MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As requested in your memorandum of January 8 to General Marshall, I have made available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of your letter of November 30, 1942, to the Prime Minister.

Since the departure of the Lyttelton Mission, War Department representatives have been working continuously with British Army representatives to determine the items not considered in detail with the Mission which are to be provided during 1943, and substantial progress has been made to date. An agreement has been reached on Ordnance material, except for a few items in which we must also deal with the Canadian Agency, War Supplies Limited. Full agreement has been reached with respect to trucks and vehicles. However, further negotiations will be necessary to fix the radio and other Signal Corps items and engineer equipment. By far, the greater majority of all items has been resolved and the remaining items should be determined within the next week.

In general, the guiding principles of these discussions have been to meet British requirements to the maximum extent compatible with meeting other requirements of equal or greater urgency established by the strategic directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Acting Chief of Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

If this comes under you,
will you prepare a reply for
my signature? Otherwise, will
you take it up with WPB?

F. D. R.

Secret letter to the President 1/28/43
from Donald Nelson, Sir Herbert Sinclair
H. F. Taylor, Amer. British and Canadian
members, Combine Production and Resources
Board, Wash., D. C. re the P. Memo of
1/8/43 enclosing copies of their Report
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the
escort vessel construction program.
MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

To read and return for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Secret Letter to the P 1/15/43 signed by Donal M. Nelson, Amer. member, Sir Robert Sinclair, British Deputy Member E. F. Taylor, Canadian Deputy Member, Combined Production and Resources Board Washington, D. C. re the P's memo of 1/8 confirming memo on escort vessels which they had previously received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff 1/2/43
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
January 8, 1943

[DECLASSIFIED]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD:

Subject: Escort Vessel Construction Program.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed me that you have been requested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to adopt every means possible to effect an immediate acceleration and expansion of the escort vessel construction program.

In their memorandum to you the Combined Chiefs of Staff have cited the reasons why they consider such action to be imperative. While there has been some slight gain in construction of merchant vessels over sinkings, the gain is not at all commensurate with the volume of construction that is being completed and the effort that we are pouring into the shipping program.

Before making any decision on this matter I wish that you would submit a report to me on the practicability of making certain of the delivery of the escort vessels now of the delivery of the escort vessels now contemplated for the calendar year 1943 and, further, of possibly increasing the number.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

[DECLASSIFIED]

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By J. J. Stewart  Date SEP 21 1973
Memo Miss Teely

If the President will sign this, it will be helpful if it is done before January 9.

W.F.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This question has really been disposed of by the action of WPB with reference to the rubber, escort vessel problem. It will require no action by you.

Your attention is called to the fact that we must standardize the types of escort vessels, etc. However, as it is addressed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it should not be necessary for you to send it to them. I suggest filing.

J. F. B.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

If this comes under you,
will you prepare a reply for
my signature? Otherwise, will
you take it up with WPB?

F. D. R.
COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
January 28, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your memorandum of January 8, 1943, we enclose copies of our Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the escort vessel construction program.

In transmitting the report, we desire to draw your attention to certain elements of paramount importance. To accomplish the stated 1943 construction program for escort vessels, and to lay the foundation for significant expansion in the latter part of 1943 and the early part of 1944, we must standardize and reduce the number of types of escort vessels, merchant ships, minor craft and auxiliary vessels, as far as possible; and all agencies concerned in the construction programs must drive ahead on a concerted and agreed plan. Furthermore, we must emphasize that the estimates given in the Report are conditional upon increased priorities not being granted to other programs or to parts of other programs which conflict with the escort vessel program. On this condition, the Board considers that to give an over-riding priority to escort vessels would do more harm to other essential programs than it would do good to the escort vessel program. They feel that the only sound way to deal with potential bottlenecks is to pursue as a matter of greatest urgency the ascertainment of the facts and apply to each place where real tightness is disclosed every possible pressure to free the situation.

If these controlling considerations are borne constantly in mind and applied, we may reasonably expect the accomplishment of the present 1943 escort vessel construction program in the United States. In addition, an increase of some seventy escort vessels over and above the December estimates in the United Kingdom and Canada should be achieved. Such increase would come mainly in the latter half of 1943.
We wish to point out that, even if all of these steps are taken, the result will fall considerably short of what we understand the requirements to be.

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Nelson
American Member

Sir Robert Sinclair
British Deputy Member

E. P. Taylor
Canadian Deputy Member

The President

The White House
MEMORANDUM

To: The Combined Chiefs of Staff  
From: The Combined Production and Resources Board  
Subject: Escort Vessels

1. Immediately on receipt of your letter of January 2nd, we called  
a special meeting at which representatives of the Navy Department and the  
Admiralty were present. At that meeting lines of inquiry to be pursued with  
the authorities concerned in U.S., U.K. and Canada were instituted. A further  
meeting was held on January 23rd to review progress.

