

PSF Earle, George H.

Subject File "E"

Box 

146

PSF Earle

Earle, George

See:Gen corres-Drawer 2-1939

For the President's memo of Sept 16, 1939 to Hull
regarding appt of George Earle as Minister to
Bulgaria.

See:Hull folder-Drawer 1-1939



Earle, George H. Hon.,
Minister to Bulgaria

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Don Conner E 3-48
file PSF Earle
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 14th
19 43

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS DOROTHY BRADY

Will you please show
this to the President? It
is from George Earle.

H.L.H.

encl.
cable dated
Sept. 13, 1943
from Geo. Earle
to H.L.H.

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ALUSNA BEYOGLU TO MR. HARRY HOPKINS
131940 NCR 4064

SEPTEMBER 13, 1943

THE THREE NEWLY APPOINTED BULGARIAN REGENTS ARE COMPLETELY CONTROLLED BY NAZIS. THE NEW PREMIER GABROVSKY IS THE MOST EXTREME NAZI IN BULGARIA - A COLD BLOODED SADISTIC TORTURER AND KILLER. IN ORDER TO BRING THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE TO A REALIZATION OF THEIR TRUE POSITION AND WHAT SUFFERING LIES IN STORE FOR THEM IF THEY DO NOT OUST THEIR PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THE GERMANS, I STRONGLY ADVOCATE THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION. FIRST, WITH RADIO AND LEAFLETS TO GIVE THEM FIFTEEN TO THIRTY DAYS WARNING OF THE PUNISHMENT TO BE METED OUT TO THEM IF THEY DO NOT REPUDIATE BY SOME MEANS THEIR PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND THE GERMAN ALLIANCE. SECOND, IF RESULTS ARE NOT APPARENT WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME, TO BOMB RAILWAY YARDS AT SOFIA. THE BULGARIANS TREASURE SOFIA AS HUNGARIANS DO BUDAPEST AND AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF RAILWAY YARDS, I WOULD GIVE THEM FIFTEEN DAYS TO REFLECT BEFORE COMPLETELY SMASHING SOFIA AND OTHER CITIES. I FEEL CERTAIN THIS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD NOT ONLY BE BENEFICIAL FOR OUR POSITION IN BULGARIA, BUT WOULD MAKE A POWERFUL IMPRESSION ON RUMANIA AND BE MOST HEARTENING AND STIMULATING FOR THE YUGOSLAV AND GREEK PATRIOTS.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 9-30-70

Signature- JHR

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131:Enle

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
TURKEY

Istanbul, Turkey
October 1, 1943

The President,
Washington, D.C.,

Dear Mr. President:

Here, undisturbed by American political maneuvering and a press will^{ing} to sacrifice everything for sensationalism, I am able to have a clearer outlook on things.

I am certain the very most important event for our country and the world is your reelection. Your support and execution of the daring plan for the African campaign was unquestionably the turning point in the war. German civilian morale is very bad. The German army discipline is also deteriorating. The end in Europe may come very suddenly.

You undoubtedly have been the greatest single factor in winning the war and the world knows it.

War however is a temporary phase. In making a stable and enduring peace you will be even more indispensable. It is inconceivable that the American people do not realize this and will not reelect you by a tremendous majority.

The most important and most difficult problem you will have to face in post war Europe will be Russia. This country, today probably the most popular in America and England, thirty days after the cessation of hostilities will be the most unpopular, due not to Bolshevism but to Russian imperialism.

However, it is barely possible that there might be a temporary military setback just before the election causing the vote to be close. It would be wrong not to prepare just as carefully, as before all your campaigns.

Pennsylvania undoubtedly will be your banner state. Popular sentiment for you is stronger there than anywhere and every element of the Democratic organization is with you in spite of its factional squabbles on other matters.

PS
EAT

There is one man whom I beg you to call in soon for a discussion of conditions as they really are in Pennsylvania. That is U.S. Judge Harry E. Kaledner. He is not pro Lawrence or pro Guffey; he is 100% pro you. He was star political reporter on the Philadelphia Record, and became my personal secretary, then Secretary of Revenue in my administration, then Common Pleas Judge, and was later appointed Federal Judge by you. Dave Stern has offered him \$25,000 a year to go back to the Record. He has a brilliant, orderly mind and his calm political judgment on Pennsylvania is in a class by itself.

May I take the liberty of saying a word about myself before closing.

The Democratic Party did its best to draft me for governor in the last election. Joe Pew, Republican boss of Pennsylvania, after the election told me that I was the only Democrat whom the Republicans could not have beaten. That may or may not be true.


It is very important that the strongest Democrat should run for senator with you, one who will not drag down your vote as Joe Guffey did in your last election. Bill Bullitt has taken himself out of the race by running for Mayor of Philadelphia. Possibly I am the man; on the other hand maybe the people of Pennsylvania have forgotten me. In any case some people want me to run. I only want to do so if you think I am the strongest man for the ticket.

You may decide I can be of more use to you in Austria or Bulgaria during their occupation.

Under no condition would I embarrass you by asking you to give an opinion, but if Harry Hopkins could drop me a line telling me what he thinks I would be greatly obliged as I would like to give an answer to the people who are kind enough to offer me their support.

Please take care of your health. Never has so much depended on one man.

Respectfully and cordially yours,



PSF

12-10-43
3-43

(2063) Signed original of this letter sent to State for delivery,
11/11/43,
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CONFIDENTIAL

November 3rd
19 43

Dear George:

I hear from you from time to time through Harry but it was good to get your letter the other day. I am delighted that you are enjoying yourself so much. For my part, I am glad that you are right where you are.

Bill made a good run in Philadelphia.

I am going to ask Frank Walker to have a talk with Harry Kalodner.

I would like to think over the matter of your running a bit and you should hear from Harry about it a little later.

I do hope you keep well.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Lt. Comdr. George H. Earle
Embassy of the United States of America
Office of the Naval Attache,
Ankara, Turkey

Gen. Loring "E"
3-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
Earle

June 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

Would you be good enough to prepare a reply to George Earle and also fill out his fitness report? From all I hear he has been doing useful work and doing it well. This has been fully corroborated by Ambassador Steinhardt.

F.D.R

Letter to the Pres., 6-11 from Lt. Comdr. George H. Earle, Moroccan Sea Frontier Forces, enclosing ~~skyscraper~~ fitness report, which has to be filled out by the President, in order for him to be eligible for a promotion.

Enclosure 3-44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

September 12, 1944

*file
personal*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter dated March 24, 1944 at Istanbul, together with its enclosure, to you from George H. Earle.

With your memorandum of May 29, 1944 you sent me these papers to read and return.

CH

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
TURKEY

*PSF
Earle*

Istanbul, 24 March 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed was handed to me by a member of the Gestapo, who says (falsely, I think) that he wants to come over to us. It is undoubtedly German propaganda, the only good propaganda Germany has.

However, propaganda to be effective must be at least 60% true.

It is this element of truth that worries me.

Is America giving its life blood to exchange one bunch of gangsters for another as masters of Europe, and as a world menace?

Mr. President, please read this. You are in so much a better position to analyze it than I.

I have one great regret, and that is your critics in America do not know the tremendous, overwhelming popularity you have in the Near East.

Cordially and respectfully yours,

George H. Earle
George H. Earle.

The President,
The White House.

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ENCLOSURE

March 12, 1944.

Present Situation in Russia and
Conclusions Drawn

According to information received from Russia, the present situation in that country seems to be as follows:

The effort made by that country to develop its military force is colossal; we might even say that it has reached its highest peak. The Soviets have mobilized a formidable force of about 15 million fighters, men and women. In spring they hope to begin their attack against Germany with nearly 400 divisions, besides the various auxiliary troops and guerrillas working behind the German lines. It is estimated that they will have some 5 million soldiers in the first line of the front. Of these, the 45-50 divisions (about 750,000 men with special formations of artillery and auxiliary units) will be fresh troops called the Special Army with HQs in Smolensk. This Army is already forming. The rest will be old divisions completed by their reserves and reformed. All these troops will be provided with an enormous number of tanks, some of a brand new type, and with an extremely powerful artillery. The air force of the Red Army will also be increased by approximately 50% with respect to the present number of planes. These approximately are the forces which the Soviets hope to put to work this spring and with which they are almost sure to beat the Germans definitely.

Concerning the object of this struggle, one cannot say that the leading parties in Russia have a clear and unanimous idea. It is true that the program of the Communist Party is to work for a World Revolution and for the extension of the Communist dogma to the entire world, but the way in which they are to arrive at it is a matter of varying opinion among the leaders. In other words there are very few staunch Communists among the generals who have distinguished themselves on the battle field during the present war. Many of them have registered as communists so they could advance more easily in their military career and be less suspicious in the eyes of the party agents, others again who have distinguished themselves by their military talents have been begged to adorn the Party lists with their glorious names. No use saying that these new members care very little about a World Revolution or even a European Revolution and expect things from this war which have nothing to do with the aspirations of the Communist Party. Furthermore there are other generals who distinguished themselves and have become very popular and influential but had the courage to decline all offers of registering with the Party.

Everybody agrees that the enemy must be expelled beyond the June 22, 1941 frontier. It is certain that this object will be realized during the summer of 1944 or at least at the beginning of the winter. As to what is to be done later, there are two distinct opinions in the country which in order to understand it is necessary to make a short review of the present situation in Europe starting with Germany.

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The situation in Germany itself is far from being pleasant. In the first place National-Socialism has copied many things from the Communists, not only as regards economic measures, but also, and especially, the organization and regulation of the life of the people and the local organization of the regime. There was very little difference between the Gestapo and the famous Toheka (now called the NKVD) and this difference has been completely wiped out now with the war. As in the case of the Bolsheviks, children of 7 are taken away from their homes and the influence of their parents and incorporated in various Party 'Youth Organizations' where they are trained in Party ideals and in the Party conception of life. The education they used to get there was laid, now it is definitely anti-Christian. The local regime, probably on account of the war, has become so rough and savage that it is almost the same as that of the Bolsheviks. Likewise, restrictions on the right to dispose of one's property and capital are so severe and tending toward state control that again they remind us of the Communist system. The organization of 'Total War' in Germany is the counterpart of the methods used by the Soviets all this while. The last trace of personal freedom has been destroyed by those measures. The last trace of individualism has been definitely smashed by the state. And finally, the terrible destruction of the large German towns caused by the Allied raids, has forced the Reich's Government to lay a hand on all the buildings which have not been hit, leaving to their owners one or two rooms only, and to establish in the rest of the house the people who have lost their homes. These people also have a right to use the furniture and clothing of their hosts. This system too was copied from the Bolsheviks who at the beginning of the Communist Revolution housed their 'Proletarians' in the homes of the 'Bourgeoisie'. In Russia, the population of the towns has increased out of proportion with the building program, therefore only higher Party officials have a private house, the rest of the people must be satisfied with one room or even part of a room.

On the whole it can be said that if at the beginning Nazism had few things in common with Communism, the war has brought about a great change, and now these two doctrines are not very different from each other.

At the time of Hitler's accession to power, the Communists in Germany disposed of 6 million votes. If by outlawing the Communist Party, the Nazis have exterminated a few thousand of its partisans, and if few more went abroad, the rest remained in Germany and in time entered the Nazi ranks. However, there is no doubt that many of the latter still remain communists. Also, many of the original communists have continued their work secretly, in spite of the Gestapo.

