FSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1942

Donovan Report

No. 1

January 15 to 24
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Here is a letter which was intercepted -- written by someone in Rio de Janeiro to his friend in New York:

"Nov. 22, 1941

"Dear Mr. Gans:

"There seems to be a serious tug of war going on between General Miller of the American Army Mission and General Goes Monteiro, the Army's Chief of Staff, centering around the very delicate point of who is to garrison the new bases, the North-American Marines or the Brazilian Army.

"There are many conflicting rumors about a conversation between General Miller and General Monteiro in which the former frankly stated that the American Army did not trust either the Brazilian Army or its Staff, and, in their last interview, when General Monteiro asked why there continued to be the delay on the part of the USA in delivering the war material that had been promised him during his visit to the United States, General Miller is said to have replied
that the material would not be forthcoming until they had obtained from Brazil what they (U. S. Army) considered they must have in return.

"The Brazilian viewpoint is that the Brazilian General Staff has agreed all along to the fullest "cooperation" with the United States and has accepted to carry out all measures advocated by the Staff of the U. S. Army for the defense of the Brazilian sector in the general hemispherical plan. In recognition, perhaps, of this, the Americans arranged with General Monteiro during his visit to the United States that they would supply the armaments that Brazil was no longer receiving from Krupps and that the Air and Naval bases were to be built with American funds and according to American plans and under American technical supervision.

"As subsequent events have proved the Brazilian Army crowd believes it was a mistake on their part to have gone so far as they did in their initial negotiations as they have left themselves wide open for further demands and these demands have now crystalized into the insistence of landing U. S. Marines to guard the new base at Natal.

"This is the storm center and whether the U. S. demands may or may not be justified in the present contingency by the lack of skill on the part of Brazilian troops and by the
half-heartedness of the Army Command, it is doubtful that national pride would accept this admission and it might be that even the President's unique grasp on the country would not be strong enough to withstand public indignation. A fine moment and opportunity for the Nazis and Integralists to exploit the situation on that appealing slogan "Brazil for the Brazilians!"

"Exaggerated Nationalism can be loaded with dynamite and, dangerous as a Nazi putsch within Brazil might be, it would take second place to what could and would be worked up in the line of opposition to "Yankee Imperialism" if the U. S. Army persists in their present demands. The Brazilian soil by U. S. land forces will have serious reaction on the other South American countries and endanger the whole "Good Neighbor" policy. The Army feels that as the Brazilian Government has gone full out in establishing definite and complete cooperation with the United States as to Continental Defense, as is demonstrated by the President's recent speech and the solemn declarations of his Foreign Minister during the latter's tour of the three southern Republics of the Continent, undertaken to coordinate the task of defending the hemisphere, that the "landing of the Marines" can be shelved as a concrete demand and quietly treated as a mere technical point that can
be resolved by mutual agreement of the technicians of the two countries. The immediate result would be to relieve tension and to remove the label as an attempt at political domination - an interpretation, through Axis propaganda, that would readily be accepted by public opinion.

"In the course of conversations between the Army representatives of the two countries, Brazil and the USA, I understand General Monteiro remarked that "in the whole of Brazil's history the country's Army command had never been changed at the bidding of a foreign power; that no Brazilian General could be found who would, under existing circumstances, be willing to meet U. S. demands, and that if such a General could, in fact, be found that he would immediately hand over his post as Chief of Staff to same". After this conversation he called in the various Generals on the active list for consultation and carried out his offer to turn his office over to anyone of them who could be willing to turn Natal over to the U. S. Marines. They all, so it is said, refused. General Ary Pires, the Staff's sub-Chief and an out-and-out anti-Nazi, was particularly contrary to the U. S. demand."
"There is no doubt that this attitude is very exasperating to the U. S. Army Mission and the removal of General Monteiro may be insisted upon, but, absurd though it may seem, there are those who believe that the situation is far safer in the hands of this intelligent but shifty personality and arch-conspirator than to have him thrown out by "foreign" manipulation. He could then pose as a martyr-patriot. Incidentally, he has been responsible for promoting all the existing troop commanders to their present posts.

"I have heard that the local office of the Standard Oil Company recently received definite instructions to suspend all deliveries of aviation gasoline to the Condor and Latti lines but later the order was cancelled. I am not familiar with the true reason for the cancellation of these instructions but quite probably the moment was not considered opportune to take this drastic step. It is inevitable that sooner or later that supplies, especially to the Latti line, will be stopped as it is generally known that "bootleg" diamonds continue to be shipped by these planes."
Under the bed was an open box containing boots and shoes, various tools, and a lead.

On Friday, November 21, the whale boat was moved overland to the Rio Negro, and from there sailed down Rio Tadic to Isla Del Diablo and the Golfo De San Esteban. In four days nothing noteworthy was seen, but from Henuel, one of the laborers from the canal whom he took with him, our source learned that the Maniguales and Kornizoff named on Grosse's rough sketch were the Indian names for the Canal Tuahuencayec and Seno Cornish. Henuel had been there with Grosse, who had gone on alone from the head of Estuario Puelma, and he knew that at high tide it was possible to cross a low fall at the head of the estuary and continue up a river to two lakes which, in turn, were linked with Seno Cornish.

On Sunday, November 23, they returned to Ofqui, our source with the conclusion that a man posted at either Cabo Raper or at San Pedro would be able to control all movements through the Golfo De Penas.

He intended to leave the following day, but at dawn Grosse arrived, delighted at the news of his Lago Buenos Aires trip, and after breakfast invited our source to his room while he packed. In the course of the conversation Grosse:

(1) Showed our source two albums of photographs, but not those he had already seen.
(2) Said that he had climbed the San Rafael glacier, and that from there it was possible to reach Lago Buenos Aires in two hours.

