THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WASHINGTON.

May 2, 1933.

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your request, I send you herewith copy of a letter I addressed to Senator Robinson, while a delegate at Geneva, which fully sets forth my views in connection with a Consultative Pact. This had the endorsement of the entire delegation at Geneva, as it was thought it would be very effective.

Secretary of State Stimson stated he did not push the matter, as he did not think Senator Robinson was enthusiastic. Senator Robinson stated he did not push it because he was not requested to do so by Secretary of State Stimson.

I do not wish to intrude myself at all in matters connected with the Department of State, but I want you to have my views. I will ask that you read this as it will not take very long.

Just following my letter to Senator Robinson there is enclosed a copy of resolution which I think will take care of the situation.

With kind regards and best wishes,

I am

Sincerely yours,

The President,
The White House.
Hotel des Bergues,  
Geneva, Switzerland.  
March 6, 1932.  

Honorable Joseph T. Robinson,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.  

My dear Joe:  

Before I left Washington, I intended to discuss with you and Borah and the Secretary of State a matter which I then thought might contribute greatly to the success of the Disarmament Conference. I felt, however, that it would be better not to mention it until I arrived here and further determined whether it would be productive of good. Since my arrival I have become more than ever convinced that it would aid materially in the Conference.  

At all disarmament conferences we have encountered difficulties in the form of insistence upon security. France and her allies have always insisted upon consultative pacts as the security desired. Of course, France is now more secure than she has been in the last two centuries and her armies could take any capital in Europe except London. Yet the leaders of France and her allies still insist on security--so much so that something must be done to save their faces with their home people and to satisfy them politically. Even at the London Conference, France had reduced her requirements to a consultative pact. Both you and I were opposed to this, and I still am.  

A consultative pact makes the United States assume additional obligations and has behind it a promise of ultimate aid. Difficulties generally arise in the construction and interpretation by the various signatories of the intentions and moral obligations arising from the pact.  

To obviate the objections to a consultative pact, I have conceived the idea of accomplishing what is desired by a joint resolution or enactment of the Senate and House of Representatives, authorizing the President, in the event of any of our multilateral treaties being violated or threatened with violation, to call a conference of the signatory
powers, or to appoint representatives to attend a conference called by the signatory powers. I believe that such a resolution or enactment at this stage of the Disarmament Conference would prove equally as effective as a consultative part and would relieve us of the assumption of obligations entailed by such a pact. I believe that it would satisfy France, as I think that France is beginning to realize that the world considers her attitude a stumbling block to peace in Europe and a menace to world peace, and I think that she is desirous of reaching an agreement conductive to peace and political reconciliation in Europe. Conversations of American Delegates with members of the French Delegation have served to convince them that this is the situation.

This Conference and the world at large would construe such a joint resolution or enactment by Congress as clear evidence that the United States entered the Kellogg, Four Power, Nine Power and other multilateral pacts in the firm belief that they contained stipulations which should be obeyed, and that she is willing to consult with other signatories as to the most effective means of obtaining respect for these treaties. The idea would be dissipated that the United States was not seriously interested in the Kellogg and Nine Power pacts. The world would be convinced that the United States is deeply concerned about these pacts and desires the fullest compliance with their terms.

The position of the State Department in the Sino-Japanese matter, in particular the letter of Secretary Stimson to Borah, has made a most favorable impression here, where it is felt that the United States has concluded that international obligations must be met. The Stimson-Borah letter seems to have done more than any other one thing to brighten the prospects for settlement of the Far Eastern controversy. Congressional action such as I recommend would, I think, be most helpful in influencing a satisfactory settlement of the Oriental question, as it would convince the nations that Congress and the American people stand behind the declarations of the Stimson-Borah letter. I believe that it would lead to a settlement of the entire affair. It would warn Japan that the American people are deeply interested in compliance with the stipulations of the treaties. In addition, it would answer all those at home and abroad who say that
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America agrees to treaties and then makes no effort either by consultation or cooperation to have the treaties respected. In the present circumstances, both in the Orient and in the Conference, I believe that a resolution or enactment of the kind suggested would have more effect than any consultative past the United States could afford to enter.

I enclose a copy of what I think Congress should pass. This will give you my views on the subject more clearly than I can tell you. Of course, this is merely a suggestion, and you are at liberty to amend, modify or eliminate at will. I have put this in the form of an enactment instead of a joint resolution, as an enactment has more appearance of importance and gives a more favorable impression to the public and to some leaders here. However, I want you to determine which ever form you prefer.

In the enclosed copy I have enumerated the Kellogg Pact, the Four Power Pact, the Nine Power Pact, and the Washington and London Naval Treaties as the multilateral treaties in which the United States is interested. The authorization of the President is limited to calling or attending a conference in case of violation or threatened violation of these treaties. I thought that it would be very beneficial at this time, especially in view of the Far Eastern situation, to name all these treaties, including together the naval treaties and the Nine Power Pact. It would be carrying out the suggestion contained in the Stimson-Borah letter that these treaties must be considered together and that violation of one might invalidate the other. Mention of these, I feel sure, would be beneficial in inducing Japan to modify her operations in Shanghai and Manchuria.

Mention of the Kellogg Pact would enable the President, in case of serious violation of the Pact or threat against world peace, to call a conference or attend a conference to obtain cooperative action to prevent war.

All of these benefits, it seems to me, would accrue without the United States incurring any additional obligations whatsoever. As an act of Congress, it would be construed alone by the United States. It could be repealed whenever desired, and modified or extended in the light of our future foreign relations.
foreign relations. It would certainly let the world know that the Congress and people of the United States require the strict observance of treaties made with the United States. It would especially strengthen the hand of the President at this time. I am simply writing you hurriedly the reasons which occur to me for this action; others and more important ones will readily occur to you.

After you have read the enclosed copy of the resolution of enactment desired, if your mind reacts favorably to it, I wish you would go to see the Secretary of State and discuss it with him. Of course, should it appear more harmful than helpful to solution of the Japanese problem, it had better be dropped. If the Secretary is not unfavorable to it, however, I suggest that you talk it over with Borah, Walsh and Dave Reed and get their reactions. I think that either you, as leader of the Democratic forces, or Borah, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, should introduce the measure, as both of you are widely known and esteemed in Europe. I leave the entire matter to your judgment, and you need not see Stimson, Borah, Reed or others if you do not like it. However, I believe that if you get interested in it, we can obtain its passage through both House and Senate; you will have done the country an incalculable good, and the benefits will continue to accrue in the future.

All my colleagues here concur in the belief that, if Congress should take this action, it would be most helpful both in the Sino-Japanese matter and in securing substantial results at the Disarmament Conference. If I were in Washington now, I would introduce the measure and exert my utmost for it, as I am fully convinced that it will prove most helpful and that it does not in any way increase the obligations of the United States. We think that, if any action is taken in this matter, it is better that it should appear as having originated at Washington rather than as occasioned by any suggestion from Geneva. It will then be universally regarded as a firm resolve of Congress to insist upon performance of international obligations contracted by nations with the United States.

After you have reached a decision on the matter, I will appreciate it if you will send me through the State Department a cablegram.
a telegram advising me of your decision, of your views and of the opinions of others whom you have consulted. You may make this telegram as full as you like.

I wrote to you yesterday regarding the general situation here, and trust you have received the letter, which was rather full.

I leave it to your judgment to make such disposition of this letter as you see fit. I also want to emphasize that I leave to your discretion modifications of my copy and whom you may consult concerning it.

With kindest regards and best wishes I am,

Your friend,
Whereas the Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris August 27, 1925, to which the United States and practically all of the nations of the world are parties, stipulates, in Article II, that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be shall never be sought except by pacific means,

Whereas the Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Region of the Pacific Ocean (Four-Power Pact), signed in Washington the 15th day of December, 1921, provides in Article I that if there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy .... not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy .... they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment, and provides in Article II that if the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation,

Whereas Article VII of the Treaty between the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, relating to
principles and policies concerning China (Nine Power Pact)
signed at Washington February 6, 1922, stipulates in
Article VII that whenever a situation arises which in the
opinion of the Contracting Powers involves the application
of the stipulations of the present treaty and renders
desirable discussion of such application, there shall be
full and frank communication among the Contracting Powers
concerned.

Whereas Article XII of the Treaty between the United
States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and
Japan limiting naval armaments, signed at Washington
February 6, 1922, provides that if during the term of the
present Treaty the requirements of the national security of
any Contracting Power in respect of naval defence are,
in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any
change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at
the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view
to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and
its amendment by mutual agreement.

Whereas the London Naval Treaty of 1930, signed
April 22, 1930, provides, in Article XXI, that in case of
any changes in the Treaty required by increases affecting
the national security of any High Contracting Party, the
other parties should promptly advise with one another
through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus
presented,
Whereas it is vital to the best interests of the United States, to the peace of the world and to the continuance of good understanding and good will among the signatories to the aforesaid treaties that the stipulations contained therein should be fully complied with, and

Whereas, in the event that a nation or nations should violate or threaten to violate the agreements made in those treaties, or a condition should arise that threatens to bring about the violation of these treaties, it may be necessary to obtain prompt co-operative action for the maintenance of the validity of these international obligations and for the preservation of the peace of the world,

Therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the President of the United States is hereby authorized in case of violation or threatened violation of the obligations contained in any of the aforesaid multilateral treaties, to call in his discretion a conference of the signatories to the treaty the subject of violation or threatened violation, or to appoint a representative or representatives to attend a conference called by any power or powers signatory to such treaty, to consult in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most effective measures to be taken jointly or separately to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.
1. Article I of the Treaty between the United States and Germany of August 25, 1921 reads as follows:

"Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States."

2. Article II of this Treaty defines the obligations referred to in Article I more specifically by stating that the rights and advantages stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles "for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in ... Part V" (among other Parts). Article II continues as follows:

"The United States in availing itself of the rights and advantages stipulated in the provisions of that Treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner consistent with the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions."
3. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles is headed "Military, Naval and Air Clauses," and contains the articles which govern Germany's disarmament. The preamble to Part V reads as follows:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."


5. The following summarizes a legal opinion on the part of former Assistant Secretary of State Rogers as to whether Germany has undertaken the same military obligations towards the United States as she has toward the Allies, and whether the United States is justified in saying that it has no interest in the application of these clauses of the Treaty:

A. The clear intent of our 1921 Treaty with Germany was to reserve for the United States a series of advantages resulting from the peace settlements, without at the same time involving us in the mechanism of the Treaty. The only limitation to the advantages we obtained, namely,
that we must also observe the specific rights accorded Germany in connection with those advantages, does not alter the fact that we received a series of benefits for which we owe nothing in return that is not inherently tied up with individual benefits. We can, therefore, exercise these benefits or fail to exercise them at our pleasure, without consulting Germany or any third Power.

B. There can therefore be no question that

(1) the United States can enjoy the advantages accruing to it from Germany's disarmed condition; and,

(2) the United States can regard Germany as bound toward it in as onerous a manner as toward the Allies.

C. In order to liberate herself from the military clauses of the Treaty, Germany, in addition to the voluntary consent of all the other signatory Powers, must also obtain the consent of the United States.

D. The United States is obligated to Germany in respect to disarmament only insofar as the preamble to Part V, quoted above, constitutes such
an obligation. Germany's claim that the Allies are obligated to carry out their bargain and to disarm themselves not only on the basis of this preamble, but also on the basis of Article VIII of the League Covenant and of the covering letter addressed to the German Peace Delegation by Clemenceau, does not apply to the United States.
Dear Mr. President:

It occurs to me that, before you talk with Schacht, you may care to know that I had a talk with Mr. Norman H. Davis over the telephone yesterday afternoon with regard to disarmament matters and also the tariff truce. I quote his reference to the Disarmament Conference:

"I have a very serious thing about this disarmament — two or three things. In the first place, on Monday morning, the Germans and the French are to bring up the question of reorganization of the army, and the British Cabinet decided today that we must take a firm stand on that to uphold their conventions and got to take it up in the Bureau. They had Eden over today from Geneva to discuss it with the Cabinet and they say we have just got to make an issue on that. It may be that it will blow (hold?) up the conference. I think myself it has got to come to a head."

I am also enclosing a clipping from the

The President

The White House.
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, which is a telegram from the HERALD TRIBUNE correspondent in Geneva - which I hope you will have an opportunity to read.

The situation looks serious and as though there were a real danger as to the continuance of the Conference.

I also give you the following information for what it is worth:

Gordon Auchincloss called me up from New York this morning to say that he had received communications from various of his associates abroad (he mentioned one of them whom I know personally and who is a very reliable man in Belgium) to the effect that Schacht's mission here is purely political and in no sense financial or commercial; Schacht, who is a very ambitious man, through his conversations here, hopes to feather his own nest at home and strengthen his position with the Nazi group. The word which Gordon Auchincloss brings is that he (Schacht) will make use of the conversations to
to his own advantage, if he possibly can do so.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
Germany, Asked For Submarine And Air Parity

World Alarmed Over Truceat Treaty Geneva
Does Not Bar Weapons

By Frank horn, 294th War Correspondent

THE home office said yesterday that
the news of the Geneva agreement was a
success story. The agreement had been
achieved, it was said, without any use of
force.

The German delegation, led by Count Willy
von Konrad, was to meet the Allied delegation
led by Sir Charles Wilson, Britain's Secretary of
State for War and Air. The agreement was to
be signed by both delegations.

The news of the agreement was greeted with
skepticism by many people. Some believed that
the agreement was just a temporary truce and
that it would not last long.

However, others believed that the agreement
was a step towards peace and that it would
lead to a lasting peace. The agreement was
expected to be signed by both delegations on
Monday.

The news of the agreement was also greeted
with relief by many people. They believed that
the agreement would lead to a better future for
all people.

The agreement was expected to be signed by
both delegations on Monday.
My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a copy of telegram No. 660 of May 25, from Mr. Norman Davis, requesting guidance as to the American Delegation's position in the forthcoming discussion next Saturday or Monday on the aviation sections of the British Disarmament Plan, and should greatly appreciate receiving an indication of your wishes as to the instructions we should send to Mr. Davis in reply.

For reference purposes I am also adding a copy of Mr. Davis' telegram No. 217 of May 15, and the Department's answer, No. 331 of May 17, on the same subject.

Enclosures:
Three telegrams as mentioned above.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
Nov 1, 1950

MEMO FOR FILES:

William Phillips (Under Secretary of State) to the President, May 27, 1933, summarizing questions asked by Norman Davis in his telegram No. 666 from the Disarmament Conference/ FDR's handwritten comments and replies to the questions appear on the margins of the letter. (SEE: Official File 404)

R.L. Jacoby
Archivist, FDRL
June 7, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter addressed by the President of the Disarmament Conference, on May 19, 1933, to Mr. Norman H. Davis, regarding your message of May 16.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary.

