THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations—First Day

Morning Meeting at Dumbarton Oaks

We met this morning, as scheduled, with Secretary Hull presiding. Secretary Hull, on your behalf, Ambassador Gromyko, and Sir Alexander Cadogan then delivered prepared statements which were released to the press. The entire proceedings were open to the press which attended in large numbers. In addition the entire morning's proceedings were filmed for the newreels and a number of press photographs were separately taken.

Meeting of Joint Steering Committee at Dumbarton Oaks at 3:00 P.M.

Ambassador Gromyko with two of his associates, Sir Alexander Cadogan with one of his associates, and I with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky, met as a Joint Steering Committee for the conversations to settle upon the necessary arrangements. Agreement was reached as follows:
(a) **Language**

Both the Russian and the English languages are to be regarded as of equal importance during the conversations although it is expected by all concerned that English will probably be used more frequently than Russian.

(b) **Chairmanship**

It was proposed by Sir Alexander Cadogan and seconded by Ambassador Gromyko that as chief representative of the host Government, I should be the permanent chairman for the conversations.

(c) **Statements to Press--Generally**

It was agreed that no statements would be made to the press except on the basis of agreement arrived at by the three chairmen.

(d) **Initial Procedure**

After considerable discussion it was agreed that the initial procedure of the conversations will be a presentation by the Soviet group of its views. In the course of this presentation the British and the American groups will make such comments as they desire.
(e) Press Announcements on August 22

The press will be informed tomorrow at noon that it has been decided that the conversations will proceed to the discussion of the general principles of international organization and that at the first meeting the Soviet group will present its ideas.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations—Second Day

Morning Meeting at Dumbarton Oaks

We met this morning, as scheduled. All members of all three groups were present. In addition a number of advisers and members of the Secretariat were also in attendance. The matters covered fell under the following headings:

(a) Chairmanship

On the motion of Ambassador Gromyko, seconded by Sir Alexander Cadogan, I was chosen as the permanent chairman. (This had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Joint Steering Committee yesterday afternoon.)

(b) Announcements

I thereupon reported to the meeting on the arrangements which had been agreed upon at yesterday afternoon's meeting of the Joint Steering Committee. (These points are set forth in the Progress Report of August 21 on the first day's proceedings.)
(c) **Presentation of Soviet Views**

As had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Joint Steering Committee yesterday afternoon I called upon Ambassador Gromyko to present the views of the Soviet group on the general principles of international organization. Points of interest in the Ambassador's statement and in the subsequent discussion may be listed as follows:

1. **Importance of Early Statement as to Major Principles**

Ambassador Gromyko said that his Government believed that it would be desirable to attempt to reach agreement on major principles. Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed his agreement with this view, adding that he understood that this did not exclude subsequent discussion in the course of the conversations of other points. Ambassador Gromyko concurred in this statement.

2. **Regional Questions and Social and Economic Questions**

There was general agreement that the questions of regional organization and of the relationship of the general organization to social and economic problems should be referred to a subcommittee for consideration.
(3) Use of the Word "Aggression"
Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed the view that in view of the uncertainty of the meaning of the word "aggression", as shown by prior experience, it might be wise in any definition of the aims of the proposed organization to use broader and more inclusive language.

(4) Voting Procedure in the Council
Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that he had been instructed to propose that voting in the council be on the basis of a two-thirds vote in all cases and further that states which are parties to disputes should not vote.

(5) International Court of Justice
It was agreed that this subject should be referred to the Legal Subcommittee for further discussion.

(6) Security Functions of the Organization
Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that the Soviet reference to a possible international air force required further study and that the British attitude on this would in large part depend upon matters of detail. There was
general agreement that detailed security matters should also be referred to a subcommittee.

Meeting of Joint Steering Committee at Dumbarton Oaks at 12:00 Noon

The same persons who had met yesterday afternoon met again at noon to determine further questions of procedure. It was decided that the following subcommittees should be established: a drafting subcommittee, a legal subcommittee, a subcommittee on general questions of international organization, a subcommittee on technical security questions.

Afternoon Meeting at Dumbarton Oaks

The afternoon meeting was devoted to a presentation of the British point of view by Sir Alexander Cadogan and a presentation of the American point of view by me, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Hackworth, and Mr. Dunn.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

August 23, 1944

Mr. President,

Attached is a copy
of the Russian document.

[Signature]
The new international security organisation should be based on the principle, as expressed in the declaration of the Moscow Conference on general security, "of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states" - on the principle which recognises that the organisation must be "open to membership by all peace-loving states, large and small".

The task of the new international security organisation should be the effecting of measures directed toward the prevention of aggression and preservation of peace and also toward the suppression of aggression. Such an international organisation can perform its task, if, when determining its constitution, powers, conditions and method of activity, the nations members of the organisation, and particularly those initiating its foundation, base themselves on the necessity of effective cooperation in measures capable of ensuring the security of peace-loving peoples.

The problem of creating a security organisation raises many diverse questions both of principle and of an organisational character. It does not, however, appear expedient during the first phase of negotiations between representatives of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain to embark on simultaneous discussion of all these questions, but rather to confine oneself to discussion of the most important questions and of the principles which should form the basis of the organisation.

Such questions should include the following points:

A. Aims and Tasks of the Organisation;

B. Composition of the Organisation;

C. Principal Organs - General Assembly, Council, International Court, Secretariat General (their competency, functions and duties);

The suggestions of the Soviet Government with regard to the above listed questions are stated in the present Memorandum. After agreement has been reached on these fundamental questions it will be necessary to work out the actual constitution of the international security organisation.

The question of regional organisation is subject to further study.

The Soviet Government sees also great benefit in and attaches great importance to, cooperation between peoples in the economic, social, technical and other spheres.

For activities of this kind there might be formed, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, a separate international organisation not connected with the international security organisation, or several organisations, embracing various spheres of international cooperation. Such organisations might act separately from the international security organisation, which would devote itself wholly to the object of preserving the general peace and security of nations. The present Memorandum therefore does not deal with questions outside the limits of international security and the preservation of peace. It will be possible to begin to discuss and work out such questions later, when this should appear necessary.

**The International Security Organisation.**

1. **Aims of the organisation.**

The principal aims of the organisation are:

1). Maintenance of general peace and security and adoption for this purpose of collective measures for the prevention of aggression and organising the suppression of aggression which has already taken place.

2). The settlement and elimination by peaceful means of international conflicts which may lead to a breach of the peace.

3). The adoption of any other measures concerning the strengthening of universal peace and the development of friendly relations among nations.

**Note:** In addition it is considered desirable to establish a separate international organisation or organisations, not connected with the international security organisation, to promote international co-operation in the economic, commercial, financial, technical, social, and health spheres and other humanitarian activities.

II. Composition
II. Composition of the Organisation.

1. The initiators and founder-members of the organisation are the United Nations, i.e. those States which signed the declaration of January 1, 1942, or who have subsequently adhered to it.

2. The admission of other peace-loving States as members of the organisation shall take place individually after the statute of the organisation has been adopted and in accordance with the regulations laid down in the statute.

III. Principal Organs

1) General Assembly
2) Council
3) International Court of Justice
4) Secretariat General.

IV. General Assembly.

1) The General Assembly shall consist of representatives of all States members of the organisation.

2) The General Assembly shall determine the general principles of international co-operation in matters of security and the maintenance of peace.

3) The General Assembly shall consider all questions concerning international security raised by the Council upon its own initiative or at the suggestion of members of the organisation. Such suggestions shall be referred to the Council for consideration if it is necessary to take measures falling within the latter’s competence.

4) The General Assembly shall consider questions concerning disarmament and reduction of armaments.

5) The General Assembly shall hear and consider yearly reports of the Council and express its opinion thereon.

6) The General Assembly shall decide questions concerning the admission and expulsion of members of the organisation on the recommendation of the Council.

7) The General Assembly shall examine questions of the modification or amendment of the statute of the organisation and of the expansion of its activities.
5) The General Assembly shall determine the allocation of expenses among the members and approve the yearly budget of the organization.

9) The General Assembly shall elect its chairman for each session and determine its working procedure.

10) Decisions of the General Assembly shall be taken by a two-thirds majority vote, with the exception of categories of questions for which a different principle of voting may be provided, e.g. decisions of an organizational character shall be taken by a simple majority vote.

V The Council.

1) The Council shall consist of representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, United Kingdom and China, and in the future also France, in the capacity of permanent members, and of a certain limited number of representatives of member-states, elected by the General Assembly for a term to be fixed in the statute.

2) The Council, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it and its ability to take urgent decisions, shall have primary responsibility for ensuring general peace and security of peoples.

Accordingly the Council shall be authorized to act when necessary on behalf of the whole international organization, and decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all states members of the organization.

3) The Council shall be entitled to take all necessary measures provided by the statute to settle any disputes and conflicts arising among states.

The Council shall determine the existence of a threat to peace and decide that measures should be taken or recommended for the maintenance or restoration of peace.

4) The Council shall in case of necessity provide for the application of armed forces for the maintenance of peace and security, using for that purpose the armed forces placed at its disposal by state members of the organization in accordance with a special agreement.

Plans for
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Council with the assistance of a military committee established for this purpose and composed of representatives of States members of the Council. The question of command over the armed forces in question should be worked out specially.

5) The Council shall subject to preliminary examination all questions pertaining to the preservation of universal peace and security which are subject to inclusion in the agenda of the general assemblies [357].

6) Decisions of the Council on questions pertaining to the prevention or suppression of aggression shall be taken by a majority of votes including those of all permanent representatives on the Council.

Decisions of an organisational character shall be taken by a simple majority vote.

VI. International Court of Justice.

An international court of justice will be established and should function in accordance with a special statute.

VII. Secretary-General.

The international security organisation shall possess a Secretary-General, headed by a Secretary General who shall be elected by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Council.

VIII. Methods of Preventing Aggression and Measures for the Suppression of Aggression.

1) The methods of preventing or combating aggression shall be as follows:

A) An appeal of the Council to the disputants calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute or conflict between them.

B) An appeal of the Council to the disputants with a warning regarding the possible use against them of other means of pressure provided by the statute.

C) Measures of economic pressure to be applied against the disputants by some or all States members of the organisation.

D) Sovereignty
D) Severance by all members of the organisation of diplomatic relations with the aggressor.

E) Severance of commercial, financial and other economic relations with the aggressor, and also interruption of postal-telegraphic, rail and air communications.

F) The Provision, by member States not possessing sufficient armed forces, of territory for the organisation of bases in areas of strategic importance for conducting military operations against the aggressor.

G) Sea and land blockade.

H) Naval and air force demonstrations.

I) Air raids on particular military objectives of the aggressor state.

J) Military operations by members of the organisation against the aggressor.

2) The above methods of preventing and suppressing aggression shall be employed by some or all states members of the organisation.

3) To enable certain urgent military measures to be taken there shall be attached to the organisation international air force corps, the strength of which shall be determined by the Council with the assistance of a commission of military experts specially created for that purpose. Members of the organisation shall participate in this corps with their national air forces, the size of which shall be determined for each participant by the organisation.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY

August 23, 1944

Mr. President,

Attached is a copy of the American document.

[Signature]
TENTATIVE PROPOSALS FOR A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

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I

GENERAL CHARACTER OF AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

A. NATURE OF
THE ORGANIZATION

1. The general international organization to
establish and to maintain security and peace, as pro-
jected in the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at
Moscow, October 30, 1943, should be based on the
principle of cooperation freely agreed upon among
sovereign and peace-loving states. The organization
should be open to membership by all such states, large
and small, and should be world-wide in character.

2. The United Nations and the nations associated
with them, and such other nations as the United Nations
may determine, should comprise the initial membership
of the organization.

3. The organization should be empowered to make
effective the principle that no nation shall be permitted
to maintain or use armed force in international relations
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged
in the basic instrument of the international organization
or to give assistance to any state contrary to preventive
or enforcement action undertaken by the international
organization.

4. The organization should be so constituted as
to make possible the existence of regional organizations
or other arrangements or policies not inconsistent with
its purposes, and to enable such organizations and ar-
rangements to function on their own initiation or by
reference from the general organization on matters of
security and peace which are appropriate for regional
adjustment. The general organization should at all
times be kept informed of the activities in matters of
security and peace undertaken by regional organizations
or under regional or other arrangements.

5. The organization should comprise arrangements
for cooperation in the fields of economic and other
specialized activities.

B. PURPOSES
B. PURPOSES

1. The primary purposes of the organization should be, first, to maintain international security and peace, and second, to foster through international cooperation the creation of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and essential to the maintenance of security and peace.

C. METHODS

As methods to be used for the maintenance of security and peace, the international organization should:

a. encourage peaceful adjustment of controversies by the parties themselves;

b. initiate cooperative action by member states for the settlement of disputes;

c. encourage the use of local or regional procedures for the settlement of disputes capable of adjustment by such procedures;

d. recommend political or diplomatic action to adjust differences;

e. provide for, and encourage resort to, processes of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration;

f. encourage reference of justiciable matters to the international court of justice;

g. refer to the court justiciable questions pending before the organization;

h. settle disputes referred to it by the parties or over which it assumes jurisdiction on its own initiative;

i. determine the existence of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace;

j. arrange, when necessary, for economic, commercial, financial, and other measures of enforcement not involving use of armed force;

k. provide
k. provide for the use of armed force, when necessary in support of security and peace, if other methods and arrangements are inadequate.

D. PRINCIPAL ORGANS AND AGENCIES

1. The international organization should have as its principal organs:
   a. A general assembly;
   b. An executive council;
   c. An international court of justice; and
   d. A general secretariat.

2. The international organization should have additional organs, councils, commissions, or other agencies for cooperation in international economic and social activities, for territorial trusteeship responsibilities, and for such other functions as may be found necessary.
II

A GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A. COMPOSITION

The general assembly should be composed of representatives of the states members of the international organization.

B. POWERS

1. It should be empowered to receive and to examine representations addressed to the international organization on matters deemed to be of concern to the organization, and to take action in matters of concern to the international organization which are not allocated to other organs by the basic instrument.

2. The principal powers of the general assembly should be as follows:

   a. to make, on its own initiative or on request of a member state, reports on and recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of any situation or controversy the continuation of which it deems likely to impair the general welfare;

   b. to assist the executive council, upon its request, in enlisting the cooperation of all states toward giving effect to action under consideration in or decided upon by the council with respect to:

      (1) the settlement of a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger security or to lead to a breach of the peace;

      (2) the maintenance or restoration of peace; and

      (3) any other matters within the jurisdiction of the council;

   c. to
c. to initiate studies and make recommendations for:

(1) the promotion of international cooperation;
(2) the development and revision of rules of international law; and
(3) the promotion of the observance of basic human rights in accordance with principles or undertakings agreed upon by the states members of the international organization;

d. to admit to membership in the organization independent states not initial members of the organization;

e. to elect the members of the executive council not having continuing tenure and the judges of the international court of justice;

f. to approve the budget of the organs and agencies of the organization, to determine a provisional and a continuing basis of apportionment of expenses of the organization among the member states together with the procedure of apportionment, and to review, make recommendations on, and take other action concerning the budgets of specialized agencies brought into relationship with the international organization in accordance with the terms agreed upon between such agencies and the international organization;

g. to receive reports from the executive council and other organs and agencies of the organization and from all specialized bodies or agencies brought into relationship with the international organization;

h. to exercise the powers with respect to economic and social activities and territorial trusteeship stipulated in Sections VIII and IX;

i. to provide for the coordination of the general policies of all organs and agencies of the international organization and organizations and agencies brought into relationship with it;
J. to set up any bodies or agencies it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; and

k. to propose amendments of the basic instrument, which should come into force when approved by two thirds of the member states through their constitutional processes, including the members having continuing tenure on the executive council.

C. REPRESENTATION AND VOTING

1. The delegation of each member state should consist of not more than six representatives.

2. Each member state should have one vote in the general assembly, except as provided for in paragraph 3 below.

3. In taking decisions with respect to the budget of the organs and agencies of the organization, the continuing basis of apportionment of expenses of the organization, and the budgets of specialized agencies brought into relationship with the organization each member state should have voting power in proportion to its contribution to the expenses of the organization.

4. Decisions with respect to the admission to membership in the organization, the election of the members of the executive council, the election of judges of the international court of justice, and the provisional basis of apportionment of expenses, should be taken by a two-thirds vote. Other decisions should be taken by a majority vote.

D. ORGANIZATION AND SESSIONS

1. The general assembly should meet annually, but it may be convened in special session on the initiative of the executive council or under any procedure the assembly may adopt.
2. It should elect its president, vice-presidents, and other principal officers who should serve for annual terms or until their successors assume office. It should perfect its organization and adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. It should maintain headquarters at the seat of the international organization but may hold its sessions in whatever places would best facilitate the accomplishment of its work.
III
AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

A. COMPOSITION
AND REPRESENTATION

1. The executive council should consist of eleven states members of the international organization. These states should be elected annually by the general assembly and should not be immediately eligible for re-election except that the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China should have continuing tenure.

2. There should be a provision in the basic instrument that whenever the executive council finds that a government freely chosen by the French people has been established and is in effective control of the territory of the French Republic, France should be added to the list of states members having continuing tenure on the council.

3. Each state member of the executive council should have one representative.

4. Any state member of the organization not having a seat on the executive council should be entitled to attend and to be heard on matters specially affecting that member.