When the war broke out and large masses of men were mobilized in Germany, and new territories were occupied where the population was for the most part hostile to the Germans, the task of the Gestapo became more difficult and the Communists found it easier to intensify their activities and develop their organizations. The failure of the German troops during the last two years and the deportation to Germany of millions of foreign workmen contributed even more to the development of the communist organizations. In present day Germany, there are on the whole only three organizations of any importance; all the others, even the Social Democratic Party, the Central Party and National Party, are in a state of complete disintegration. Two of these organizations are

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legal and open; the first is the Workmen's National Socialist Party which is a very powerful organization and well developed, and which at the present moment has dictatorial power over the country. The second organization is the WEHRMACHT; it is purely military and occupies itself only with the conduct of the war; it receives orders from the highest ranking leaders of the Party, since Hitler, the Chief of the Party is at the same time the Supreme Commander of all the German armies. The third organization, the German Communist Party, although secret and clandestine, is crowded and well developed. This third organization is the only other party which is powerful and which could take the place of the first two if they were to collapse.

There is another reason why many more Germans may embrace Communism: Many million Germans have lost everything as a result of Allied bombardments. So long as these people believe in a German victory, they have faith in the word of the German Government that they will be refunded and their houses rebuilt at the expense of their present enemies. But as soon as they realize that Germany has lost the war for good, they will certainly turn communist since they have lost everything, have nothing more to lose, and since general communism is the only thing which can compensate to a certain extent for their loss. Besides, they will become the deadly enemies of a regime which was the cause of their suffering and which betrayed them, and they will naturally look up to the only organized adversary of this regime, Communism.

Through the Communist organization in Germany the Soviets are well aware of what is going on in that country, and they are sure that when the Germans find themselves at bay they will have no other choice than cause a Communist Revolution at home and come to an agreement with the Soviets in order to save their country from the vengeance of the British, from subdivision and from political and economic ruin. That is why the Soviets are already trying to prove that their peace terms are independent. The Anglo-Americans have declared that they will insist on the unconditional surrender of Germany, the German Committee in Moscow, on the other hand, acting according to orders from the Soviet Government of course, has stated that Germany can obtain an honorable peace without unconditional surrender. Besides, if we compare the unconditional surrender of Badoglio's Italy with the peace conditions offered Finland by the Soviets, we shall be astounded at the clemency of the Soviet conditions. This is a further proof that the Soviets are trying conscientiously to attract to themselves the peoples of the West by proving to them that they will be free to act and that the peace terms offered by the Communists to Europe will be more lenient than those which the Anglo-American middle-class can dictate.

The second largest country in Europe, France, is also in a confused state. If it is true that Petain has lost a large percentage of his followers thanks to the mistakes committed by the Germans after the Armistice of 1940, it is not less true that the ranks of communists and their sympathizers have greatly increased. This is clear from the activities of the Committee of Liberation in Algiers, from the influence the Communists have in the "Parliament" in Algiers, from the escape to Spain of a large number of officers of the Army of Liberation in Africa, and finally from the fact that almost all the saboteurs in France are Communists. A neutral Frenchman who knows the situation in France, has assured us that 70% of Marshal Petain's enemies in France are either communists or communist sympathizers and that only 30% belong to other political creeds. He agrees that after the Allied landing there will be a revolt in France, but this revolt will have the character of a Communist Revolution, not

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a National Revolution as is hoped for by the Anglo-Americans.

According to recent information the situation in Poland is as follows: The Poles are divided into three groups. The first group is quite important and thinks that Bolshevism is the worst menace for Poland and Europe. According to this group the Anglo-Americans will be too weak after the war to be able to save Europe from this peril, and only the German military forces with the help of the other peoples of Europe could stop the Bolshevik avalanche. This must be the primary consideration of all the European nations, all other questions can be solved later. That is why this group is collaborating with the Germans and has given quite a few volunteers to the army and to the various special formations. This group is made up of important land-owners (especially in the eastern provinces), of industrialists, of financiers, of real-estate owners, of intellectuals of the extreme right, and of a large number of rich peasants in the eastern provinces. The second group which is also the largest, is composed of intellectuals, of factory hands and of peasants. (It should be remembered here that the policy of the old Russian Government toward the Polish population was always based on the protection of the peasants against the big land-owners and the middle-classes. That is why the Polish peasants were always faithful to the Russian authorities, never took part in the Polish insurrections, and rather helped the troops and the Russian authorities to suppress those revolts. Even after the restoration of Poland in 1918, when authority in this country was in the hands of the land-owners and the Polish middle-class, the peasants did not hide their hostility toward this regime, nor did they hide their pro-Russian feelings.) This group which included quite a number of communists, is on friendly terms with the Polish Committee in Moscow and the the USSR and is hostile to the Polish Government in London. This group is very well organized, it has sub-committees throughout the country, it is in constant and intense contact with Moscow, and it is well armed and ready to go to action at the required moment according to orders. Finally the third group which is the least numerous, is the group of the men adhering to the Polish Government in London. This group is made up mostly of intellectuals, of some land-owners, of some members of the middle-class and of some peasants, the latter of the western provinces annexed by the Germans. The relations of this group with the Poles in London are badly organized and occasional and cannot compare with those of the second group and Moscow. The authority and prestige of the Polish Government in London is diminishing daily in the country, that is why this group is actually losing most of its partisans to one or the other two groups. It will not be long before this group has completely disappeared. Thus Soviet Russia has many more chances of success in Poland than have the Polish Government in London or its Allies the British. The distribution of the Polish population among these three groups stands as follows, in round figures: the first group advocating German collaboration, 20%; the second group advocating collaboration with the Soviets, 65-70%; the third group advocating collaboration with the Polish Government in London, 5-10 %. The members of the first group mostly quit to join up with the second.

The strictly communist organization is smaller in Hungary than anywhere else in southeastern Europe, but to this we should add the organization of the Social-Democrats which unlike other countries, in Hungary it is intimately linked with the communists.

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Together they probably account for 30% of the population. The communist party is perfectly well organized, and its clandestine propaganda is in full progress everywhere at the expense of the Hungarian National-Socialist Party (crossed arrows) which is in complete disintegration. On the other hand it is almost certain that if the Red Army attacks Hungary, the Hungarian Army will capitulate.

Concerning the Balkans, in the first place there is the famous "Marshal Tito" with a whole Communist Army behind him, who is so assiduously helped by the British at the expense of the nationalist general Mikhailovitch. Tito is the pillar around which the federal and communistic Yugoslavia is already forming. It is true that Serbia in its present frontiers and the largest part of Montenegro are wholly anti-communistic, because the peasants of the former had to submit to the Bolshevik regime in 1941, and the peasants of the latter in 1943. But these two together are only one quarter of Yugoslavia and she could not resist alone for long. Bulgaria being pro-Russian is communist to the last degree. In 1942 there were in Bulgaria over 140,000 members in the clandestine Communist Party, all of them well organized; there were besides 3-4 times as many sympathizers. They are waiting for the Red Army troops to come to the Rumanian frontier to start a revolution which will send the Germans away from the country and will bring about a unification with Tito's Yugoslavia. According to the plans of the Comintern, Bulgaria is to participate in the two communist Federal Republics: that of Bulgaria and that of Macedonia. A communist movement is starting in Greece after the example of Tito. This movement which is beginning among the guerillas now seems to endanger the unity of action against Germany. However, the communists say that order will be restored as soon as the communist partisans have vanquished their adversaries, and resistance against the German invader will then become stiffer, this time of course under the red standard of the Communist International. In Rumania, Marshal Antonescu continues in power thanks only to the Germans, because nobody is for him in the country. It is true that among the higher classes and the intellectuals there are many pro-British and pro-Democratic sympathizers, but on the other hand the communists also have many partisans among the workmen, the craftsmen, the smaller employees, the city proletariat, the peasants of Moldavia, of Bessarabia and Bukovina. The blame for this lies with national politics and religion, and the Governments which have misled Rumania since 1918, not forgetting the present government under Marshal Antonescu. It is certain that when the Red Army reaches the Dniester, great things will happen in Rumania.

The USSR has a better information service than even the famous "Intelligence Service", since in every country there are communist partisans who are ready to sacrifice their own land for the "country of all the workmen". Russia therefore knows the situation in Europe very well, she is in constant contact with the communists in the various countries, she helps them and advises them what to do, and they must follow her advice. In spite of the dissolution of the Comintern, the Communist Party continues to aim at the same things, viz., to make Europe, if not the whole world, communistic, and to realize this by means of a Communist Revolution led from above or below. However, there are two distinct opinions in the leading circles as to how best this revolution could be brought about.

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The first group includes a large number of "politicians", i.e., of higher civil officials of the party; in the second place it includes military men who are for the most part politicians or civilians by their mentality, such as Marshals Vorochilov and Boudien both of whom have lost their military capability, in spite of their distinguished rank, having failed so pitifully during the summer campaign of 1941; in the third place it includes the Jews with L. Kaganovitch and M. Litvinov at the head.

The second group is composed of: 1) A large number of true militaries (many among them were inferior officers in the old Russian Army, or else they are the sons of such officers) -- generals who have distinguished themselves during the present war and who know better than anybody else the needs, mentality and hopes of the Army; 2) A certain number of Party politicians, for the most part Russian origin and young, that is belonging to the new communist generation. Unconsciously perhaps these men are guided by the interests of the Russian Nation rather than by those of the Communist Party.

The first group considers the Russian peoples as a means to realize the general communisation of Europe, and is not mindful of the sacrifices these people will have to submit to. Seeing the present situation in Europe, it believes that the moment has come and that the army is strong enough to drive the Germans out of Russia, and then proceed deeper into Europe.. This group feels sure that Germany as it is now, will fall like a ripe fruit into the hands of Communism (which result the Communists could not obtain in 1929 in spite of their efforts at the time), and that its fall will bring about the communisation of Central Europe, the Balkans and may be that of France. When this happens the Communists will have won the war, because even if the Anglo-Americans can keep for some time Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Scandinavian countries, they can do nothing against a federal communist state which will extend from the Channel and the North Sea -- or at least from the Rhine and the North Sea -- to the Far West and the Pacific, and which will unite the power and industries of the USSR and of Germany with the human reserves of Central Europe and the Balkans. This is why the war must be pursued to the end, and Europe be made communistic so that the Anglo-American middle-class will face an accomplished fact. This group is in close contact with all the communist organizations in Europe (Marshal Tito's organization in Yugoslavia, the Communist parties in Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.), and urges them to be ready for action or even to act whenever the situation is favorable. This group of course claims that all this may be accomplished without the "second front", solely by the Red Army and the Communist organizations in the USSR and in Europe, and that the "Second Front" might even be in the way, for instance in the Balkans.

The second group thinks that the Red Army and the USSR have already done too much for the Anglo-Americans in the way of sacrifices. The Anglo-Americans they say have used the Red Army to fight the German military machine while their own forces remain intact. When the Germans have been beaten, then the Anglo-Americans will use their forces to guide Europe at will and at the expense of the USSR and of the hopes of the Communist Party. Some imprudent revelations to that effect made by English politicians to certain prominent Poles have reached the USSR and have greatly diminished the confidence of that country in the Allied middle-class, a confidence which already was not very deep. We must always remember that the present generation has been systematically

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brought up during the last 25 years in the hatred and distrust of all the capitalistic regimes especially that of the British, whom Soviet literature and many declarations by the highest officials of the Communist Party (and by Stalin himself) referred to as the most voracious people, the greatest exploiter and the most dangerous enemy of Communism. That is why every self-conscious communist knows that after the "Fascist bandits and aggressors" have been beaten and even exterminated (this last point is especially dear to the Jews who cannot forget the atrocities committed by the Germans in the territories occupied by them) the turn will come for the struggle against the British middle-class. The Russians must prepare for this struggle now, and concerning this point there is no divergency of opinion between the two groups.

It is interesting to note that Communist mentality is much less hostile toward the German people than it is towards the British. This may be due to the fact that so many Germans have already embraced communism and that therefore there is good reason to hope that after the fall of the Nazis it will be easy to spread Communism throughout Germany. The Communist leaders wish to exterminate the "Fascist leaders and the Hitlerite bandits", but unlike the British they do not want to destroy the economic force of Germany, they rather want to attract the German people towards the USSR by offering to them benevolent conditions.