(3) Said that he had climbed all the other glaciers in the Ofqui district.

(4) Invited our source to make a trip with him to the Alacalufes to make a film.

(5) Lied in saying that he did not know the Guaytecas.

(6) Said that he was a farmer, that his hobby was expeditions, and that he was expecting news in Aysen of a friend who might be accompanying him to Lago Buenos Aires: that he might be going to Santiago first.

(7) He was taking all his things as he did not know whether he would be returning to Ofqui or not.

(8) Lied in saying that Max Yunge, who had come to Chile with him in 1930, had returned to Germany. Yunge is in the south.

At 3 p.m. Grosse left for Puerto Aysen in the launch, our source having refused his offer to take him with him.

On Wednesday, November 26, our source also sailed and reached Estero Quesahuen that night.

The following morning the launch Crucero towed him to Puerto Traiguen, and from there he rowed to the head of Estero Pueima. At 3 p.m. on Friday the tide was high and the whale boat was able to cross the fall mentioned by Nehuel. The lake above the fall is some 5 miles long by one and a half to two wide; 10 metres from the eastern end the depth was three fathoms, the boat's length further, six fathoms, and from there it gradually deepened until in the centre a
45 metre lead did not touch bottom. At the far end of the lake a navigable channel of half a mile connects it with another smaller lake to the west, and this opens out into Seno Cornish and the open sea.

On Saturday, November 29, they sailed back down Estero Puelma to Puerto Traiguen, and from there were towed to Colonia on the Isla Traiguen by the same launch, the mechanic of which said that on several occasions he had left Grosse there, once at the fall at the north of the island, and that there he had seen, some five or six months before, a grey, two-funnelled ship which he thought was a destroyer.

On Tuesday, November 2, the launch left them at this fall which proved to be the eastern outlet of the vast lake they had reached from the western side of the island on November 15. Here, too, trees had been cut with axes.

The following day they sailed north to Isla Mineana where another large lake was reported to be located, but Antonio Ampuero, an old friend of our source, who has lived on the island for two years and knows the interior well, denied the existence of any inland stretch of water.

From there they continued north to arrive back at Melinka on Tuesday, December 9, only noticing on the way a newly-installed automatic light at Cayo Blanco.
CONCLUSIONS

From his own observation and from isolated pieces of information picked up in many conversations, our source has reached the conclusion that the Nazis are using the canal works at Ofqui as a cover, that Grosse has organized a ring of Nazi purveyors (e.g. wood and meat at uneconomic rates from Puyuhuapi and Koop in Puerto Aysen respectively) and that the object of his, Grosse's, explorations has been to find suitable lakes for seaplane bases. The indications on his marked map cover all the navigable waters, both internal and the open sea. Our source assumes that the exploration has continued further south under Max Yunge.

All of this would be in preparation for the closing of the Panama Canal and the forced diversion of shipping to the southern route.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

January 15, 1942

Noon

Here is a report on "Enemy Naval Activities in Chile" which I obtained through friendly sources.

I attach also photostatic map of the west coast of Chile.

I think you may be interested in examining both the report and the map.
ENEMY NAVAL ACTIVITY IN CHILE

On November 10, 1941, our source left on a voyage of inspection of the southern channels and islands down to the Isthmus of Ofqui. The inspection lasted a month and was carried out in a whale boat without an auxiliary motor and with a crew of four Indians.

In Lagunas an old Indian told him of movements by "the gringo from Ofqui" (Augustus Grosse) at Sepulcro on the island of Traiguen. On Saturday, November 15, he reached this point, and the information was confirmed by Juan Ranchul, an Indian from Punta Pescadores, who added that Grosse had been there with a gang of men from Chonchi and had cut a path along the side of the river leading up into the woods.

On Sunday, November 15, our source with two of his men set out along the path, which seemed to have been cut about a year ago, and after ten hours hard climbing came out on the shores of an enormous lake some 300 metres above sea level. It stretched for kilometres, was several kilometres in width, and on the far side, using his telescope, he could see that another river left the lake.

The following day he continued south along the Canal Errazuriz and into Estero Elefantes to Punta Pescadores, and on Tuesday, November 18, after sailing 40 miles in six and a half hours, reached Punta Leopardo. There he found a
hut in which small pieces of coal (a rarity in the region) scattered generally over the floor suggested that a considerable quantity had been stored there. In the neighborhood he found broken pieces of iron, two slightly rusted bolts, and trees cut by people unaccustomed to the work and using axes of at least six pounds; those used in the district are of a maximum of four.

On the Wednesday he climbed the small hill behind the hut with two of his men. They too commented on the "crazy" axe work, and our source was able to determine that two objectives had been pursued--first, to bring some heavy object up to the top of the hill along the narrow path, and secondly, to open a view commanding the Taitao Peninsula. On a clear day and with a good glass it would be possible to see to the Golfo De Penas. On the same afternoon, through a storm of wind and snow, he crossed Lacuna San Rafael and arrived at Ofqui.

At Ofqui he presented himself to the Administrator, D. Marcos Vallejos, in his capacity as Government Forestry Inspector, and was put up in the Administration building. He found that Vallejos was a member of the Socialist Party and anti-Nazi, that Jose Figueroa, an old friend and the non-commissioned officer in charge of the official radio, had already denounced Grosse to the Ministry of Fomento as a spy, that of the other officials of the canal works Manuel Neira was neutral and Pedro Bocke and Jorge Diaz were rabid
Nazis. Grosse himself was not officially connected with the works and figures on the pay roll as a simple laborer at 25 pesos a day; he was away in Puerto Aysen, and was expected back imminently.