B. POWERS

1. The executive council should have primary responsibility for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, for the prevention of threats to the peace and breaches of the peace, and for such other activities as may be necessary for the maintenance of international security and peace. It should in such matters represent, and act on behalf of, all the members of the international organization and should in every case seek a just and equitable settlement of international disputes.

2. The
2. The principal powers of the executive council are enumerated below in Section V, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Section VI, Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace and Action with Respect Thereto, Section VII, Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces, and Section X, General Administration and Secretariat.

C. VOTING

1. Each state member of the executive council should have one vote.

2. Decisions with respect to the following matters should be taken by a majority vote including the concurring votes of all member states having continuing tenure, except as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 below:

   a. the assumption on its own initiative or on reference to it of jurisdiction over a dispute;

   b. the terms of settlement of disputes;

   c. the negotiations for a general agreement on the regulation of armaments and armed forces;

   d. the determination of threats to the peace, of breaches of the peace, and of acts obstructing measures for the maintenance of security and peace; and

   e. the institution and application of measures of enforcement.

3. Other decisions should be taken by a simple majority vote.

4. In all decisions any state member of the executive council should have the right to abstain from voting, but in such case the abstaining member should be bound by the decision.

5. Provisions will need to be worked out with respect to the voting procedure in the event of a dispute in which one or more of the members of the council having continuing tenure are directly involved.

D. ORGANIZATION
D. ORGANIZATION
AND SESSIONS

1. The executive council should be in continuous session. Its headquarters should be maintained at the seat of the organization, but its meetings may be held at any places best facilitating its work.

2. It should elect its chairman.

3. It should be empowered (a) to set up any bodies or agencies it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions, (b) to perfect its own organization, and (c) to adopt its own rules of procedure.
IV

AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. The Permanent Court of International Justice should be reconstituted in accordance with a revision of its present Statute.

2. The revised Statute should be made a part of the basic instrument of the international organization.
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. All states, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required (a) to settle disputes by none but peaceful means, and (b) to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged in the basic instrument of the international organization.

2. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger international security or peace should be obligated, first of all, to seek a settlement by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, reference to the international court of justice, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

3. Where feasible, regional or other arrangements should be employed to bring about adjustment or settlement of local or regional controversies.

4. If the parties fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute by the means above indicated, they should be obligated to refer it to the executive council.

5. Any member state should have the right to bring to the attention of the general assembly or the executive council any condition, situation, or controversy the continuance of which the member deems likely to endanger international security or peace.

6. The general assembly should refer to the executive council any such condition, situation, or controversy which it deems to require action to prevent an immediate threat to the peace or breach of the peace.

7. The executive council should be empowered to investigate any such condition, situation, or controversy and should recommend appropriate procedures or measures of adjustment. It should be empowered to do this upon its own initiative, or upon reference from the general assembly, or at the instance of a member state.
8. The executive council, when it determines upon its own initiative that there exists between member states a dispute which constitutes a threat to security or peace, and which is not being adequately dealt with by other procedures, should be authorized to assume jurisdiction to effect a settlement.

9. In case of a dispute involving a member and a non-member state, or non-member states only, and which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the executive council should be authorized to take jurisdiction either upon its own initiative or at the request of any party.

10. In discharging its responsibilities with respect to pacific settlement the executive council should be authorized to seek the advice and assistance of the general assembly, to appoint commissions of inquiry or conciliation, to refer to the international court of justice justiciable disputes or legal aspects of disputes not wholly justiciable, to employ regional or local procedures, or to take any other appropriate measures to effect a settlement.

11. The executive council should be empowered with respect to any dispute referred to in the preceding paragraphs to encourage and facilitate the execution of the terms of any settlement determined under the authority of the international organization.
VI

DETERMINATION OF THREATS TO THE
PLACE OR BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND
ACTION WITH RESPECT THERETO

A. DETERMINATION OF
THREATS TO THE PEACE
OR BREACHES OF THE PEACE

1. The executive council should be empowered to
determine the existence of any threat to the peace or
breach of the peace, and to decide upon the action to
be recommended or taken to maintain or restore peace.
It should be empowered to seek the advice and assis-
tance of the general assembly in any matter in this
connection, and of the international court of justice
in any matter within the competence of the court.

2. The executive council should be empowered to
determine whether any condition, situation, or act in-
volving an alleged threat to the peace or breach of the
peace is of sufficient gravity to require action.

Note: The conditions, situations, and acts en-
visaged above include, for example:

a. employment of military forces by a state within
the jurisdiction of another state not authorized
by the international organization;

b. failure to comply with a request of the execu-
tive council to accept procedures of pacific
settlement in any dispute;

c. failure to accept terms of settlement of a dis-
pute as prescribed under the authority of the
international organization;

d. failure to comply with a request of the execu-
tive council to maintain the existing position
or to return to a prior position as determined
by the executive council;

e. failure
e. failure to observe obligations with respect to the regulation of armaments and armed forces and the manufacture of and international traffic in arms; and

f. obstruction of measures for the enforcement of security and peace through failure to comply with a call from the council (1) to carry out agreed undertakings regarding measures of enforcement, and (2) to make available, upon the basis of agreed obligations, forces and facilities for enforcement action.

B. INITIATION OF ACTION

1. When the executive council determines that a threat to the peace or breach of the peace exists, it should immediately (a) require the parties to refrain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and (b) decide upon the measures to be recommended or taken.

2. All states, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required to refrain from giving assistance to any state contrary to preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the international organization or with its authorization.

C. MEASURES NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE

1. The executive council should be empowered to call upon member states to institute measures not requiring the use of armed force in support of its decisions and to determine, in any instance necessitating such action, what measures should be employed and the extent to which the respective member states should be called upon to apply them.

2. In any case in which such action has been decided upon by the executive council, member states should be obligated:

a. to cooperate with the executive council and the general assembly in obtaining the information
information necessary for action and in appropriate measures of publicity;

b. to take part in concerted diplomatic measures;

c. to take part in collective economic, commercial, and financial measures; and

d. to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in such measures instituted by the executive council.

D. MEASURES INVOLVING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE

1. In the event that other measures prove to be inadequate, the executive council should be authorized to provide for the use of armed force to assure the maintenance of security and peace.

2. The member states should undertake to furnish forces and facilities when needed for this purpose at the call of the executive council and in accordance with a general agreement governing the number and type of forces and the kind and extent of facilities to be provided. Such an agreement should be concluded among the member states at the earliest possible moment after the organization comes into existence. It should be a duty of the executive council to formulate as rapidly as possible plans and procedure for the negotiation of such agreement. In formulating plans for the agreement and in carrying out operations under the agreement, the council should take account of the geographical position of the member states, their regional or special obligations, their population, and their relative resources.

3. The general agreement should provide that member states should be obligated to maintain in condition of effective readiness the armaments and armed forces which by the agreement they respectively undertake to make available for international cooperative action.

4. Pending the conclusion of the general agreement, the states parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and other states
in position to do so should provide, on the basis of their various capacities and of undertakings among themselves, such forces and facilities as may be needed for establishing and maintaining security and peace.

5. The executive council should be empowered to call upon the member states for economic, financial, and commercial and other assistance necessary to support and to supplement international action involving the use of armed force as and when undertaken. Member states should undertake:

a. to afford such assistance, the terms to be determined in consultation between the executive council and member states;

b. to deny economic or other assistance to a state against which enforcement action is undertaken, the nature of such assistance to be defined by the executive council at the time of the action; and

c. to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in security measures involving the use of armed force instituted by the executive council.

6. The executive council should be empowered to call upon member states to grant rights of passage and to furnish facilities, including bases, necessary to the effective action of forces operating under authority of the council. The conditions of the exercise of these rights and of the furnishing of facilities, including bases, should be determined, in advance or at the time of action, by agreement between the executive council and the member states in whose territories these rights and facilities are required.

7. The executive council, advised and assisted by the permanent security and armaments commission described in part E below, should be responsible for the planning of, and should exercise general supervision over, any use of force determined to be necessary under the provisions of the basic instrument of the international organization.

E. SECURITY
E. SECURITY AND ARMAMENTS COMMISSION

1. The executive council should establish a permanent security and armaments commission.

2. The permanent security and armaments commission should provide the executive council with the expert military advice and assistance necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities of the council concerning the employment of force and the regulation of armaments and armed forces, and should perform such duties of study, recommendation, administration, and execution as the council may assign to it.

3. The security and armaments commission should have authority, with the approval of the executive council, to establish subordinate agencies and otherwise perfect its organization.
VII

REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

1. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international security and peace with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments, the executive council should be made responsible for initiating negotiations for the conclusion of a general international agreement, envisaged in the Four-Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments and armed forces and for the regulation of the manufacture of and international traffic in arms.

2. The executive council should be authorized to exercise such powers for the execution of obligations stipulated in the general international agreement as may be assigned to it by the agreement.

3. The armaments and armed forces of the Axis states [to be named later] should be governed by the terms of their surrender and by the authority established thereunder. The executive council should be empowered to take responsibility for assuring the execution of stipulations governing the armaments and armed forces of the Axis states, to the extent that such responsibility may be assigned to it in succession to the authority established under the surrender terms.
VIII
ARRANGEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

A. PURPOSE AND RELATIONSHIPS

1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the general international organization should facilitate and promote solutions of international economic and social problems, including educational and cultural problems. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the general assembly, and under the authority of the general assembly, in an economic and social council, established in the basic instrument of the organization.

2. The various specialized economic and social organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each specialized economic or social organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the general international organization. The terms under which each specialized organization or agency should be related to the general international organization should be determined by agreement between the economic and social council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the general assembly.

B. POWERS

1. The economic and social council should be empowered:

a. to carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the general assembly in regard to economic or social matters;

b. to make recommendations, on its own initiative, to the various specialized organizations or agencies, to governments, or to the general assembly, with respect to economic or social problems, including those beyond the scope of the specialized organizations, with a view to promoting
promoting the fullest and most effective use of the world's economic resources, to achieving high and stable levels of employment, and in general to advancing the well-being of all peoples;

c. to coordinate the activities of the specialized economic and social organizations or agencies through advisory consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations;

d. to receive and consider reports of the activities, decisions and recommendations of the specialized organizations or agencies, and to submit annually an analysis of such reports to the general assembly;

e. to examine the administrative budgets of the specialized organizations or agencies with a view to recommending to the organizations or agencies concerned, and in appropriate cases to the general assembly, as to the most effective utilization of resources; and

f. to perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the general assembly, or as may be provided for in future agreements among member states.

C. COMPOSITION
AND VOTING

1. The economic and social council should consist of qualified representatives of a specified number of member states. The states designated for this purpose should be selected by the general assembly for terms of three years, and each such state should have one representative.

2. Each representative of a state designated as a member of the economic and social council should have one vote. Decisions of the council should be taken by majority vote.

3. The economic and social council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies to participate
without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

D. ORGANIZATION

1. The economic and social council should establish an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required to facilitate the consideration of problems within the scope of its functions. Such commissions should consist of experts specially qualified in their respective fields, who may be nationals of any member state of the general international organization. The members of the commissions should be appointed for periods of three years.

2. The economic and social council should elect a chairman from among its members. A director and a staff of competent experts should serve as the permanent secretariat of the economic and social council and of the commissions, and should constitute a part of the central administrative staff of the general international organization.

3. The council should adopt its own rules of procedure and otherwise perfect its organization.
IX

ARRANGEMENTS FOR
TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIPS

Note: Documents on this subject will be available later
A. OFFICE OF DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

1. A director-general of the international organization should be elected by the general assembly with the concurrence of the executive council. He should serve for a period of five years and should be eligible for re-election.

2. The director-general should have the responsibilities of the chief administrative officer of the organization. He should serve as the secretary-general of the general assembly, of the executive council, and of such other organs and agencies of the international organization as the assembly or the council may direct. He should also provide for coordination, within the general policies appertaining to administration established by the general assembly, of the administrative procedures and regulations of the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the international organization. He should report to the general assembly on the work of all the organs and agencies of the organization and of commissions, agencies, and other bodies of concern to the international organization.

3. The director-general should appoint such deputies and principal officers of the central administrative staff as may be required, subject to confirmation by the general assembly, and such other personnel of secretariats for which he is responsible. He should recommend for appointment by the general assembly or the executive council respectively the directors of commissions and agencies responsible respectively to these two organs.

4. The director-general and his deputies should not during their terms of office hold any other public office.

5. Officers appointed to the central administrative staff should be selected on the basis of technical
or administrative competence and experience, and of the widest practicable distribution among nationalities. These officials should be constituted as a continuing international civil service, and they should upon their appointment pledge themselves to perform the duties entrusted to them in the impartial manner and spirit necessary to advance the interests and purposes of the international organization.

B. OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIALS OF THE ORGANIZATION

1. Member states should impose no obligations upon their nationals who are officials of the international organization that are inconsistent with the performance of their duties.

2. Member states should grant the customary diplomatic immunities to officials of the international organization when engaged on business of the international organization or when traveling to and from their offices.
XI

PROCEDURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND INAUGURATION

1. The general international organization for the maintenance of peace and security projected in the Four-Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, should be established at the earliest practicable date—if feasible, prior to the termination of hostilities.

2. The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China, the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration, should take immediate steps to reach agreement in principle on the fundamental features of a plan of the organization.

3. An agreed statement of the fundamental features of the plan of the organization should then be transmitted to the governments of the other United Nations and the nations associated with them, together with an invitation to communicate comments and suggestions for the purpose of arriving at a substantial consensus of views on the fundamental features of the plan.

4. As soon as practicable, the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration should convene a conference of the United Nations and the nations associated with them for the formulation and signature of an agreement which would constitute the basic instrument of the organization. The agreement should be submitted to the participating governments for ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

5. Provision should be made in the agreement for its coming into force when ratified by fifteen states including the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration.

6. The signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration should be empowered by the agreement to call the first meeting of the general assembly of the organization under the agreement upon its coming into force.

7. The general assembly should elect at its first meeting the non-continuing members of the executive council, and the council should thereupon immediately
Mr. President,

Attached is a copy of the British plan.
DECLASSIFIED.

Published in its entirety in
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944
Vol. 1, General,
Page(s) 670–693.
SECRET

TENTATIVE BRITISH PROPOSALS
FOR A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Presented to the Department of State
by the British Embassy
July 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM A

SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE PERMANENT ORGANISATION

I. THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTS OF THE ORGANISATION.

1. The World Organisation will consist of independent States freely associated and working together for the better realisation of the common good of mankind.

2. The principles and objects of the Organisation should be stated in the preamble of the document which brings it into existence. The Organisation should be as simple and flexible as possible. Thus the statement of its principles and objects becomes specially important, since they lay down the conditions in which action is taken by the members of the Organisation.

3. Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration lays down that the Organisation shall be based on the "sovereign equality" of States. Two principles follow from these words. In the first place members must agree to respect each other's political independence, and secondly all members enjoy equality of status, though not necessarily equality of function.

4. Members should not be entitled to receive the benefits of the Organisation unless they are prepared to accept the obligations that go with them. Moreover, it is the assumption of such obligations by all members that ensures to all the benefits of the Organisation. This should be recognised, therefore, as one of the principles of the organisation.

5. The object of the Organisation is stated in Article 4 to be the "maintenance of international peace
and security," and this must be regarded as its primary purpose.

6. But if recourse to violence is ruled out, means must be provided by which members of the Organisation can settle their disputes by other than violent methods; and the establishment of machinery for achieving this must be one of the objects of the Organisation.

7. Moreover, in order that international peace and security shall be maintained there must be in the world some means by which States meet together to review and harmonise their political action. One of the objects of the Organisation, therefore, must be to create a meeting place where statesmen can come together for that purpose.

8. But international peace and security must be made positively, and not only kept by the negative means of suppressing violence. They will be confirmed and strengthened by guarding the right of man to seek his freedom, and by increase in the well-being of human society. Statesmen of the United Nations have declared this to be both the purpose and the condition of development in international order.

9. It will be necessary, therefore, for the Organisation to create institutions to promote the betterment of world-wide economic conditions and the removal of social wrongs, and to support and extend institutions which now exist for these purposes.

10. Thus the principles and objects of the Organisation, and consequently the conditions in which its members receive its benefits and accept its obligations and on which actions taken under its authority are based, may be described as follows:

11. PRINCIPLES

(i) That all members of the Organisation undertake to respect each other's political independence.

(ii) That all members are equal in status though not necessarily in function.

(iii) That
11. That all members undertake to fulfil towards each other the obligations which are the conditions of receiving the benefits of the Organisation.

II. OBJECTS

(i) To ensure that peace and security shall be maintained so that men shall not live in fear of war.

(ii) To provide means by which all disputes arising between States may be so dealt with that peace and security are not endangered.

(iii) To provide a centre in which the political action of States can be reviewed and harmonised, and directed towards a common end.

(iv) To promote the betterment of world-wide economic conditions and the well-being of all men by international agreement so that the fear of want may be removed from the world.

(v) To guard and enlarge the freedom of man by institutions for the removal of social wrongs.

II. THE NATURE OF THE ORGANISATION

13. In Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration it is laid down that the organisation is to be founded on the sovereign equality of its members. Its members will, therefore, retain control of their own actions except so far as they are limited by the obligations into which they freely enter and by international law.

