Subject File
"C" 141
Box No. 1942

PSF Coordinator of Information 1942
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I suppose that Hitler will support the plan for a religion for Germany that has been announced by Rosenberg. Thus, Catholic Italy will be fighting side by side with a pagan Germany and a heathen Japan. The Catholics of this country and many even of the Protestants found it difficult to accept the involuntary support of Russia because that country is non-religious.

It is significant that Russia should sign an engagement to fight, among other things, for religious freedom, on the same day that Rosenberg should announce in effect that Mein Kampf was to be the future Bible of Germany, which of course means Hitler-worship.

It seems to me that much can be made of this situation. Formerly there were more wars for religion than for anything else and the religious conviction is a deep one, however much people may have fallen away from its open expression. My thought is that there ought to be a carefully planned campaign of nation-wide radio speeches to explain the religious implications in this war. Without mentioning them, it ought especially to be brought home to various Catholics and the German Lutherans that one of the prime objectives of Hitler is to uproot those two religions completely, while confiscating all church properties in Germany.

Sincerely yours, /s/ HAROLD L. ICKES
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached proposal I have submitted to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark. They approve. They think it essential and approve of this particular man. If you sanction it, please let me know as I think we should try to get him off at once.

[Signature]

OK. go ahead
1. It is proposed to send Colonel Charles Sweeny to Morocco to investigate and eventually to organize an uprising of native tribes against German occupation.

Colonel Sweeny was one of the organizers of the American Volunteer Corps in the French Army in 1914. He served in the Foreign Legion from 1914 to 1917, reaching the grade of Captain. He was attached to the Viviani-Joffre Mission to the United States in 1917. Transferred to the American Army, he served in France until after the Armistice.

In 1925 he served in Morocco in the Air Force and was Honorary Commander of the Sultan's Guard. During the operations against Abd-el-Krim that summer and autumn, he commanded the Air Force in support of the columns engaged in the Ouergha Valley and the Riff Mountains. The most active of these columns was commanded by Colonel Nogues. In execution of his mission, Sweeny attached himself to this column and, for three weeks, lived in the same tent with the Column
Commander. This is the same Nogues who, today a full General, is Resident-General of Morocco. General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in North Africa, then a Captain, was Nogues' Chief of Staff. The three men have remained firm friends.

2. While in Marrakech, Colonel Sweeny knew intimately the three great Caids of the South: El Glaoui, El Gundalfi, and El M'Tigue. The latter two are now dead and El Glaoui remains Supreme Lord of the Atlas Mountains under the French.

El Glaoui, the Chief of the Glaoua tribe, was chosen by Lyautey, Conqueror and First Resident-General of Morocco, to pacify and organize the territories of the Sus and the Atlas Mountains of Southern and South Eastern Morocco. It was Lyautey's policy to count on the great land and religious chiefs more than on the force of arms. Even with this policy, it required 25 years to subdue the Atlas definitely.

El Glaoui, by this association with the French, has become
a very wealthy man. French and English bankers estimate his wealth in the neighborhood of twenty-five million dollars. He is convinced that a German occupation of his country would entail the certain loss of his position and fortune. To attach him to our cause, arms, and eventually money, would have to be supplied.

3. The tribesmen of the Atlas and of the Anti-Atlas Mountains towards the Sus and the Sahara Desert are very warlike. It would be possible to arm at least 100,000 of them, and possibly 250,000. The road system from Morocco to the South toward Dakar, passing through mountains and desert, is very open to attack by bands of guerrillas. The French, in spite of their long experience in colonial warfare, found this their greatest difficulty in the Conquest of Morocco. For example, Marshal Petain required ten months and a force of 150,000 men and 30 batteries of 65 m/m mountain guns to put down the Abd-el-Krim
insurrection of 1925–26. Native African troops and the Foreign Legion, men hardened to the desert heat and the mountain cold, made up 90% of this force. Even then the operation was finally successful only because of the support of certain local tribes. The Germans, who know nothing of the art of colonial warfare would, at first, find the problem almost impossible of solution and would always be in difficulties. Colonel Sweeny does not feel that it would be possible to prevent the Germans from reaching Dakar once they had occupied Northern Africa, but he does feel that communications could be made extremely difficult and at times impossible.

4. As soon as it was certain that the Germans intended to occupy Northern Africa, rifles and machine guns would have to be landed on the Moroccan Coast in the region of Agadir, or further to the south.
Colonel Sweeny proposes to go to Morocco to contact El Glaoui and other friends in the tribes and among French Colonials. He will report with the least delay possible. Any effective plan will inevitably call for the landing on the Coast of requisite arms and munitions, an estimate of this would be furnished with report by Colonel Sweeny.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have just received the following message from our radio man in London:

1. During the last few days, I have had intimate unofficial conversations with Sutton, Morton, and Bowes Lyon, and these conversations lead me to urge, in the strongest terms, that the questions of our providing at least token forces of American airplanes for leaflet operations be vigorously pressed in Washington before we ask the British to handle United States leaflet No. 2.

2. I also urge that it would be extremely valuable if we could give some tangible proof that the question
of token Naval and Air Forces in Africa and the Mediterranean was also being pressed.

3. No American pilots or American-made airplanes participated in the initial leaflet, evidently because unusually increased, specifically, military commitments made their use impractical.

4. As these commitments are, at the moment, so urgent and extensive, the Air Ministry is balking somewhat in continuing to carry out continuous and extensive British leaflet operations; which include Courrier de L'Air and which have included all the major Roosevelt speeches up to now.

5. The Air Ministry has used the United States leaflet operations to take the position that the fulfillment of American requirements should be taken as satisfying all political warfare needs of both
America and Britain.

6. This has obviously created a difficult position for PWE and they feel that a token American Air Force, assigned to the leaflet work, would answer the Air Ministry's argument.

7. The United States leaflet No. 2 has been prepared and will be ready for dropping by the end of the week.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

We need to select a representative for the Censorship Board. It requires a man with an appreciation of world communications and the significance of the censorship raw material for intelligence. State Department experience is desirable. Lamont Belin, formerly Ambassador to Poland, may be available. Before asking him to serve, I would like to know if you have any objection.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is one segment of our attack on North Africa. It deals with the Navy, and I propose to take it up with Admiral King:

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in the event of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:

   (a) desert with their ships to our side;
   (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
   (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American Forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us nominal.

2. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should
be directed primarily at career officers actually serving in ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen in the French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders received from their superiors. At some French Naval stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

III. Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

1. Radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.

2. Officers of French Naval Intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.

3. There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardroom are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to
shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above -- collective listening in wardrooms -- is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be banned at least at some stations.

(1) Immediately following a short program of music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.
(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political -- for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France -- but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects -- especially from French Colonial and naval history -- are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

It is desired to ask the approval of the Navy Department with a view to the prompt inauguration of a detailed Radio program which, due to its length, has been omitted from this particular memorandum.

If in principle the project is approved it is suggested
that a representative of the Navy Department be assigned to cooperate closely with the Radio Division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.
January 24, 1942

If the positions in the Pacific were reversed, if Japan were in our place and we in Japan's, our home territory would long since have been invaded, and our capital at Tokyo bombèd. The desperate vigor with which the Japanese are now striking wherever they can distract and divert us shows how well they understand the value of the military diversion to gain that most precious commodity of war—time.

We can apply and must apply such methods to our present situation if we are to make time our ally instead of our enemy.

One possible application of this principle:

An expeditionary force of 10,000—15,000 men, young vigorous, tough; volunteers chosen from fully trained soldiers and Marines, specially organized on the principles of the British commandos, armed with a high proportion of automatic weapons, mortars, grenades, mountain artillery and small tanks, with an air contingent of 6 medium bomber squadrons and 1 fighter squadrons. The best of our equipment, plenty of ammunition and stores.

Assemble this force at a Pacific coast port which is off the beaten track—Gray's Harbor, Washington, might do. Embark it on a few comparatively large ships, as fast as possible considering shipping exigencies. Naval escort of 1 or 2 carriers, 3 or 4 large cruisers, 8 to 12 destroyers. Send it straight across the Pacific to descend "out of the blue" on the Japanese island of Hokkaido, the northernmost of the islands of Japan proper. Establish a bombing base, and commence bombing operations against the main industrial centers of Japan, shipyards and naval bases.