According to the opinion of the military circles which is representative of the second group, as soon as the Germans are thrown out of the Soviet territory, or even before then, when the Germans realize that they cannot hold their own any more --which should be when the Red Army has recaptured most of the Baltic states in the north, the districts of Minsk, Polotzk and Dvinsk in the center, and the line between the Bug and the Dniester, and Odessa in the south, an armistice should be offered them and an advantageous peace concluded with Germany. The Red Army should stop at her frontiers of 22 June 1941, or at least at some strategic rectifications of that frontier which Germany should and will accept in favor of the USSR. Furthermore, an agreement should be reached between the USSR and Germany concerning the Slavs in the Balkans, in Poland, Rumania, and eventually about the Czechs and the Slovaks. In exchange, Russia will agree to remain neutral in the war which will continue between the Germans and the Anglo-Americans who not only did not keep their word concerning the second front, but are even ready (the British most probably) to betray the Soviets by ruining them to the end and then dictating to them humiliating conditions for the benefit of the "Anglo-American capitalists and the Feudal Poles and Rumanians".

In order to push the Germans to mortal combat against the Anglo-Americans and thus reverse the game which the Allies tried to play on the Russians, the USSR will be ready to help the Germans by providing them with naphtha, metals and even a certain quantity of ammunition. So the war between the Germans and Japs on the one hand ^{and} the Anglo-Americans and Chinese on the other will last a good many more years. In the mean time, working according to the accelerated program "Udarni" and with the help of imports from Germany (the Germans will be asked to provide for reparations and they will have to export goods to the USSR in return for the raw materials which this country will be sending them) the Soviets will straighten out their economic situation,

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will reinforce the Red Army, perfect its armament, and get ready for the task ahead: the invasion of Europe and may be that of Iran and the Arabian countries with their oil reserves.

The partisans of this group are more than certain that the struggle to death between Germany (free from the pressure of the Red Army) and the Anglo-Americans, will cause a general weakening of both parties and such moral and material deterioration, that Europe, its economy and material civilization completely destroyed, with millions of people who will have lost everything they had, will be ready to fall into anarchy and chaos. That is when the USSR with the Comintern will step in: Enough! they will say, the Red Army will move into Europe to liberate it. It will be welcomed by the peoples of Europe because it will bring peace, and the end of destruction and plenty of food. Thus the communist regime will establish itself firmly on the Continent and even in England which by that time will be ready to receive it. Europe will then form one state: the "Union of the Federated Socialist Republics" which along with present day USSR will include the whole of Europe, a large part of Asia, will have a population of 500 million and will be led in a dictatorial manner by the COMMUNIST PARTY.

We shall probably be told that the plan of this group looks fantastic and that the Communists are realists which means that they shall never submit to such illusions. In the first place it is easy to see that the Communist Party was on the verge of realizing this plan which it has been preparing very conscientiously over long years. That is why before Hitler ever came to power, the USSR had already undertaken to organize the Red Army and a formidable military industry. The immense resources of Russia were all mobilized for that purpose, and the people have had to lead a miserable life during 25 years. This the people of Europe understand now only after 5 years of war and destruction.

The leaders of the Communist Party foresaw the new Imperialistic World War and hoped for it, because according to them this second war would bring about the communisation of Europe just like the first Imperialistic World War of 1914-1918 resulted in the communization of Russia. All this is clear from the writings and the speeches of the chiefs with Stalin at the head. It is to make this second war possible that the Soviets refused to sign up with the Democracies and in August 1939 concluded a pact with Hitler; they knew that Hitler would never start on this war if Russia was not his friend. Had Russia joined the Democracies from the start, that would have tied down Germany. On the other hand this agreement with Germany allowed the USSR to spread communism to parts of Poland, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the Baltic States and may be other parts of Europe and Asia --who knows what the secret articles of this agreement were.

With this agreement, the Soviets had realized their first aim: the great powers of Europe, the Democracies and the Fascists would be at war, while the third team, the Communists would be neutral. This would give time to the Communists to complete their military preparations, and the enemies were tired out, Russia would intervene and turn the final outcome in her favor. This plan was followed so closely that Hitler did not need any special foresight to see through it. But in attacking the USSR, Hitler committed a grave mistake which is about to lose him: he under-estimated by far the real strength of Russia, and so

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tried not only to beat Bolshevism but also to enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union and to tear the country apart and let Germany and her Allies share in the spoils. Because Hitler never hid his intentions but rather exhibited them in words and facts, since the beginning of the Russian campaign, before the outcome was clear, he started dividing the country and treating the natives as "Untermenschen" (inferior people). This infuriated the peoples of the USSR against the Germans and united them to Stalin and the Communist Party, the only existing force which could organize a successful resistance to the invader. The Red Army thus succeeded in driving the Germans out of most of the Soviet territory, the Germans had to sustain heavy losses, while the guerillas which were organized behind the German lines enabled Russia to bring down almost the final blow on Germany.

This is the difference of opinion which exists between the two influential groups of the Communist Party concerning the pursuit of the war. Stalin the dictator upon whose good will the real road to be followed depends, is still silent on the subject. The people who know Stalin well, however, say that he is a great realist, that he is very obstinate and that he diligently pursues his aim; therefore, we must expect from him a decision along the following lines: If the Germans are thrown out from the Soviet territory still in their hands without great sacrifices on the part of the Red Army, this army will not be very exhausted --or if Stalin thinks that it is not exhausted-- then he will certainly follow the opinion of the first group and order the Soviet troops to proceed deeper into Europe and bring Communism with them. If the contrary happens, that is if it takes time and heavy sacrifices to clean the rest of Russia from the German invaders, and if as a result the Red Army is exhausted, it is safe to think that Stalin will prefer the plan of the second group. Of course Stalin's decision will depend a good deal on his estimate of Germany's strength at that time.

Two recent events in the USSR make it seem likely that Stalin at the present moment is in favor of the first group and that accordingly the Red Army will march on Central Europe and on the Balkans:

The first of these events is the extension of rights to the Federal Republics of the Soviet Union. Each one of these Republics will in the future have its own Military Commissariat (Ministry of War) with its own armies, and its own Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with its own Foreign Legations. Furthermore, each Republic, regardless of what the others do, will have a right to sign conventions with other foreign countries. This project was elaborated by the friends of the FIRST GROUP long before it was submitted to the Supreme Council. It is claimed that the famous Korneitchouk, the husband of Wanda Wassilevska, was its principal author and that Litwinov helped him with the work. With this project the first group aimed at two things:

The first aim was to make it easier for other peoples to enter the Soviet Union since by so doing they could keep their armies, their language and customs and their foreign political rights almost intact. The first country considered here was Poland. It is historically known that the old state of Poland wanted to form a federation with the Ukraine and direct its activities against Russia. This also is a well known fact that around the 40's, in the XIXth c. the Poles started the famous "Ukraine Movement" in Galicia, the purpose of which was to prove to the people of Small Russia that they were not Russians but

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another people, the "Ukrainians" whose mortal enemy was Russia, while the Poles were their friends. Then at the beginning of the XXth c. it was the turn of the White Russians. The Germans on the one hand and the Communists on the other helped these movements --both striving for the same thing: to weaken the Russian people by starting a strife among the various tribes which would make their eventual subjugation simpler. This was the main reason why the Russian nationalist forces could not sign an agreement with the Germans in their struggle against Bolshevism.

On the other hand, the Communists foreseeing a war with Fascism and being in need for this purpose of the whole Russian people, changed their tactics. They forgot all about the autonomies of the Federal Republics of the USSR, created a central government in Moscow, and started on a movement of Russian nationalism. This propaganda increased during the first period of the war until the trend of the war appeared distinctly in their favor. But this policy and propaganda provoked a dangerous situation from the point of view of the Communists, because it might be the cause of a change in the regime in Russia: the national conscience and the national forces of the Russian people had been roused. In order to counteract this new and undesirable movement, Communist propaganda has for the past year gradually and imperceptibly retracted its communistic ways. On the whole it is with the purpose of stifling forever the national ideology among the masses of Russian people that this new law of decentralization, of separating the ancient Russian Empire into a large number of smaller almost independent states each of which will have its own master people and where --except in the case of the Federal Russian Republic-- the Russians will be "minorities" having to submit to the wishes of the "governing people", was elaborated by the first group in which the non-Russian element --or that which considers itself as such-- was chiefly represented.

The second group had a different opinion of this plan. In the first place the militarys saw in it a weakening of the fighting power of the Red Army; there would be too many military Commissariats, (one for each new Republic), among which conflict may arise at any time especially when each Army Corps speaks a different language. The second group also said that this freedom of foreign relations may give rise to intra-republican conflict if any of the new republics signed agreements which were contrary to the interests of the other confederate states. And finally, especially after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union may cease to exist.

Those in favor of the plan answered that all the Republics will be led by the Communist Party, i.e., by the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Party, that therefore none of the new Republics could have an independent policy not in conformity with Party directives, and that on the other hand this kind of organization will be considered as extremely liberal and noble by the Great Democracies --especially in America, where it will aid the friends of the USSR to fight her enemies. Also, until now, in all the great international conferences where each state had one vote and where England with her dominions ruled, the Soviet Union with her 16 votes will change things completely.

For one reason or another the opinion of the first group triumphed. Its advocates succeeded in persuading Stalin; the project was accepted by the superior organizations of the Party, and the unanimous vote of the Supreme Council and of the Council of Nationalities was a mere formality, because voting is always

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unanimous in the representative organs of the USSR, there is no opposition.

The second victory of the first group consists in the peace terms offered Finland by the USSR upon request by the former. There is no information available yet concerning this second victory, but seeing how mild the conditions are when compared with those which the Democracies dictated to Badoglio, we understand at once that the Soviets want to attract the peoples of Europe by their clemency. This sets a precedent of which they may make use again if they find it advantageous. Already the official Soviet agency "Tass" has declared in connection with the speedy judgement of Germans convicted of cruelty towards the population of Kharkov --when the British press protested this speedy judgement-- that the Red Army conducted the war independently of anybody else, and that the Soviet Government was free to judge the criminals and needed nobody's permission to do so.

If we add to the above the failure of the Anglo-American action in Italy while the Red Army is successfully advancing against the Germans --the annihilation of 10 German divisions near Korsun, the progress of the Russian troops in Estonia and Galicia, the fresh German defeats in the Ukraine-- it is easy to see that the hopes of the Russians to free the rest of their territory will be realized soon, that the opinion of the first group will triumph, and that the Red Army will immediately invade Europe to communize it.

T-279

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you read the enclosed
and let me know what you think
I should do about it?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President from
Commander George H. Earle, dated
March 24, 1944, enclosing memo-
randum given to the latter by a
member of the Gestapo titled
"Present Situation in Russia and
Conclusions Drawn".

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal*

May 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN.

F. D. R.

Letter from Commander George H. Earle, dated March 24, 1944, addressed to the President, enclosing memo on "Present Situation in Russia and Conclusions Drawn".

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

May 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

There is of course an element of truth in this German propaganda.

Even if it were 100% true and 100% objectionable to America there appears to be nothing we can do about it until Hitler is defeated.

I suggest sending Lieutenant Commander Earle's letter with its enclosure to the Department of State for its information.

W.H.L.

hms

Signed original of this letter & the
fitness report handed to Bigdon
for forwarding. hms

~~Gen. Louis "F"~~
3-4-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PST
Earle

June 26, 1944.

Dear George,

I have been glad to sign your
fitness report for the period of December
20, 1942 to June 11, 1944. I am informed
that your name will be considered for promotion
with your running mates and I wish you all
success.