This memorandum gives the results of these inquiries up to this time,  
presents for decision what appear to us to be the major issues affecting the  
production program, and contains, in so far as we feel we can appropriately  
make them, our recommendations.

2. We have examined the programs as they existed at the end of 1942  
and find them to be as follows:

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* Figures for 1943 taken from Consolidated Production Summary – December 1942.

Note: In addition, Canada estimated that 33 Algerine Minesweepers (17 knots)  
and U.K. estimated that 21 Algerine Minesweepers and 16 sloops (15 5/4 knots) could be completed in 1943.

Of the 260 D.E.s estimated to be produced in the U.S. in 1943, 99 are  
turbo-electric (24 knots) and the remainder Diesel (18 knots).

We have not included in this table Fleet Destroyers of which some part  
are used on Escort Duty because the proportion we use depends entirely  
on operational considerations.
This statement does not, of course, reflect the various considerations referred to in Paragraphs 4 to 10 hereunder.

3. The basis on which we have considered the problem is:

(a) The grave situation outlined in your letter of January 2nd demands that no possible way of accelerating or expanding this program should be ruled out from consideration because of repercussions on other programs; but, where it appears that such measures would result in substantial conflict with other urgent programs, the alternatives should be clearly presented;

(b) By the end of 1943 or as soon as possible thereafter it would be desirable, if practicable, that the United Nations should have in service approximately three times the number of escort vessels now in service;

4. As a result of the further inquiries, which have been made in full recognition of the urgency of the problem, the following are the latest estimates we have been given of the position:

(a) U.K. will increase Corvette production from 26 to 78
(of which 36 will be single screw in 1943 and 40 twin screw)
at a small sacrifice of merchant tonnage.

(b) Canada will aim to produce 42 single-screw and 42 twin-screw—an increase of 22; and 39 Algerine Minesweepers—an increase of 6. This does not involve any reduction in 1943.

(c) U.S. production in 1943 is not likely to exceed 320 Destroyer Escorts and Corvettes combined.

5. The result is, so far as 1943 is concerned, an increase of 69, of which 6 are Algerine Minesweepers—making the revised 1943 total:

- D.E.s and Corvettes: 497
- Mines: 16
- Algerine Minesweepers: 60

573

It should, however, be noted that the U.S. figures are not final. Both agencies concerned are currently examining their production plans, but the opinion of those responsible for the scheduling of their production
is that it would be unsafe to put the probable 1943 figure higher than 320 at this time. Further, the Canadian production up to the point stated is not entirely self-supporting; it is for Canada an ambitious program, but there appears to be at least a reasonable possibility of the components they require up to this point being made available from U.S.

6. The result summarized in the last paragraph is obviously very far from adequate. It does not achieve the acceleration desired in the early part of the year. It is, however, on a realistic basis the best result which seems possible within the next 12 months. The main reasons why it cannot be further improved in U.S. are:

(a) Lack of standardization;

(b) Shortage of yards and fitting-out basins, each with the management, labor and facilities competent to deal with these relatively complicated vessels;

In addition, there may be during part of 1943 a shortage of components such as generators, pumps, valves, etc. - this is dealt with more fully in Paragraph 11.

7. Standardization is, in our judgment, the most important single factor which can contribute to an expansion of the construction in the U.S. As the U.S. is the greatest potential contributor to the solution of the problem, a clarification of the position in that country is of vital importance. Mr. Nelson is taking this up with those concerned and the following facts are set out to indicate what scope exists.

In the U.S. there are more than 150 types of ships currently under construction, for example, including 18 types of tugs, 6 types of large cargo merchant vessels, and 5 types of escort vessels. The merchant ships, (other than the Liberty ships which are fully standardized) employ 19 different types of geared turbine machinery. The escort vessels employ 6 different types of propulsion machinery.

Three Agencies - the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the War Department - are responsible for specifying requirements of vessels, and the responsibility for construction is divided mainly between the first two.
8. It should, we consider, be laid down as a definite policy that our plans for future construction should be based on the greatest possible reduction of types consistent with operational needs. This, of course, takes into account the desirability of not reducing total output meantime.

Within that general policy, there are certain specific steps which we would recommend:

(a) **Destroyer escorts**

Standardize propulsion machinery on one type only – Turbine Gear; although for a time, Turbine Electric may have to be included as well. The elimination of Diesel engines for this type of ship is, we understand, desirable from the operational and maintenance aspects, as well as from the production aspect. Even if this is decided now, it can only come into effect at the end of 1943.