Enclosure:

Copy of letter from President of Disarmament Conference, May 16.

The President,

The White House.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted: June 6, 1933

Addressed to:
The President,

The White House.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Conference for the Reduction and the Limited
ation of Armaments.

GENEVA, 19th May, 1933.

Dear Mr. Davis:

I wish to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of May 19th in which, at the request of President Roosevelt, you were good enough to send me a copy of the message which the President addressed to the heads of all the States participating in the world Monetary and Economic Conference to be held in London, and the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

I have communicated this message to the General Commission at its meeting today. After hearing the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, Turkey and France, the General Commission desired me to extend to the President of the United States its sincere thanks for his invaluable contribution to the cause of disarmament; and to assure him that the proposals contained in his message will receive its most sympathetic and earnest consideration.

I shall appreciate it, therefore, if you will be so good as to convey to the President the sentiments of the General Commission in this matter.

I am, my dear Mr. Davis,

Yours very sincerely,

(s) Arthur Henderson,

President of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

The Hon. Norman H. Davis,
Delegation of the United States of America,
Hotel des Bergues.
Memo for the President:

Here is the memo of Clarence Street's conversation with Deladier which I spoke to you about and which I think worth reading.

W.D.
On August 1st, 1933, I had a talk, lasting an hour and a half, with M. Daladier, the French Premier, at Vichy. This was the result of my war debt plan which I had shown his aide, M. Fernand de Brinon during the London Conference. M. de Brinon, interested by it, showed it to M. Daladier and told me later the Premier was very much interested in the idea and would like to discuss it with me further. It was arranged that I should see him on my return to Geneva from London. As M. Daladier was then resting in Vichy I saw him there. The talk was not for publication. I spoke in a purely private capacity. We were alone except for one of the Premier's secretaries and, part of the time, de Brinon.

The talk covered Franco-American relations in general and the war debt question in particular.

D. impressed me as being deeply interested in improving the former and settling the latter. I have found no one who has shown a keener interest in my own debt plan nor a better grasp of its possibilities, as I see them, than D. Although he did not, of course, wish to commit himself in any way until the concrete details of the idea had been worked out and studied, he seemed very favorably disposed towards the plan in principle.

This was my first talk with D. He made a very strong and favorable impression on me. He is a man with unusual political understanding and imagination coupled with much prudence in execution and quiet strength of character. A thorough democrat. He has much personal charm. He has clear, honest eyes, a straightforward look and manner and there is something very youthful in his face. He lacks the exuberance and emotional quality of M. Herriot as M. Herriot lacks his serenity. The similarities between the two men impress me much more than the differences. They both are profoundly men of the left.

I think it is a profound mistake to consider D. as unfriendly to the United States despite the fact that the domestic and international political situation - particularly our invitation to M. Herriot practically over the head of D. - has been such as to tend to pit the two men against each other on American policy. D. has remained very favorably disposed not only toward the U.S. but particularly towards the Roosevelt administration. He shows a more friendly attitude and much more understanding of and sympathy with the present situation in the States than I have found in any Frenchman with whom I have talked lately. I have not talked with M. Herriot lately but I doubt if he is really much better disposed than D., allowance made for the fact that H. does not have D.'s responsibilities. An American attitude that makes H. appear as our only friend in France makes it all the harder not only for H. but for D. to play ball with us.
In talking with D., I stressed the belief that fundamental conditions were never better for a Franco-American rapprochement than now. In this connection I pointed out that for the first time in 12 years there were now in both countries a government of the Left. Whereas Great Britain opposed the American program on all four of its chief points, public works, shorter hours, restriction of production and monetary depreciation, the French Government agreed with us on three points and differed only on the monetary question, the one which I thought had the least permanent importance. In these circumstances it seemed a pity that France and America instead of concentrating on the points of agreement should have concentrated instead on the one point of discord. D. agreed with this analysis.

All the difficulties that seemed to separate the two countries, I argued, could be surmounted if only the two governments approached each other in the right spirit. France could achieve her aims — which on essential points were the same as ours — much better by making an effort to understand the difficulties that faced Roosevelt and to approach him in a friendly constructive way, than to hold back, or be critical or hostile.

To illustrate, I said I realized how deeply shocked the French had been by our financial policy and how they believed our difficulties had been the result of our own mistakes. Indeed, I was ready to agree with them. But on the other hand, before 1914, we Americans had felt that the political policy of Europe must lead fatally to war. Yet when the war came the American people did not hesitate to feed and succour the Belgian, French and other victims of their own folly. It seemed to me that France and the rest of Europe had not shown as generous and sympathetic a spirit toward us in the hour of our distress. Instead, there had been mostly criticism, much of it unsound and unfair, little apparent realization of our troubles nor of all from which Roosevelt had already saved the world as well as the U.S. I said I realized how deep was the popular feeling in Europe that all Americans were rich and how hard it was for the ordinary European to believe that things could have been as bad as they were in America in February and March, but still, the European people that first took that attitude toward us: "Here is an old friend who is in trouble — what can I do to help him?" would not lose by thus distinguishing itself from the mob.

D., who seemed much impressed by this, said, "That's altogether true. Our newspapers have been very unjust to the U.S." Turning to de Brinon, he said, "You remember, I told you a few days ago that I must do something to clear away this." Turning to me, "I've been turning over in my mind the past few days how to do this. I think I shall deal with the subject in a speech some time in September. Our press has been quite unfair to you. But, he added with a twinkle in his eye, "you know, our papers are not really concerned with Roosevelt. What they are aiming at is to attack my government through him. It's always the same."

Before I developed this illustration, D. in telling me how much he appreciated all R. had done, said he was convinced that R. had
saved the U.S. from grave social troubles, perhaps from civil war between east and west - likening in this connection the situation to the struggle between creditors and debtors in ancient Rome - and then modifying his statement and saying, "No, not sectional civil war, but widespread social war."

In mentioning things which the French, who think R. has hurt them on the monetary side, could put on the credit side of the balance as helping them I stressed wheat. That is one of the French Government's worst problems, and I pointed out how much worse it would be if the U.S. had not only set out energetically to restrict its production, but was working hard to get all the other big overseas producers to do the same.

I also indicated that it seemed as bad to me for a Liberal French Government to make R. suffer for the sins of Hoover & Coolidge & Harding as for us to tax the France of Daladier with the sins of Tardieu, Laval, Poincare & Clemenceau.

D. explained why it was politically impossible for any government in France to undertake now a policy of monetary devaluation. He was convinced that even the Socialists, the only party that favored devaluation, would not dare execute that policy if in power. In expressing his sympathy with the entire Roosevelt program, D. turned to de B. and reminded him how he, D., had advocated a similar program for France in her monetary crisis eight years ago at the time when Poincaré took the other course. "I still believe it would have been the wiser policy," he said, reiterating that the monetary side of it, however, was now too late.

"I think I understand President Roosevelt's position and I not only have no criticisms to make but I would have done the same things he has done if I were in his place," he said. He also said, and very earnestly, "I have the highest admiration for Pres. R. and a growing admiration. He is no ordinary statesman - he is a great man with extraordinary political insight." He said this, and more, in a way and in a context that satisfied me he was speaking from the heart.

"I was not surprised," he said, "as our experts were when R. rejected the stabilization agreement in London -(he referred to the Harrison-Warburg one) - for since the U.S. was represented by experts I doubted if they could really know the President's mind, or see things as a whole as he must. I'm afraid experts," he ended with a smile, "are the same everywhere; they have little political sense."

I expressed my personal opinion that France was contributing more to recovery by sticking to gold than by going off, that it was just as necessary from a world viewpoint for her to stay stable now as it was for us to do so during the European inflation period, and that I believed that when we studied the situation more deeply we would agree that France's gold policy was helping, not hurting, the chances of success of our experiment, and that the maintenance of the gold bloc market was essential to our success. I also stressed my personal opinion that the key to R.'s monetary policy was not a desire or
intention to depreciate but a desire to avoid permanent
devaluation by obtaining through purely temporary and easily
reparable means the stimulus to prices depreciation gives. I
pointed out that R. having thus primed the pump by monetary
means was now devoting all energy to keeping the water flowing
by natural action, - by action along lines France herself
advocated. R's end for me was price raising, not money lowering,
and though he would doubtless permanently devalue if necessary,
he would do his utmost first to accomplish the much greater
achievement of reestablishing the 1928 price level while keeping,
if possible, the gold content of the dollar intact, and thus
avoiding the tremendous loss devaluation would entail for the
host of small creditors, including every American with an
insurance policy. The 1926 dollar, I recalled, was at par on
foreign exchange. Though convinced ( for a number of reasons I
gave him) that R.'s dream is to restore prosperity without permanently
devaluating the dollar, I stressed that to his mind this deval-
uation was essential that he let no one know his real end now. D. agreed
this conclusion followed the premise and seemed to agree that the
promise too was sound.

The best way for France to assure the return of the dollar to
gold, and at the old parity, I argued, was for France to do what
she could in the other fields, where her policy was the same, to
help R. raise prices. It was a great mistake, I held, to believe,
as some French experts do, that if the American experiment failed
we would be more inclined to stabilize. If the experiment failed,
we would become more radical, and we would depreciate the dollar
even more - it would be less stable than ever. The more the
experiment succeeded in restoring prosperity, the more moderate
we would become and the less inclined to experiment with untried
monetary systems. "It is quite true," said D. "When you were
prosperous you were conservative, and the more the depression
deepened the more inclined to experiment you became."

Consequently, I concluded, the way to overcome the Franco-
American discord on the monetary point is not to fight over it,
but to work together on the other three points - public works,
shorter hours and regulation of production, - where the policies
of the two governments were in accord.

It was a remarkable thing, I said, that whereas the Government
of the Right in England differed with our Left Government on all
four points, and with the French Left government on all of them
also (for Britain refused to stabilize too,) yet it preserved
much more friendly relations with both Left governments than the
latter did with each other.

I pointed out that though the pound had been stabler than the
dollar during the Conference, there was this great difference
which would make France more friendly to the dollar: If we had
gained an export advantage by depreciating the dollar, we had it
offset this partly if not entirely by as deliberately raising the
cost of our production through our shorter hour and higher wage
policy which also built up buying power for imports, England had depreciated the pound more than we the dollar, and for a much longer time, and had not only retained this whole advantage in the export field, but was the chief opponent to all efforts to raise wages and shorten hours.

I used this simply to keep things in perspective, and at no time sought to make for trouble with England. I took pains instead to stress that England's position was different from ours or France's as she depended more on exports, and to argue in favor of the three great democracies, Britain, France and the United States, pulling together as the only way out of the crisis.

D. apparently had not thought before of this difference between the dollar and pound depreciations. Knowing his humanitarian sympathies and his concern for the small man and peasant, I drove it home by underlining how R. was not only not hurting French exports in reality but was promoting in the U. S. the ideals of the governing parties in France and was entitled to their positive support.

D. agreed that it was remarkable that two governments which seemed designed to work together should be at such odds, while being each so friendly with a Conservative government. He attributed it to the war debt question.

Debts.

D. stressed the great majority by which Herriot (as I recall) fell on the debts question, saying there had never been anything like it. Evidently it put the wind up him very much, but it certainly has not stopped him from wanting to settle the question in a friendly and reasonable way, within the political possibilities of Paris and Washington. He is obviously very much concerned with this problem, several times during the talk tracing troubles back to the debt question.

He said that in June he had asked the French treasury if it were possible to pay (I did not grasp whether a token or the whole installment) and he had been told that it was. He assured me that he had thereupon advocated payment and added, "But I was a minority of one, - of one, mind you - in my own cabinet." None the less there had been negotiations on the debts question in June at London, he said though he did not make clear with whom France talked. The British were happy, he said wryly, for they had told Mm at London they had the French refusal to pay to thank for Washington's acceptance of their token payment.

I urged my debts plan on him in close relation with all I said about the possibilities and advantages of better Franco-American relations. About half the time was spent on it.

Both the American and the French governments wanted an international program of public works and shorter hours. What blocked it was the impossibility of finding the money for it. Even in prosperous times it would be very hard (I said) to get the
necessary agreement and money for executing a synchronized program of this kind.

The existence of the debts situation - the fact that almost every state in Europe owed debts to us (in the last analysis) and that while it was now impossible to collect them all reasonable men saw the need of settling this problem amicably and not by default - the existence of this situation, I argued, furnished a unique opportunity to the U S with her price-raising policy and to France with her European federation dreams. Here was a powerful lever for synchronized public works program on a Pan-European scale, and if it was not used now it would soon be too late.

D. seemed impressed and agreed the debts provided a rare chance for concerted action along these lines. He remarked at one time that if no debt settlement were reached with his government, none would ever be reached with any French government, for it would be too late.

I added a new element to my plan while talking to D. - the shorter working week. I suggested that it might be specified that the shorter week should prevail on all public works executed under the debts settlement program. This would allow the shorter week to be introduced in all parts of Europe, which would be very useful both for advertising the shorter week and for providing valuable experience in developing this system.

D. said he saw no reason why this should not be done. He expressed himself very strongly as favoring the shorter week, and said he had personally instructed the French delegation at the International Labor Conference in June to work for it.

D. is not only in favor of public works, it is one of his pet ideas. He has been advocating it for years. In stressing this he declared that he was in favor of public works as a remedy for unemployment even when not remunerative or very necessary. And yours, he said in referring to my plan, would pay their way.

I emphasized that the public works I had in mind should not only be self-liquidating (partly to assure the interest payment on the debts annuity involved in them) but also planned on a pan-European scale, in a way calculated to bind Europe together peacefully and to capture public imagination immediately. To illustrate, I said the plan should call for a Paris-Turin-Belgrade-Bucharest highway. In execution, however, there would be no need to build the whole road; all that one needed to do to begin was to link up and shorten the existing national roads by public works such as tunnels and bridges that would charge toll and that would be situated preferably on frontiers. As examples I mentioned the tunnel projected under Mont Blanc and the bridge across the Danube which would greatly reduce the distance between Belgrade and Bucharest. Instead of treating these works as separate things, one should so handle them as to make them active parts of a whole, and the traveller on entering should read a sign: "Pan-European Tunnel No. 1, Paris-Bucharest Route, Built with the War Debts."
D. showed himself quite alive to the advantages of a European program of public works. He also spoke of the possibilities of such works in Africa, saying there were plenty of railroads to build there. (In this connection, as I recall, he talked of France's plans of developing cotton growing in her African possessions, and said she could soon be self-supporting in this regard. He said he was willing to hold back such development, but it would not be possible politically unless he had something in return to show for it.)