Cordially yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Lieut-Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R.,
Assistant Naval Attache,
American Embassy,
Ankara, Turkey

Via O.N.I. pouch

1000 100 1000

STEINHARDT
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

Would you be good enough to prepare a reply to George Earle and also fill out his fitness report? From all I hear he has been doing useful work and doing it well. This has been fully corroborated by Ambassador Steinhardt.

F.D.R

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

MOROCCAN SEA FRONTIER FORCES

11 June 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

With all the tremendous burdens now upon you I am terribly sorry to bother you with a comparatively unimportant and personal matter.

As I have had twenty-six months of active service as a Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve, I am now eligible for promotion; however, since all my reports have gone only to you, either directly or through Harry Hopkins, I am told by the Naval officers I have consulted that there is no one but you who can give me a fitness report or recommend me for promotion.

I therefore enclose my fitness report. If it bothers you in the slightest, please don't hesitate to throw it in the waste paper basket.

Cordially and respectfully yours,

Isaiah Tule

The President
The White House

-
5. Franklin D. Roosevelt
 6. Commander in Chief, Army and Navy.
 8. Present assignment - 3.7
 9. No.
 10. Particularly desire to have him? Yes.
 11. None known.
 12. No opportunity to observe. See remarks.
 - 13.
 14. Yes.
 15. Lt. Comdr. Earle has served during the period in question as Asst. Naval Attache, Istanbul, Turkey, under special instructions from me. He has carried out his duty in a highly satisfactory manner and has accomplished useful work. I have had an opportunity to judge results and Ambassador Steinhardt has made very satisfactory reports on Lieutenant Commander Earle.

ВОРОССАИ СЕВ ФРОНТИЕР БОРСЕР



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PL.M

Dear Grace: This is Geo. Earle's present to Father which Earle says belonged to Sultan Mohammed the fourth. He says further: "The dates of the Sultan's reign are 1640 to 1692, and I consider it the finest Turkish antique I have ever seen. On the point end of the scabbard is the Sultan's turban, the stars on the blade are his personal motif, and his name in small Arabic letters are on two places on the scabbard."

This is part of that terrible letter he wrote me, and which I read to you. Adm. Brown insists on seeing Father about this last. So, perhaps a letter of thanks had better wait until it is decided what to do about the gent.

Anna

See cover? 3-44

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ
TURKEY

*Full
independent
PSF
Earle*

Istanbul, 22 August 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosure with this letter I consider the most important communication I have ever sent to you. I beg of you to read it very carefully.

It was written by Bergerie former French Ambassador to Russia, and now Vichy Ambassador to Turkey. He considers you, in his words, "the greatest humanitarian of modern times". He has written it for you alone, not as an Ambassador nor as a French Deputy, nor as owner of a Paris newspaper, but as an individual who admires your courage, resourcefulness and sincerity.

About Russia, I fear he is right.

May I make two observations. An American banker said to me a few weeks ago, "we should have been warned of Japan's intentions by the simple fact that every Japanese tourist in America was pictured with a camera, and American tourists were not permitted cameras in Japan!" In the same way I say by the fact Russia will not permit our soldiers to fight with them nor our correspondents to go to the front should warn us of Russia's intentions.

Also, and far more important is the fact the moment fighting is over, there will be irresistible pressure from the people of the Democracies to demobilize and return home our soldiers. There will be no such pressure to demobilize the Russian soldiers since the lot of a Russian is far more comfortable in the army than at home.

My most fervent hope is that a year from today you can say "George Earle was a fool and an alarmist".

Cordially and respectfully yours,

George H. Earle

George H. Earle.

The President,
The White House.

FROM THE MARECHAL PETAIN TO THE RUSSIAN PROBLEM

The Maréchal was in 1939 against the war, because he knew how unprepared we were - and because at the last moment the URSS changed side.

But when the war had been declared he was of course in favour of doing everything possible to win it. When therefore the French army was destroyed in 1940, he looked round to see what help could be reasonably hoped for. The British had reembarqued in Dunkerk, loosing all their land war material and were only hoping to avoid invasion by using their naval and air forces, up to then carefully economised. The USA had replied negatively to the last appeal sent to America by Paul Reynaud in agreement with Petain. The URSS was on the german side.

Such are the reasons for which the Maréchal accepted the armistice, provided honour was safe (i;e. our remaining forces - and especially the fleet - would not be used against our British Ally and the French governement would remain in French hands). His attitude was best described in the Message of september 40 : "We seek reconciliation not because of our defeat but in spite of it. If Germany dominates her victory, we will dominate our defeat. If not, we will know how to endure and wait..."

Since then, the whole international situation was inverted. The Britich who had left us pratically without help in 1939, displayed the greatest heroism and finally won the air battle of 1940 in the british sky.

The American who had refused Reynaud's last call, were

driven into the war by Germany's initiative, and weighed with all their potential, then industrial, finally military power. The URSS which undoubtedly wanted to remain at least for the moment outside the war (see the Tass communique of Juin 13 th 1941), were attacked by Germany and threw in a weight which was incredibly underrated by every member of every foreign mission in Moscow without any exception. (the extreme duration of russian resistance was estimated to something between 3 weeks and 3 months).

The result was , in two years, the complete unforeseen and unforeseeable inversion of the military situation (1942-1943) -

Why didn't the Marechal Petain invert consequentially his own position and escape to North Africa ?

For three main reasons :

a.- He wanted to keep his word to everybody, even to his enemies.

b.- He wanted to remain among his people in order to share their sufferances and to help them : he was the flag and the gardien.

c.- He feared that the result of present coalitions would be the substitution to a German control over Europe of a Russian dictature.

The two first reasons have a moral force and a political significance which cannot be denied: the anglo-american troops will witness that very quickly on French soil.

The third reason needs much more thought and raises a problem of world magnitude.

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The Russian problem is usually treated with a combined lack of knowledge and serious thought.

One class of people consider everything under the angle of a blind sovietphobia - the motives of which do not go much further than the fear of losing their personal properties and the hatred of anything that threatens to change their habits of life and thought.

Other classes of people exhibit a prosovietic feeling, the motives of which are often ^{not} much more commendable.

Some are just conscious or unconscious agents of the sovietic organisations, payed ~~in~~ cash or conceit (the latter being often the case with intellectuals accustomed to discreet applause in small slumbering circles - suddenly born in triumph by masses of enthusiastic proletarians) - Others are just snobs who "go for" Stalinism in the same way as they buy pictures by surrealist painters.

A third class of people have decided to display an extraordinary "agnosticism" and do not want to hear anything about a russian problem, because it presently disturbs the comfortable line of thought they have been driven into by the radio and the press : viz. that there is a big black wolf called Germany, after the destruction of which the world will be happy and free for ever. These people, when placed before certain uncomfortable facts, just answer "it's all German propaganda".

At least those who have a responsibility in Allied Countries must try to think ^{of} the russian problem as seriously as the russian leaders think ^{of} the european problem.

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The permanent aim of what can well be called the sovietic civilisation is not a mystery. It was printed in black on white on all the cards of communist parties throughout the world : the class dictatorship - the socialisation of means of production and exchange and the spreading of the system on an international basis. Only the following addition was not printed : "... under the authority and the control of Soviet Russia".

Lots of people nowadays go on pretending that those permanent aims have been recently modified : and they quote as proofs the inequality of salaries - the strong discipline enforced - the renewal of russian patriotism. One respectable british paper was even childish enough to add new proofs : the beautiful uniform of red army officers and the fact that they are encouraged to learn ~~american~~ american dances.

In fact, this belief in a fundamental change is nothing more than wishful thinking added to a complete ignorance of lenino-stalinian tactics.

Lenine taught his disciples that every mean is justified to achieve the aim. Throughout the world one has thus seen the communist parties follow the line of their interest without any regard as to their constant contradictions. In France, for ^{example,} the communists were antimilitarists under the Rapallo germano-russian treaty ; they became militarists after the ascension of Hitler and the Laval-Stalin agreement (1933) ; they returned to antimilitarism and called the war "imperialistic" after the germano-russian agreement of 1939; they returned to militarism after the attack of Germany on Russia (1942) and will remain in that line unless, by chance, there is a new Germano-Russian understanding. According to that line, they cannot be surpassed in their superpatriotism in every country. It may safely be predicted that the nations will

never have sung their national anthem and exhibited their national flag more than on the day they will celebrate their absorption by the Soviet Union.

The great patriotic enthusiasm does not therefore imply in any way a departure from the original scheme: it simply means that such a passion is considered as useful in time of war.

It may be added that discipline and outward signs of discipline - or inequality of salaries are in no way contradictory with the sovietic doctrine: those who think otherwise display their ignorance of the said doctrine, probably confusing it with anarchism which is exactly the contrary and the deadliest enemy of sovietism.

To sum up, it can be said that there is no evidence whatsoever of a fundamental alteration in the sovietic doctrine, in the sovietic final aim.

This does not imply any criticism on the leaders of the URSS. Very much to the contrary. It is admirable that a man like Stalin still maintains at the summit of power and success, the principles he adhered to in the distant days of poverty and persecution.

Furthermore, why would not Stalin try to spread over Europe and the whole world the political system which he believes to be the best and which led Russia to an unprecedented triumph? Why should the bolcheviks give up the hope of bolchevising the world, when the nazies tried to nazify it, and while the democrats express their formal will to make it democratic ?

The only justified criticism bears on the methods employed

to enforce bolchevism inside and spread it outside. But these methods are themselves an integral part of bolchevism and asking bolchevism to renounce them is asking bolchevism to renounce itself. Besides violence and deceit are in no way a monopoly of soviet system which simply carries them further and ^{which} had the courage to inscribe them in their theoretical tactics (because, according to its ethics, what serves the proletariat is "moral" by definition).

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There being thus no evidence and no probability of a change in the permanent meaning and final aim of the Russian regime, one can put the next question : how is ^{the} URSS going to try and achieve its aim ?

The answer solely depends on what Stalin will choose as the most practical method . He may choose a. to accept for the moment a division of Europe in two zones, one being the " vital space " of URSS, the other being under Anglo-Saxon influence, and then proceed b.y. propaganda to annexate sooner or later the second zone - or b. to proceed at once to the conquest of the whole continent by a combined military and political offensive.

The result, in both cases, would be approximately the same.

Some observers however contend that there is a third prospect : viz. that Russia will remain satisfied for a long period of time with the Division of Europe in two zones. They ground mainly their opinion on

1.- the supposed exhaustion of Russia and its need for help by American capitalism after the end of the war.

It does not seem that such an opinion or hope -----
----- corresponds to facts.

However great may be the help given to URSS by the United States during the war, it is obvious that the main supplies of an army of 20 million men were produced in URSS itself. The method which made such an extraordinary achievement possible in pre-war and war time (after the complete destruction of all industrial wealth during the early years of the revolution) will certainly be applied with success to the work of reconstruction, with or without the help of American industry and capital.

2.- the fact that the preceding attempts to dominate or organize Europe by a single nation have failed, and the conviction that any new attempt would inevitably meet with the same failure.

It is true that Napoleon and Hitler equally failed in their attempts. But Stalin disposes of assets which ^{to the two others} lacked, totally or partially, i. e. . . . :

a. the disposal of 180,000,000 men and, in a very limited number of years, of 250,000,000 men, not taking into account the Slaves & present outside the URSS frontier, who could well be added to the ruling or controlling country.

This question of population is essential to establish and maintain control on a continent containing - URSS not included - over 300 million inhabitants.

For such an achievement, France of 1815 and Germany of 1944 proved to be too small.

A century or half century ago, such big countries as Russia counted only for a percentage of their population, because of the difficulty of govern^{ing} such huge surfaces and because of the low grade of civilization of the masses.

But modern methods have made it possible to govern very efficiently from Leningrad to Vladivostock and also to utilize to the full in super-taylorized (or Stakanovized) factories the half-civilized asiatic masses.