Japan is fully extended on the mainland of Asia and in the southern islands. She is taking a great gamble; she has put in all she has to win or lose. All her trained and well-armed troops, all her air force
is busy—on the Russian frontier, in China, in Malaya, in the Philippines, in the Dutch islands. Her planes are scattered from the Yangtse to New Guinea. Pressure against her is increasing. She must put in more and more strength.

At such a moment, a well delivered, hard blow against her main islands might well prove completely disastrous—quite aside from the moral and political effect on China and Russia.

Initial resistance in Hokkaido does not seem likely to be formidable—there can hardly be any first-line formations left, and the older reservists, with imperfect armament and leadership could make little stand against a force such as above described. This war has taught again and again that numbers do not count against superior armament. Of course a most careful terrain study of Hokkaido would be necessary in order to choose a proper landing place, with ground for airfields nearby and strong defensive positions covering the whole area. Such a study would determine the exact number of men and types of units best adapted for the task. The more widely the airfields could be scattered, the better.

The most favorable moment for such a descent would be one in which the defense of Singapore had stiffened, calling for more Japanese troops in which the Chinese were on the offensive, in which the Russians were making political gestures which caused the Japanese uneasiness, and in which the Allied air and naval operations in the southern islands were calling for more and more Japanese planes to safeguard the far-flung Japanese communications. If the commando raid then called Japanese planes and troops back to the north, immediate advantage could be taken thereof to drive the Japanese from their outlying bases in the south.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Attached is a brief estimate of the French military leaders in French North Africa. It was prepared by Chautemps.
As far as the military leaders in French North Africa are concerned, we do not believe that great hopes should be based on them.

General Juin, who commands in Morocco, was a prisoner of the Germans and was freed after promising never again to take up arms against Germany or undertake anything against her which other French officers refused to do.

He was sent to Morocco after Weygand was recalled and it appears probable that his nomination, made by Darlan, was agreeable to the Germans.

We think that General Koeltz (Coels), who is at the head of the Algerian troops, is the same General who was sent by Weygand to Algeria in June, 1940, to determine the technical possibilities for the resistance proposed by General Noguès. He brought back an entirely unfavorable opinion to the Ministers' Council which was used to impose the Armistice.

We had the impression that this mission was not so much to really study the military situation but rather to find arguments to overcome the opposition to capitulation.

We do not wish to draw any conclusion from these memories as to General Koeltz' own feelings. However we were not surprised when we were assured that this officer in Algeria, was considered to be in favor of collaboration with Germany.

General de Lattre de Lassigny, commander of the troops in Tunisia, at the beginning of the war was Chief of Staff to General Bourret, commander of the Fifth Army on the Rhine front. General Bourret, former Chief of the Military Cabinet and a personal friend of Daladier, was a republican officer who came up from the ranks. To what extent did his Chief of Staff share his ideas? We could not say.

However, General de Lattre de Lassigny, at that time had a
favorable reputation. It seems to us, according to personal information together with these memories, that General de Lattre de Lassigny perhaps deserves more attention than his two colleagues in Algeria and Morocco from the American authorities.

The successor to General Odic, who joined the de Gaulle movement after having commanded the aviation of all North Africa for a year, is a General who on his arrival in Algeria did not hesitate to criticize General Weygand's attitude, not sufficiently orthodox in his eyes. He has been described to us as an ardent supporter of the regime and of the policy of the extremists.

As for General Harcourt, whose name has been mentioned in connection with North Africa, has been retired and has left Algeria to direct civil aviation at Vichy.

There remains a military personage in Algiers whose role is vague but doubtless of some importance; Admiral Fenard who was brought by General Weygand as his secretary general and who has remained at his post even after the General's departure. He is an adherent of the regime and more of a bureaucrat than a politician.


It seems to us that the civil administration leaders, although two out of the three are of military origin, are much less ardent, more cool-headed, and are in closer contact with the inhabitants and with the realities of daily life.

Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, is considered in the navy as an outspoken man who has no sympathy for the Germans or the Italians. He is certainly loyal to Marshal Pétain, but it is believed in general that he does adhere to the policy of submission.

The Governor General of Algeria, Yves Chatel, is a distin-
guished official who was completely successful in Indo-China. He

came to Algeria as General Weygand's civilian collaborator and
fully satisfied the population by his administrative qualities.

When General Weygand was made Governor General of Algeria,
relieving Admiral Aribal, Yves Chatel was his assistant and already
assured the management of the civilian administration. After
Weygand was recalled, Chatel's actual position was only confirmed
when he was officially assigned the post of Governor General.

In his case, one seems to be dealing with a man who symbol-
izes the good French official of which France must have many today:
they are people who are more concerned with their country and their
duties than with one political regime or another, and who have con-
tinued to serve France after the Armistice in the same spirit of
devotion as before. Quite certainly they think about recent events
and do so intelligently most of the time. They approve neither of
the excessive internal measures of the militant supporters of the
regime, nor of the treasonable actions of the collaborationists.
In the present public misfortune, they cling to the prestige and
integrity of Marshal Pétain in whom they have confidence. One must
not hope that they will rebel against their chiefs, but one can be
certain that they will make every effort to maintain, as far as
they are able, the independence of their country and preserve
American friendship for France. Therefore, there certainly is a
policy which should be used in regard to such men.

*   *

General Nogles to whom a part of these preceding general
observations could be applied, is nevertheless a slightly more
complicated case.

Nogles is a very distinguished soldier. For a long time he
has also been an extremely diplomatic high official. Through his family connections and social habits he is also something of a politician. His wife, who has great influence over him and has a great many outside activities, is the daughter of the former Foreign Minister, Delcassé, who played an important role in European politics at the beginning of the century. One should not lose sight of the fact - and we hope that M. and Mme. Nogès will do the same - that the most important action of Delcassé's career was the cordial Franco-British entente. Nogès has administered Morocco with a certain amount of success since 1936, besides which he has been Commander in Chief of French North African forces since 1939. In this position he had worked to increase the strength of the African Army. In spite of the scarcity of modern material, owing to insufficient industrial means, he had established a solid instrument of war which it would have been possible to plan to reinforce in case of a setback on the principal fronts. Unfortunately the contrary took place; beginning on May 10 the Commandment emptied North Africa of her best soldiers and modern material.

Nevertheless, General Nogès in strong terms proposed to the Government that they seek refuge in Algeria where he was preparing to defend himself. It was at that time that General Weygand sent General Koeltz, as we have already told, to establish the technical impossibility of the proposed resistance.

General Nogès bowed to the armistice decision but not without having very nobly protested. He was even threatened with disgrace because of the vigour of his telegram to General Weygand and it was with great difficulty that President Lebrun and M. Camille Chautamps were able to defend him.

Sometime later we had the opportunity to question him about these events. Was it simply a change of technical conviction or professional discipline? He did not hesitate to tell us that he had
been misinformed at the time of his appeal for resistance, that at that time he did not believe the defeat at home to have been such a catastrophe and therefore that there would be time to transport fresh troops and material to Africa. He added that since the facts were better known, he believed the decision not to attempt a hopeless struggle in Africa was wise. According to him, a German attack, preceded by a landing, even by air, in Spanish Morocco would have found French Africa so little prepared for modern war that the destruction and conquest of our beautiful colony would have been certain and rapid.

We recently ascertained that this was likewise the opinion of another officer of great merit and in his case can not be accused of any partiality towards Vichy, since he has gone to join General de Gaulle. We are speaking of General Odic who was in command of aviation in North Africa.

This is a point which we would especially like to bring to the attention of the American Government. The question of responsibilities in regard to the Armistice, which, according to some can have no other explanation but treason, is poisoning the atmosphere. Even recently M. Churchill, in his Ottawa speech, declared that if the French had gone to Africa, Italy would have been liquidated in 1940. It is on this assertion that he principally bases his indiscriminate accusation of "the men of Bordeaux". This is a technical point which we ask the American Government to study. According to us, this conclusion, derived from the facts, has not been proved and springs from irritation rather than reflection. Doubtless one could have conceived a plan - and the High Command and the Prime Minister are guilty of not having studied the possibilities - for a prepared general retreat towards Algeria in case of a metropolitan defeat. But the men and available material should have been sent in time. We do know that this was not the case for Reynaud on the eve of his resigna-
tion, was still considering with de Gaulle what they called the "reduit breton" (retreat in Brittany) without even having referred to the Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, there could not have been any important quantity of arms in North Africa. The English, after Dunkirk, did not have at their disposal any material which could have been sent to the French and America had just answered that she could do nothing.

