mr. Crowley spoke to Jimmy this morning and he said he would have to find out from you if it was all right. He said you had never asked him to make a speech. Mr. Crowley suggests that you either ask him or write a note suggesting that he make this talk.

GGT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U. S.
OFFICE OF MAJORITY LEADER

Dear Mr. President:

I was requested
by a delegation from
the C. I. O. of Mass.
to leave the within
with you for your
consideration and
attention.

Very respectfully yours,



Byrnes folder BF
2-46
Subject File

The days between now and V-E Day have a value out of all proportion to their probable number. We need a program to tie the executive and legislative branches of government together with leaders of the major interest groups in the community, industry, labor, agriculture, civic and religious organizations.

There are two parts to such a program:

1. A movement to make V-E Day a day of national re-dedication to the winning of the war and the establishment of a lasting peace.
2. The organization between now and V-E Day of such measures as are necessary to maintain war production at the highest possible level and at the same time to make full use of America's remaining productive resources of men, materials, and machines.

The majority and minority leaders of Congress have an opportunity to make a non-partisan contribution to both parts of this program. The President would undoubtedly welcome assurances from them that both Houses of Congress and both major parties are prepared to support after V-E Day the Administration's program for winning the war with the same display of unity they have given hitherto. He would undoubtedly also appreciate any suggestions which these leaders might care to give him as to a program for keeping America's productive activities at their present peak levels.

Such a program to be effective requires a general agreement between government on the one hand and representatives of industry, labor, and agriculture on the other hand. The President would greatly speed up the development of such a program if he would tie together the Advisory Committee to Justice Byrnes and the Postwar Committees of the House and Senate. He might do this by calling in the Byrnes Advisory Committee and instructing them to begin the preparation of such a program and empowering them to secure the necessary information from public and private sources. He might then bring together these members of the Advisory Committee with the ranking members of the House and Senate Postwar Committees and the leaders of the House and Senate.

Topics which should be included in such a program are:

1. An agreement on an orderly reconversion plan for use after V-E Day.
2. An agreement on a general wage increase to go into effect before V-E Day.
3. An agreement on a reconversion price policy after V-E Day.

*file
Secret*

PSF: Byrnes folder 2-45

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

I wish you would let me have your thought on this. I feel rather strongly that the trial should be handled by the Secretary of War and I have no objection, just as he has no objection, to the help of the Department of Justice.

I want as little publicity as possible and, on the whole, the trial could be conducted at Governors Island with the least amount of publicity.

F. D. R.

P.S. Please return enclosures with your comment.

1. Letter to the President from the Secretary of War, dated Jan. 7/45
2. Memo from S. T. E. to S.I.R.
3. Letter to the President from the Attorney General, dated Jan. 8/45
4. Memo to S.T.E. from S. I.R.

PSF: Byrnes folder 2-45

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
Confidential*

February 22, 1945

James F. Byrnes
Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Schneider, who submitted to me the attached memorandum, was formerly with the War Shipping Administration. For some months he has been advising me on shipping. Army, Navy and War Shipping will agree as to the accuracy of his figures. The statement is so encouraging, I submit it to you.

J. F. B.
J. F. B.



20 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Justice Byrnes
FROM: F. Schneider
SUBJECT: Shipping Position

The estimated deficits in War Shipping Administration shipping continue to disappear. January and February, for which two months the Combined Military Transportation Committee estimated in its paper of January 12 a deficit of 143 sailings, will come out even. March, for which the Committee estimated a deficit of 87 sailings, now promises to be at least in balance. Judging by developments in the first quarter, essential War Shipping Administration requirements should be met in the second quarter. Meanwhile it is clear that a very moderate reduction in United Kingdom commodity stocks will eliminate the deficit in the British shipping position shown in the Combined Military Transportation Committee paper.

The figures for the first quarter now are as follows:

	<u>CMTC - 1/12/45</u>			<u>Revised - 2/20/45</u>		
	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Total</u>
January	- 7	-50	-57	- 8	+11½	+ 3½
February	-43	-35	-88	- 1	+ 1	0
March	-36	-51	-87	+21	Still Indefinite	

The deficits are disappearing principally because excessive requirements are being reduced as actual berthings approach. This is illustrated by the following tables:

ATLANTIC COAST

	<u>January</u>		<u>February</u>		<u>March</u>	
	<u>CMTC</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>CMTC</u>	<u>Revised</u>	<u>CMTC</u>	<u>Revised</u>
Total Requirements	565	565	571	516	578	529
Total Available	558	557	528	515	542	550
Balance	- 7	- 8	-43	- 1	-36	+21