(b) **Merchant ships**

Eliminate the C.1 type, do not proceed with the C.4 type, and consider very carefully the possibility of eliminating C.3 or C.0.

(c) **Corvettes**

Get into production as soon as possible on the existing Canadian design (adapted to the minimum degree necessary to conform to U.S. practice) only bringing in – as and when it can be done without interrupting the flow of production – the improvements for which plans are now being completed in U.K.

(d) **The C.O.S. and O.P.R.B.** should together set up a body under some such title as the Combined Shipbuilding Committee (Standardization of Design). This body should be charged with the duty of securing and maintaining the greatest possible standardization of design, equipment and lay-out in the three countries. It should concentrate first on escort vessels. (As regards merchant vessels and small craft, the problem is very largely one for consideration within the U.S.). On the Committee there should be representatives of the
U.S. Navy Department, Maritime Commission, and W.P.E.,
British Admiralty and D.M.S., Canada and R.C.N. It should
have particular regard to operational experience and require-
ments in accord with strategic plans.
It would in no sense cut across the responsibilities for
production.

2. We have considered whether any further acceleration can be
secured by according to this escort vessel program some overriding
priorities.

In the U.K. and in Canada the responsibility for shipbuilding is
concentrated under one head. The British Admiralty and the D.M.S., Canada,
have both given escort vessels the highest priority.

In the U.S. the Navy Department have given Destroyer Escorts highest-
priority, subject only to completion of certain aircraft carriers which
are no less urgently required. The completion by the due dates of the
existing 1943 programs of other combat major ships is already assured
and will not be affected by the fact that the acceleration and expansion
of Destroyer Escorts will come ahead of any increased program of other
Naval Ships which is considered desirable.

The estimates given in this Report (as at January 23, 1943) are
conditional upon increased priorities not being granted to other programs
or to parts of other programs which conflict with the Escort Vessel
Program. On this condition, the Board considers that to give an over-
riding priority to Escort Vessels would do more harm to other essential
programs than it would do good to the Escort Vessel Program. They feel
that the only sound way to deal with potential bottlenecks is to pursue
as a matter of greatest urgency the ascertainment of the facts and apply
to each place where real tightness is disclosed every possible pressure
to free the situation. They understand that as regards U.S. this will
be under the personal direction of Mr. C. E. Wilson as Chairman of the
Production Executive.

If any other program which conflicts with the Escort program were
to be given preferential treatment, the estimates herein would have to
be radically revised.
10. It has been suggested to us that, if decisions are now taken to plan an expansion of the Escort Vessel Program, concentrating on certain yards presently engaged on construction of C-type merchant ships or the larger tank landing craft - yards which are relatively well placed as regards management, labor and facilities for the construction of corvettes - and, if, for the remaining yards, a full and regular flow of material and components is arranged, it ought to be possible to produce in the U.S. a substantial expansion of the corvette program in the early part of 1944, without a material reduction in merchant ship tonnage completed during 1943.

This general policy seems to us sound and it should be examined in detail by the Agencies concerned. A provisional and, we hope, a conservative estimate is given in Paragraph 12 below.

11. As regards components, it is very difficult at this time to get a clear picture. The detailed scheduling of the rubber and octane programs with the program for escort vessel construction is not yet complete. Certain equipment, such as compressors and heat exchangers, which recently were thought to be bottlenecks, are on the way to being cleared. It appears definite that certain types of generators will be inevitably in short supply through the greater part of 1943 and probably there will be some shortage of pumps and valves.

The U.K. have undertaken that the Admiralty and Ministry of Production will give the closest attention to the problem of diverting capacity from other and relatively less urgent needs to the particular bottlenecks in the U.S. and Canadian programs. It may not be possible to give a list now which is finally the correct list because it takes some time to explore to the full the possibilities of opening up certain lines of production in this country. For, however, a program of the importance and urgency of the one under consideration it would, we think, be right to leave out nothing which conceivably might be a bottleneck and to the increased production of which additional capacity can now be diverted.

12. We are not yet in a position to give a firm estimate of the maximum production of escort vessels in the first half of 1944 since that largely depends on the considerations referred to above. On the data, however, at present available, the best estimates we can give are as follows: 

[DECLASSIFIED]
As regards the U.K., the sacrifice of merchant tonnage involved in the acceleration referred to in Paragraph 4 is some 76,000 D.W. tons in 1943 and 250,000 D.W. tons in 1944. The 1944 corvette production would be at the rate of 10 per month.

The estimated Canadian production in 1944, without a sacrifice of merchant tonnage is 56 twin-screw corvettes and 41 single-screw corvettes. If components were available and the policy were agreed upon, an additional 25 corvettes could be produced in Canada in 1944 at the expense of 450,000 tons of merchant shipping. Of that quantity, 12 might be completed by the end of the second quarter in 1944. Such price in merchant ships for the increased corvette production appears to be inordinately high.