In the course of the night our source entered Grosse's room in the administration building. He found:

(1) A map with the following markings:

A red circle in the middle of Rio Lucac

An arrow to the north of Peninsula Sisqueland pointing to the head of Estero Pueima

A question mark to the north of Traiguen Island

Various red lines pointing to the east of the Estero formed by Seno Cornish and a line of dots joining Seno Cornish and Estero Pueima

A question mark to the north of Canal Proeromat

A question mark, an arrow, and a figure, perhaps a date, in Isla Benjamin

A circle and an arrow pointing to Huafo on Isla Ipun, a circle and an arrow, pointing towards Isla Benjamin on Isla De Guamblin

A circle and an arrow pointing to Ruafo from Isla Ipun

A circle and an arrow pointing to the west on Isla Magdalena, a cross in Estero Pangal, another in Seno Magdalena, the size of which had been doubled with red dots and marked with numbers, apparently soundings, from one to nine

A cross in Estero Cuervo in Canal Jacaf

Crosses at Coigue, Santo Domingo, Palena and Tic-Toc

An arrow, with one head pointing east and another west, on Isla Huafo, with a circle in the middle of Huafo or Guafo.
A question mark on Isla Ascension with numbers from 1 to 16.

A carefully drawn cross between the points marked 69 and 105 opposite Canal Manzano on Isla Leucayec.

(2) Unused and unmarked charts of the Taitao Peninsula and of the Golfo De Penas.

(3) Various personal possessions, none of them marked with an indication of ownership, and

(4) Two boxes, one of wood and the other of metal.

Thursday, November 20, was spent in conversation with the various employees, and our source learned that Grosse acted as liaison between the works at Ofqui and Puerto Aysen and Putuhuapi, constantly making the trip in the launch Rio Cisnes. He was well liked and very obliging, and for this reason had been given a room in the administration building although he was not officially connected with the works. This, however, was likely to be his last trip as he had received a telegram from Santiago about an expedition to Lago Buenos Aires. This was confirmed by Figueroa, who showed our source a copy of the telegram, signed Espinosa, and by Catelican, one of Grosse's Indians, who also said he had been in San Pedro to take food and some parcels to a friend of Grosse's there. Figueroa added that some months ago Grosse had given a sealed parcel to an employee of the Ministry of Fomento for delivery in Santiago to a woman who had turned out to be an employee.
of the German Embassy: when he, Figueroa, was in charge
of the radio at San Pedro lighthouse, a German, 40 or 45
years old, named Schwenke or Schenke used to come to buy
provisions and ammunition. Our source himself had informa-
tion that a German named Yunge was in that part.

By midnight Grosse had still not arrived, and in
the night our source again entered his room, this time going
through the contents of the wooden box. They included books
on aviation and gliding, in German; a small compass and a
barometer; two albums of photographs including views of two
farms, "Aparacion de Paine" and "La Aguada", and three pages
devoted to a small seaplane; and a packet; wrapped in a small
Nazi flag, containing:

(1) A photograph of a German officer in uniform, of at
most 30 years old.

(2) A photograph of a woman, aged from 30 to 35.

(3) A notebook containing many addresses and a rough
sketch of a canal or river named Maniguales, two
irregular circles inside which were many numbers,
and the word Kornizoff.

(4) Ten handwritten letters in German.

(5) Copies of six typewritten letters in German, in which
our source was able to recognize the names of islands
in the Guaytecas archipelago and such words as
Wasser Fall, Flut, Ebbe. The letters were all
addressed to "Lisber Herr Doktor."

(6) A stamped envelope addressed to Dr. Otto Reuter,
Casilla 1596, Puerto Aysen.

(7) A list, evidently of Casilla numbers, covering Puerto
Monit, Calbuco, Ancud, Castro, Chonchi, Osborn and
Puerto Aysen.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Here is a report from William L. Brewster, who has just come back after seven weeks in Spain.

Spain is undoubtedly influenced somewhat by Germany, but it is not under German domination even though the Spanish press is 100% German controlled. The press has been manipulated outright by the Germans but represents neither the government nor the majority, however, a certain number of Spaniards in Spain believe in the event of a German defeat would support the government of the general Franco movement. Working men and women who were leaders in the fascist government during the Civil War and who are now refugees in the allied countries, may be expected to return to power and they are the last thing the majority of the Spanish people desire.

Spain, it is almost certain, will eventually restore the monarchy by recalling Don Juan and it only waiting for the psychological moment to do so. This is the policy that Franco himself is determined of following out.

The German sympathizers in the government are led by Franco himself and the Falangist Party, which latter is most powerful, but is becoming every day more and more discredited with a corresponding increase in its losses and setbacks. As a result, we find a possibility that the Nationalist regime may be a temporary one.
RESUME OF THE SITUATION IN SPAIN AS OF
DECEMBER 20, 1941.

While Spain is undoubtedly influenced somewhat by Germany, contrary to the general opinion of this country, she is certainly not under German domination even though the Spanish press is 100% German controlled. The press has been purchased outright by the Germans but represents neither the government nor the majority of public opinion. There is, however, a certain real fear in Spain that in the event of a German defeat Aguirre of the ephemeral Basque Republic, Negrin, Prieto and Fernando de los Rios who were leaders in the Loyalist Government during the Civil War and who are now refugees in the allied countries, may be supported in a bid to return to power and this is the last thing the majority of the Spanish people desire.

Spain, it is almost certain, will eventually restore the monarchy by recalling Don Juan and is only waiting for the psychological moment to do so. This is the policy that Franco himself is desirous of following out.