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

Commerce Dept. letter, 11-15-72
By SLR, NARS Date JAN 26 1973

PACIFIC COAST

	January		February	
	<u>CMTC</u>	<u>Revised</u>	<u>CMTC</u>	<u>Revised</u>
Total Requirements	268	211	277	228
Total Available	218	222½	242	229
Balance	-50	11½	-35	1

On the Atlantic the principal reductions have been in the requirements for military operations in Italy, where plans for expanded activity were relinquished, and in those for relief in the Balkans where previous estimates of unloading capacity were greatly exaggerated. While the figures show a January deficit of 8 ships, it should be noted that this is after including in requirements 52 additional sailings for British aid in advance of their due date. These sailings were made in order to use the ships.

The table appended gives the details of the Atlantic situation for January, February and March.

On the Pacific the effects are being felt of the instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to theater commanders to the effect that ships must not be used as warehouses and that requirements must not exceed what can be discharged. In January, for example, the Combined Military Transportation Committee paper listed an Army requirement for the Southwest Pacific area of 69 ships; this was subsequently reduced to 32. For the same month, the Navy's Pacific requirement was reduced from 120 to 92; but 109 ships were berthed. The situation in the Pacific in March is still obscure; present indications are that the Army will reduce the Combined Military Transportation Committee requirement of 108 to about 90 but the Navy's ultimate figure is not yet available.

Some of the reduction in requirements has been due to inability to provide cargo at the ports. While this condition was accentuated by the bad weather, it is becoming apparent that the traffic through our ports is nearing their capacity and that at New York it has already passed winter capacity. Altogether one may say that during the first quarter the amount of shipping available will be at least adequate in the light of cargo availability and loading capacity at ports in the United States and reception capacity abroad.

[REDACTED]

COMPARISON OF ATLANTIC REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABLES IN COMBINED MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE REPORT OF JANUARY 12, 1945
WITH ACTUAL BERTHING IN JANUARY AND REVISED ESTIMATES AS OF FEBRUARY 20, 1945

	January		February		Estimated Berthings	March	
	Required	Berthed	Requirements CMTC	Revised		Requirements CMTC	Revised ^{3/}
<u>United States Army</u> ^{1/}							
United Kingdom and North Continent	204	219	228	233	233	221	216
South France	55	(119	65	89	89	66	66
Italy and Other Mediterranean	68)	103	52	52	113	70
Persian Gulf	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
China, Burma, India	8	8	3	3	3	1	1
Pacific	12	10	20	4	4	20	10
Total Army	<u>348</u>	<u>357</u>	<u>420</u>	<u>382</u>	<u>382</u>	<u>422</u>	<u>384</u>
<u>United States Navy</u>	29	22	30	14	14	30	34
<u>TOTAL MILITARY</u>	<u>377</u>	<u>379</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>396</u>	<u>452</u>	<u>398</u>
<u>War Making Capacity of Western Hemisphere</u>	21	20	12	15	15	12	15
<u>British Aid</u>							
North Atlantic	73	61	20	24	24	16	16
Other	47	44	29	29	28	30	30
Total British Aid	<u>120</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>46</u>
<u>Russian Aid</u>	36	37	36	34	34	36	37
<u>Liberated Areas Aid</u>							
French North Africa	5	12	6	7	7	5	7
Southern France	1	1	2	2	2	3	3
Northern France	4	3	9	7	7	10	10
Italy	1	0	2	1	1	2	1
Balkans	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
Belgium	0	0	4	0	0 ^{2/}	4	8
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Eastern Europe	0	0	1	1	1	2	3
Total Liberated Areas	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>33</u>
<u>TOTAL LEND LEASE AID AND CIVILIAN</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>178</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>131</u>
<u>Total Requirements</u>	565		571	516		578	529
<u>TOTAL Available</u>	558	557	528		515	542	550
<u>Balance</u>	- 7	- 8	-43		- 1	-56	21

^{1/} Includes Civil Affairs

^{2/} No cargo available

^{3/} Estimated berthings are expected to correspond with revised requirements.

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Commerce Dept letter, 11-15-77
SIC JAN 26 1973

4110
Ans

PSF Byrnes folder
Subject File 2-43-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JIMMY BYRNES.

You will get this probably after you see me. We are a day out and the trip has been excellent thus far. I think your press conferences have been grand.

"F.D.R." F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to Justice Byrnes.

PSF: Byrnes predca 2-44-

*file
secret*

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.