Given the maximum measure of standardization that we recommend above, U.S. production in the first 2 quarters of 1944 might reasonably be estimated at 170 1st quarter, and 190 2nd quarter. This is a disappointing estimate but is as high as can realistically be made at this time. It is subject, however, to more detailed examination as suggested in Paragraph 10.

13. We have considered whether a further increase in escort vessel construction in the U.S. could be achieved through a reduction in the rate of merchant ship construction. It is, of course, primarily a question for the production authorities in the U.S. to assess the relative costs and we believe it is one upon which a precise answer cannot yet be given. We are, however, advised that no sacrifice of merchant tonnage could substantially increase the number of escort vessels produced in 1943 beyond the 330 referred to in Paragraph 5 and that, as regards the expansion in 1944, the cost of undertaking more than is estimated in Paragraph 12 above would be so high as to be almost prohibitive. To achieve the figures estimated, the U.S. will be making maximum use of yards suitable for this construction. To draw upon yards building 0.9 or 0.9 would be virtually to stop construction of the faster type of merchant vessel—a policy which we are assured would be disastrous from the operational point of view. To bring into escort vessel construction yards now producing liberty ships, might be to lose as many as three liberty ships for each additional escort vessel.

DECLASSIFIED
14. We prepared some tables to illustrate broadly the probable ratio of escort vessels to merchant tonnage at various dates up to the third quarter of 1944, taking into account losses, lag between completion and commissioning for service, etc. We have, however, been informed today that the C.N.A.B. have made a detailed study of this subject on different hypotheses from those we had used as regards the lag between completion and commissioning for service, but on the basis of previous production estimates.

We do not wish to put into circulation a series of figures based on different hypotheses but designed to illustrate the same point. On the other hand, we felt it unwise to delay this Report for the preparation of further detailed calculations. We have therefore given to the C.N.A.B. our latest production estimates, with the request that on the hypotheses approved by the Service Authorities concerned a revised tabulation be prepared as soon as possible.

For the purpose of this Report it will suffice to say that whatever be the ratio of escort vessels to merchant ships (established by these further calculations) at intermediate dates, the position throughout 1943 and well into 1944 will fall short of what we understand it ought to be.

15. In conclusion we should like to re-emphasise the paramount importance of standardization to the acceleration and expansion of large scale escort vessel production.

Donald M. Nelson
American Member

Sir Robert Sinclair
British Deputy Member

E. F. Taylor
Canadian Deputy Member
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Will you arrange an appointment for General Henry to come in and see me and will you give this to me when he comes in?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Your best to

Emmal Henry
February 8, 1943.

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

On January 15, 1943, at a regular meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, the Board unanimously approved the Twenty-eighth Recommendation, which reads as follows:

"The Board considered the question of the postwar disposition of the defense projects and installations which the Government of the United States has built or may build in Canada. The Board noted that the two Governments have already reached specific agreements for the postwar disposition of most of the projects and installations thus far undertaken. It considers that such agreements are desirable and should be made whenever possible.

"The Board recommends the approval of the following formula as a generally fair and equitable basis to be used by reference whenever appropriate in the making of agreements in the future and to cover such defense projects, if any, the postwar disposition of which has not previously been specifically provided for:

"A: All immovable defense installations built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, be relinquished to the Crown either in the right of Canada or in the right of the province in which the same or any part thereof lies, as may be appropriate under Canadian law.

"B: All movable facilities built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, at the option of the United States Government:"
(1) be removed from Canada;

or

(2) be offered for sale to the Government of Canada, or with the approval of the Government of Canada, to the Government of the appropriate Province at a price to be fixed by a Board of two appraisers, one to be chosen by each country and with power to select a third in the case of disagreement.

"C: In the event that the United States Government has foregone its option as described in B(1), and the Canadian Government or the Provincial Government decides to forego its option as described in B(2), the facility under consideration shall be offered for sale in the open market, any sale to be subject to the approval of both Governments.

"D: In the event of no sale being concluded the disposition of such facility shall be referred for recommendation to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense or to such other agency as the two Governments may designate.

"The principles outlined above shall reciprocally apply to any defense projects and installations which may be built in the United States by the Government of Canada.

"All of the foregoing provisions relate to the physical disposition and ownership of projects, installations, and facilities and are without prejudice to any agreement or agreements which may be reached between the Governments of the United States and Canada in regard to the postwar use of any of these projects, installations and facilities."