D. mentioned without enthusiasm the plan of settling the debts in connection with wine exports—liquefying them. I said I saw no hope for it, because of the combined opposition it would arouse from the California grape growers and the Puritans and prohibitionists, and I stressed the opening this would give the Francophobes. He agreed.

It would be far better, I said, for France to approach the US with a constructive plan like mine which would show that she was actively trying to help restore prices by making the debts an entering wedge for public works and shorter hours throughout Europe and by hitching them generally to prosperity and peace. I said I felt that if the French approached the American people in this spirit at this time they would find them receptive, and the two could go a long way together.

I spoke throughout as a private citizen. At the outset I introduced myself as a well-wisher of France, in a position to know the French view point better than most Americans. D. did not question me about the attitude of the American government toward the plan, nor of any of its members. He did ask once if the plan were my own, and I said it was, though including ideas of others, such as the European public works scheme of Albert Thomas.

We did not discuss details, such as who would launch the plan and how. He gave me the impression of wanting to wait to see how the British debt talk turned before doing anything. I urged the need of not waiting until the last minute, and of beginning without loss of time to prepare for Dec. 15.

De Brinon, whom I saw later again, seemed delighted with my talk with D. both the debts part and the more general France-American part. He asked me to keep in touch with him.

While I would not exaggerate the results of a single talk—especially in view of the very difficult parliamentary situation any French premier faces on the debt question—and while I left D. with nothing definite in hand (for that matter, I asked for nothing definite), I can say that I left him much more encouraged than I had expected to be and convinced that if the US government is equally interested in this plan, agreement can be reached.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Dear Mr. President:

The enclosed aide memoire from the British Embassy, together with our reply, is sent to you for your examination and approval, in the event you concur in the facts and the reasoning contained in our memorandum, which is intended as a reply.

In the event you concur in our memorandum, we should get it off as soon as convenient.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
White House.
DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, September 22, 1933.

PERSONAL

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing memoranda of recent conversations with Messrs. MacDonald, Daladier and Paul-Boncour which will give you more detailed information than was contained in my official telegraphic despatches.

While the atmosphere here is very tense and some of the speeches in Germany glorifying war have been disturbing, I feel more hopeful of the possibility of agreement on disarmament than I did a few days after my return here. The seriousness of the situation and the realization of what a failure would mean is having a very sobering effect. The French instead of holding back as heretofore are now eager to reach an agreement without further delay because if it is not possible to get an agreement they wish to take preventive measures to protect...
themselves. The result is that a big game of European politics is being played in the effort on the part of France, England and Italy to bring about an appeasement of the political situation if possible, and to decide which way to jump if it is not possible.

I was sorry to hear from press despatches that you were suffering from a cold, and I hope that you are entirely recovered again.

With warm regards, I am, as ever,

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
Copies of memoranda of conversations with:
1. Sir John Simon, etc., London, September 6
2. Captain Eden, etc., London, September 14
3. Prime Minister MacDonald, London, September 18
4. M. Daladier, etc., Paris, September 19
Memorandum of Conversation held at the Foreign Office, London, on September 6, 1933. Present were Sir John Simon, Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Hugh Wilson.

Mr. Davis mentioned that press inquiries had been made of him on the boat regarding an alleged British naval building program. Sir John Simon stated that no program had been decided upon and none existed. He was glad, however, that Mr. Davis had raised this question since he wished to tell him in the utmost friendliness and frankness that the fact that we were building 10,000 ton six inch gun cruisers, even though it was tonnage permitted under the Treaty, was creating a new type of six inch cruisers of greater broadside capacity and thus would tend to counteract the efforts which the British had been making to reduce the size of unit cruisers. He went on to say that once the unit for six inch guns was established at 10,000 tons it would be difficult to prevent the British Admiralty and other Admiralties from following that pattern.

Mr. Davis said that he appreciated this frankness on Sir John Simon's part, that he was not fully informed regarding the details of our building program, that the President had seen an opportunity in the reconstruction program of getting an appropriation without a great deal of talk and devoting this appropriation to naval purposes. In the ticklish situation with Japan it was well to have our unbuilt tonnage completed as we would be in a better position in 1936 to negotiate with Japan if we had afloat the tonnage permitted to us. Sir John stated that in any case he would like to talk further with Belairs and
and Craigie to get the facts on the matter as he had an impression that there was some sort of an understanding either in the Treaty of London or during the discussions to the effect that this type of vessel would not be constructed.

Sir John and Mr. Davis both recited their information regarding the proposed discussions on disarmament and it resulted therefrom that Eden will go to Paris about the 17th to consult with the French. After he has had the consultations with the French it will be determined what his subsequent movements are to be and it will probably be time then for him to continue to Geneva to attend the Council.

Sir John explained that a Cabinet had sat yesterday and that it had been decided not to give Eden binding instructions but to let him speak to the French saying that they had invited this meeting and he was anxious to ascertain just what they had in mind. First, did they really want a disarmament treaty; second, if they did want a treaty what were they prepared to do in order to make it possible to have one.

Then followed a discussion of the French and German attitudes but it was apparent that none of the parties had any information later than that of the last three-cornered conversations and Mr. Henderson's conversations.

Mr. Davis showed Sir John and then Cadogan the personal letter from the President to Mr. Davis which Sir John found of high interest. Mr. Davis said he intended to show this letter to the Prime Minister and that he also had a personal letter to
deliver to the Prime Minister. Sir John explained that the Prime Minister was going to Balmoral and that he believed he was returning to his home in Scotland after that. In any event the near future was probably compromised by the condition of Viscount Grey who is at death's door. In the event of his death the Prime Minister would undoubtedly have to attend the memorial services.

Mr. Davis let it be known that he desired to have a personal meeting with the Prime Minister and would bring up the matter subsequently.

As for Sir John, he is going to the country for some days and after that to Balmoral. He will probably not return to London until the latter part of next week.

Throughout the entire conversation Mr. Davis repeatedly raised the thought that with the present conditions on the Continent and the apprehension regarding the Hitler regime the British Government might find itself drawn so close to France that it would be unable to exercise pressure upon them in disarmament matters. Sir John replied emphatically and repeatedly that a Disarmament Convention is in his opinion essential to the peace of Europe and to preventing an eventual war. He gave every indication that British pressure would be vigorous and continuous.
Memorandum of Conversation held at the Foreign Office, London, on September 14th. Present were Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Reber.

Eden welcomed Mr. Davis back to Europe and said he was very glad indeed he had returned in time for the conversations in Paris on the 13th. The British Government, Eden explained, felt that the time had come when they must find out exactly what the French had in mind, i.e., what were they prepared to do in order to make it possible to bring about a disarmament treaty. He had no instructions for the Paris talks save to ascertain this if possible.

Mr. Davis said that the United States was prepared to do all in its power to aid in bringing about a successful conclusion of real measures of disarmament; but if other powers felt the time had not yet come for that the United States would be obliged to consider that it had done all it could to help.

The serious and grave consequences of any failure to achieve a Convention at this time were then discussed and both Mr. Davis and Mr. Eden said they had received discouraging messages from Paris which indicated that the French seemed to feel that the situation in Germany precluded any serious measures of disarmament being taken at this time and that they had made no definite program for the conversations.

Eden felt that the French would try to bring up the question of Germany's rearmament and infractions of the Treaty of Versailles during the conversations with the British on the morning of the 13th. He was to say that he had no instructions to discuss this matter and that the primary interest of the British Government was centered in the question of disarmament
itself. In answer to a specific question by Mr. Davis, he said the information in his possession with regard to German rearmament, while very voluminous and from sources which could not be made public, was not as impressive as press reports made out. The principal case to be brought against Germany for the Versailles Treaty lay in the preparation of very complete plans for industrial mobilization and in military training. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Davis, however, thought that the question of rearmament could best be answered by the establishment of a system of supervision. In order to gain Germany’s acceptance of any such measures to be proposed, very definite assurances of real disarmament to follow must be contained in the same Convention which sets up this machinery and France must be made to feel its urgent need for this.

It was apparent throughout the conversation that both Eden and Cadogan did not wish to carry on the conversations with the French alone and welcomed the fact that Mr. Davis will be in Paris at the same time. They are anxious to return to the procedure followed in June for they wish to avoid any long discussion with the French alone for fear the talk will center around Germany’s rearmament and what Great Britain is prepared to do about it in collaboration with France. Eden said he felt that France would gain little support from Italy or some of the smaller powers if she persisted in refusing to agree upon some measures of control and disarmament at the present time. It was likewise clear that Great Britain has not yet decided how far it will support France. It above all desires to avoid trouble in Europe and wishes not to feel itself aligned alone.
with France in too militant a policy.

Mr. Davis said he felt the time had come when the United States and Great Britain must stand closely together in order to achieve concrete results. The failure to do so now would lead inevitably to a European war. Together the United States and Great Britain might prevent this and every effort must be made to impress France with the necessity of saying now what it is prepared to do. Too great a delay or a useless prolongation of the work of the Conference would play into Germany's hands, permitting it to rearm under cover of the talks in Geneva.

During the course of the conversations Mr. Davis asked Mr. Cadogan whether anything further had developed as regards the naval question discussed with Sir John Simon on September 6th. Mr. Cadogan replied that the question had been carefully studied and that the British Government feared that the construction of 10,000 ton six inch gun ships by the United States would lead Japan to further building of six inch gun cruisers above 8,000 tons which would call for similar construction on the part of Great Britain, thus necessitating a change in the present program and tending to start a new naval armaments race. It was explained that a full memorandum setting forth the British Government's position had been cabled to the Embassy in Washington with instructions to bring this matter to the attention of the Department of State and ask whether the United States would have any objection if the British Government should approach Japan and endeavor to secure an agreement not to build any more of the large size six inch gun cruisers. The British
quite realized, Mr. Cadogan explained, that such a construction on our part was fully within our rights under the London Treaty and that it was undoubtedly brought on by the Japanese building but that they hoped to discuss this matter quite fully with us and possibly with Japan before 1935 in order to prevent, if possible, further naval rivalry in a new type of ship. He further explained that the matter had been carefully looked up, that it was quite understood that no commitment or agreement had even been made by the United States not to engage in the building of these ships but that during a conversation held during the London Conference between the British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Admiralty and the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, the latter had said he did not believe the United States desired to build 10,000 ton ships from the Category B allotment. Mr. Davis explained that he was not fully conversant with this situation and therefore he did not feel that he was in a position to discuss the matter but he did recall that during the hearings of the London Treaty before the Senate it had been specifically stated by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy and Senator Robinson that there had been no unit tonnage limitations imposed upon ships of that type.
Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister
MacDonald and Mr. Norman H. Davis at 10 Downing
Street, London, September 19, 1933 beginning at
breakfast at 8:15 a.m. and lasting until 10:20 a.m.

After some general conversation at the breakfast
table about conditions in general I told the Prime
Minister that I was leaving for Paris at eleven o'clock
to resume the disarmament discussions and that I was glad
of an opportunity to have a talk with him beforehand.

Mr. MacDonald brought up the question of Henderson's
election to Parliament and said that this made it diffi-
cult for the British Government because it would be un-
willing to carry on confidential disarmament conver-
sations and negotiations with the virtual leader of the
opposition sitting in; that they would definitely if
necessary refuse to do so and confine themselves to
saying only what they would be willing to say in full
conference.

I then gave him a personal letter which President
Roosevelt had asked me to deliver to him and also let him
read a letter which the President had written to me under
date of August 30th. He then said we were facing a very
critical situation and it was most important for us to
cooperate and talk matters over with a view of determi-
ing what can or should be done.

After breakfast he said that he wanted first to ex-
plain to me some of the things that had happened at the
Economic Conference. I told him that while I was sorry
the Economic Conference had not been more of a success
I really had nothing to do with that. He said he
realized that but intimated that he wanted to explain
certain things because of their bearing upon our efforts
to cooperate in the future which was most important. He said that since his cardinal policy had been to cooperate closely with the United States, when the difficult situation arose as the result of President Roosevelt's message of July 3rd and the rejection of the stabilization agreement Moley had negotiated, his colleagues in the Cabinet told him they did not understand that kind of cooperation, etc., and made it rather uncomfortable for him. I told him it was very foolish to assume that we were failing to cooperate because of our failure to enter into an agreement to put up gold to help keep France on gold, and furthermore that this and a few other questions as to which there had been a difference of opinion or interest were of infinitesimal importance in comparison to such major issues as world peace, disarmament, etc., as to which there is a common and vital interest. He concurred in this and said in effect that there was no complaint because of the failure to reach an agreement on stabilization but because the disagreement was made known in such a way as to magnify its importance and make it difficult to iron out or smooth over the differences in such a way as to avoid a crisis. He said in effect that if we had talked the matter over with them explaining our point of view and difficulties we could have agreed upon a common strategy but as it was done the British were placed in a very embarrassing position with the gold countries. I told him I didn't know enough about just what transpired to express an opinion and repeated that it was a matter about which I had nothing to do.

MacDonald said there had been two aspects of this matter which disturbed him greatly. The first was that it almost brought about the complete collapse of the Con-
ference in such a way as to leave deep bitterness and misunderstanding and at the same time jeopardize his political position; secondly, he was quite disturbed because Secretary Hull thought he had been carrying on negotiations with Moley behind his back. As to the first, he had been determined that the Conference should not break down. In so far as possible he had tried not to mix his work as Chairman of the Conference with that of the British Delegation to the Conference. The Conference itself, in the committee headed by Cox, was discussing a general plan of stabilization and much to his surprise Jung of Italy came to a meeting on Thursday afternoon to inform them that there was no use of their working any longer on this question because an agreement had just been reached for stabilization. MacDonald said this was quite a surprise to him and he asked Jung about it who said that they had reached an agreement with Moley at the American Embassy. In spite of that he said that he did not somehow feel quite comfortable about it and intimated that he thought it was rather an irregular way to deal with it. Later, the next day he thought it was, Moley called him by telephone to say that the President had not accepted the agreement that had been arrived at and that Secretary Hull wanted to have a talk with him. He asked Moley what was the matter. Moley said he could not tell him anything more and that he was really doing something out of the ordinary in telling him that much but that he ought to have a talk with Secretary Hull.

Either that day or the next day MacDonald went to a garden party at Lady Astor's expecting to see Hull but he did not show up. He then proceeded to recite to me the tenseness of the delay in waiting for a final clarification.
On Monday the third of July Cox told him - he thought it was Cox - that the President had definitely turned down the agreement that had been negotiated and that the American Delegation was giving out a statement. He said he urged them not to give out any statement but Cox told him that the President had sent a message with instructions that it be given out. It was then that Cox read to him the message which the President had sent which he said was a very great shock to him. During those two or three days in which there was so much uncertainty he had assumed that there had been some detail which was not acceptable to the President and that the President would probably talk to him by telephone or communicate with him suggesting some modification or explaining just what his difficulty was in order that they might agree on some way of handling the situation so as not to create any serious difficulty.