The German sympathizers in the government are led by Serano Suner and the Falangist Party, which latter is netly pro-Axis, but is becoming every day more and more discredited with a corresponding lessening in influence and power. The generals, who are whole-heartedly supporting Franco, are neither pro-German nor pro-Ally, they are pro-Spanish and are
striving to steer Spain through the present crisis by avoiding war.

If the present war lasts very much longer it is doubtful if Spain can maintain its independence without outside help. Her situation is desperate and bordering on starvation and she must receive assistance which can only come from the democracies and principally from the United States. Unfortunately, we have failed conspicuously to understand that the opportunity exists today for us to bring Spain into sympathy with the democracies. The British now understand this clearly and the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare, said to me in November that it had taken him eighteen months to persuade Mr. Churchill and his government to adopt this policy of limited aid to Spain.

By "limited aid" is meant sending regularly enough supplies to increase the present very low standard of living and prevent the entire internal economy from breaking down. Great Britain, in view of the difficulties in obtaining her own requirements, is not in a position to assist Spain materially. Therefore, the responsibility falls on us.

Of our own exports so far to Spain, I think it can be safely said that nothing (with the exception of such negligible quantities as may be bootlegged) is reaching Germany or Italy either directly or indirectly, in spite of rumors and reports
to the contrary. This conclusion is the result of my own investigations and is concurred in by both the British representatives in Madrid as well as our own Naval Attache, who is exceptionally well posted. Conditions in Spain are so bad and the country so near the starvation line that, even if the wish were there, none of the exports would be allowed to be re-exported to the Germans or Italians because, if discovered, the resultant Allied naval blockade, which would certainly follow, would definitely spell revolution.

It should be thoroughly understood that it is the German policy to keep Spain in this condition of destitution and, one can almost say, desperation. By not assisting Spain we are actually supporting Germany's game. The German desire back of this policy is that some day trouble sufficiently serious may arise to force France to call on Hitler for help in putting it down and thus give the Germans the chance they are looking for to come in and "protect" Spain as was done in Roumania.

The continuous rumors and statements in the press to the effect that German troops are moving into Spain originate from German sources and are part of the German war of nerves. Unfortunately, these reports are published in our press with obviously no effort to substantiate their authenticity. There are no German troops nor is there any other form of German control in Spain and, with the xenophobia for which the Spanish people
are known, no attempt at foreign control would be tolerated. As Franco said to Hitler at his last meeting with him at Irun, "If you come through Spain, I cannot be responsible for the actions of my army or my people". Spain feels she has long since repaid the debt for German assistance during the Civil War and the Germans have no illusions as to any real love the Spaniards may have for them.

Spain is in vital need of cotton, wheat, petroleum products, beef and other foodstuffs and is ready to pay for whatever purchases she can make in this country, providing credits cannot be arranged. As materials exportable to this country she has tungsten, mercury, pyrites, cork and olive oil. However, in all dealings with these people one is obliged to take into consideration the Spanish character and its exaggerated pride. It is impossible, as past experience has shown, to attempt to force Spain into any kind of trade or barter agreement. On the other hand, if we would for a period, say of from three to six months, sell or at least authorize the necessary export licenses for Spain's minimum requirements without tying any strings to our actions, I feel confident we will find the Spaniards ready to offer us whatever we need of their exportable surpluses.

It must be remembered that the Spaniards will never come to us, hat in hand, begging for assistance. They will allow
their country to go under first. While it is not of great importance, still the following shows the feeling of the Spanish Government towards us. When Ambassador Cardenas visited Spain last September, Franco said to him in effect, "The great trouble with the country to which you are accredited is that they never offer anything with the right hand until they are certain of receiving something back with the left," and of course with the Spaniards such a policy is doomed to fail. The Spaniards are probably the most trying people in the world to deal with but, conscious of our strength and position I feel we should ignore any minor annoyances and keep before us the larger issue of detaching Spain from the Axis.

It has been suggested that radio or propaganda of other sorts might be used effectively by the Allies with the Spaniards. I can definitely state that anything of this sort would be just so much wasted effort as the only propaganda at present that will carry any weight in Spain will be shipments of their very much needed supplies. The effect of just a few shipments arriving regularly will far exceed any other form of propaganda in obtaining Spanish sympathies. Regarding propaganda, the following may be enlightening. Senor Carceller, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, told me that when in Berlin in November, a member of the German government
asked him how he felt concerning the assistance Germany was giving to Spain and his reply was that all the assistance he had noticed so far was propaganda and literature which wasn't of much help to empty stomachs.

I am convinced that by easing up a little in our policy towards Spain and endeavoring to understand them a little better, we will be able in the course of a very few months by diplomatic handling of the situation to accomplish two things.

1. The virtual elimination or neutralization of Serano Suner.

2. The altering of Spanish policy from one of non-belligerancy to one of neutrality.

The key to this situation lies entirely in our hands and in any attempt to assist Spain we can count on full British cooperation and, as I have said before, it seems doubtful if Spain will be able to weather the present storm unsupported. Our present policy towards Spain has certainly not succeeded and, if Spain is still struggling to remain out of the conflict, it is in spite of and not because of this policy.

Therefore, in adopting a policy of limited aid which I propose it would seem that we have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Should this new policy after a few months prove to be unsuccessful we will have lost nothing nor will we have been in any way of assistance to Germany.
There are several points in connection with the prosecution of the war that it may be of interest to note here:

There are no German or Italian submarine bases in Spain nor are there German or Italian submarines operating out of Spanish ports or harbors. That a submarine of one of these nationalities may obtain a few supplies once in a while by bootlegging is perhaps possible but if so the quantities so obtained are negligible and it is done without the knowledge of the authorities.

