

New York State Politics - Subject File Box 160

Box 160

PSF: N. Y. Politics

305 BROADWAY, NEW YORK

February 18 1935

Mr. Marvin H. Mc Intyre,
Assistant Secretary to the President,
White House, Washington, D C.

Dear Mr. Mc Intyre:

I would be obliged if you would see that the
President gets the enclosed.

As I told the President, Mrs. Price and myself and
two friends are leaving for a Caribbean cruise March 2nd., and expect
to reach the Virgin Islands March 11th., where we will stay for a
couple of weeks. A letter to the Governor will be appreciated. ||

Yours very truly,

Joseph M. Price

5/16 Said Before Ickes Knew.

In the loan contract between the United States of America and the Triborough Bridge Authority Secretary ICKES, who signed as the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works, specifically recognized the standard established by ROBERT MOSES as chairman of the Long Island State Park Commission. Commissioner MOSES was then not identified with the Triborough Bridge Authority. The contract was signed for that authority by GEORGE GORDON BATTLE, its chairman. Section 12 of the contract, dealing with the construction of the project, says:

In order to maintain a standard of design consistent with State and Federal parkway construction in the Borough of Queens, that part of the connections which is designated by the letter "C" on Exhibit 1 hereto annexed shall be designed by the New York State Department of Public Works and the Long Island State Park Commission, without cost to the borrower or the government, and said part of the connections shall be constructed in conformity thereto to the satisfaction of the resident project engineer.

Of course, Secretary ICKES did not know at that time that Commissioner MOSES was going to take over the job of building the Triborough Bridge.

PSF: N.Y. Politics

305 BROADWAY, NEW YORK

February 18, 1935.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have taken up with Robert Moses the suggestion you made to me in our talk on Wednesday last, that he should publicly withdraw statements he made in reference to Governor Lehman during the last campaign. This he will not consent to do.

In the first place while the Moses campaign may have intensified personal feelings, I would like to point out that the trouble with the Tri-Borough-Bridge Authority started long before Moses was nominated or had any thought of becoming a candidate for Governor, in fact, the withholding of funds for the Bridge began immediately after Moses was appointed to the Authority last February and has been continuing off and on ever since. Shortly after Moses was appointed to the Authority and began to reorganize it, Secretary Ickes asked Mayor La Guardia to get him off the Authority on the ground that he was not friendly with the recovery program at Washington, though acknowledging that he was honest and competent.

Secondly I cannot see how his campaign for the Governorship alters the principle of the case—that is that the allotment of Federal funds should not be contingent upon a Federal veto of municipal appointments, granting in every case that the appointee is competently filling his job. There has been no suggestion in the Moses case that he is not so doing.

If the Federal Government has the veto of such appointments it will only furnish ammunition to the opponents of the New Deal.

I want to again point out to you the unanimous public feeling here against Secretary Ickes order, which will only do harm to your policies (from which we all hope so much) if carried out.

I trust that you will make plain that Federal funds for additional public works in New York City are not contingent upon Moses resigning or the Mayor declining to reappoint him to the Bridge Authority or his resignation as Park Commissioner. This implication has been freely voiced here.

305 BROADWAY, NEW YORK

The rescinding of Secretary Ickes Order No. 129 will emphasize your previous statements that Federal funds will be administered in a non-political manner.

I want to again thank you for giving me so much of your time and hoping this Moses affair will not change our personal regard for one another.

Cordially yours,

Joseph M. Price

*am not releasing this to the press.
Congratulations on the gold decision
which I have just heard*

PSF: N. Y. Politics

August 16, 1937.

Dear Bobby:-

Many thanks for your note. I
do hope to see you one of these days soon.

My best wishes to you,

Always sincerely,

Robert Kenneth Straus, Esq.,
570 Lexington Avenue,
New York City,
New York.

PSF: N.Y. P

Robert Kenneth Straus

570 Lexington Ave
New York, N. Y.
August 11, 1957

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to tell you that I hope to be a candidate in the November election for the City Council on the City Fusion and American Labor tickets. I would have preferred to call on you in person to discuss the question of my doing so with you, but I did not feel that I had any right to intrude upon your time with such a minor question.

For Father's sake, however, as well as my own, I would like you to know that in running on the ticket with Mayor LaGuardia, I feel that I remain a New Dealer, since it seems to me that the Mayor has stood more staunchly for your policies than anyone else in the New York picture.

If you should want to see me at any time, I would, of course, be happy to come whenever it is convenient. In the meantime, I hope you will still regard me as one of your followers.

Yours very sincerely,

RM Straus

PSF: N.Y. Politics

NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

From THE PRESIDENT X-K Y-K	ACTION	To SEC MCINTYRE
Released by		
Date 4 AUGUST, 1938	INFORMATION	To <i>cmc 2</i>
NITE to		
ROUTINE to X		
PRIORITY to		

Write ACT, office address, repeating as above indicated.