Fortunately MacDonald said Sir Morris Hankey had kept a complete record of all the meetings and particularly each conversation which he had had during the days in which Moley was negotiating this agreement. This, which he gave to Hull, proved conclusively that he had not been negotiating with Moley at all and that he was not in any way to blame. MacDonald said he had a very great respect and admiration for Secretary Hull, who had shown a fine spirit under very trying circumstances and had also found Cox to be a very fine man. In fact, he said that Hull and Cox had been very helpful in every way but that there were others who had had a different spirit.

I repeated that while I had heard a lot about what had taken place at the Economic Conference and had been distressed over some of its difficulties, I thought there was nothing to be gained now by allowing ourselves
to dwell on that and that perhaps in the long run it was just as well to get certain questions clarified even if it had been done in a way which was not particularly agreeable to certain parties and that so far as he was concerned I did not believe it had hurt him and did not see how anyone could well blame him for the failure of the Economic Conference to achieve more of a success. He said that he had thought for a while that he would just have to throw up his hands and quit but he held on and had decided now to see what could be done and therefore asked Loveday and Stoppani to come to London today, and was going to devote most of the day to discussing with them what could now best be done.

He also told me about all of the efforts of France and the gold countries to get England to go along with them. He said that it had placed him in a very difficult position. I told him that while I had no authority whatever to deal with this question and did not want to deal with it, it did seem to me that the most important problem for the Economic Conference was to consider how to raise the price level and to remove quotas. So long as the other countries were not interested in that and were interested only in some scheme for stabilization which would allow them to stay on gold I thought President Roosevelt had been forced to take the position he did and that my own personal opinion was that instead of trying to work out some scheme now for a general stabilization it would be wiser for England and the United States to try to establish some relationship between the dollar and the pound disregarding for the time being any scheme to stabilize with the gold countries. He intimated that this was worth serious consideration. I repeated, however, that it was a matter upon which I could speak with
no authority whatever.

I then tried to get onto disarmament but he first wanted to bring up the question of the navy. I told him about what Simon had said to me on the subject of our program for naval construction and that I had told Simon I would be glad to communicate with my Government if he could give me all the details and that he had asked me to wait, stating that the Prime Minister was more conversant with this and that he wished to talk with him and with Admiral Bealair. I had waited and had heard nothing further until last Thursday the 14th when talking to Eden and Cadogan when I asked Cadogan, who was present at the conference with Simon, if he had cleared up this matter. Cadogan then told me that they had looked up the records, that they could find no agreement not to build any new type vessels but that in a memorandum which Mr. MacDonald had made of a conversation with Secretary Stimson the latter had stated that although the United States had authority in the Treaty to build six inch cruisers of ten thousand tons it was not the intention of his Government at that time to build any new types of vessels; that clearly there had been no violation of the agreement and since Japan was the first to start the construction of four cruisers of 8500 tons they realized that our building program was in answer to that. He then informed me that the Foreign Office had sent a despatch on the preceding Monday night to their Embassy in Washington asking them to deliver a communication to the American Government setting forth these facts and views and asking if it would have any objection to having the British Government approach the Japanese Government to see if they would agree not to construct any more of this type of vessel so as to avoid a race in a new type.
MacDonald told me that he had been completely out of touch for the past week and that he did not know about that communication.

I then told him that while the British had a perfect right to communicate directly with Washington it did seem to me rather strange, in view of the fact that they had raised the question with me and asked me not to communicate with my Government until they could get more facts, for them to have sent this communication without at least advising me of what had been done. MacDonald said he thought this was very strange himself and said he would look into it. He then said that the Foreign Office had given me a correct statement; that while Stimson did not agree that we would not build any of such type vessels he had said it was not our intention then to do so and that the spirit of this he understood to mean that if we should decide to build any such new types we would at least first communicate with them in a friendly way and talk the matter over. I told him that I had not gone into the question of the naval construction, assuming that since we had gotten so much below the treaty limit there could be no question raised by anyone regarding our taking steps to bring up our strength and that, in fact, the British should look upon this construction with considerable satisfaction particularly as it was the logical consequence of the Japanese building program. He said he realized that and that the only thing which concerned him was that it gave the Admiralty in England a chance "to get their teeth in" and demand some vessels of the same type which would not only involve a considerable outlay of money which they would like to avoid now but would considerably complicate an agreement in 1935. I told him
that without knowing more about it nor having authority to do so, I was not in a position to say anything more definite but that I would like to know how he himself thought we ought to look upon our own situation and the Japanese program and whether they would not really prefer to have us take steps to counteract what Japan had done. He said that he certainly wanted to see us keep up our naval strength but that he thought we might have confined ourselves for the present to building more cruisers of the present type, so as to bring up our strength without building a new type which would bring about another race to avoid which so much effort had been made. I told him that I could not quite understand why the Admiralty should be so disturbed over our building program as they must realize that our navy did not have Great Britain in mind in any respect whatever. I then told him that the Hillman press service had sent a despatch to America giving an account of what Simon had said to me on this subject, which was so strikingly close to being correct as to arouse curiosity and that I had been informed that Hillman got this from the Admiralty. This seemed to surprise and disturb him somewhat. After some further discussion he said that he would try the next day to get in touch with the Admiralty and that possibly Simon would be able to give me some more facts when he came to Geneva the latter part of this week.

I then told him that while all of these questions we had discussed were of importance they were of infinitesimal importance in comparison with the bigger issue of world peace to which the United States and England could contribute so much by cooperating; that we were facing a very critical situation with regard to disarmament and that it was most important for us to put
our heads together. He agreed to this and said that with the Germans in their present state of mind and with the French in their state of mind it was going to be a very difficult question with which to deal and that what complicated it still further was the uncertainty of the position which Italy was going to take.

I told him that I had found suspicion in England as to Italy and I was inclined to believe it was not well founded. He said he thought that suspicion was possibly the wrong word, that what he himself felt was disappointment that Italy was not taking a more definite attitude. I told him that Grandi had told me on last Friday that Italy found it difficult to cooperate satisfactorily with either Germany or France because neither seemed to understand friendly cooperation without an agreement which was in effect an alliance and if Italy did not agree with them on anything she was accused of being a traitor; that Italy did not want an alliance - she wants peace and to obtain disarmament; that my own belief is that it would not be difficult for England and the United States to enlist the full support and cooperation of Italy with regard to disarmament. He said that this would be very helpful and that we must try to do so.

During the course of the talk about Italy I told him I had been informed that Aloisi expressed himself as believing that the Disarmament Conference would fail and that the sooner the better because they could then proceed under the Four Power Pact to do what the Disarmament Conference was unable to do. I told him this seemed foolish to me because it would be impossible to bring about any
disarmament under the Four Power Pact and that if the Disarmament Conference failed I did not believe that the Four Power Pact would last a week. He indicated his complete agreement with this.

He then said that Eden had gone to Paris without any authority, that this was done deliberately because they suspected that the French wanted to avoid a disarmament agreement now and wished to discuss the rearmament of Germany and infractions of the Treaty of Versailles rather than actual disarmament. Therefore they thought it better for Eden to have no authority to discuss this.

I told him that while I was fearful of a change in the French attitude I was assuming that we would resume with the French the three power conversations along the lines of the one day's discussion we had in Paris the early part of June. He said that was, of course, what we ought to do. I told him that the real danger would be to have the question of disarmament slide; that at one time the Germans seemed determined to bring it to an issue, but that there were some indications of late that the Germans would be willing to avoid this on the theory that time is an asset and the longer they can drag out the stronger their case becomes for renouncing the Treaty of Versailles and rearming; and there was danger that the French, who were reluctant to disarm, would fall into their trap. I further stated that it seems to me there are only two policies possible. One is to use force to prevent Germany from rearming but that this seemed impracticable because to succeed it would mean that they must jump on Germany now and try
to destroy her before she gets rearmed and I did not think it possible to get any armies to go into Germany and murder the Germans after they had been defeated. The only other wise course was to get Germany into a disarmament agreement that would provide against German rearmament and at the same time provide for the progressive disarmament of her neighbors under a system of strict supervision and control. He said he agreed with this and that we would have to see what could be done and that we could tell more about the situation in the next few days.

In substance he said that he did not want to be jockeyed into a program that would result in the French refusing to disarm. My impression was that while he agreed with my views as to disarmament and realizes the importance of it his mind is still more occupied with the Economic Conference and the naval question but that he is firmly convinced of the importance and is desirous of cooperating with the United States and remaining on most friendly terms with us.
Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Norman Davis and the President of the Council, M. Daladier, at the Ministry of War, September 19, 1933. Mr. Hugh R. Wilson and Allen W. Dulles accompanied Mr. Davis.

M. François-Poncet, French Ambassador to Berlin, was just leaving M. Daladier's office as we entered and remarked to Mr. Davis that he would like to have a talk with him and tell him of his impressions of Germany where conditions had vastly changed since M. Poncet and Mr. Davis had discussed the situation at the time of Mr. Davis' April visit.

M. Daladier welcomed Mr. Davis back to France. Mr. Davis said that he had appreciated the suggestion received through the French Embassy that they desired him to join with them in preliminary conversations and he was here to be of any possible help. He realized the situation had undergone a considerable change since he had left in June, a little over two months ago, but he was relieved to learn from M. Paul-Boncour, whom he had just seen, that despite the apprehension caused by Germany's attitude, France was still prepared to agree to substantial steps in disarmament provided a transition period were allowed in which to establish an effective control and provided Germany respected her obligations.

M. Daladier confirmed the general position which M. Boncour had outlined. Hitler's Germany was naturally giving them great concern and the President of the Council remarked that he was having considerable difficulty in keeping the French people calm and reasonable in the face of Germany's provocative attitude.

Mr. Davis then told M. Daladier of his talks with the President just prior to his departure, stating that the President was even more interested in the
success of the Disarmament Conference than ever, and
was confident that such success would contribute in a
greater degree than any other single thing toward pro-
moting peace and solving some of the economic problems
with which the world is faced. M. Daladier said he
thoroughly agreed that a successful disarmament agree-
ment would bring about a general European appeasement
which would permit the economic recovery that they were
all striving for. Mr. Davis said that President Roose-
volt in his talks with him had indicated his personal
regard for the serenity and ability which M. Daladier
has manifested. In a postscript to a personal letter
the President had asked Mr. Davis to express to the
President of the Council his regret that he had not the
pleasure of knowing him personally. Mr. Davis said
that while the letter in question was a very personal
one to him giving the President's views as to the vital
importance of the success of the Disarmament Conference
he felt that it might be useful to let M. Daladier know
what the President's views were in the President's own
words. Mr. Wilson then translated the President's
letter to M. Daladier and Mr. Davis handed him a trans-
lation of the postscript. No copy or translation of
the letter was left with the Prime Minister.

M. Daladier expressed his appreciation for this
opportunity to get at first hand the President’s views
and expressed his great admiration for the President
and the work that he was doing toward economic recovery
in the United States. On many phases of the President's
policy he disagreed with the critical attitude of his
financial advisors. He admired the boldness of the
President's conception and the vigorous measures he had
taken which had produced such a change in psychology and
enlisted to so large a degree, on a voluntary basis, the cooperation of the people of the United States in the task of recovery. He said that he had remarked to his financial advisors that he wished that at least one of them had been brought up in the Roosevelt school since if they had they would be bringing his new and bold ideas rather than more thread-worn doctrines based on past experiences, that what he was looking for was a fresher approach to the whole situation.

Turning to the question of disarmament Mr. Davis remarked that he fully realized the problem presented by Germany's conduct, in fact Germany seemed in many respects to have gone quite mad. In this situation he could appreciate that in France might feel that of the two conceivable courses that might be taken it would be best to jump in and smash Germany, but that he still felt that it would be wiser to join with England, Italy and the United States in taking a firm but equitable position as regards disarmament along the lines of the conversations of last June. Certainly, delay which he felt the Germans were seeking, would play right into their hands. Personally, Mr. Davis felt that any effort to crush Germany would in the long run defeat itself. Doubtless France could now gain an easy military victory but you could not exterminate 65,000,000 Germans and a military victory would only create fresh problems and be no permanent solution. If on the other hand an effective system of control could be established and a transition period allowed for checking up the situation France would seem, in the long run, to have accomplished more toward securing its position than by any other course. Naturally, a decision as to France's future conduct was one of such
momentous importance to them that no one would be justified in assuming the responsibility of trying to tell France how she should settle the problem. Mr. Davis suggested that a good many people felt that Hitlerism had been in part created by the long delay of the other powers in taking steps in disarmament.

M. Daladier said that he did not feel that such was really the case. Hitlerism had come as a result of inflation in Germany which had rendered the middle class and the small bourgeoisie helpless and in many cases completely impoverished them. Thus instead of being the bulwark of democratic institutions this class had been a ready material for the Hitler propaganda based on an appeal to selfish nationalism. His whole policy in France had been to protect and strengthen the small bourgeoisie.

Mr. Davis stated that he had had a brief talk with Captain Eden following the latter's conference the day before with M. Daladier and M. Paul-Boncour and had gained the impression that Captain Eden was both satisfied and encouraged by his conference. M. Daladier said that he also had received a favorable impression from the stand taken by Captain Eden who had seemed disposed to take a more helpful attitude in the matter of supervision and control. In return for that, M. Daladier had thrown out encouragement to Captain Eden, that he might be able to go even somewhat farther in the matter of eventual reduction than had been indicated at the time of the June conversations. He reemphasized, however, that while France was prepared to take a definite commitment to carry through substantial measures of disarmament this was contingent upon a test period during which Germany's intentions and actions in the matter of
armaments would be subject to examination. He was convinced that a disarmament treaty was the only possible solution and he was absolutely firm in his resolve to work toward that despite the obvious political difficulties involved for any government in following such a course. He agreed with Mr. Davis in the desirability of agreement between France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States as to their position with respect to Germany and the disarmament treaty. If Germany then refused and the Disarmament Conference failed he would take steps and would ask for an immediate appropriation of one billion francs. M. Daladier said that in order to get the French people to accept the idea of a disarmament treaty it would be necessary to have,- he would not call it a guarantee,- but at least some form of assurance of moral support from England and the United States as to their position in the event that Germany was shown up as patently violating the terms of the treaty through rearming. The mere right to denounce the treaty in that event would not be sufficient as Germany might already have gotten too long a lead. He appreciated that this was a difficult problem particularly for us. He greatly appreciated the work which Mr. Davis had done in the matter of disarmament and the stand which the President had taken as expressed by Mr. Davis had been of the greatest possible help in bringing the British to a more reasonable position. In this connection Mr. Davis said that the American position in this general connection had been set forth in the speech which he had made last May.