The result is that Russia of 1914, with 120 million inhabitants, counted as 30 or 40 millions. But the URSS of 1944, with 180 millions, counts as 180 millions;

b. the disposal of illimited raw materials (which failed to Germany) and therefore illimited industrial potential;

c. the strength of a likable or not likable, but perfectly consistent ideology;

g. the innumerable complicities which URSS finds in foreign countries. Napoleon had certain complicities in Italy and in Poland because of the French revolutionary principles : but nothing to be compared with present URSS. Hitler could only count in each European country on a very small amount of individuals, most of whom were a highly payed but very restricted fifth column. To day URSS can find a gratuitous " fifth column" of hundreds of thousand and even of millions of people in every country in Europe because of :

- 1.- the communist ideology grouping a disciplined minority in practically every country;
- 2.- the racial affinity of all Slaves (cf. the recent manifest of the Slav congress in Moscow - where the Bulgarians Serbs - Poles and Slovaks adressed "dear Joseph Vassirionovic" and hailed the red army of their "great russian brother");
- 3.- the orthodox religion (extending to Rumania and Greece)-the head of which has been reconstructed in Moscow.

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If finally we leave general ideas to consider the recent facts, we find no positive indication as to which of the two methods will be adopted ^{by Russia} - but we find clear indications that one of these two methods will certainly be chosen.

The Moscow-made Polish government is the most significant precedent.

The conditions of peace to Finland may be more or less hard on financial or territorial items : but they will certainly remain in the line of the preceding offers, i.e. the occupation of Finland by the Russians soldiers and propagandists - that is to say, practically, the immediate or mediate

association of Finland in the Union.

In Greece, it is certainly not on its own initiative that the communist party threw back the national union with Papandreu, accepted in Beyrouth two months ago by its delegates.

In Bulgaria, it is generally admitted that the coming day of the departure of the occupying forces will be the eve of a more or less avowed surrender to the "great brother".

In Serbia, nobody has the slightest doubt as to the real allegiance of Marshall Tito.

In Turkey, we have witnessed the unrestrained bad humour of the Russian radio after the breaking off of the diplomatic relations with Germany. The Russian Ambassador explained himself clearly in that respect to the Bulgarian Minister: " We don't want our neighbours to keep connections with Germany. But we don't want them either to cling to an anglo-saxon help of which they have no need ... "

It is useless to demonstrate the sovietic influence in Syria-Palestine -nor in freed Italy- nor in French North Africa.

One can safely say that the URSS has already put her protecting or organizing hand not only on its immediate neighbours, but even on more distant territories, beyond the limits of a stable division of Europe in two " zones of influence " (supposing that such a division could be considered as curable under any circumstances).

Such are the facts which have to be faced with courage. The usual attempts to avoid these facts are lamentable:

a. The already above mentioned reply " This is german propoganda " is the most usual : but the question is not whether it is anyones peopsganda;it is whether it is true or not.

b. "Russia has changed" has already been dealt with.

c. "Let us beat Germany first, and then we will think about all that" is another escape. But what if the fact of defeating Germany to the extent that there would remain nothing but a void between the Rhine and the Russian frontier allowed the Slaves to fill that void and therefore created the danger about which one wants to "think later" ? What would one say of a man who, boring a hole in his cabin wall and warned that the water will sink the ship, would answer: " I will think of that later " ?

d. Last but not less frequent is the hint " Stalin promised Roosevelt to be a good boy ". It is to be hoped that there is no need to answer such an infantile escape which would considerably amuse M. Stalin himself.

Leaving aside those poor escapes, it appears that two and only two courses remain opened.

1.- One can say that a Russian " organisation " of Europe is desirable or unavoidable.

2.- One can decide that a stop can and must be put to the said Russian " organisation " if and when the russian intentions are considered as beyond doubt.

But in both cases, one has to accept the consequences of the choice.

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The first attitude is not envisaged here solely as an academic argument. If the means of an effective "veto" cannot be found in time, russian control over Europe might be unavoidable and it would then be advisable to "make the best of it". Furthermore, it is the perfect right of any stalinien communist to consider those events as desirable. As for the non-communists and for those who attach a price to national freedom, it would be hard to say that the process will be attractive. But it has been said by someone that "Stalinism is the worst method to attain excellent and necessary transformations". If that is true, one may have to welcome that unpleasant russian method, if the rest of the world and its ruling classes prove themselves unable to provide less unpleasant ones. Moreover it has been thought that finally, all the three main regimes that have appeared in this war - the planned american economy, the nazi state and the stalinien one - would, in spite of spectacular initial oppositions, lead the world after a century to exactly the same socialism inscribed in autonomous but federated nations (the only difference being therefore in the more or less "expensive" methods - and in the choice of the provisionally controlling nation). If that is correct, one may have to ask the survivors of the unpleasant first decades to forget their sufferances and think only of the final result.

All this has been said and can be contended.

But the logical consequences should be simultaneously adopted: the first of which would be to give up the usual thesis about the "our freedoms", the idea of "making the world safe for democracy" and the additional talk about ruling according to the gospel of St Paul. The sooner would be the

better: as it would seem really unnecessary to add mockery to the sufferances of the European nations.

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The second solution is that ^{of} the " veto " to excessive Russian ambitions. This supposes the willingness and capacity to assemble the material and moral resources necessary to enforce the said " veto ".

The difficulties are certainly not less than for the first solution.

a. It is hardly worth emphasizing that no such veto will be effective unless backed by sufficient military forces. The Anglo-Saxon powers have not got for the moment in Europe, or in the vicinity of Europe, anything like the number of divisions required, even taking into account the overwhelming air and naval supremacy. Their population does not exclude the material possibility of the necessary divisions being trained and brought over. But it is a question whether there is a psychological possibility of such an effort. And a further question whether such an effort can be completed in due time. If the responsible Anglo-Saxon leaders cannot answer those questions by the affirmative, then arises the difficult problem of making a sort of peace (other than unconditional surrender) with some sort of German government in order to utilise remaining German military possibilities, or at least to prevent Germany from becoming a supplementary source of soldiers and technicians for Russia. It must be clear that this is envisaged here quite apart from its intrinsic merits or dangers - solely as an unavoidable consequence, if the Anglo-Saxon Powers decide to enforce a veto without being able, or willing to enforce it by their own strength.

b. But these military conditions are not the only ones. Unless deep changes are brought in the schemes of peace, it is hardly believable that an armed veto would have any chance of being supported by either anglo-saxon opinion, or continental opinion - in spite of the fact that organized communists are, for the present, a minority. If the now published schemes (more or less disguised return to pre-war political and economic systems - adoption of neo-Versailles solutions to Franco-german problems) are opposed to the sovietic solutions it is to be predicted that sooner or later - exhausted by political, economic and international crisis - the majority of Europeans will welcome the russian system as at least something that has not already been tried and has not already failed. Explaining in full the European complex in these matters would involve a separate and lengthy memorandum. It will be perhaps sufficient to point out that there are many points in the sovietic system which correspond, partially at least, to the historic stage we have reached : in short, authority must be combined with freedom - the ruling of concentrations of capital over the state must come to an end - and the moment has come for a federation of European powers, either under the unpleasant control of a dominant country, or by the free association of all countries.

Nothing short of such deep reform can constitute the moral background of an attempt to oppose sovietic ambitions on the continent.

+

+ +

It is quite clear that both solutions raise the most intricate problems - and imply painful sacrifices for :

number of people.

But the worst would certainly be to try to escape those problems and sacrifices.

A day could rapidly come where every one would feel uncomfortable as some innocent person remembers that the immediate cause of the war was the refusal to recognize partial mutilation of Poland.

And more uncomfortable still when somebody would want to know exactly why the blood of young men was shed between 1939 and 1945.

file
perman

October 31, 1944.

~~Gen. Gassier~~ 3-4 v

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
TURKEY

PSF
Earle

My dear Mr. President:

Yesterday,
Doctor Gassier, with the French
Army rank of Colonel, who is head
of the Pasteur Hospital here, said
to me in strictest confidence:
"I have had many opportunities
of observing General de Gaulle. I will
stake my reputation as a medical
man that General de Gaulle is a
~~paranoiac~~ with a slow but
progressive trend towards delusion
and insanity!"

Whether this opinion
is an accurate ^{diagnosis} analysis or something
wholly untrue given me with the
intention of prejudicing me against
General de Gaulle, I can not

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OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
TURKEY

say but I thought you ought to know
of it. A week from today is probably
the most important election in our
History. That you will win I am
certain, and that, by a majority
that will amaze you.

You have no idea how
much the people of Turkey and the
minorities are hoping and praying
for your election. In all the
world I believe only the Germans
and Japanese hope for your defeat.
Cordially & respectfully yours,
Freight Car

T-111

Memorandum "S"

PSF 3-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Earle

November 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

What do you think of this?

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 9-23-44, from Lt. Comdr. George H. Earle, U.S.N.R., Naval Attache, American Embassy, Istanbul, Turkey, suggesting that he (Earle) be sent to Germany on an American Mission - to continue personal observations and report conditions in Germany to the President.

(Adm Brown answered this direct & copy of reply is in files.)

Miss Tully

~~General~~ 3-44
file
PSF
Earle

November 21, 1944.

My dear Mr. Hochstetter,

The President asked me to acknowledge your letter of October 27th and to thank you for the information you have sent about the high regard in which Lieutenant Commander Earle is held by the people of Bulgaria. The President is very glad to have the information as further evidence of the fine work Lieutenant Commander Earle has rendered.

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Mr. Leo D. Hochstetter,
Office of War Information,
Istanbul, Turkey.

United States of America
Office Of War Information

Istanbul, Turkey

October 27, 1944

*Admiral Brown
To answer
d return correspondence
for my files*

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Whitehouse,
Washington.

My dear Mr. President:

In my capacity as Chief Editor of OWI news operations in Turkey, I have been in a position to interview a great number of Balkan travellers and other persons who have recently been in Bulgaria.

Among those interviewed were the American airmen who were interned near Sofia, American correspondents and other newspapermen of varied nationalities who have just returned from Bulgaria, Free Bulgarians and Consular officials.

If there is one thing upon which all these parties seem to be in general agreement, it is that the former American minister to Sofia, Commander George Earle, is still regarded by the Bulgarians with highest esteem. One might go so far as to say that Commander Earle seems to be, with the exception of yourself, the most popular American in Bulgaria.

I thought that this information and these conclusions might be of some interest to you.

Respectfully yours,

Leo D. Hochstetter

Leo D. Hochstetter

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ
TURKEY

See cover "E" 3-VV

file
Carle
PSF

Istanbul, 9 December 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

The most vital question for world civilization is the future attitude and action of Russia. In other words "has the leopard changed its spots?".

I enclose an article on this subject just written by a man of Russian and Polish blood who has lived many years in Russia, and who is thought by many here to be an excellent authority on Russia. I thought you might find it interesting.

Cordially and respectfully yours,

George H. Carle

George H. Carle.

The President

The White House.

see page 5

The Return to Tradition in Soviet Russia
and
The Future of Bolshevism

Introduction

The international press and the American and Western European political circles have been aware for some time of the internal changes now taking place in the Soviet Union. Such events as the liquidation of the Komintern, the cessation of the war against religion, the reorganization of the army according to pre-revolutionary standards, etc., encourage many students of Russian and international affairs to draw the conclusion that Russia is turning her back on the Revolution, that she is gradually obliterating its traces and that she is on the way to become, if not a Capitalistic state, at least one with a structure similar to that of the Democracies.

This, in its turn, creates the hope for Russia's return to the family of nations with Western culture. Some people believe that Russia not only will cease being the prime cause of extremist social agitation and political insecurity but will also become a very valuable economic asset for the Capitalistic world and an enormous market for British and American goods.