0004 FIRST MAKE CONTACT WITH MR HOPKINS AND THEN WITH FLYNN CONCERNING FAY PERIOD IT IS MY HOPE THAT FAY WILL CONSENT TO RUN 1330

TOR CODE ROOM 1440 4TH

*Send McIntyre
by me
7:53 pm*

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION.....SECRETARY MCINTYRE
19.....FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 2-18-59
Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*



Tuesday

PSF: N.Y. Politics

7/2

WILLIAM T. FETHERSTON
COUNSELLOR AT LAW
30 BAY STREET
STATEN ISLAND, N.Y.
PHONE GIBRALTAR 7-2300

January 24th, 1941

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I wish to apologize for the delay in answering your memorandum regarding the activities of Verne Marshall. An attack of the Flu immediately upon my return from the Inaugural Ceremonies confined me to my home.

However, upon receipt of your memorandum, I immediately had inquiries made and, as far as I can ascertain, up to the present time, Marshall or the Coughlanites have not as yet started on Staten Island any movement tending to obstruct, or in any way interfere with, the activities of the National Government.

After careful consideration, and in the light of the information contained in your memorandum, it is my firm conviction that every Leader and every member of the Democratic Organization of Richmond County has been, and will continue to be, in accord with your policies, and will not permit subversive activities to influence them in patriotically supporting you and the National Government.

Please accept my sincere thanks for the information contained in your memorandum.

With assurances of my highest personal regards, I am

Cordially yours,



WILLIAM T. FETHERSTON

PSF: N.Y. Politics F

PRIVATE

January 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. WILLIAM T. FETHERSTON

It has come to my attention that this man Verne Marshall, a publisher from Iowa, who is conducting a campaign which has the whole-hearted blessing of the Nazi Government and is intended indirectly to encourage complete German victory, has approached a number of Democratic leaders in New York City. It is said that one leader signed the names of his district captains to Marshall's pronouncement, apparently without their knowledge. It is said that in one of the Brooklyn districts the Marshall crowd and Father Coughlin's crowd have come together.

I thought you would like to have this information.

F. D. R.

30 Bay Street
St. George
Staten Island, Ny

PSF: N.Y. Politics

*file
personal*

*My State Election
Folder*

August 12, 1942.

Dear Jim:

I have given your letter of August fifth to the President and he agrees absolutely that the best chance is for everybody to get behind Judge Hoyt. He thinks it would be very unwise for Judge Hoyt to take his name off the ballot because, in the President's judgment, he could not possibly be elected to the Supreme Court in that District.

Also, the President feels that it would make a great number of Democrats very angry and they might vote for Fish. The President says there are infinitely more Democrats in the District than there are anti-Fish Republicans, so it is up to the anti-Fish Republicans to play ball with Judge Hoyt, who is not a violent party man, but could really be considered an independent Democrat.

With every best wish,

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

James M. Kieran, Esq.,
Nelson House,
Poughkeepsie,
New York.

Independent Committee of the 26th District

"To Eliminate Hamilton Fish as Congressman
To Elect in his place a Competent Statesman
Regardless of Party."

2 Cannon Street, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. Phone 2211

Allen T. Brown, Asst. Secretary

August 5th, 1942

Provisional Officers

James H. Casey, Chairman
Carmel, N. Y. (Putnam County)
Miss Hope Spingars, Vice-Chairman
Amenia, N. Y. (Dutchess County)
Mrs. Vanderbilt Webb, Vice-Chairman
Garrison, N. Y. (Putnam County)
John Charles Strates, Vice-Chairman
Warwick, N. Y. (Orange County)
Mrs. Lewis Mansford, Treasurer
Amenia, N. Y. (Dutchess County)
Lewis B. McCabe, Jr., Secretary
Garrison, N. Y. (Putnam County)

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:


Thanks for your recent note and for
the kind service.

I am shooting along another one, and
I would appreciate it very much if you would
get it before the President for this reason:
on Friday of next week, we are getting to-
gether in the hope of reaching a final agree-
ment on a single candidate to defeat Fish,
and if the President wants anything set forth
for the conference, I would like to have it
a little ahead of time.

If things develop as they now seem to
be heading, I will probably be back at the old
homestead at the Nelson House, where the apple-
jack used to flow in the good old days.

The very best regards, and I hope to see
you soon.

Yours,


JAMES M. KIERAN

JMK/sbb
Enc.

Independent Committee of the 26th District

"To Eliminate Hamilton Fish as Congressman
To Elect in his place a Competent Statesman
Regardless of Party."

