

PSF Coordinator of Information

1941

PSF Coordinator of Information

Subject File

"C"

141

1941

Box No.



~~131~~

Memorandum for the Pres. of the
United States, 6-10-47

J. B. ...
Present this
as confidentially
with Ben Cohen
Military - act
C. S. ...
LMA

MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF
SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base -- on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production and upon the character and efficacy of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present day army exacts an equally wide and deep network of operative lines. The "depth of strategy" depends on the "depth of armament."

The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitute what is called total war. To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Bernhardi says, "We must try,

by correctly foreseeing, what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the future expects us to do."

Although we are facing imminent peril, we are lacking in effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain (or in some cases have obtained), relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. It is true we have intelligence units in the Army and the Navy. We can assume that through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of peace, have available immediate operational information in time of war, and, on certain occasions, obtain "spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our Government, documents and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Critical analysis of this information is as presently important for our supply program as if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would engage in a \$7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such a mastery in the secrecy, timing and effectiveness of her attacks.

Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect, either directly or through existing departments of Government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character

and strength of their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies.

For example, in the economic field there are many weapons that can be used against the enemy. But in our Government, these weapons are distributed through several different departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined.

To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized, trained research officials in the relative scientific fields (including technological, economic, financial and psychological scholars), is of determining influence in modern warfare.

Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the intelligence services of those departments which, in

some cases, would have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.


But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In this attack, the most powerful weapon is radio. The use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent upon accurate information. From this information, action could be carried out by appropriate agencies.

The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction of a Coordinator of Strategic Information, who would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of FBI, the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials from other Governmental departments principally concerned.

The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general duties to be

discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the Government, and it will be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the Government.


The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by which the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic Board would have available accurate and complete enemy intelligence reports upon which military operational decisions could be based.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William J. Donovan". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent initial "W".

William J. Donovan

P R E S I D E N T

C O O R D I N A T O R O F S T R A T E G I C I N F O R M A T I O N



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*file
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*PSF
Donovan Folder
Coordinator info*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

If you are asked a question about Colonel Donovan's organization, the following is suggested:

"Almost every time the Government of the United States acts to strengthen its defenses and to increase its efficiency -- for the better protection of the people of the United States -- it seems that one or two Senators immediately labels that act in a way that creates distrust, fear and misunderstanding.

"One Senator has referred to Colonel Donovan's organization as an Ogpu or Gestapo. That just isn't so.

"Another Senator has ^{*spoken*} ~~acted~~ in a way that leads to misunderstanding and distrust of the "good neighbor" policy. We intend, however, to carry-on -- to do our best to strengthen our defenses and give the Government a better efficiency."

S.T.E.

PS
C.O.I

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Alfred Rosen

August 6, 1941.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The President of the United States
White House.


Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum which contains excerpts from a letter written by the Brigadier who is Chairman of the Joint Operations Group in England. I thought it might give you a point of view which you would like to have.

You might be interested also in knowing that the questionnaire for the consuls is being answered and I am looking forward to getting something valuable from it.

I hope you are getting a rest.

Sincerely,


BILL DONOVAN

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM: For The President

From: William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.

Subjects: Excerpts from letter dated July 25, 1941, from Chairman
of Joint Operations Group in England.

"In the first place we gather over here that many of your people are not at all happy about the whole business of the Middle East, and think that we are expending an enormous amount of effort there to maintain something which is not really of great importance at all. I should not imagine for a moment that you subscribe to these ideas, but you might perhaps be interested to know the sort of line we take in countering this proposition .

"I believe the trouble is that many of your people think that we are not strong enough yet at home, and that until we are 100% safe we ought not to take any risks in sending forces out to Egypt. We of course agree that we must be secure here, but it is just as foolish, when your resources are limited, to over-insure as to under-insure. I suspect that some of your people may be still a little influenced by the ideas of the last War in their assessment of the amount of force required to resist invasion. It is true that we are thin on the ground, and that, as you saw yourself early this year, divisions hold an enormous length of coast-line. On the other hand, our Air Force is continually growing in strength and, though we cannot depend on the R.A.F. alone to kill invasion, it does make a difference. One of the best correctives I know for undue pessimism is to turn the individual concerned on

to making a plan for an opposed landing! His outlook changes very rapidly, I have found.

"It is not enough of course merely to be secure in this country. That will never win us the War, though it might prevent us loosing it. We must ensure that our supply lines are kept safe--and also that we put ourselves in a position to take the offensive against the Hun.

"The importance of the Atlantic supply lines is always present in the minds of your people, but we have to think as well of the sea communications to the East through the Indian Ocean. We cannot allow the enemy to get bases from which to make a direct attack on these communications. If we did, the Naval commitment would be much greater than is now involved in containing the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, we have to protect our sources of supply in the Middle East, particularly the Persian oil which is of vital importance with the present shortage of tankers. Also we have to ensure the tranquility of India and of all the Arab world. If we got bad trouble on the North-west frontier of India, the country would become a liability instead of an asset as a source of man-power. To cover the Indian Ocean sea communications and our sources of supply and man-power in the Middle East and India, we must hold defensive positions in depth. Syria, Egypt and Iraq give us a defensive position in depth; and it would be even better if we had our Turkish friends in as well, and could drive the enemy out of Cyrenaica. From the defensive point of view, therefore, it is sound strategy to hold on where we are.

"From the offensive point of view, our present positions are useful because we can interrupt enemy trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (although admittedly less than when we still kept that toe-hold in the Balkans on which you were always so keen). We can also deny the enemy the resources of the Middle East, and we can hammer away to some extent at the mainland of Italy by air. With more resources we could intensify our attack on the enemy's communications with North Africa and in the Balkans. We keep a jumping-off point from which we can recapture Cyrenaica. With that coastline in our hands once more our fleet would be in a very much better position to take the offensive than it now is, since we could give fighter cover to it from North African aerodromes, and thus offset the loss of Crete. Ultimately we might, and I hope we shall, as I know you hope - drive the enemy clean out of Libya and set out Italy from the Tripoli end in real earnest. We might even persuade the French to join in too. Even where we are at present, we can bolster up Turkey and join hands with Russia south of the Caucasus.

"From both points of view of course it is a good thing to extend the Germans such as we can, and make them maintain forces at the end of long lines of communication. I would not like to say that we are containing more land forces than our own numbers, but on the air side at least, I think it is a profitable detachment. On the coldest argument of strategy I think there is every reason for holding on where we are. The other factors like those of morale and prestige naturally appeal more to us than to your Staff, but I know you appreciate the enormous importance of these factors, so I need say no more about them. There is, however, also the consideration that we could never get away the vast mass of stuff we have collected in the Middle East without

losing most of it.

"I think some of your people feel that even if all the above is true, we have not any real chance of holding on where we are because the enemy is on interior lines while we are on exterior lines, and because therefore he can bring up bigger forces against us than we can hope to measure against them. This may be true if you work it out on a mere basis of counting heads. But it was certainly more true a year ago when the Wops had half a million men in Africa, and we had an Indian Division and a weak Armoured Division available for operations, after providing for internal security. On a cold calculation at that point we ought to have cleared out while the going was good. But we didn't, and we have cleaned up East Africa completely; we have broken the Italian Army in North Africa, and knocked her fleet about so much that Italy will not, I think, do very much more in the rest of this War. We have cleaned up Iraq and taken possession of Syria. You may say we did all this against the Wops and the French, and it will be a different story when it comes to meeting the Germans, who certainly chivvied us out of Benghazi. But if we get the material we want out in the Middle East and have a brief respite, owing to the Russian business, from living from hand to mouth, the picture will be very different. You know so well, from what you say in Cairo, what difficulties we were in over equipment. Out there it has always been a case of ten fellows wanting to go to the dance with only three pairs of trousers between them. That is why we want your stuff so badly, and we want it quickly too - before the Hun can completely disentangle himself from the Russian venture. Of course we shall

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have to fight hard, and some people seem to think that you can make war without having to fight or having any casualties. I was rather taken aback by one of your fellows who spoke of "the appallingly heavy losses in Crete". It was just about the anniversary of the first day of the Battle of the Somme, and I couldn't help pointing out that we had had 200,000 casualties on that day.

"In your last letter you asked me whether the United Kingdom would provide sufficient room for an Air Force which would seriously batter Germany. It has been gone into very carefully, and we are quite satisfied that it can be done. We should hope to put down, by the time we are through, about thirty times the weight of bombs on Germany which we are now doing. But of course that will want a lot of aircraft, and we shall have to look to you for a great deal of that - possibly most of it. I believe that if we can hit the Hun as hard as this, going particularly for his transportation system - and perhaps later for his morale; if we can employ all the devices of sabotage, subversion and propaganda; if we can keep him extended and thus strain his administrative resources; the cumulative effect of all these factors and of shortages of supplies (none of these perhaps decisive in themselves), we shall produce in the end a condition in which his armed forces will be so weakened that it will be possible to regain an entry on to the Continent with small and specially equipped armoured forces. These would start the rot going fast and once the whole structure begins to crumble I think it will go very quickly - like a ladder in a silk stocking. The conquered peoples will have to play their part - first in the sabotage line, and then in providing the equivalent of the Infantry which we shall not have the transportation to get across in any quantity. This means we shall have to arm them and organize them secretly somehow. It is looking a long way ahead I know, and in all probability the

War will end in quite a different way altogether, but that we cannot at present foresee."

* * *

PSF: Donovan folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1941

PRIVATE & [REDACTED]
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

To speak to me about on
Tuesday.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Let to the President - undated - from
Colonel Bill Donovan, Coordinator of
Information, Washington, D. C. asking
2 questions - 1. I assume you will
advise Churchill of the message - if
not is there anything you wish me to
do as far as the British are concerned?
2. Should the State Department be advised
Memo for the President 8/22/41 from GGT
Says Col. Donovan is referring to the
subject matter of the request from the
Chinese which they asked be passed on
Col. Donovan wants to know whether FDR
is going to pass it along to Churchill
or should Donovan, etc.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. 1313
JAN 24
By W. J. Stewart Date

PSF (01: Donovan Folder)

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 27, 1941

*File
Confidential*

My dear Mr. President:

Here is a letter I have just received from the Polish Ambassador, which I thought would be of interest to you.

Respectfully,

Bill Donovan
William J. Donovan

Attachment: Letter dated September 27
from the Polish Ambassador.

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

L'AMBASSADEUR DE POLOGNE
À WASHINGTON

September 27th, 1941.

My dear Bill,

I know how interested you are in the development of the efforts of the Polish Government relating to the formation of the Polish army units in Soviet Russia, as well as in that of Polish-Soviet relations in general on the basis of the agreement signed in London on July 30, 1941, between Poland and the U. S. S. R., by virtue of which normal relations have been renewed between the two countries.

I am very glad to be able to tell you on the basis of information just received from London that the enthusiasm of the Poles in Russia actively to resume the fight against Hitlerite Germany is so great, that the Polish Army in Russia will be virtually an army of volunteers. Great numbers of Poles of military age apply daily demanding to be enrolled immediately in the Polish Forces, thus swelling the ranks of units which are being formed from our regular soldiers who had been interned

interned in Russia.

The Polish Government is confident that it will be able to put in the field very shortly an army of well over 100,000 men, provided they can be supplied with the necessary material and equipment from Great Britain and the United States. I hear that two divisions are already formed and the third is nearing completion.

What will interest you especially, I am sure, is that the U. S. S. R. has - in the same way as in the case of our army in Great Britain - granted us full rights of an independent National Polish Army, giving it likewise the right of opening its own schools, full cultural freedom and freedom of worship for both Christians and Jews. We have already got our own Catholic military chaplains.

Generally speaking, as matters now stand, the Soviet Government is loyally fulfilling all its engagements. The Polish deportees have now obtained their freedom and it is gratifying to note that of the estimated number of one million and a half of Poles at present

present in Russia, those who are physically able and who are not of military age, are anxious to do their share in all kinds of war work in factories and field for the common effort. A special Polish Committee has been set up to enable them to do so.

Perhaps the most heartening fact is that a Polish Catholic church is about to be opened in Moscow, as well as a synagogue for Polish Jews, and that the Polish communities in Russia have been allowed by the Soviet Government to institute places of worship and have been given full freedom in this field.

One of the great difficulties is the lack of warm garments and warm underwear, footwear, as well as of medical supplies among the Poles in Russia. Men's clothing is most needed, there being a majority of men among the Polish deportees.

I was anxious to give you these details because I know your kind interest in this matter.

Hoping to see you soon, I am,

Yours ever,

Jan Ciechanowski

file
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 8, 1941

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

I wish to call your attention to a dispatch from Berlin carried by the press agencies this morning, quoting the D.N.B. This Nazi agency has released what it asserts to be the text of a letter from President Roosevelt to Josef Stalin.

As carried from Berlin by the United Press, the alleged letter reads as follows:

"My dear Friend Stalin:

"This letter will be handed to you by my friend Harriman, whom I have instructed to be leader of our Moscow delegation.

"I wish to take opportunity of expressing my great confidence that your armies finally will be victorious over Hitler.

"Mr. Harriman is well acquainted with your problems and will, I know, do everything he can to bring the Moscow negotiations to a successful conclusion.

"Harry Hopkins reported extensively about his successful and satisfactory visit in the Foreign Ministry. I cannot say how deeply we all were impressed by the achievements of the brave Soviet armies.


The President
Page Two

"We shall find suitable ways of obtaining materials and the equipment necessary to fight Hitler on all fronts, including the Soviet front.

"I assure you of our greatest determination to provide the necessary material support.

"In cordial friendship,

Franklin D. Roosevelt."



William J. Donovan

Enclosure 1

• Audrey
for filing in
Special file.

10 Oct 1941

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION *of State*

WASHINGTON, D. C.

*PSF
C.O.I*

JK - Sent for approval
[Signature]

October 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM for The President.

From: The Coordinator of Information.

By joint action of the Military and Naval Intelligence Services there was consolidated under the Coordinator of Information the undercover intelligence of the two services. In their memorandum the reasons stated for the action are:

1. That such a service is much more effective under one head rather than three, and
2. A civilian agency has distinct advantages over any military or naval agency in the administration of such a service.

This consolidation has been approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

In making this consolidation effective, it is necessary to do the following:

1. Send to a given country a man who is essentially an organizer. The function of this man would be to set up agents of

information who would be able to supply him with information:


- (a) During the period that our diplomatic corps is accredited to that country; and
- (b) To be in a position to continue sending reports in event diplomatic relations are severed.

Vital considerations in making this plan effective are security and communications. Therefore, it will be necessary for our representative to have:

- (a) Status for his protection;
- (b) Use of the diplomatic pouch;
- (c) Establishment of a line of communications, both by radio and other means, that will endure after the particular country has been closed to us diplomatically.

As a concrete illustration of what can be done, we are now planning to deal with a very present problem in

North Africa by setting up at once a wireless station in Tangier and having stationed there an assistant Naval or Military Attache who can unify the activities of the Vice-Consuls in North Africa and stimulate efforts in the selection of local agents of information.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J. J. ...', written in a cursive style.

PSF Donovan Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Coordinator
clerks

October 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN

This seems to be a matter which you ought to look into. Will you handle it with Berle, F.B.I. and the British Intelligence?

F. D. R.

Memorandum to the President, dated October 9, 1941, from Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle, re question raised by F.B.I. in connection with short wave wireless set over which British Intelligence here send messages in code to London and of which the F.B.I. have no knowledge because they do not have the code.

*July 6
Confidential*

PSE C.O.I. Donovan Folio

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 13, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Following the memorandum of our talk with Stallforth, he wishes to add the following. I pass it on as he gave it:

* * * * *

In case peace is not made and we should declare war, I was informed that the Germans intend immediately to invade Spain and Portugal and try to conquer Gibraltar. On the East front they intend to drive down to the Caucasus and take the oil fields and the Suez Canal and so bottle up the Mediterranean with the idea that in the winter they will go to North Africa. Their idea is that that way they will build an economic Empire and just will sit tight and wait until the Western powers decide to make peace. They claim that after having accomplished this and having conquered Russia they will be able to get all necessary raw materials and food to supply all of Europe.