14. Nothing has been more clearly proved during the present war than the interconnexion of peace and security in all parts of the world. The future organisation must recognise this fact and be a world organisation in which all peaceful States in every part of the world can cooperate together for their mutual benefit.

15. Though the status of all members is equal and all will enjoy the same rights and undertake the corresponding obligations, their differences in power make necessary...
some recognition of differences in function. The
initiative for the formation of the organisation has
come from the Four Powers, the United States, the
U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and China, and it is
generally recognised that its success will depend
more upon their continued cooperation than on any
other single factor. The machinery of the organisation
should make it possible for them to carry out the
responsibilities which they will have agreed to
undertake. They must be given, therefore, a special
position in the Organisation in order effectively to
maintain peace and security. In general, as regards
all States the more power and responsibility can be
made to correspond, the more likely is it that the
machinery will be able to fulfil its functions.

16. We look forward to the liberation of France
and her restoration to the ranks of the Great Powers.

17. It is presumed that there will come into
existence a number of specialised technical organi-
sations through which States will combine together for
various purposes. There are already such organi-
sations in existence as part of the system of the
League of Nations. The relations of these bodies to
one another and to the main organisation are considered
in Memorandum D. Here it need only be said that such
bodies are unlikely to survive as effective instruments
in a world from which reasonable security is absent.

18. Just as there are special functional organi-
sations, so there may be regional associations for
various purposes when there is obvious advantage to be
obtained by limitation of the sphere of action. In
particular, there should be some Regional Organisation
for the Continent of Europe if only to prevent a
repetition of the circumstances which have caused two
world wars to originate in that area. The condition
of Europe at the close of this war will demand the
special care and assistance of the United Kingdom, United
States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
means must be found to prevent its becoming the centre
of a third world tragedy. It is possible to presume
that out of some "United Nations Commission for Europe"
as proposed in paragraphs nine and ten of Mr. Eden's memo-
randum of July 1, 1943 there might grow a Europian

Organisation
Organisation which, under the guidance of the three major Allies, might foster peaceful tendencies, heal the wounds of Europe and at the same time prevent Germany from again dominating the Continent. Such Regional Associations might also come into existence for economic cooperation, for the promotion of welfare in Colonial territories, etc. It is, however, essential that they should not conflict with the world-wide Organisation, but rather assist it to carry out its purpose.

III. CONSTITUTION OF THE ORGANISATION

19. It is generally recognised that it will be necessary to set up two main bodies, one as a centre of discussion on which all States are represented and the other, a smaller body, as a centre of action. It is suggested that these bodies be termed the World Assembly and the World Council respectively.

20. Membership - It is assumed that at the outset all the United Nations will be invited to be members of the Organisation. What States now neutral shall be admitted and at what period is a matter for consideration. The enemy States cannot be admitted until they have shown by their conduct that they accept the objects of the organisation and intend to pursue them.

21. All the members of the organisation should share in some manner in the admission of new members. It will have to considered how far it is necessary to lay down conditions under which a State shall cease to be a member of the Organisation.

22. World Assembly. The sovereign equality of all members should be recognised by their representatives meeting together on a footing of equality in a World Assembly at least once a year. The right of information and criticism should belong to all members of the organisation.

23. It is not suggested that this body should have all the powers that were possessed by the Assembly of the League. The specialised and technical bodies should undertake some of the duties which that body performed.
performed and the initiative in preventing breaches of the peace should lie with the "world Council."

24. It is a matter for consideration whether the "world Assembly should have the control over finance and the admission of new members which the Assembly of the League possessed; but it is suggested that the States cannot be expected to contribute to the finances of an organisation without some share in their determination, nor to belong to a society to which other States may be admitted without consultation with them.

25. World Council. This body should be sufficiently small and compact to ensure action and of such a character as to possess the confidence of all members of the organisation.

26. The Constitution of this body raises many difficult problems. The relation between the Great Powers and other States has been a matter of dispute for over a century. It is clearly necessary that the Four Powers, which between them are directly responsible for the peace and security of nearly two-thirds of the world's inhabitants, should always be represented on it. The principle has been generally accepted that where the interests of any State are specially affected it should have the right to lay its case before the Council.

27. It is desirable that the World Council should be strictly limited in size, and it has been suggested in some quarters that its membership should be restricted to the three or four Powers upon whom responsibility of maintaining peace principally depends. It is, however, open to question whether the other States would agree to the establishment of a Council so limited in number. In any case the number and method of their representation is a matter for grave consideration, and the manner in which the decisions of the Council shall be made may depend on the method adopted. The object would be to ensure that the other States on the World Council command general confidence. Some form of election is probably essential and the World Assembly might be used for this purpose.
28. In such a Council, some means must be found to ensure that the various regions of the world are adequately represented. The size and area of States vary so greatly and are so unevenly distributed over the Continents that some agreement on this subject is essential. Thus the Caribbean area has more independent States than all the rest of Latin America, which includes Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Both Europe and South America have many more States than North America or Asia. Hitherto States as different in power and status as Canada and Panama have had equal rights of representation. The principle of rotation has deprived the Council of experienced Statesmen, while the creation of "semi-permanent" seats was much resented by some States that did not enjoy the privilege.

29. If the principle which governs the election of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. could be accepted, a more satisfactory result might be obtained, but it is difficult to find the principle to apply to a political body.

30. Should Regional Associations of sufficient importance be formed (e.g., a Regional Organisation for Europe) they might furnish a basis for representation on the Council. But for the most part, States do not recognise other States as "representing" them on institutions in which they have a major interest.

31. It is clear that this subject will need careful examination - not only amongst the Four Powers themselves but with the other States whose wishes must be taken into account.

32. The main function of the World Council will be to ensure such intercourse between the statesmen of the countries represented on it as to enable them to secure solutions of international problems by discussion and cooperative action. For this purpose regular meetings with an appropriate procedure and secretariat are indispensable. No other single factor is likely to be so influential in producing harmony between the policies of States. The experience of the last thirty years shows that there is
no adequate substitute for it.

33. The functions suggested for the World Council as the body responsible for the peace of the world are described in Memorandum B.

34. It will also be necessary for the World Council to give some common direction to the functional bodies. This question is considered in Memorandum D.

35. In general it is hoped that the Council may become a centre where Governments reconcile their attitudes towards major international problems so as to be able to act decisively towards a common end.

36. Permanent Court of International Justice - It is assumed that there will be general agreement that a Permanent Court of International Justice will be set up. The proposals of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee which recently reported on this question seem to indicate the general lines that should be followed.

37. Secretariat - A permanent secretariat will be indispensable. The experience of the League of Nations and the I.L.O. should be utilised. It is assumed, however, that a number of new specialised technical bodies will come into existence. Further consideration of this question might, therefore, await more definite information concerning them.

38. The suggestion that the head of the Secretariat should be given the right of bringing before the World Council any matter which in his opinion threatens the peace of the world might well be incorporated in the rules of the Organisation.

39. Specialised and Technical Organisations - This question is considered in Memorandum D. The position of the International Labour Organisation will need special consideration.

40. Seat of the Organisation - This problem should be left open until further information is available on the number and character of the functional organisations.

41. Name
41. Name of the Organisation - The term "United Nations" is now in general use and there does not seem to be any strong reason to substitute any other for it.
SECRET

TENTATIVE BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Presented to the Department of State by the British Embassy July 22, 1947

MEMORANDUM A

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I. THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

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3. Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration lays down that the Organization shall be based on the "sovereign equality" of States. Two principles follow from these words. In the first place members must agree to respect each other's political independence, and secondly all members enjoy equality of status, though not necessarily equality of function.

4. Members should not be entitled to receive the benefits of the Organization unless they are prepared to accept the obligations that go with them. Moreover, it is the assumption of such obligations by all members that ensures to all the benefits of the Organization. This should be recognised, therefore, as one of the principles of the organization.

5. The object of the Organization is stated in Article 4 to be the "maintenance of international peace and
and security," and this must be regarded as its primary purpose.

6. But if recourse to violence is ruled out, means must be provided by which members of the Organisation can settle their disputes by other than violent methods; and the establishment of machinery for achieving this must be one of the objects of the Organisation.

7. Moreover, in order that international peace and security shall be maintained there must be in the world some means by which States meet together to review and harmonise their political action. One of the objects of the Organisation, therefore, must be to create a meeting place where statesmen can come together for that purpose.

8. But international peace and security must be made positively, and not only kept by the negative means of suppressing violence. They will be confirmed and strengthened by guarding the right of man to seek his freedom, and by increase in the well-being of human society. Statesmen of the United Nations have declared this to be both the purpose and the condition of development in international order.

9. It will be necessary, therefore, for the Organisation to create institutions to promote the betterment of world-wide economic conditions and the removal of social wrongs, and to support and extend institutions which now exist for these purposes.

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(i) To ensure that peace and security shall be maintained so that men shall not live in fear of war.

(ii) To provide means by which all disputes arising between States may be so dealt with that peace and security are not endangered.

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II. THE NATURE OF THE ORGANISATION

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 Organisation which, under the guidance of the three major Allies might foster peaceful tendencies, heal the wounds of Europe and at the same time prevent Germany from again dominating the Continent. Such Regional Associations might also come into existence for economic cooperation, for the promotion of welfare in Colonial territories, etc. It is, however, essential that they should not conflict with the world-wide Organisation, but rather assist it to carry out its purpose.

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19. It is generally recognised that it will be necessary to set up two main bodies, one as a centre of discussion on which all States are represented and the other, a smaller body, as a centre of action. It is suggested that these bodies be termed the World Assembly and the World Council respectively.

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21. All the members of the organisation should share in some manner in the admission of new members. It will have to be considered how far it is necessary to lay down conditions under which a State shall cease to be a member of the Organisation.

22. World Assembly. The sovereign equality of all members should be recognised by their representatives meeting together on a footing of equality in a World Assembly at least once a year. The right of information and criticism should belong to all members of the organisation.

23. It is not suggested that this body should have all the powers that were possessed by the Assembly of the League. The specialised and technical bodies should undertake some of the duties which that body performed
performed and the initiative in preventing breaches of the peace should lie with the World Council.

24. It is a matter for consideration whether the World Assembly should have the control over finance and the admission of new members which the Assembly of the League possessed; but it is suggested that the States cannot be expected to contribute to the finances of an organisation without some share in their determination, nor to belong to a society to which other States may be admitted without consultation with them.

25. World Council. This body should be sufficiently small and compact to ensure action and of such a character as to possess the confidence of all members of the organisation.

26. The Constitution of this body raises many difficult problems. The relation between the Great Powers and other States has been a matter of dispute for over a century. It is clearly necessary that the Four Powers, which between them are directly responsible for the peace and security of nearly two-thirds of the world's inhabitants, should always be represented on it. The principle has been generally accepted that where the interests of any State are specially affected it should have the right to lay its case before the Council.

27. It is desirable that the World Council should be strictly limited in size, and it has been suggested in some quarters that its membership should be restricted to the three or four Powers upon whom responsibility of maintaining peace principally depends. It is, however, open to question whether the other States would agree to the establishment of a Council so limited in number. In any case the number and method of their representation is a matter for grave consideration, and the manner in which the decisions of the Council shall be made may depend on the method adopted. The object would be to ensure that the other States on the World Council command general confidence. Some form of election is probably essential and the World Assembly might be used for this purpose.
28. In such a Council, some means must be found to ensure that the various regions of the world are adequately represented. The size and area of States vary so greatly and are so unevenly distributed over the Continents that some agreement on this subject is essential. Thus the Caribbean area has more independent States than all the rest of Latin America, which includes Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Both Europe and South America have many more States than North America or Asia. Hitherto States as different in power and status as Canada and Panama have had equal rights of representation. The principle of rotation has deprived the Council of experienced statesmen, while the creation of "semi-permanent" seats was much resented by some States that did not enjoy the privilege.

29. If the principle which governs the election of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. could be accepted, a more satisfactory result might be obtained, but it is difficult to find the principle to apply to a political body.

30. Should Regional Associations of sufficient importance be formed (e.g. a Regional Organisation for Europe) they might furnish a basis for representation on the Council. But for the most part, States do not recognise other States as "representing" them on institutions in which they have a major interest.

31. It is clear that this subject will need careful examination - not only amongst the Four Powers themselves but with the other States whose wishes must be taken into account.

32. The main function of the World Council will be to ensure such intercourse between the statesmen of the countries represented on it as to enable them to secure solutions of international problems by discussion and cooperative action. For this purpose regular meetings with an appropriate procedure and secretariat are indispensable. No other single factor is likely to be so influential in producing harmony between the policies of States. The experience of the last thirty years shows that there is
no adequate substitute for it.

33. The functions suggested for the World Council as the body responsible for the peace of the world are described in Memorandum B.

34. It will also be necessary for the World Council to give some common direction to the functional bodies. This question is considered in Memorandum D.

35. In general it is hoped that the Council may become a centre where Governments reconcile their attitudes towards major international problems so as to be able to act decisively towards a common end.

36. Permanent Court of International Justice - It is assumed that there will be general agreement that a Permanent Court of International Justice will be set up. The proposals of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee which recently reported on this question seem to indicate the general lines that should be followed.

37. Secretariat - A permanent secretariat will be indispensable. The experience of the League of Nations and the I.L.O. should be utilised. It is assumed, however, that a number of new specialised technical bodies will come into existence. Further consideration of this question might, therefore, await more definite information concerning them.

38. The suggestion that the head of the Secretariat should be given the right of bringing before the World Council any matter which in his opinion threatens the peace of the world might well be incorporated in the rules of the Organisation.

39. Specialised and Technical Organisations - This question is considered in Memorandum D. The position of the International Labour Organisation will need special consideration.

40. Seat of the Organisation - This problem should be left open until further information is available on the number and character of the functional organisations.
41. Name of the Organisation - The term "United Nations" is now in general use and there does not seem to be any strong reason to substitute any other for it.
MEMORANDUM B.

THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES AND THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

I. INTRODUCTION

If war is to be prevented there must be in existence a means to make those decisions which in the past have been made by violence. If an organisation is set up to achieve this end there must be some guarantee that its members will be protected should States, inside or outside it, threaten to subject them to violence. For the purpose of providing protection, action may have to be taken against an offending State, and this necessitates some statement of how and when such action shall be taken.

2. The maintenance of peace and security is not merely an end in itself but a means by which an ordered and progressive community of States may come into existence. The principles and objects of such a society have been indicated in Part I of Memorandum A, and it is on them that all action by the Organisation should be based. A state of peace should be regarded as not simply the acceptance of the status quo but active cooperative between States for the objects and principles of the Organisation.

3. Such ends cannot be obtained by any system of procedure however skilfully designed. Everything depends on the unity of purpose of those States which possess the greatest means of carrying out their purposes. It is impossible to ensure that these States will always be in agreement, and no set of rules will do so. But an agreement to act under certain specific principles in a World Organisation will make their cooperation easier and will enable other States to be associated with them for their common purpose.

4. If all the Great Powers are members of the Organisation and show their intention of acting in accordance with it, all States will be more ready to accept
accept the responsibilities commensurate with their power. The absence of the United States and, for a long period, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the League of Nations caused the United Kingdom to review its responsibilities. For the same reason smaller States were often reluctant to accept full responsibility.

5. For the same reason also there was great anxiety on the part of many States to define very closely the occasion for action by the organs and members of the League of Nations. As is explained below, this attempt failed in its purpose. Moreover, public opinion did not understand the elaborate safeguards against arbitrary action that existed. It is suggested that the methods embodied in the constitution of the Organisation should be simple and flexible. They should be extended and elaborated only as the result of experience.

6. It is believed also that, whatever procedure be adopted, it is only by setting up some definite security system such as is suggested in Memorandum C that reality will be given to the promises made and that the States of the world will come to believe that by accepting the rights and responsibilities given to them by the Organisation they will be spared such sufferings as they are now enduring.

II. THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

7. Disputes between States are divided into two main categories, those, often termed "justiciable," that can be settled by a legal tribunal, and those in which other considerations are predominant.

8. It is the second class which produces the most intractable and dangerous disputes, including those in which the legal position is entirely clear. In the past, States have promised not to attempt settlement of their disputes by violent means, but they have not promised to settle their disputes. It is suggested that it might be well if they now promised to "settle" their disputes in the sense that they will not allow them to endanger peace and security.

9. Justiciable Disputes - It would seem that there is likely to be general agreement that justiciable disputes should be generally settled by a

Permanent
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Informal Inter-Allied Committee suggested in its recent report that the Court be open to all States, whether they accept compulsory jurisdiction or not. It would be possible for the International Organization to make the acceptance of such an obligation a condition of membership, but in such a case it would be necessary to allow States to make certain reservations.

10. The difference between accepting compulsory jurisdiction with reservations and retaining full freedom of action is likely to have more psychological than practical effect, especially if the World Council can obtain Advisory Opinions from the Court on some point in a dispute, which has been submitted to it.

11. Other Disputes - Reference to the World Council is the obvious method of dealing with other disputes. Though other elaborate methods of conciliation have been set up they have hardly ever been used and they have the disadvantage of placing the case in the hands of persons who are not responsible for the consequences of failure to preserve peace. It is only in the World Council itself that a body of rules and a technique of procedure can be gradually established as the result of accumulated experience.

12. It should be for the World Council to decide what method should be used for dealing with the dispute. Any decision of this nature should be regarded as a decision of procedure and consequently be adopted by a majority vote.