2 Cannon Street, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. Phone 2211

Provisional Officers

James H. Causey, Chairman
Cornel, N. Y. (Putnam County)
Miss Hope Spingarn, Vice-Chairman
Amenia, N. Y. (Dutchess County)
Mrs. Vanderbilt Webb, Vice-Chairman
Garrison, N. Y. (Putnam County)
John Charles Stroton, Vice-Chairman
Warwick, N. Y. (Orange County)
Mrs. Lewis Mansfield, Treasurer
Amenia, N. Y. (Dutchess County)
Lewis E. McCabe, Jr., Secretary
Garrison, N. Y. (Putnam County)

Allen T. Brown, Asst. Secretary

August fifth,
1942

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

It looks as though Fish will win the Republican primary. Augustus W. Bennet will probably make a strong showing even though he has been a completely colorless candidate.

The vote for Bennet and for Fite will reflect what we have contended all along as to the increasing anti-Fish sentiment which is rising in the district.

I would like to bring you up to date on the plans for the immediate future. Mr. Causey has been in consultation with the leading Republican anti-Fish figures, with Mr. Willkie, and with the Democratic County Chairmen. On the Friday after the Primary election, we are going to hold a conference of all these groups in the hope of arriving at a common candidate around whom all anti-Fish forces will gather themselves for the general election.

It is our hope that the anti-Fish Republicans will agree to support Ferdie Hoyt. That seems to us the surest way to beat Fish. A good many of the Republicans, however, will in all probability gag somewhat at getting behind a Democrat, even though they have nothing against Hoyt personally. We expect them to claim that keeping Bennet in as an Independent Republican will split the Fish vote and insure the defeat of Fish.

It is our belief that the fight in the district is not a Republican and Democratic battle, but a Fish and anti-Fish fight, and that a third candidate in the field will serve to draw more votes from the anti-Fish forces than from the Fish forces. For that reason, we are going to exert our influence to keep it a two-way fight.

It is necessary to make a quick decision insofar as Hoyt is concerned, since the only way to get him off the ballot, if it should be decided that this is the course to follow, is to get him the nomination for Supreme Court in the judicial district.

In view of the importance of the conference on the Friday after the Primaries where all of the interested parties of the district are going to try to reach an agreement, is there anything which you would like to tell us here -- myself or Mr. Causey -- which could serve as a guide both to us and to the others in the conference -- to be used judiciously, of course, so that you do not yourself become improperly injected in a way which might provide incorrect ammunition for the other forces?

It would be highly helpful to us of the Independent Committee in our bargaining lest some viewpoint be represented as yours which does not come from you and does not adequately reflect your real attitude.


As I understand it, your position is that you want Fish defeated, and that the all important thing to you is not that it be either a Democrat or a Republican who is to defeat him, but the very best man who can most surely be relied upon to achieve that result.

I would like to point this out: the Tuxedo Park Republicans have had their show with their man Bennet. They have spent a good deal of money and they have not done much of a job. Our Committee has provided the main leadership in the thing.

In the general election, I believe firmly that a much more aggressive and clear cut battle must be waged in order to eliminate Fish. These "yes and no" Tuxedo boys behind a Republican candidate or entering into the field with an independent candidate, will hedge so much that the kind of "crusade" which the campaign must be, will not develop.

I agree with Mr. Willkie, and I believe you do too, that to lick Fish you have to go all out. For that reason, I hope and trust we can get all the forces behind Ferdie Hoyt on the Friday after the Primaries.

Yours,



JAMES M. KEENAN

*file
personal*

PSF: N.Y. Political Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Irwin Steingut talked to Sam on the phone this afternoon and later on called me.

Frankly, he is pretty much "flabbergasted" He says that Frank Kelly evidently feels after seeing you that it will be all right if Bennet is nominated. Irwin feels that something could still be done with him if it were put up to him flatly.

Irwin suggested that you might be willing to phone Ed Flynn and tell him that from reports coming in to us down here, Frank evidently got the wrong impression of your attitude; have Flynn tell Frank just what you said to Farley:

"that of course you would vote for Bennett if he were nominated in preference to Dewey"but that is all you did say.

He hoped that you might tell Flynn further to tell Frank that you recognized the position he was in but that you hoped he would not attempt to force a unit rule and so prevent any of his delegates who might want to go in for Keade.

Irwin also said that Flynn could tell Frank that if he had any qualms about what he (Flynn) was telling him, he could call me.

MHM

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Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1942.

(Dictated to Mr. Flynn's secretary over the telephone from Hyde Park - G.G.T.)

MEMORANDUM FOR ED FLYNN:

Tell Frank for me that:

No. 1 Despite newspaper stories I have not got the time nor am I taking an active part in this convention fight.

No. 2 If Bennett is nominated, I will not go one step further than I told Farley six weeks ago which was that I would announce that I will vote for Bennett as against Dewey. Not one word more.