Economically the Germans are today, in my mind, in a more advantageous condition than the United States and Great Britain to finance the war. Germany has created an economic Empire in Europe dependent only on the working hour. They disregard gold or security and are financing the war and their needs on the present and the future. We are in a disadvantageous

condition because we still have to finance all our war, government and other problems through our savings and inheritances accumulated in many years past. I believe that our problems today are insignificant compared with what we will have to face if peace is long delayed. When peace comes we are going to face a world absolutely bankrupt and our problem must be to feed not only Europe, but practically the whole world for a number of years. Besides, in order to rehabilitate the countries and to help in the reconstruction of Europe we have to give them credits or money and there will be no security for financing loans. On the other hand, in order to continue our trade we have to find means and ways to create a purchasing power in all the countries we intend to do business with. South America will also be a problem to us because we will not be able to buy their principal raw materials and products and we will have to finance them in order that they can make shipments to Europe or other parts of the world that are in need of them. I have discussed this problem not only with German economists but also with outstanding European and South American economists and all assert that the natural market for South America is Europe.


If satisfactory peace under the leadership of the United States is not immediately effected there is only one proper course for the United States and that is to declare war immediately. This is the psychological moment for such entry. It

would lift the morale of the now conquered nations and lower German morale. All over Europe the people want peace; they fear the United States and a repetition of 1917-18. We should effect an agreement between, if not a merger, of all English speaking nations immediately and thereby avoid disagreements between Great Britain and the United States, for economically there are already disagreements developing. Nothing would be more disastrous than to fail to show the world a United Front, not only militarily but also economically.

The war machine of Germany and the strong SS is so powerful that I do not believe that they, except through a present peace, for which they can be used, can be broken for many years to come.

The world destruction, economic and moral, through a long drawn out war, which I am certain the Germans can conduct, indefinitely, is beyond estimates. Therefore I beg you to use these thoughts to supplement my other information.

My personal belief is that the fate of the world is in the hands of the Christian President of the United States, F.D.R. Only he can compel peace. Personally I would say, also based on historical facts -- "let Germany and the Axis people win the battles -- but -- through our President let us win the peace.


W.J.D.

7-11-41
Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

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Confidential


WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I attach a summary of a survey on the Russian transportation system, based on available material from the various Departments. I am not sending at the moment the material prepared in this office upon which this summary is based because I wish it to reflect certain facts that have been gathered by our geographical and functional sections.

Respectfully,


William J. Donovan

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Part I.

Summary and Conclusions

In this study of the industrial war-losses of Russia, and of the lines of communication by which American help may reach that country, the major questions involved are exceedingly complex, and in nearly every case the evidence respecting these questions is spotty, incomplete, and in part inconsistent. Any conclusions based on such a study must therefore be tentative and preliminary. The chief advantages and disadvantages of the three major lines of communication between the United States and the Russo-German war-zone are discussed below.

Sources:

In this report an attempt is made to coordinate information received from the Department of State, the War Department, the Navy Department, the Department of Commerce, the Division of Defense Aid Reports, the Maritime Commission, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, and to supplement this information from printed Russian sources.

I. The Northern Route (via Archangel)

By far the shortest route between the Eastern industrial centers of the United States and the Russo-German war zone.

Very largely a sea route, and therefore for much the greater part of its length under American or Anglo-American control.

Port of Archangel has much the largest monthly capacity of any Russian port now open to American ships (perhaps 300,000 T. per month); but it may not be possible to keep the ice-lanes open in winter.

The capacity of the Archangel railway (probably between 135,000 and 315,000 T. per month) is much less than that of the Trans-Siberian line, but the Archangel line is almost completely available for the handling of foreign goods, rather than domestic freight.

The sea route, the port of Murmansk, and the connecting railways from Murmansk and Archangel are in greater or less degree vulnerable to enemy attack. If convoys are necessary from the United States, this and the other military handicaps must be balanced against the much greater length of the other routes.

If the Russian forces become divided into three disconnected resistance groups (in Northwestern Russia, in the Volga-Ural region, and in the Caucasus), the Northern force will have no domestic economic base of consequence and must depend almost exclusively on foreign supplies, or collapse.

II. The Eastern Route (via Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railroad)

Much longer than the Northern Route.

Much more largely a rail route, under Russian control.

Port of Vladivostok has a monthly capacity of perhaps 140,000 T., or about one-half that of Archangel.

Trans-Siberian Railroad has a much larger in total capacity than Archangel railroad, but normally carries a much greater load of freight of domestic origin, and will be increasingly loaded with domestic goods if the Russian army retreats further, and army and populace become increasingly dependent on the tributary area of this railroad. The trackage capacity of the Trans-Siberian for the westward movement of foreign goods may possibly be in the neighborhood of 250,000 T. per month.

In case of a division of the Russian forces, the main body of the Russian army will almost certainly be in the area served by this railway system; there it will have the only considerable domestic economic base left to Russia. The Eastern supply line is the only one from abroad that could serve this central force effectively.

This route is safe throughout from German attack, but in the Western Pacific it can be cut overnight by the Japanese navy.

III. THE SOUTHERN ROUTE (VIA THE PERSIAN GULF)

This route falls very far below the others in tonnage capacity. It is controlled for almost its entire length by Britain.

It is comparatively safe from attack (though there is a possibility of German action through Turkey).

As long as the Russian armies maintain a continuous front from the Arctic region west of Archangel to the Black Sea, they can be far more easily supplied and re-enforced by way of the Northern and Eastern routes than by way of the Southern. If the war front approaches the Caucasus, the Germans are almost certain to cut off any forces in the Caucasus region from the main Russian armies farther North. If this happens, the Russian force in the south will be without a domestic economic base or a good line of communications with America or Britain. The Germans who advance toward the Caucasus along the line of the Rostov-Baku railway will have a great advantage over the Russians in the matter of communications and supplies, but the terrain of the Caucasus region will favor the Russian defenders. However, in this situation the chief Russian reason for defending the Caucasus will already have disappeared: it may be possible to ship a limited amount of Caucasian oil and gasoline to the main Russian forces via the Caspian Sea and the Turkestan railways, but the supply so transported will certainly be comparatively small and the central Russian forces will be acutely short of this primary essential.

Conclusions:

The economic losses of the Russians (in goods and plant) have been enormous and critical.

Because of its great length and extremely limited capacity,

the Southern Route would seem to be the least advantageous for traffic between the United States and Russia.

As long as the Russian Army maintains a continuous front covering the Archangel railway and central Russia, and as long as the port of Archangel can be kept open by ice-breakers, the Northern Route as well as the Eastern Route will be available for the shipment of supplies to the Russians. The Northern Route is vulnerable to attack by sea and air, but is much shorter than the Eastern Route. Only a technical expert can balance these two factors, but there may be some advantage in employing both routes to avoid possible congestion.

If the Soviet forces in the north are cut off, they will have no domestic economic base, and the question of the advisability of shipping supplies via the Northern Route will then require reconsideration.

If the Russian armies become divided, it may be expected that the main center of resistance will be in a region that can be supplied in any quantity from abroad only via the Eastern Route.

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*Hemman Filler
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Item (2) - for Discussion with President
Tuesday, October 21, 1941.

COMMANDER FORD'S GROUP

For the benefit of Colonel Donovan a brief history of the personnel of the Photographic Presentation Division is appended.

This branch is composed of cameramen, laboratory technicians, still cameramen, special photographic effects men, sound and radio men. It comprises, in its different branches, the best camera and technical brains of Hollywood. It is part of a unit of nearly two hundred officers and men that was recruited and trained in Hollywood in the past eighteen months under the leadership of John Ford (Commander, U.S.N.R.).

Commander Ford is a director-producer of motion pictures and has been a Naval Reservist for a number of years.

Lieutenant Gregg Toland (U.S.N.R.) for example, has to his credit the photography of many recent motion pictures of note: "Wuthering Heights," "The Grapes of Wrath," "Citizen Kane," "The Long Voyage Home," and "The Little Foxes." Lieutenant Toland has an average weekly salary of \$2,500.

Lieutenant Joseph Howard August (U.S.N.R.) like Lieutenant Toland, is a top Hollywood cameraman and an annual contender for the Academy Award. He was a director of photography on many well-known pictures, for example, "The Informer," "The Hunchback of Notre Dame," "Gunga Din," "The Devil and Daniel Webster," and many others too numerous to mention. Lieutenant August's salary is around \$1,500 to \$1,800 a week.

Lieutenant Siegler's work on the recent Frank Capra productions "Meet John Doe" and "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington" met with great critical acclaim.

Lieutenant Harold Wenstrom (U.S.N.R.) and Lieutenant Alfred Gilks (U.S.N.R.) are cameramen who specialize in service type stories, particularly sea and air photography (for example, "Hell Divers," "Lost Patrol," etc.). These officers in their civil capacity earn an average of \$1,000 a week each.

Lieutenant S. Halprin (U.S.N.R.) is the best trick and effects cameraman in the motion picture business. He has with him in the unit four of his assistants, Ensign Ray Kellogg, Chief Photographer Mohn, J. B. Allin, Photographer 2nd Class, and W. H. White, Photographer 1st Class. This highly specialized group is a very valuable adjunct to the photographic division. Lieutenant Arthur Arling is a specialist in Technicolor photography and research.

Lieutenant (jg) Kenneth Pier (U.S.N.R.) is in charge of the sound recording section. He is one of the pioneers of sound on film engineering besides being an excellent radio man. Lieutenant Pier has with him his chief assistant, R. M. Braggins, who, when the commissions ran out cheerfully came along as a bluejacket.

Commander Ford's Executive Officer, Lieutenant (jg) Frederick Spencer is a Naval Reservist and a graduate of Yale and has been a director of motion pictures for the past ten years. He has been

responsible for the executive management of many of the biggest productions made in Hollywood, besides being a thoroughly competent Naval officer.

Because of the fact that in the original set-up of this unit there were not enough commissions available, the following ace photographers volunteered for enlistment: W. J. Wheeler, R. R. Rhea, P. O. Mohn, E. A. Hilson, A. T. Powell, L. L. Goldstein, G. V. Thayer, and H. H. Van Pelt. They were shipped as Chief Petty Officers, and are now with the C.O.I.

The above officers and men have been drilling for the last year on an average of one to three nights a week. In addition to the photographers there is an excellent cutting group (film editors, sound effects men, music cutters, etc).

The Naval training of this group has been to make them thoroughly competent in all types of service pictures, propaganda, morale, military and naval information, training, and historical.

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Item No. (6) - For Discussion with
the President,
October 21, 1941.

Leave copy of letter from British
Naval Officer to his wife in
England, giving vivid description
of the sinking of the BISMARCK.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER WRITTEN BY A NAVAL
OFFICER TO HIS WIFE IN ENGLAND.

At long last we have had our fun, and
oh boy, oh boy, what fun, what a party!

We were the only ship to see it through
from start to finish, as you no doubt gathered
from the Radio, and we finished up with a nice
spot of bother with a Heinkel. We got through
it all with no trouble or damage of any kind,
except that my cabin was wrecked by our own
firings. Thank God I had put your picture to
bed.

We narrowly escaped being badly shot up
on the edge of the ice, north of Iceland (all
this is common property via B.B.C.) and managed
to keep touch with the enemy all the 1/2 light
of Friday night.

We had a front row of the stalls view of
the action between the Hood and Prince of Wales,
and the German forces on Saturday morning, and

saw the terrible sight of the Hood blowing up. It was quite appalling. You know the size of those ships -- the splashes were twice the height of her mast. Poor old Tubby! I am awfully upset about him and for many others I knew there. They had a mercifully quick release, and it was all over in five minutes. It seemed absolutely incredible. The sight of the Prince of Wales steaming through the smoke and wreckage, firing with all her guns and with fountains of splashes all around her, was a never-to-be-forgotten sight. Bismarck was hard hit at this time too, and turned away with troubles of her own. Prince of Wales and two cruisers then shadowed Bismarck all day during her run to the South, and mighty respectful we were of her superlative gunnery. We were far out to the westward, running South in the longitude of South of Greenland, and the most dramatic chase

Twice she gave us the slip, and we picked her up with air reconnaissance from carriers, and slowed her up by P.Q.A. torpedo attack. The awful problem was oil. Would we have enough to get heavy forces on to her, before she got into Brest? On the last night (Sunday) Viau's destroyers found her and almost stopped her with torpedoes, carrying out a superlatively gallant attack at close range, and despite a mighty hot reception, getting clean away with it.

The last morning broke off the Bay of Biscay in a North West gale, and heavy rain squalls, and we had some difficulty in picking up Bismarck in the low visibility, always with the chance of being blown out of the water at close range. We located her and put on the Battleships, King George V, and Rodney, and then began the unforgettable finale which I shall remember to my dying day.

Bismarck was incomparably the biggest ship I have ever seen, 35,000 tons -- nothing!! Our two ships looked literally like picket boats. She was simply gigantic. Our battleships ran in and started the ball rolling, and she was soon being hit with the colossal explosions of our heavy shell. The explosions were indescribable. Huge flames of fire all over her, and she was burning everywhere.

She fought back magnificently, but to no effect, and one by one her guns were silenced. We pounded away, our little shells could be seen bursting all over her, looking ridiculously small on her huge structure. Every time we hit, the troops cheered like mad.

By this time, she was silenced, but still looked an impregnable fortress despite the hammering she had taken. Then started the most fantastic phase of all, which made even the most blood-thirsty feel rather sick.

We simply could not sink her, and we expected large scale air attack at any moment. Two battleships and two cruisers steamed around about her at close range, pumping all they had into her. It was quite appalling. You would never believe the frightful effect of our heavy shell. Colossal flashes inside her, which must have been a shambles long before this, and wretched men running hither and thither on her deck, but she would neither surrender nor sink.

It is simply incredible that any ship could stand half the hammering she took. Our heaviest shells sent the water up three times her height, and great chunks of her upperworks were blown away. She was finally despatched with torpedoes.

A most dangerous and incomparable ship. Her company were subjected to the long drawn out sufferings of four days chase,

and incessant attacks and finally had 2½ hours agony of what must have been Hell on Earth. Thank God we blow up and sink more easily.

If we had not sunk her, there is no knowing what harm she might not have done, as great concentration of our forces was necessary to deal with her. I wish you could have seen her. Her colossal size was like a Goliath, and her construction and honey-combing of compartment must have been superb.

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Item No. () For meeting with the President
October 21, 1941.

Berlin Cable re - Jewish
Propaganda Staffs

GRAY

Berlin

Dated October 17, 1941

Rec'd 5:40 P.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3802, October 17, 5 p.m.

The German press today publishes almost identical articles under Berlin date line asserting that under President Roosevelt's instructions Major General Donovan has been liberally supplied with money and is energetically enlisting the services of numerous well known publicist and radio speakers to build up the huge "propaganda and agitation center". This it is alleged will have the dual purpose of "making the American people ripe for war" and preparing the outside world, particularly South America, for the entry of the United States into the war. The newspapers state that preference is given to Jews to direct this program and the party organs ANGRIFFF and VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER headline their articles with "The Jew-Roosevelt at Work" and "The Jew-Roosevelt Names War Maker Donovan as Super-Agitator", respectively. Among the "notorious names" of persons already said to be engaged are Mayor La Guardia, Nelson Rockefeller, James Warburg, Douglas Miller, Joseph Barnes, James Warburg, and Irvin G. Pflaum. It is stated that Donovan

has already made contracts with leading broadcasting companies for several hours of time daily at an annual fee of \$700,000. Finally, the newspapers allege that this organization has to fight the opposition of the Department of State, since the latter already has its own competing "agitation apparatus directed by highly paid Jews" and that there have been "sharp exchanges" between John Wiley and the State Department on this account. They add that "it will be interesting to see which Jewish clique Roosevelt favors". It is believed that since the appearances of articles in several German newspapers some months ago on the alleged Jewish ancestry of the President, this is the first time that he has been referred to us as a Jew in German newspaper headlines.

RSF C.O.I.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Donovan folder
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October 21, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

It occurred to me that you might be interested in reading a description of the origin and use of the British military units called "Commandos" which I enclose.

I have already brought this to the attention of the War and Navy Departments.

Respectfully,

Bill

William J. Donovan

The President,

The White House.

Enclosure: Description, British "Commandos."

C O M M A N D O S

Although the Commandos in Britain are somewhat similar to the independent companies of the days of the Black Prince, the modern unit had its origin as a result of the Battle of France.