Under these conditions the British Prime Minister's assurance is not based on serious proofs. One could just as well maintain that the Armistice, without collaboration, would not have placed the Allies in a worse situation than would have resulted from the total occupation of France with 2 million more prisoners, the naval bases, like Toulon and doubtless all the French African bases, in the hands of the enemy.

To return to General Noghes; in the past he had a good attitude, later he submitted to the new regime. In August, 1940, he seemed to us somewhat timorous with regard to government authority. Nevertheless, we believe that his inner feelings must have remained the same, and we can not consider him either as an enemy of England or America or as a friend of Germany.

* * *

In our opinion, one should seek the support of the more modest but more independent agents rather than rely on the great leaders. In North Africa there are legions of officials of medium rank who have influence on both the French and native populations and who ask nothing better than to work for the liberation of their country.

It is necessary to create, with the support of those who can be approached - and by going from one to the other, one will find a great number - an atmosphere of sympathy towards the Americans,
suppressed hostility towards the Germans and Italians and towards those who wish to submit to them and develop a hopeful and expectant spirit in the population. The leaders will feel it and will themselves be more confident - or more prudent.

When the day comes and the need is felt, one will find a population prepared to do their duty towards their country and towards their liberators.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan

I am advised by our people in New York that there is a great deal of loose talk regarding ship movements, troop movements and all sorts of information of both military and economic value to the enemy.

I have no doubt that this same kind of talk exists in other places.

Might it not be desirable that the attention of the general public be called forcibly to the fact that such talk is dangerous. Someone has suggested that instead of putting up attractive posters advising people not to talk that large disfiguring signs saying "DANGER - DON'T SAY IT" should be placed behind every bar and in every barber shop, etc., the idea being that an ugly sign of this sort would be more effective on people than anything pretty.

From all that comes to us, something needs to be done to stop this dangerous practice.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Would you think it feasible and advisable to set up the following radio program for short-wave:

To have a series of short-wave broadcasts by signatories of the United Nations Pact. It would begin with the Secretary of State and follow with two of the delegates each week until all have spoken.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

COLONEL DONOVAN

In reference to your #217, February fourth I wish you would talk this over with Archie MacLeish, Byron Price and Lowell Mellott and have them have a talk with George Fielding Elliot. There is a lot in what he says.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I received the attached letter with enclosure from George Fielding Eliot. You might be interested in reading it.
Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose herewith a memorandum on the subject of "An American Press Service", which I hope you will read when you have time.

I think this is a very important subject and trust that you will agree with me that something ought to be done about it.

I shall be in Washington Wednesday and hope that you will be able to spare me a few moments to talk about this and related matters.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/ George F. Eliot
George Fielding Eliot
AN AMERICAN PRESS SERVICE

January 11, 1942

One of the most powerful weapons for the successful prosecution of this war, and one of the most necessary instruments for the attainment of an enduring peace, is accurate and timely information. It is not only necessary that governments should be informed as to the doings of other governments; it is also necessary, especially amongst the Allies, that peoples should be informed as to the doings, thoughts, and ways of life of the other peoples with whom they are associated in this great struggle.

Out of better understanding is born a mutual confidence and respect, which is the very cornerstone of fruitful cooperation toward victory and of the making and maintenance of that lasting peace, which is the only worthwhile fruit of victory.

The enemy will seek to divide us, as he has always sought to divide his opponents. He is committed to the policy of the lie. He will stop at nothing; he will distort, dissimulate and misrepresent; he will seek to breed suspicion, mistrust, anxiety and fear. All of this he can do with far greater facility under present conditions than he could if there were some means by which the American people could make themselves known to those with whose fortunes their fortunes are now
irrevocably bound up for good or ill. All this he can do with greater facility under present conditions than he could if there were some means by which the American people in their turn could learn more about these Allies of theirs, their thoughts, their habits, their ways of life, their attitudes on public questions, their hopes and their anxieties.

The need is great, and the weapon with which to meet that need is TRUTH. We shall be serving a great and noble purpose, and one well worthy of our best efforts, if in the winning of this war we can at the same time demonstrate that Truth is mighty and shall prevail. We are fighting that the free peoples of this world may live together in amity and under conditions based on justice, confidence and security. Truth is of the very essence of the great contract that we have drawn with our Allies and for our future. It is for us to prove that Truth cannot be defeated by lies.

Specifically, in the prosecution of this war, a mutual confidence based upon accurate and complete information is of great importance not only because it lays the moral foundations for useful cooperation, not only because it is needful to counteract the efforts of the enemy to divide us, but also because in a common effort it may be necessary for the forces of some of the Allies to be placed under the command of officers of other nations.
In almost every large theater of operations these conditions of direct Allied cooperation will arise and they present problems, which in the last analysis can be solved only if supported by a public opinion in all the allied nations, which is free of suspicion and jealousy.

Likewise, it is of primary importance to begin now to examine in the great court of public opinion the conditions of an enduring peace. Unless we know what we are fighting for, we shall not fight with that unity of purpose and effort which is the key to victory.

There must be a reasonable agreement upon principles and objectives attained by open and frank discussion and clear understanding. It is only thus that we may avoid the very grave danger of a reaction after this war similar to that after the last, a turning away from cooperation and international responsibility with all the dreadful consequences which may ensue. It is only in this way that we can avoid those mutual suspicions and divisions which were so fatal to the securing of the fruits of the victory which we and our associates gained in 1918.

An American Press Service organized for the purpose of making our Allies and the remaining neutral countries acquainted with the American people, and of obtaining like information with regard to them for our
people, should properly function not under the direction of the Department of State, whose organization and traditions are not well fitted for such a purpose, but under the direction of an American Department corresponding to the British Ministry of Information. It is to be noted that the extremely successful and efficient British Press Service in the United States became really useful only when it was divorced from control of the foreign office and placed unreservedly under the Ministry of Information.

Nevertheless such an American Press Service should have an official character in order that it may have the proper standing in the communities where its offices are located and may be able to obtain official contacts and have access to official sources of information in the United States as well as maintaining a proper relationship with the respective embassies and legations of the United States in its various centers of activity.

It should be staffed very largely by experienced newspaper and radio men and women and by experts in the various subjects with which it may have to deal -- political, financial, economic, military, etc.

It is suggested that as a beginning, offices should be established in London and Moscow, and that
gradually, with the benefit of the experience thus obtained, other offices should be set up in Ankara, Cairo, Melbourne, Bombay or Calcutta, Capetown, Chungking, and in such Latin American capitals as may be considered suitable -- certainly in Rio, Buenos Aires and Mexico City, if not in others.

Suggested methods of operation and activities are as follows:

1. Regular daily releases sent by mail and messenger to local newspapers, radio stations, and individual publicists, of interpretative news stories covering matter not covered, or not covered in full, through regular news channels.

2. The distribution of the full text of important addresses by American public men and of the text of broadcasts of the American long-wave radio, which may be of local interest or of interpretative importance.

3. Special reviews of particular phases of American activity—military, economic, political, etc. prepared periodically by well-known American experts in these fields.
4. It should be the duty of the American Press Service to arrange for interviews with visiting Americans of importance for the local press.

5. In some localities it might be well to hold regular conferences for the press and there should be a proper personnel available at all times to give information and assistance.

6. In each office of the American Press Service there should be a library of American reference books and well-known standard works on American subjects with a file of some of the more important United States newspapers and magazines, and of standard government publications including the Congressional Record and the Federal Register.

7. Specific attention should be given to truthful and objective analyses of enemy propaganda, both from local sources and from enemy countries about the United States, and its activities.
8. Special attention should be given to obtaining information for the local press, radio, etc. on specific American subjects.

9. A close liaison should be maintained with the local embassy or legation of the United States in order to give service to our diplomats in publicity matters.

10. The personnel of the American Press Service should cultivate personal contacts with leading journalists, etc. of the locality where they are stationed for the purpose of establishing friendly and, if possible, confidential relationships to further the work of the service and a cordial, mutual understanding.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

COL. WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:

Have you seen report from Bern
No. 390, February fourth, 9 A.M. in regard
to publicity, etc. in Switzerland? If
not, get it from the State Department.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM For The President.
From: William J. Donovan.

On Saturday, February 21st, there will be commemorated the entry of the Rainbow Division into the front lines in France early in 1918. As you know, McArthur was a member of that Division. They have asked me to speak, with certain other officers of the Division. I would not speak more than five minutes (although I know a lot of harm can be done in even that short a time). If you have no objection, I would do so, upon the theme that production alone cannot win but we must dedicate ourselves to fighting. If you prefer that I do not speak at all, would you please let me know.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:

I wish you would have a talk with Frank Murphy about this and also with somebody in the Army that would cooperate on this work. It is past the zone of civilian effort.