No. 3 A further check-up in the city leads me to believe that Bennett will be too weak a candidate to be elected. He will run badly up-state. He will not get the A.L.P. endorsement nor will I ask the A.L.P. to do so.

No. 4 As I told Frank, it looks as if the Mead and Bennett camps have got into such a mess that both have been irrevocably hurt through no fault of their own.

No. 5 Therefore, in order to carry the State ticket a third candidate seems to be much the best way out. I would, of course, give whole-hearted support to such a candidate.

*file
pres*

*PSF; N.Y. State Political
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

GRACE TULLY

Mayor LaGuardia called and wanted to talk to the President. I explained I had already told Flynn and Mead that the President did not want to talk to any of them about it because of the Press conference tomorrow.

LaGuardia is going to call you tomorrow afternoon (Friday) and try to get through to the President on the phone.

You might warn the President that what I think the Little Flower is going to ask about is a third ticket.

MMH

PSF; N.Y. Political folder

*File
personal*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES BENSON
HON. JAMES TOWNSEND

I have been doing a little analyzing of the County returns, especially in regard to the race for Congress. On the whole, the results in the town were not so bad. However, I am a good deal disturbed over the vote in the City of Poughkeepsie, especially in the Democratic wards. Things were not nearly so bad in the Republican wards. I should like to have a report on just what happened in these wards. It is a disgrace.

Beacon also should have gone heavily for Hoyt.

It seems to be an actual fact that if we had done better in Beacon, and especially if we had done better in the Democratic wards in the City of Poughkeepsie, Hoyt would have been elected.

How come?

F. D. R.

N.Y. State Election
4-42
PSF; N.Y. Politics

November 12, 1942.

Dear John:-

First of all I want to tell you how perfectly delighted I have been with the pheasants. Ever so many thanks to you and your Missus.

I am enclosing copy of a memorandum to Benson and Townsend. I just cannot understand it. Where we should have gained heavily, we made heavy losses.

Have you any explanation?

As ever yours,

Honorable John E. Mack,
Poughkeepsie,
New York.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

November 10, 1942

To Grace Tully

For your information

D.K.N.

C
O
P
Y

HOYT FOR CONGRESS COMMITTEE

Beacon New York

November 6, 1942

Mr. James H. Causey
17 East 42 Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Causey:

The elections are over. We have lost. Under ordinary circumstances I suppose that we should feel that we have done the best we could, congratulate the winner, and go on about our business. But we as you so well know, this was no ordinary election, and the way that we were beaten, after coming so close to an amazing victory, might prove highly interesting to you.

To my mind, we lost the election in Poughkeepsie. In 1940, Hardy Steeholm won the city of Poughkeepsie by over 1,400 votes. Hoyt lost this city by approximately 400 votes. In other words, Fish was able to switch close on to 2,000 votes here, and he ended up by winning by 4,062 votes. As the election turned out we need to take exactly 2,032 votes away from Fish to win.

There are two most peculiar things about our losing in Poughkeepsie. In the first place, we made an amazing recovery in all the normal Republican Districts, and even took the Town of Poughkeepsie, but we lost the lower districts in Poughkeepsie which have always given a strong Democratic plurality. We not only lost them, but we got the hell beaten out of us in them. In the second place, one of the things that contributed to our defeat in these Democratic districts, was the Irish Catholic vote. The leading Irish Catholic in Poughkeepsie is Judge John Mack.

Three days after the primaries, I went to see John Mack, and told him that we were greatly concerned about this Irish Catholic vote, and asked him to please do something about it. He said that he didn't think we had anything to worry about there, but if we wanted him to he would take care of it. To the best of my knowledge, Judge Mack did not only fail to lift a finger in our behalf (he did most generously contribute a check of \$100.) but at the Bennett Dinner in Poughkeepsie, he completely snubbed Judge Hoyt for all Democrats present to see, and then called on him to speak last, after all newspaper reporters had gone to file their stories.

The land of politics is a strange place indeed.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Allen T. Brown

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1942.

Dear Grace:

You will be
interested in this letter from
Mrs. Vanderbilt Webb.

D.K.N.

NOVEMBER 9, 1942

MR. DAVID K. NILES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEAR MR. NILES:

I WISH I WERE WRITING YOU A LETTER OF VICTORY INSTEAD OF ONE OF DEFEAT. WE ALL DID THE BEST WE KNEW HOW UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE FACT THAT MR. FISH RAN SO BEHIND HIS TICKET SHOWS THAT MUCH OF OUR WORK WAS EFFECTIVE. I AM MORE THAN APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR GREAT COOPERATION AND EFFORTS IN OUR BEHALF AND WITHOUT THEM WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE POWERLESS.