The close of that battle left the British Army so inferior to the Germans in number and in munitions that its very survival was dependent upon the avoidance of a straight fight for an indefinite period. This was a new experience for the British Army, although in many a colonial war it had witnessed its opponents in similar straits, and in June, 1940, Britain did exactly the same thing that the Boers, Pathans, Afghans and Arabs had done when they had suffered a hard blow from a powerful foe -- Britain withdrew her Army within her own country and waited for the enemy to come in and fight on ground that was advantageous to British defenders. History repeated itself, and the conquering Germans hesitated to precipitate such costly operations -- a lull ensued, with the main armies out of contact with each other.

The Imperial General Staff, from its knowledge of the history of British troops fighting with smaller countries, recognized that, under such conditions in South Africa, the Northwestern

Frontier of India, Mesopotamia or Palestine, such a mement would have been a signal for guerilla bands to embark upon a war of attrition while the main army licked its wounds and made good its losses -- a war of continual mosquito tactics, which, at small cost to the marauders, would wear down and sicken the more ponderous bulk of the more powerful side. With those lessons in mind, the Imperial General Staff made its first task after Dunkirk the creation of a special force of British Guerillas. Thus the Commandos came into being.

The Commandos started free of all the conventions which surround a traditional Corps. From the very beginning, the aim was to combine all the essentials of irregular bands with the superior training, equipment and intelligence of regular troops. With his Bren, his grenades and his Tommy gun, the Commando soldier had to be able to scale a cliff like a Pathan, to live like a Boer with no transport columns or cockhouses, and to disperse and break away like an Arab before the enemy could pin him to his ground. Nearly every conception of guerilla warfare was opposed to all the British soldier had ever been taught. The "team spirit" had to go by the Board, no longer could the pace

be that of the slowest, every man had to go on, regardless of the fate of his neighbors, "better one man to get through than none!" In adversity each one had to learn to save his own skin, none could afford the risk of being pinned in an attempt to extricate a slower colleague. "Always attack - never defend - run to fight another day!" had to be the new motto, and it was not an easy one to teach to troops who had grown up on a tradition of stubbornness in defence and steadiness in maneuver.

As a first step toward raising the Commandos, an analysis was made of the chief features of guerilla organizations, with a view to adapting them as closely as possible to the peculiarities of the British soldier. This started by opening up a new angle on the vital question of leadership and discipline. In the British Army a soldier was placed, quite at random, under the command of an officer whom he was compelled to obey by law under pain of punishment. The guerilla, on the other hand, selected his own officer for his prowess in the field and deserted him for another if he failed to produce the goods. Discipline, entirely summary in nature, was maintained solely by the energy and personality of the leader, who usually remained absolute chief

of his own band, even though it might form but a small part of some bigger man's following. "Leadership," in fact, rather than "Command", was the keynote, and no remote postings officer of "superior authority" interfered in the man-to-man relationship of the Leader with his Followers. Obviously, even the Commandos couldn't go quite so wild; but the principle was maintained by allowing each officer to pick his men and to return any of them at will, without appeal and without having to give any reason. Similarly, every man had the right to return to his original unit on giving a minimum period of notice, without stating his reasons. Subsequent experience justified these innovations, and it was seldom found necessary to introduce any punishment, other than a warning of dismissal from the Commando.

Recruiting was started in England by a circular letter from the War Office to Commanders-in-Chief of Commands, asking them to call for volunteers "for special service" and giving a list of the qualifications required. No attempt was made to indicate the nature of the service, except that no man would be asked to parachute unless he specifically volunteered for it; a promise was made that every volunteer would be interviewed privately by an officer and given an opportunity of withdrawing

after he had received some indication of what it was all about. The qualifications were:

- (a) Youth and physical fitness.
- (b) Intelligence, self-reliance and an independent frame of mind.
- (c) Ability to swim.
- (d) Immunity from sea-sickness.

(Subsequent events proved the importance of (c) and (d)!) In addition, every volunteer had to be a fully-trained soldier with a minimum period of service. With the exception of trained staff officers, all arms of the service were eligible, a mistake which had to be corrected later when it was found that too high a proportion of skilled technicians with a keen spirit of adventure were being employed as infantrymen in the Commandos. Finally, Commanders-in-Chief were asked to select a few officers to lead Commandos. There were to be below the rank of Lieut. Colonel, not over the age of 40, and possessing, in addition to the qualifications laid down for the rank and file:

- (a) Tactical ability and sound military judgment.
- (b) High qualities of leadership.
- (c) Dash

The order of importance of these three was stressed.

Final selections from the Commanders-in-Chief's list were to be made in the War Office.

While recruitment was proceeding in the Commands, the detailed structure of the Commando Force was designed in the War Office. Here, again, every effort was made to base it on the guerilla, system, where numbers of small bands of various sizes joined together to form larger, but controlable, units. It was decided to base the organization on a "Troop" of 50 men, as a convenient number which a single officer could handle with the aid of an understudy or "Second-in-Command." (Later the Troop-Leader was given two junior officers, which was perhaps too generous an allotment.) No attempt was made to sub-divide the Troop in practice, and each Troop-Leader was left to organize it his own way. This flexibility proved a considerable asset later when troops had to be split up quite arbitrarily to fit into boatloads, etc., and the basic organization of 50 men was a marked success of the organization. It had been decided to raise a total of 10 Commandos, each of which was to comprise not more than 10 Troops. The underlying idea at the time was that some Commands would not contain as good material as others, and there were conveniences in calling for an approximate quota of two Commandos from each. As I talked with some of these Command

Officers, they told me that, actually, it might have been better to limit each Commando to 7 Troops and place a Lieut. Colonel in command of three Commandos. This was not noticeable later on, when a Brigadier was appointed to command all ten; by then all Commandos were 500 strong with ten Troops each and had to be linked in pairs under a "Battalion Commander" to facilitate control.

In due course, two officers from each Command were chosen by the War Office as Commando-Leaders, were given the acting rank of Lieut. Colonel, and told to select their Troop-Leaders from the lists of officer volunteers at the Command Headquarters. The selected Troop-Leaders were then to pick their two juniors, and the three then worked through the Command lists for other ranks until 50 N.C.Os. and men had been interviewed and accepted for the Troop. It took time, but in the end, every officer had personally selected the men whom he was to lead in the field. From the rejects he kept a record of likely reinforcements to replace later wastage -- although as the scheme matured a Depot unit was formed later into which selected volunteers from any training unit could be drafted to form an immediate reserve upon which the Commandos could draw for replacements. A very high proportion of N.C.Os. was allowed in each Troop, both to facilitate tactical employment in very small parties and to

offer reasonable promotion prospects to the superior material which soon flocked into the ranks of the Commandos.

Attention was turned next to the arms and equipment which the Commandos would need, both of which clearly depended upon the type of operations they would have to undertake. In the summer of 1940 the answer seemed obvious. The Germans had extended themselves along a coastline reaching from Narvik to Biarritz, every bit of which lay within reasonable striking distance of the British Isles. With the Royal Navy's superiority at sea, there seemed to be unlimited opportunities for amphibious guerilla bands to raid up and down that coast, striking down a sentry or two here, cutting out a small garrison there, making the enemy's life a burden and a misery, forcing him to expend much unprofitable effort and ever keeping alight the flame of revolt in the conquered countries. That seemed to be the obvious use of the Commandos, until the time came for them to play their part in some bigger forward movement on the Continent. It set a scale to their equipment at once, and gave a keynote to their training; they had to be essentially an amphibious force -- a sort of super-Marines -- with nothing which they could not carry on their backs from a boat to a beach. Oddly enough, it restored to

them the irregular's mobility across country which European armies had long lost, for any form of transport beyond a bicycle, and perhaps a handcart, was ruled out. Elaborate wireless sets, mortar, heavy machine-guns with their huge ammunition supplies, all had to go by the board, and the only transport the Commando could look forward to would be what they could capture themselves. So it was laid down that each man should join with his own rifle or pistol, and the Commando should hold a stock of Brens and Tommy-guns (in the proportion, respectively, of 1 to 2) for training purposes and for distribution as required for each specific operation.

After that came the vexed question of supplies. Like the guerilla, who lives on the country, the Commando had to be one hundred per cent fighting men; there could be no cooks and no supply column, and somehow they would have to fend for themselves. Here for once, however, they had one advantage over the guerilla in his barren hills, for most of the likely area of operations lay in civilized country where food could be bought for money. But the British soldier is normally quite untrained to fend for himself; he is used to seeing his food brought to him ready cooked at regular intervals wherever he may be, and without it, he is apt to be

lost. So it became an essential part of the Com-mando's training to get the men used to fending for themselves at all times and under all conditions, and this led to an experiment which has been the subject of much controversy.

It was decided that the Commandos, from their very formation, should receive no quarters or rations from the Army. Instead, each man drew an allowance of 6/8d. a day (double for officers) with which to provide himself with lodgings, food, travel to and from his place of parade, and the upkeep of a suit of civilian clothes. (The latter was required on occasions for secrecy purposes, such as "trick-ling" troops into a port area prior to embarking for a raid, etc.). The "6/8d. system" was no more than the application of the normal practice of "admin-istering" civilian labor to a citizen army, but it found many critics. It was unpopular with other units of the Army (who were probably jealous of its privileges) and many senior officers considered it detrimental to good discipline, but the Commando-Leaders themselves were all unanimous in its praise. After some four or five months' experience they reported at a War Office conference that it did more than anything else to teach the men self-reliance and to instill the "Commando spirit"; that it left every officer and man free to devote

his whole time to training, with none of the guards and camp "duties" which are normally such a drain on efficiency; that it entirely eliminated grumbling, since each man had only himself to blame if his food or lodging was not up to taste; and finally, that it was immensely popular with the men and added much weight to the threat of dismissal from the Commando for any breach of discipline.

Each Commando was allotted a seaside town, within its parent Command, in which to form. A suitable house was taken as Headquarters in which offices and stores were set up, and a small administrative staff installed to relieve the Commando-Leader of the routine paper-work concerning pay, records and equipment, etc. The Administrative Staff were not designed to go on raids, and the Administrative Officers was usually a rather elderly Major with much greater administrative experience than was likely to be found in the young and dashing type of officer needed to lead the Commando. It was an arrangement which worked well.

On arrival at its "home-town", the men of the Commando dispersed to find themselves lodgings, while a recreation-ground or local hall was taken over to act as the parade ground. Here too, they joined up with the "irregular" naval unit with which they were to train. Later on, it was possible

to allot a fully-manned ship with which the Commando could both train and sail on actual operations but to begin with, the "irregular navy" was usually a miscellaneous collection of motor, sailing and pulling boats in charge of a young R.N.V.R. officer, with enthusiastic yachtsmen and fishermen as his crews. But, however composed, this intimate co-operation between the "irregular Navy" and each Commando was from the very start an essential element in the whole scheme. It was the "seaworthiness" of the Commandos which was to give them their mobility: in 1914-18 it had always been a point of honor for a British unit to own the No-Man's-Land in front of it; now the sea was the No-Man's-Land of the British Front Line, and it was up to the Commandos to keep it as their own hunting ground. Their amphibious training had to give them all the advantages at sea of guerillas fighting in their native hills, so that they could scorn the obvious sandy landing beach and descend unexpectedly from rocky coves or precipitous headlands.

Training of Commandos aimed at developing the individual initiative of each man for fighting of the tip-and-run nature. All training was designed for purely offensive purposes, and Commando-Leaders were given a completely free hand and a reasonable cash allotment to organize their own training. It consisted mostly of swimming and

boating practice, of exercises to bring the men to a high standard of physical fitness and proficiency in the handling of their weapons and -- most important of all -- practice in night work of every kind. Although a good deal of stalking and use of ground for concealment by day was taught, the success of most raiding operations depended more on the silence and precision with which the unit could operate at night. Finally, it was impressed upon all ranks that no type of operation, however peculiar, must be regarded as unusual; at a moment's notice they had to be prepared to ride bicycles or motorcycles, drive cars or lorries of unfamiliar types, travel in aircraft or in ships and boats of any sort; they might have to copy the enemy in certain circumstances in order to "infiltrate" in the guise of sailors, airmen, technicians, etc., so that each man had to be capable of acting a part with reasonable solemnity. Officers and N.C.OX. were sent in batches to undergo courses of instruction at a special school of irregular warfare, and all ranks gained practical sea-going experience manning anti-aircraft machine guns or anti-"E" boat weapons in various patrol craft operating off the English coasts.

I talked with many of those who had to do with the training and fighting of these Commandos,

them agreed upon the retention of the features:

- (a) Recruitment only of trained soldiers who are volunteers -- preferably those with a minimum of, say, 6 months service with an active unit.
- (b) The principle of selection by which officers choose their own men.
- (c) The mutual right of dismissal by the officer, without question and of the return of the soldier to his own regiment on giving reasonable notice.
- (d) The basic unit of 50 men under a leader, with one or two officer assistants.
- (e) A proportion of not less than 35% to 40% of the N.C.Os. in the ranks.
- (f) Not more than seven basic units under one commander.
- (g) Permanent inclusion in every Commando from the start an "irregular" naval element.
- (h) Each Commando to be based upon a sea-side town.
- (i) the "6/8d." method of administration to be retained.
- (j) No arms or equipment which cannot be carried by hand.
- (k) Ample training in night work and sea-going experience of allsorts.
- (l) A special school to study irregular and amphibious

warfare and teach
it to the personnel
of Commandos.

The following principles should be kept
in mind:

1. Guerilla Warfare School: This should be done for the training of the first officers and N.C.Os. selected for this Command. As high a proportion as possible should be sound, well-trained, professional soldiers, who have had actual experience at guerilla warfare. This may sound elementary, but it was a principle which was completely disregarded when the first British School was started.

2. Formation of a Special Corps: I admit that it may be debatable whether there should be a "Special Corps" for each Command. If there is a Special Corps, it should be given a name with historic association.

3. Size of the Corps: The British in their experience suggest a basic unit of 50 men, and that not more than seven of these units should form the Commando or equivalent. If it be desired to put several Commandos under one Commander, they can be grouped in three, forming an equivalent of a battalion of about one thousand strong.

4. Recruitment of the New Corps: It would seem that the practical way would be to have each Army area produce its quota. Under his orders, each Corps Commander could prepare a list of volunteers who must be fully-trained soldiers with a

minimum period of service.

5. Concentration of the Unit: Each unit could concentrate in a coastal town with reasonable boating facilities.

6. Naval Cooperation: From the day it forms, each unit should have a small naval wing with which it can both train and operate. The same soldiers and sailor should live and work alongside throughout. The Naval wings should be recruited from volunteers on the same selective principles as the soldiers. The naval wing will use mostly naval boats, but should also have naval cutters and whalers ships' life-boats, etc. -- in fact any pulling boats which may have to be used in a landing operation. The British found that the most useful type of motor boat for this type of work is the special shallow-draft craft with tunnelled propellers made by Higgins of New Orleans. There are various models from 35 ft. to 75 ft., including one with a silent, low-speed-auxiliary motor for the final approach to the Beach.

7. Training: Leaders of these units should be given as free a hand as possible in the training of their units, and a reasonable cash allowance to be spent at their discretion. Higher control of training will be much better carried out by issuing "directives" and useful appliances

than by close supervision. There should be ample range facilities and a generous allotment of practice ammunition, good "sand-models" and practice in reading aerial photographs.

8. Replacement of Wastage: Once the original corps has been formed, a depot unit will be needed from which wastage from the ranks can be made good. The intake into the depot will be best confined to suitable volunteers from army training units.

Long Range Desert Patrols

I want to write briefly about another organization that I observed in Libya. This was the Long Range Desert Group. They follow the principle of guerill warfare. The principal object of this group is to provide long range ground reconnaissance patrols in the desert. These patrols are organized so that they can be used offensively, if required.

Each patrol is an independent body capable of travelling entirely self-contained for a minimum of 2000km. in distance, and for a period of two to four weeks, and capable of finding its way over unmapped country.

Each group is a G.H.Q unit. It consists of Group Headquarters and two squadrons. Each squadron consists of Squadron Headquarters and three fighting patrols.

The patrol contains two officers and 30

other ranks, transported in one 15 cwt. pilot car and ten 30 cwt trucks. The armament consists of 4 Vickers Guns, 6 Lewis Machine Guns, one 37 mm. BOFORS or 2 pdr. anti-tank gun, and 3 BOYS anti-tank rifles.