F.D.R.

Letter from Justice Murphy to the Pres.
2/19/42
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

[Signature]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

5-18-42

Miss Deary:

Mr. McCloy said the Secretary spoke to the President about the attached and that it may be filed.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1942.

Personal and Confidential

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

It is my conviction that Bill Donovan is most anxious to find an "out" from the present predicament. It is his hope now that the entire office of Coordinator of Information will be taken in by the Army and Navy as an adjunct of the Joint Board.

I believe that Bill himself would be overjoyed to be ordered to service with the Army and Navy. If the President made it known to Bill that this service was of a special, secret and even mysterious nature, I think that Bill would be especially happy and his personal prestige would be undamaged.

The office of Coordinator of Information, in my opinion, should be dissolved and its useful branches distributed.

The Research and Analysis Branch should go under the Joint Board, for which it is now working almost exclusively.

The Visual Presentation Branch should also go into the service of the Army and Navy, if it is wanted.

The Foreign Information Service should go into a new consolidated information agency.

The Oral Interviewing Branch should go with F.I.S.

The Foreign Groups Branch is something of an anomaly -- a sort of Junior State Department -- and I don't know just where this would fit if not in the State Department itself.

The C.O.I. secret operations -- S.O.S. and S.I.S. -- should be absorbed by M.I.D. or O.N.I.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION
REPORTS SECTION

WEATHER AND
DATES FOR A POSSIBLE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE
AGAINST EASTERN SIBERIA

March 27, 1942
WEATHER AND
DATES FOR A POSSIBLE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE
AGAINST EASTERN SIBERIA

There are three relatively favorable periods for military operations along the Manchurian-Siberian border: (1) late winter, (2) late spring, (3) autumn.

Midwinter, early spring, and midsummer are unfavorable periods. Midwinter is unsuitable because the cold is so severe, worse even than on the western Russian front; early spring is unfavorable because the ground is thawing; midsummer is even worse along the eastern Amur because of floods and waterlogged ground during the heavy summer rainfall. Ground conditions are less impeding in summer on the higher ground along the western and northwestern Manchurian border, and on a few high spots near Vladivostok.

Because the distances are so short from the Manchurian border to the Trans-Siberian Railway (approximately 10-60 miles), weather may not be a very important factor in a possible Japanese advance in this zone.

On the coasts of Siberia favorable times for naval operations appear to be limited to summer, after the coastal ice has melted.

Late Winter Operations

From the standpoint of terrain conditions late March and early April are the most favorable to the Japanese for an attack on the center of the Soviet installations in...
in eastern Siberia, the Khabarovsky region. Most of the border is protected by rivers and broad flood-plain areas (Fig. 1). In summer the Amur reaches a width of over 15 miles in some places, and smaller rivers likewise become broad. At present these areas are ice covered and easily traversed. Ice on the rivers forms from 3 to 8 feet thick and is used as a highway for autos.\textsuperscript{1} Ice in the Amur region of Siberia forms much thicker than in similar latitudes of Siberia and European Russia.\textsuperscript{2} In Manchuria winter is the preferred time for land travel away from railways. Ice trails are used.\textsuperscript{3} By attacking now the Japanese can menace many points along the border. By April 15, ice usually breaks up in the Amur and other rivers in this district.

The ice break up varies from place to place and year to year. A fifteen year record shows March 23 as the first date for ice break-up recorded near Iman on the Ussuri about half way between Khabarovsky and Vladivostok. April 14 is the first date at Koltsovski, about 140 miles north of Blagoveshchensk on the Amur. Latest dates at these stations were April 12 and May 5 respectively. Points on the rivers between these northern and southern stations had break-ups intermediate in time between the extremes just cited (Table 4).

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] U. S. Weather Bureau, Office of Statistical Research.
\end{footnotes}
After ice break up, the Soviets presumably can better mass their troops to guard the few dry approaches to eastern Siberia, as well as utilize their gunboats on the Amur.

Although the winter on this front is more severe than in western Russia, March mean temperatures at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk are 20 to 25 degrees warmer than their January mean temperatures (March means: 26.4° at Vladivostok, 16.2° at Khabarovsk), and April means are 30 to 45 degrees warmer (April means: 39.9° at Vladivostok, 37.1° at Khabarovsk). The temperature in April is, therefore, not so low as to hamper military operations to the extent of the much lower temperatures of December, January, and February (Table 1). Furthermore, there is less fog and general flying conditions are better than in summer. The Japanese have been training in cold weather in Manchuria for ten years and presumably are able to cope with low temperatures.

Late Spring Operations

After the ground has thawed in late spring there still remains a period of relatively dry weather preceding the heavy summer monsoon rains (Table 2). The case for an

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4U. S. Weather Bureau, Office of Statistical Research.

5Ibid.

6Weather and War in the Far East, Far Eastern Section, C.O.I., Memo No. 4, Nov. 29, 1941.
attack in this period presumably is much the same as for an attack after ground thawing on the western front, although the ground drying dates are later and consequently fall in a period of slightly greater rainfall.7 (Table II)

Table III presents dates of first mean temperatures of 32° (the beginning of ground thawing), 41° (after final ice break-up), and 50° (approximately a week after the ground has dried out).

Military operations can probably start a week or a week and a half ahead of the 50° mean temperature dates, according to calculations made in the Western Front Study.8 This time falls approximately between May 5 and May 12 on the Manchurian-Siberian border.

Since rain becomes increasingly heavy, reaching a maximum in late July and early August, the sooner the attack is made after the ground has dried out after thawing, the better. In midsummer much of the region, particularly the low land along the Amur, is waterlogged; the Amur in places becomes 15 miles wide carrying the flood of summer rain. The lower Sungari reaches a width of 6 miles.9

Outside the Manchurian area, military operations could proceed more easily if postponed until late spring,

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7 Dates for a Possible 1942 German Spring Offensive in Russia, Geographic Division, C.O.I., February 28, 1942.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., op. cit., p. 85.
although fogs and storms are common in summer along most of these northerly east coasts.

Ice break-up dates vary on the Siberian coasts mainly according to latitude (Table 5). In the vicinity of Vladivostok, inner harbors are usually ice-free after mid April, and outer channels after mid March. At Vladivostok ice breakers keep the steamer channel open throughout the winter. Some of the outer channels are naturally ice-free, because tide and wave motion prevent freezing. Farther north, in the Amur estuary, ice usually breaks up in late May. Most of the Sea of Okhotsk is clear by mid June; Petropavlosk, the principal harbor of Kamchatka, is ice-free in early May. The Komandorski Islands, off the east coast of Kamchatka, in spite of their northerly position, are ice-free the year around, although drift ice is brought to the islands from Kamchatka during prevailing west and northwest winds. Still farther north Bering Strait is generally free of ice by the first part of July, but clear water does not extend very far north. On the Arctic coast from Bering Strait to the Kolyma River mouth the navigation season lasts from the end of July to mid-September, time enough for a round trip from the

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Bering Straits. Ice breakers have been used to make a passage for ships still farther west on the Arctic coast.

**Autumn**

The period after the summer rains have subsided and before the extreme cold of winter comes is suited to military operations. Late September appears best in this respect (Tables 1 and 2). The whole countryside is relatively dry, and land operations can be carried on extensively.