These hopes are skilfully encouraged by the Soviet Government, who publish impressive - not to say fantastic - plans on the importation of industrial products from the Anglo-Saxon countries after the war.

The aim of the present note is to find out, through an objective examination of the facts, whether and to what extent these hopes are justified. Is Russia really turning away from the Revolution and returning to Europe or are the changes tactical moves only, imposed by the necessities of war and propaganda?

I. The Return to Tradition and Nationalism.

The return to tradition and patriotism, so much commented upon lately, is not a new phenomenon in Soviet Russia. In the first phase of the revolution, aimed at the destruction of the Tsarist regime, the Bolsheviks fought against these notions because they were the foundation of the old order. Later, when the revolution passed from destruction to construction, the Bolsheviks, whether they wanted or not, had to use again the old ideas. This could be noticed as early as 1920, during the Polish-Soviet war. At that time the Kremlin made appeal to the patriotic feelings of the masses and accepted "white" generals in the army. When it became known that the Poles satisfied themselves with the 1920 frontier, leaving intact Soviet Ukraine and Bielorrussia, the official "Izvestia" published (19.XII.1920) a "Moscow Ballade" impregnated with pure Great-Russian nationalism: "Today we are rebuilding the ancient throne of Moscow..." This tendency towards patriotism and nationalism reappeared every time Russia expected trouble from abroad, namely, during both conflicts with Japan, in 1926 and 1932. In 1934 the Soviet press used for the first time the slogan "for fatherland" which was previously considered as being counter-revolutionary.

The Soviet very early began to get ready for the present war, foreseeing not only a defensive war but one of expansion for the Soviet Union. A Committee for the Revision of History Textbooks, founded in 1935, recommended to stress the great role played by "men

who assembled the Russian lands" like Ivan Kalita, Tsar Peter I, etc., i.e. by leaders and princes who annexed the neighbouring lands on the West, East and South. The Committee also ruled that the October Revolution should not be considered as a civil war but as the struggle of the people, desirous to preserve Russia's unity, against the Capitalistic Powers which wanted to divide her.

The celebrations in honour of Pushkin, in 1937, played a very special role in the strengthening of nationalist feelings. In an article entitled "The Glory of the Russian People", the "Pravda" wrote (10. II. 1937):

"Pushkin belongs to us, he is Soviet.... His work has now identified itself with the Revolution, as a river flowing into an ocean. Pushkin was a nobleman. For this reason the stupid, vulgar mob proclaimed that his work is permeated with the feelings of his class. What a low calumny!"

On that occasion 8,5 million copies of Pushkin's works were published and the whole press carried articles about Russia-" a nation of geniuses, the most advanced on the globe."

At the same time a press campaign was started against "the persecution of the Russian language in the national schools of the Soviet Republics." The press also requested the cleaning of the Russian language of revolutionary terms and expressions.

The influence of patriotic tradition was felt very early also in the Red Army. In July 1918 the practice of electing the army commanders by the soldiers was abandoned; in 1924 the principle of personal command was adopted; in 1926 were abolished the common canteens for commanders and soldiers; officers' degrees were introduced in 1936; class limitations were removed in 1937.

The present war quickened the pace of this change. During one year only, 1940, the following reforms were introduced: 1. Obligation to salute superiors; 2. Abolition of political commissars; 3. Soldiers lost the right to appeal to higher commanders without first addressing themselves to their direct superior; 4. Strengthening of officers' authority, introduction of a special mark of distinction for the marshals (star set with jewels).

These reforms went further after the German attack on Russia: officers put on insignia very similar to the old, Tsarist ones; a great number of new orders and rewards was created (Ordres: Suvorov, Kutuzov, Alexander Nevski, Victory and Glory, Ushakov, Nahimov, Hmielnitski. Medals: National War, Partisans', etc.) The new degree of "Chief Marshal" was created. Regiments and divisions are given the names of towns they take. The banner is now sacred. In case of loss of banner the whole officers' corps of the unit is responsible and the unit is disbanded ("Pravda", 13. 6. 1943).

The officers gradually tend to become a caste, their clubs are getting to be exclusive. The press creates around them an aura of superiority which reminds one of the Prussian cult of the uniform. At the same time, an ever increasing number of people, pupils, students, officials, wear uniforms.

The continuation of the tradition of the Tsarist Army is particularly stressed. Kutuzov and Suvorov are presented in the press, the theatre and literature as the glory of Russia. On 7. XI. 41, Stalin, speaking about them and other great military leaders of the Tsarist period, described them as " great ancestors". Count Ignatiev, spared by the revolution and having kept his old, Tsarist rank of general is today pushed to the foreground as a symbol of and link with the past. He has recently published four volumes of memoirs, " Fifty years of Service", and they are a veritable textbook for the young Soviet officer.

Articles are published about "Russia's national system of warfare", created by Alexander Nevski and practiced by all Tsarist generals as well as by Marshal Stalin and his generals.

This return to tradition is becoming more and more Imperialistic.

As we said before, the "assemblers of Russian lands" are highly praised. This concerns first of all Peter I whom internal propaganda presents as Stalin's precursor. The official organ of Soviet historians, "Istoricheskii Jurnal" goes as far as to refute the thesis of the Tsarist historians, Milukov and Kluchevski, who held that Peter's reforms were accidental and were not linked together by any general idea. Gradually Ivan the Terrible also grows to be a symbol. The periodical "Bolshevik" (nr. 13, 1943) writes about him:

"... he knew what he wanted. He created a political force which enabled the Russian people to overcome the danger that threatened them and afterwards to come out on the open, historic road."

It is difficult not to see an allusion to Stalin's policy, in the above words: first, with a severity equal to that of Ivan the Terrible, he wiped out the opposition, then, having prepared the country for war, he came out on the "open, historical roads" leading to the West and the South.

Old, Tsarist writers are readily quoted. Especially those who pushed the people to expansion. The "Bolshevik" (No. 6, 1943) mentions Bieliniski, who wrote that only Russia is predestined to lead the Slav peoples. "We are called upon to tell the world our Idea and our Word."

Soviet Russia does not conceal any more her return to Tsarist panslavism. The manifest expression of this are the "Panslav Congresses" which assemble in Moscow yearly and have their offices there. At these meetings the representatives of the smaller peoples speak very clearly in favor of Russia's right to leadership in the family of the Slav nations, in the political as well as the military and ideological fields.

The return to nationalism is also felt very strongly in the domain of Soviet education. In a statement made during a meeting of the secretaries of the Communist Party (12. I. 1944), Kalinin said:

"The greatest stress is put on the study of Marxism whereas too little attention is given to Russian history. This is absolutely wrong. The study of Russian history is both interesting and attractive." ("Propagandist" - No. 2, 1944)

At present the co-educational schools are being abolished and separate schools for boys and girls are organized instead. Communistic "competition" has also been removed from the schools. Discipline has been greatly strengthened. "Komsomolskaia Pravda" (5. VI. 1942) highly praises the activity of the teacher Protopopova who had sharply criticised the revolutionary practice of teaching the children "nonsense and stupid theories" instead of inspiring them with love for their country. "We must love our country so much that we must think of her with tears of enthusiasm and our blood should boil at the sole thought that we might lose her." According to instructions given by the Commissariat of Public Instruction of the Russian Federal Republic even children's toys must have a national meaning. ("Doshkolnoie Vospitanie" - Nos. 11 and 12, 1943.)

The change in the attitude towards religion began to be felt many years ago. After a long period of militant atheism, a sort of truce was concluded with the Orthodox Church, several years before the outbreak of the present war. The activity of the Society of Atheists was perceptibly tined down even before 1939. As a result of this, the Orthodox Church, exploiting the opportunity to recover at least a part of its former religious liberty, made repeated declarations of loyalty to the Soviet State, after the German attack on Russia. A Red Army Relief Fund was created by the initiative of the clergy, the Soviet press, violating the rules of the official Soviet orthography, began to print the word "God" with a capital letter. Finally, after

a meeting between Stalin and the few bishops that had managed to keep alive, the Synod assembled and elected the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church. At the same time, the Soviet of the People's Commissars instituted a special committee for church affairs. A few clergymen were decorated for outstanding services in the war against the Germans, others became members of the Committee for the Investigation of German atrocities. Matters of religious interest gradually came to be treated by Soviet literature without the usual mockery. The "Bezbozhnik" ("Atheist"), the official organ of militant atheism, was banned. The Society of Atheists continues to exist but has ceased all activity.

As results from this rapid review of the more characteristic facts, the return to tradition in Soviet Russia is real and widespread. Its influence embraces the older generation educated in Tsarist schools, is spread by the school among the young, reaches the masses by way of films, literature and art. It is felt in the army and even in the sphere of foreign politics. G. Gafencu's interesting and reliable work, "Préliminaires de la guerre à l'Est", demonstrates, on base of so far unknown documents and facts, that Stalin and Molotov's policy follows a direction adhered to by all Russian politicians since the time of Catherine II. To this we must add the newly awakened, thanks to the successes of the Red Army, national pride as well as the fact that the belief in the excellence of all things Russian is being instilled into the masses, and we will be able to have a notion of the nationalistic atmosphere that is beginning to prevail in Russia.

From this, a new, though always the same Russian imperialism is being born today. Is this atmosphere the beginning of lasting structural and ideological changes in the Soviet Union? Before we answer, let us consider whether the change really has such a revolutionary character or whether this is rather a temporary exploitation of tradition and national sentiment, carried out without abandoning the doctrines of Marx and Lenin.

II. Marxism, Leninism and the Return to Tradition.

The answer to this question must be sought first of all in the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism itself. This doctrine attaches a great importance to the adjustment of revolutionary tactics to existing conditions at a given moment. The leaders of the State and the Communist Party must in each case decide whether circumstances permit an intensification of revolutionary action or whether, on the contrary, they impose the necessity of lessening it.

If conditions encourage the continuation of a revolutionary action, the Marx-Lenin doctrine advises rapid offensive.

If, however, conditions are not favorable, the doctrine recommends to avoid action and even to enter into compromise with other forces then wait for the moment when the attack will be possible.

With regard to the tactics of retreat, Stalin wrote in his "Problems of Leninism":

"Reserves should be used in such a way as not to lose the possibility of receding when the enemy is strong, and withdrawal becomes the only means of saving the revolutionary vanguard and maintaining the reserves intact."

The same view had already been expressed by Lenin ("Selected Works", vol. X, p. 65-66):

"Revolutionary parties must complete their education. They have learned how to attack. Now

"let them realize that this knowledge must be completed with the skill of timely retreat."

In "Leftism, Communism's Infantile Disease", Lenin wrote:

"The Bolshevics have carried out an orderly retreat from all revolutionary and opposition parties... with the smallest possible losses and with the greatest possible certainty to be able to continue their work with energy and in a big way. They were able to achieve these results because they pitilessly expelled from among their midst those false revolutionaries who did not want to understand that sometimes they must learn to work legally in the most reactionary parliaments and professional organizations, etc."

Stalin explains in his "Problems of Leninism" that the aim of this "tactics of retreat" is to gain time, demoralize and fool the enemy and concentrate one's own forces for an offensive at a later time. As an example Stalin gives the treaty of Brzesc-Litewski (Brest-Litovsk) which was forced on Communist Russia by Germany. The most striking example of this, however, is the Soviet policy in the years 1939-1941 when Russia succeeded in diverting towards the West the attack that threatened her, and then practiced during two years the tactics of "withdrawal" in order to gain time for the final fight.

This tactics is recommended by the leaders of Communism not only in the field of international politics but in ideology also. Stalin speaks about this openly:

"Under certain circumstances proletarian governments may find it necessary to leave the path of the socialistic reconstruction of society... and take the road of slow transformation, of reforms and concessions to the non-proletarian classes in order to break the unity of these classes and enable the revolution to rest and to gather forces for a new offensive. The Proletarian State is able to practice this policy only because the revolutionary cleaning in the preceding period has been thorough enough and has created the possibility to pass from the offensive to temporary retreat..."