Neither are there any airfields in Spain from which German planes are regularly operated. There have been occasions when German Bombers returning from raids on allied shipping lanes have landed on Spanish airfields for minor repairs and, in some instances, fuel has been furnished to allow them to reach their nearest landing fields in southern France though such instances are the exception. On the other hand, there are also instances where German Bombers have landed in Spain with all or a portion of their bomb loads and have been obliged to discharge and leave these behind before being allowed to proceed.

Since the fall of France in June 1940, particularly from the submarine angle, Spain no longer holds the same interest for the Germans who now have Bayonne and Bordeaux at their disposal.
It is my definite opinion there will be no invasion of the Iberian Penninsular by German forces unless Hitler is forced to play a desperate card in an attempt to reach North Africa. As of December 20th there were no German first line troops or mechanized units south of Bordeaux. The inevitable troop movements towards the Spanish frontier, which will be the prelude to an invasion, are certain to be reported by reliable British and American sources in Spain who are ever on the lookout and until then all rumors and reports to this effect can be discounted as being so much German propaganda.

In connection with North Africa I heard certain reports in Spain that I feel warranted in noting in this memorandum. The Spanish government believes that if the British pursue Rommel's retreating army into Tunisia the French forces there might then become involved. In this case Spain would also be forced to take a stand to protect her position in Morocco for which she is determined to fight. If the United States and Great Britain could reassure the Spanish government that its present position in North Africa will, naturally with the exception of Tangier, be respected it will undoubtedly prevent Spain from entering the conflict in that area. Such a guaranty will also give Germany one less excuse for putting pressure on Spain to become involved.
Finally it should be pointed out that with fifteen inch guns covering the Straits of Gibraltar from Spanish territory on both sides of the Straits, the dock yard and naval base at Gibraltar could have been rendered quite useless without attacking the rock itself. That Spain to date has resisted German pressure to take some such action is material evidence that the Germans are not in control of Spain as the reports would have us believe.

I would add that in addition to speaking Spanish I resided in Spain from 1924 to 1930 and since the beginning of the Civil War in July 1936 I have been very close to the Franco government in view of assistance rendered in furnishing their much needed supplies of petroleum products. I have now just returned to the United States after having spent seven weeks in Spain, commencing November 1, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have just been advised from a very reliable source that a Japanese military attache in Europe has spoken privately as follows. We do not know whether the statements in paragraph 3 represent only personal views of the attache.

1. Japan will conduct war in the Far East exclusively in own interests and will not necessarily link operations there with the war in Europe. Japan distrusts Germany. Japanese objectives are Singapore, Malaya, Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Borneo, New Guinea and whole Archipelago.

2. Japanese objectives: (a) Elimination of all Far Eastern bases of Great Britain and the U.S.A.
with least possible delay; (b) Obtain military and political hegemony in the Far East; (c) Secure sources of raw material, principally oil and rubber. Japanese General Staff is confident that this can be obtained in six months in view of ample Japanese forces available, a strong Fifth Column and Quisling of U.S. fleet.

3. Having obtained objectives Japan will initiate peace negotiations with Great Britain and the U.S.A. independently of the other Axis powers. Next step, peace offer, failing which they will threaten a sudden attack on India.

Copies have been given to Mr. Hull, Colonel Knox and Colonel Stimson.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Our San Francisco office sent the attached transcript of a Tokio Broadcast in English at 10:30 P.M., EST, January 14th. It is Tokio's first direct response to the President's last speech.

It is also the first direct personal attack on the President by a Japanese commentator in English. It shows that Tokio has taken over the Nazi "Lord Haw-Haw" method.

An analysis of Arima's talk indicates the following appeals:

1. An attempt to create suspicion in the minds of American listeners on the question of the President's sanity, by recalling "New Deal theories"
and the "openly expressed conviction that President Roosevelt's mind was becoming unbalanced."

2. An attempt to instill doubt as to the President's veracity by attacking his charge that Japan fought Russia in 1904 as part of a scheme for Japanese conquest. Theodore Roosevelt, history books and other sources are cited to undermine the President's assertion.

3. In an effort to justify Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Tokio broadcaster appeals to American realism and tries to place the blame entirely on President Roosevelt, as Commander-in-Chief of the American Army and Navy, "He should have seen to it that they were ready at any moment and at any place and for any method of attack, but President Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Army and Navy fell
down on the job."

4. An appeal to superstition in America by explaining that the Japanese "deliberately chose the Lord's day for attack on the U. S. There can be no doubt that God in his wrath at the machinations which have been committed by the President in joining forces with anti-religious organizations, enabled us to crush the American Pacific fleet." The Japanese commentator says that a storm was raging almost to the moment of Japanese attack, when the sky suddenly cleared.

5. An appeal to anti-Communist sentiment in the U. S. by ridiculing the President's assertion that the U. S. is fighting for freedom of all Nations. The commentator cites the absence of religious freedom in Soviet Russia.

6. An appeal to the colored races in America
citing the President's declaration that the U.S. is fighting for racial equality, "That would be laughable if it were not such an insult to the members of the so-called colored races. It is an established fact that there is less racial equality in the United States than in any other country in the world."
TOKYO ENGLISH 10:30P.M. EST 1/14/42 NAO MILLIS TRANSCRIPT

COMMENTARY:

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. MOST OF YOU IN AMERICA TODAY ARE BEING TOLD TO BELIEVE ONLY THE STORY AND STATEMENTS AS ADVANCED BY THE STATESMEN AT WASHINGTON. YOU; AS A LOYAL AMERICAN, SHOULD BY ALL MEANS SUPPORT THE WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES. BUT WHAT TO DO WITH THE DISGRACED AND BROKEN PROMISES THAT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY YOUR HONOURED AND RESPECTED LEADERS? YOU HAVE BEEN ENJOYING FOOD AND ABUNDANCE IN THE LAND OF PLENTY, ONLY FIVE WEEKS AGO. ARE YOU AS HAPPY AND SATISFIED TODAY AS YOU WERE FIVE WEEKS AGO?