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Table 1

MEAN TEMPERATURES BY MONTHS
FOR SELECTED STATIONS ALONG
THE SIBERIAN-MANCHURIAN BORDER *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Vladivostok</th>
<th>Sui-fentio</th>
<th>Khabarovsk</th>
<th>Blagoveshchensk</th>
<th>Chernyaev</th>
<th>Hailar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>°F.</td>
<td>°F.</td>
<td>°F.</td>
<td>°F.</td>
<td>°F.</td>
<td>°F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-1.</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-18.2</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>- .6</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>51.</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>61.</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U. S. Weather Bureau, Office of Statistical Research*
Table 2

MEAN PRECIPITATION BY MONTHS
FOR SELECTED STATIONS ALONG
THE SIBERIAN-MANCHURIAN BORDER *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Vladivostok</th>
<th>Suifenhe</th>
<th>Khabarovsk</th>
<th>Blagoveshchensk</th>
<th>Chernyaev</th>
<th>Hailar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U. S. Weather Bureau, Office of Statistical Research*
Table 3

FIRST MEAN DAILY TEMPERATURE DATES
ALONG SOVIET-JAPANESE FRONTIER *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>32° F.</th>
<th>41° F.</th>
<th>50° F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok Region</td>
<td>Mar. 30</td>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>May 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk Region</td>
<td>Apr. 7</td>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>May 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blagoveshchensk Region</td>
<td>Apr. 10</td>
<td>Apr. 26</td>
<td>May 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hailar Region</td>
<td>Apr. 17</td>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>May 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin</td>
<td>Apr. 19</td>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>June 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Table 4

**EARLIEST AND LATEST DATES OF ICE BREAK-UP FOR SELECTED RIVER STATIONS NEAR SIBERIAN-MANCHEHURIAN FRONTIER, 1897-1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Earliest</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Latest</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thaw</td>
<td>End of Ice Jams</td>
<td>Thaw</td>
<td>End of Ice Jams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I Amur River</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaevsk (11 year record)</td>
<td>Apr. 23</td>
<td>Apr. 29</td>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>May 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>Apr. 8</td>
<td>Apr. 13</td>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>Apr. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterino Nikolsk</td>
<td>Apr. 6</td>
<td>Apr. 19</td>
<td>Apr. 23</td>
<td>May 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innokentevskaya</td>
<td>Apr. 8</td>
<td>Apr. 16</td>
<td>Apr. 22</td>
<td>May 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blagoveshchensk</td>
<td>Apr. 9</td>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>Apr. 25</td>
<td>May 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koltsovsk</td>
<td>Apr. 14</td>
<td>Apr. 21</td>
<td>May 5</td>
<td>May 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II Ussuri River**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Earliest</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Latest</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thaw</td>
<td>End of Ice Jams</td>
<td>Thaw</td>
<td>End of Ice Jams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk (broken record; break-up generally 1-4 days before Amur)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozlovskaya</td>
<td>Apr. 2</td>
<td>Apr. 6</td>
<td>Apr. 13</td>
<td>Apr. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grafskaya (near Iman)</td>
<td>Mar. 23</td>
<td>Apr. 1</td>
<td>Apr. 12</td>
<td>Apr. 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5
ICE CONDITIONS ALONG COASTS
OF EASTERN SIBERIA *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Ice Formation</th>
<th>Ice Break-up</th>
<th>Maximum Thickness</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 43° 61' N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 131° 52' E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Harbor</td>
<td>Late Dec.</td>
<td>Mid-April</td>
<td>2½'</td>
<td>Ice breaker opens channel on application from steamers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East half of Eastern Bosporus Strait</td>
<td>Early Jan.</td>
<td>Mid-March</td>
<td></td>
<td>Longest period on record during which strait was frozen was 2-1/3 months in 1879.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olgi Bay (St. Olga)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 43° 42' N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 135° 17' E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner Harbor</td>
<td>Mid-Nov.</td>
<td>Mid-April</td>
<td>2'</td>
<td>Tide keeps entrance channel open through year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer Bay</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Only occasionally covered with thin layer ice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vladimir Bay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 43° 55' N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 135° 30' E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bay</td>
<td>Mid-Nov.</td>
<td>Mid-April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of Harbor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Little freezing because of swells of sea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Ice Formation</th>
<th>Ice Break-up</th>
<th>Maximum Thickness</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Tartary</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
<td>April 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Irregular freezing depending on distance from shore and water depth; unimpeded navigation by May 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castries Bay</td>
<td>Nov. 1</td>
<td>Early April</td>
<td>3'</td>
<td>Ice begins Nov. 1; bay completely frozen by end of Dec.; bay completely free of ice by April 1 or May 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait of Tartary</td>
<td>Mid-Nov.</td>
<td>April 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>End of December to mid-April ice is thick enough to allow sledges to cross from Sakhalin to mainland; in a 15 year period the earliest ice formation was Nov. 5; latest ice break-up was May 22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Part (Sakhalin Fairway)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In 15 year period earliest formation of ice was on Nov. 17; latest break-up was June 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur River Estuary</td>
<td>Mid-Nov.</td>
<td>Late May 17</td>
<td>3' (in channels)</td>
<td>Channels usually open to navigation by May 10-20; closed by end of October; storms expected in October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaevsk</td>
<td>Mid-Nov.</td>
<td>Late May</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bays, gulfs and coasts fringed with ice 40-50 miles out; rest of sea does not freeze; by mid-June</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Ice Formation</th>
<th>Ice Break-up</th>
<th>Maximum Thickness</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petropavlosk, Kamchatka</td>
<td>Late Oct.</td>
<td>Early May</td>
<td></td>
<td>the greater part of the Sea of Okhotsk is clear of ice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foggy in summer reaching an average of 17 days with fog in July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karafuto, East Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakaehama</td>
<td>Mid-Jan.</td>
<td>Early April</td>
<td>1'</td>
<td>Whole stretch of coast ice-bound from mid-Jan. to early April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakuhi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 47° 25' N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 142° 49' E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komandorski Islands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ice-free throughout year except when drift ice is blown in from Kamchatka during prevailing west and northwest winds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Commander Islands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 56° N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 166° E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bering Strait</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Generally free of ice by first part of July, but clear water does not extend very far north.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arctic Ocean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bering Strait to Kolyma River</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Navigation season last of July to middle of September, enough for a round trip from Bering Strait to Kolyma River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lat. 72° N.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long. 161° E.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
THE WEATHER ELEMENT

AS RELATED TO INVASION POSSIBILITIES

IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS REGION, ALASKA

Coordinator of Information

Geographic Division

March 30, 1942
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THE WEATHER ELEMENT AS RELATED TO INVASION POSSIBILITIES IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS REGION, ALASKA

The Aleutian Islands region is noted for a climate characterized by cloudiness, storms, strong winds, high humidity, cool temperatures, and rapid weather changes. Conditions are relatively poor for the use of aircraft or boats by comparison with other regions in the world. There are, however, certain months which are more favorable than others.

BEST OPERATIONAL MONTHS FOR AIRCRAFT ARE SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER; second most favorable are March, April and May. FOR SURFACE CRAFT SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER ARE BEST OPERATIONAL MONTHS; next best is the period from February through August (Tables 1 and 2).

These generalizations are subject to adjustment for the following reasons: (1) the region is large and there are few observation stations, (2) records
are for short periods and discontinuous for many of the stations, (3) the weather may vary considerably from the average in any day or month, or with position with respect to surface figuration or proximity to the water.

Also, it should be noted that because weather is unfavorable so much of the time, the military strategy factor may outweigh the weather factor in considering possibilities of invasion.

**Fog and Cloudiness:**

The region is known as one with a high frequency of fogs but there is a definite annual variation. October through May is the period of least fog (about 15-20% of the time), while July and August are the worst months (about 35-75% of the time). Most of this summer fog originates east and south of Kamchatka Peninsula and moves to the region of the islands with the prevailing southwest winds of that season. Therefore, fogginess increases in the summer from the Aleutians southwestward to the
area of origin.

In the autumn fogginess decreases rapidly and by the end of spring begins to increase again.

There is no apparent daily variation in the formation or occurrence of fog in the region. This is because daily temperature variations over the water are small and when fog forms it tends to persist and move to the islands whenever the wind is favorable.

Fog is usually more frequent on the southern sides of the islands than the northern, the latter frequently having broken ceilings or clear weather. This is particularly true for the larger islands of Unalaska, Atka, Adak, Tanaga, Kiska and Attu, where elevations are great enough to have an effect. This explains much of the clear weather at Dutch Harbor when other places are fog-bound. Over the open water and through
the passes the fog is usually distributed generally, sometimes in patches.

A peculiarity of the Aleutians is that fog and winds may persist together for days at a time. It is most likely to come with winds from the southeast to southwest and least likely with winds from the north. In general, any wind can bring fog and reduced visibility. But if a northwest wind blows for two or three days the windward sides of the islands are foggy for at least the first day and then there is good visibility, higher cloud ceilings and clear weather for a short time.

On some occasions the fog is quite thick but it seldom exceeds 4,000', leaving the tops of the higher mountains above the fog. Sometimes it is thin, close to the water and not exceeding 100' at other times passes are fog-bound while adjacent land areas are fog-free.