Mr. Davis told M. Daladier of his talk with Ramsay MacDonald before he returned to America in June when he had told the British Prime Minister that he felt the
French position in the matter of supervision and control was logical and necessary and that Great Britain should be the last one to desire France to disarm unless there could be assurance through the system of supervision that Germany was not preparing to strike at her after she had taken steps in disarmament.

M. Daladier said in the strictest confidence he could not fully understand the British hesitation on this point. What would be the British position if by any chance France and Germany should enter into an agreement. After all, there were no serious territorial questions separating them. Austria was more Italian than a French problem, the Corridor a Polish problem. France and Germany if they wish could divide up Continental Europe. Obviously this was not his policy, but the British should realize the inherent danger which might exist if France should ever be forced to adopt any such policy. After all, France had either to make her peace directly with Germany or obtain the greatest possible measure of protection against being overrun by Germany. England should realize this situation and do its share to help.

Mr. Davis said that in view of Captain Eden's return to London to report to the British Cabinet, he assumed that no further conversations would be held until the British answer was forthcoming. He would therefore keep in touch with M. Paul-Boncour and hold himself in readiness to meet with the French or with the British and the French at such time.
As we were leaving M. Baladier said that he would like to show us something that he had obtained that he was going to send to President Roosevelt. He walked to a corner where he picked up a sabre beautifully worked with an American eagle on the grip as well as a shield containing fifteen stars and the monogram 'W'. M. Baladier explained he had obtained this in a small town in Alsace where there had been more than a century ago a very famous shop for the production of weapons of this type. The sword had undoubtedly been ordered for General Washington but whether by him or by the officers who accompanied Lafayette could not be verified as the records had been destroyed in the years of the Revolution. It was possible, M. Baladier stated, that the sword was not sent because of the death of President Washington or because of the disorders in France at that time.

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Memorandum of conversation on September 19th, Paris. Present were M. Paul-Boncour, M. Massigli, Mr. Norman Davis, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Paul-Boncour began by stating that France had not changed its attitude as revealed in the conversations in June and he was anxious to know whether there was any modification of the American position. Mr. Davis replied that not only was there no modification but that as a result of numerous and lengthy conversations which he had had with President Roosevelt on the subject he could say that the President is even more interested than ever in disarmament and most desirous that something should be accomplished of a definite nature. Mr. Davis stated that he had told the President that he understood there was some impression in Europe that due to his immersion in internal affairs the Government of the United States was thinking along nationalistic lines and not interested in international questions - such as disarmament - and that the President had authorized him to state that such was not the case and that never before had he been so convinced of the necessity for success of the Disarmament Conference.

M. Paul-Boncour expressed himself as very satisfied with this news. He added that though the French thesis had not changed from the June conversations the French were more than ever convinced of the necessity for a trial period. They were firmly convinced that Germany is now rearming and at a speed much greater than the world dreams of. They are assured of this not only from French sources but from German socialists and in fact from all members of the Second International. Since, therefore, the state of affairs in Germany is such it is essential that the trial period be set up and this is the irreducible demand of the French. They will make definite commitments as to serious reduction to take place after the trial period provided the parties to the treaty
live up to their contract. This program should give the Germans satisfaction in several respects. In the first place the control will be on all states alike therefore discrimination disappears. In the second place, during the trial period the transformation of the Reichsheer will be accompanied by the reduction of effective and disappearance of professional formations in other armies. Further they will have definite commitments on the part of other powers for reductions, and substantial reductions, in material to take place at fixed periods after the trial period. Mr. Davis replied first with the suggestion that we adopt another name for the trial period which would be a more accurate indication of what it was to be and also less objectionable to Germany and suggested “transition period.” To this M. Paul-Boncour acquiesced as he himself had thought the phrase “trial period” objectionable.

Referring to the essential nature of the French desire to obtain a trial period to the treaty, M. Paul-Boncour said that if France could not win the consent of the other states to such a provision they would have no alternative but to demand either through the Disarmament Conference or through Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, an investigation of the present status of German armaments. He recognized that such action would probably cause the break up of the Disarmament Conference and perhaps the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations but they could not tolerate that present conditions continue.

Mr. Davis then said he felt there were two courses open now. However, the United States not being in such an exposed position, did not wish to accept the responsibility of offering advice. The first possibility was in trying to crush Germany at once. While France could easily overrun Germany she could not destroy the German people and the whole situation would have to be refigured and it would not be a permanent solution. The other pathway lay along
the lines of establishing a treaty which must be fair but
which at the same time must be firm. This treaty would pro-
vide for such definite control that the fear and uncertainty
which now exists would be thereby eliminated. The justice
of the treaty would, Mr. Davis hoped, appeal to the reason-
able elements in Germany and make it more difficult for the
German Government to preach any mad program. In order to
reach such a treaty it seems essential that Great Britain,
France, Italy and the United States should find a program
which they consider just and reasonable; that they should
agree upon this program and lay it before Germany. The real
danger lay in procrastination wherein the present situation
could continue.

M. Paul Boncour said that he had told Mr. Henderson
this morning that members of the Second International, Mr.
Henderson's comrades, not French citizens, had yesterday
urged that the only course he could now pursue in view of
the speed with which Germany was rearming, was a preventative
war. M. Paul-Boncour stated that this was not his policy and
very definitely not the policy of France; that they had defi-
nitely decided their wisest course must be to obtain a treaty
of disarmament and that the only hope for peace in Europe lay
through the accomplishment of such a treaty.

M. Paul-Boncour brought out a point which troubled him.
It was perfectly feasible to provide that if the inspection
provided for revealed that Germany was violating the treaty
after it was signed, the obligations of the treaty would
naturally fall. This, however, was not sufficient since this
meant that a period of years might go by during which discus-
sion of violations might be carried on and the same speed of
rearmament continued by Germany. M. Paul-Boncour recognized
that the question was extremely difficult for both Great
Britain and the United States but thought that something would
have to be worked out as a greater penalty for violators than
a mere end of the obligations on the part of other members of the treaty. Mr. Davis replied that he had given a lot of thought to this but obviously any positive action on our part was out of the question. He had thought his declaration of our position on neutrality would have given the French much comfort on this question. M. Paul-Boncour replied very earnestly that such had been the case and that they thoroughly recognized and were gratified at our position in this connection but they had to work out somehow a more positive action to meet this eventuality.

It was apparent that M. Paul-Boncour felt that conversations on further detail could not be usefully carried on until the British had answered certain questions which the French had put to Eden. It was then decided that Massigli would keep in touch with Mr. Davis and that when replies had come through either Lord Tyrrell or through Eden further meetings would be arranged, possibly on Thursday.

Mr. Davis told M. Paul-Boncour that before leaving America the President had written him a very personal letter expressing certain thoughts on disarmament and had asked him in this letter to convey a message to M. Daladier. He thought that courtesy demanded that he convey the message first to M. Daladier, but would like to tell M. Paul-Boncour about it afterwards. M. Paul-Boncour requested Mr. Davis to return to the Foreign Office after that message had been presented to the Premier.

Immediately after the meeting with Daladier Mr. Davis returned and read to M. Paul-Boncour the President’s letter and postscript, having taken pains to explain that it was a very personal letter from the President to Mr. Davis and that, therefore, the views of the President were expressed with entire freedom and with no attempt at diplomatic phraseology. Mr. Paul-Boncour expressed his appreciation of the courtesy extended in acquainting him with this.
Dear Standley:

As you will know long before this reaches you, the Disarmament Conference has adjourned for ten days, to October 26. You, no doubt, know what is going on here through the Press and the despatches which have been sent to the State Department. I presume you get copies of these even though naval matters aren't mentioned. If you don't get them, it seems to me you ought to and no doubt Pickens can arrange with Moffett for you to see them.

Generally we work together in preparing these messages and both I and Colonel Strong are kept informed of what goes on. We have so far had free access to all going and coming despatches.

The Bureau, which is a sort of steering committee for the General Assembly, preparing matters for the General Assembly's consideration and action, met last Saturday. Sir John Simon then read the British Plan of disarmament - rearmament. Disarmament for all except Germany, a re-armament for Germany, so that at some period to come, parity, so to speak, would be reached. He provided in this plan something like eight years with the first for a control, or trial period of four years.

Mr. Davis followed saying we were in accord. The Italian, Sh. Di Soranga, followed with more accord. Paul Benoist (French) came next making a solid line up. The German representative, Baron Von Rheinbaben came along and all accord was off. He said his government wanted what had been promised - immediate disarmament - rearmament and that the Plan of Sir John was not in accord with that and that he would inform his Government of the British plan.

Then followed some more accords with the British plan in principle by Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Greece. The Bureau then adjourned with the statement that the British Plan would be presented to the General Assembly, Monday afternoon the 16th October for General Discussion.

You might be interested in knowing that the Bureau is made up of Delegates from the following countries: Allemagne, Argentine,
Anticoche, Belgique, Espagne, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, France, Grande-
Bretagne, Italie, Japon, Pologne, Suisse, Tchécoslovaquie, and U.S.S.R.
Mr. Henderson, President, presides over the Bureau, as well as the
General Assembly, and does the job well.

The afternoon, Saturday 14th, after the Bureau adjourned,
Sir A. Henderson received a despatch from the German Government,
which of course you know about, saying the German Govt., in view
of the new proposals was withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference.
That was a "Coup de Tonnerre" among the Delegates, and Geneva too.

The Big Four - U. S., G.B., Fr. and Italy, immediately
went into a huddle of conversations, working - talking - planning,
long and hard. It looked for a while as though all of us would be
on our way home in a day or so. However, every effort was made to
keep the conference going. It would never do for anyone country
to break it up - too much progress toward "real dis-armament" had
already been made.

Saturday afternoon way over to two o'clock Sunday morning,
then from eleven Sunday until late Sunday night conversations went
on. The Delegates of the four countries doing practically all of
the conversing.

Monday, yesterday morning word came that the Bureau
would meet at three in the afternoon and the General Assembly
at four. Rumor was that the Bureau would tell the Assembly that
an adjournment for ten days was now in order.

Well, the Bureau was seventeen minutes only late in
meeting. When they met, Sir Arthur Henderson announced that the
proposal, in view of the German action was an adjournment for
ten days, then to meet again. He asked for objections, if any.
The Spaniard was the only one to speak up and he asked what were
we going to meet for after the ten days? Mr. Henderson took the
trouble, "hid a bit of laughter from the left wing, to say they
hoped then to accomplish something.

Mr. Henderson read also a proposed despatch in reply
to Germany's withdrawal and if no objections, he would send that
in for approval of the General Committee. No objection, not even
the Spaniard had anything to say. Bureau then adjourned.

The Assembly met at 4:10, only ten minutes late. Standley,
as an aside, I want to say here that it would be a cinch to fight
a fleet manned by diplomats - the battle would be over before they
began to fight.

- 2 -
In the assembly the proposed adjournment went over big. The proposed reply to Germany didn't have such easy going.

The Hungarian Delegate was not pleased with the ending "I regret therefore that this grave decision should have been taken by your Government for reasons which I am unable to accept as valid". He objected to the tone of it. The Russian Delegate said a few people were running the whole show and that he, for one, was not kept sufficiently informed as to what was going on. Turkey objected to lack of information and didn't care to sign on the dotted line and wasn't for sending such an answer. Poland thought she was not sufficiently consulted but didn't seem to register much objection. No others had anything to say, whereupon Sir A. Henderson said in view of lack of objections the message would be sent. Some hand clapping and some laughter.

The Assembly adjourned to 26th October.

Quite a number of the Delegates and their assistants have gone home - to Paris, Rome, London, etc. We are having our regular 0830 meetings and talking over the outlook. Mr. Davis seems to think, and certainly hopes, that after the German elections - 12 November - something worth while will be done. Not very much before then. Looks to me like another adjournment on 26 October.

Wilkinson is here and we have been holding conversations with the British - R. Adm. Bellairs, Comdr. Belbon and Lt.Comdr. Brenner. We are working for status-quo at least until 1935 conference. Have met the Japanese, R. Aemuril, and so far he is something like we found Vice Admiral Hyakubaker upon his arrival in Los Angeles harbor. No smiles, a very serious world and as there is no Hollywood hereabout I am not sure I am going to get this R. Admiral to thaw out. However, I am to see him and have a "conversation".

This is a very expensive place in which to live and so far nothing much to see but the lake, plenty monuments and some very pretty parks. The "adjournments" have no appeal for me. We have to stick around for anything which may turn up.

With best wishes for every good thing for the Chief of Naval Operations - and family, too, in which Mrs. Leigh joins.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) R. H. LEIGH.
Geneva, Switzerland.
9 October 1933.

Dear Standley:

We arrived here Saturday evening, the seventh, after a very pleasant passage from New York to Havre and a couple of days stop over in Paris.

As you know we crossed on the Washington, commanded by George Freid, who was my Quartermaster when I was Navigator of the New York. He saw that we were well cared for.

In Paris we saw quite a good deal of Le Breton and he helped materially to get us about there.

When we arrived here Colonel Strong met us at the station and smoothed our way so we had no difficulty in getting through the Customs and to this hotel where most of the American Delegation are located.

Sunday morning I saw Mr. Davis and found him very much interested in the 10,000 ton six inch cruiser controversy. He said that Sir John Simon had sent the "Aide Memoire" to the U.S. on his own responsibility, that Prime Minister McDonald did not know about it. As a matter of fact, Mr. McDonald first heard of it through Mr. Davis!

This morning - Monday - we had our first official gathering at nine-thirty. The American Delegation will meet at that time every morning except Sunday from now on.

At the meeting this morning were:

Mr. Davis, Presiding
Mr. Wilson (Minister to Switzerland)
Mr. Mayer (Secretary to above)
Mr. Pell, Assistant to Mr. Davis
Mr. Dulles " " 
Mr. Reiker " " 
Col. Strong - U. S. Army
Major Goetz - Assistant to Col. Strong
and myself.
Major Coetz is Military Attaché at Berlin but is here with Colonel Strong during the Conference. He was here in that capacity last year. So Strong has an Aide.

The question discussed this morning was reorganization of the Continental European Armies.

The general plan is a reduction of personnel and equipment on the basis of 25% a year plus to a certain minimum to be reached in six to eight years - time yet to be determined but probably not less than six, nor more than eight years.

Abolition of bombardment aviation - reduction of airplanes.

Nothing definite reached but a general discussion along above lines.