In this Stalin ^{Russia} closely Lenin who wrote:

"... the whole history of Bolshevism, before and after the October Revolution, is full of examples of withdrawals, compromise and agreements with other, bourgeois parties. We are waging war for the destruction of the international bourgeoisie and this war is a hundred times more difficult, more complicated and longer than the longest war between nations. Would it not be ridiculous, in these conditions, not to resort to intrigue and not to exploit the conflict (even temporary) of interests among enemies and to seek agreement or compromise with possible (even if wavering and temporary) allies?.. The utmost faithfulness to the ideals of Communism must be combined with the skill of practicing all the necessary and useful compromise agreements and withdrawals, etc., in order to use up the political power of the Hendersons... to encourage the inevitable quarrels between the Hendersons, Lloyd Georges, Churchills, then to chose the proper moment of conflict between these supporters of sacred private property, strike and destroy them all and get control of the political power." (Lenin: "Leftism: Communism's Infantile Disease").

These words contain the answer to the question of what is the real, internal attitude of the Soviet leaders towards their present Capitalist Allies.

The practical answer to this question has already been given by the conduct of the Communist Party in Britain and France from 1939 to the day of the German attack on Russia.

The principles of Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics permit therefore to express the opinion that the present return to tradition in the USSR is a temporary phenomenon dictated by war-time necessities that it is in accordance with the Communist doctrine, that many precedents of such policy exist in the past, and that it cannot in any way be considered as guarantee of Russia's leaders' intention of abandoning their plans for a world revolution.

In fostering this return to tradition the Soviet Government acted under the pressure of external as well as internal necessities.

Internally, it was necessary to rouse the masses to enthusiasm and, by creating the illusion of a return to the old form of a national and more liberal state, use for the war effort the energies even of those who were secret enemies of the regime. Even the former soldiers of the Tsarist and the counter-revolutionary armies of the civil war period have been accepted in the Soviet Army. As says the "Leningrad" (March, 1943) - "they wear their St. George crosses."

The influence of religion had also to be reckoned with; it had been wiped out in the cities but was still a real if secret force in the villages where 2/3 of the population of Russia lives.

In the field of foreign policy, Russia needed the help of British and American Capitalism. She also had to do everything to counter Germany's slogan, very dangerous for the Soviet Union, about the Communist menace.

Stalin understood that in 1939 circumstances had become unfavorable for the Revolution and immediately drew his conclusions. Knowing that it will be impossible to win the war without the help of England and America, he decided not only to refrain from any activity directed against the existing social order in these countries but even created the illusion that the USSR is beginning to resemble the Capitalist world.

III. The Return to Tradition in the Light of Dialectics of Marxism

Materialistic dialectics states that the social process of development should be considered as something separate from metaphysics. A certain number of quantitative changes automatically bring about changes in quality. Ex.: The seemingly small and unimportant social changes in the XIX c. have made possible the profound and often revolutionary changes after 1918.

If this is so, we may ask whether the slight quantitative changes now taking place in the USSR will not oblige the Soviet leaders to go farther than they themselves intend and produce such essential qualitative changes in structure as to abolish the Communist system?

It seems, however, that Stalin (author of a work on materialistic dialectics) has realized the danger early. In order to prevent it, he has given a specific value, favorable to the interests of Communism, to all the new notions the acceptance of which by Soviet Russia produces abroad the impression that the USSR is turning away from Communism.

A branch of linguistics called semantics deals i.a. with the so-called shifts in meaning of words, i.e., a process whereby a word acquires a new meaning by a substitution of an old conceptual value for a new one.

In the same way, the new symbolism of ideas, traditionalist and allegedly opposed to Communism, which is being introduced in the USSR, has taken only the outward form from the national-democratic vocabulary. The meaning of these words and slogans is entirely new and harmonizes perfectly with the structure and interests of the Communist State. Examples:

Today, Peter I is being glorified in the USSR. But the Peter I of

Soviet propaganda is not the oppressor of peasants and the symbol of reaction but a reformer, the man who tamed the Church, the clergy and the nobility, the atheist, the enemy of the boyars, in fact Lenin's and Stalin's precursor. Ivan the Terrible is not a monster with a fancy for killing people, but a wise ruler carrying out "purges" for the superior interest of the State, furnishing, as it were, an explanation for the famous Moscow trials of 1937. Suvorov, today honoured as a hero in Soviet Russia, is not a Tsarist general and reactionary; he is a man who encouraged progress, who opposed the autocracy of Tsar Paul and Prussian customs in the Russian army, and was a father to his soldiers and the protector of peasants. Alexander Nevski is praised highly but to this day nobody has dared to mention the fact that he has been canonized by the Orthodox Church. Pushkin is adored but presented as having been almost a Communist. In the newest work about this great poet (A.S. PUSHKIN - Ogiz, 1943) we can read:

"...he was persecuted by the Government. He spent six years in exile, under police supervision. Persecuted by the censorship.. The stronger he despised autocracy the better loved Russia..."

In rebuilding the Orthodox Church today, Stalin is bringing back to life only its ossified remains, totally dependant upon the Kremlin, which to-morrow will serve him for his Balkan and internal politics. A proof of the tactical and anti-idealistic attitude of the Soviet Government towards the Orthodox Church may be found in the fact that at the same time Mohammedanism is also strongly encouraged in Russia. This may be useful for future action in the Middle East and Arab countries.

Thus, old, seemingly traditionalist notions have acquired a new meaning in the USSR. This is strictly in accordance with the Communist doctrine, which defines language as an "ideological superstructure" subject to change.

Finally, the classic example of the introduction of new, Communist or Soviet etatist meaning into the old concepts is the Soviet policy with regard to nationalities. Liberal in appearance, investing the numerous Soviet Republics with theoretic autonomy or self-government, it is, in fact, the exponent of the Soviet raison d'état. The so-called "national culture" is being encouraged in Soviet Russia through the opening of national libraries, schools and theatres. This culture, however, was and is limited to the purely external verbal forms, because each national language serves only as vehicle for conveying the ideology of Communism and the Russian State. The official theory of the USSR is, that the culture of the peoples of the Soviet Union should be national in form (language) and Bolshevich in meaning.

It can be said therefore that the present "return to tradition" in Russia proper is this same trick played again: people's life and culture has the "national " Russian form and the same Communist ideology.

The slogans meant to introduce this element of tradition never stand alone but are always used in conjunction with Communist slogans. Thus Stalin's appeal of November 7, 1941, saying that Soviet citizens should find inspiration in the example of Suvorov, Kutuzov, etc. ends with the words:

"Let the victorious banner of the great Lenin protect you."

The Soviet teachers' journal "Nachal'naya Shkola" (No 7, 1943) though it requests that pupils should be acquainted with the rich heritage of Russian culture, particularly stresses "the spirit of faithfulness to the Communist Party" in which children should be educated. The new Soviet poetry tells us about tradition, the nation

and its greatness, but always combines this with Stalinist and revolutionary motifs. An example of this is the new Soviet National Anthem now replacing the International (the International is still the Party Anthem). It reads:

"An immovable alliance of free Republics was for always created by Great Russia"
But right after this national accent the hymn

goes on:

"The great Lenin lighted our way, we were grown by Stalin. He taught us to be faithful to the people and gave us inspiration for work and heroism..."

IV. Dynamics of the Communist Party in the course of the present War.

It can be seen from what has been said above that the so-called "return to tradition" in the USSR not only is a temporary phenomenon, a "retreat" resorted to by the Kremlin under the pressure of circumstances, but that the new concepts which are introduced are permeated with Communist meaning and do not weaken the regime or the Communist ideology of the Soviet Union.

But this is not all: much more can be said, namely, that not only Communism is not receding, but is acquiring new dynamics during this war. A few examples:

"The whole course of the great national war of the Soviet people against the German invaders shows that the structure born in October 1917 is the strongest structure in the world. There is no country in the world which would be able to bear the trials through which the USSR has victoriously passed." ("Pravda"-20.X.1942.-)

"This war is the most difficult trial imposed on the Soviet Union in the last twenty five years. No other country could have resisted to such dangers. The Soviet structure has shown itself to be the strongest in the world." ("Pravda"-30.X.42)

The important periodical "Pod znamenem Marxizma" (No. 9-10, 1943) writes that the direct outcome of the October Revolution was not only the creation of the Soviet State, a country having the first place in the world's production; the Revolution also saved the State from disaster to which it was led by the bourgeois Governments. If, as said Stalin, the Soviet structure resisted so well to these dangers - it is the strongest in the world.

This motif of the "strongest structure" is repeated endlessly by entire Soviet press since 1941.

That the Soviet Government is directly interested in the growth of Communism, now in all its glory after so many victories, can be seen from the following: Lenin's works have been published in many more copies during the war than ever before. An editions of 40 volumes is in preparation besides short, popular editions. ("Propagandist"- January, 1944).

"During this war, the "Short History of the Communist Party" is the chief source of knowledge of the Party's history and doctrine. In every civilian and military organization, in big cities and in remote villages - everywhere groups are formed to study this book." ("Propagandist" Decem. 43)

How the Communist Party is faithful to its old line may be seen from this: Even the newest (1943) editions of the official "History of the Party" speak sharply of the anti-Soviet "intervention of the Anglo-French in 1918-1920, on the side of the "white" generals.

In this "History" Britain and France are attacked today with the same violence as in 1938, when the first edition of this book appeared. "Nachalnaia Shkola" (No. 1, 1943) still continues to recommend the teaching of all about this 1918-1920 Capitalist "intervention" and the danger which then threatened Communism.

The new Soviet primer by Iankovskaia (State Editions, 1943) is soaked in Communist ideology and glorification of Lenin and Stalin. In 1944, on the anniversary of Lenin's death, a book of Stalin's speeches on Lenin was published with Stalin's facsimile calling workers to "work according to Lenin's teachings." The entire "Bolshevik" of the 1.1.1944 is devoted to Leninism, "the most progressive doctrine in the world." The most recent, official slogans of the Communist Party, published on the day of the 26-th anniversary of the formation of the Red Army, say i.a.:

"Long live the all-Union Communist Party of Bolshevics, the Lenin-Stalin Party, the source of inspiration and the organizer of the national struggle for victory over the German-Fascist invaders."

What proves that Bolshevism is gaining new strength is the fact that the Communist Party is passing through a period of rapid growth since the beginning of the war: in the year 1942 alone 1,340,000 new members were admitted. In the course of one month only, August 1943, 110,000 new members were admitted and 201,000 inscribed as "candidates". The Communist Party in the USSR has at present 4,600,000 members, i.e. more than at any time since its formation. ("Bolshevik"-November, 1943).

Conclusions.

Summing up, first we state that:

1. The return to the slogan "Nation and Country" and the return, by associations, to tradition have always since 1920 taken place in the Soviet Union in moments of crisis and danger. After 1932, and especially since 1939, this return has taken a greater intensity than ever before because the danger also was great;

2. This return to tradition is entirely in accordance with the Marx-Lenin doctrine which not only tolerates but encourages such returns as an indispensable tactical move in certain circumstances;

3. When examined from the standpoint of the doctrine of materialistic dialectics, the present return to tradition does not seem to be leading to real ideological or structural changes in the USSR, for:

- a/all the elements of this change have been deprived of their previous, "bourgeois" meaning and have been given a Communist meaning instead;
- b/this return to tradition is accompanied by a large scale penetration of Communism into the Soviet masses and its internal strengthening and re-activation based mainly on the practice of presenting the victories of the Red Army as being due to Communism.

Therefore, to the question of whether the present return to tradition in the USSR is, at the same time, a tendency to abandon Communism, its doctrine and aims - we must reply in the negative.