13. Even on questions of principle (as opposed to questions of procedure) decisions might be taken by (say) a two-thirds majority of the Council rather than by unanimity. In all such cases all Four Powers should, of course, be included in the majority. In any event, the votes of the parties to the dispute should not be taken into account.

14. States are not likely to bind themselves to accept the decision of the Council in all cases. Nor will it be likely that they would undertake the obligation to enforce it on other States in all cases. But it would still be the function of the World Council and particularly the Great Powers on it, to see that
disputes did not threaten peace and security, and for the other States to cooperate with it to the utmost of their power for that purpose, so that there would still be large opportunities for action to deal with even the most difficult disputes.

15. For, as has been indicated, if peace and security are to be maintained, some method must be devised for the settlement of all disputes between States. "Settlement" in this sense may, as is often the case in domestic disputes, show that no remedy exists for a legitimate grievance. But, if States promise to "settle" their disputes in the sense defined in paragraph 8 above, the balance is thrown more in the direction of change. The status quo is sufficiently safeguarded by the mere existence of a universal system for the maintenance of peace and security. Should the dispute be such as to threaten peace and security, it will be for the World Council (and in such cases action will depend largely on the Great Powers) to decide what action should be taken to deal with it.

16. If the dispute involves the Great Powers themselves the machinery for decision may prove inadequate; but there is hope that the habit of cooperative leadership in the settlement of other disputes and the restraints imposed by their own promises to one another and to other States may suffice to achieve a settlement, even where the machinery seems to be inadequate to do so. Much will depend on whether a sufficient number of States, great and small, come to attach so much importance to the preservation of the system that they are prepared to run risks and make sacrifices to support and preserve it.

17. There was considerable agreement in the period between the two wars that the vague words of Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations were hardly a sufficient recognition of the fact that there must be a change in the world. When, in the thirties, it was perceived that there was no great desire in some countries to go to war to defend some of the frontiers erected by the Peace Treaties, there was much discussion of a process which became known as "peaceful Change". Examination of this concept shows that it cannot be obtained by a clause in a Covenant, but can only be a continual process achieved through discussion and compromise between the Great Powers and, in their...
due place, the smaller States concerned. But it is essential that such a process be guided by principle and subject to an ordered procedure, and it is necessary, therefore, that it should take place within an international organisation.

18. It may be hoped that the international functional organisations which are being brought into existence will contribute to furthering the process of peaceful change in an orderly manner.

III. THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES

19. In considering this question the history of the guarantees given in the Covenant of the League of Nations must be taken into account, since it throws great light on the nature of the problem. For by Article X the Members of the League "undertook to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members". The formula had first been devised by President Wilson for the Western Hemisphere and it was at his instance that it was applied universally. No method was laid down as to how the obligation should be carried out except that the Council should "advise" upon that question.

20. Territorial Integrity - There was much opposition to the proposed Article, attention being concentrated on the question of "territorial integrity". Lord Cecil suggested that the guarantee should be withdrawn if the State concerned refused to accept a modification of frontier desired by a large majority of the members of the League of Nations. The vague phraseology of Article XIX of the Covenant was all that resulted from this proposal. Mr. Lansing and Dr. Miller were also opposed to inserting Article X, though the latter came to believe that it made little difference. Sir Robert Borden tried to abolish it before the Covenant was signed, and the Canadian Delegation renewed the attempt of the First Assembly. In 1923 an interpretative resolution was adopted by the Assembly (though as Persia dissented it had no legal force) which laid down that it was for each State to decide how it should carry out its obligations under this head, while the Council was to take into account, in any advice that it might give, the geographical situation and special conditions of each State.
21. In fact, Article X was hardly ever used in the disputes which came before the League of Nations. But it was constantly referred to when some State wished to remind others that its existing frontiers were guaranteed by them. It was also constantly used by critics of the League of Nations to show that its members had guaranteed for all time frontiers which they possessed no legal means of changing without the consent of the State concerned.

22. Much smaller attention has been paid to this subject in recent discussions, though there may, of course, be a shift of interest when the treaties that register any changes of frontier which may be made come into existence. There is, however, reason to think that many States will be more interested in the establishment of some concrete security system ready for immediate action than in guarantees of frontiers which in themselves do little to prevent the invasion and occupation of territory by the armed forces of another State.

23. Many other States would be likely to refuse to accept an organisation which committed them to a guarantee of the territorial integrity of all States.

24. It is suggested, therefore, that no such guarantee be included in the obligations undertaken by members of the Organisation.

25. Political Independence - The question of "political independence" raises issues of a rather different character. The Moscow Declaration has already based the Organisation on the "sovereign equality" of all States, which implies that the members of the Organisation will retain legal control over their own actions except in so far as they agree by treaty to limit it. All States naturally attach the highest value to their political independence, and the principal statesmen have made repeated declarations that they intend to respect the independence of other States.

26. But an undertaking to respect the political independence of other States does not necessarily involve a commitment to guarantee it. It is, moreover, not easy to define exactly what political independence is. One State may control the actions of another.
State by indirect means. It is impossible to distinguish the line which divides such actions from what is generally regarded as the legitimate influence which one State may exercise on the actions of another. The objection to any guarantee of "political independence", therefore is that it could only extend to external and legal forms. It could not take into account more indirect methods.

27. For this reason the inclusion of a guarantee of political independence in the obligations of the Organisation seems undesirable. But it should be recognized that mutual respect for the political independence of its members is one of the essential principles of the Organisation as already pointed out in Part I of Memorandum A.

28. The Maintenance of International Peace and Security - By the Covenant of the League, States undertook to inflict sanctions on another State which broke its promises to submit a dispute to pacific settlement and resorted to war. It was for each State to determine its own actions after the Council (or Assembly) had declared that the occasion for action had arisen. Doubt was constantly expressed as to the sufficiency of this promise, though, so far as words can guarantee action, a definite promise was made. But the duty of enforcing action to be taken was laid on the members.

29. Also by Article XI of the Covenant the duty of safeguarding the "peace of nations" was laid on the League, but no specific obligations as regards the action to be taken were laid on the members.

30. The Four Powers have already, by Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration, laid down that the main purpose of the international organisation is the "maintenance of international peace and security," and have asserted by Article 5 that "they will consult with one another and, as occasion requires, with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations" for this purpose until a system of general security is inaugurated. It would seem that it is along these lines that any guarantee should be given.

31. The duty of cooperating to the utmost of their power in the maintenance of international peace and security
security should be undertaken by all members of the Organisation. The degree of such cooperation must obviously depend on the geographical situation of States, the amount of their resources, their own internal situation and possibly other factors which cannot be accurately weighed in advance. But the duty of cooperating to the utmost of their power in an Organisation which is essential to the peace and security of all should be laid upon all members.

32. The duty of maintaining international peace and security should be laid in the first instance on the World Council acting on behalf of the other members of the Organisation. It will be for the World Council to take the initiative to give effect to the undertaking to maintain international peace and security. The Head of the Secretariat should, however, as suggested in paragraph 38 of Memorandum A be given the right to bring before the Council any matter which in his opinion threatened international peace and security.

33. It is for consideration whether any special obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security should be explicitly assumed within the permanent Organisation by the Four Powers who have undertaken such a responsibility pending the establishment of a general system.

34. If regional organisations are set up for security purposes, part of the responsibility in the first instance might fall on them, but, as is suggested in Memorandum A, paragraph 18, not in such a manner as to conflict with the final responsibility of the World Council for the maintenance of peace and security.

IV. THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

35. It is generally recognised that there must be some statement in the constitution of the Organisation as to the conditions in which action is taken to maintain international peace and security. In the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the attempts to elaborate the Covenant great attention was given to this question.

36. In
36. In the Covenant the sanctions of Article XVI came into force only if there was resort to war after a Member had broken the promises made in Articles XII-XIV. Even then each State necessarily determined for itself whether the *casus foederis* had arisen.

37. In Article X the guarantees were against "external aggression" only. It was by this article that the unfortunate word "aggression" was introduced into the Covenant and became the subject of so many debates at Geneva. But the more the word was discussed the more difficult it became to define exactly what it meant. The definition of aggression was considered important because it was thought that it might affect the right of the Council to advise that sanctions be employed. The most notable contribution to the debate was the suggestion that aggression should be determined by the acceptance or refusal of arbitration or some other peaceful method of settling disputes. But this did not cover the preparations for aggression, nor did it take the time element sufficiently into account. Moreover, the discussion and analysis of aggression enabled States to use a procedure calculated to defeat the objects of the Covenant. Illustration of this fact was given by the Japanese attack on China in Manchuria.

38. In Article XI sanctions were not mentioned, and the obligations of the Council were stated in the most general terms. These obligations could be interpreted as giving the right to take drastic action, but in the light of other articles it was difficult to find in them any right to use force against a State. In actual practice a number of dangerous situations that arose between small States were dealt with successfully under Article XI, and a technique which involved such matters as the setting up of commissions of enquiry and the establishment of neutral zones was gradually developed.

39. In the Protocol of 1924 an attempt was made to make the sanctions "automatic" by setting up an elaborate set of rules. But the discussions showed that such a course was impossible. Sanctions depend upon the will of Governments and peoples and cannot be automatically brought into existence.
40. As has been noted above, one test of aggression is the acceptance or refusal of some method of settling the dispute. But the acceptance may be merely a method of delay while preparations for aggression are being made (as in the case of Italy's attack on Abyssinia) or actual force is used (as in Japan's attack on China). It can be argued that in both these cases the lack of effective action was due not to any defect in the Articles of the Covenant but to the lack of will on the part of the other States, and notably of the Great Powers involved, to go to war with the recalcitrant State. But it was also true that Japan was able to use her right of veto under Article XI to place obstacles in the way of the necessary enquiry, and that preventive action against Italy, before she attacked, was difficult to take legally under the Covenant. Under the Locarno Treaties the signatory States could act without League authority in the case of "flagrant aggression," but not preventively. If the question of Germany's rearmament had been brought before the Council it is not easy to see what sanctions could have been taken against her under the Covenant.

41. In actual fact there was never any doubt, in the cases in which the League of Nations was concerned, as to the identity of the aggressor, though sometimes as to the character of the provocation to aggression. States, it is true, adapted their actions and procedure to the language and resolutions adopted at Geneva and later to the Pact of Paris. But in no case were the real intentions and motives of the aggressive States concealed from the Governments of the other members of the League or from public opinion. The discussions at the Council and the Assembly made them sufficiently clear.

42. This experience suggests that too rigid a definition of the occasion for action is as likely to hinder as to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security. If the World Council is given power to act for this purpose it will be able to work out for itself the necessary procedure in the light of experience. It will be easier also in such circumstances to refer matters to regional associations if any such come into existence which can be used for that purpose.

43. At the same time the principles and objects governing the actions of members will have been laid down.
down in the Preamble to the document bringing the Organisation into existence. These, as suggested in Part I of Memorandum A, should include not only the maintenance of peace and security but also respect for the "sovereign equality" and "political independence" of its Members. If, therefore, it is laid down that the World Council shall only take action in accordance with these principles and objects, action for other purposes will be excluded. It is suggested that States will be protected from arbitrary action by the World Council as much by this safeguard as by elaborate definition, while the World Council will be more free to act to protect States from violence.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

44. As to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes:

(1) That all States should promise to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

(ii) That justiciable disputes should generally be decided by a Permanent Court of International Justice.

(iii) That other disputes should be subjected to a process of discussion and conciliation in the World Council, which should have power to determine the procedure to be followed without the consent of the parties to the dispute.

45. As to Guarantees:

(1) That all Members should undertake to co-operate to the utmost of their power in the maintenance of international peace and security, and that the World Council should be required to take the initiative for this purpose.

(ii) That no guarantee should be given of the territorial integrity of Members.

(iii) That no guarantee should be given of the political independence of Members, but that respect for it should be recognised as one of the principles of the organisation.
46. As to the conditions in which action should be taken for the maintenance of peace and security:

That there should be no attempt to lay down in advance any rigid definition of the occasions on which such action should be taken, but that the members of the Organisation and the World Council should only be empowered to take action in accordance with the principles and objects of the Organisation.
MEMORANDUM C: SECURITY

THE MILITARY ASPECT OF ANY POST-WAR SECURITY ORGANISATION

INTRODUCTION.

1. The Moscow Declaration on General Security contemplates the creation, at the earliest possible date, of an international organisation charged with the maintenance of world peace and security. This organisation is to be founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and all such States are to be eligible for membership.

2. An attempt is made in the present paper to sketch out the general lines on which the organisation of International Security might be attempted after the conclusion of the present war. The proposals deal, however, with the form which the Permanent Security Organisation might eventually take and do not relate to the intervening period. During this last period it is evident that some temporary arrangements will have to be made, but these will be obviously affected if there is some previous general agreement as to the form which the permanent organisation might assume.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

NATURE OF THE ORGANISATION.

3. The proposed world organisation, whatever its form, is bound to fail unless:


(b) The Governments and peoples of those Powers at least retain the will to enforce peace.

(c) The organisation is simple, its objects are clear-cut, and the machinery is of a kind to which member States are already accustomed.
THE OBJECTS.

4. The objects should be:-
   (a) to disarm Germany and Japan;
   (b) to keep them disarmed, and
   (c) to prevent them or any other aggressor from again upsetting the peace of the world.

THE MEANS.

5. The proposed organisation will have to rely, in the main, on the combined military forces of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Four Powers, working together to a common end. Most of the States concerned are already accustomed to such a system.

6. Economic measures, also, may operate to deter potential aggressors, but unless backed by force or the effective threat of it are unlikely to prove an adequate check on a State which is, itself, ready to resort to force.

THE IDEA OF AN "INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE".

7. In some quarters it is contended that the co-ordination of military forces could best be expressed in a completely international "Police Force". Whatever its theoretical merits, this postulates a greater advance in international co-operation than States are yet prepared to make, as it implies the existence of a world State. Practical questions of size, composition, maintenance, location and command would give rise to controversies on which international agreement would almost certainly be unobtainable.

8. We conclude that the time has not yet come for the creation of such an international force.

PROPOSALS.

HIGHER MILITARY ORGANISATION.

9. The proposed world organisation implies the existence
existence of some sort of World Council. This Council will need military advice and this advice will have to be given by States, not individually but in concert. Apart from the "strategic" side of the work, e.g., the preparation of plans to resist potential aggression, there are a number of general questions such as the regulation of armaments on which combined military advice will be required.

10. If the Higher Military Organisation is to advise the World Council and provide machinery whereby plans can be made in advance and the efforts of the forces of member States co-ordinated, it follows that it must form part of, and receive directions from, the World Council.

11. It thus becomes clear that there will have to be Military Staff Committee serving the World Council.

**Composition of the Military Staff Committee.**

12. Since for many years to come the Four Powers will have to play the predominant part in safeguarding world peace, the permanent members of this Committee should be the military representatives of those Powers. The co-operation of States other than the Four Powers will, however, be essential in providing forces and making available bases, shipping and other facilities, and these States will expect to be given a voice corresponding to their obligations. These States should, therefore, be associated in some form or other with the work of the Military Staff Committee. The form which this association should take raises difficult problems, and must depend to a considerable extent on the form which the World Council itself takes. As a beginning, the Committee might be strengthened, when dealing with particular security problems, by the addition of military representatives of States having special concern with the question under discussion.

13. It
13. It is important that the members of the World Council should not receive military advice from more than one source. It is, therefore, essential that the members of the Military Staff Committee should be the supreme military authorities in their own countries, or their representatives.

FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE.

14. The primary duty of the Committee would be to prepare and keep up to date plans for the prevention of any renewed aggression by Germany or Japan, or by any other State which might at any time give signs of becoming an aggressor. The Committee would also be responsible for any necessary co-ordination of the national forces of the member States.

FORCE AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE WORLD COUNCIL.

15. For the purpose of dealing with major aggression, it is contemplated that, when necessary, the full resources of all member States would be made available. To deal with minor emergencies, part of the obligation to be assumed by member States would be the earmarking of a quota of their national forces or other resources to be at the disposal of the Council. It would be for the World Council to decide, on the advice of the Military Staff Committee:

(i) What the size and composition of the quotas of individual States should be.

(ii) In the event of an emergency arising, what particular forces should be called upon to deal with it.

16. The mere existence of national forces and their availability in emergency would not, however, by itself, suffice to ensure the maintenance of security, even if plans for their employment were made in advance by the Military Staff Committee. It would be essential that these forces should have worked together in time of peace if their co-operation were to be smooth and efficient in time of emergency.
In this connexion it is difficult to exaggerate the psychological effect of constant co-operation.

**CO-OPERATION BETWEEN FORCES OF DIFFERENT STATES.**

17. In time of peace co-operation could best be fostered:

   (a) By the joint garrisoning or occupation of certain areas; and

   (b) By means of joint cruises and flights, and other joint exercises.

The method by which these objects should be achieved would require detailed study, and the necessary rights and facilities for joint garrisoning or occupation, joint exercise and joint access to ports and airfields, would have to be secured by agreement between member States and, where necessary, by expressed provisions in the peace treaties with enemy States.

**REGIONS**

18. There is considerable support for the suggestion that, for purposes of an international security system, the world should be divided into fixed regions, each containing forces which, under the supreme control of a World Council, would be responsible for preventing aggression in that region. It has been argued that such an arrangement would limit the military commitments of the smaller States and increase efficiency and rapidity of action.