Mr. Davis had a long talk yesterday with Mr. Motalny, the present Chairman of the German Delegation. Mr. N. told Mr. Davis that, as the U. S. was in a neutral position on this Continental-European Army question that he, Mr. Davis, holds a unique position and should be a power in helping bring about an agreement.

I have met Rear-Admiral Bellairs, the British Naval Adviser, and like him. He feels that Continental-European Army disarmament is the question before the Conference and that our job is watch in case anything affecting the Navy comes up.

Already there is talk of something being done under Article 33 of the Draft Convention - making a preliminary study re reduction in the sizes of vessels of war in the various categories, to have something for the 1935 Conference. He thinks in this way a limit could be placed on the size of E.E. France and Italy could lay down prior to '35. Of course, I know what is back of it all and am perfectly willing to talk with him and get his views. Whatever comes up when we get down to actually doing something the Navy Department will be kept fully informed. No commitments, of course, without reference to you.
I will write you personally from time to time to keep you informed, knowing that your judgment as to what I have to say re confidential matters will be of the best. I mean you will know just what to keep to yourself, and of course, the Secretary.

Everything is going smoothly so far tho I see Mr. Davis wants to give in on the size of B.B.s, if it comes to a show down. Of course, that question will not come up in the draft convention proper, but a study of it as provided in Article 33 may, and doubtless will, come up. I have the General Board's opinion on Article 33, as outlined on page 300 of the Gray Book - that is my guide.

I hope everything is going well with you in Washington and throughout the Navy. We have had rain here so far, cold and uncomfortable weather but I am assured that it will not last.

Mrs. Leigh joins me in best to Mrs. Standley and you.

Please keep me advised of any matters you think should be brought to my attention here.

Very sincerely,

(Signed) R. M. Leigh.
December 26, 1933.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to our recent telephone conversation I have endeavored to give a brief analysis of the disarmament situation and I have also added to this, for your consideration, something which I think it might be useful for you to say.

It occurs to me that in connection with any statement on disarmament it might be well for you to say something about the naval building program which has been so misunderstood in certain quarters. I would, therefore, suggest for your consideration that you say something to the following effect:

'Until there is a general disarmament agreement or until there is a modification in the existing Treaty for Naval Limitation I have deemed it wise to keep up our naval strength, but well within the limits of the Treaty. We shall, nevertheless, be glad to consider with the naval powers still further reductions in the present naval limitations.'

I now plan to get to Washington on next Thursday morning and hope to see you some time during the day.

With warm regards, I am,

Faithfully yours,
At the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva we have played an active role and have endeavored in every proper way to achieve success. Progress has been slow for, although all countries have recognized the menace to international peace and the drain on world economy, of excessive armaments, they have hesitated to reduce them because of fear. Anything that lessens the danger of attack or that reduces the power of offense in case of attack, and correspondingly strengthens the power of defense, serves to diminish this sense of fear and insecurity. With this in mind, I telegraphed on May 15th to the Chiefs of State of all nations suggesting an agreement to abolish all weapons of peculiarly offensive power and also a general pact whereby, subject to treaty rights and limitations, no nation should move its armed forces across its own frontiers. With these two propositions I still hold.

On October 14th Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and soon thereafter from the League of Nations. Since then the discussions have centered in two fields. In the one, which is peculiarly European in scope and involves considerations of a primarily European character, we are not participants. In the other, however, which is universal in aspect and concerns measures of disarmament, we have constantly taken part and shall continue to exert our full effort towards ultimate success.

While the effort to secure agreement for a general reduction and limitation in armaments has received what many regard as a serious set-back, it may well be that the recent crisis in the disarmament negotiations may prove to be a stepping stone to a later agreement. It forces a choice between two courses, one leading to another race in armaments and war, the other to a limitation in armaments and peace. Surely the disastrous experience of the last War, from which the world has not yet recovered, should have a determining effect in preventing such a recurrence.

While some governments may still be pursuing policies which do not promote peace, and while manufacturers of armaments in certain countries may be fomenting international discord and strife, from which they expect to profit, the peoples of the world are becoming more and more averse to war and more than ever desirous of peace. The peoples, who so earnestly desire peace, know instinctively that rivalry in armaments is a sure road to war. They also know that if the states of the world should recognize by Covenant that armaments are of mutual concern and are no longer based alone upon autonomous decisions, mutual suspicion will be diminished and good neighborliness will be increased. I am persuaded that public opinion will continue to press governments towards this happy issue.
It is certain that Herriot will bring up as soon as possible the question of security on the continent of Europe and that our willingness or unwillingness to cooperate in a general security plan may be used as an important trading weapon. It seems advisable that the United States agree:

1. To consult its co-signers of the Kellogg Pact in case of a violation of the Pact or a threat of violation.

2. That if the continental European powers agree among themselves upon special measures for maintaining or guaranteeing peace in continental Europe and for determining and taking collective action against a continental State responsible for a breach of peace, or of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the United States should agree to refrain from any action and to withhold protection from any of our citizens engaged in action which would tend to defeat the collective action upon which the European States may have decided. Such withholding of action by us to be predicated upon our own entirely independent decision that the allegedly aggressor State in question has in fact been responsible for the breach of the peace.
GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Geneva, June 4, 1934.

DELEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

My dear Mr. President:

As I shall be going to London for the naval conversations about the time you receive this letter, I wish to raise certain points about which I will want your guidance and instructions.

As I have cabled to the Secretary, it is my opinion that we must be careful not to be jockeyed into a position of conducting, for an indefinite period, only bilateral discussions because this gives the British too much of a chance to act as broker between the Japanese and ourselves. This role is an old one which they have learned to play very well. I think, however, that we will be able to deal with this when the time comes.

I understand the Japanese first want to discuss the time and the place for the 1935 Conference. I think it better for us to take the position that this would be putting the cart before the horse because it is essential that we first ascertain whether it is possible to agree upon

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
certain fundamentals and thus have a reasonable assurance of the successful outcome of the Conference.

Assuming that we reach the stage of fixing the place and time for the Conference, it is well to bear in mind the following considerations. The two naval conferences which resulted in a treaty were held in Washington and London and the Japanese will, therefore, no doubt make a strong effort to have the next one in Tokyo. We will be unable to reach an agreement unless the Japanese reduce their present pretentions and give in on the question of ratio, and it would undoubtedly be easier for them to give in in Tokyo than elsewhere because, if the Conference is held there, they would have every incentive to make it a success, and would be better able to get their public opinion to accept the concessions necessary to bring about agreement. Furthermore, it would have a tendency to bring the Japanese mind more into contact with the Western world and probably curb the present trend of going so entirely oriental.

If, however, we should be willing to concede to the Japanese this point of the place for the Conference, we must make it really count for something and should play it accordingly, keeping it absolutely secret until the proper moment.

There are, of course, reasons why we would naturally prefer to have the Conference in Washington, but, since in the Japanese mind there is the feeling that they
were out-traded in Washington, I am inclined to think they
would agree to this only under pressure.

On the other hand, if the developments should
be such as to require a more complete naval agreement, includ-
ing all the powers concerned, to be tied into a general dis-
armament program, it would mean that, besides England, Japan,
France, Italy and ourselves, Germany, Sweden, Holland, Spain,
Turkey, Jugoslavia and Russia should be invited to attend
the Conference, in which case Tokyo might be out of the ques-
tion. It might be deemed necessary, in view of such a large
conference, to hold it in Geneva where there would be the
machinery of the League for handling the technical side of
the work.

There are some over here who have suggested
that it would be well to have the Naval Conference in Rome,
on the theory that this would help bring Italy and France in-
to the next treaty and would give Mussolini some sugar.

The French want it in Paris but that seems to
me to be out of the question because the French press would
be almost sure to kill it.

While I think the British are still feeling
their way, as they are disturbed over the political trend in
Europe, and while there are certain Tories who would favor a
closer affiliation with Japan, I am satisfied that the Brit-
ish Government and the Dominions,—as well as their people,—
would never be willing to go so far in that direction as to
interfere in any fundamental way with a closer cooperation
with us, particularly with regard to naval matters.

One thing that disturbs me is that, until there is some solution of the Japanese position on the Chinese mainland, there is not a very sound basis for a real solution of our political relations with Japan which, after all, affect the naval situation. The most logical solution would be an agreement between China and Japan. I think that the Japanese would, as a last resort, agree to renew the Treaty substantially as it is, without any modifications in the ratio, provided the British and ourselves would enter into a pact of non-aggression with them. On the other hand, I do not see how we could well do that so long as they continue to penetrate China and do things in flagrant violation of treaties which we have already signed with them. They simply cannot have it both ways. I also doubt the wisdom of our entering into limited treaties of non-aggression. I think that the constructive way to do this would be as a supplement to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and a General Disarmament Convention.

With warmest regards, I am,

As ever, Sincerely yours,

[N Name]

NHD: EH
My dear Mr. President:

It is not possible as yet to tell where we are going to end up in our disarmament efforts. I think, however, that I have given in my cables to the Department of State, a fairly clear account of the situation and the various currents and counter-currents.

The crux of the problem is to get Germany back into the negotiations, which I now feel is possible provided we can agree upon a means of doing so which would not be humiliating to Germany and provided that France and England can be brought into agreement as to what concessions will be made to Germany and what limitations will be placed upon her.

It has taken some days to get at the bottom of the Anglo-French tension that has developed. I am now satisfied, however, that it is primarily due to the British refusal to make an out-and-out alliance with France. Eden told me very confidentially last night that they had practically told the French a few weeks ago that they would be

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
willing to guarantee the execution of a disarmament agreement provided there were a real program for disarmament, although the actual disarmament might not begin for several years, and that he thought this was the only way short of war to keep German rearmament within reasonably safe limits. He said that the French then said that they would not agree to any disarmament short of an Anglo-French alliance, which the British refused.

As a result of that the French pride was hurt and they proceeded to run to cover in the direction of a combination between Russia, France, the Little Entente, Poland and the Balkan states, with the idea that if Germany could be induced to come in it could be made into an Eastern Locarno, but if not it would be a combination against Germany. I still believe that their principal idea was that they would thus bring indirect pressure on England to change her mind and form an Anglo-French alliance.

I am afraid, however, that France is playing too much into the hands of Litvinoff, who knows so well what he wants and how to go about getting it that he is going to lead them into all sorts of trouble. The net effect of such an arrangement, if it is effected, would be that France and her allies will protect Russia in the rear in case of trouble with Japan and that Russia could never render any assistance to France against Ger-
man because the moment she should do so she would expose herself to an attack from Japan. However, while Litvinoff is terribly bitter towards the Germans and greatly mistrusts them, for which he has real justification, and while he therefore is not interested in getting Germany back to the Conference now, at least until he gets what he wants from France while she is so scared, he does want peace. He has asked me to lunch with him today and I will find out some more then.

Dodd writes me from Berlin, and I am also informed through other channels, that the Germans would like very much to find a graceful way to return to a participation in the negotiations. One German has just told me that they would like to have me come to Berlin to help find a way, which I told him I could not do, or to have the United States request Germany to return to the Conference.

However, the situation seems to be shaping itself to where they may all ask us to use our good offices to get Germany back and to reconcile the differences between England, France and Germany which have been reduced and crystallized in the French note of January 1, to Germany, the British Memorandum of January 29, and the German note of April 16, to the British. While the situation is difficult and dangerous it is not yet by any means hopeless. While it would seem impossible to get an actual agreement just now there is a possibility of
agreeing upon a basis of negotiation which would make it possible to get an agreement in September or October.

With warm regards I am, as ever,

Sincerely yours,
June 13, 1934.

Dear Mr. President:

I doubt whether it will ever be possible for you to find time to look over the enclosures, which pertain in a general way to one of the matters you mentioned Sunday evening.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

P.S. Walter More
PROHIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF ARMS, ETC., TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, my purpose is to draw attention to a measure soon to be taken up for consideration by the House. It is a joint resolution, unanimously reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and as it is brief, I ask permission to append it to my remarks. The resolution declares in favor of the general policy of prohibiting the exportation to any nation at war with another nation of arms, munitions, or implements of war. The policy as declared is not applicable to a condition of civil war within a nation, but to a war between or among nations.

As the intention is to prevent any American citizen or interest from aiding or abetting a belligerent by directly or indirectly supplying it the articles in question, I can see that it would be wise to amend the resolution by going beyond the use of the mere term "exportation," so as to set forth the intent more definitely and deal more effectively with the evil which is designed to be remedied. I feel confident that to this end the committee will offer a perfecting amendment.

Whenever foreign nations embark in war the President issues a proclamation announcing that our Government will stand neutral. There is no statute requiring this, but it is done in accordance with the practice initiated at the beginning and which no President would now think of disregarding. The resolution provides that upon such a proclamation being made it shall forthwith be unlawful to export or attempt to export from this country to any belligerent the materials or implements of war specified in the resolution. A violation of the prohibition is made punishable by both fine and imprisonment in the penitentiary.

Of course, Congress would retain authority to remove the ban generally or in any particular instance, without any expression to that effect, but it was thought wise to advertise to the world, in some quarters of which our system is not understood, that Congress possesses such authority, and conceivably might exercise it in some appropriate case.

The committee spared no effort to enumerate carefully and exhaustively the things which are forbidden to be exported. In the enumeration is the list of articles some time ago formulated at Geneva, and to that list are added tanks and armored cars, aircraft meant for warfare, poisonous gases and acids, and there is an inclusive reference
reference to any other articles or inventions prepared for use in warfare.

Our Government and people earnestly wish to do whatever is possible to make an end of war and, short of that, to minimize its scope and activities. Nevertheless, we regretfully confess that since the armistice was signed much less of a practical nature has been accomplished in that direction than is universally desired. The resolution proceeds on the theory that whatever may be the attitude of other nations in respect to the desirability of a more peaceful world, a plain duty attaches to our own undeniable attitude. In its spirit it is antagonistic to war as a legitimate method of settling international disputes, and on the contrary it breathes the very spirit of peace. It does not stop with the employment of words voicing a belief and hope, but in at least one broad field of opportunity it concretely substitutes the obligation to discourage war in the place of continuing a right of traffic which inevitably encourages and supports war. To that extent, it really outlaws war. It construes the commandment "thou shalt not kill" so as to pledge ourselves not to assist the inhabitants of one nation in the business of killing the inhabitants of another nation. It is not designed to make any American his brother's keeper, but it is designed to prevent him from being an accessory to his brother's injury or murder.