"YOUR LEADERS IN WASHINGTON (THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) TO (1 WORD) THE IDEA THAT THE BLAME FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS RESTS ENTIRELY ON THE TREACHERY OF THE JAPANESE WAR MACHINE. ANYONE REJECTING THIS IDEA IS NOT A LOYAL AMERICAN, AND ALL OF YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE A LOYAL AMERICAN. BUT WOULD YOU BE SO LOYAL TO YOUR LEADERS AT WASHINGTON AS WOULD (THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) ALL THE MISTAKES AND BROKEN PROMISES MADE BY YOUR LEADERS? ARE YOU PREPARED TO BE SO LOYAL AS TO LET THEM SPOIL YOUR COUNTRY AND ROB THE NATION OF ITS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE IT HAS HAD ENJOYED FOR CENTURIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD? WE HAVE ENTIRELY TOO MUCH RESPECT FOR AMERICANS TO ASSUME THAT SUCH IS THE CASE. AMERICA IS FOR THE AMERICANS, AND NOT FOR ONE FUTILE JESTER OR FOR A HANDFUL OF SELF-DESIRING STATESMEN AT WASHINGTON. THAT IS THE REASON YOU WILL HAVE A SPEAKER TODAY WIDELY KNOWN FOR HIS CALM STUDY ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY FORTUNATE IN BEING ABLE TO OBTAIN MR. HAJIME ARIMA, WHO WILL SPEAK TO YOU TODAY, AND FOR THE NEXT FOUR DAYS AT THIS SAME TIME, ON THE SUBJECT OF "ROOSEVELT, HIS FAULTS AND PROMISES". MR. ARIMA:

(MORE) JS114APST
"President Roosevelt, on January 6 in his message to Congress on the State of the Union, made a number of dumbfounding charges against Japan, charges which cannot be permitted to go unchallenged, charges which no man would or could make. A few months ago Reich Fuehrer Hitler questioned the sanity of the American President. Before that, when Roosevelt reckoned to upset the entire United States—social, economic and political system with his cracked-brain communistic New Deal theories, many of his own countrymen, men who held responsible positions and were highly respected by the people, openly expressed the conviction that President Roosevelt's mind was becoming unbalanced. If there was any doubt of this, what he told Congress in his recent message ought to leave no uncertainty that there is something radically wrong with the American President's mind.

In his message to Congress he makes the specific charge that Japan's war against Russia in 1904 was fought in a scheme for conquest. That is the vilest and most shameless and dishonorable thought that has ever been expressed by the head of a supposedly first-class power. Rarely has the leader of a nation stooped so low in an effort to justify the warped judgment and miscalculation by which he dragged his country into a war which his own people did not want. There has in the past never been a greater distortion of history than President Roosevelt's charge in his message to Congress that Japan fought Russia in 1904 for conquest. His namesake, Theodore Roosevelt, led the world cry which hailed Japan and encouraged her. He and the entire American nation agreed with us that Czarist Russia brought on the war by moving down into Asia step by step until it finally threatened to gobble up Korea. You can read the scores of books that have been written on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, you can read any history of the world since then and..."
YOU WILL NOT FIND A SINGLE LINE TO TESTIFY TO THE HIDEOUS CHARGE WHICH PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT HAS MADE IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN THIS SAME MESSAGE, DECLARES THAT JAPAN'S DREAM OF CONQUEST INCLUDES THE DOMINATION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN BY JAPANESE MILITARY AND NAVAL CONTROL OF THE WESTERN COAST OF NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

"THAT CHARGE IS AS DISTORTED AND AS FALSE AS HIS STATEMENT THAT JAPAN WENT TO WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1904 FOR THE SAKE OF CONQUEST.

"MOST OF ALL THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES KNOWS THAT JAPAN DID EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO KEEP THE HOSTILITIES IN EAST ASIA FROM SPREADING TOWARD OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND THAT WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE TO MEDITATE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, LEAST OF ALL TO CONTROL THE WESTERN COAST OF NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, AS YOUR PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE YOU BELIEVE.

"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT CONDUCTED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON ALL THROUGH LAST SUMMER AND AUTUMN.

HE KNOWS WHAT SINCERE, EARNEST AND WHOLEHEARTED EFFORTS WE MADE TO REMAIN AT PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE KNOWS HOW (THREE WORDS INAUDIBLE) BY SENDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO OUR ENEMIES, BY CUTTING OFF TRADE RELATIONS WITH US, AND, FINALLY, BY INCITING AND INSTIGATING THE BRITISH, THE DUTCH, THE SOVIETS (?) AND CHUNGKING TO FORM A MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ENCIRCLEMENT TO STRANGLE US.

"SO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, OFFERS THE RIDICULOUS EXPLANATION THAT WE DID NOT WAIT FOR AN ACT OF WAR ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE STRIKING. WHAT DOES HE CALL THE SYSTEM OF (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) AND THE SENDING OF MILITARY (MORE)
Experts and the dispatching of officers of the American armed forces to our enemies?

"What does he call the shipping of arms and ammunition, and the erection of an airtight economic blockade against us?

"If such actions are not definite acts of war, we would like to hear President Roosevelt's enlightening interpretation of international law.

"President Roosevelt, in his lust for power and in his insane ambition to become the Lord High Protector of the Universe, has plunged his country into World War by compelling Japan to fight to protect its rights and its honor. His big misjudgment of our fighting power will go down in American history as the biggest error made by any president.