IN ANALYZING THE VOTE I THINK THE GREAT WEAKNESS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION IN DUCHESS COUNTY IS SHOWN; THE FACT THAT WE LOST THE DEMOCRATIC WARDS IN POUGHKEEPSIE AND THAT APPARENTLY THE ONLY WORKERS SHOWING ANY ACTIVITY THERE ON ELECTION DAY WERE THE AMERICAN LABOR GROUP IS AN INDEX OF WHAT I MEAN. I THINK THAT OWING TO YOUR GENEROSITY THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN COMPARATIVELY EFFECTIVE WORK WAS DONE AT THE LAST MINUTE, BUT THIS COULD NOT COMPENSATE FOR THE LACK OF ENTHUSIASM, INTEREST, OR ACTIVITY SHOWN DURING THE PRECEDING WEEKS. I DON'T KNOW THAT ANYTHING COULD HAVE BEEN DONE ABOUT IT, CERTAINLY NOTHING BY ME, BUT I JUST WANT TO GET IT OFF MY CHEST TO YOU. HAD WE HAD SEVERAL MORE ACTIVE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEES WORKING THROUGHOUT THE DISTRICT THE RESULT MIGHT ALSO HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.

AGAIN THANKING YOU,

YOURS SINCERELY,

Wilson H. Webb

MRS. VANDERBILT WEBB
179 EAST 71ST STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

PSF: N.Y. Politics

N.Y. State Election folder
4-42

*file
personal*

Nov. 18, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I can understand very readily the feeling expressed in your letter of November 12th, and certainly the results were very disappointing.

It is admitted that Hoyt received enough Republican votes in the whole district to be elected, which I believe to be true, had he had full support of Democrats.

Well, what happened? As I see it there were many unusual circumstances. You take a look at the lower wards of the city, for instance, with its large foreign element. After putting forth a lot of effort to build up the registration, which the results show was without success, because of the fact of many large families, some having two and three boys in the Army already and another just coming old enough for service, many of these families being Italian, plus the fact that they were all employed at this time, combining all these circumstances, they just were not interested and could not be induced to register. But then there were a considerable number of Mead Democrats who would not register and could not be interested in the election.

Regarding Beacon, we fully expected that Hoyt would get at least 800 majority. Of course, there are a large number of factory workers there, many of them foreigners, especially Italian, and they were just not voting this year. Added to all this it would seem very probable that the Republican landslide in the state hurt considerably.

While I was out of commission pretty much during August and September, I feel the above to be a partial explanation of what happened.

With very kindest regards, I am

Yours sincerely

James Townsend

JT:B

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM ON POLITICAL SITUATION IN NEW YORK CITY - MARCH 1944

For the past few months those of us who have been watching political developments in New York have had cause to be alarmed. An analysis of the elections in the 21st Congressional District has added to our fears. Unless the trade unions of New York and especially the CIO unions take immediate and drastic action in every shop without a moment's delay, there is every likelihood that the Dewey forces will win New York State - and with a substantial majority.

Dewey is Stacking the Cards:

The Republican State Legislature worked out the new Congressional and Senatorial Districts. An examination of their work shows that they have achieved the following:

1. Added to their Congressional strength upstate by gerrymandering districts including larger cities so as to nullify the labor vote.
2. So gerrymandered the new Congressional Districts in Queens and Long Island that while adding four new Districts they twisted their boundaries in and out of Republican neighborhoods to nullify any possible Democratic majorities.
3. The Republicans are making every effort to dangle jobs before "starved" Democratic district leaders in the Irish and Italian areas of the city and to establish friendly working relations with the Farley and Woodring followers among these groups - with increasing success in the past few months.
4. There is no doubt that deals are being made between Democrat and Republican district leaders on different levels - and there is stacks of Republican money around.

The Democratic Party Machine is Crippled in Key Areas of the City

In Manhattan - In at least five districts covering Washington Heights, Harlem and Riverside. In 11th, 13th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd A.Ds. In Lower Manhattan - in the 13th Cong. District and 11th C.D. - including the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 3rd and 10th A.Ds. Especially in the Irish areas, on the West Side, and in Yorkville, there is the gravest danger of defection of large numbers of voters either to the Woodring group or to the Republicans. The addition of many new Republican headquarters in Manhattan (and throughout city) and the activity there is a sure sign of their developing strength among New York city voters.

In Brooklyn - The drop in Democratic Party Enrollment in Brooklyn was the largest in the City. While A LP enrollment held its ground, and the Republican enrollment dropped 26,000 in 1943 over 1942, the Democratic enrollment dropped by 110,000. The drop is particularly bad in the 1st, 3rd, 9th, 10th, 12th, 16th, 21st and 23rd A.Ds. All of these are areas with large CIO memberships. A serious cleavage in the Democratic Party ranks has occurred in the Bayridge area, in a section of Williamsburg and in the 22nd A.D. The death of Cullen in the 4th C.D., covering a large Irish area, will mean another by-election by April 1st, in a heavily populated CIO area. We have no forces organized there, although Ship, UE and Transport have about 6,000 to 8,000 members in the district.