I should not omit to say that the principle of the resolution had its origin with the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (MR. BURTON). On the first day of the present session Mr. BURTON offered a resolution providing against the exportation of the instrumentalities of war to any aggressor nation making war on another nation in violation of its treaty obligations. To this there were two objections: First, that it is often difficult to determine which of two nations is really the aggressor; and, second, that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether treaty obligations have been violated. Furthermore, the committee, after much deliberation, were convinced that a full step should be taken instead of a partial and uncertain step, and so the resolution was framed free of the limitation originally attached.

There is a powerful argument in favor of the proposal deductible from our own history and the provisions of existing statutes. Neutrality is the most progressive branch of international law, but the progress was not swift or sure until this Government was founded. It was
the action of our Government in its earliest days which established, or, if not that, courageously defined and enforced the doctrine that a nation should remain neutral toward nations at war with each other. The service rendered the world by Washington in applying that doctrine is one of his many great contributions to the welfare of mankind and throughout the subsequent period there has been steady adherence by this Nation to the principle of neutrality. That principle will be logically and wisely extended by the enactment of this resolution. But there is something else: During that period statutes have been passed and are now in effect extending the doctrine of Government neutrality to our citizens within a certain sphere of action. These statutes, which need not be detailed, forbid citizens under heavy penalties to enter the war service of a foreign nation with which we are at peace; to fit out expeditions in this country for participation or assisting in carrying on war against a nation with which we are at peace, and from furnishing equipment to the naval vessels of a belligerent nation entering any of our ports. These statutes command our citizens to observe a measure of neutrality. What we are now asking is that their complete neutrality shall be insured. We ask for a statute to penalize the exploitation from this country and the intention is to penalize the sale in this country for the direct and indirect use of a belligerent of the primary means of warfare. Under the operation of the law whose enactment is asked, the United States would hereafter cease to be a reservoir from which belligerent nations might obtain a supply of the agencies of bloodshed and destruction. No one disapproves the Government itself standing neutral. No one disapproves compelling the citizens to be neutral to the extent provided by the statutes mentioned. That being the situation, how can anyone reasonably combat the proposition that neutrality to the extent contemplated by this resolution, should be enjoined on the citizen?

Should it be argued that the proposal is a radical departure from the prevailing practice in the Old World, as well as here, the reply is that war has taken on a more serious aspect because of its increasingly destructive character and that any expedient is justified, even though it may be considered radical, which gives any promise of preventing or diminishing the evils of war.

Should it be argued that to stop the traffic in the manner proposed might lead the nations of the Old World, recognizing their inability to obtain war supplies here, to incur more expense in accumulating them for use in case
of need, the reply is that what they may do in that direction is their own business, and an additional reply is that it is more probable, since no belligerent will be able to look to this country for assistance in carrying on war, that the law would result in greater exertion being made by the nations across the sea to reduce expenditures in preparing for war by the limitation of armaments and otherwise.

Should it be argued that to stop the traffic in the manner proposed might slow down the manufacture of war material necessary for our own use in the event of being brought into war, the reply is that the most competent and wealthy nation on earth is not entitled to depend on keeping itself prepared by facilitating in times of peace the destruction of people who for some reason have been doomed to suffer the horrors of armed conflict. The manufacture of war supplies in the United States is not an infant industry requiring protection at the expense of unfortunate people of other nations. And it certainly does not deserve protection for the purpose of any person or group being enabled to profit from a traffic which can not be thought of otherwise than as the most sordid species of homicide—homicide for a money consideration.

Should it be argued that if the law is enacted and then in some instance Congress, in order to save a weak nation from cruel injustice, or possibly in order to safeguard the interests of this country, should lift the embargo in its application to some belligerent, our Government might be charged with practically waging war against the adversary belligerent, the reply is that we are strong enough to risk any such possibility, and that we must not forever take counsel of our apprehension and fears if we are to exert ourselves effectively for the promotion of peace.

Long ago a question was asked about priority in the matter of individual greatness, and the answer was:

"Whosoever will be the chief among you, let him be the servant of all." This conception is as true of nations as of individuals. It is the ability and willingness of our Nation to serve which marks its greatness. The measure which I have discussed can work no detriment to our own interests, but by its enactment we can perform our duty of rendering some service to humanity. [Applause.]

Mr. DENISON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOORE
Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Yes.

Mr. DENISON. Does this resolution referred to by the gentleman from Virginia prohibit the importation of these same articles into this country by neutrals?

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. No; it does not.

Mr. DENISON. Does not the gentleman think it ought to, in order to be consistent?

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Personally I would have no objection to that at all, though I do not think it of practical consequences because it would be very rarely the case that any importations would be desired.

Mr. DENISON. If our country should get into war with some other nation, the tendency would be for neutrals to want to send their war supplies to our country. If by law we are going to prohibit our citizens from selling war supplies in other countries, ought we not also to prohibit the citizens of other countries from selling war supplies in our country?

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I think the gentleman's suggestion is well worth consideration. I think we should put the bars up just as far as possible against traffic that makes for the promotion of war.

Mr. DENISON. We at least ought to impose the same prohibition on the citizens of other countries that we seek to impose upon the citizens of our own country.

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. So far as we can reach the citizens of other countries, or reach the citizens of this country.

Mr. DENISON. We can reach the citizens of other countries by prohibiting the import as well as the export.

Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We can. It is a point which deserves to be thought about.

The resolution referred to is as follows:

H. J. Res. 183,
Mr. BURTON introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed. January 30, 1938, referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Joint resolution to prohibit the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war to belligerent nations.

Resolved, etc., That it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States of America to prohibit the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war to any nation which is engaged in war with another.

SEC. 2. Whenever the President recognizes the existence of war between foreign nations by making proclamation of the neutrality of the United States, it shall be unlawful, except by the consent of the Congress, to export or attempt to export any arms, munitions, or implements of war from any place in the United States or any possession thereof, to the territory of either belligerent or to any place if the ultimate destination of such arms, munitions, or implements of war is within the territory of either belligerent or any military or naval force of either belligerent.

SEC. 3. As used in this joint resolution the term "arms, munitions, or implements of war" means—

1. Rifles, muskets, carbines.
2. (a) Machine guns, automatic rifles, and machine pistols of all calibers; (b) mountings for machine guns; (c) interrupter gears.
3. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated in Nos. 1 and 2 above.
4. Gun-sighting apparatus, including aerial gun sights and bomb sights, and fire-control apparatus.
5. (a) Cannon, long or short, and howitzers, of a caliber less than 5 9/10 inches (15 centimeters); (b) cannon, long or short, and howitzers, of a caliber of 5 9/10 inches (15 centimeters) or above; (c) mortars of all kinds; (d) gun carriages, mountings, recuperators, accessories for mountings.
6. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated in No. 5 above.
7. Apparatus
7. Apparatus for the discharge of bombs, torpedoes, depth charges, and other kinds of projectiles.
8. (a) Grenades; (b) bombs; (c) land mines, submarine mines, fixed or floating; depth charges; (d) torpedoes.
9. Appliances for use with the above arms and apparatus.
11. Tanks and armored cars; aircraft designed for purposes of warfare.
12. Arms and ammunition not specified in the above enumeration prepared for use in warfare.
13. Poisonous gases, acids, or any other articles or inventions prepared for use in warfare.
14. Component parts of the articles enumerated above if capable of being used in the assembly or repair of the said articles or as spare parts.

SEC. 4. Whoever exports or attempts to export any arms, munitions, or implements of war in violation of the provisions of this resolution shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to report any such violation of the provisions of this resolution to the United States district attorney for the district wherein the violation is alleged to have been committed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I hesitate a little about this. There is no question that Great Britain and other nations have exploited Persia in the past to a disgusting degree — oil, etc. I do not know enough about the Islands and the Gulf to form any final opinion, but I should hesitate to have us get into the position before the world of apparently upholding concessions given to Great Britain and other foreign nations when Persia was completely helpless.

Perhaps we might discuss it a little further.

F. D. R.

Arms Traffic Convention as it affects Persia.
My dear Mr. President:

In advising and consenting on June 15 to the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 the Senate adopted the following reservation:

"Resolved that such adherence to this Treaty shall not be construed to deny any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or the waters thereof."

This action was taken at the instance of the Persian Minister in Washington who, despite the fact that he had been fully advised on several occasions that such a reservation was unacceptable, conferred with one or more members of the Senate and induced the passage of the reservation over the objections of the Department.

When the American Delegation at the Arms Conference at Geneva was informed of the adoption of the reservation, Mr. Wilson immediately telegraphed that in his opinion the reservation raised so many difficulties, both in respect to the negotiations at Geneva and in respect to international law, that he hoped you would consider whether the convention should

The President,

The White House.
should be ratified. Upon being requested to submit his further views, Mr. Wilson reported that authorities whom he had consulted in Geneva had expressed the opinion that the reservation would make the Persians even more difficult to deal with than they were at present. He also suggested the desirability of consulting the French and British Governments with respect to their attitude toward the reservation.

After consultation with the Foreign Office, the Embassy at London telegraphed that although the British authorities felt that the reservation had no substantial significance they feared it would encourage the Persian Government in its allegedly preposterous claim to certain islands in the Persian Gulf and would render more difficult the proper policing of the Gulf waters. Subsequently the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, acting under instructions from London, called twice at the Department to inquire into the reasons for the reservation. Although he was assured that neither the President nor the Senate had any intention of interfering with the status quo in the Persian Gulf or of taking any part in disputes with respect to territorial questions in that area, he stated that his Government continued to be concerned and feared that the Persians would stir up trouble unless this Government issued a clear statement that it did not support the Persian claim to sovereignty over the Gulf.

The French Government in expressing its attitude toward the reservation stated that on legal grounds it would be necessary
necessary for France, as the depositary of the Convention, to obtain the consent of all the signatory Powers. Fear was expressed that the consideration of this reservation by the signatory Powers would lead to further reservations which would indefinitely delay, if not actually prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.

From the point of view of our own interests mention should be made of the official Persian protest made to us with respect to a concession obtained by an American company for the development of petroleum resources in the Bahrein Islands. The Persians assert sovereignty over these Islands although they have not been in actual possession since 1783. The situation with respect to the ownership of these Islands has been thoroughly aired before the League of Nations and from our study of the relevant documents we see little if any basis for the Persian claim. We are fearful, however, that the Persians, encouraged by the Senate reservation, may use their naval forces to seize the tankers of the American company, or otherwise to hamper the company’s legitimate activities. In this connection, it should be mentioned that a bill has recently been introduced in the Persian Majlis authorizing the Persian naval forces to exercise control within a distance of twelve nautical miles of the Persian shore.

For convenient reference I enclose a memorandum setting forth the foregoing considerations in detail.
The situation is therefore that despite our earnest efforts at Geneva, London and Paris to obtain a favorable reaction to the Senate reservation, we have met with no success whatever, and it has become abundantly clear that it will be impossible to bring the Convention into force in the near future, if ever, as long as the reservation stands. In view of these circumstances, and bearing in mind the possible adverse effect which the reservation may have upon our interests in the Persian Gulf, I venture to recommend the desirability of returning the Convention in question to the Senate for its further advice and reconsideration of the reservation with reference to the Persian Gulf.

In making the foregoing recommendation I believe I should also advise you of the objectionable behavior of the Persian Minister in Washington, as exemplified not only by his negotiations with members of the Senate over the head of the Executive but also by the tone of his oral statements and notes, a copy of the latest of which is enclosed. With your approval, I contemplate replying to the Minister in the sense of the attached draft.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:
Memorandum dated August 11.
From Persian Minister, August 11, 1934;
Draft of Department's reply to Persian Minister.
Proposed Reply

to

Persian Minister
Sir:

I have received your communication of August 11, 1934, with further reference to the Geneva Arms Convention of 1925 and have noted with surprise its contents.

While this Government is at all times prepared to give careful consideration to the views, when properly presented, of the Persian Government, I regret to inform you that I cannot regard your present communication as merit[ing such consideration, in view not only of its general tone and tenor but also of the many misleading statements and the misstatements (which I will assume are not intentional) which it contains.]

Under the circumstances, therefore, I consider that

The Honorable
Ghaffar Khan Djalal,
Minister of Persia.
no useful purpose would be served by further discussion of the Arms Treaty with you on the basis of your present Note.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.
MEMORANDUM.

August 11, 1934.

In advising and consenting on June 15 to the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 the Senate adopted the following reservation:

"Resolved that such adherence to this Treaty shall not be construed to deny any right or sovereignty which the Kingdom of Persia may have in or to the Persian Gulf or the waters thereof."

The American delegation at the Arms Conference at Geneva was informed of the adoption of this reservation and Mr. Wilson immediately replied that in his opinion the reservation raised so many difficulties both in respect to the negotiations at Geneva and in respect to international law that he hoped the President would consider whether he should ratify. Upon the receipt of this telegram the Department requested Mr. Wilson to ascertain discreetly from persons in Geneva whose opinion might be of value the probable effect of ratification with the reservation (a) upon the time at which the Convention could become effective and (b) upon the negotiations then proceeding with a view to the inclusion in the general Disarmament Convention of provisions pertaining to the international traffic in arms.

Mr. Wilson replied that he had discussed the matter informally with certain authorities and that they had been of
the opinion that the effect of the reservation would be to make the Persians even more difficult to deal with than they were at present, and that their attitude would be stiffened by the knowledge that their cause had found support in the United States. Since the 1925 Convention provided that the French Government be the depositary of ratifications, Mr. Wilson suggested that it would be for that Government to decide whether the Senate reservation would necessitate consulting the other Powers which had already ratified the Convention, asking them whether they acceded to the Senate reservation. He therefore suggested that the Department consult with the French Government on this matter and with the British Government with respect to the political effects of the reservation. The Embassies at London and Paris accordingly were directed to take up the matter with the British and French authorities, respectively.

The Embassy at London consulted with the British Foreign Office early in July and telegraphed that the Foreign Office felt that the reservation had no substantial significance, but feared that its effect on the Persian Government would be to encourage the latter in its allegedly preposterous claim to islands on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf and would render more difficult the proper policing of the Gulf waters. The Foreign Office apparently felt that Great Britain's difficulties in dealing with the Persian Government would be greatly
greatly enhanced and it was unable to understand why the Senate adopted the reservation since the Convention impinged in no way on the sovereignty of Persia in her own territorial waters.

The Embassy at Paris reported that the French Foreign Office felt that on legal grounds it would be necessary for France, as the depository of the ratifications of the Convention, to obtain the consent to this reservation of all the other signatory parties. The French spokesman likewise feared that the consideration of special reservations of this kind might induce other Powers to make a great variety of reservations. Of course such an eventuality would indefinitely delay, if not entirely prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.