Each patrol is also equipped with one No. 11 W/T set for communication with H.Q. or with other patrols or units with which it is operating, and one PHILIPS type receiving set with which to receive the wireless time signal.

I had several talks with Col. Bagnell, who organized these patrols and who commands them now. He told me that he had experimented over a period of years by taking fellow officers and spending their leaves in the desert. I have obtained notes on these patrols in their organization and operations in the desert. These you will find attached. As you will see, it is an extension of the Commando principle.

These Commandos have been used in many operations. Perhaps it may be that the acid test of battle would not justify certain features of the organization. Not all of the High Command were whole-heartedly in favor of the idea. Junior officers were keener for it than senior officers. It may be that perhaps the more ardent exponents expected too much of the organization. But all agreed that it served a real purpose. Certainly I saw with my own eyes that it was a sort of corps

-19-

d'elite, and served as an incentive for men in other Commands. In point of fact, to my mind, one of its best functions is stimulating a spirit of emulation in other troops. In reality the British follow the Germans in their use of special troops trained for specific purposes (their parachutists are really flying guerillas). My observation is that the more the battle machines are perfected the greater the need in modern warfare of men calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring, who are trained for aggressive action. In all of our talk on defense, we are apt to miss the spirit of the attack. And if we were to try to develop the idea in our army it will mean a return to our old tradition of the scouts, the raiders and rangers.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.


*P.S.F. C.I.D. Donovan Folder
4-1
Confidential 1-41*

October 23, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested in looking at the attached report giving a brief resume of the activities of our Research and Analysis Division up to October.

Respectfully,



William J. Donovan

The President
The White House

Oct. 20, 1941

REPORT ON RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
BRANCH

In the two months and a half since you asked me to form and direct the Research and Analysis Branch of the COI, it has grown to include nearly a hundred scholars, drawn from half a dozen Federal Agencies and from the faculties of thirty colleges and universities. Among the institutions represented are Brown, Harvard, Williams, and Yale in New England; Columbia, the College of the City of New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Princeton in the Middle States; American and Howard Universities in the District of Columbia; Duke, Virginia, and the University of Kentucky in the South; Beloit, Chicago, Earlham, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio State, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin; and Pomona and the University of California on the West Coast. President Walter Livingston Wright obtained leave of absence from Robert College to head our Near Eastern Section.

The group contains many of the foremost historians, economists, political scientists, geographers, and psychologists in the country and will be aided by many more who will serve as part-time consultants. The full-time staff, which can deal with materials in thirty-four foreign languages, probably constitutes the ablest

academic group which has been enlisted in the service of a single Federal agency.

The members are organized into a Board of Analysts, of seven members; the Divisions of Economics, Geography, and Psychology, the Central Information Division including the files and Library, under the direction of Dr. Wilmarth Lewis of the Yale Corporation, and the Division of Special Information, under the direction of Professor William L. Langer of Harvard. This latter division is composed of eight geographic sections, set up to deal with strategic information concerning the British Empire, Western Europe, Central Europe, Russia and the Balkans, the Near East, the Mediterranean and Africa, the Far East, and Latin America.

Our first task was to survey the materials available both in the Library of Congress and in other government agencies. It soon became apparent that the war had stopped the flow of some indispensable newspapers and periodicals from overseas and that it would be necessary for us to dispatch forthwith men to Berne, London, Chungking, and either Shanghai or Tokyo to arrange for microfilming and dispatch by airmail of the materials necessary for proper evaluation of foreign opinion. It

was likewise apparent that, despite the large amount of material available in the various government departments, an important job of correlation remained to be done since the information was not complete in any one place and needed digestion and evaluation as well as collection.

Committees drawn from the Board of Analysts and the various divisions have been at work on three problems set us by your directives: (1) the possible intentions of Japan, (2) the strategic situation with regard to the Iberian Peninsula and North and West Africa in the event of our more active participation in the war in the Atlantic, and (3) the problems raised by our exposed right rear in South America during such hostilities. It has seemed to us necessary to break down these large-scale problems into their component parts. Our Far Eastern Committee, for example, is at work on (1) regionalism as a solution of Japan's economic problem, (2) a preliminary review of American aid to China, (3) the relation of nationalist movements to Japanese penetration into other Far Eastern countries, and (4) the sufficiency of Japanese resources for waging war against possible new opponents.

In all our work we have had invaluable assistance from the army and navy officers detailed to assist us, especially from Colonel Frank K. Ross, U.S.A. and Captain Francis Denebrink, U.S.N. We have derived great benefit, moreover, from interviews with men recently returned from the areas in question, especially from General Lehman Miller and General Frank McCoy, U.S.A., retired.

Confidential reports for submission to the President and various government agencies have dealt with conditions in Thailand, the present situation in Tangier and the possibility of more effective support to Turkey. In the British Empire Section Mr. J. F. Green produced an interesting analysis of the recent Australian political crisis, and Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a significant memorandum of a conversation with Senator Frank MacDermot of Eire.

Two important reports which illustrate the opportunity for successful coordination of information were prepared by our Russian Section. The first dealt with the raw materials and industrial resources available to Russia in September. The second, completed last Friday, was a study of Russian railway facilities based on

materials obtained from M.I.D., O.N.I., the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Maritime Commission, Export Control, and the Division of Defense Aid Reports, supplemented by information from the Institute of Pacific Relations and from printed Russian sources.

Our Economics Division has undertaken a study of certain financial operations of the Vichy government, at the request of the Department of State. We hope to have an increasing volume of similar specific requests, both from the President and from the State, War and Navy Departments.

James Baxter et.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

My dear Miss Tully —

Could the Presidents have
a course at this — before we
arrive —

Bill Donovan

File
Confidential

Private

PSF C.O.D. Donovan folder
1-11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN *effort*

The enclosed copy of Sir Robert Vansittart's broadcasts entitled "Black Record" could, I think, be used with great ~~effect~~ by some broadcaster in this country if it were edited to suit our needs.

Obviously, the more British or British Empire sentences or paragraphs can properly be deleted.

Also, I am inclined to think that the effect to prove that the Germans have always been barbarians for a thousand years as a nation go a bit too far. Those paragraphs should be stressed which place the blame on the German people for following utterly destructive leadership -- and on the leaders themselves.

I hope you will read this little record because if, as I suggest, it is revised for an American public, it might do a lot of good. What do you think?

F. D. R.

Sub-Confidential
CONFIDENTIAL COPY

PCF: COI: Donovan file
1-11

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 15r 11/27/74
By *SPS* Date DEC 1 1974

London [1947]
Nov. 12, #5392

DECLASSIFIED

~~Most Secret~~ for William J. Donovan from Whitney

Most of the points discussed by Mr. Churchill during three days that I spent with him in the country and on the train were repeated in Monday's Mansion House speech, but following additional points should be noted:

(1) Another front: Churchill states that R.A.F. losses in the course of the diversion provided for the Russians since June have been greater than those suffered in entire Battle of Britain. The raids on Friday night, which were on the largest scale to date, resulted in losses of more than 10%. These heavy losses reflected the bitter weather which had been feared as possible but which could not be predicted. Losses of R.A.F run on the average 5%; with 5 sorties a month a flyer has four months' life. (Seven thirteenths of German fighter force are pinned in the West to meet the sea (sic) attacks, I learn from another absolutely reliable source). This whole explanation Churchill gave me in answer to the clamor for another front.

(2) Invasion: That Britain can be defended Churchill is completely convinced. Undue emphasis has been put on perimeter defense of aerodromes as distinct from defense by counter attack by our Army experts, he fears. It is inconceivable that the Germans should ~~know~~ land on all aerodromes. Hence it would be sheer waste to disperse their forces and would be something like sending battleships to American ports in 1898. In the event certain aerodromes are seized superior forces in the neighborhood will capture them by counter offensive. But that the Germans will ever make such an attempt is considered unlikely. It is possible that great gliders, etc., are building by the

thousands, but in the daytime these would be sitting-birds for the fighter command, and at night they could not find destructions. Neither smoke nor gas could affect large areas for long periods. And yet it is the part of wisdom to assume that Spring will bring an attempted invasion, and therefore, to keep British home forces completely prepared for this eventuality.

(3) Invasion of Ireland: From the continent the Germans are as close to Britain now as they would be in Ireland. Hence there is no good reason for an attempt on Ireland. Why should they stir up the Irish?

(4) Russia: Putting together all the reports from the Eastern front, his ~~intention~~ ^{intention} tells him that there is real chance that the Nazis are stopped before Moscow. Recently his Moscow odds were five to four on the Germans, he confided in the War Cabinet, but now he has reversed those odds. Deniken reached Tula in 1919. He gives five to four odds on Moscow holding; points out Deniken got to Tula in 1919 and was stopped by "that hero Budenny". Batum-Baku line excellent defensive position, if Germans got that far.

(5) Mediterranean: Friday ; convoy action illustrates (1) effective cooperation between Air and Naval commands, (2) continued useful function of surface ships - no force of bombers could have done so through a job. This action possible only because of increasing air strength through Middle East permitted ~~having~~ ^{having} cruisers ~~in~~ Malta.

(6) Far East: Points included in Mansion House speech.

(7) U. S. Intervention: Two assumptions by Churchill.

(1) every week sooner we come in will reduce war by one month;
(2) order of choice - (a) U. S. without Japan; (b) U. S. and Japan both in War; (c) neither at war; (d) Japan without America (this possibility unthinkable).

(8) Reconstruction: Churchill will appeal to public to agree to continued party truce at appropriate moment to ~~outtime~~ ^{outtime} for two

or three year period after war in order to lay solid basis for reconstruction.

(9) Attitude toward Germany after War: German and Russian militarism must be destroyed - presumably division of Germany into at least two States.

B.F.C.O.I.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Donovan
Folder*

*file
personal*

November 17, 1941

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a brief report on Germany
covering the Spring and Autumn of 1941.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

Enc.

REPORT ON GERMANY - SPRING AND AUTUMN - 1941

This report is based on about a quarter of a million private letters from Germany which were read in Bermuda between April and September 1941.

CONCLUSION

German morale is not yet broken but despair, misery and desperate faith in some happier Utopian future seem all to be inextricably intermingled. One major setback or even prolonged failure to end the present slaughter and the German will to sacrifice and to conquer might hang dangerously in the balance.

War time shortage and summer food conditions

On the whole, the general impression to be gained is that although coffee and fats are very short indeed, although cooking oil is getting scarce and the meat ration was cut 100 grams in June, there has been hitherto no serious shortage of food in Germany. Soap and clothes are repeatedly asked for in letters to America.

The Royal Air Force

While it is quite impossible to arrive at any concrete conclusions as to the varying air-raid morale of people in the different districts, it seems fairly definite that the Germans are getting to look forward to the long nights less and less, and that a considerable number are extremely frightened. References to larger bombs, heavier planes and greater accuracy first appeared in letters written after the first weeks of June. Statements such as the following appear more frequently: "If only the War would end so that we could sleep in tranquility once more. Oh, how terrible aerial war is; our nerves have quite gone to pieces. We have gone through so much."

The Question of America

With the question of America looming ahead, references to the United States intervention are growing in number, although the general view is that nothing can alter the final outcome of the war.

Labor

"How we have to work; hardly a pause for breath."

The German Army and the Russian War

Whereas, before the invasion of Russia, weakening of morale or depression in letters from German soldiers was conspicuously its absence, July, August and September brought a

bitter change: "Yesterday, after a long interval there was news from Theo; he is still in the front line. He writes that this war against Russia is the cruelest thing yet. Sigmund was near Minsk but was sent back to Warsaw again to hospital on account of his feet. He couldn't walk, but he is on the march again now. He wrote that what he has experienced up 'till now is enough for his whole life. He does not want to write about it. He says it is not for women. Is there no one in the whole world who can stop this murder?"

The Home Front and the Russian War

On the home front, the news that Germany was at war with Russia came as a staggering blow. Irrespective of optimism, war weariness or blind faith in Hitler's leadership, all writers express the same amazement.

It seems that the lowest ebb in German morale was reached somewhere about the end of August and the first weeks of September. The war was still not over. Losses were vast and assuming ever increasing proportion. The nights began to draw in and people thought of the hazards of winter in Russia. As ever before in the past, comparison was drawn between this war and the years 1914-1918, but for the first time, people were saying: "The last war did not bring us somany hardships."

All flags were flown half-mast in Konstanz when the news came of entire regiments having been annihilated. With the exception of four men, the whole Bodensee regiment was said to have been wiped out.

"Every one dreads the postman's knock."

"There are tears and mourning everywhere."

1
Inclosure 2

PSF C.S.D. 2
OK
L.S.P.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 17, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Armand Denis, of Denis-Roosevelt Expeditions, Inc., is prepared to go to Central Africa as soon as transportation and other arrangements can be made. His ostensible purpose will be to make a reconnaissance for a future motion picture, and to study and purchase anthropoid apes. He is particularly familiar with, and well-known in, the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa, where he is widely recognized as a photographer, motion picture producer, and naturalist.

In order to effect the purpose we have in view, it is recommended that he be furnished transportation from New York to Africa and return for himself, and possibly also for a cameraman. In addition, he would be given a lump sum of \$5,000 to cover all his expenses and compensation from his departure until his return to the United States (as well as those of his cameraman, if he is so accompanied) for which no accounting would be required. He would undertake to stay in Africa a minimum of one month.

2

The President

Page 2

His mission would be to observe German espionage and military activity; the attitude of the native chiefs of the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa; the stability of the Free French; the industrial production and development, as well as the movement of products of the Belgian Congo. All of this is with a view to testing German intention in Central and South Africa.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

Inclosure 3

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 17, 1941

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instructions I have talked with Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson. He is ready to make available to us his services, as well as those of his staff, which would include the use of his 15,000 volume library and extensive files. His field would be all of Alaska; Canada north of 60 degrees; all of Greenland; all of Iceland; the Scandinavian countries and Finland north of 60 degrees; the Soviet Union north of 62 degrees; the shores of Hudson Bay, and Labrador as far south as Hamilton Inlet. He would also cover Okhotsk Sea, Bering Sea, Hudson Bay, the North Atlantic and the entire Polar Sea with its islands.

Dr. Stefansson would attempt to supply any kind of information from the geographic area described, including not merely sciences like geography and oceanography, but information regarding such things as religion, language, clothing, food, economics, etc. (See attached memorandum).

*BF
C.O.I.*

3

*AK
In Track
P. H. J. H.
A. J. P.*

It is recommended that Dr. Stefansson and his organization be employed by us at a monthly rate of \$2,500 for a period of six months. This sum would include all his expenses, such as telephone, telegraph, and traveling, as well as maintenance of office, staff, purchase of books, and compensation for himself. In view of his large organization, and unique background, it is believed that this is a very reasonable arrangement. At the end of six months, the contract could be renewed or not, as might appear advisable.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

Attachment

M E M O R A N D U M
FOR
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

1. We would be an independent unit directed by the Coordinator from Washington.

2. We would be bound by no regulations which would make it difficult for us to secure information quickly from any source, domestic or foreign.

3. We would give by telephone or telegraph immediate preliminary information on any question within our field. This would be followed up, as seems advisable in each case, through work in our library and through referring questions to personally known co-workers in this or in other countries.

4. We would do research work on any problem within our field that is referred to us by the Coordinator.

5. We would refer to the Coordinator the results of our research in any field that we think might be of interest to him.

6. Our geographic field would be all of Alaska; Canada north of 60 degrees; all of Greenland; all of Iceland; the Scandinavian countries and Finland north of 60 degrees; the Soviet Union north of 62 degrees (this parallel chosen for Soviet administrative reasons). We would also include the shores of Hudson Bay, and Labrador

as far south as Hamilton Inlet. We would cover Okhotsk Sea, Bering Sea, Hudson Bay, the North Atlantic and the entire Polar Sea with its islands.

7. We would attempt to supply any kind of information from the geographic area described. By "any kind of information" we mean not merely sciences like geography or oceanography but also things like religion, language, social organization, even politics.

8. We suggest that we might begin work with our present staff but there should be an elasticity of set-up providing for expansion as mutually agreed.

9. We would be prepared to work with any person or institution designated by or approved by the Coordinator. (For example, we would upon request edit, annotate, give opinions on work of other research organizations, which work then would no doubt be submitted to us in a semi-final form).

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

21 Nov. 1941

PART 20 PAGES 4470-4471

*BF
C.O.D.*

November 15, 1941

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

To read and return for my files.