Fog and coulds combine to make the ceilings shown in Tables 3 and 4. Kanaga Island is representative of the main portion of the Aleutians, Dutch Harbor of the eastern part of the region (but not as representative as Kanago Island due to the
surface configuration of the Alaskan Peninsula, and St. Paul Island of the Bering Sea. Ceilings in the main portion of the islands vary from about 1,600' in late winter to 2800' in late spring, and at St. Paul Island from about 500' in early spring and midsummer to 3,200' in the fall. Particularly in the summer over the Aleutians, however, fog is apt to form very rapidly and causes considerable lowering of the ceilings.

Visibility

Clear vision is closely related to fogs and cloudiness. Best visibility in the Aleutians is obtained in November, January and March, and poorest from June through August. Favorability of visibility does not correspond exactly to that of fogs and cloudiness due to the presence of high winds in the winter season. These, coupled with a winter maximum of precipitation in the region, make the air so turbulent as to materially decrease visibility although it does not average as low as the summer months.
Strong Winds

Winter is the season with the highest incidence of winds over 30 knots. They reach greatest development in March. These winds are usually from the northwest to the northeast and are associated with the movement of cold, continental air masses from Alaska and Siberia. Although squalls may develop locally in the summer these are the most favorable months for steady and light winds.

However, the wind situation is modified greatly throughout the Aleutians and the Alaska peninsula by the "Williwaws". These are sharp, local winds caused by colder air piling up behind a mountain range and then spilling over and down through a pass. They commonly develop velocities of 50 to 100 per cent greater than average wind speeds but are short lived (maximum about 40 to 60 knots). This precludes the use of many of the harbors by aircraft. The same harbors are also
unable by ships where anchorage area is limited
or there is poor holding ground. All of the southern
cost harbors of the Alaska Peninsula are subject
to "williwaws" and therefore are disadvantageous
anchorages.

Throughout the Aleutians the maximum develop-
ment of "williwaws" is in the winter but occasionally
in the summer winds are impressed and flumed through
passes producing somewhat the same effect.

Wind velocities and directions differ some-
what with elevation over the islands. Throughout
the four seasons at Kanaga Island there is little
change in wind direction between the surface and
10,000' but there is a noticeable decrease in
velocity at 2,500'. The same conditions prevail
at St. Paul Island and Dutch Harbor with the addition
that velocities at 5,000' are also less than those
on the surface. In all cases, velocity at the sur-
face and 10,000 are approximately the same.
Icing

Icing is particularly dangerous to air navigation in the region from October through March. In these months the maximum precipitation of the year falls--both as snow and rain. Air temperatures are low enough that complete precipitation does not take place until the air is set in motion. Passage of planes through air in this condition, and at temperatures between 32° and about 17° F., will often cause the formation of \( \frac{1}{2} \) to \( \frac{3}{4} \) inch of ice on the plane and propellor in a few minutes.

Surface Conditions

Temperature and Harbor Ice

The climatic graphs in Appendix A show the average annual temperatures to be about 40° F. with a few stations recording monthly means below freezing. There is an exception in the Bristol Bay section where the position of the stations is such that they are exposed to cold continental air masses. They are not near enough to the Japan
current which flows along the south side of the Aleutians in a clockwise direction, to feel its tempering effects.

During December, January and February the temperatures in the region are occasionally low enough to freeze the salt-water spray. This, with the high winds, curtails the operations of submarines, destroyers and aircraft.

Existing information on harbor ice indicates that January and February are occasionally cold enough to freeze the water in the harbors. This happened at a harbor on Unalaska Island in 1933-34 but was the only exception in about 25 years. Normally harbor ice formation is not thick enough in the Aleutains to interfere with navigation.

Precipitation

In the Aleutains, precipitation averages from 50 to 70 inches a year. Much of this comes in the form of snow. The Kanaga Island and Dutch Harbor reports record snowfall in all months except June, July and August. St. Paul Island
is snow-free only during July and August. Relative humidity averages about 85% in the Aleutains as at least 50% of the days in any month have precipitation reported. Although there is stated to be an even distribution of precipitation from Attu Island to Kodiak Island throughout the year, the climatic graphs show the summer season as one of distinctly less precipitation. However, stations on Bristol Bay and at St. Paul Island have about one-third as much precipitation as the Aleutians. The maximum occurs in late summer and early fall.

Surface Configuration

The Aleutain islands are an extension of the volcanic and mountainous Alaskan Peninsula. Maximum elevations vary from about 3,000' on Attu Island at the west to over 10,000' on Mt. Iliamna in the Southern Central part of the Peninsula and increase northeastward. The effect of the ruggedness of surface is to increase the complexity of climate
and weather in the region and to contribute to great local differences.

Recent Verification of Aleutian Weather

The report of the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Aerological Expedition, dated June, 1941, generally verifies the statement that September and October are the months most favorable for air operations in the Aleutian Islands region.¹

It is important to note that his generalities on fog frequency in the region are much higher than the statistics used as a basis for this report.

¹Reference Number 2.
List of References


Table 1

SUMMARY OF WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS REGION, ALASKA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEATHER ELEMENT</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fog</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloudiness</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceilings</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Visibility</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Winds</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Icing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precipitation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Ice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favorability for Air Operations</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favorability for Sea Operations</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X Most favorable conditions.  O Possible conditions. - Unfavorable conditions.
### Table 2

**FLYING CONDITIONS IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS REGION, ALASKA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Hours Per Day (7AM-7PM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul I.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanaga I.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Favorable**

- Sky partly cloudy with ceilings over 1,000 feet;
- surface winds under 20 knots; and visibility over 2 miles.

**Undesirable**

- Clouds below 1,000 feet; visibility 1-2 miles;
- and winds over 20 knots. Not necessary to postpone flying.

**Bad**

- When fog, heavy rain, snow, strong winds, icing danger, etc., make flying dangerous or impossible.

Source: H. O. No. 187, passim
WEATHER OBSERVATION STATIONS
USED IN THE REPORT ON THE
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS REGION
TERRITORY OF ALASKA

(Indicates area not shown)

(Indicates area not shown)

1.000  500  100  500  1000

SCALE

1:160,000

100  150  200  250

100  150  200  250

SOUTH MILLS

DRAWN IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION, C.S.I.
### Table 3

**CEILINGS IN THE ALEUTIAN REGION - 1933-34**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
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<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Height in feet</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>3089</td>
<td>2557</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>2460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hours with ceiling over 10,000'</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hours with ceiling over 5,000'</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
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**Kanago Island**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>M</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Height in feet</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>3170</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>1340</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hours with ceiling over 10,000'</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hours with ceiling over 5,000'</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>M</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>J</td>
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<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Height in feet</td>
<td>1813</td>
<td>2768</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of hours with ceiling over 10,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of hours with ceiling over 5,000'</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dutch Harbor
Table 4

CEILINGS IN THE ALEUTIAN REGION
FOR JUNE, JULY AND AUGUST, 1934*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Days of Observation</th>
<th>Aver. Height in Feet</th>
<th>% of Hours Over 10,000</th>
<th>% of Hours Over 5,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agattu</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>389</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attu</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buldir</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chichagof Harbor</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>874</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiska</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>883</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Littian Tanaga</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeper Cove (Kuluk)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y Cove (Gt. Sitkin)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix A

Climatic Graphs

Legend

Temperature in degrees Fahrenheit
Precipitation in inches
4 yrs. Length of record. Continuous unless indicated as (broken).
21.2" Average annual rainfall.
42.1° Average annual temperature.

Sources
1. Reference Number 1.
2. Reference Number 3.
4. Reference Number 10.
Station Atka, Alaska
Lat. 52° 12' N. Long. 174° 20' W.

10 Yrs. (Broken) 78.20"

Station Attu, Alaska
Lat. 52° 36' N. Long. 174° 13' E.

7 Yrs. (Broken) 71.17"
Station Naknek, Alaska
Lat. 58° 41' N. Long 157° 00' W.

4 Yrs. (Broken)
21.5"
Station Ugashik, Alaska

| Type | Alt. 25 | |
|------|--------||
| 100  |        |   |
| 95   |        |   |
| 90   |        |   |
| 85   |        |   |
| 80   |        |   |
| 75   |        |   |
| 70   |        |   |
| 65   |        |   |
| 60   |        |   |
| 55   |        |   |
| 50   |        |   |
| 45   |        |   |
| 40   |        |   |
| 35   |        |   |
| 30   |        |   |
| 25   |        |   |
| 20   |        |   |
| 15   |        |   |
| 10   |        |   |
| 5    |        |   |
| 0    |        |   |

Fahrenheit* Inches
No. 160 24.6" 3 Yrs. (Broken)
GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

Prepared by
Economics Division
Office of Coordinator of Information

March 31, 1942
GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

The German Air Ministry was created in May 1933 with Goering as Air Minister. The creation of the new German Air Force was officially announced in March 1935. At this time the German Air Force, which had been in process of formation long before its creation was officially announced, consisted of about 1,000 military aircraft and about 20,000 officers and men.