On July 12 the Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington called at the Department, under instructions from his Government, to make informal inquiry as to the background and reasons for the Senate reservation. The Counselor stated that the Foreign Office greatly feared that this development would complicate Anglo-Persian relations and render the Persians even more intractable than they were at present. The Counselor was assured that the ratification of the Convention with the reservation would not imply any intention on the part of either the President or the Senate to interfere with the status quo in the Persian Gulf or to take any part in disputes which had arisen or might arise with respect to rights to territory in that part of the world.
On August 2 the British Chargé d'Affaires again approached the Department on the same matter under instructions from his Government. The Chargé stated that his Government was still greatly concerned and feared that the reservation would cause them no end of trouble in dealing with the Persians unless they were able to point to a clear statement from the American authorities that the United States Government did not support Persia's claim to sovereignty over the Persian Gulf. He said that his Government had considered the possibility of an exchange of notes containing a statement along the above lines, but that it was hesitant to suggest such a procedure since it would prefer to have such a declaration come spontaneously from us.

The Persian Government has during the last few years set up a claim to the islands of Bahrain off the Arabian coast of the Gulf and to numerous other islands in those waters. The Persian claim was brought to the attention of the League of Nations in several notes which the Persian authorities addressed to the British Government, and the British replies to these notes were also furnished to the League. The Persians have not occupied the island of Bahrain since 1783, and the British contention is that the local Shaikh, who is in treaty relations with Great Britain, is an independent ruler and has been so for 150 years. Persian observations on this subject up to the present time do not appear to have invalidated the British statement.
Within the last two months, moreover, the Persian Government handed our Legation at Teheran a note of protest with respect to a petroleum concession which an American company is developing in the Bahrein Islands. In this protest the Persians stated that Bahrein was an integral part of Persia and that consequently the concession should have been obtained not from the local ruler but from the Persian authorities. This note is a clear indication of the extent to which the Persians are going in their endeavor to set up a claim to Bahrein and other territories in the Persian Gulf. Now that the Persians have a small navy in the Gulf we are fearful that they may attempt to seize some of the oil tankers of the American company. In this connection we have recently received word from Persia that a bill has been presented to the Persian Parliament delineating the Persian coastal waters at a distance of six nautical miles from the lowest ebb-tide and creating a second zone to be known as the "Persian naval controlling (patrolling) territory," where the Persian Government will assume the right to exercise control within a distance of twelve nautical miles from the lowest ebb-tide parallel to the Persian coasts. We also learn that the Persian Government recently instructed its Legation at Tokyo to warn the Japanese concern which purchases the first shipment of oil produced by the American company in Bahrein that it was buying such oil at its own peril inasmuch as it had been sold
illegally.

From the foregoing it is evident that the Persians are serious in their intentions of attempting to obtain sovereignty over the islands of Bahrain, and we believe that they will make use of the Senate reservation to justify any action they may take against the American company operating there.

To sum up, I note below the principal objections to ratification of the Convention with the existing reservation:

(1) Such reservation will have to be communicated by the French Government (the depositary of the Convention) to the other Powers which are signatory, with a view to obtaining their consent. Certain Powers, particularly the British, would undoubtedly refuse consent and other Powers might themselves endeavor to make further reservations. All of this would certainly delay, and probably even prevent, the coming into force of the Convention.

(2) Ratification of the Convention with the reservation will undoubtedly make more difficult the task of the British in policing the waters of the Persian Gulf and in controlling the arms traffic in that area.

(3) If the reservation is retained it will certainly encourage the Persians to press further for recognition of their claim to the islands of Bahrain, with resulting loss to the American company which has invested in good faith a large sum in the development of the petroleum resources of those islands. Indeed, the reservation may even encourage the Persians to take some high-handed action against the American company's
company's oil tankers operating in the Gulf.

Under the circumstances it is strongly recommended that steps be taken to eliminate the reservation before the Convention is ratified.
August 11, 1934.

Your Excellency:

In order to prepare a memorandum to serve as a reference for Your Excellency, I venture to put on record the principal points in the conversation which I had the honor of having with you last Thursday.

Your Excellency maintained that the object in ratifying the Convention of Geneva of 1925 without any reservation was, "to maintain the neutrality of the American Government in a dispute between the Persian Government and that of England, and afterwards, to proceed with drafting another convention with reference to the arms traffic, favorable to Persia; and that in case of making a reservation in favor of Persia, in order to maintain our neutrality we had to make the reservation in favor of England as well". Whereupon I pointed out that England does not have, and never has had, any coastal territory on any side of the Persian Gulf to give her a single claim of sovereign rights in the Persian Gulf.

For imperialistic motives she thrust herself in the Persian Gulf at the time when Persia was weak, forcing and inducing by all possible means, certain sheikhs along the Southern coast of the Gulf, and in the islands in the Gulf, to enter into treaty relations with her to the detriment of the sovereign rights of Persia. On the other hand, the territory all along the Northern coast, together with numerous islands
islands scattered throughout the Gulf, is Persian territory. Therefore, to give England any sovereign right, much less to put her on an equal footing with Persia, is wholly unjustifiable and incomprehensible; and to ratify a treaty which is purposely designed to encroach on Persian sovereign rights in the Persian Gulf, will show inexusable partiality to the imperialistic motives of England.

Furthermore, to put the Persian Gulf (more than half of its coast constituting Persian territory; with numerous islands scattered all over the Gulf, all properly organized, with customs houses established in all ports; with regular naval communication; and a navy of the most modern type to control the Gulf waters) on the same footing with the Red Sea (both coasts of which are inhabited by a semi-savage people, without proper authority, navy, or even customs houses) by placing it in a special zone, is not only a gross injustice but insulting to the Persian people and Government.

Such a crafty convention is made purposely, no doubt, to give England her desired ends. Knowing that the Persian Government would never submit to such a humiliation by signing the Convention in which the Persian Gulf is placed in a prohibited zone, and there being no other signatory power which may have an interest in the Persian Gulf or have a navy to control the arms traffic, this function and duty will automatically fall to the British Government, who will alone control the Persian Gulf under the pretension of having the mandate of all the Governments. Such humiliation has even been spared to the
African states such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, etc., which are exempted from the prohibited zone in the Geneva Convention.

A few weeks ago, when, under your suggestion, I discussed with Mr. Green the unjustifiability of putting the Persian Gulf in the prohibited zone, the latter remarked that it was necessitated and justified by the fact that the Southern coast is inhabited by semi-savage Arabs. Whereupon I observed, "Then why are the African coast and port of Alexandria not included in the zone?" Mr. Green replied that the Egyptian people are all civilized. When I proved to him that the scale of civilization of the Egyptian tribes, is lower than that of the inhabitants of the Southern coast of the Persian Gulf, Mr. Green observed that since the waters of the Alexandria port were under British control, there was no necessity for such a step. Thereupon I retorted, "Now we have touched the point! Wherever it is under British control, no matter how savage may be the inhabitants, it should be exempted from the prohibited zone; but wherever it is not already controlled by England, in order to place it under her domination, it should be included in the prohibited zone."

As I mentioned to you, in spite of the fact that Persia has in her possession all possible means of controlling the Gulf, Persia is ready to cooperate with England in controlling the arms traffic in the Gulf, on the condition that the Persian Gulf be removed from the prohibited zone.
The latest report from our representative at the League of Nations is to the effect that the League of Nations Committee, including the American representative, voted for the revision of the Geneva Convention. They also made certain alterations in the Convention which were approved by the American representative on the Committee. One of the alterations was with reference to the prohibited zone, the Committee proposing that it should be confined to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and that the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman be exempted from the prohibited zone. They proposed further that control of arms traffic in the Persian Gulf should be left to an arrangement or agreement between Persia and England.

That is the decision of the League of Nations Committee in which your representative has participated, and which he has approved.

Such being the case, as I have mentioned above, I am sure Your Excellency will agree that the ratification of the Geneva Convention without reservation not only will be interpreted as support of English imperialistic motives and aggression in Persian waters and territory, but will also strengthen the validity of the Geneva Convention in the eyes of the world. And England, finding her position so strengthened, will refuse to replace that convention by the one which you have in mind.

I and my Government are sure that such is not the intention of the American Government, especially under the Presidency
dency of Mr. Roosevelt, who has done and is doing a great work for the freedom of all nations. The President's action in renouncing the American treaty rights in Cuba, Haiti, and other South American countries, and giving them complete freedom and satisfaction, are shining examples of that fact.

In the course of the conversation Your Excellency also mentioned that as some other Governments have ratified the Convention without reservation, making a reservation on the part of the United States would be an exception to the rule. As I remarked verbally, those who ratified the Convention without reservation did so without knowing the real facts and without realizing the injustice which they were doing to Persian national rights. When they heard the complaint and explanation of the Persian representative in the League of Nations, they gave their approval and consent to the revision of the Convention.

But the case is quite different with your Government. Your Government is aware of the Persian complaints and the injustice that is designed in drafting the Convention against Persian Sovereign rights; and your representative in the Committee of the League of Nations has agreed and approved, as I mentioned above, the recommendation of the Committee for a revision, and exclusion of the Persian Gulf and that of Oman, from the prohibited zone.

Therefore, to ratify the Convention without reservation will give the impression to the whole world, not only of deliberate
deliberate action on the part of your Government against neutrality, but of deliberate backing of the imperialistic designs and motives of the English Government.

I sincerely hope that Your Excellency will, as you promised, explain all these facts to His Excellency Mr. Roosevelt, and prove to him that the only just course lies in signing the ratification with the reservation already passed in the Senate, with unanimity, which demonstrated to the world the sense of justice of the American people.

Availing myself of this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration.

GHAFFAR DJALAL

The Minister.

His Excellency,
The Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Codell:

Please refer to Wilson's #1003, March 8th, Noon, from Geneva. This is a very significant dispatch which I think you should lay aside for possible future need. It shows two things: first, the unwillingness of the British, because of alleged armament weakness, to accept the principle of open international armament inspection -- thus making it impossible to go along with what we have considered essential in its application to Germany; in other words, the only practical way of keeping German armaments down to an agreed on level being to inspect German armament supplies, England dashes this hope by declining to be inspected herself. The last paragraph is a frank admission that the British decline to accept detailed publicity as to armament orders on the ground that it would prejudice their armament trade.

At some future time it may be advisable to pull this rabbit out of our hat as proof that the present British Government is not sincere in seeking limitation or reduction of present world armaments or present world trade in warlike weapons.

I am much discouraged.

Very sincerely yours,
March 22, 1935.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

For your information I am enclosing a memorandum of my talk with Lindsay. I got the impression that the idea which I advanced to him, as a means of coping with the situation that confronts them, did not appeal very much to his imagination. I could not press it further without giving the impression that we were proposing something. However, the Scotch do not always show what they are feeling or thinking.

I am convinced that until the European situation becomes more clarified we should make no move, and should not even send a note of protest to Germany. Both sides are to blame for the situation there. So long as there is such a marked difference between the British and the French point of view - the British wanting to negotiate an agreement with Germany and the French wanting to impose one - it is difficult for them to make much headway. However, Simon's visit to Berlin may at least determine the course which the British and the French will take.

With warm regards, I am as ever,

Faithfully yours,

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM

March 19, 1935
Washington, D. C.

I called Sir Ronald Lindsay by telephone at 5:45 p.m. to ask him if he were going to be in for a while and would give me a drink if I would run up to see him. He said he would be delighted.

I first asked him if he had any recent news from his Government as to the German situation. He said he did not, that he had received nothing during the day but he assumed they were very busy and had nothing particular to communicate. He assumed, however, that they would keep Atherton informed which was easier than drafting cables. I told him apparently they had been doing that as they gave Atherton a copy of their note to Germany which was received here before it was published.

He said that he had noticed that we had been having some meetings at the White House presumably to discuss this matter. I told him the Secretary and I had discussed with the President the pros and cons of the entire situation, that while we were of course concerned about peace in Europe and sanctity of treaties and disarmament this was a matter with which the European countries had to deal and I did not see anything for us to do but to pursue the even tenor of our ways and watch developments. Although the German action was disconcerting, fortunately for us it was not a matter that could give us the concern that it naturally gave England, France and the other European countries and, while we were
not interested in European political questions, we were interested in peace and respect for treaties and particularly interested in disarmament. I personally felt that disarmament was the only solution of the problem with respect to Germany. He said that that was probably true but that he was satisfied Germany did not want an agreement of any kind, and that France would not now agree to disarm.

I then said that I was sorry to see that France was criticizing the British for not sending a stronger note and that it would be unfortunate just now for the British and French not to work together. I assumed that the British note was intended to convince the British public that the Government was doing everything in its power to bring about a peaceful solution so that if Germany refused, public opinion would back the Government in such measures as it saw fit to take. He said that the latter was true, that as regards England and France he did not mind the French criticism because nothing could drive them apart just now, that they had to stand together although they had different views as to the way to deal with the problem. I said that that had been the unfortunate thing all along, that the British and French had a similar objective but such divergent views as to the way to obtain it. I asked if he thought they were apt to take coercive measures in case Germany did not agree to a settlement. He said no, that he was satisfied Great Britain would not do so now because there was a great opposition to sending troops to Europe and getting involved. He doubted if the French people would want to march into Germany. I told him that interested me because I had been somewhat fearful
that they might decide upon collective action such as im-
posing economic sanctions, and perhaps ask us to at least
acquiesce in same, which the President would be unable to do
without authority from Congress and which I doubted if he
could get. He said he doubted if they would take any
drastic steps now. He was, however, skeptical of a solution
now and remarked that the Germans were becoming most unreas-
sonable, and were asking for a Navy 75% that of Great Britain.
I said that I certainly sympathized with the British and
French both in the terrible problem that faces them and that
in view of the fact that he thought the French would be reluctant to march into Germany, and that the British did not want
to send troops to Europe, I wondered if anyone had ever thought
of possibly meeting that situation by first making a very
concrete disarmament proposal to Germany that was fair and
reasonable; in effect proposing what Germany herself has
heretofore proposed in her April note of 1934, which it would
be difficult for Germany under the circumstances to refuse.
If she did refuse, I wondered if they had ever thought of the
possibility of trying to bring Germany to terms through an
announcement that they would not invade Germany but that they
would surround Germany and establish a military blockade. He
said he did not think they had ever considered that and did
not seem interested. I said it might be Utopian and prob-
ably unacceptable but, in view of the fact that the Germans
are insisting upon their right to rearm because they were
otherwise at the mercy of their neighbors and subject to in-
vansion at will, it would destroy that argument and might
change the psychology if the other Powers gave definite assur-
ances that they would not invade Germany except in retal-
iation. He did not seem to think much of the idea and after a few general observations the conversation was terminated.
In the course of our talk I told him that, having worked so long on disarmament I had a personal interest in it aside from the official side, and was talking to him purely from the personal angle.

Norman H. Davis