F.D.R.

Re: Mr. [Name] [Title] [Date] [Time]
in which he [Action] [Subject]
made by Mr. [Name] [Title] on Nov. 15, 1941
[Name], [Title], [Address]
[City], [State]

*file
personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

*BF
Coordinator
clerk.*

November 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have read the attached communication to you from Colonel Donovan and return it with thanks.

C.H.

CH

*Memorandum
1-41*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 13, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

The following is the substance of statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November 6, to Mr. Malcolm R. Lovell:

If Japan goes to war with the United States, Germany will immediately follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the Pacific. It could not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the Pacific.

If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would

surely bomb Manila.

When Russia collapses,
the Japanese will occupy northern
Sakhalin. This will alleviate the
oil situation in Japan, as the oil
supply in Sakhalin is substantial
and can be more fully developed.

Japan is trying to gain time
with the United States. In a way this
effort works both ways, for the United
States seems to be trying to gain time
with Japan. In the last analysis,
Japan knows that unless the United States
agrees to some reasonable terms in the
Far East, Japan must face the threat of

strangulation, now or later. Should Japan wait until later to prevent this strangulation by the United States, she will be less able to free herself than now, for Germany is now occupying the major attention of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, it will be comparatively easy for the United States to strangle Japan. Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not.

If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if not all, of the South American countries will do the same.

The new United States

Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin by boat, via Lisbon. Evidently the United States is in no hurry to get him to Berlin. This probably means that no immediate diplomatic rupture is planned. It is, of course, always possible that a diplomatic break may be postponed indefinitely. Japan and China so continued for two full years. Of course there is always the possibility that my government may tire of the undeclared war, and may itself break diplomatic relations. I think this is improbable, however.

I was amused at Stalin's

radio address. We have definitely taken prisoner, over 3,000,000 Russian soldiers, and these men are now actually working for Germany, building roads, winter barracks, for our soldiers, and other constructive work. We are sure that at least an equal number of Russian soldiers have been killed.

I am very tired. I need a vacation very much. For three years I have had no rest. I wish we two and our wives could go to Florida for a month to sit on the beach in the sunshine.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

Confidential

PST C.O.D. Donovan - 1-41

24th of 11th mo., 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

As I wrote you I had dinner on Saturday evening with Dr. Hans Thomsen, at the Mayflower Hotel.

I give you below several quotations:

"The United States is the reason for the Vichy dismissal of General Weygand. The United States had built up General Weygand as the friend of the United States, and had repeatedly sent Murphy from Vichy to be near Weygand. The United States had sent food and supplies to North Africa, all the time emphasizing that General Weygand was not in full accord with the Vichy government and its policies."

"It had reached the point where the world was beginning to feel that General Weygand represented anti-Vichy policy and was close to Britain and especially the United States. This was not actually true, for General Weygand has always been and always will be loyal to Petain, but in order to show the world that France is fully united under Petain, it became necessary to dismiss the man who had been built up by the United States as the discordant element in the French government. It had to be shown that no one man is a factor in the policy of Vichy. General Weygand agreed that his sacrifice was necessary for proper world understanding of French unity under Petain, and he willingly accepted and agreed to this decision that such a dramatic act as his dismissal be done, in order to show, particularly to the United States, that they had erred in thinking he would or could act contrary to Vichy".

"The Germans have no hostility or unfriendly feeling toward General Weygand. His sacrifice was necessary, but not desired."

"Should the campaign in Libya turn out disadvantageously for the Germans, it would not be wholly unfortunate from the German point of view. Such a result would bolster morale in the United States and would tend to remove the present absurd fear that Germany would or could ever be able to cross the Atlantic Ocean for an attack on the United States. Certainly such an African decision would not affect the decision of the

war in Europe."

"I have read the advance copy of Under-Secretary Welles' speech to be made in Baltimore tomorrow. I think it is intemperate in its reference to Hitler. This is really not at all like Welles, and furthermore I believe it is psychologically unsound for American morale. Welles knows better, but he is evidently following orders from higher up."

"The United States may break diplomatic relations at any time, if the Administration feels that British morale is cracking. This severance of relations would be to reassure the British that the United States is fully behind them, and that the breaking of relations is a definite indication that the United States is much nearer actual war. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that relations may be continued to the new year, or the spring or even to summer."

"The striking power of the Russians is definitely gone, and gone for good. Russia can make ply wood wings for planes, but no more aluminum. There will probably be no Russian decision until spring at least. There can be no final decision now that severe winter weather has set in. Always barring, however, unexpected collapse."

"As the strongest nation in the world, the United States has a perfect right to be interested in the future of Europe and Asia. This is well understood by the Germans and has their sympathy. There is no official German resentment at the United States realization that such intelligent interest in, and participation in world decisions, is vital for the future of the United States."

Confirming my verbal conversation with you, Colonel Donovan, may I note two matters. Dr. Thomsen is very interested in antiques, paintings, old silver pieces, and all art in general. I also love such things. Not long ago he told me that I should keep an eye out for a seventeenth century Flemish tapestry of a size small enough to go over the mantel of his office fire place. It happened that I discovered one at the Silo Auction Rooms in New York at 45th and Vanderbilt Avenue. I wrote to him about it and since he was coming to New York that week he said he would look at it. He dined at my home in New York on Thursday evening and spent the evening with us. The next morning he went to the Auction rooms and saw the tapestry and

liked it. He phoned to me to buy it for him. He also told me that he had seen a Dutch primitive that he liked very much and an eighteenth century needle point covered chair. All of these he asked me to purchase if they did not go too high. He returned to Washington on a noon train and I attended the auction. I bought the tapestry, which was the only item in which he was interested, on sale on Friday. Knowing that he would be pleased, I at once sent him a telegram saying that I had purchased for him the tapestry, giving the catalogue number, and the price. The next day at the sale I also bought for him the primitive but did not get the chair.

Dr. Thomsen told me on Saturday the 22nd, when I dined with him, that my wire, sent on Friday afternoon, had not been delivered to his home until Sunday afternoon. He said that evidently the FBI had passed an excited weekend trying to figure out what secret code I was using to tell him of some vital matter affecting my State. He chuckled over it, but seriously added that perhaps our friendship was hurting me, and that it might be safer for me and my family to give up our friendship, which he and his wife highly valued.

Another incident occurred on Saturday evening, the 22nd, after dinner at the Mayflower. We had left the dining room and looked for a place where we might sit and talk without being overheard. The lobby was practically deserted at that hour, ten o'clock. We found a bench far removed from any one and with many vacant seats between it and the center of the lobby. No sooner had we seated ourselves than a handsome young man, typically suitable for the job of FBI agent, walked swiftly toward us, and passing many vacant seats, sat down in a chair right next to our bench. Dr. Thomsen said that they must think ill of me or they would not make such an attempt to overhear our conversation. He rose and suggested that we go to the writing balcony where he noted no people were sitting.

Cordially yours

(signed) MALCOLM LOVELL

Colonel William J. Donovan
Bureau of Coordination of Information

PSF Coordinator of Information
Follett

*file
please*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF

November 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Captain James Roosevelt

J. R.

In the hills of Yugo-Slavia, Colonel Mihailovitch, a modern Marion, and 30,000 Serbs, Croats and Greeks are fighting the Axis. They have wirelessly a desperate appeal for help to you and Mr. Churchill. The world is just becoming aware of this battle still raging in the interior of Europe. The struggle of the Serb guerillas is as dramatic as the World War I fight of the Armenians against the Turks immortalized in "The Forty Days of Musa Dagh".

To aid these people, to let them know they have made contact with the outside world, to show them their pleas have not fallen on deaf ears, we propose to send a bomber load of medical supplies as a token of our good faith and as a minute but tangible indication of help to come. The supplies would be dropped by parachute.

Finally, as a propaganda weapon, the fact that America could deliver supplies to a force fighting in the interior of the Balkans would stun all Europe. The effect domestically might be considerable. To many Americans, it would mean that there has been a rebirth of American initiative and daring.

Could we have the authority to make the necessary arrangements to carry out this project.

PSF C.O.d.

Donovan Folder
1-41

*File
as indicated*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 24, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Here is a memorandum of a conversation between Sir Lewis Beal and Dr. Wright of our staff, who is President of Roberts College in Turkey. I thought you might like to read it.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
WALTER L. WRIGHT, JR. OF THIS OFFICE
AND SIR LOUIS BEAL OF THE BRITISH
PURCHASING COMMISSION

Sir Louis Beal asked for a candid opinion on the attitude of the Turkish Government and public toward participation in the war. The reply was that the Turks have one inclusive aim: To develop in peace and complete independence their large and thinly populated country. They therefore desire to stay out of the war, yet realize how great are the odds against them. They believe that the Axis threatens their peace and independence, whereas Britain does not. They are convinced that Britain has much to gain by supporting a strong and independent Turkey which bars the best route for Axis advance into Asia, excluding the Axis from the centrally located and

exceedingly strong military base of
Anatolia. With Anatolia in their power,
Axis forces would constitute a quadruple
threat: against Syria, Palestine, and
Egypt; against Iraq and the Persian Gulf;
against the Caucasus and Iran; and against
the eastern Mediterranean from Turkish
ports. In consequence of this community
of interests, the Turkish Government has
become a non-belligerent ally of Great
Britain, has refused all Axis offers of
cooperation, has refused to permit Axis
military use of the Straits, and has
restricted trade with the Axis to the
lowest point consistent with technical
neutrality. Meanwhile, the Turks are
using every day of continued peace to
increase their military strength, looking
to Britain and the United States for arms
and other supplies. All but the most in-
significant minority of Turks support

fully the Government's policy. No change in public sentiment or Government policy is to be expected unless the conviction becomes general that the Axis is certain to win the war and that Britain will be unable to give sufficient help to enable Turkey to have at least a chance of maintaining resistance in the interior of Anatolia. If the Turkish leaders can see no hope of this and no hope of ultimate Axis defeat, they may feel compelled to make the best terms they can with the Axis. Even if complete Axis victory should seem inevitable, it is exceedingly doubtful whether public opinion in Turkey would tolerate a government proposing to surrender without a fight, for both Turkish and Moslem tradition would be utterly violated by such a surrender.

Sir Louis then asked what should be done by Britain in addition to what is

already being done for Turkey, to which the reply was made that there were two coordinate aims to be followed -- one directed to strengthening Turkish morale and the other directed to strengthening Turkish military power. As for the first, shipment of goods for civilian consumption directly from the United States should be undertaken as soon as possible. The Turks have become increasingly isolated from the non-Axis world, and trade has almost ceased. Outstanding needs are for automobile tires and spare parts, sole leather, drugs, serums, and medical supplies in general, rope-making materials, sacking, coffee, and a whole range of manufactured articles formerly obtained from Germany. A single shipload delivered at Alexandretta or Mersin would have a tremendous effect. Turning to military equipment, the most pressing needs, so far as is

known, are for anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and for tanks to equip one division and allow the Turkish army the possibility of counterattack. As for aircraft, a small number of fighter planes would help, but the Turks are not technically prepared to use efficiently a large air force and should, therefore, rely on an R.A.F. contingent moving into Turkish airfields.

Sir Louis commented on this statement that the goods for civilian consumption could be found and sent without too much difficulty, but that the military equipment was needed elsewhere, and that his military colleagues would oppose diverting it to Turkey, of whose resistance to Axis attack they could not feel absolutely certain. Dr. Wright replied that, to him, the situation seemed to call for a gambler's choice, that

the stake was the Turkish army of some 750,000 tough fighting men and the possession of the Anatolian plateau, which dominates the eastern Mediterranean and entire Near East; that he believed that, if Turkey should desert Britain, his military colleagues would be the first to see this and would probably begin too late to call for all-out aid to the Turks. He further urged that the only way to become certain of Turkish resistance was to give the Turks adequate evidence that resistance would have at least a fighting chance of success, that the amount of military material involved would not be sufficient, even if it should fall into Axis hands, to have any great significance, and that, in short, he believed the gamble eminently worth making, for the Turkish army is by far the largest and most determined fighting force now in the Near East or likely soon to be there. A decision should be made

immediately and action should follow without delay, for the Turks have already seen too many examples of British and American aid arriving too late and in insufficient quantity.

The conversation ended with Sir Louis stating that the above line of thinking agreed with his own, that he was convinced of the necessity of immediately despatching to Turkey both goods for civilian consumption and military supplies, and that he would at once take up the subject energetically with his military and other colleagues here. He ended by suggesting that the Coordinator of Information consider presenting this subject to the United States Government, for time was short until next spring, when Turkey could expect to be subjected to the heaviest Axis pressure, and freight shipments to Turkey would not arrive within three months.

*File
Confidential*

*PSF: Coordinator of Information
Files*


COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 28, 1941

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending along a memorandum
which the President might be interested in reading.

Sincerely,


James R. Murphy

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

The following is a description of the General Headquarters of Hitler as related by an aide of Horthy of Hungary on a recent visit to Hitler:

From his special train, Hitler directs all operations personally, devoting to them his undivided attention and taking the most scrupulous care over details. From this train he has 'conducted' the campaigns in Poland, Belgium, the low Countries, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia. Still in the same train, the Chancellor is today issuing his orders to the entire Russian front, which extends for thousands of kilometres.

Adolph Hitler has spent nearly two years in his G.H.Q. which with its military offices and modern installations constitutes the

most highly perfected caravan - if I may so term it - in the world. News from all parts converges and is assembled there; it is there that decisions are reached and all plans concerning the war are drawn up; to that point all reports, whether of major or minor importance, are directed; troop advances or retreats, however small the units, movements and action of submarines and aircraft and details of the gigantic, almost inconceivable, organisation for supplying the armies - a titanic task, organised with clockwork precision.

It will not surprise anybody to hear that this G.H.Q. is carefully concealed in the woods, in the places where it cannot be detected by enemy 'planes. It is known, however, that at whatever sector of the front it happens to be, a larger number of anti-aircraft guns are placed

together with an extra heavy reinforcement of military pickets.

In the middle of the encampment is the Fuehrer's coach, and around him are the various offices, which can be dismantled in a few minutes; cars, autocars and caterpillar-cars complete the circle.

The geographical and topographical maps on which the development of operations in the East are noted hour by hour are situated in a separate tent called 'the eastern tent'. In the tent set aside for the 'west' are the geographical plans relating to operations against England.

Among the various cars at the Headquarters is that of Herr Dietrich, head of the Reich press; beside the radio coaches are placed those for wireless telegraph. There a stupendous task is carried out. There can hardly be a

wireless station in the world whose wave-length is not picked up by these installations, which are equipped with all the latest improvements. The men in charge of these posts work day and night.

The Fuehrer is therefore kept informed of all that is happening in the Reich and all over the world, hour by hour, minute by minute, and if he does not go mad it is because he is a genius, a phenomenon of nature - which indeed is tantamount to being mad.

Hitler generally spends the greater part of his day in the so-called 'eastern tent.' With his marshals he studies developments in the military situation with minute attention. It is doubtless in this tent that the ideas and plans which surprise the enemy are conceived. I would even venture to say that it is there that modern strategy is evolved. And those in the

Fuehrer's immediate circle do not conceal or dispute the fact that every plan which has determined the German victories has been his work. His is the spirit which guides this formidable war machine, the greatest of all time. From this G.H.Q. he also directs the Reich's internal affairs. The Ministers, the Party chiefs, Goebbels and von Ribbentrop, visit the Chancellor 'somewhere on the eastern front.'

He nearly always travels by plane. He has at his disposal an enormous 'FOKKER WULF' and a tiny 'JUNKERS 52' of the type used by the air force. He uses one or other of these machines as a rule when visiting the various sectors of the front. The sheds of the G.H.Q. also contain a third machine which is capable of landing on any sort of ground. Furthermore he has at his disposal a very high-powered grey car in which

he visits the combatant forces and a smaller
runabout called an 'UEBERLAND-WAGEN.'

He eats the same food as his soldiers
and sometimes takes his meals in the military
canteens.

People who have had the opportunity of
seeing him at close quarters say that during these
two years of war his appearance has not changed.
The lines on his rather pale face have perhaps
deepened a little but he still keeps his good
humor and perfect health. His hair is beginning
to go grey at the temples, but his step has not
lost its elasticity, and he holds himself very

*BF Coordinator of Information
file personal folder 7-41*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 29, 1941.