"President Roosevelt declared that we chose the time and the place and the method of attack. What under the sun did he expect us to do? He disclaims (two words inaudible) to us as a threat. We adopted definite acts of war against them. If every any country (1 word) such a quality, ought to have sense enough to keep its armed forces in full preparedness. He should have seen to it that they were ready at any moment and at any place and for any method of attack. But President Roosevelt, the commander in chief of the American Army and Navy, fell down on the job.

"He was, it is now clear, merely (1 word) and when Japan (1 word inaudible) he proved to be nothing but a four-flusher.

"President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, berates Japan for the cause of the (two words inaudible) we set at Hawaii. It was on a peaceful Sunday morning, in other words, on the day which is set for the Lord. Japan shows that they do (two words inaudible).

(More) JS13:1 April
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THE MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF MEN LIKE
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, WHO WILL CONSORT WITH COMMUNISTS AND AT
THE SAME TIME EXPECT OTHERS TO (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE). COMMUNISM
DOES NOT BELIEVE IN ANY FORM OF RELIGION, MUCH LESS IN THE VIRTUES
OF GOD. THAT IS WHY WE DELIBERATELY CHOSE THE LORDS DAY FOR OUR
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT GOD, IN
HIS WRATH AT THE MACHINATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN-COMMITTED BY THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN JOINING FORCES WITH THE ANTI-RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS, ENABLED US TO CRUSH THE AMERICAN PACIFIC FLEET.
WHAT BETTER PROOF OF THIS CAN THERE BE THAN THE FACT THAT A STORM WAS
RAGING IN THE HAWAIIAN WATERS ALMOST UP TO THE MOMENT OF OUR ATTACK,
WHEN THE SKY SUDDENLY CLEARED AND BROUGHT THE FLEET OF THE (1 WORD
INAUDIBLE) NATION DIRECTLY INTO THE VIEW OF THE EAGLES OF OUR
GLORIOUS NAVY. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT, EITHER, THAT GOD, IN
HIS WRATH, WOULD SMITE AND BLAST THIS ENEMY AND THEN ALL COUNTRIES
WHICH REFUSED TO JOIN THE (1 WORD) CORPORATION. IF YOU HAVE
ANY DOUBT ON THIS POINT YOU MUST MERELY LOOK AT THE FATE OF FRANCE
AND NORWAY AND BELGIUM AND YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE.
"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECLARED
THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM OF THE NATIONS ALL
OVER THE WORLD. CAN THIS MAN BE IN HIS RIGHT SENSES? DOES HE
MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
THE SOVIET UNION, WHERE MORE CHURCHES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND
MORE PRIESTS MURDERED THAN IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD?
DOES HE MEAN FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AMONG THE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN
CHINA? DOES HE MEAN FREEDOM OF RELIGION FOR GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK,
WHO LED THE MOVEMENT IN CANTON IN 1926 TO DESTROY ALL CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES IN CHINA? AND WHO TODAY IS FIGHTING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE
COMMUNIST ARMIES OF CHINA? DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT MEAN THAT?
THEN WHY IS
(MORE) JS136APST
THE UNITED STATES NOT FIGHTING AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA AND
CHUNGKING?

"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECLARES
THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING FOR RACIAL EQUALITY. THAT
WOULD BE LAUGHABLE IF IT WERE NOT SUCH AN INSULT TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE SO-CALLED COLORED RACES. IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT
THAT THERE IS LESS RACIAL EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES THAN IN
ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD.

"DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT AMERICA IS
FIGHTING JAPAN TODAY TO BRING ABOUT GREATER EQUALITY FOR THE
AMERICAN NEGRO? CAN WE BE BLAMED FOR QUESTIONING THE SANITY OF
A MAN WHO ADVANCES SUCH AN INSANE ARGUMENT? WE SUGGEST
REMEMBERING THE DAY WHEN WE HEARD THAT.

"MERELY IN CONTRAST, IF JAPAN SAID IT WAS FIGHTING THE UNITED
STATES TO BRING ABOUT RACIAL EQUALITY, FOR THE JAPANESE AND ALL
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE YELLOW RACE HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM ENTERING THE
UNITED STATES EXCEPT AS VISITORS AND ARE DEPRIVED OF THE PRIVILEGE
GRANTED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE WHITE RACE OF TAKING OUT
CITIZENSHIP PAPERS . . . . (COMMENTARY SUDDENLY INTERRUPTED, STATION
APPEARENTLY JAMMED. LAST TWO MINUTES INAUDIBLE.)

END

EGGLESTON SX 1/15/42 JS140APST
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

We have received the following cable from our London office:

"During the last few days, I have had intimate unofficial conversations with Sutton, Morton, and Bowes Lyon, and these conversations lead me to urge, in the strongest terms, that the question of our providing at least token forces of American airplanes for leaflet operations be vigorously pressed in Washington before we ask the British to handle United States leaflet No. 2.

"I also urge that it would be extremely valuable if we could give some tangible proof that the question of token Naval and Air Forces in Africa and the Mediterranean was also being pressed.

"No American pilots or American-made planes participated in the initial leaflet operation, evidently because unusually increased, specifically, military commitments made their use impractical."
"As these commitments are, at the moment, so urgent and extensive, the Air Ministry is balking somewhat in continuing to carry out continuous and extensive British leaflet operations, which include Courrier de L'Air and which have included all the major Roosevelt speeches up to now.

"The Air Ministry has used the United States leaflet operations to take the position that the fulfillment of American requirements should be taken as satisfying all political warfare needs of both America and Britain.

"This has obviously created a difficult position for PWE and they feel that a token American Air Force, assigned to the leaflet work, would answer the Air Ministry's argument.