By January 1939 the German Air Force had a first line strength of 3,000 aircraft and the German aircraft industry was capable of producing 700 aircraft per month. By September of that year the G.A.F. had still further increased, and Germany faced her enemies with approximately 4,300 first line aircraft backed by an industry which was capable of turning out each month about 1,100 planes of all types.

It would seem that the above rate of production should yield a much greater first line strength than that indicated. However, probably only 67-70% of total aircraft produced are combat types, the remainder being transport and trainer planes which are unsuitable for combat duty. Moreover,
about a third of the combat planes produced are allotted to operational training units for the training of new pilots. Finally, reserves have to be built up during periods of comparative inactivity to take care of the drain on stocks resulting from the heavier combat losses of active warfare. These reserves are not ordinarily included in figures for "first-line" strength.

At the beginning of the Russian campaign the monthly production of planes of all types was calculated to be about 2,200, the highest estimate being 2,600. First line strength was 4,500; reserves brought up the figure for operational types to 12,600 planes. The total number of planes in the German Air Force, including transports and trainers, was 23,300.

The estimated monthly production of aircraft in Germany increased steadily during 1941 from about 2,000 a month in January to 2,400 a month in December. Standardization of models and importation of foreign labor contributed to this expansion. There is no evidence that R.A.F. bombing has had any appreciable effect on production. In spite of the high rate of production, first line strength has not increased since June 1941 because
of heavy losses in the Russian offensive. British estimates of losses up to September 1 totaled 1,800 planes, and a projection of this rate to the end of the German offensive on December 6 yields a figure of 4,300 planes lost. Casualties were high due to the extremely unfavorable conditions of operation on the Eastern front; first line efficiency has been impaired by losses among the best trained pilots and crews.

The British estimate the present first line strength to be 4,000 planes, or roughly 85% of the June 1941 high. It is also believed that reserves have been seriously depleted. American sources think first line strength has remained unchanged and that reserves of 4,200-5,000 planes have been maintained.

Present estimates of German production range from 2,400 to 2,700 planes per month. The British claim that present output represents virtually the maximum capacity for 1942, with all production facilities at full use. Any permanent increase is said to require 100,000 additional workers of all types for every 250 additional aircraft per month. However, the Military Intelligence Division believes that in view of plant expansion in process, output can be increased. Air Intelligence
contends that the 1941 rate of expansion can be maintained by continued importation of foreign skilled labor, especially French. This implies that Germany will be able to produce about 2,900 planes a month by the end of 1942, provided (1) no extensive model changes are made and (2) there is no effective bombing of Axis aircraft factories. Whether the accelerated rate of production will be accompanied by an increase in first line strength depends, of course, upon the considerations discussed above. An intensive campaign which steps up combat losses, a high rate of pilot losses which necessitates a greater allotment of planes for training new pilots, or developments which make existing types of aircraft obsolete -- any or all of these factors, if operative, might hold down or even reduce first line strength regardless of the greater output.

Note on Sources

The figures used in this report draw on studies made by the British Air Ministry, the Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Army Air Corps. Other sources were examined which, if judged reliable, were used to check our data. Although unreasonable calculations were discarded, there was still a wide margin of variation, particularly among the earlier estimates. More recent calculations corresponded more closely. Our figures represent an attempt to arrive at conclusions which are consistent with each other and with the reported performance of the German Air Force.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

Will you speak to me about this?

F.D.R.

Memo for Mr. Hopkins from W. B. Smith,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff, March 26th
Subject: Donovan Organization, attaching
draft of a proposed military order by the
Pres. designating the Office of Coordinator
of Information as a supporting agency of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

March 27, 1942.

This Order leaves Sherwood's foreign broadcasting
under Donovan and not in the new Information
Service. Incidentally both Marshall and King have
seen this Order and think it is the best thing to do
under the circumstances.

H. L. H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
BILL DONOVAN:

The attached is for your personal and private eyes only. Please return for my confidential files.

F.D.R.
March 31, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of March 26 in regard to Bill Donovan's memorandum no. 347, which I am returning to you herewith, it seems to me clear that if you agree to the procedure indicated in that memorandum the impression would inevitably be created that this Government favors a Hapsburg restoration.

If Otto is allowed by your direction to see the former Hungarian Consul in New York and the latter transmits messages from Otto to members of the Hungarian Government, these messages will unquestionably contain the added information that this is being done under your auspices. If the suggested information service between Hungary and this country is built up, it would be clearly a Hapsburg information service. If Otto sees you before any of these steps are taken, that also naturally would be regarded as added proof that this Government is backing the Hapsburg restoration.

The President,

The White House.
I do not know what your own thoughts may be with regard to a possible Hapsburg restoration. It would seem to me that the situation is not yet sufficiently clarified for us to be able to form any conclusion as to what particular kind of free-Hungarian or free-Austrian movement this Government should favor. From a message which Halifax gave me last night from the British Foreign Office, the British Government seems to feel pretty definitely that at this stage it would be premature to favor any particular movement.

For the reasons I have stated I seriously doubt the desirability of your agreeing to the request made. There are plenty of ways in which Otto can communicate with Hungary--and undoubtedly is communicating--without utilizing this particular method. The suggestion gives me the impression that it is being laid before you by Otto for the purpose of obtaining what is tantamount to your official benediction.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Memorandum.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Bill Bullitt asked me yesterday to meet with him and the Archduke. Otto's request is this: that he be permitted to interview at White Sulphur Springs, or any place that might be designated, the former Hungarian Consul in New York, one Megyesy.

The purpose of this meeting is:

(a) To give Megyesy certain messages to Otto's personal representative in Hungary (this personal representative is the husband of Jim Gerard's sister-in-law) for the purpose of initiating talks with members of the Hungarian government (the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior), in order to prevail upon them to change sides at the acceptable time.

(b) To build up an Information Service between Hungary and this country through Switzerland.

Also, Otto would like to have the opportunity of an interview with you before he sees the Consul.

I will be grateful if you will let me know what you

No. 347
March 26, 1942
8:30 A.M.
April 14, 1942

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

It was characteristic of you to send so thoughtful a letter as yours of the 13th instant. As Grace probably told you, I was ready to return when a blood clot, from which knee they do not know, settled in my left lung and after a few uncomfortable days is now in process of absorption. The doctors assure me that it will not be long before I shall be completely well. In the meantime through direct connection with my office I am able to continue the supervisory, if not the active, part of my job.
I talked with Sam Rosenman yesterday and was disturbed as well as surprised by the conversation. Disturbed because it indicates that since you have not yet signed the order pertaining to our alignment with the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a supporting agency, it must be that you have not yet become convinced, as I am, of the necessity for some such alignment. The conversation was further disturbing because of my strong feeling that the preparation of any plan involving political and subversive warfare must heavily involve those entrusted with the prosecution of subsequent forms of warfare.

If this war has taught us anything, it has taught us the need for unification of all the efforts -- some new -- which play a part in modern warfare. It was for this reason that I wrote you on March 4th outlining fully the reasons for leaving the present efforts of our office coordinated into one effective whole. I would
particularly call your attention to this paragraph:

Now that we are at war, foreign propaganda must be employed as a weapon of war. It must march with events. It is primarily an attack weapon. It must be identified with specific strategic movements often having within it the flavor of subversion. To do this kind of work effectively it must be allied with the military services. It must be to a degree informed as to possible movements. The more closely it is knit with the intelligence and the physically subversive activities of the Army and the Navy, the more effective it can be. All of this necessitates security. In point of fact the use of propaganda is the
arrow of initial penetration in conditioning and preparing the people and the territory in which invasion is contemplated. It is the first step -- then Fifth Column work, then militarized raiders (or "Commandos), and then the invading divisions.

It was for these same reasons that I concurred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their request for aligning our office with them. Further deliberation, far from causing me to change my mind, has only served to make me more convinced that the successful prosecution of this war demands such unification of all the forces of war.