19. From a military point of view, there are certain objections to a world organisation constructed on a basis of separate regions. These objections may be stated as follows:

   (a) It is impossible to draw a boundary of a region so as to confine within it all military operations which the member States in that region might have to undertake.

   (b) If
(b) If an attempt were made to fix the operational boundary of a region, States on the perimeter would necessarily form part of the neighbouring geographical region. Thus neighbouring regions would overlap extensively.

(c) The defence arrangements of some Powers are based primarily on sea and air power, which do not lend themselves to regionalisation.

The advantages of regional organisation may be summarised as follows:

(a) The main attraction of a regional political organisation is that it would give the smaller nations a more direct concern in security problems, and so encourage their cooperation in security measures, thus reducing the burden on the Four Powers.

(b) Regional organisation might increase the efficiency and rapidity of both political and military action by member States of the region.

(c) A regional organisation, through its attached military staff, would facilitate military co-operation between the States concerned.

20. An argument in favour of the proposals contained in this paper is that the suggested military organisation is not dependent on the existence of regional political councils, yet could be adapted to a regional system if the latter proved desirable on political grounds. In such a case the Military Staff Committee would serve to co-ordinate the activities of the military staffs attached to the regional organisations.

CONCLUSIONS.

21. Our conclusions, therefore, are as follows:

(a) Any complete international "Police Force" is impracticable in present circumstances.

(b) The
(b) The success of any world security organisation depends on the whole-hearted co-operation of the principal member States and on their resolution to use force to prevent aggression.

(c) The object, in the first instance, of any world security organisation should be the prevention of renewed aggression by Germany and Japan.

(d) Forces to support the World Council would have to be placed by member States at its disposal in the manner contemplated in paragraph 15.

(e) Military advice and direction would be afforded to such World Council as may be set up by a military staff composed of the supreme military authorities of appropriate Member States or their representatives.

(f) National forces associated for the above purpose should train and work together in peace to the greatest possible extent.

(g) There would be some military difficulty in the division of the world for security purposes into fixed geographical regions, but, if Regional Political Councils were set up as part of some world organisation, it would follow that they should have Military Advisory Staffs, and this might facilitate local co-operation.

NOTE - It will be noticed that the system proposed above differs from the system which existed prior to the war in the following three main points:

(a) The establishment of an effective Military Staff Committee of the World Council with power to formulate plans and to co-ordinate the action of national forces prior to any emergency which may necessitate their action.

(b) The joint garrisoning of certain areas by combined detachments of national forces.

(c) The
(c) The training and exercising together of national forces in peace time, making use of certain specified seaports and airfields.
1. There will inevitably be set up, as part of the permanent international system, a number of specialised international bodies dealing with economic and social questions. Some of these bodies have already been considered in considerable detail, e.g. the Permanent Organisation for Food and Agriculture. Others are in earlier stages of development. There are already in existence the technical organisations attached to the League of Nations, such as those which deal with Health, the abolition of the Drug Traffic, Transport etc.

2. It will be necessary to make provision -

(a) to co-ordinate the activities of these bodies on their technical side;

(b) to bring them into relation with the World Organisation.

3. The obvious methods by which these objects can be achieved are by means of discussions both between the specialised organisations themselves and in the World Organisation, and by means of an economic and social secretariat attached to the World Council.

4. No doubt some form of consultation will be arranged between the specialised bodies themselves so that their activities may be directed towards a common end. This co-ordination will be assisted by the existence of an economic and social secretariat attached to the World Council. The specialised international bodies should also have the obligation of sending reports to the World Organisation as well as to their constituent members. These reports can be considered and discussed in the World Organisation, so far as it is desirable to do so, in order to facilitate co-operation between the specialised bodies and the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. These discussions will be assisted by the existence of an economic and social secretariat attached to the World Council, and there may thus come into being for economic and social questions an equivalent to the machinery which (see Memorandum A, paragraph 38) will, it is hoped, be in existence for political questions.
MEMORANDUM E.

METHOD AND PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHING
A WORLD ORGANISATION.

1. It may be hoped that the exchange of memorenda and preliminary discussions between the four powers will result in a considerable measure of agreement. The question thus arises how such agreement shall be recorded, in what form it shall be submitted to the four Governments for their approval, and how and when the views of the other United Nations shall be obtained.

2. In Article 4 of the Moscow Declaration the Four powers recognised the necessity of establishing an international organisation "at the earliest practicable date," and an obligation lies on them to make every effort to fulfil this promise.

3. Moreover, if agreement can be obtained between the United Nations on a definite scheme to maintain international peace and security a new hope will arise in the world which may do much to render less difficult the painful process of reconstruction. The reception of the Moscow Declaration by public opinion shows how anxious the world is to receive some assurance that such a scheme is ready for adoption.

4. There appear to be considerable advantages in obtaining at the earliest possible moment agreement on the essentials of the permanent International Organisation, leaving the more detailed working out of its several parts to a later stage.

5. If it is decided to set up any regional associations in any part of the world it will be much easier to fashion them in accordance with a general plan after the outline of the World Organisation has been determined.

6. Moreover.
6. Moreover, the existence of such an agreement will facilitate negotiation for the establishment of specialised and technical bodies. It will also make possible the adaptation of such parts of the temporary machinery set up immediately after the war as it is desired to incorporate in the permanent Organisation.

7. In the Moscow Declaration the Four Powers have assumed a responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security pending the establishment of a general system of security. This duty is likely to be less onerous if the other United Nations, and possibly States now neutral, are associated with the Four Powers for that purpose at the earliest possible date. In this way the new permanent Organisation will more quickly become a reality and take its proper position in the new world community.

8. Moreover, the Treaties of Peace will be more easily made if the form and character of the new permanent organisation are already known. Solutions of difficult problems will be more easily found and there is less likelihood of decisions being made which are incompatible with the terms of the permanent organisation.

9. It is suggested, therefore, that the aim of the preliminary talks at Washington should be to reach such agreement as can be referred to the four Governments in the form of a Draft Declaration, similar to that signed at Moscow but containing in its several clauses a more extended survey of the objects and principles of the permanent International Organisation and an outline of the machinery which it is proposed to set up to obtain them.

10. It may be necessary to omit from the draft Declaration many important particulars, e.g., the exact methods by which the members of the World Council are chosen and their number. Some of these points may perhaps be left to the new organisation itself to determine. But it may be hoped that agreement may be obtained on what political bodies shall be set up, e.g., a World Assembly, a World Council and a World Court; on the principles on which action will be taken for the pacific settlement of disputes
and the maintenance of international peace and security; on the necessity for agreeing some permanent method by which the military forces necessary to maintain international peace and security can be co-ordinated; and on the principles which shall govern the relations of the specialised organisations with one another and with the World Council and World Assembly.

11. It will then be for the Governments of the four powers to determine how far they can approve the draft Declaration and it may be necessary to have a more formal exchange of views between them for this purpose.

12. If agreement is thus obtained it will be necessary to communicate it to the other United Nations for consideration, and immediately thereafter to publish it. After a suitable interval the United Nations would be invited to attend a Conference at which the Declaration, with such amendments as had been found desirable, would be definitely adopted.

13. It should then be possible to set up a body to work out a more detailed instrument in the form of a Convention or Treaty on the lines of the Declaration. It would be the coming into force of this instrument, after the ordinary procedure required for ratification, which would bring the permanent organisation into existence. The exact date on which it was put into force might well be left to be determined by the four powers who are specially responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security in the interim period.

14. This method would have the advantage that, while the permanent organisation can, of course, only be brought into existence with the full consent of the Governments concerned after they have consulted the peoples which they represent, its form and character will have been to a large extent decided in consequence of the adoption of the Declaration. Many of the Governments of the United Nations might find it impossible to sign a treaty at that stage. Some of them may not survive the transition from war to peace. But many of them could record their agreement to a Declaration of the kind described and so prepare the way for themselves or their successors to take part in the preparation and signature of the final instrument.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.--At this stage, the Executive Council should not be given the right to impose the terms of settlement of a dispute. Its functions should be to promote peaceful settlement, to make recommendations to the parties, and to settle disputes only on the request of the parties.

2. Voting by Great Powers.--The votes of great powers involved in cases before the Council should not be counted in the Council's decisions with respect to such cases.

3. Election of Council Members.--We should accept a procedure under which one-half of the non-permanent seats would be filled every year, thus providing for a two-year rather than one-year term.

4. Number of Permanent Seats.--If necessary, we should accept a modification of our present proposal as regards France in the sense that she would be given a permanent seat on the Council when she has a government
recognized by the four major powers and that, in the meantime, she would have provisional representation without the prerogatives of a permanent member. At the same time, we should raise the question of giving Brazil a permanent seat.

5. **Vote in the Council.**—We should accept a provision for a two-thirds, rather than a simple majority, vote in the Council, except for minor decisions.

6. **Withdrawal and Suspension.**—Our position should be against the inclusion of provisions for withdrawal and suspension.

7. **Ad Hoc Judges.**—We should make it clear that we regard the principle of *ad hoc* judges as unwholesome, but we should not raise the question too sharply because we ourselves would always have a judge on the Court. We should accept the proposition if other countries insist, but express a hope that eventually the system would disappear.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I think the President will need
this for his study this evening.

Many thanks!

[Signature]
August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

As agreed in my conversation with you this morning, I attach hereto a brief outline of the differences in the papers on World Security as presented by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

[Signature]
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

August 19, 1944  

CHECK LIST OF  
ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES, THE BRITISH, AND  
THE SOVIET PROPOSALS  

I. SCOPE OF THE  
ORGANIZATION  

U. S. - The organization should include arrangements both for security and for economic and social cooperation.  

U. K. - Same.  

U.S.S.R. - There should be a separate organization or organizations for economic and social cooperation. Relation to general organization might be discussed later.  

II. FUNCTIONS OF THE  
PRINCIPAL ORGANS  

U. S. - The general assembly and the executive council should have essentially different functions—the assembly for economic and social questions, the council for security. The assembly should have budgetary and electoral functions. Another council or commission, under the assembly, would deal with coordination of economic and social agencies.  

U. K. - The assembly would have less significant functions than in the U. S. plan. It would be the center of discussion, the council the center of action. The same questions presumably could be considered by both the council and the assembly. The assembly might also have budgetary and electoral functions. The executive council would deal with security and with economic and social questions.
U.S.S.R. - Since the Soviet plan contemplates an organization for security alone, both the assembly and the council would deal with the same questions at different levels. The assembly would determine the general principles of cooperation for security and peace, would consider questions of disarmament, would admit and expel members, examine amendments, and deal with budgetary and electoral functions. The council would have primary responsibility for enforcing peace and security and would give preliminary consideration to all security questions which may be included in the assembly agenda.

III. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS

U.S. - Regional organizations should plan an important but subsidiary role in security questions, acting in enforcement matters only on the authorization or request of the executive council. They could take initiative in peaceful settlement or welfare questions. In all cases, they must be consistent with the purposes of the general organization.

U.K. - Greater stress is laid on regional organization in all fields, especially for security. Like U.S. proposal, they should be subject to the guidance of the general organization. They should, however, be under the guidance of the major allies.

U.S.S.R. - No views are presented on regional organization—except that question should be studied.

IV. AIR FORCE

U.S. - No support is presented for an international air force.

U.K. - The time not yet come for the creation of an international force.

U.S.S.R. - An international air force corps should be created, by the council, for taking urgent military measures, in which national air forces would participate.
V. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS
FOR SUPPLY OF FORCES, AND
CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS.

U. S. - Two such special, general, international agreements are proposed to be negotiated at the initiative of the council.

U. K. - This plan differs from the U. S. proposal in making no explicit provision for such special agreements. The council would have full powers in these fields through the basic instrument, not through subsequent special agreements.

U.S.S.R. - Similar to U. S. plan in proposing special agreement on supply of forces—there is no special agreement on armaments regulation proposed (probably influenced by U. S. plan on the first point).

VI. DEGREE OF
FOUR POWER CONTROL

U. S. - Unanimity of four powers in council would be required for security measures (abstention is possible, though the decision would be binding) and for amendment of the basic instrument. (A new voting provision for required abstention by a special vote is under consideration.)

U. K. - Unanimity of four powers would be required for taking security measures, but no mention is made for amendment.

U.S.S.R. - Similar to the British proposal.

VII. MEMBERSHIP IN
THE ORGANIZATION

U. S. - Initial membership should consist of the United Nations, the nations associated with them in the war, and such other nations as the United Nations may determine. Provision for the suspension of any or all rights, and for withdrawal is being considered but not expulsion.
U. K. - Initial membership is confined to United Nations. No reference to the associated nations. Admission of neutrals and of enemy states left for later consideration. Necessary to lay down conditions for state ceasing to be a member (expulsion or withdrawal?). Suspension of rights not mentioned.

U.S.S.R. - Initial membership is confined to the United Nations. Others to be admitted later. Expulsion would be provided for. Suspension of rights not mentioned nor withdrawal.

VIII. INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

U. S. - Proposes (1) Interim Consultative Security Commission, and (2) European High Commission.

U. K. - Some temporary arrangements will have to be made but no specific proposals are advanced.

U.S.S.R. - No proposals are made.

IX. OBJECTS OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS

U. S. - To agree in the first conversations on fundamental features of a plan to be transmitted to other governments for comments with a view to wider agreement preparatory to a conference for drafting and signing the basic instrument.

U. K. - To agree in the first conversations on a draft declaration which should be referred to the four governments for agreement prior to submitting it to the other United Nations for consideration preparatory to a conference to accept the declaration. A special body should draft the detailed instrument for signature and ratification.

U.S.S.R. - Should have a preliminary exchange of views on the most important questions and principles to be agreed on and work out afterwards an agreed upon draft of the three Governments.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations--Third Day

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Organization

We presented a tentative list of topics for discussion which was acceptable to the British, but as the Soviets expressed a desire to talk from their document, that course was followed.

(a) Aims of the International Organization

The aims stated in the Soviet memorandum were generally acceptable, but were thought by our group and by the British to require extension, by inclusion of basic principles and objects of the Organization.

(b) Economic and Social Cooperation

I suggested that the important question of economic and social cooperation be taken up in the Joint Steering Committee.

(c) Principal Organs

We agreed as to the principal organs and that the Organization should be empowered to create necessary subordinate agencies.
(d) General Assembly

After Ambassador Gromyko clarified the Soviet view that the Assembly would discuss and the Council would decide and act, both on security and peace and on arms limitation, we were in substantial agreement. It was understood that the Council would not have to take cognizance of matters referred by the Assembly.

(e) Admission and Expulsion of States

We and the British proposed that admission of states be left to the Assembly. We and the British proposed that there be no reference to withdrawal or expulsion. The Soviet group will consider these views.

(f) The Council

Ambassador Gromyko said his Government desired to have the five permanent members of the Council named in the Basic Instrument and not subject to election. Both the British and the Soviet groups felt that no provision should be made for increasing the number of permanent seats. I suggested that this matter be discussed in the Joint Steering Committee.

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security

We discussed a tentative list of topics presented by our group. These were extended by reference to our proposals relating to security and to the British
memorandum on the military aspects of security. Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander agreed in principle to our proposals concerning (1) determination of the existence of threats to peace or breaches of peace, (2) action to be taken and obligations of member states, (3) measures for the enforcement of decisions, both those not involving the use of armed force and those requiring provision of armed forces and facilities. Both the British and the Russian groups requested that matters of detail be reserved for clarification in the drafting subcommittee.
Conference gets down to business with two closed meetings during which chief delegates present views of their respective govts. on methods for assuring peaceful relations among nations when war is won. Conference now expected to be divided up into small committees to study various concrete problems. It is thought likely that three committees will be necessary to do spadework for meeting—one on political matters, one on military plans, and one on drafting. (Wash., Her-Trib, Polk; Star, Baird)

American plan, as obtained from unimpeachable source by NY Times, is careful to emphasize that U.S. has no intention of proposing 4-power dictatorship on rest of world, but makes quite clear that authority of assembly of all powers should be limited. American plan calls for Executive Council of 4 permanent members and 7 additional members. It stipulates that in order to use force to prevent aggression, 4 permanent members must vote for it unanimously and in addition there must be majority vote of council. It proposes that powers enter "general agreement" on number and type of forces they are obligated to put at disposal of executive council, making it unnecessary for U.S. delegate to return to Congress every time he and majority of council vote to apply force to prevent aggression. U.S. scheme proposes that forces of each country be used in its natural region whenever possible. (Wash., NY Times, Reston)

Russian delegation proposes to discipline aggressor nations by breaking off diplomatic relations, inflicting financial and commercial penalties, cutting off railroad, telegraph and airplane communications, establishing blockade, and making show of military and naval strength. (Wash., Times-Her., Moore)

Gromyko's speech seemed to place more stress on role of great powers in postwar organization than do Anglo-American nations. But U.S. officials do not consider that any wide gulf separates Russian and Anglo-American viewpoints. They hold that it is merely a matter of emphasis. (Wash., Star, Baird)

Senators, in atmosphere devoid of partisanship, join in discussing Dumbarton conference as leading to ultimate happy outcome for world peace. Connally indicates confidence meeting will succeed. Vandenberg says gathering starts "under happiest auspices". Connally assures Taft that Hull has promised to "keep us posted" on progress of conference "day by day if necessary". Single hint of politics occurs when Taft asks Connally about Ambassador Harriman's reported statement that "firm alliance" exists between U.S. and Soviet. Connally says phrase is "rhetorical flourish" and general in meaning, and says "we have assurances from highest sources that no commitments were made at Casablanca, Tehran, or Moscow which would bind this country". (Wash., NY Times, Wood)

Hull assures members of Congress that they will be kept informed of progress of Dumbarton talks. Explains that current meeting is "technical" and that when matters of "policy" become involved he will
continue his practice of advising lawmakers. (Wash., AP, Star)

Explanation of secrecy maintained about details of discussions at Dumbarton Oaks is given to newspapers by press officer of U.S. delegation. He says this is in no sense a dress performance, but rather consists in preliminary and exploratory talks, which may lead to agreement on which full publicity will be given. Declares that in this present stage too much publicity would be misleading, and would not be desired by all delegations present. (Wash., NY Times)

Dulles, on arriving in Wash., tells reporters he brings no specific proposals for conference with Hull, but is hopeful for full exchange of views which would permit agreement between U.S. political parties on future international plans. (Wash., NY Times) Andrews, writing in Her-Trib., sees in Dulles' remarks indication that Dewey is proceeding on assumption that he will be kept fully informed of Dumbarton developments. Describes Dulles as "as careful in his use of language as any State Dept. spokesman ever was". Ward, writing in Sun, says Dulles intimates that one purpose of his visit will be to test bona fides of Roosevelt Administration's professed desire for "bipartisan cooperation in effort to establish lasting peace". Pailey writes in Times-Her., that Dulles, arriving in midst of press censorship imposed by State Dept.'s McCormick, says he hopes bipartisan understanding between Hull and Dewey would not exclude full and free debate as to future world organization and America's part in such a set-up.