To say, however, that the process of the return to tradition in the USSR has an entirely artificial character would mean to simplify the case purposely, just as it is a simplification to say that the Soviet structure elaborated in the years 1918-1941 does not change at all. Leninism itself recognizes the eternal movement of the constantly changing matter and says that only the laws of nature and the Marxist social laws are not subject to change. If we examine what has taken place in the last 25 years, we come to the conclusion that

the Soviet have never ^{yet} esitated in giving new forms to the technique and organization of their political and social activity but that these changes have always been dictated by the desire of more complete realization of fundamental principles of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. The doctrine and the principles have indeed remained unchanged.

The same thing happens with the present return to tradition. Hard pressed by the imperious necessity of mobilizing all the internal forces and of obtaining help from abroad for the defence of the Communist State as well as for its expansion, the Soviet regime decided to exploit the feelings of patriotism and nationalism, always strong among the Russian people. This move was therefore based on living and real forces known by the Kremlin to exist in the Russian soul. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this newly-awakened nationalism is in any way similar to the moderate and anti-Marxian nationalisms of the West. One of the reasons why European students so often fail to understand Russia is that they seldom pay due attention to that country's association with the East. Russia has been under a continuous, sometimes very powerful influence of Asia ever since the time of the Mogul domination and has created a civilization entirely different from that of Europe, though it may have its points of contact with the West. In its essence, this civilization is anti-European and, in any case, alien and hostile to Europe. Not only the Bolshevics speak about the "rotten West"; many writers and thinkers of the Tsarist period did so too.

If today Russia uses traditionalist slogans, these have nothing in common with the national and liberal traditionalism of the West but are exclusively directed towards this specific, Russian-Asiatic nationalism or patriotism, grown and nurished by centuries of opposition to Europe and distrust of her. And if Soviet writers say that Bolshevism is the product of the Russian spirit - they are to a great extent right. For, many of the elements found in Bolshevism today (the cult of autocracy, the complete subordination of the individual to the state, distrust of the rest of the world, and even collectivism) are only the development of the elements of the old Russia's Moscow-Asiatic culture. Only during the Petersburg period of the Russian culture some efforts were made to approach the West, but this did not give any results. At that time a few elements of Western culture were forcibly and mechanically introduced into Russian life; however, the propagators of these Western ideas were almost always foreigners, protected and favoured by some of the Tsars.

Today, when the Kremlin wants to awaken, on tactical grounds, national or rather patriotic sentiments in the people, it need not create a fictitious phenomenon: it is enough to encourage the elements of Russian-Asiatic culture predominant in the soul of the people, which are in complete harmony with the long-term aims of Communism and lend themselves to organizational treatment of the Soviet system.

So then, the injection of Asiatic-Great Russian traditionalism does not bring Bolshevism nearer to Europe and her way of life but, retaining the attitude of estrangement from and even hostility to Europe, it strengthens Bolshevism and leads it towards an ever greater persistence in the realization of its final goal - the World Revolution.

Today, based on national-Moscow tradition, immensely strengthened by confidence in its own forces, Bolshevism is not at all on the point of "democratizing" itself; on the contrary, it enters into a period of renaissance and new dynamism.

Russia's role in the present war and in the world of the future must not be underestimated. It should be born in mind, however, that she will always be a partner with her own, always the same, aims which are in striking opposition to the ideas and way of life of the Western Democracies. Bolshevism will not abandon these aims and, as soon as another "flow of revolutionary conjuncture" comes, it will switch from the tactics of "retreat" to that of attack. Because of its totalitarian

character it will again have the advantage of quicker decision and action as compared to the Democracies, the more so if the latter continue to be influenced and put off their guard by the Soviet propaganda presenting Stalin's Russia as a prodigal son who is being converted to democracy.

U.S. Navy "E" 3.45
PSF
Earle

March 29, 1945.

Dear George,

Your letter of March 26th has just reached me and your orders to duty in the Pacific have already been issued. As I have already changed instructions once, I think you had better go ahead and carry them out and see what you think of the Pacific war as one of our problems.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R.,
The Racquet Club,
Philadelphia, Pa.

Admiral Brown says to
attach letter from Sec.
Eagle to this prepared
reply for the President to
sign _____ *YMC*

March 26, 1945.

THE RACQUET CLUB
PHILADELPHIA

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of March 24. you order as my Commander-in-Chief I shall obey to the letter.

Further than that, my gratitude for the honours you have conferred upon me and made possible for me compels me to give you my word of honour that I shall issue no public statement of any kind again so long as you are the President, except should you again decide to be a candidate when I shall certainly do all in my power in

Pennsylvania to have you
relected.

Your friendship for
me has been one of the
most valued possessions in
my life. When I wrote
you that last letter I
realized it might cost me
that friendship. You may
know, therefore, when I
deliberately took such a risk
how intense and sincere
were my feelings and
convictions.

On March 3, you wrote
me that you thought that

a bigger field of usefulness lay before
me in civil life. With those words
you destroyed my desire to stay in the
Navy. Since nothing has occurred since
those words of yours, except that I
should have had a difference of opinion
with you, (the first in thirteen years of
association), I request respectfully
that I be transferred to inactive duty.
May God give you health and guide
you right in this Russian mess,
Very respectfully yours,
George G. Fair

March 26, 1945.

THE RACQUET CLUB
PHILADELPHIA

My dear Mrs. Boettiger:

Will you be kind
enough to give the enclosed letter
to the President?

I assume you it will be
the last time I shall bother you.

Very sincerely yours,
~~George B. Cole~~

Copy

The Racquet Club
Philadelphia

March 21, 1945

Dear Mrs. Boettiger:

You may remember I wrote you about the Sultan Mohammed IV hunting knife I had for your father. I told you that I would like to give it to your father personally but if he were too busy I would send it to you to give to him. Then I had a telegram from Mr. Hassett asking me to come to Washington Monday that the President wanted to see me personally.

Sunday I got out of bed with a fever of 103, took a sleeper to Washington to be on time and called Mr. Hassett as to the exact time for the appointment and was informed by him the President was too busy to see me and would I stop by the White House and leave the knife. So I am sending it to you to give to him.

The dates of the Sultan's reign are 1640-1692 and I consider it the finest Turkish antique I have ever seen. On the point end of the scabbard is the Sultan's turban, the stars on the blade are his personal motif, and his name in small Arabic letters are on two places on the scabbard.

As you may know my support of your father began in July 1932, about as early as a Republican could support him. Under him I have been Minister to Austria, Governor of Pennsylvania, Minister to Bulgaria, and three years in the U.S. Navy, the last two years as Asst. Naval Attache' in Turkey, reporting directly to him on Eastern Europe and Near East conditions. I have had several letters from your father congratulating me on my work.

Last autumn I felt my usefulness as an observer in that theatre was finished, so I wrote asking your father to transfer me to occupied Germany for the same sort of work. Imagine my shock when I arrived here to find myself about to be brushed off to the inactive list and not sent to Europe for what Admiral Brown has been frank enough to say on several occasions was because of my anti-Russian attitude. In other words, because I told your father the truth about conditions in Russia and countries occupied by Russia, that near-Bolshevist group of advisers around the President had persuaded him to force me out of the picture.

However, before I am out of the picture, unless your father objects I want to present the following to the members of Congress and to the American people.

First, I shall tell of my opportunities for observation of the Bolsheviks, their methods and results obtained, as Minister to Austria, to Bulgaria and two years as Asst. Naval Attache' in Turkey reporting directly to the President. Then I shall recall my vigorous fight against Nazism from the very beginning in Austria 1933, Bulgaria, etc.

See letter 3-45

*solid 3/26/45
sent 266A*

Then I shall point out why Russia today is a far greater menace than Germany ever was, because of its manpower, natural resources, prospects of Bolshevizing Europe, including Germany, and because of its millions of unpaid fifth columnists. I shall show how Russia twenty-five years after its Revolution is exactly the same Red Terror it was then, of its 15 million people in concentration camps, of its treatment of the Jews and of Labor. I shall prove how Stalin deliberately started this war with his pact of friendship with Hitler so that the capitalistic nations would destroy each other. I shall show the history books of 1944 being taught the Russian children, teaching Lenin's doctrines more strongly than ever, among which is stressed that any deceit, lie, treachery or murder is ethical if it helps the proletariat. I shall show how Mr. Davies and other higher government officials were shown and heard of Russia only what the Bolshevist leaders wanted them to hear and see, as contrasted with me who interviewed scores of refugees.

I shall not do this until my papers have been received retiring me from active service, which I understand will be within the next week, and unless I hear from you, your father does not want me to do it.

I am no Raymond Moley or even Bill Bullitt. No matter how hurt I may be because your father resents the fact I told him the truth and after twelve years wants me to return to civil life, I shall never do anything to hurt or embarrass him as long as we both live.

I forgot to say that if I send this letter to the Press and members of the Congress, I shall ask a delegation be sent immediately to investigate Russian breaking of promises in the Balkans, where they are sentencing to jail Bulgarian democrats who used to meet me secretly to plan opposition to Nazi influence and power in Bulgaria. I shall also state that the criticism of my article as being untimely or unpatriotic can hardly be considered so when from the bottom of my heart I believe the ally we are aiding will be a far greater menace to us and to civilization than the enemy we are now fighting.

If I do not hear from you in a week, I shall understand the President has no objection to me sending this letter to members of Congress and the Press.

Very sincerely yours,

George H. Earle

Dear Grace: This is Geo. Earle's present to Father which Earle says belonged to Sultan Mohammed the fourth. He says further: "The dates of the Sultan's reign are 1640 to 1692, and I consider it the finest Turkish antique I have ever seen. On the point end of the scabbard is the Sultan's turban, the stars on the blade are his personal motif, and his name in small Arabic letters are on two places on the scabbard."

This is part of that terrible letter he wrote me, and which I read to you. Adm. Brown insists on seeing Father about this last. So, perhaps a letter of thanks had better wait until it is decided what to do about the gent.

Anna

*Miss Tully -
for information file*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1945.

Dear George,

I have read your letter of March 21st to my daughter Anna and I have noted with concern your plan to publicize your unfavorable opinion of one of our allies at the very time when such a publication from a former emissary of mine might do irreparable harm to our war effort. As you say, you have held important positions of trust under your Government. To publish information obtained in those positions without proper authority would be all the greater betrayal. You say you will publish unless you are told before March 28th that I do not wish you to do so. I not only do not wish but I specifically forbid you to publish any information or opinion about an ally that you may have acquired while in office or in the service of the United States Navy.

In view of your wish for continued active service, I shall withdraw any previous understanding that you are serving as an emissary of mine and I shall direct the Navy Department to continue your employment wherever they can make use of your services.

I am sorry that pressure of affairs prevented me from seeing you on Monday. I value our old association and I hope that time and circumstance may some day permit a renewal of our good understanding.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R.,
The Racquet Club,
Philadelphia, Pa.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 24, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(Chief of Naval Personnel).

Enclosure (A) is a copy of a letter the President has sent to Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R., this date. The President directs that it be made a part of your confidential files; that it be understood that Commander Earle no longer has any special instructions or responsibility to the President; and that he be employed in administrative duties in the war area wherever you consider his services most helpful.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Condi. of Sale, U.S.N.P.
The Racquet Club,
Phila., Pa.



Mrs. Boettiger,
The White House,
Washington,
D.C.,
U.S.A.



THE RACQUET CLUB
PHILADELPHIA



July 18, 1958

*PSF
Earle*

Confidential Magazine, August 1958, July 1954 removed from
PSF, Closed Box 153, 1945, "E" General and placed in PPF 1999-
Earle. Also FDR to Earle, March 3, 1945; Wilson Brown to
Miss Tully, Mar 3, 1945 plus attachments.

RLJ