In Queens - The drop in Democratic enrollment was 52,000 compared to a Republican drop of 11,000 and an ALP gain of over 400. Of the 52,000 Dem. drop, 15,000 occurred in the 4th A.D., which includes the largest Negro section in Queens. The Democratic leaders in Queens are playing ball with the Republican leadership and are particularly favorable to the Farley or Woodring alignment. The Republicans are in a position to make serious gains in Queens because of the above factors and the gerrymandering of the Congressional and Assembly Districts. In Nassau-Suffolk Republican strength is great even among our CIO members.

In Bronx - The most serious drops in Democratic strength in Bronx occurred in the 8th and 6th A.Ds. In the 4th, a Negro area, the Republican party practically held its ground while the Democratic party lost $\frac{1}{2}$ of its enrollees. While the ALP increased its enrollment over 1942, and the Republicans dropped 13,000, the Democrats dropped 63,000.

The Elections in the 21st C.D. Manhattan

The election in the 21st C.D. while not a definitive test of voting strength for November 7th, did uncover weakness in the Democratic party machinery which holds for most sections of the City. These weaknesses can be listed as follows:

1. While the Republicans got one out of every $2\frac{1}{2}$ of its 1943 enrollees to vote in the 21st, and the ALP almost the same percentage, the Democrat Party got less than one out of 8 of its enrollees to vote.
2. The leader of the party in the area was himself the candidate - He should have brought out at least the machine voters; he failed even in that.
3. The weakness of the machine is particularly illustrated by the showing in several Election Districts in the 21st. In one E.D. not even the Democratic Party Captains voted; there, with an enrollment of 98, Torrens got no votes; Bennett got 8 votes with an enrollment of 37; the ALP got 3 votes with an enrollment of 8. In the 4th E.D. while Torrens got 19 out of an enrollment of 136, and the ALP got 4 out of 23, Bennett got 76 out of 79.

This does not merely show lack of enthusiasm for Torrens as a candidate; it shows refusal by the Dem. Party members to follow their party leadership. It shows that the machinery is half-wrecked. For in the past, with machine-men no better than Torrens running, the regular Democratic Party voters always turned out when the district and E.D. Captains called.

4. The showing in the Negro areas is particularly alarming. In the 19th A.D., the heaviest Negro district in the city, the Republicans with less than $\frac{1}{3}$ the enrollment of the Democrats got almost twice as many votes. Almost the same was true in the heavy Negro community of the 21st.

The weaknesses shown in the 21st C.D. are not peculiar. They are typical - they betray the present condition of the Dem. Party in New York. The same factors are at play in many other districts throughout the city. These factors are:

1. Loss of State and City patronage has drastically reduced the ranks of the Dem. Party's E.D. Leaders.
2. The bulk of the Party's E.D. Leaders has been drawn from its Irish members and in lesser proportion from its Italian members. The Farley, and to a

degree the Woodring grouping has been working overtime to bring about the defection of the Irish from the Roosevelt Administration.

3. The influence of the former Fathers Coughlin and Curran groups remains strong among many of the New York Irish. They are incessantly propagandized against the 4th term, FDR's domestic program, and the Teheran decisions. The Italian voters are not as willing to accept FDR today as they were in 1940. A great many Negro voters are at this time not well disposed towards the Administration.

Republican prospects in the State at this time:

Dewey has been in power for almost two years and the Republicans in power in the State Legislatures twice as long; sufficient time - with La Guardia's help in "starving" the City Dem. politicians - to build an increasingly maturing apparatus in New York City and a powerful machine upstate.

The Republicans are counting on an upstate plurality of 900,000 or 300,000 more than in 1940. They are counting on cutting the Democratic plurality in New York City which was only 400,000 in 1940 down to 200,000 or even 150,000 in 1944. They thus figure to cancel out the expected ALP vote of over 400,000 and win with 100,000 to 150,000 to spare, at least.

They base their chances on:

1. AFL endorsement of the Republican candidates.
2. A swing of the Negro vote to the Republicans.
3. The inability of the Democratic Party machine to produce upstate and serious defection from the Dem. Party line in New York City. (Remember - the Democrats rolled up over a million votes for FDR upstate in 1940 - 1,185,000, only 600,000 less than the Republicans).
4. They count on aid, whether positive from Woodring or possibly negative from Farley, but effective, in cutting deep into the New York City Irish and Italian vote.
5. They are inclined to think that the 1944 ALP vote will be as large if not larger than the 1940 ALP vote, of 417,000 for Roosevelt.
6. They expect considerable help from the cut in the Soldiers' vote, especially if the Federal Soldiers' Vote Bill is defeated.
7. They have more money to spend than at any time since 1928 - and they are ready to spend it lavishly.
8. And, incidentally, of course, they expect to be able to make deals with an increasing number of local Democratic politicians whose patronage comes from local sources.