Owing to your absence in Africa, it was necessary if we were to comply with the request of the Canadian Government, to vary our procedure somewhat in connection with this recommendation. We, therefore, obtained the formal approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy of this Recommendation. The Secretary of State thereupon addressed an instruction to our Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Ottawa, informing him that the War and Navy Departments having approved this Recommendation, the Chargé was authorized to exchange notes with the Canadian Government quoting the text of the Recommendation and stating that it had been approved by the Government of the United States.

I enclose the following pertinent papers: a copy of a letter
dated January 23 from the Secretary of War approving the Board's 28th Recommendation; a copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy in the same sense; a copy of an instruction dated January 25, 1945, which the Secretary of State sent to the American Chargé d'Affaires at Ottawa, authorizing him to enter into an exchange of notes with the Canadian Government approving this Recommendation.

In the past you have personally approved recommendations of the Board which involved matters of policy and recommendations which were above regular routine inter-service subjects. The American Section, therefore, deemed it proper that this Twenty-eighth Recommendation should have your approval.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Chairman, American Section
Permanent Joint Board on Defense.
JAN 23 1943

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State.  

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The War Department has reviewed the Twenty-eighth  
Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense,  
Canada-United States, and concurs in this Recommendation.  

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

APR 11 1974
Sir:

At the request of the State Department, the 28th Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada - United States has been studied by the Navy Department and no objections to its adoption by both Governments concerned are interposed by this Department.

It is understood that the wording of the 28th Recommendation on the rough draft, which is the only copy available at the moment to this Department, will be identical with the final smooth draft which is in the process of preparation.

Respectfully,

(Signed) FORRESTAL

James Forrestal
Acting

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.
January 25, 1945

No. 1296

Lewis Clark, Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Ottawa.

Sir:

I refer to the general question of the post-war disposition of defense projects and installations which the Government of the United States is building in Canada which was raised with you informally several months ago by the Canadian authorities and later transferred by them for discussion in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

All of the defense projects and installations which has thus far been undertaken in Canada are being constructed by the War and Navy Departments, especially the former. The War and Navy Departments have informed me that the recommendation on this subject which was adopted by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense on January 13, 1945, meets with their approval. You are therefore authorised to send a note in the following sense to the Canadian Government:

"Although in many instances the Governments of the United States of America and of Canada have reached specific agreements covering the post-war disposition of defense projects and installations which, in order more effectively to prosecute the war, the Government of the United States, with the consent and approval of the Canadian Government, has built or is building in Canada, nevertheless there seemed advantage in defining certain general principles which in the absence of special circumstances should serve as a guide to the two Governments in formulating any future agreements covering the post-war disposition of such projects or installations in Canada. The same general principles would of course apply reciprocally in the event of any project or installation being built by the Canadian Government in the United States territory."

"The matter was referred to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense which after careful study adopted the following Recommendation on January 13, 1945:

""The
The Board considered the question of the postwar disposition of the defense projects and installations which the Government of the United States has built or may build in Canada. The Board noted that the two Governments have already reached specific agreements for the postwar disposition of most of the projects and installations thus far undertaken. It considers that such agreements are desirable and should be made whenever possible.

The Board recommends the approval of the following formula as a generally fair and equitable basis to be used by reference whenever appropriate in the making of agreements in the future and to cover such defense projects, if any, the postwar disposition of which has not previously been specifically provided for:

A: All immovable defense installations built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, be relinquished to the Crown either in the right of Canada or in the right of the province in which the same or any part thereof lies, as may be appropriate under Canadian law.

B: All movable facilities built or provided in Canada by the Government of the United States shall within one year after the cessation of hostilities, unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments, at the option of the United States Government:

1. be removed from Canada;

or

2. be offered for sale to the Government of Canada, or with the approval of the Government of Canada, to the Government of the appropriate Province at a price to be fixed by a Board of two appraisers, one to be chosen by each country and with power to select a third in the case of disagreement.

C: In the event that the United States Government has foregone its option as described in B(1), and the Canadian Government or the Provincial Government decides to forego its option as described in B(2), the facility under consideration shall be offered for sale in the open market, any sale to be subject to the approval of both Governments.
D: In the event of no sale being concluded the disposition of such facility shall be referred for recommendation to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense or to such other agency as the two Governments may designate.

The principles outlined above shall reciprocally apply to any defense projects and installations which may be built in the United States by the Government of Canada.

All of the foregoing provisions relate to the physical disposition and ownership of projects, installations, and facilities and are without prejudice to any agreement or agreements which may be reached between the Governments of the United States and Canada in regard to the postwar use of any of these projects, installations, and facilities.

I have today been directed to inform you that this Recommendation has been approved by the Government of the United States of America, which would welcome confirmation from you that it has likewise been approved by the Government of Canada.