JAMES F. BYRNES
DIRECTOR

March 3, 1945

Box 121

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum as to the shipping situation is very interesting.

I am looking into the possibility of diverting to France, Belgium and Holland some of the 24 additional ships tentatively allocated to the British.

J.F.B.
J. F. B.

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.



March 2, 1945

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO: Justice Byrnes
FROM: F. Schneider
SUBJECT: Shipping Situation

A genuine surplus of merchant shipping on the Atlantic coast in March has developed since my memorandum to you of February 20. Some embarrassment may be experienced in bringing forth enough cargo to fill the ships.

Whereas it was estimated in the Combined Military Transportation Committee paper of January 12, 1945 that 542 ships would be available on the Atlantic coast in March, it now appears that there will be approximately 600.

15 additional ships have been allocated to the Air Corps to take bombs to the United Kingdom, and the total military requirement on the Atlantic is now 411 ships as compared to 398 on February 20. 10 additional ships have been allocated to United States civilian requirements; 24 additional have been allocated to British Aid; and 14 more have been put into aid for the liberated areas. After these additional allocations, it appears that there will still be a surplus of 10 ships.

The details of the March position are given in the table on the following page:

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Commerce Dept. letter JAN 11 26 1973

By SLR NARS Date

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COMPARISON OF MARCH ATLANTIC REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABLES IN COMBINED
MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE REPORT OF JANUARY 12, 1945 WITH
REVISED ESTIMATES AS OF FEBRUARY 20, 1945 AND MARCH 1, 1945

	<u>Requirements</u>		<u>Allocations as of 3/1/45</u>
	<u>CMTC 1/12/45</u>	<u>Revised 2/20/45</u>	
<u>United States Army</u> ^{1/}			
United Kingdom and North Continent	221	216	231
South France	66	66	66
Italy and Other Mediterranean	113	70	72
Persian Gulf	1	1	1
China, Burma, India	1	1	1
Pacific	20	10	7
Total Army	422	364	378
<u>United States Navy</u>	30	34	33
<u>TOTAL MILITARY</u>	452	398	411
<u>War Making Capacity of Western Hemisphere</u>	12	15	25
<u>British Aid</u>			
North Atlantic	16	16	40
Other	30	30	30
Total British Aid	46	46	70
<u>Russian Aid</u>	36	37	37
<u>Liberated Areas Aid</u>			
French North Africa	5	7	7
Southern France	3	3	5
Northern France	10	10	15
Italy	2	1	3
Balkans	6	0	0
Belgium	4	8	8
Netherlands	0	1	5
Eastern Europe	2	3	3
Total Liberated Areas	32	33	47
<u>TOTAL LEND LEASE AID AND CIVILIAN</u>	126	131	179
<u>Total Requirements</u>	578	529	590
<u>Total Available</u>	542	550	600
<u>Balance</u>	-36	/21	/10

(1/ Includes Civil Affairs)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Commerce Dept. letter 11-15-72
By SLR... NARS Date JAN 26 1973

~~SECRET~~

Taking the first quarter as a whole, it now appears that there will be a surplus of 1 ship on the Atlantic coast as compared with an estimated deficit of 86 ships in the Combined Military Transportation Committee paper of January 12. This is a result of having 44 more ships available than was estimated and by having total requirements cut by 43 ships. The reduction was chiefly in military requirements for Italy and in relief shipments to the Balkans where it developed that many more ships were already available than could be unloaded.

Berthings, during the quarter, averaged 557 ships. When allowance is made for the short month of February and mid-winter conditions, the indication is that the 600 ships to be available in March is not abnormally high.

With better weather and improved port conditions on the continent, the tonnage employed should easily produce 600 berthings a month during the second quarter. The second quarter deficit of 126 ships which was estimated in the CMTC paper of January 12 will be eliminated.

Granted reasonable management, the Atlantic shipping situation should run smoothly from here on. With regard to aid for the liberated areas, it is worth noting that in March, 47 ships have been allocated to this service as compared with the requirement of 32 in the CMTC paper of January 12. The allocations for lend lease and other aid total 179 ships as compared with the requirement of 126 in the CMTC paper.

As is usual when a surplus has appeared, the British seem likely to be the chief gainer due to their excellent liaison with the War Shipping Administration and to their command of large amounts of cargo. They are scheduled to receive 24 ships in March in excess of their normal requirements, which will have the effect of increasing commodity stocks in the United Kingdom instead of diminishing them. If it is desired to further increase shipments to the liberated areas, this can be done by taking some of these ships and cargoes away from the British.