Captain James Roosevelt,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmie:

Bob Fell has passed me the attached article of Nazi origin appearing in the September 29, 1941, issue of the Madrid Newspaper, El Alcazar. You might be interested in knowing that besides stating as a fact that the Roosevelts are a family of converted Sefardic Jews, this article goes on to say, "that the President is the most representative man of the majority of North Americans."

The article also states that we are a fantastic people given to doing things in an exaggerated manner. It occurs to me that such comment collaborates (1) Our duty to produce the weapons of war in fantastic quantity in a fantastically short time and, (2) that the President has the support of the majority of his fellow citizens.

An interesting commentary on life in North America is contained in the third paragraph in the section entitled "How the Yankees treat the Indian." This paragraph written completely in the present tense reads:

"The most terrible Indians are the Apaches, the Comanches and the Navajos, who kill whenever possible the white people in Tejas, Arizona and along the entire highway that leads to Mexico. On the other hand, the white people kill the Indians as they would kill a wolf or a snake without mercy, stabbing them and their entire families."

The next paragraph states:

"That it is enough for an Indian or Negro to make the slightest mistake for the white people to arm themselves at once without hesitation and using rifles, shoot the Negroes or Indians on the street, or if they cannot shoot them, to hang them according to the legal and popular formula of Lynch's Law."

Perhaps the boss would enjoy this enlightening article.

Sincerely yours,

Irving Pflaum
Irving Pflaum

Encl.

7-22-41 Madrid

LOS YANQUIS Y YANQUILANDIA

Roosevelt, descendiente de judíos sefarditas. — El país y su desenvolvimiento. — ¡Aquel "Maine" hundido en la bahía de La Habana!

Roosevelt anda buscando un pretexto — sea cual fuere — para justificar ante su pueblo la entrada en la guerra actual.

Los republicanos sabemos, por desgracia, cómo les gustan los yanquis.

La votadura del "Maine" — hecho preparado y realizado con un refinado esmero — fue el pretexto que justificó el despojo de Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas.

Ahora Roosevelt, tal vez recordando aquel "hecho histórico", quiere repetir aquella comedia.

Para ello se ha cubierto con el traje de ese tipo que en España conocimos hace años con el nombre de "samano" (no hay en él mala intención, pero tampoco gana con los poderosos intereses de una familia de indios sefarditas instalada en grandes ciudades de su territorio, ya sea por los mejores capitales y sus conexiones respecto al monopolio como emigración a la América inglesa), y después de tener recio y calibrado las solapas de la americana lanza en su discurso insultos y amenazas efectistas.

Los yanquis son exagerados para todo: Las avenidas de Nueva York, sus rascacielos, sus fábricas, su infinidad de "reyes" del acero, del petróleo, del betón, etcétera, etc.—; una república federal con gran cantidad de "reynos" — basta y sobra para jugarlos. Son fantásticos en todo. Roosevelt es el hombre más representativo de la mayoría de los norteamericanos.

Importancia del pueblo yanqui

En el mundo yanqui, como en la España del tiempo de los descubrimientos, el sol jamás se apaga. Cuando el sol se oculta en los lagos forestales del Maine, sale en las Aleutianas, detrás del velo de la niebla. Tal es el pueblo cuya precoz adolescencia, su frenético apremiamento y su actividad sin límites no ha tenido igual en la Historia.

El año 1701 el terreno colonizado contenía unos 260.000 habitantes. El 1810, 92.284.129, poco más o menos. Hoy se acerca a los 150.

Los primeros habitantes de la orilla en que viven hoy los yanquis fueron unos pescadores de Bristol que se establecieron allí en el año 1607. Pero, atemorizados por el rigor del invierno americano, regresaron apresuradamente a Inglaterra.

Al poco tiempo, otros ingleses se establecieron en la isla de la costa que hoy corresponde al Estado de Virginia, en la parte donde el río James desemboca en el mar. A éstos se unieron elementos muy diversos: desterrados de la metrópoli, criminales comorados en subasta, mujeres vendidas por algunas libras de tabaco y esclavos africanos, contratados para trabajar, de día, en aquella orilla casi tórrida.

En la parte norte del (Hudson) virginiano, a lo largo del río Hudson, se establecieron los holandeses. Su aldea Orange es hoy Albany, y Nueva York ocupa el lugar que ocupaba el año 1615 su nueva Amsterdam.

Más tarde llegaron neerlandeses, flamencos, valones, a los que se unieron hugonotes de Francia,



«La rapacidad yanquis, así se titulaba este sabroso y actual dibujo que publicó «Le Monde», de París, en 1898, cuando el robo de Cuba, Filipinas y Puerto Rico.

superior en tamaño a Francia. Más tarde les trajo en Oregon su río y sus soberbios bosques.

En 1848, Méjico, vencido, les dio Utah, el Nuevo Méjico, la California, espléndida, con sus ricas minas de oro, y más tarde, la Arizona.

Rusia les entregó por siete millones de dólares a los indios de Alaska y sus tierras, frías.

En 1898, después de la guerra con España, y conforme al tratado de París, quedaron dueños de Puerto Rico y el archipiélago de Filipinas, además de toda la isla de Cuba, en donde ejercen un protectorado que es más bien una dominación.

Los Estados Unidos sólo son inferiores en extensión a tres potencias: Inglaterra, el Canadá y el Brasil, y sólo tres países están más poblados: la China, la India y Rusia.

Cómo tratan los yanquis a los indios

Las tribus indias son innumerables en los Estados Unidos; pero no todas están entregadas a sí mismas, errantes o habitando donde de mejor les parece en las inmensidades aun desiertas.

Para sujetar a los indios, el Gobierno ha reunido a los más el-

patata, representa una riqueza enorme. Las frutas y el tabaco también producen ingresos grandes al Estado. Así como el algodón, que es una de las principales riquezas del país.

Los parques de ganado en Chicago ocupan una superficie de 150 hectáreas y tienen 80 kilómetros de pajas y 32 de abrevaderos. Por término medio entran allí al año de tres a cuatro millones de cabezas de ganado mayor de ocho a nueve millones de puercos, de dos a tres millones de carneros, y unos 100.000 caballos. Esto sólo en Chicago.

Los Estados Unidos cuentan también con una producción minera excepcional. El oro, la plata, el hierro, la hulla y el petróleo se recogen en abundancia.

A pesar de todo esto, los Estados Unidos es un país casi viejo, con ciudades enormes y esparcidas por todos lados el atontamiento, la miseria, las huelgas, la industria desenfrenada, los sufrimientos sin nombre.

Los yanquis abusan de todo: de su suelo, de sus bosques, que fueron espléndidos; de sus minas, de todos los metales, de los europeos y... de ellos mismos. No tienen nada de histórico. Grandes, ricos, indolentemente prosperos usando y

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 1, 1941


Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I thought that you and Father would
enjoy reading this.

Best regards.

Sincerely,


Jimmy
James Roosevelt
Captain, U.S.N.C.

Attachment

COPY

*Approved
file
Confidential*
The British ^{PSF} ^{C.O.d.} ^{Warren} ^{Fisher}
inc this is a reliable source

The following information which we have today received will be of interest to you:-

[1941]

The political situation in the Argentine has taken a turn for the worse during the last forty-eight hours.

The Acting-President banned nation-wide meetings of the Accion Argentina planned for November 29th. These meetings were to have affirmed loyalty to Democracy and to register disapproval of:-

1. Fraudulent remnants.
2. Isolationist policy of the Government.
3. Attitude of M (Group mutilated) A. (M.F.A.?)
4. Freedom of action allowed to Fifth Columnists.

The Acting-President's action was not at first considered to be a prelude to a coup d'etat, but information received indicates the possibility of this after the Buenos Aires Provincial Election on December 7th. The Minister and Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior believe that the Acting-President plans to annul elections regardless of which Party wins, and to then assume dictatorial powers.

General Menendez, although not supporter of the Acting-President, will back this move with his Nationalist group. He is an extremely daring man. The Minister of Justice and Education is said to be implicated in this scheme also.

General Justo, on the other hand, is certainly against any scheme of this nature. Furthermore, he is in virtual control in Buenos Aires, as his supporters are army men in key positions. The Under Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Acting Chief of Federal Police are his men, so between them they should be able to deal with any situation.

The solution of the crisis would be the entry of General Justo into the present government, as it is reliably considered that he is against any dictatorial step. In this connection, a reliable and accurate source reports that on December 2nd, General Justo and the Acting-President had a secret meeting lasting one and a quarter hours, when Justo hinted that the Acting-President wished to know on what terms Justo would collaborate with him.

Another reliable source saw General Justo on November 29th when the latter expressed most friendly feelings towards the United States and Great Britain and considerable dislike of M.F.A. whom he described as "dangerous". He approved the work of the investigation committee but regretted TABORDA being Chairman as the latter's past reputation might handicap the Committee's activities through lack of Governmental support.

In short, trouble may occur, but General Justo will be there, and ultimately our interests should not suffer.

P.S.F. C.O.D. Donovan Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY

FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
Count Sforza, dated Dec. 2, 1941,
enclosing report on German-
Italian danger as he found it on
his trip through the Middle West.

*file
Confidential*

PSF C.S.D.

*Hinton Fieldy
1-11
PSF C.S.D.*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 8, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

There is attached photostatic copy of
a letter in German, with a translation.

The man mentioned as Dr. F is "Fentone",
a German agent in South America. We are in-
formed that Fentone's activities relate princi-
pally to the field of economics.

Respectfully,

WJ

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

TRANSLATION

Something of interest: Dr. F. is a confirmed Catholic. His father was a great surgeon. His mother's family was an old military one. F. was active in the last war. He has been a friend of Mr. Fritz Wiedemann for the last 20 years. F. says that W., in contrast to many others, is a decent man and this is the reason why he was sent to San Francisco. He was against war with England and agitated against the Nazi extremism. I do not know how far this is true. But the fact is that this Mr. Wiedemann, who is well-known to you by name, arrived here by Lati from Berlin (with English Navicert), in order to sail from here by Japanese liner to assume his new job as Consul-General in Tientsin. Wiedemann's first visit here was to his old friend F., who found it very embarrassing to entertain Wiedemann in the hotel.

He took Wiedemann at once to a cafe. Here Wiedemann told his old friend the following, and I have no doubt that Dr. F., in confidence, reported the matter to me entirely accurately:

Wiedemann stated that the war was lost for Germany. The morale in the country itself has become rotten. A large part of the people are in despair, and the working class especially is very "down", (using the writer's own word).

Nevertheless, all opposition is nipped in the bud, and the terror is so great that a counter-movement from within could not succeed. Further, the production figures have shrunk to such proportions that the worst may be expected.

I believe that it will be of interest to you to hear this, coming from the source from which it originated. You need have no doubt that Mr. Wiedemann actually spoke in this manner.

M. NEROS & METAIS LTDA
R. DE JANEIRO
Tel. 27.343
Eng. Tenny METZ

Rio de Janeiro, den 12. September 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sehr geehrter Herr Dr. Lippmann,

inzwischen schätze ich Sie im Besitz meines Briefes vom 10. cr., und werden Sie aus diesen Aufklärungen ueber die Kabel Dr. F. und Gattin, entnommen haben.

Weiter werden Sie mir ja ~~angeben~~ kabein, sobald Sie erfahren haben, dass der hollaendische Anwalt sich mit Dr. Krawelicke in Verbindung gesetzt hat. Sie wissen, dass sogleich danach Dr. F. Herrn Kr. antelephonieren will, um ihn ausfuehrlich zu instruieren. Ich moechte mit Ihnen und Ihrem Bruder hoffen, dass die Sache irgendwie noch eine gute Wendung nehmen wird.

etwas Interessantes; Dr. F. ist ueberzeugter Katholik. Sein Vater war ein grosser Chirurg, waehrend seine Mutter aus einer alten Militaerfamilie stammt. F. war im voriven Krieg aktiv, und war er seit 20 Jahren mit Herrn Fritz Wiedemann befreundet, von dem er sagt, dass er im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen ein anstaendiger Mensch sei und dass er deswegen s.Zt. nach San Francisco geschickt worden waere, weil er gegen einen Krieg mit England und gegen den nazistischen Radikalismus agitiert haette. Ich weisse nicht, wie weit dies wahr ist. Aber Tatsache ist, dass vor einigen Tagen jener ~~Ilma~~ den Namen nach bekannte Herr Wiedemann hier mit der Lati aus Berlin angekommen ist (mit englischem Passiert), um von hier aus mit einem japanischen Schiff seinen neuen Posten als Generalkonsul in Tientsin anzutreten. Wiedemann's erster Besuch hier war bei seinem alten Freund F., dem es sehr unangenehm war, als er ihn hier im Hotel aufsuchte. Er ging mit ihm sogleich aus in ein Café, und hat Wiedemann seinem alten Freund folgendes gesagt, und habe ich keinen Zweifel, dass Dr. F. absolut wahrheitsgemaess mir die Sache konfidentiell weitererzaehlt hat:

Der Krieg sei fuer Deutschland verloren. Die Stimmung im Lande selbst sei saumaessig geworden. Eine grosse Menge der Leute sei verzweifelt, und gerade auch die Arbeiterschaft sei sehr down, doch wuerde jede Opposition im Keime erstickt, und der Terror waere so stark, dass zunaechst eine Gegenbewegung von innen nicht aufkommen koenne. Ausserdem seien die Produktionsziffern in einem derartigen Masse zurueckgegangen, dass man mit dem Schlimmsten rechnen muesse.

Ich glaube, es wird Sie interessieren, dieses aus jener Quelle zu hoeren, und Sie sollten nicht zweifeln, dass Herr Wiedemann dies tatsaechlich so gesagt hat.

Mit bestem Gruss

GWE/AR

Ihr

Wiedemann

*file
Industrial*

HSF C.O.I.

*Donovan
Folder*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE

TO:

December 8th, 1941

SUBJECT:

Dear Colonel Donovan,

On Friday afternoon, December 5th, 1941, Dr. Hans Thomsen came to my home in New York for dinner. I also spent Saturday morning with him. During our conversation of several hours in all, he said the following items which I think may be of interest to the Administration:

"Japan and the United States were near a friendly solution of the Far Eastern problem, when the Chinese stepped in and barred it".

"The Japanese and the Chinese are negotiating right now between each other. They wish to settle their affairs between themselves without help or obstacles from other countries. When they do finally compose their difficulties, it will be done by them, between themselves, without outside interference."

"It is not to Germany's advantage to have Japan go to war with the United States, as this would involve Germany in formal war with the United States. Germany's purpose is just as well served by a state of high tension in the Pacific."

"The main interest of the United States in the Burma Road is the tungsten which comes out of China on return bound trucks. The munitions of war sent in to Chungking are not sufficient in volume, and cannot ever be, to do more than keep China barely going. They are not sufficient to bring China victory over Japan. No heavy munitions are now going to Chungking from Russia."

"If war should come between Japan and the United States, it will be found that Siberia has been dangerously denuded of Russian troops. The Rostov offensive by the Russians was fought by twenty of the best divisions of the Siberian army, taken from vital Siberian points, to strengthen Timoshenko's army. Japan will now have no difficulty in overwhelming the maritime area of Siberia if they decide to move there. Incidentally, the United

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE

TO:

SUBJECT:

States has asked for a naval and air base on the coast of Siberia. Japan will never permit this."

"The countries of South America have become alarmed at the occupation of Surinam by United States troops. The Dutch were not willing to agree to the occupation, but were forced to it. They persisted in refusing to permit Brazilian co-operation. They were unwilling to have Brazilian soldiers come into the country."

"All South American countries are most concerned over the future United States plans for their continent, and the United States will soon find less and less reciprocation of the "good neighbor" spirit."

"Germany expects the United States to one day attack in Africa. We do not believe such a move would be successful. We think the point of attack will more likely be Casablanca than Dakar."

"The recent meeting between Marshal Petain and Marshal Goering was not by any means between strangers. They first met at Belgrade at the funeral of the King. They later met again at Warsaw at the funeral of Marshal Pilsudski."

The above are the quotations of interest to you.
I trust that they may be of value.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Col. WM. J. Donovan
Director of the Bureau of
Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 8th, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I have just left the German Embassy where I chatted for an hour with Dr. Thomsen (three to four P.M.) He said that the severence of diplomatic relations now probably depended on Berlin. He saw no reason for the United States to break relations, as they would gain nothing by it. He did not know how his government would act, but he feels that he will not be here very long.