I avail myself, et cetera.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Hull
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1943

Mr. F. R. LaGuardia,
Chairman, American Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defense,
In Care Senior Army Member,
Room 3E-338 Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. LaGuardia:

I have approved the Twenty-Ninth Recommendation
of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United
States, and return it to you herewith.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Twenty-Ninth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on
Defense, Washington, returned to Mr. LaGuardia. The President
did not sign the actual Recommendation.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date APR 11 1974
March 5, 1943

General Edwin M. Watson
Secretary to the President
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Watson:

Will you be so good as to see that the President gets the enclosed and please see that it is sent to the War Department immediately.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Mayor
Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Mr. President:  

I inclose for your consideration the Twenty-Ninth  
Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States, approved at Montreal on February 24 and dealing with the expeditious completion of the airway from the United States to Alaska. This Recommendation was adopted by the Board after its presentation by the United States Army Member.  

In order to expedite the accomplishment of this Recommendation, I ask that it be returned to the War Department in the inclosed envelope, after its approval.  

Sincerely yours,  

F. H. LaGuardia,  
Chairman, American Section.  

2 Incls:  
29th Recmdtn. PJBD.  
Env. addressed to:  
S/W, Att: PJBD.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Completion of airway from the United States to Alaska.

Recently Mr. LaGuardia submitted to you the Twenty-ninth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which provided in general for the United States accepting certain responsibilities in connection with the completion of the airway from the United States to Alaska. You sent Mr. LaGuardia's recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that expeditious completion of facilities on the Alaska Air Ferry Route is essential to permit its use in the summer of 1943, particularly for the delivery of Lend Lease aircraft to Russia.

The Canadian effort to speed construction of this project has been unsuccessful and it is understood that they are willing to permit the United States participation to the extent provided by the Twenty-ninth Recommendation.

The Twenty-ninth Recommendation calls for certain construction work to be done by the United States Army Air Forces. This is contrary to the provisions of Public Law No. 326 of the 77th Congress. However, to effect a change in the resolution would necessitate returning it to both governments and to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense which would only result in delaying the project. To overcome this difficulty the War Department will designate the Chief of Engineers as an agent of the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces for the project listed at Edmonton and White Horse with the sole responsibility for the completion of these projects.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform Mr. LaGuardia of your approval of the Twenty-ninth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States. A letter to this effect has been prepared for your signature and is attached hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR RECOMMENDATION.
F.D.R.

March 12, 1943.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

A18705
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE:

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FOR RECOMMENDATION.

F.D.R.

Undated letter to the President from Mayor LaGuardia, Chairman, American Section, Permanent Joint Bd. on Defense, Canada-U.S., Washington, enclosing for consideration the 29th Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Bd. on Defense, Canada-U.S., approved at Montreal on Feb. 24th and dealing with expeditious completion of the airway from U.S. to Alaska; recommendation adopted by the Bd. after its presentation by the U.S. Army member.
The original of this memorandum was handed to the President by Admiral Leahy, and returned to him with "O.K., F.D.R." written thereon.

\[\text{Signed by Smith}\]
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

9 May 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize their responsibility continually to review the needs of the military establishments as the day for the defeat of Germany approaches.

Consistent with this responsibility they have already approved the general policy that our programs for military aircraft will be gradually curtailed as the war in Europe approaches an end.

As a guide for future procurement planning, it is recommended that you approve the following corollary policy concerning assignments of Lend-Lease munitions with respect to nations outside the Western Hemisphere:

Upon the defeat of Germany, assignment of Lend-Lease munitions will be limited to the materials which are not available to the Allied Nations concerned and which are necessary to support that portion of the forces of such nations as, in the opinion of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, can and will be profitably employed against Japan in the furtherance of our agreed strategy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73  
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

Copy to accompany original.

DECLASSIFIED
DEC 4 1973
My dear Admiral Leahy:

I believe steps need to be taken which will afford full assurance that communications to and from the various Federal departments and agencies do not disclose or become a source of information of value to the enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would seem to be in the best position to be of assistance in this regard.

Accordingly, I wish that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would proceed to make a survey of all cryptographic systems and related procedures now in use or proposed to be used by any Federal department or agency, utilizing in this survey the services and facilities of the Joint Communications Board. The survey should consist of an examination of the codes, ciphers, cipher devices, cipher machines, and other equipment in use for secret or confidential communications; of all procedures relating thereto; of all methods of handling such communications; of the adequacy of cryptographic personnel; and, generally, of the means and equipment utilized in connection with the physical security of such communications.

It is my desire that all Federal departments and agencies concerned cooperate fully with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their designated representatives in this connection. These departments and agencies should furnish the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their representatives any information pertinent to the survey and should also permit access by the Joint Chiefs and their representatives to any records, systems, devices, and equipment involved in the survey. I wish you would forward to each such department or agency, on my behalf, a copy of this letter.