Molotov and Harriman voice confidence that Allied powers will shape postwar world free of aggression. Molotov says success of Dumbarton conference is "a result of good will of peace-loving nations and increased consciousness of necessity of dependable guarantees against instigators of new wars". (Moscow, AP, Sun, Post)

Chinese National Herald laments necessity of holding 2 separate conferences at Dumbarton Oaks. Says no doubt this duplication will be rectified in near future when Soviet joins in total war against Axis powers and when all United Nations, large and small, sit in same council. Herald otherwise expresses full support of Dumbarton conference. (Chungking, UP, NY Times, Times-Her)

Britain strongly supports expanding world security organization now being mapped at Wash., into more than alliance for keeping down aggression and making it into agency for wiping out economic and political evils that give rise to war. However, there is no indication that Govt. proposes to make suggestions to other powers at this time. (Lon., Sun, O'Neill)

Polish-American Congress sends memorandum to Hull asking that its support of Atlantic Charter as basis of future world organization be given consideration at Dumbarton conference. (Wash., Times-Her)

COMMENTATORS

Krock, NY Times, August 23: Aspect of U.S. plan for new peace-keeping league which is most likely to divide the country into opposing groups is its alleged provision that if Senate ratifies by treaty the details of our membership on the new League's Council, then Executive will have full warrant to apply force when council votes to use it, without further recourse to Congress.

Sullivan, Her-Trib., August 23: Recommends that Dumbarton conference assure that, upon threat of war, force to repulse the threat will come into action, as nearly automatically as it is possible to achieve.
Constantine Brown, Star, August 22: Secrecy with which State Dept. has decided to cover Dumbarton conference likely to harm rather than help.

Van Devander and Player, NY Post, August 21: There's great deal of bewilderment -- particularly in Chinese circles -- over why China should have to stay away from conference table until after Russia has left. There has been, and will be, no open protest or show of resentment by China, but many Chinese are deeply disappointed over set-up and feel, very privately, that they have been sort of kicked around for no apparent good reason.

EDITORIALS

Sun, August 23: While conference proceeds behind closed doors it will be well for public to remember two points: 1) results will not be binding but will be recommendations to three govts. by their delegations, and 2) there will be no news of actual proceedings except such as State Dept. puts out in formal releases. So long as final decision on policy rests with people, as Hull has formally assured it will, specialized labor of negotiation may properly be allowed to proceed in atmosphere of privacy.

Post, August 23: Two results of secrecy of conference will be: 1) spotlight will be removed from conference which seeks to carve mankind's destiny, and 2) reports that do get out will be compounded of rumor and gossip. American people subsisted on this pabulum in 1919 and result was, as Welles points out, to breed spirit of cynicism in this country toward peacemakers. It is not too late to change this policy.

Daily News, August 22: Harmony presided at opening of Dumbarton conference, but this does that mean that conflicts will not be bared when principles are applied. All three speakers denied Big 3 domination, but no small nation has been invited to participate. They have merely another promise for representation to be added to those of Atlantic Charter, United Nations Declaraton and Moscow Pact.

Star, August 22: Delegates to Dumbarton know what needs to be done, and in a general way, how they propose to do it. What remains is translation of these concepts into a finished plan. Hull outlined the problem at opening of conference in clear and forceful language.

Daily News, August 22: Hull-Dulles meeting reveals that Dewey was not talking to make political impression when he warned against power politics at Dumbarton. If he had, he would have been caught flat-footed by astute Hull, when Hull offered to discuss foreign policy with him.

PM, August 22: Difficulties which confront men at Dumbarton Oaks are enormous. There are differences among Big-4 themselves. Men at Dumbarton Oaks must find some way to reconcile insistence of sovereignty with workable international order, to dress up any agreement in terms palatable to our own Senate. They must not let it be said that they played "power politics", but they must nevertheless play power politics if they are to do their job well.

NY World Telegram, Aug. 21: Our allies should accept Hull-Dulles as evidence that there are no basic party differences in U.S. for pol.
Miss Tully,

The attached is a note covering today's proceedings at Dumbarton Oaks which I believe the President might wish to glance over.

ES
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks
Conversations—Fourth Day

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Organization

(a) Soviet Views Concerning the Council

(1) Settlement of Disputes.--We agreed in principle that the Council should be empowered to consider the settlement of disputes in accordance with the Statute. The British and ourselves felt the power to impose settlement should apply only when a breach of peace is involved. The Soviet group seemed to agree, but the matter is to be studied further.

(2) Provision of Forces.--We agreed, subject to further study, that forces should be provided on the basis of a separate general agreement, subject to the constitutional processes of each state.

(3) Consideration of Matters Pertaining to Peace and Security.--Ambassador Gromyko clarified the Soviet view that the Council should examine all questions relating to peace and security before they are discussed in the Assembly.
(4) Voting.--We and the Soviet group proposed that questions of peace and security be decided by a simple majority including all permanent members, but agreed to consider the British preference for a two-thirds majority.

The British favored excluding from voting a state party to a dispute, on grounds that the veto power of a permanent member might prove difficult for smaller countries to accept. We called attention to our interest in this matter. The Russians are studying the subject.

(b) American Views on the Organization

(1) General Assembly.--We proposed and the British agreed that the Assembly might examine representations and reports on matters of concern to the Organization, and act on matters not allocated to other organs. The Soviet group felt that matters relating to security should be brought to the Assembly by the Council, and they reserved judgment on our proposal that the Assembly make recommendations for peaceful adjustment of questions affecting general welfare.

(2) Amendment.--Our view was accepted in principle that amendments should be proposed by a simple majority of the Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the states, including the permanent members of the Council. The British felt that imposition of an amendment on the remaining one-third might offer difficulties.
(3) **Voting.**—The differences between our proposal and the Soviet view on voting in the Assembly appeared to be a matter of drafting. Both views were generally acceptable to the British.

(4) **The Council.**—We suggested that non-permanent members be elected for one year but agreed to consider the British proposal of three years with rotating retirement, and the Soviet view of one or two years. It was agreed in principle that states not on the Council should attend and be heard on matters affecting them. The British suggested that such states might be given the right to vote on matters not affecting peace and security. Our view was that such matters would not ordinarily be a concern of the Council.

**Meeting of the Legal Subcommittee**

The subcommittee discussed the American views on the International Court. The British commented but the Soviet group reserved comment until later except to agree the Court should be part of the Organization.

**Meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee**

Military representatives discussed the provision of forces, particularly the Soviet view that an international air force corps should be integrated and under the direct control of the Council.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations--Fifth Day

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

This meeting, the only one held today, was the most important of the entire conversations so far.

(a) Relation of the World Organization to Economic and Social Matters

This important topic, which when previously raised had been postponed for future discussion, was considered fully for the first time.

(1) Unity of British and American Views.--The British indicated that they are prepared to accept our views that an Economic and Social Council should be created and should be an organ of the Assembly.

(2) Full Presentation and Discussion of Soviet Views.--The Russians earnestly and exhaustively argued that the League's experience demonstrates that an intermingling in the same organization of responsibilities for both the maintenance of peace and for economic and social matters will work out to the detriment of security. We presented at length our reasons for
believing that the general organization must concern itself with all matters which bear upon the maintenance of conditions conducive to peace. We also urged that our proposal not only accomplishes this but leaves the executive Council free to concentrate on the primary task of security, thus obviating the defects in the League's structure. We were encouraged by the attention which Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Sobolev paid to our arguments. It was agreed that Ambassador Gromyko would report fully to his Government.

(b) **Regional Organizations**
   We agreed to postpone consideration of this topic.

(c) **Composition of the Executive Council**
   We agreed to postpone consideration of this topic.

(d) **Expulsion and Withdrawal of Members**
   Ambassador Gromyko insisted that the power of expulsion is desirable for the "discipline" of members. The British, as a substitute, proposed suspending the privileges of membership of those states against which action is taken by the Council. This proposal was tentatively accepted, ad referendum.

(e) **Should the Council make Decisions by 2/3 or Majority Vote?**
   We stated that we could agree to the British proposal that important questions should be decided by a 2/3
vote (including the unanimous vote of members having permanent seats on the Council). Ambassador Gromyko indicated no dissent and said he would inform his Government.

(f) **Should Parties to a Dispute Vote?**

We agreed to state our views early next week.

(g) **Composition of Military Staff Committee**

The British clarified their proposal and said their military authorities regard it as of very great importance. We agreed to present our view on the British proposal next week. There was also tentative discussion, with little apparent divergence of view, of the question of the supreme commander for joint security forces.

(h) **International Court of Justice**

There appeared to be general agreement (1) that there should be a Court, (2) that the Court should be a part of the Organization, and (3) that there should be no attempt to draft the actual Statute of the Court during these conversations.

(i) **Authority of Council to make its Decisions Obligatory**

There appeared to be tentative agreement with the British proposal that the Council should have authority to make its recommendation obligatory in any dispute involving a clear threat to peace when all other methods of settlement have failed.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations--Sixth Day

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

The Committee continued to discuss the topics of which consideration had been begun last Friday.

(a) Expulsion and Withdrawal of Members

 Ambassador Gromyko stated that the tentative opinion of the Soviet group now is that the proposal made by the British last Friday for suspension of the privileges of membership should be regarded not as a substitute for the Soviet proposal for expulsion but as a proposal for action in addition to expulsion.

(b) Composition of the Council

(1) Possible Permanent Seat for Brazil.--In response to a question by Ambassador Gromyko, we indicated that at some later stage of the discussions we may wish to propose that there be added to the number of permanent members of the Council some one of the Latin American countries. We mentioned Brazil specifically, in reply to another question by Ambassador Gromyko.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he would inform his
Government, commenting that he doubted if they had contemplated the possibility of such a proposal. He thought that if the number of permanent seats were increased beyond five there would be considerable difficulties. The Russians want only five permanent seats.

(2) Statua of France.—There appeared to be general agreement upon the desirability of a permanent seat being reserved for France, regardless of whether or not a government of France has been formally recognized by the time the Organization is formed.

(3) Number and Tenure of Non-Permanent Members.—There seemed to be general agreement that there should be six non-permanent members and there was tentative agreement, ad referendum, with the Soviet proposal for a two-year term.

(c) Vote of Permanent Member Involved in a Dispute

We stated that we had come to the conclusion that a state involved in a dispute should not vote on matters affecting that dispute and that this rule should apply to all members. There ensued a full discussion in which we explained carefully the reasoning which had led us to our present position in which we were strongly supported by the British. The Soviet representatives stated that they considered our proposal to be in violation of and a "retreat" from the basic principle that major decisions of the Organization should be arrived at on the basis
of unanimity among the great powers. They maintained their prior position that a special procedure should be worked out to govern instances in which one of the states having a permanent seat may be involved in a dispute and indicated that a specific Soviet proposal on this might be forthcoming later.

(d) Initial Membership of the Organization

We discussed this topic at the request of Ambassador Gromyko and there appeared to be general agreement with our proposal that initial membership would include the United Nations and associated nations.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that all of the 16 Soviet republics should be included among the initial members of the Organization. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he had no comment on the Ambassador's statement at this stage but he remarked that he believed his Government will have to talk to the Soviet Government about the general question of the international status of the Soviet republics. We said that we would have to think about the Ambassador's statement.

Meetings of New Formulation Groups

Pursuant to arrangements arrived at in Friday's meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, small formulating groups of the Organization Subcommittee and of the Security Subcommittee met this afternoon to draw together the work which has been done by these Subcommittees and to put this work into form suitable for approval by the Joint Steering Committee.
MATTERS TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. Status of France - Apparent general agreement that fifth permanent seat on Council should be reserved for France.

2. Brazil on Council - We proposed a sixth permanent seat and mentioned Brazil - Soviets want only five - British probably want only five also.

3. Sixteen Soviet Republics - Grozyko said all sixteen Soviet republics should be initial members of the organization.

4. Votes of Members Involved in Disputes - We stated our position that "guilty" party should not vote in own case - British supported us - Soviets said this "violates" principle of unanimity of Big Four.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Statement to the Press on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations

In accordance with your suggestion, I proposed to Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan that paragraph No. 2 of the attached statement to the press should be amended to read:

"A council composed of a smaller number of members in which the principal States will be joined by a greater number of other States to be elected periodically."

This suggestion was not acceptable to Ambassador Gromyko and we were able to agree only upon the statement as given.
August 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations--Seventh Day

Meetings of the Formulation Group on General Organization

The formulation group of the Subcommittee on General Organization, meeting Monday and today, has reached tentative agreement on the following aspects of the International Organization:

I. Purposes

To maintain peace and security through effective collective measures for the prevention and suppression of threats to or breaches of the peace; to adjust or settle peacefully disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace; to develop friendly relations among nations; to serve as a center for harmonizing the action of nations for these ends. We and the British agreed that the Organization should achieve international cooperation on economic, social and technical matters, but the Soviet group, while constructively participating in discussion of this point, reserved judgment pending instructions.
II. **Principles**

The Organization will act in accordance with the following principles: the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states; fulfillment by all members of the obligations assumed in accordance with the basic instrument; settlement of all disputes by peaceful means not endangering peace and security; avoidance of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with these purposes; and no assistance to a state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken.

III. **Membership**

Membership should be open to the United Nations and all other peace-loving states; initial members should be the United Nations (the Soviet group reserves judgment as to whether "the nations associated with them" should be included); states not initial members should be admitted individually after adoption of the basic instrument and in accordance with regulations in it.

IV. **Principal Organs**

An assembly, a council, an international court, a general secretariat, and such additional organs, councils, commissions or agencies as may be found necessary.
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

We reviewed and rather promptly reached agreement, with very minor revisions, on the draft statements of the formulation group, summarized above.

The ease and the dispatch with which agreement was reached on these matters was encouraging.

We also agreed easily upon the schedule of meetings to be followed tomorrow and the next day. The arrangements at which we have arrived for considering and disposing of the various matters under discussion seem to be working smoothly and effectively.
News Stories

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

No. 207a

**NEWS DIGEST**

August 29, 1944

DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE SUPPLEMENT

**NEWS STORIES**

Senator Bridges cautions in Senate against secrecy imposed on Dumbarton conference, and says Congress will "not stand for double-talk" surrounding U.S. proposals for an international peace organization. From what he has learned of U.S. proposal, he says, a projected assembly representing all nations "will be a debating society with no power save to discuss and advise" and "all power will be in the council which will be in the hands of the big four". Sen. Hill says Sen. Bridges is disturbed by rumors, and should reserve his criticism until he sees what conference does, Sen. Bridges draws no support from his fellow Republicans during his clash with Sen. Hill. (Wash., all papers)

Paul Ward, writing in Sun, sees Bridges' attack as a rift developing in Republican-Democratic truce over issue of devising postwar successor to League of Nations. **NY Times** story points out that as matter of fact the secrecy concerning Dumbarton talks has not been ironclad for a great part of basic plan submitted to delegates has been published in **NY Times**, and suggests that Sen. Bridges evidently made use of these articles.