Let me add only this; at the very outset of our present relationship, it was agreed that I would deal directly with you. Due to your continued support and confidence, we have been able to set up for you an instrument of modern
warfare which, if it is left unimpaired, will mean for you a weapon of combined operations which will be able to stand against any similar weapon of the Axis. In doing this we have not usurped the functions or encroached upon the domain of the Army, Navy or State Department. I am sure you believe that I have no such intention. But I feel it is now my duty respectfully to urge that this weapon which has been so carefully prepared over the last eight months, which has already begun to demonstrate its usefulness, and which has won the respect of some who were skeptical at the outset, shall not be disturbed at home before it shall ever be put to its really crucial work abroad.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN

Here is the reply from the Under Secretary of State in regard to the memorandum of which I sent you a copy. Please return for my files.

F. D. R.
April 29, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of April 28 with regard to representatives of the C.O.I. in Latin America, I enclose a memorandum prepared for me by Adolf Berle giving the information which P.B.I. has given him on that subject. This memorandum specifically states that just prior to April 1 C.O.I. took over the C.O.I. men in Mexico.

On March 31 Ambassador Messersmith wrote in a personal letter from Mexico City as follows:

"There called on me yesterday Mr. Donald Downes, who states that he came to see me at the request of Mr. Allen Dulles of the Office of the Coordinator of Information. Mr. Downes states that he is the confidential liaison between Colonel Donovan's office and Italian and Spanish groups in Mexico. He states that the underground Spanish and Italian movements in Italy and in Spain have their headquarters in Mexico City. Colonel Donovan's office gets from these Italian and Spanish sources valuable information concerning developments in Spain and in Italy. Mr. Downes comes to Mexico City for the purpose of getting these data orally and in writing from these Spanish and Italian sources. He asked me whether I thought it could be safe for him to carry this written information with him across the border on his way to Washington.

The President,

The White House.
"I told him that as far as the Mexican authorities were concerned, I did not think that they would either examine or take from him any documents which he had. I said that as far as our own Government was concerned, I thought the Army had a very definite control at the frontier, and from what I had heard, it was possible that they would take his documents and either return them to him after a brief delay or send them to him in Washington. Mr. Downes said he knew that there was this control by the Army and he believed there was also a control at the frontier by the F.B.I. While the information which he carried would eventually be available to the Department of State and to the Army and to the F.B.I., he did not wish his documents to fall into the hands of anyone as it was of such primary importance that the names of his informants be kept secret - if only for the personal safety of the informants.

"He asked whether the pouch could be used. I told him that I could not permit the use of the pouch until I had been informed by the Department that the pouch could be used by a particular person. I suggested therefore that on his return to Washington he tell Mr. Dulles that my own suggestion was that he get in touch with the Department and ask if I could be instructed to receive from Mr. Downes in Mexico certain envelopes for transmission in the pouch addressed to Colonel Donovan's office. Mr. Downes said he thought this was quite reasonable and that he would take this up with Mr. Dulles on his return to Washington. I said that I would have no objection to sending sealed envelopes for him through the pouch to Colonel Donovan's office if I were specifically instructed by the Department of State that I could receive such envelopes from Mr. Downes."

In the same letter George Messersmith reported that this man Downes had stated to him that "colonel Donovan had no agents or representatives in Latin America", and was not collecting information from Latin America. The facts remain, however, that Mr. Downes
as agent of Colonel Donovan was in Latin America and was collecting information in Mexico.

On March 25 Lawrence Duggan informed me that he had been confidentially advised by an official high in Colonel Donovan's office that Colonel Donovan had at least ninety persons in Mexico. This official stated that a large number of these persons were at airports watching the passenger traffic, scouting around to ascertain whether Axis supporters were buying land or taking any actions in connection with these airports, and in general were maintaining surveillance of a sweeping character. As a result of that information, I sent a personal letter to Colonel Donovan on March 25, of which I enclose a copy, and on March 26 I received his reply to that letter, of which I likewise enclose a copy.

Notwithstanding the assurances contained in Colonel Donovan's letter to me of March 26, Messersmith reported only five days later the facts I have set forth above. When the further information, which the F.B.I. will send us as promised in the last paragraph in Berle's memorandum, is received, I shall immediately transmit it to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Encs.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE AUD.

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
W. J. D.

Ben Smith is, I am sure, wholly loyal. This would include the pre-
war period except that during that time he engaged in all kinds of
consultations with Germans and Italians — and possibly Japanese.
In other words, he may have thought he was doing a smart thing or some-
things that was good for his country but I think he has completely failed
to understand that a private citizen has absolutely no right to inject
himself into matters relating to governmental policies in respect to
other nations. Very rich or very influential individuals are con-
stantly doing this.

That is why I very much doubt the wisdom of having him represent
this Government or Lord Beaverbrook in any international matter. His
discretion in such things would require constant watching against
himself.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Lonovan

I talked with Sam Rosenman today and found him, as always, impartial, unprejudiced and open to conviction. I gave my opinion that the transfer at this time would be a serious impairment of the whole war effort; that the foreign radio service was not set up with us as something separate, but there was such an interplay of functions among all of our units that to rip this out now would tear the tissue of our whole organization; and further, that in fulfillment of my duty to the President, I should not let this be done without swining a red lantern.

Neither Sam nor I stressed our respective divergent views but approached it from the very practical standpoint of what should be done now.

As he expressed it, the single question was a choice between two courses -- one, to have our radio propaganda service, as distinct from our political warfare and subversive services, made part of a general information
agency; or, second, to have it remain as it is now and to effect close liaison with the domestic information agency. I accepted this as the question, but suggested that at best this question could not be decided without further proof. That as a means of establishing the proof the following be done:

1. That a domestic integrated information service should be set up to see if it would work. That this domestic agency should be given power and control over the various units, rather than be compelled to rely on persuasion.

2. That a period of three months should be given to see how this experiment worked out.

3. That a close liaison should be established between the domestic radio and our own, so that there should be the fullest interchange of support and of joint action.

4. That at the end of three months a new look be given to see the result.

Among other reasons for this suggestion were the following:

(a) That at most this was an experiment. For
the purposes of this action I was willing to concede that it was a question of fact as to which is the best method.

(b) As Sam epitomized my view, it was that the proposal being untried, "the burden of proof was on the proponents".

(c) That to try to do the whole thing at once, before it could be seen whether the domestic propaganda service could stand upon its own feet after consolidation, might jeopardize the ultimate success of any arrangement.

(d) That to permit our machine to remain as it is for the next three months would jeopardize nothing, and if at the end of three months it should be decided to make the change no harm would have been done.

(e) But if the change were to be made now, in the process of which our whole organization would be upset, and then within three months it was found to be a mistake, irreparable injury would have been done.

I tried to make clear that while my conviction is that under the present set-up we had created a weapon for you that should not be impaired, nevertheless I wanted to go to the fullest extent in examining any proposal that
Sam felt would be more effective. For that reason only I made the above suggestions.

In view of the differences of opinion that exist, such an experimental period carried on with good faith would be able to satisfy you as to what course should be followed.

One other thing I stressed with him. That is the proposed order submitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We discussed that for the moment a simple order in lieu of that should be issued. It might follow the lines of the enclosed draft. This would designate us as a supporting agency, and nothing more. It would, however, answer the basic question, and would leave the other questions to be determined later. At this moment there are many things which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to put through. The delay is hindering aggressive action on our part. These could be put through almost at once if the Chiefs of Staff knew that the fundamental question had been decided. I have talked with General William B. Smith, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he has said such an order would be acceptable "in order to relieve the log jam."

I do not know Sam's conclusion. I am sending
him a copy of this memorandum, and I hope in reading this he will feel that he can recommend it to you as a common sense course to follow. If you feel otherwise, I hope you will let me have an opportunity to discuss it with you before you reach a final decision.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Louis Johnson says they are most anxious to have two transmitters for India. I do not know anything more about it than that. Johnson would know.

F.D.R.
June 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB SHERWOOD:

Dear Bob:

The President asks me to send you the enclosed. I showed it to Sam and he evidently liked it.

G.G.T.

Enclosure.

Memo from Doc O'Connor asking the Pres. to read the enclosed memo regarding a leaflet to be dropped on every major city within Germany except Berlin.
MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN:

Young King Peter II of Yugoslavia and the Minister spoke to me about eighty Yugoslavian airmen and saboteurs and asked that we do all possible for them. Will you take this up with the Yugoslav Minister?

F.D.R.