Perspective for Democrats:

1. Primarily they rely with almost childlike faith on FDR's magnetic pull on the Presidential year voters - in New York City usually an additional 1 1/4 million or an additional 1/3 to the regular voters.
2. The machine politicians hope they can give their followers the inducement that if they win this year there will be only a year to go before they put a Democratic Party administration into City office in 1945.
3. They expect to lose the state offices again and a number of additional city districts - unless by some miracle, produced by labor, FDR's sweep is terrific. Most of them, however, believe that if they win the State it will be by a much narrower margin than in 1940 - which was only 224,000.
4. They rely heavily on labor after their experience of labor's potential power last year and its ability to get out the registration. However, they will not, as some labor people think, be willing to share candidates or offices generally with labor. They are not prepared to make sacrifices as yet. Too many of them are out and out opportunists and self-seekers to do anything like that unless Washington cracks down.
5. They know better than anyone else how badly their machine has deteriorated and would not only welcome but would eagerly seek help from labor in propping their machinery if they thought it meant business about sending its members into their districts as "volunteer" canvassers, etc.

Perspectives for the ALP:

- . The help the CIO gave it last year put it back on its feet to a degree not apparent until one examines the 1943 registration and enrollment figures. While the 1943 enrollment drop for the major parties over 1942 reached large proportions, the ALP enrollment increased in Bronx and Queens, dropped only a few hundred in Brooklyn and 3,000 in Manhattan in an off year and when registration in the City dropped 394,000 from 1942 figures and more than 600,000 from 1941 figures.

The ALP, if the C.U.L.P. wins decisively and is thus able to start building a united and hence effective labor party, should be able to poll 600,000 votes in New York State for its presidential candidate. If labor is really aroused and really begins to organize itself for political action before it is too late - that is, begins now this month, the ALP might poll 700,000 on its line. It has two assets superior to the other parties:

1. A greater attractive power - 1 enrollee to 2 1/2 voters on its line - because of its program and its stress on program in a year when issues will count most.
2. A base in an already organized body of citizens - the unions - which if, they moved their rank & file, could decide the election for the state - and very likely, the country.

What Labor Must Do to Win in 1944

Labor must build its own machinery this year, at once, without delay. It must be a machinery capable of reaching not only its own members but all voters. It must be able to reach into every ED in the City. It must be capable of reaching, through the ALP, all of the more politically-minded workers and through the CIO's own machinery the average worker who in New York is an Enrolled Democrat.

The ALP itself cannot do the job for the following reasons:

It is a political party; it must approach the voters as a political party challenging their own political affiliations and offering them an alternative affiliation and program. It is important and necessary that the ALP do this. The average union member who is not an ALP member, whether rightly or wrongly, considers such an approach in his Union as "playing politics" and injecting factors extraneous to the purposes of a union. He answers: "As long as I am a good union man my politics are my own affair and none of the union's business". He feels that if the ALP is permitted to use the union as a political forum, why not his own party - the Democratic, or the Republican - since there are more Republicans than ALP members in our unions and 3 times as many Democrats as both of the others combined,

Once and for all, in my opinion, progressive trade unionists especially, must stop fooling themselves that all they need to do is to talk, act and recruit for the ALP to do the job in a national election as important as this. The facts are that at least 85% of our members are not going to participate in active political work in the name or under the banner of the ALP at this time; that we will never get more than a small fraction of our members involved in active political work if we funnel their interest in it only through the ALP and under its banner. We will only get mass participation from our union members in political activity if we appeal to them to act under the banner of the CIO in the name and in defense of their plain bread and butter interests, no matter what Party they belong to. We can, should and will do everything we can to play up and recruit for the ALP. But our leading members will have to stop using the ALP as an excuse for failing to organize their whole membership into the CIO's political activity and dealing only with their most "advanced" members when it comes to politics. I have seen this done in union after union - when a political issue or action arises. In most unions the rank and file as a whole has never been thoroughly tapped for political activity, because it involved so much work, so much explaining and the danger of arousing disruptionists. In most unions a selected core was called in for intensive discussion and planning while 5 minutes of a 2 hour business meeting was devoted to a general talk on the importance of this or that political activity or issue. It is this approach that must be drastically changed before another month passes.

My opinion is that nothing less than the following will turn the tide:

1. An intensive drive in each union to recruit by June 1st, 5,000 CIO political canvassers. Each union should be given a quota and a deadline for filling it. Each Canvasser should be responsible to the union and either a special or his own union-card marked to prove he is doing his job - as strictly as though he were assigned to a picket line.
2. We must insist on a full time paid Political Action Director with authority in each union with more than 2000 members - full time and no other chores added - between now and November 7th.