Cordially yours

Malcolm Lovell

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of the Bureau of
Co-ordination of Information
Washington, D.C.

PSF C.O.I. Donovan File

*file
Donovan*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 9, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Yesterday I told you that we had information that the Chief of a German paper in Berlin had telephoned his representative here that the representative should make up his mind whether he wished to return to Germany or go to South America and that the decision had to be made promptly.

Checking back on this source, I learned today that all the German correspondents here will go back on the same boat as the Embassy staff, excepting one who is to be taken to South America.

This same source says that Germany would rather declare war on the United States than wait for the United States to declare war on her -- this for the reason that she wishes to show her own people her internal strength. The informant also stated that Germany is to declare war within a few days.

Respectfully,

Donovan
William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

PSF Coordinator of Information
Folder
For Trade Department

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~Confidential~~
file 2
11th Dec. 1941.

Captain James Roosevelt U.S.N.C.
Office of the Co-ordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Captain Roosevelt,

Occupied as the President must be I thought that, in a leisure moment, he might be interested to see a leaflet recently dropped through the agency of my Department over France, embodying the President's and Mr Winston Churchill's pronouncements on the execution of the hostages. As there is a ban on the publication of any of these leaflets at home, please regard this as confidential as far as the newspapers are concerned.

I hope your root is better.

Yours sincerely,

Valentine Williams

Valentine Williams

Les Otages

DECLARATION DE
M. Churchill
SUR LES EXECUTIONS
D'OTAGES EN FRANCE

10 Downing Street, Londres
25 octobre 1941.



"Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'associe pleinement aux sentiments d'horreur et à la condamnation exprimés par le Président des Etats-Unis à propos des massacres nazis en France. Ces exécutions d'innocents citoyens, perpétrées de sang-froid, retomberont sur les sauvages qui les ordonnent et qui les accomplissent.

" Ces massacres en France sont un exemple de ce que les nazis de Hitler font dans maints autres pays placés sous leur joug. Les atrocités de Pologne, de Yougoslavie, de Norvège, de Hollande, de Belgique, et, par dessus tout, celles commises derrière le front allemand en Russie surpassent tout ce que l'on a connu depuis les temps les plus sombres et les plus barbares de l'humanité.

" Ces atrocités ne sont qu'un avant-goût de ce que Hitler infligerait aux peuples britannique et américain si seulement il en avait le pouvoir.

" Le châtement de ces crimes doit désormais être placé parmi les buts les plus importants de la guerre."

Winston Churchill

Les Otages

DECLARATION DU Président Roosevelt SUR LES EXECUTIONS D'OTAGES EN FRANCE

Maison Blanche, Washington
25 octobre 1941



“ La pratique consistant à exécuter en masse d'innocents otages en représailles d'attaques isolées contre des Allemands dans les pays provisoirement placés sous la botte nazie révolte un monde pourtant déjà endurci aux souffrances et aux brutalités.

“ Les peuples civilisés ont depuis longtemps adopté le principe qu'aucun homme ne doit être puni pour les actes d'un autre homme. Incapables d'appréhender les personnes ayant pris part à ces attaques, les nazis, selon leurs méthodes caractéristiques, égorgent cinquante

ou cent personnes innocentes.

“ Ceux qui voudraient “ collaborer ” avec Hitler, ou qui voudraient chercher à l'apaiser, ne peuvent point ignorer cet effroyable avertissement.

“ Les nazis auraient pu apprendre de la dernière guerre l'impossibilité de briser le courage des hommes par la terreur. Au contraire, ils développent leur “ lebensraum ” et leur “ ordre nouveau ” en s'enfonçant plus bas qu'ils n'avaient eux-mêmes jamais été dans un abîme de cruauté.

“ Ce sont là les actes d'hommes désespérés qui savent au fond de leur cœur qu'ils ne peuvent pas vaincre. Le terrorisme n'apportera jamais la paix en Europe. Il ne fait que semer les germes d'une haine qui, un jour, amènera un terrible châtement.”

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Confidential

Captain James Roosevelt U.S.M.C.
Office of the Coordinator of Information
25th & 'E' Streets
Washington, D.C.

*Capt. James thought the
President might like to
see the enclosed.*

MSI Carr. of Information 5-3
1941
Att. Wms. to James Carr.
12-11-41

RECEIVED
DEC 12 11 29 AM '41
COORDINATOR
OF
INFORMATION

— This is the plan —
in operation —

showman
Folder
D. PSF
C.O.d

Stations have pledged to use news only from domestic press associations, Coordinator of Information, and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Navy censor has been placed in our New York office to give directives to stations to omit anything in domestic press association reports from their broadcasts that might be useful to enemy. Thus, one censor is in a position to exercise his censorship on all stations. We have asked the Navy to assign a special man in San Francisco.

See
Noted
J.S.
12/11/41

We have asked all stations to review all personnel engaged in international broadcasting and are assigning dossiers to F.B.I. on basis of possible suspicion. Since F.B.I. cannot investigate all personnel overnight, we have

set up this "priority list".

The F.B.I. is also making recommendations regarding improvement of physical security of stations.

Captain Fenn has been apprised that recording facilities in New York are at his disposal if and when there is suspicion that broadcasts are carrying "broken codes".

PSF *Coordinator of*
Information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:

I think most decidedly you
should take this up at once with
* Sumner Welles and the Latin American
Bureau.

F.D.R.

Memorandum on South American from
Col. Donovan in black book.

BSF

Coordinator of
Information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

COLONEL DONOVAN

Please talk with State and Justice as to what should be done, now that we are at war with Germany, Italy, Japan and several other nations, in the case of those American citizens who are working for enemy governments.

Offhand, I think they still come under some old law and can have their property in the United States confiscated, i.e., taken over as if the property belonged to an enemy alien. Whether they automatically lose their citizenship or not should be looked into.

F. D. R.

Report of broadcast by E. D. Ward, one of two Americans broadcasting in the Nazi pay from Berlin. Report returned to Colonel Donovan.

*file
personal*

ASF Coordinator of Information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I assumed that you wanted
me to go ahead and I have seen
Welles and he is now writing
the Canadian Government.

W. J. D.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Inclosure 4

PSF C.O.D.

15

December 20, 1941
6 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Sumner Welles, on behalf of the State Department, requested me to set up a branch in my office which would study and report upon foreign politics as they unfold in the United States in connection with our foreign-nationality groups. Its tasks would be:

(1) To keep currently informed about foreign political personalities in the United States, such as Sforza, Otto of Hapsburg, Hodza of Czechoslovakia, Chautemps, and so on;

(2) To keep informed generally respecting foreign political activities among the nationality groups in the United States, their leaders and factions;

(3) To appraise this information and submit timely reports to the State Department and other policy-making

I have made considerable progress in the direction desired, having placed the work in the hands of John Wiley and DeWitt C. Poole, both of whom have had long diplomatic experience. The work has been discussed with Archibald MacLeish, and he has given it his blessing. Precise estimates are now about to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget and I should like therefore to ask if you approve.

OK
F. B. I.

closure 5

PSF C.O.D.

17

December 21, 1941
6 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I told you on my No. 82 dated December 20, 1941, 12 M. delivery, that this young Tammany man came in to see me about Ireland. He reported to me today that they had discussed the matter with Martin Conboy. He thinks Martin Conboy would be prepared to act but was of the impression that he would like some suggestion from you.

Do you wish to make it directly, or do you wish me to do something about it, or have anything to do with it at all?

Ask Martin Conboy?
FJD

Inclosure 6

PSF C.O.D.

December 21, 1941
6 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Pursuing the subject I referred to in my memorandum on North Africa, and also emphasizing my answer to Frank Knox, who discussed the same subject:

I talked this afternoon with a man who has a Holy man whom he has befriended. My man was a friend of Lyautey and lived there for six years. His friend, the Holy man, is very close to the Sultan. He thinks that he would have a reasonable chance of inducing the Sultan to carry out the project we have in mind. He thinks money would not be required, but arms and equipment plus a promise of semi-autonomy.

Our agent is an Englishman, graduate of Sandhurst, excellent education and experience. Our only chance of getting him in, however, would be under an American passport.

W.J.D.
Take up with
Marshall &
State Dept.
F.D.R.

-2-

On the operational side, I would have it handled by our S.O.S. here who will be returning from England where I have had him at the guerrilla school.

It would be necessary to get our supplies in there at once.

If you feel that you wish this to be taken up, please let me know as quickly as possible. I think we could work it jointly with the British.

December 26, 1941

Honorable Harold D. Smith
Director of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith:

I am making a request for additional funds, by reason of the following:

Upon the direction of the President, I took up with General Marshall and with Mr. Sumner Welles the problem of getting necessary preparatory and conditioning work done in the Cape Verde Islands and in French North Africa.

This will involve a K&L project on the S.O.S. model and will necessitate the hiring of men and the purchase of many materials. At the suggestion of General Marshall, the details will be worked out by General Stillwell, who is to have command of the project.

I do not need to elaborate to you the need, not only for funds, but for speed in such an undertaking.

you, J. C.
of the company
through J. J. J.

Enclosure, see J. J.

-2-

So far as we can estimate now, we should be able to obtain sufficient material for a sum of \$500,000. This should include the obtaining of men, the transportation, the purchase of demolition material, and the conduct of operations for a period of two months. If that is extended, or if a larger project cannot be put through at the end of that time, more funds will be needed.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

M:CC

Inclosure 7

BSF C.O.D.

No. 92.

December 22, 1941.
8:30 A.M.

*OK if
agreed to
by State War
Dept*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT.
FROM: William J. Donovan.

Further on the question of Fifth Column activities in the AZORES suggested by Colonel Knox:

(a) You will recall that on December 17, noon delivery, I sent the suggestion of an AZORES air patrol.

(b) This was not approved by the representative here of the Air Force, because of some contemplated movements in the Azores.

(c) However, the situation has changed, and I feel that I ought to bring it to your attention again.

(d) As a result of negotiations extending over some weeks time the GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL has agreed to grant the concession for internal air service operations in THE AZORES, to an old established shipping undertaking controlled by an Azorean family, which already handles 70% of the business of the Islands.

(e) The head of this business is an Anti-Axis Portuguese, who is known to be completely reliable and who has already been of considerable service to the Allied Cause.

(f) He is prepared to initiate immediately the necessary steps to establish bases for the air service operations contemplated, which would provide ideal natural cover for extensive penetration of the Islands for special defensive purposes.

(g) It would be necessary to supply him with some equipment, say two amphibians, and to provide the financial requirements to conduct the overt and covert operations.

(h) The aircraft should be enroute at the earliest possible opportunity, and certain skilled personnel selected for special purposes should accompany the owners to the Islands.

(i) Our Portuguese friend referred to has control of the ships which would carry the necessary equipment to the Azores from the United States, and unloading could be done without undue inquiry as to certain parts of the equipment accompanying the aircraft.

(j) Due to the predominant position in the Islands of our Portuguese friend, he would be in a position to very quickly obtain local assistance without undue risk.

(k) He could also recruit pilots and

technicians in numbers without attracting unusual attention, as the operation of the air lines by him has been long expected, and it is known from public utterances he has made in the past that his only desire is to be a pioneer of air service in the Islands, as his family before him were in shipping, and that he does not expect the operation to make a profit for some time.

(1) Therefore, all the necessary cover is provided for extensive penetration operations, and, in addition, the most difficult problem usually encountered in such an operation, namely, means of transportation and infiltration, are provided for in a form which avoids the likelihood of undue attention and suspicion being attracted to the activities of the penetration force.

(m) The cost involved would be, roughly, the cost of two aircraft and ancillary equipment, and airdrome construction, say \$300,000; overt and covert working capital, say \$200,000 - a total of \$500,000, to which must be added the cost of any special "stores" it is possible to introduce in quantity.

December 26, 1941

Honorable Harold D. Smith
Director of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith:

It will be necessary to obtain funds from the Budget Bureau, by reason of the approval by the State and War Departments of a project which the President authorized subject to such approval.

The project relates to certain special activities proposed in the Azores, a brief statement of which is as follows:

(a) As a result of negotiations extending over some weeks' time, the Government of Portugal has agreed to grant the concession for internal air service operations in the Azores, to an old established shipping undertaking controlled by an Azorean family, which already handles 70% of the business of the Islands.

(b) The head of this business is an Anti-Axis Portuguese, who is known to be completely reliable and

RECEIVED
U. S. AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RECEIVED
U. S. AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

who has already been of considerable service to the Allied Cause.

(c) He is prepared to initiate immediately the necessary steps to establish bases for the air service operations contemplated, which would provide ideal natural cover for extensive penetration of the Islands for special defensive purposes.

(d) It would be necessary to supply him with some equipment, say two amphibians, and to provide the financial requirements to conduct the overt and covert operations.

(e) The aircraft should be enroute at the earliest possible opportunity, and certain skilled personnel selected for special purposes should accompany the owners to the Islands.

(f) Our Portuguese friend referred to has control of the ships which would carry the necessary equipment to the Azores from the United States, and unloading could be done without undue inquiry as to certain parts of the equipment accompanying the aircraft.

(g) Due to the predominant position in the Islands of our Portuguese friend, he would be in a position to

obtain very quickly local assistance without undue risk.

(h) He could also recruit pilots and technicians in numbers without attracting unusual attention, as the operation of the air lines by him has been long expected, and it is known from public utterances he has made in the past that his only desire is to be a pioneer of air service in the Islands, as his family before him were in shipping, and that he does not expect the operation to make a profit for some time.

(i) Therefore, all the necessary cover is provided for extensive penetration operations, and, in addition, the most difficult problem usually encountered in such an operation, namely, means of transportation and infiltration, are provided for in a form which avoids the likelihood of undue attention and suspicion being attracted to the activities of the penetration force.

(j) The cost involved would be, roughly, the cost of two aircraft and ancillary equipment, and air-drome construction, say \$300,000; over and covert

-4-

working capital, say \$200,000 - a total of \$500,000, to which must be added the cost of any special "stores" it is possible to introduce in quantity.

In accordance with the direction of the President, I am pursuing this matter with the British. General H.H. Arnold, who was present at the conference with the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, has designated an air officer to assist.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

M:CC

—

PSP Coordinator of Information


COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 22, 1941

Dear Miss Tully:

I am sending you the memorandum on British Commandos, which was referred to in Colonel Donovan's note in the six o'clock delivery today.

Sincerely,


James R. Murphy

Miss Grace Tully

The White House

Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

ON

BRITISH COMMANDOS

William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information

MEMORANDUM
ON
BRITISH COMMANDOS

William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information

Although the Commandos in Britain are somewhat similar to the independent companies of the days of the Black Prince, the modern unit had its origin as a result of the Battle of France.

The close of that battle left the British Army so inferior to the Germans in number and in munitions that its very survival was dependent upon the avoidance of a straight fight for an indefinite period. This was a new experience for the British Army, although in many a colonial war it had witnessed its opponents in similar straits, and in June 1940, Britain did exactly the same thing that the Boers, Pathans, Afghans and Arabs had done when they had suffered a hard blow from a powerful foe -- Britain withdraw her Army within her own country and waited for the enemy to come in and fight on ground that was advantageous to British defenders. History repeated itself, and the conquering Germans hesitated to precipitate such costly operations -- a lull ensued, with the main armies out of contact with each other.

The Imperial General Staff, from its knowledge of the history of British troops fighting with smaller countries, recognized that, under such conditions in South Africa, the Northwestern Frontier of India, Mesopotamia or Palestine, such a moment would have been a signal for guerilla bands to embark upon a war of attrition while the main army licked its wounds and made good its losses -- a war of continual mosquito tactics, which, at small cost

to the marauders, would wear down and sicken the more ponderous bulk of the more powerful side. With those lessons in mind, the Imperial General Staff made its first task after Dunkirk the creation of a special force of British Guerillas. Thus the Commandos came into being.

The Commandos started free of all the conventions which surround a traditional Corps. From the very beginning, the aim was to combine all the essentials of irregular bands with the superior training, equipment and intelligence of regular troops. With his Bren, his grenades and his Tommy gun, the Commando soldier had to be able to scale a cliff like a Pathan, to live like a Boer with no transport columns or cookhouses, and to disperse and break away like an Arab before the enemy could pin him to his ground. Nearly every conception of guerilla warfare was opposed to all the British soldier had ever been taught. The "team spirit" had to go by the board, no longer could the pace be that of the slowest; every man had to go on, regardless of the fate of his neighbors, "better for one man to get through than none!" In adversity each one had to learn to save his own skin, none could afford the risk of being pinned in an attempt to extricate a slower colleague. "Always attack - never defend - run to fight another day!" had to be the new motto, and it was not an easy one to teach to troops who had grown up on a tradition of stubbornness in defence and steadiness in maneuver.