In contrast to the easy Atlantic situation, the Pacific situation is tight. It seems clear that the Pacific requirements in the CMTC paper were inflated, but the precise degree of inflation is not yet clear. In January, 225 ships were available on the Pacific and this supply seemed to pretty adequately cover essential requirements.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Commerce Dept letter, 11-15-72

By SLE HARS Date JAN 26 1973

~~SECRET~~

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In February, 205 ships were available which, allowing for the short month, would indicate a rate of 225 to 230 ships a month. In March it appears some 214 ships would be available, but that due to repair difficulties, only 205 of them will be placed on berth. This figure probably is about 20 short of essential requirements.

Enough tonnage is employed in the Pacific to produce a satisfactory number of berthings, but this tonnage is not yet moving with satisfactory dispatch. However, as better harbors, such as Manila become available, and as routing is simplified, the performance should improve.

The rate of berthings, covering both coasts, probably will reach 850 ships a month in the second quarter. This would compare with a peak of 747 ships reached in May 1944, and with a low of 658 ships in November 1944. We may even attain a rate of 900 a month. When this occurs, our port facilities, including longshore labor, are likely to be strained to the limit, and the problem of securing an adequate flow of cargo will be severe. The War Food Administration, for example, already is experiencing difficulty in supplying certain kinds of foodstuffs, and is asking longer advance notice of demands made upon it. The Office of Defense Transportation also reports the railroad system seriously strained. Ocean shipping is not likely to be the bottleneck in the second quarter or throughout the year.

F. W. ...

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
Commerce Dept. letter, 11-15-72
By SLR NARS Date JAN 26 1973

~~SECRET~~

PSF: Byrnes

~~Off. of Economic Stabilization~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject File

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

For your information.

F. D. R.

PSF Byrne folder 2-45
Subject file

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.



file

March 23, 1945

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Carl Vinson is very much interested in the future control of the islands wrested from Japan in this war. He says his Committee is prepared to report a bill declaring that these islands be held for the defense of the United States.

I advised him you were of the opinion, in view of our assertions that we sought no territory, I thought his resolution might embarrass you. I told him of your thought that the United Nations should assign the islands to the trusteeship of the United States. He stated this would be satisfactory but wanted to know whether you could secure an agreement to have the islands north of the equator placed under the control of the United States, letting Great Britain assume responsibility for any islands south of the equator.

If you believe this can be done, he would do nothing about his resolution.

I promised to convey this message to you.

J. F. B.
J. F. B.

T-504

PSF Byrnes folder
Subject File 2-43-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

HONORABLE JAMES F. BYRNES;

Will you look over this and ask
Stinson, Forrester and Stettinius for
their approval.

F.D.R.

Memo to the President, 3-27-45 from
Hon. Jas. F. Byrnes, with enclosed
memo to Byrnes from Committee representing
War and Navy Depts., Gen. Clay and Elmer
Davis, re VE Day Information Program,
with attached Tab "A".

PSF Byrnes folder - 2.45
Subject File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE WILLIAM D. HASSETT

Dear Bill:

I do not want to get more jittery than other people are about the approach of V-E Day.

However, I am attaching a copy of a memorandum I sent to the President last week. I wonder if you could get it cleared.

Also, in connection with any remarks the President may make on V-E Day, those who have been making this plan for V-E Day under Justice Byrnes' direction, are anxious that there be some reference to memorial services for those who have given their lives in this war on the Sunday following V-E Day, unless V-E Day is on Sunday, or Sunday follows V-E Day so soon as to give no time for local preparation for such memorial services.

Jonathan
Jonathan Daniels

April 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Justice Byrnes has sent me a copy of information on plans related to V-E Day designed to prevent an interruption in the American war effort. I am told that in general terms this program has been approved by you. I would like, however, to bring specifically to your attention the fact that the plans drafted by OWI and approved by Justice Byrnes call for your participation as follows:

V-E Day:

V-E Day Proclamation.

"A four-network one-hour evening broadcast including the President, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Eisenhower, General Arnold, Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur. In closing this broadcast, the President sets aside the following Sunday as a day of tribute to those who have given their lives in this war and invites mass observance throughout the nation. President's V-E Prayer."

On a day subsequent to V-E Day:

"A one-hour four-network broadcast on international unity opened by the President with Stettinius, Crowley, and British, Chinese, Canadian, and other ambassadors in Washington, expressing the joint determination to beat Japan, the need for and appreciation of our help."

I would like confirmation of participation by the President as planned in this report.

JOMA THANDANIELS