3. We must insist on:

- a) Regular monthly contributions from each union to finance our apparatus in the communities and political districts for door-bell ringing - the Community Councils.
 - b) A special fund - \$1.00 a member - for election campaign work and literature; the fund to be raised and turned in now, within the next three months, and raised from the rank and file through special drives, meetings, special stamps, etc., so that every member is involved.
4. A Political Action Steward in every shop of 20 members or more and in large shops a P.A. Steward for every 40 to 50 members, for every department or floor.
 5. A complete, new and duplicated A.D. breakdown of each union's membership lists to facilitate registration and political organization.
 6. Every person who enlists now as a CIO Political canvasser to be urged to become the permanent CIO Community Steward in his A.D.
 7. A drive to enroll members into the ALP.

The tide, which at this moment is in favor of the Republicans in New York can be turned. But only we can turn it. If we fail, New York State will swing the elections nationally to the Republicans; we will be responsible for the defeat of labor and the people in America in 1944. There is no worker who will not suffer if we lose. The issues on which we can turn the tide are magnificent. They are simple and profound issues dealing with life and death matters. No election has had issues like them in our time. What we need most and immediately is an army. An Army of volunteers recruited in every shop. An Army of 5,000, well organized, well supplied and well led.

March 14, 1944
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Banner Canal

Cultural Director in C 20

by New York
- the Committee on the Administration of the Government -

(b) A special fund - \$100,000 - for election campaign work and literature to be raised and raised in New York, with the next three months, and raised from the bank and the special drives, meetings, special camps, etc., so that every member is involved.

(c) A Political Action Board in every state of 30 members or more and in large areas a P.A.B. Board for every 50 to 100 members, for every district and floor.

(d) A Political Action Board in every state of 30 members or more and in large areas a P.A.B. Board for every 50 to 100 members, for every district and floor.

(e) Every person who wishes now or in 1934 Political Campaign to be urged to become the permanent Political Campaign Board in his area.

(f) A drive to enroll members into the P.A.B.

The time of this report is in favor of the Republicans in New York can be found, but only we can turn it. If we fail New York State will swing the election nationally so the responsibility will be responsibility for the defeat of labor and the people in America in 1934. There is no voter who will not vote for us. The issues in which we can win the election. We have one single and program issue dealing with the bank matters. No election has had issues like that in our time. What we need most and immediately is an army of volunteers recruited in every state. An army of 1,000,000 will organize, will organize and will lead.

March 14, 1934
New York

PSF: N.Y. Politics

New Lines "S"
4-44

May 23, 1944

Personal

Dear Adelbert:

Thank you for your letter of
April nineteenth.

I appreciate your interest,
although I am afraid there are several
sides to be considered in the various
matters you write about.

How are you getting on with the
personnel problems of the Republican
Watchman?

As ever yours,

"F. D. R."

Adelbert M. Scriber, Esq.
The Republican Watchman
200 Broadway
Monticello, New York

SIR:G

PSF: N.Y. Politics



The Republican Watchman

Adelbert M. Scriber
Publisher

Established 1826

200 BROADWAY

MONTICELLO

SULLIVAN COUNTY, N. Y.

April 19, 1944

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Washington
D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

Everything is shaping up for the fourth term. There may be some obstacles along the political path. Dewey is growing weaker in some sections of New York and stronger in other sections. To off-set that strength Willkie should be nominated on the Democratic ticket for United States Senator. Senator Wagner is ill and does not care to run again. True he was suggested at the recent State gathering in New York City but did not consent to run.

The New York Post, established by Alexander Hamilton in 1801, said six months ago that Senator Wagner was ill and would not accept the nomination to succeed himself.

Willkie on the Democratic ticket for U. S. Senator would cause Dewey to lose his breath and stampede the Republican hosts in New York State. In fact, my dear Mr. President, Willkie on the Democratic ticket would cause McCormick, Stassen and several others to wet their pants.

Think it over and then send for Willkie.

Very truly yours,

A. M. Scriber

A. M. Scriber

AMS/mg



The Republican Watchman

Adelbert M. Scriber
Publisher

Established 1826

200 BROADWAY

MONTICELLO

SULLIVAN COUNTY, N. Y.

April 19, 1944

Miss Grace G. Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Miss Tully:

I will appreciate it if you will
place the enclosed letter on the President's
desk.

For past favors I am very grateful.

Very truly yours,

A. M. Scriber

A. M. Scriber

AMS/mg

PSF: N.Y. Politics

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

S.I.R.

Do you want to try your hand
at preparing a reply to this?

F.D.R.

PSF NY Politics

N.Y. STATE POLITICAL FOLDER

SEE: Letter from the President to

Hon. John Godfrey Saxe
The Homestead
Hot Springs, Virginia

(Gen. Corres - "S")

President talks about Bennett & Dewey