As a first step toward raising the Commandos, an analysis was made of the chief features of guerilla organizations, with a view to adapting them as closely as possible to the peculiarities of the British soldier. This started

by opening up a new angle on the vital question of leadership and discipline. In the British Army a soldier was placed, quite at random, under the command of an officer whom he was compelled to obey by law under pain of punishment. The guerilla, on the other hand, selected his own officer for his prowess in the field and deserted him for another if he failed to produce the goods. Discipline, entirely summary in nature, was maintained solely by the energy and personality of the leader, who usually remained absolute chief of his own band, even though it might form but a small part of some bigger man's following. "Leadership," in fact, rather than "Command", was the keynote, and no remote postings officer of "superior authority" interfered in the man-to-man relationship of the Leader with his Followers. Obviously, even the Commandos couldn't go quite so wild; but the principle was maintained by allowing each officer to pick his men and to return any of them at will, without appeal and without having to give any reason. Similarly, every man had the right to return to his original unit on giving a minimum period of notice, without stating his reasons. Subsequent experience justified these innovations, and it was seldom found necessary to introduce any punishment, other than a warning of dismissal from the Commando.

Recruiting was started in England by a circular letter from the War Office to Commanders-in-Chief of Commands, asking them to call for volunteers "for special service" and giving a list of the qualifications required. No attempt was made to indicate the nature of the service, except that no man would be asked to parachute unless he specifically volunteered for it; a promise was made that every volunteer would be interviewed privately by an officer and given an

opportunity of withdrawing after he had received some indication of what it was all about. The qualifications were:

- (a) Youth and physical fitness.
- (b) Intelligence, self-reliance and an independent frame of mind.
- (c) Ability to swim.
- (d) Immunity from sea-sickness.

(Subsequent events proved the importance of (c) and (d)!) In addition, every volunteer had to be fully-trained soldier with a minimum period of service. With the exception of trained staff officers, all arms of the service were eligible, a mistake which had to be corrected later when it was found that too high a proportion of skilled technicians with a keen spirit of adventure were being employed as infantrymen in the Commandos. Finally, Commanders-in-Chief were asked to select a few officers to lead Commandos. There were to be below the rank of Lieut. Colonel, not over the age of 40, and possessing, in addition to the qualifications laid down for the rank and file:

- (a) Tactical ability and sound military judgment.
- (b) High qualities of leadership.
- (c) Dash.

The order of importance of these three was stressed. Final selections from the Commanders-in-Chief's list were to be made in the War Office.

While recruitment was proceeding in the Commands, the detailed structure of the Commando Force was designed in the War Office. Here again, every effort was made to base it on the guerilla system, where numbers of small bands of various sizes joined together to form larger, but controllable, units. It was decided to base the organization on a "Troop" of 50 men, as a convenient number which a single officer could handle with the aid of an understudy or "Second-in-Command". (Later the Troop-Leader was given two junior officers, which was perhaps too generous an allotment.) No attempt was made to subdivide the Troop in practice, and each Troop-Leader was left to organize it his own way. This flexibility proved a considerable asset later when Troops had to be split up quite arbitrarily to fit into boatloads, etc., and the basic organization of 50 men was a marked success of the organization. It had been decided to raise a total of 10 Commandos, each of which was to comprise not more than 10 Troops. The underlying idea at the time was that some Commands would not contain as good material as others, and there were conveniences in calling for an approximate quota of two Commandos from each. As I talked with some of these Command Officers, they told me that, actually, it might have been better to limit each Commando

to 7 Troops and place a Lieutenant-Colonel in command of three Commandos. This was noticeable later on, when a Brigadier was appointed to command all ten; by then, all Commandos were 500 strong with ten Troops each and had to be linked in pairs under a "Battalion Commander" to facilitate control.

In due course, two officers from each Command were chosen by the War Office as Commando-Leaders, were given the acting rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and told to select their Troop-Leaders from the lists of officer volunteers at the Command Headquarters. The selected Troop-Leaders were then to pick their two juniors, and the three then worked through the Command lists for other ranks until 50 N.C.Os. and men had been interviewed and accepted for the Troop. It took time, but in the end, every officer had personally selected the men whom he was to lead in the field. From the rejects he kept a record of likely reinforcements to replace later wastage -- although as the scheme matured a Depot unit was formed later into which selected volunteers from any Training unit could be drafted to form an immediate reserve upon which the Commandos could draw for replacements. A very high proportion of N.C.Os. was allowed in each Troop, both to facilitate tactical employment in very small parties and to offer reasonable promotion prospects to the superior material which soon

flocked into the ranks of the Commandos.

Attention was turned next to the arms and equipment which the Commandos would need, both of which clearly depended upon the type of operations they would have to undertake. In the summer of 1940 the answer seemed obvious. The Germans had extended themselves along a coastline reaching from Narvik to Biarritz, every bit of which lay within reasonable striking distance of the British Isles. With the Royal Navy's superiority at sea, there seemed to be unlimited opportunities for amphibious guerilla bands to raid up and down that coast, striking down a sentry or two here, cutting out a small garrison there, making the enemy's life a burden and a misery, forcing him to expend much unprofitable effort and ever keeping alight the flame of revolt. That seemed to be the obvious use of the Commandos, until the time came for them to play their part in some bigger forward movement on the Continent. It set a scale to their

equipment at once, and gave a keynote to their training; they had to be essentially an amphibious force -- a sort of super-Marines -- with nothing which they could not carry on their backs from a boat to a beach. Oddly enough, it restored to them the irregular's mobility across country which European armies had long lost, for any form of transport beyond a bicycle, and perhaps a handcart, was ruled out. Elaborate wireless sets, mortars, heavy machine-guns with their huge ammunition supplies, all had to go by the board, and the only transport the Commando could look forward to would be what they could capture and drive themselves. So it was laid down that each man should join with his own rifle or pistol, and the Commando should hold a stock of Berms and Tommy-guns (in the proportion, respectively of 1 to 2) for training purposes and for distribution as required for each specific operation.

After that came the vexed question of supplies. Like the guerilla, who lives on the country, the Commando had to be one hundred percent fighting men; there could be no cooks and no supply column, and somehow they would have to fend for themselves. Here for once, however, they had one advantage over the guerilla in his barren hills, for most of the likely area of operations lay in civilized country where food could be bought for money. But the British soldier is normally quite untrained to fend for himself; he is used to seeing his food brought to him ready cooked at regular intervals wherever he may be, and without it, he is apt to be lost. So it became an essential part of the Commando's training to get the men used to fending for themselves at all times and under all conditions, and this led to an experiment which has been the subject of much controversy.

It was decided that the Commandos, from their very formation, should receive no quarters or rations from the Army. Instead, each man drew an allowance of 6/8d. a day (double for officers) with which to provide himself with lodgings, food, travel to and from place of parade, and the upkeep of a suit of civilian clothes. (The latter was required on occasions

for secrecy purposes, such as "trickling" troops into a port area prior to embarking for a raid, etc.) The "6/8d. system" was no more than the application of the normal practice of "administering" civilian labor to a citizen army, but it found many critics. It was unpopular with other units of the Army (who were probably jealous of its privileges) and many senior officers considered it detrimental to good discipline, but the Commando-Leaders themselves were all unanimous in its praise. After some four or five months' experience, they reported at a War Office conference that it did more than anything else to teach the men self-reliance and to instill the "Commando spirit"; that it left every officer and man free to devote his whole time to training, with none of the guards and camp "duties" which are normally such a drain on efficiency; that it entirely eliminated grumbling, since each man had only himself to blame if his food or lodging was not up to taste; and finally, that it was immensely popular with the men and added much weight to the threat of dismissal from the Commando for any breach of discipline.

Each Commando was allotted a seaside town, within its parent Command, in which to form. A suitable house was taken as a Headquarters in which offices and stores were set up, and a small administrative staff installed to relieve the Commando-Leader of the routine paper-work concerning pay, records and equipment, etc. The Administrative Staff were not designed to go on raids, and the Administrative Officers was usually a rather elderly Major with much greater administrative experience than was likely to be found in the young and dashing type of officer needed to lead the Commando. It was an arrangement which worked well.

On arrival at its "home-town," the men of the Commando dispersed to find themselves lodging, while a recreation-ground or local hall was taken over to act as the parade ground. Here, too, they joined up with the "irregular" naval unit with which they were to train. Later on, it was possible to allot a fully-manned ship with which the Commando could both train and sail on actual operations, but to begin with, the "irregular navy" was usually a miscellaneous collection of motor, sailing and pulling boats in charge of a young R.N.V.R. officer, with enthusiastic

yachtsmen and fishermen as his crews. But, however, composed, this intimate cooperation between the "irregular navy" and each Commando was from the very start an essential element in the whole scheme. It was the "seaworthiness" of the Commandos which was to give them their mobility: in 1914-18 it had always been a point of honor for a British unit to own the No-Man's-Land in front of it; now the sea was the No-Man's-Land of the British Front Line, and it was up to the Commandos to keep it as their own hunting ground. Their amphibious training had to give them all the advantages at sea of guerrillas fighting in their native hills, so that they could scorn the obvious sandy landing beach and descend unexpectedly from rocky coves or precipitous headlands.

Training of Commandos aimed at developing the individual initiative of each man for fighting of a tip-and-run nature. All training was designed for purely offensive purposes, and Commando-Leaders were given a completely free hand and a reasonable cash allotment to organize their own training. It consisted mostly of swimming and boating practice, of exercises to bring the men to a high standard of physical fitness and proficiency in the handling of their

weapons and -- most important of all -- practice in night work of every kind. Although a good deal of stalking and use of ground for concealment by day was taught, the success of most raiding operations depended more on the silence and precision with which the unit could operate at night. Finally, it was impressed upon all ranks that no type of operation, however peculiar, must be regarded as unusual; at a moment's notice they had to be prepared to ride bicycles or motorcycles, drive cars or lorries of unfamiliar types, travel in aircraft or in ships and boats of any sort; they might have to copy the enemy in certain circumstances in order to "infiltrate" in the guise of sailors, airmen, technicians, etc., so that each man had to be capable of acting a part with reasonable solemnity. Officers and N.C.O.'s were sent in batches to undergo courses of instruction at a special school of irregular warfare, and all ranks gained practical sea-going experience manning anti-aircraft machine guns or anti-"E" boat weapons in various patrol craft operating off the English coasts.

I talked with many of those who had to do with the training and fighting of these Commandos, and all of them agreed upon the retention of the following features:

- (a) Recruitment only of trained soldiers who are volunteers -- preferably

those with a minimum of, say, 6 months' service with an active unit.

- (b) The principle of selection by which officers choose their own men.
- (c) The mutual right of dismissal by the officer, without question, and of the return of the soldier to his own regiment on giving reasonable notice.
- (d) The basic unit of 50 men under a leader, with one or two officer assistants.
- (e) A proportion of not less than 35% to 40% of the N.C.Os. in the ranks.
- (f) Not more than seven basic units under one commander.
- (g) Permanent inclusion in every Commando from the start of an "irregular" naval element.
- (h) Each Commando to be based upon a sea-side town.
- (i) The "6/8d." method of administration to be retained.
- (j) No arms or equipment which cannot be carried by hand.
- (k) Ample training in night work and sea-going experience of all sorts.
- (l) A special school to study irregular and amphibious warfare and teach it to the personnel of Commandos.

I have written you rather fully, because I think there is the essence of an idea here that is peculiarly consonant with, not only the nature of our people, but with the tradition of our fighting forces. I do not propose the particular organization that we should set up, in the event that the idea would seem feasible. The best structure for our peculiar problems could be devised after consultation with experienced fighting men. In any case, I think the following principles should be kept in mind:

1. Guerilla Warfare School: This should be done for the training of the first officers and N.C.Os. selected for this Command. As high a proportion as possible should be sound, well-trained, professional soldiers, who have had actual experience at guerilla warfare. This may sound elementary, but it was a principle which was completely disregarded when the first British school was started.

2. Formation of a Special Corps:
I admit that it may be debatable whether

there should be a "Special Corps", it should be given a name with historic association.

3. Size of the Corps: The British in their experience suggest a basic unit of 50 men, and that not more than seven of these units should form the Commando or equivalent. If it be desired to put several Commandos under one Commander, they can be grouped in three, forming an equivalent of a battalion of about one thousand strong.

4. Recruitment of the New Corps: It would seem that the practical way would be to have each Army area produce its quota. Under his orders, each Corps Commander could prepare a list of volunteers who must be fully-trained soldiers with a minimum period of service.

5. Concentration of the Unit: Each unit could concentrate in a coastal town with reasonable boating facilities.

6. Naval Cooperation: From the day it forms, each unit should have a small naval wing with which it can both train and operate. The same soldiers and sailors should live and work alongside throughout. The Naval wings should be recruited from volunteers on the same selective principles as the soldiers. The naval wing will use mostly naval boats, but should also have naval cutters and whalers, ships' life-boats, etc. -- in fact, any pulling boats which may have to be used in a landing operation. The British found that the most useful type of motor boat for this type of work is the special shallow-draft craft with tunnelled propellers made by Higgins of New Orleans. There are various models from 35 feet to 75 feet, including one with a silent, low-speed auxiliary motor for the final approach to the Beach.

7. Training: Leaders of these units should be given as free a hand as possible in the training of their units, and a reasonable cash allowance to be spent at their discretion. Higher control of training will be much better carried out by issuing "directives" and useful appliances than by close supervision. There should be ample range facilities and a generous allotment of practice ammunition, good "sand-models" and practice in reading aerial photographs.

8. Replacement of Wastage: Once the original corps has been formed, a depot unit will be needed from which wastage from the ranks can be made good. The intake into the depot will be best confined to suitable volunteers from army training units.

Long Range Desert Patrols

I want to write briefly about another organization that I observed in Libya. This was the Long range Desert Group. They follow the principle of guerilla warfare. The principle object of this Group is to provide long range ground reconnaissance patrols in the desert.

These patrols are organized so that they can be used offensively, if required.

Each patrol is an independent body capable of travelling entirely self-contained for a minimum of 2000 km. in distance, and for a period of two to four weeks, and capable of finding its way over unmapped country.

Each group is a G.H.Q. unit. It consists of Group Headquarters and two squadrons. Each squadron consists of Squadron Headquarters and three fighting patrols.

The patrol contains two officers and 30 other ranks, transported in one 15 cwt. pilot car and ten 30 cwt trucks. The armament consists of 4 Vickers Guns, 6 Lewis Machine Guns, one 37 mm. BOFORS or 2 pdr. anti-tank gun, and 3 BOYS anti-tank rifles.

Each patrol is also equipped with one No. 11 W/T set for communication with H.Q. or with other patrols or units which it is operating, and one PHILIPS type receiving set with which to receive the wireless time signal.

I had several talks with Col Bagnell, who organized these patrols and who commands them now. He told me that he had experimented over a period of years by taking fellow officers and spending their leaves in the desert. I have obtained notes

on these patrols in their organization and operations in the desert. These you will find attached. As you will see, it is an extension of the Commando principle.

These Commandos have been used in many operations. Perhaps it may be that the acid test of battle would not justify certain features of the organization. Not all of the High Command were whole-heartedly in favor of the idea. Junior officers were keener for it than senior officers. It may be that perhaps the more ardent exponents expected too much of the organization. But all were agreed that it served a real purpose. Certainly I saw with my own eyes that it was a sort of corps d'elite, and served as an incentive for men in other Commands. In point of fact, to my mind, one of its best functions is stimulating a spirit of emulation in other troops. In reality the British follow the Germans in their use of special troops trained for specific purposes (their parachutists are really flying guerillas). My observation is that the more the battle machines are perfected the greater the need in modern warfare of men calculatingly reckless with disciplined daring, who are trained for aggressive action. In all of our talk on defense, we are apt to miss the spirit of the attack. And if we were to try to develop the idea in our army it will mean a return to our old tradition of the scouts, the raiders and rangers.