Chiefs of U.S., Brit., and Russian delegations agree to hold press conference at Dumbarton Oaks this morning; Stettinius, Cadogan, and Gromyko decide to hold press conference after week in which State Dept. was bombarded with complaints of "secret diplomacy". Hull discloses at his press conference that delegates will attempt to give to press in their communiques "something with a little more substance" than contained in announcements made so far. (Wash., Post, Folliard; **NY Times**) Asked if he had shared information about Dumbarton conference with Dulles, Hull tells press conference "I talked with him as I would to a Senator." (Wash., **NY Times**)

Dr. Wellington Koo arrives at National Airport and thus rounds out roster of Big-4 representatives in Wash. Stettinius and Cadogan, accompanied by members of U.S. and Brit. delegations, are on hand to meet Dr. Koo. Conspicuously absent are Gromyko and Russian delegates. Dr. Koo says China is eager to make her contribution to success of conference. (Wash., all papers)

Mr. Kung favors international police force rather than standing armies to maintain world security, he reveals in interview. Emphasizes that he speaks in personal capacity and not for his govt. describes a single world police force paid by all members of new league and operating under an international military commission as ideal and economical way to keep peace. (Wash., Times-Her)

Major topic of discussion among U.S., Soviet and Brit. delegates is method by which proposed international council may decide on action, military or economic, if one or more of Big-6 powers become embroiled in a controversy, it is learned. Success or failure of meeting may turn on this point, according to diplomatic sources. (Wash., Her-Tib, Polk)

Stettinius' dook, Wong Lei, whose great ambition is to shake hands with Dr. Wellington Koo, is at end of line at airport greeting Dr. Koo as he arrives. (Wash., AP, Sun)
Precinct stations of world police force will be spotted at strategic points around globe if plans conceived by some delegates to Dumbarton conference are accepted. A substantial force of Americans, Brit., Dutch, French, Brazilians and Colombians would be stationed somewhere in Caribbean. Powerhouse of military strength would be maintained in China with additional troops in eastern Russia. World's most powerful force would be stationed in Brit., and France. Agreement has not yet been reached on Balkan area, but Turkey is favored by majority of delegates. Talks are reported to have achieved astonishingly good results (Wash., PM, Michie, Aug. 27)

COMMENTS

Childe, Post, Aug. 29: Newspapers protest closing doors policy at Dumbarton Oaks want an end to leaks which result in one or two favored reporters getting news denied to the majority. It is to be understood in which preliminary meeting to organize world security is to be conducted, then public will be fully prepared to understand what is taking place. Behind present dispute is niggardly information policy of State Dept. While there's been marked improvement in recent months, the old tradition of "no news will cause no trouble" is still strong. Question of informing the public is really part of a broader question—whether State Dept. is equipped to wage peace. Here in a small way, by liberalizing the news policy at Dumbarton Oaks, State Dept. can show it is abreast of times.

Lippmann, Post, Aug. 29: There are compelling reasons why liberation of Paris should be followed by invitation to French provisional govt. to participate in Dumbarton conference and European Advisory Commission. Inclusion of France in Dumbarton conference will do what no mechanical formula can possibly do in answering complaint that 3 great military powers seek to dominate the world.

Pusey, Post, Aug. 29: U.S. influence in international affairs would certainly be stronger if commitments to use force to keep the peace should be left to executive discretion. But it is improbable that Congress would ever consent to lodging of so much power in President. Grave danger is that issue of executive control over peace forces, if officially presented, will divide the people and lead to a stalemate such as that which undermined peace of 20 years ago. Adoption of some means of inducing President and Congress to work together in this field is no less urgent than agreement among victorious powers themselves.

EDITORIALS

Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 26: To give American delegates on world council direct access to American armed forces for law enforcement need not be the test case on Congress' Constitutional right to declare war. Given honest information and clear leadership, American people will not long refuse to approve plans for making action in name of the world organization swift and effective.

Chicago Sun, Aug. 26: A decision of the Big Four at Dumbarton Oaks to discipline each other would be desirable but not practicable at the present time. No collective-security system can be established unless the Big Four agree to stick together at least during the years of its early development. It is better to work for attainable strides than to underplay the conference because perfection is not just around the corner.
ITALY—Rome press has given wide coverage to opening of postwar security conference at Dumbarton Oaks with address of Secretary particularly featured. Commenting Deservatore Romano, August 23, expressed fear that victor nations might assume hegemony of world but found comfort in assurances of Secretary that organization of future is to be based on sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.

Italia Nuova, August 24, recalling that attempt at peace after last war failed for many reasons of which chief was probably lack of international police force urges that this force now be set up by all nations on basis of equality (so it will not be mere instrument of power) to preserve peace until world is sufficiently educated in freedom and democracy.

Nenni in Avanti, August 25, refers to developments in war in Europe during recent days as presaging early end of hostilities and says four-power conference from which new association of nations is being watched with anxious expectancy. He warns however that formulae of 1919 will not solve problems of 1944 and asserts that question for tomorrow is not whether frontiers will be drawn here or there but rather one of free circulation of labor and laborers and free access to raw materials.

Corriere Di Roma, August 25, endorses Secretary's remarks and says that in view of fact that all wars have been caused fundamentally by economic maladjustments minor nations may find renewed hope in Secretary's policies and assurances.

TURKEY—Formerly pro-Axis Taegvirifekter editorial, August 23: Mr. Hull's speech inaugurating Dumbarton Oaks' conference was welcomed by Turkish public opinion with great interest. We Turks entertain strong hopes for success of present experiment aimed at establishing international harmony and lasting peace in world. American Secretary of State apparently favors creating armed force for protection of world's peace and security. It will be impossible to achieve durable peace and order unless all nations great and small are granted equal chances for progress, aggression and political intrigues altogether eliminated. If Dumbarton Oaks delegates are merely trying to defend policies of their respective countries, decision of this conference can hardly be expected to bring about stable world order.

UshankaLigi in Son Posta, August 23: American and entire Anglo-Saxon world have apparently concentrated all their attention on problem of protecting tomorrow's peace, relegating to second place for time being matter of actually establishing peace. If under formula of unconditional surrender lie hidden desire not to make definite commitments before final crystallization of future events, then adoption of measures for protection of peace before founding of peace structure itself constitutes important part of well-drawn-up program.

Tent, August 23: In view of continually changing circumstances, future peace no matter how just can only temporarily settle international problems. Consequently establishment of political organization responsible for solution of controversial problems becomes absolute necessity. Most important principle is acceptance by all nations of obligation to submit their problems to such security organization. However such sacrifice of right to sovereignty depends upon nature of tomorrow's peace and sincerity of security organization. Great powers should therefore refrain from making organization tool of their own interests.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

August 30, 1944

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations—Eighth Day

Meeting of the Special Military Subcommittee

(a) Provision of Forces

The Subcommittee, meeting for the first time this week, resumed its discussion of the nature of forces to be provided for enforcement action. Admiral Willson submitted for the American group a formula which would obligate each state to maintain, in accordance with a general agreement, a stipulated quota of air, sea and land forces in readiness for immediate movement upon receipt of an order from the Council. A warning order would indicate at what time these forces would come directly under the command of the Council. Our formula was agreeable to the British but the Russians asked whether it would exclude an international air force corps under direct control of the Council. Our view was that the American formula was more comprehensive than the Soviet proposal because sea and land forces, as well as air forces, as provided for under the agreement, would be subject to control of the Council when and as required. The Soviet group asked for a few days in which to consider the American proposal.
(b) **Composition of the Military Committee of the Council**

The British set forth their view that the four principal powers should be continuously represented on this Committee, presumably by representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other states would be associated with the Committee as occasion arose on a basis to be determined later by the Committee and the Council. The American and Soviet groups were in general accord with this proposal, subject to later agreement upon exact language.

**Meeting of the Subcommittee on General Organization**

The Subcommittee on General Organization, meeting for the first time this week, discussed but did not undertake to reach agreement on the questions which follow. Ambassador Gromyko explained that the Soviet group would be able to contribute little to the discussion because they had not given much previous consideration to these questions.

1. Should amendments to the basic instrument be binding on dissenting states?

2. Enforcement of obligations over non-member states.

3. Has a non-member of the Council a right to vote on special questions affecting its interests or should it merely have a right to be heard?
5. Should the Council be "in continuous session"?
6. Director-General's right to call the attention of
   the Council to threatening situations.
7. Character of the Secretariat.
Memorandum to the President and the Secretary of State

From the Under Secretary of State

Subject: Brazil’s Place on the Council.

1. The British and the Russians have emphatically rejected our proposal for a sixth member of the Executive Council in that capacity.

2. Our own American group, after an exhaustive study of this subject, recommends unanimously that we should not press for Brazil for the following reasons:

A. If Brazil goes on the Council, we would be responsible always for her action.

B. If Brazil is put on the Council at our instance, all the other Latin American states would be antagonized.

C. Our insistence on Brazil would raise the question of regional representation, thus bringing forth claims by the Soviet Government and other groups for additional permanent members on the Council such as Czechoslovakia or some other state in her orbit.

D. Brazil is not a great military power and is not likely to be one in the near future, and therefore the whole concept that special responsibility would be assumed by great military powers would be weakened or destroyed.
E. As now contemplated, there will most probably be two Latin American states always among the non-permanent councils of the Council, since more than one-third of the membership of the organization would be western hemisphere countries — 21 out of possibly 60.

It would be much better to have the Latin American representation distributed over the continent than to single one out.

F. If we have six permanent members and a Council of eleven, it would give up your valuable idea of having a greater number of small countries and large countries on the Council. An increase in the number of representatives on the Council at this stage would be thoroughly undesirable from the point of view of the efficiency of the Council's action.
Memorandum to the President and the Secretary of State

From the Under Secretary of State

Subject: France as a Permanent Member of the Council

1. The memoranda of all three governments contain a proposal that France should eventually become the fifth permanent member of the Council.

2. It would be extremely embarrassing now for us to propose to the Russians and the British that the question not be settled to the extent of providing a place in the future among the permanent members of the Council.

3. We anticipate no difficulty in working out a formula for the actual admission of France in the future to a place as a permanent member of the Council, to be regulated by agreement of the four governments.

4. May we have your authority to provide in the present draft for an arrangement of this kind?
RUSSIA—Tass dispatch in Pravda for August 28 reporting Dumbarton Oaks Conference contains following paragraph: "Together with short official reports which present only some insignificant details regarding the course of conversations, and moreover do not reveal their characters, the newspapers continue to publish various unconfirmed reports based apparently on statements made privately by various officials".

French Communists

RUSSIA—Trud for August 16 publishes article by French Communist Maurice Thorez entitled "At the Head of the Struggle for the Liberation of France". Thorez describes resistance of French workers to German occupation which he stated began immediately after country was occupied. Germans attempted to exploit French workers but they refused to yield and by determined resistance forced Germans to partially satisfy their demands for better rations and working conditions. French people were inspired by heroic struggle of Red Army, and active resistance of French workers increased substantially after German attack on Soviet Union. Illegal cells were formed in various industries and developed into committees of national and trade union action. Soviet victories in east and Allied landings in Normandy released extraordinary enthusiasm in France. Trade unions advised workers to form military detachments and prepare for general strike to paralyze war production and German transport. French workers are rendering important aid to Allied armed forces.

Churchill's Italian Visit

ENGLAND—Fullest account of Mr. Churchill's visit to Rome appears in dispatch from Daily Telegraph's correspondent there. It reads in part: "Mr. Churchill on Tuesday received Signor Bonomi, who lunched at the British Embassy in Rome. Marshal Badoglio was also present. This luncheon party is sufficient refutation of the suggestion made in some Italian quarters that Mr. Churchill's visit would be the occasion for Cabinet changes and the return of Marshal Badoglio to office. Mr. Churchill entertains a warm regard for Marshal Badoglio and has already expressed his opinion of the somewhat hasty manner in which the Marshal was forced to resign the Premiership. The British Prime Minister left in the minds of both his Italian fellow guests no doubt that he has full confidence in the good-will of the present government. He believes that it is doing well and deserves all the help that the Allies can give. Signor Bonomi called on Mr. Churchill at the Embassy at noon and they had an hour's cordial conversation. Though their meeting was entirely private, it is certain that Italian Premier stressed his government's eagerness to contribute every possible additional effort to defeat the common enemy. He added the hope that this effort would earn for Italy generous treatment from the Allies in facing her immediate problems and in the final peace settlement."

Article by Times special correspondent in Rome lists Mr. Churchill's contacts there with Prince Umberto, Premier Bonomi, General Badoglio, Ambassador Kirk, and Mr. Myron Taylor. Correspondent goes on to say: "Altogether it has been a very useful visit. Mr. Churchill has been made aware of the sense of disappointment which the Italian people feel at being admitted as co-belligerents with the Allies and then left with little apparent recognition of the creditable effort that they have made to deserve that title. The Prime Minister's
Minister's opinion, there is reason to believe, is that the Italians have indeed 'worked their passage' and have earned the right to some counterpart. He has had an opportunity of observing at close quarter how distracted the Italians now are, and the demoralizing effect of inadequate food supplies and insuperable transport difficulties, and of considering the dangers that may emerge if this state of affairs is allowed to continue. The depth of Mr. Churchill's investigation of the Italian situation had not been foreseen when he left London, and consultations with Mr. Eden and the United States Government will be necessary before any decisions can be taken, but it does look as if the visit might result in the formulation of a clearer and more positive Anglo-American policy towards Italy than has hitherto existed. This is what the Italians have long been asking for. A small step in that direction had already been taken before Mr. Churchill's visit by the decision to allot British war material to the Italian army sufficient to equip several new units. It is this sort of thing that helps to make the Italians feel that their war efforts are being taken seriously by the Allies. Without it they are liable to collapse into reckless despair".
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Chinese Plan

I am pleased to enclose herewith for your information a copy of the Chinese document on International Security.

[Signature]

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944
TENTATIVE CHINESE PROPOSALS
FOR A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Presented to the Department of State by the Chinese Embassy, August 22, 1944.

ESSENTIAL POINTS IN THE CHARTER OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

I. General Principles.

1) The International Organization shall be universal in character, to include eventually all states.

2) The principle of equality of all states and all races shall be upheld.

3) The International Organization shall preserve and maintain peace, on the basis of international law and justice.

4) The use of force as an instrument of national policy shall be absolutely prohibited. Any dispute between states, irrespective of its nature or origin, shall be settled only by peaceful means.

5) The member states shall promote economic cooperation, with a view to securing social stability and economic development of all nations.

6) The member states shall strive to advance social welfare, raise the standard of living of their people, promote cultural collaboration among nations, and effect a solution of population and demographic problems.

II. Membership of the International Organization.

1) All states, not original members of the International Organization, may be admitted into the International Organization upon resolution of the Assembly. However, the Axis states shall not be admitted until it has been proved that they are fully prepared to cooperate with other nations in the furtherance of peace and democracy.
Page Two

2) All member states shall respect and maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of each other against external aggression.

3) A member state may withdraw from the International Organization upon the expiration of two years after the notification of withdrawal. But the withdrawal will not be effective until such member state has fulfilled all her obligations under the Charter, including such obligations as may arise from the settlemet of a pending dispute.

III. Structure.

1) The International Organization shall consist of an Assembly and an Executive Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2) Under the Executive Council, there shall be established a Military Commission, an Economic Commission, a Commission on Territorial Trusteeship, an International Law Codification Commission, an International Labor Office, a Social Welfare Office, a Cultural Relations Office, and such other organs as the Council may deem necessary.

IV. Assembly.

1) The Assembly shall consist of the representatives of member states. Each member state may send three representatives.

2) The Assembly shall meet at least once a year, and at any time, in case of emergency.

3) The Assembly shall have power to deal with all matters within the competence of the International Organization or any matter relating to international peace.

4) Each member state shall have one vote in the Assembly.

V. Executive Council.

1) The Executive Council shall consist of the four nations of the Moscow Declaration as permanent members, and a certain number of non-permanent members, not exceeding seven members, to be elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic representation.
In the election of non-permanent members, the principle of rotation shall be observed; and provision shall be made to avoid a complete change of membership at any one time.

2) The Council shall meet at least four times a year and may be convened at any time, in case of emergency. States members of the Council shall appoint representatives to be stationed permanently at the seat of the International Organization. When the Assembly is not in session, the Executive Council shall be the supreme organ of the International Organization, with powers to deal with all matters within the competence of the International Organization or relating to international peace.

3) States who are members of the Council shall each send one representative and shall each have one vote.

4) Where matters before the Council involve a member state not represented at the Council, such member state shall be requested to send a representative.

VI. **Method of voting.**

1) Decisions regarding the application of sanctions and other important matters concerning the maintenance of peace shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present at the meeting, including the concurrent votes of all the permanent member states of the Council.

2) Decisions in all other matters shall be by simple majority of the members present at the meeting; and in certain matters, such as elections, by secret ballot.

3) A party to a dispute, whether or not a permanent member of the Council, shall have no right to vote in any decision relating to the dispute.

4) A member abstaining from voting, or casting a negative vote shall be bound by the decision of the majority.

VII. **Secretariat.**

1) The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary-General, six Deputy Secretaries-General, and a certain number of Secretaries, technical experts,
and other functionaries. The Secretary-General shall be selected from amongst the nationals of member states other than the permanent members of the Council, and appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly.

2) The Deputy Secretaries-General shall be appointed by the Council, with the approval of the majority of the Assembly—four from amongst the nationals of the permanent member states of the Council and two from amongst the nationals of other member states of the International Organization, of which the Secretary-General is not a national.

3) The Secretary-General shall act as the Secretary-General of the Council and the Assembly.

4) The Secretariat shall constitute an impartial, competent, and independent international civil service and shall be so selected as to reflect a fair representation of various nationalities.

VIII. Military Commission.

1) There shall be established a Military Commission, the functions of which shall be as follows:

A. To draft a disarmament convention and supervise its execution.

B. To draft and execute plans for military sanctions.

C. To organize and direct an international police force.

2) The Military Commission shall consist of the representatives of the permanent members of the Council, and a certain number of representatives of other member states of the International Organization, to be determined by the Council.