At the conclusion of the survey and at such earlier times as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may deem necessary, I should like to have them submit to me their findings and recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt
EXECUTIVE ORDER

SURVEY OF SECURITY OF CODED MESSAGES

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, in order to further the protection of the national security and the successful prosecution of the war and with a view toward insuring that communications to and from the various departments and agencies of the Government of the United States do not disclose, or become a source of, information of value to the enemy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Joint Communications Board shall make a survey of all cryptographic systems and related procedures now in use, or proposed to be used, by any Federal department or agency. Such survey, which shall be made subject to the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall include an examination of the codes, ciphers, cipher devices, cipher machines, and other equipment in use for secret or confidential communications; of all procedures relating thereto; of all methods of handling such communications; of the adequacy of cryptographic personnel; and, generally, of the
means and equipment utilized in connection with the physical security of such communications.

2. All Federal departments and agencies concerned shall cooperate fully with the Joint Communications Board and its designated representatives in carrying out the purposes of this order. To that end, such departments and agencies shall, upon the request of the Board or its representatives, furnish any information pertinent to the aforesaid survey and permit access by the Board or its representatives to any records, systems, devices, and equipment involved in such survey.

3. The Joint Communications Board shall, at the conclusion of the aforesaid survey and at such earlier times as the Board may deem necessary, submit its findings and recommendations resulting from the survey to the President through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

, 1944.
Subject

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

APP 7144

WASHINGTON D.C.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Office of the Attorney General

The President,
The White House

May 2, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting a proposed Executive order entitled "Survey of Security of Coded Messages referred to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget by Your Executive Clerk and Forwarded for my consideration by the Director after revision in his office with respect to form only."

Accompanying the proposed order is a memorandum to you by the Director as an alternative substitute for the proposed order.

The letter is directed to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy and is drawn for your signature. In this accompanying memorandum, the Director gives the reasons in support of the Executive order or by letter. I am inclined to agree with the Director that the use of a letter in this instance is preferable.

Through Division of the Federal Register.

Washington, D.C.
The proposed order has my approval as to form and legality.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Attorney General
My dear Mr. Attorney General:

Herewith is a proposed Executive Order entitled "Survey of Security of Coded Messages".

The proposed order, which was referred to this office by the Executive Clerk, The White House, with request that it be prepared in proper form, has been considerably revised as to form but without change in substance.

However, as you will note from my enclosed memorandum for the President and draft of letter attached thereto for the President's signature addressed to Admiral William D. Leahy, I am recommending that the said draft of letter, which will accomplish the purpose of the proposed order, be used in lieu of the Executive Order.

The proposed Executive Order has, however, my approval as to form.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) HAROLD D. SMITH
Director.

The Honorable,

The Attorney General.

Enclosures.
April 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET:

Attention: Mr. Titus

The attached draft of proposed Executive Order has been returned by the President with request that it be put in proper form for his signature.

M. C. Latta
EXECUTIVE CLERK

Memorandum for the Director of the Bureau of the Budget:

The attached draft of a proposed order has been returned by the President with request that it be put in proper form for his signature.

M.C.

Send to Board:

Attention:

J. Rexford

Keep Registry and copy filed

Men in here
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JUDGE LATTA.

The President has okayed the attached proposed Executive Order and asked me to send it to you for preparation in proper form.

I am not sure that he noted that State says it has not yet been cleared with the Budget Bureau, but I thought it best to call that point to your attention.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Executive Order re Security in Handling Coded Messages...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
JUDGE LATT.

The President has Okayed the attached proposed Executive Order and asked me to send it to you for preparation in proper form.

I am not sure that he noted that State says it has not yet been cleared with the Budget Bureau, but I thought it best to call that point to your attention.

Respectfully,
W. M. Rigdon.

Executive Order re Security in Handling Coded Messages.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Survey of codes, equipment and cryptographic procedures throughout the Government.

On March 7 Mr. Stettinius sent a memorandum to you on this subject following a request you had made of him that he consider the question. His memorandum recommended that the War Department be requested to make a thorough study of this problem.

At your request the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this memorandum and recommend that a survey be conducted by the Joint Communications Board rather than by the War Department. This Board includes in its membership both the Chief Signal Officer of the Army and the Director of Naval Communications. The State Department concurs in this recommendation and I enclose herewith a draft of an executive order for your consideration which would serve the purpose of initiating the survey by the Joint Communications Board. We have not cleared the proposed executive order with the Budget Bureau but will be glad to do so if it meets with your approval.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 21 1973
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 

SECURITY IN HANDLING CODED MESSAGES

1. Whereas, it is necessary for the protection of the national security, and for the successful prosecution of the war, that communications from and to the various departments and agencies of the Government of the United States do not disclose, or become a source of, information of value to the enemy; and

2. Whereas, the Joint Communications Board, a supporting agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has at its disposal outstanding experts in the cryptographic aspects of communication security;

3. NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered that:

a. The Joint Communications Board is hereby directed to make a survey of all cryptographic systems and related procedures now in use, or proposed to be used, by any department or agency of the Government of the United States. The Joint Communications Board will include in the survey an examination of the codes, ciphers, cipher devices and cipher machines and equipment in use for secret or confidential communications, together with all related procedures, including methods of handling, technical employment, and means and equipment for physical security.

b. All departments and agencies concerned are directed to cooperate fully and to give to the Joint Communications Board, and its designated representatives, any information requested, and access to any records, systems, devices, and equipment involved in this survey.

g. The Joint Communications Board is directed to report to the President, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its findings, and to make suitable recommendations for the protection of the national security. Interim findings and recommendations may be made, if desired.

The White House
March 1, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.
March 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Security in handling coded messages.

Following our conversations last autumn regarding the Department's code facilities, I immediately began a careful inquiry. Upon looking into the matter, however, I became convinced that it was not a problem affecting only a single agency but rather one in which the Government as a whole was vitally concerned.

There are at present thirty-eight Federal agencies making use of cryptographic systems in one form or another, but there is adequate internal control in only a few of the agencies and there is no over-all coordination. From the point of view of security this is a most dangerous arrangement, for serious blunders seem bound to occur which will place in jeopardy the cryptographic systems of the entire government. The present arrangement affords ideal conditions under which the enemy can break our codes by comparing messages containing similar information but sent in different codes, one of which may already have been broken. It would appear, therefore, that there must be careful coordination among all agencies in the use of cryptographic material.

In addition, it is essential that the codes themselves be sound, that the equipment used be of the most modern types, that the personnel employed be skilled, and that adequate security procedures be followed at every step.

I believe the most effective solution is to assign the War Department, which has had the broadest experience in the field of cryptography, the responsibility for making a thorough survey of existing codes, equipment, and procedures throughout the Government. The War Department will then be in a position to present to you a comprehensive series of recommendations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In compliance with your letter of May 10, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a complete survey of the security of the cryptographic systems and related procedures in use or proposed to be used by the various Federal departments and agencies. The survey included consideration of the adequacy of cryptographic aids, and the training, knowledge and efficiency of personnel, physical security, and transmission security relating to cryptographic communications.

Upon the completion of the survey of each agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately recommended to it appropriate corrective measures within the limits of the facilities available. Such piece-meal corrective measures by individual agencies do not permanently insure the high standards necessary for protection of the national security and interest. Moreover, there exists no over-all coordination among, or supervision of, the cryptographic systems and related procedures in use by the various agencies, with the result that the practices of one agency may undermine the communications security of another agency.

The present situation is not conducive to the security of governmental communications. The survey indicates that there may be a need for

a. Continuous over-all coordination, supervision and control;

b. The establishment and maintenance of high and uniform security standards; and

c. An extensive program of education and training.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are therefore continuing their study of the data obtained during the survey for the purpose of preparing and submitting final and specific recommendations as to the possible desirability of creating a permanent supervisory agency with authority to achieve the highest possible standards of security of governmental communications.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
1 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In compliance with your letter of May 10, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a complete survey of the security of the cryptographic systems and related procedures in use or proposed to be used by the various Federal departments and agencies. The survey included consideration of the adequacy of cryptographic aids, and the training, knowledge and efficiency of personnel, physical security, and transmission security relating to cryptographic communications.

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The present situation is not conducive to the security of governmental communications. The survey indicates that there may be a need for

a. Continuous over-all coordination, supervision and control;

b. The establishment and maintenance of high and uniform security standards; and

c. An extensive program of education and training.

Copy to accompany original.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RH, NLR, Date APR 11 1974
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are therefore continuing their study of the data obtained during the survey for the purpose of preparing and submitting final and specific recommendations as to the possible desirability of creating a permanent supervisory agency with authority to achieve the highest possible standards of security of governmental communications.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, SIR, Date APR 11 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The memorandum of the Director of Strategic Services dated 18 November 1944 on the establishment of a central intelligence service was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation. The matter has received careful study and consideration.

In view of all the circumstances it appears that the possible advantages to be gained by the reorganization of intelligence activities and the establishment of a central intelligence service at this time, are outweighed by the known disadvantages.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that further consideration of and action on this proposal be deferred.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 11 1974