3) There shall be established, under the Military Commission, an International General Staff, the organization of which shall be determined by the Council.
IX. **Economic Commission.**

1) There shall be established an Economic Commission, the functions of which shall be as follows:

A. To draft international conventions relating to economic cooperation and supervise their execution.

B. To formulate and execute plans for economic sanctions.

C. To study and compile statistics and reports on world economic conditions.

2) The Commission shall consist of representatives of the permanent members of the Council, and a certain number of other member states of the International Organization, to be determined by the Council.

3) The conventions relating to economic cooperation, drafted by the Economic Commission, shall be put into effect after their adoption by international economic conferences to be convened from time to time by the Council.

X. **International Territorial Trusteeship Commission.**

There shall be established an International Territorial Administration Commission, the functions of which shall be as follows:

1) To administer or supervise the administration of such territories as will be placed under the trusteeship of the International Organization.

2) To administer territories that shall have been internationalized on account of strategic or other reasons, and placed under the jurisdiction of the International Organization.

3) The Commission shall, with regard to the administration of the territories under trusteeship, introduce the necessary measures for the protection and welfare of the local populations; and the promotion of education with a view to enabling such territories to become self-governing and independent.

4) The Commission shall submit an annual report to the Council regarding the conditions of the territories under the administration of the International Organization.
5) The organization of the Commission shall be determined by the Council, and provision shall be made for representation on the Commission of the local populations of the territories concerned.

XI. **International Law Codification Commission.**

1) There shall be established an International Law Codification Commission, the functions of which shall be as follows:

   A. To study problems of international law, and to propose conventions relating thereto.

   B. To codify existing international law.

2) The regulations governing the organization of the International Law Codification Commission shall be determined by the Council.

3) Conventions relating to international law, drafted by the International Law Codification Commission, shall be effective after their adoption by international codification conferences, to be convened from time to time by the Council, and ratified by two-thirds of the governments of the participating states.

XII. **International Labor Office.**

The present International Labor Office shall be maintained as part of the International Organization, for the advancement of the welfare of all workers, and the promotion of cooperation between labor and capital.

XIII. **International Social Welfare Office.**

1) There shall be established an International Social Welfare Office, the functions of which shall be as follows:

   A. To formulate various projects relating to international social welfare.

   B. To supervise the execution of the above-mentioned projects.
2) Projects relating to international social welfare shall include the following matters:

A. To regulate the production, manufacture, and sale of opium and other dangerous drugs.

B. To suppress traffic in women and children.

C. To prevent and suppress the spread of disease between states.

D. To introduce measures of social relief and social insurance.

3) Regulations governing the organization of the International Social Welfare Office shall be determined by the Council.

4) The projects relating to international social welfare, formulated by the Social Welfare Office and adopted by the Council, shall be put into effect by the Office, or recommended to the government of member states.

XIV. International Cultural Relations Office.

1) There shall be established an International Cultural Relations Office, the functions of which shall be as follows:

A. To formulate projects relating to international cultural cooperation.

B. To supervise the execution of the above-mentioned projects.

2) The above-mentioned projects relating to international cultural cooperation shall include the following matters:

A. To establish the concept of international peace.

a) Preparation of publications and school textbooks calculated to promote international understanding and friendship.

b) Encouragement of international peace movements.
Page Eight

c) Removal of possible causes of international ill-feeling in the fields of radio broadcasts, films, theaters, press, and literature.

B. To effect cultural exchanges.

a) Convening at regular periods international educational and academic conferences.

b) Exchange of professors and students.

c) Promotion of cultural and academic organizations of an international character.

d) Setting up international research institutes and libraries.

e) Encouraging scientific discoveries and assisting scientific and technical collaboration.

7) The regulations governing the organization of the International Cultural Relations Office shall be determined by the Council.

4) The projects relating to international cultural cooperation, formulated by the International Cultural Relations Office, and adopted by the Council, shall be put into effect by the Office or recommended to the governments of the member states.

XV. International Court of Justice.

1) There shall be established an International Court of Justice, for the judicial settlement of international disputes.

2) The protocol governing the International Court of Justice shall be put into effect after its adoption by the Assembly and ratification by three-fourths of the states members of the International Organization.

3) The Court shall have competence to deal with any justiciable dispute, at the request of the Council or of a party to the dispute.
4) In the case of non-justiciable disputes, where both parties are agreeable to a judicial settlement, the International Court of Justice may deal with the case "ex seque et bono."

5) The International Court of Justice may deliver an opinion on matters referred to it by the Assembly or the Council.

6) The Court may set up a Commission of Factual Investigation, where this is necessary for the adjudication of cases.

7) All decisions by the International Court of Justice shall be compulsorily enforced.

XVI. Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

1) No state shall be permitted to resort to the use of force for the settlement of disputes.

2) Where a dispute between member states has been settled by arbitration, or judicial or other pacific means, parties to the dispute shall have the obligation of faithfully carrying out the decisions of such settlement.

Where a dispute between member states is not settled by pacific means, the Council or the Assembly shall, at the request of either party to the dispute, have power to deal with the case. Where a party to the dispute is not represented in the Council, the Council shall invite such party to send a representative.

When a dispute is the subject of voting in the Assembly or in the Council, the parties to the dispute shall have no right to vote and, for the purpose of voting, shall not be counted as among those states present.

3) The council may, at any time, on its own initiative, transfer a case of dispute to the Assembly. Where it is so requested by either party to the dispute, the Council shall transfer the case to the Assembly; but such request for transfer shall be presented within a specified period after the dispute has first been brought before the Council. Similarly, the Assembly may refer cases of dispute to the Council.
4) Any use of force, or any threat to use force, whether immediately affecting any member state or not, shall be deemed a matter involving the peace of the world. In such cases, the Secretary-General may, on his own initiative or at the request of any member state, immediately convene the Council to take effective measures to safeguard peace. A member state shall not give any support or assistance, or accord any de facto or de jure recognition, to any situation that is created by force in contradiction to the principles of the Charter.

XVII. Aggression and Sanctions.

1) Any party to a dispute shall be considered the aggressor, who shall have been first to commit any of the following acts:

A. Declaration of war against another state.

B. The invasion by armed forces of the territory of another state.

C. The use of land, naval, or air forces to bombard the territory of another state or attack the land, naval, or air forces of another state.

D. The establishment of a blockade of the coast or ports of another state.

E. Provision of support to armed groups, formed within its territory, which have invaded the territory of another state; or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive such groups of all assistance or protection.

F. The landing in, or introduction within the frontiers of another state, of land, naval, or air forces, without the permission of the government of such state; or the infringement of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the duration of sojourn or extension of area.

G. Provision of arms and munitions, or financial or technical assistance to the
nationals of another state, calculated to create civil commotion or to overthrow the government of such state.

2) Sanctions shall consist of three kinds:
   A. Diplomatic sanctions
   B. Economic sanctions
   C. Military sanctions

3) Concrete plans for the application of sanctions shall be formulated by the Council, in consultation with the Military and Economic Commissions, so that they may at any time be put into immediate application. With a view to the effective application of sanctions, such plans shall also include comprehensive provisions for aid to the victim of aggression and for mutual assistance among member states applying sanctions.

4) There shall be established an international police force (which may exclusively consist of air force), which shall act under the Executive Council for the application of military sanctions. The organization of the International Police Force shall be determined by the Council. The expenses of the International Police Force shall be borne by the International Organization. In addition to the International Police Force, member states shall contribute armed forces in accordance with plans formulated by the Council.

5) As soon as the aggressor is determined, there shall, in addition to the immediate application of diplomatic and economic sanctions, be set in motion the necessary preparations for military sanctions to be enforced by the decision of the Council, against such aggressor.

6) Where there is a threat of the use of force, the Council shall, on its own initiative or at the request of a party to a dispute, immediately adopt emergency measures for the prevention of actual conflict of arms. If either party refuses to comply with such emergency measures, the Council shall take the necessary steps with a view to the application of sanctions.
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7) Upon the outbreak of an international conflict, the Council shall, on its own initiative or at the request of either party, be immediately convened to determine the aggressor. Pending determination of the aggressor, the Council may decide upon emergency measures for the suspension of hostilities; and either party to the dispute who acts against such measures shall be deemed the aggressor.

8) The Council may also apply sanctions in the following cases:

A. To a member state which refuses to submit a dispute to pacific settlement.

B. To a member state which refuses to carry out the terms of a pacific settlement.

9) All decisions relating to aggression and sanctions shall rest with the Council.

XVIII. Peaceable Changes.

1) Where a treaty has become inapplicable on account of change of circumstances or where there exists an international situation, the continuance of which may endanger world peace, and the parties concerned have failed to achieve results by direct negotiation, the Assembly may, at the request of either party, make recommendations for a satisfactory solution.

2) Such recommendations must have been passed by a two-thirds majority of member states present in the Assembly.

3) If either party fails to comply with the recommendation of the Assembly, the Council may, at the request of the other party, take effective measures for their enforcement and may, if necessary, apply sanctions.

XIX. Regional Organizations.

1) Member States within the same geographic area may voluntarily establish regional organizations to promote cooperation and peaceful relations.
2) The purpose of a regional organization shall be supplementary to the International Organization and shall not, in any case, be contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the International Organization.

3) A regional organization shall be subject to the control of the International Organization and shall submit an annual report of its work to the Assembly of the International Organization.

4) International matters of regional character may be dealt with by the regional organization; but any member state concerned which is not satisfied by the action taken by the regional organization may submit the case to the Council or the Assembly for reconsideration.

5) A regional organization shall have no right to decide on questions relating to aggression and sanctions. The structure and constitution of a regional organization shall be formulated by the states concerned, in accordance with regional conditions, subject to the approval of the Assembly or the International Organization.

XX. Treaty Obligations.

1) All treaties and international agreements hereafter entered into by member states should be registered with and published by the Secretariat of the International Organization. Such treaties or international agreements shall not be considered effective prior to registration.

2) Member states shall mutually agree that all obligations or understandings existing among them and contrary to the provisions of the Charter should be abrogated by virtue of the Charter; and they shall undertake henceforth not to enter into any obligations contrary to the provisions of the Charter.

3) Any member state which has, prior to admission to the International Organization, undertaken obligations contrary to the provisions of the Charter, shall immediately take the necessary steps to divest itself of such obligations.
XXI. Relations between the International Organization and Non-Members.

1) In cases of dispute between a member state and a non-member state, or between non-member states, the Council shall invite such non-member or states, to accept, provisionally, the obligations of member state, under such conditions as are deemed appropriate by the Council, with a view to a settlement of the dispute. Where such invitation is accepted by a non-member, the provisions of the Charter relating to pacific settlement, aggression, sanctions, and other relevant provisions, shall all be applicable.

2) After such invitation is offered to a non-member, the Council shall immediately investigate the circumstances of the dispute and make recommendations of such measures as it shall deem most appropriate and effective.

3) If one party so invited declines to accept the obligations of a member state for the settlement of a dispute, but resorts to the use of force against the other party, such party shall be subject to sanctions.

4) If both parties to a dispute decline, upon invitation, to accept the obligations of a member state for the settlement of a dispute, the Council shall take the appropriate steps and make recommendations with a view to preventing hostilities and solving the conflict.

5) In matters relating to disarmament, economic collaboration, international law codification, social welfare, and cultural relations, the International Organization shall take steps to make possible participation by non-member states.

XXII. Budget.

1) The budget of the International Organization shall be determined by the Assembly.

2) The expenses of the International Organization shall be borne by the member states, according to a scale adopted by the Assembly on the basis of the respective national incomes of the member states.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations--Ninth Day

Meeting of Joint Steering Committee

The Joint Steering Committee met at noon today for the first time in two days to consider drafts relating to the Assembly which had been prepared for it during those two days by the formulation groups. There was striking unanimity of views on these drafts.

a. Points Agreed Upon

1. Composition. To be composed of all states members of the Organization.

2. Functions and Powers. Assembly to have the right to consider questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security, but not on its own initiative to deal with any such matter which is being dealt with by the Council; to approve the annual budgets; to have the power of suspending members against which action has been taken by the Council; and to elect non-continuing members of the Council and the Director-General (upon recommendation of the Council) and judges of the Court in accordance with the Court's statute.
3. Voting. Important decisions to be by a two-thirds majority.

b. Expulsion; Economic and Social Council

The Soviet group continued to urge that the Assembly also be given the power to expel members and they continued to reserve their position with respect to the substance of our proposal for an Economic and Social Council. However, on both these matters agreement was reached as to form of language.

c. Amendment of the Basic Instrument

Our position was that amendments should be proposed by a majority vote of the Assembly and should come into effect when approved by two-thirds of the member states including all those having permanent seats on the Council. The Soviet and British groups are drafting their own respective formulae on this point.

Meeting of the Legal Subcommittee

We reached tentative agreement with both the Soviet and British representatives that: (1) an international court should be the principal judicial organ of the Organization, its statute to be part of the basic instrument; (2) the Statute of the present Permanent Court should be revised or used, subject to modifications, as the basis of the new statute; (3) all members of the
Organization should *ipso facto* be parties to the statute; and (4) the conditions under which states not members of the Organization may become parties to the statute should be determined in each case by the Assembly on recommendation of the Council.

**Meeting of the Security Subcommittee**

We reached tentative agreement with the Soviet and British representatives on the following questions, all of which were then referred to the formulation group for more detailed consideration:

a. **Determination of Threats to or Breaches of Peace**

   The Council should determine in each case when a threat to or breach of peace exists.

b. **Council's Right to Obtain Facilities**

   Member states should be obligated by a general agreement to furnish facilities. Supplementary agreements might be made by the Council in emergencies.

c. **Responsibility of the Council for Enforcing Surrender Terms for Germany and Japan**

   There should be continuing supervision of the enemy states.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOREIGN PRESS SUMMARY

No. 291 August 31, 1944

Dumbarton Oaks

ENGLAND--In addition to full news stories from Washington on Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Times, August 23, devotes its main editorial to talks and other editorials are published on same day by Daily Herald and Daily Worker.

Declaring that "American, British and Russian representatives have settled down to a task whose scope and importance require no emphasis," Times goes on to assert that joint statement made August 22 by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Dulles on need for United States to play a constructive and responsible part in assuring world order constitutes "convincing evidence of Republican support for the broad lines of administration policy, and will strengthen the hands of the American delegates at the conference." Editorial says: "The talks are exploratory and non-committal; and their conclusions, whether made public or not, will be reported to the three governments for their consideration. There is therefore every guarantee of frankness in discussion and of a determination not to allow real issues and practical difficulties to be overshadowed by those stereotyped formulae of good intention which have so long encumbered the path of international cooperation." Times believes that conference will probably be much preoccupied with question of national status. It holds that the phrase "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states" was "somewhat unguardedly introduced into the Moscow Declaration"; and that it had unfortunately shown signs of being adopted as a convenient missile on American platforms.

Daily Herald editorial is sharply critical of views voiced on August 22 by Daily Express which attacked idea of a new League of Nations, and placed emphasis on use of force in maintaining world peace. Asserting the Express has during the war displayed an internationalism which might have deceived many of its readers, claiming to be "America's British buddy" and "Soviet Russia's number one foreign tovarich", Herald says that Beaverbrook paper, "like so many converted... becomes a backslider as soon as the heat of hell recedes". Labor Herald paper alleges that "Lord Beaverbrook himself scoffed in House of Lords at the Hot Springs Food Conference", recalls campaign in Daily Express against Bretton Woods Agreement, and maintains that Express reference to League of Nations is attack on aims of Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

Editorial in Daily Worker stating that hopes of postwar world depend on ability of three major powers to work together, holds that from this viewpoint opening speeches at Dumbarton Oaks Conference are highly encouraging. It particularly approves "the unanimity with which they discredited the attempts made by anti-Tehran forces before the conference--in the press both over here and across the Atlantic--to represent either Britain and United States as disagreeing with the Soviet Union, or else all three agreed upon riding roughshod over the rights and opinions of the lesser nations".

BRAZIL--Rio de Janeiro press gave warm support to Secretary Hull's speech at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21. O Jornal, August 22, said: "Secretary Cordell Hull's speech assures us that it is not the intention of the United States Government to establish with England and Russia a scheme for the reconstruction of international society without giving a hearing to legitimate interested parties, who otherwise would have the opportunity only of nodding their heads in tacit approval."

O Radical described Hull's speech as "magnificent". All papers headlined the speech, full text of which was widely published.

FRENCH
French Situation

ENGLAND—Observer, August 27: "There is a French Government again on the free soil of France. The agreements now signed between General de Gaulle's provisional government of fighting Frenchmen and the British and American Governments are evidence of accord and alliance to secure the swiftest, most orderly return to full French rule; and must be followed with equal speed by every Allied step to restore France to her own place in the councils of Europe and the world. But it is the deeds, endurance and discipline of the French people themselves that are bringing back so quickly the old self-rule and self-reliance refreshed; and it is now the privilege, right and duty of General de Gaulle, by asking what the nation wishes, to restore the whole republic."

Editorial in Manchester Guardian, August 29, brings up question of what General de Gaulle will do with opportunities and responsibilities with which he is faced, once national enthusiasm which lifted him to place as head of provisional government of France has subsided. It says steps to be taken toward making France one of the great Allied powers will be slow and gradual process; "meanwhile great power for good or ill will lie with General de Gaulle, the provisional government and the regional commissioners whom it has appointed."