"The United States leaflet No. 2 has been prepared and will be ready for dropping by the end of the week.

This cable has been examined by our Planning group here and they urge that some portion of our air force be designated to handle the distribution of American leaflets on the Continent.

I think it is fair to recognize, after the impression created by our Leaflet No. 1, that the dropping of propaganda leaflets on
enemy territory is a very important feature of modern warfare. I am sure you agree that we should be furnished mechanical facilities for distributing these leaflets. These facilities should be American planes operated from British bases. The fact that these leaflet-dropping operations would be valuable training for American pilots is an incidental advantage which does not detract from the proposal.

Our Leaflet No. 2 will consist of excerpts from your last speech and it would give point to what you say in that speech if the leaflets containing those excerpts could be dropped by your fighting planes.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

January 16, 1942
12:00 Noon

The attached is the second in a series of short-wave broadcasts from Tokio in English. This one was at 10:30 P.M., EST, January 15. An analysis indicates that this deals with the following:

1. An attempt to undermine confidence in American news as given to the American people. "America today needs men who are great enough to face unpleasant facts, to act to eradicate all the mistakes committed by their leaders."

2. Most of the program is an attack on the President's message to Congress January 6th. "His
utterances are the work of a mischievous propaganda artist, perhaps the most mischievous propaganda artist of modern times."

3. Attacking the President's demands for airplanes, tanks, etc., in 1942, the Japanese commentator states that their military forces are ready and willing to pay a million dollars for that information, if it is true. "So the American people can hardly expect these figures to be correct. It is just a bluff."

4. The courage, patriotism and preparedness of U. S. fighting men is questioned. "Those at Hawaii made such a spectacle of themselves that a Board of Investigation has had to be sent to the Island and the commanding officers of the Army and Navy forces replaced."

5. Quotations from the President's campaign
speeches are quoted to cast doubt on his assurances to the American people.

6. The broadcast closes with the "American people are somewhat to blame. Knowing better, they are permitting their bombastic egoistic (one word inaudible) leader to deceive them."
THE SECOND RADIO ATTACK UPON PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN A FOUR-TALK SERIES ENTITLED "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES," WAS HEARD OVER TOKYO IN ENGLISH AT 10:30 P.M. EST., THURSDAY NIGHT, JAN. 15TH.

AFTER A SHORT INTRODUCTION, THE RADIO COMMENTATOR TURNS THE MIKE OVER TO MR. HAJIME ARIMA. BOTH INTRODUCTION AND SPEECH ARE GIVEN BELOW, TRANSCRIBED CAREFULLY BY MILLIS.

-TOKYO, ENGLISH 1030 PM EST 1/15/42 MILLIS TRANSCRIPT.-

COMMENTARY (CONTINUED FROM 1/14/42)

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. THE WAR IS NOW GOING ON IN FULL BLAST IN THE PACIFIC. BUT BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE PRESENT WAR YOU HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO BACK UP ITS CLAIMS BY FORCE OF ARMS IF NECESSARY. YOU WERE TOLD THAT ALL PREPARATIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. (TWO WORDS INAUDIBLE) ARGUMENT HAS BEEN FORCED DOWN YOUR THROAT THAT SO MANY AIRPLANES, BATTLESHIPS AND SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT WOULD WIN AN EASY VICTORY OVER POORLY EQUIPPED FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING JAPAN.

"DID ALL THESE ARGUMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS TURN OUT TO BE TRUE? WELL, PERHAPS, THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOMETHING WRONG, SOMETHING RADICALLY WRONG WITH WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO KNOW SO FAR.

"ALL MEN OF EXPERIENCE WILL BEAR OUT THAT SUCCESS IN ANY ENDEAVOR CANNOT BE EXPECTED IF ONE ACTS ON MISCONCEPTIONS OR FALSE PROMISES. ONE MUST HAVE ALL FACTS IN HAND BEFORE HE DECIDES TO ACT. HE CANNOT AFFORD TO LOOK AT ONLY THOSE FACTS WHICH ARE PLEASANT. HE MUST MAKE AN EFFORT TO LOOK AT UNPLEASANT FACTS AS WELL, IF HIS REASONING IS TO BE SOUND AND (ONE WORD INAUDIBLE).

"AMERICA TODAY NEEDS MEN WHO ARE GREAT ENOUGH TO FACE UNPLEASANT FACTS, TO ACT TO ERADICATE ALL THE MISTAKES COMMITTED BY THEIR LEADERS.

"WE CAN FIND NO MAN BETTER FITTED TO POINT OUT TO YOU THOSE BARE FACTS THAN MR. HAJIME ARIMA, OUR SPEAKER FOR TODAY, AND WHOSE TOPIC IS "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES." AND THIS IS THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF HIS RADIO ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC "ROOSEVELTS FAULTS AND PROMISES":

(MORE)---1/15/42...1115PST..(GE)
X75...2....(JAP-ROOSEVELT)

"PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON JANUARY SIXTH, ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, IS AN INSULT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OF ALL PEOPLES AND FOREMOST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. HIS UTERANCES ARE THE WORK OF A MISCHIEVOUS PROPAGANDA ARTIST, PERHAPS THE MOST MISCHIEVOUS PROPAGANDA ARTIST OF MODERN TIMES. LET US LOOK AT THE TWO MODELS HE HAS USED AND THE WONDERFUL GRANDIOLOQUENCE WHICH HE HAS JUST DRAWN FROM THAT ENTERPRISE.

"IMMORTAL IS THAT OF THE WEAKENED, DISABLED FIGHTING FORCE WITH A BLACKENED EYE, A CRIPPLED HAND AND A HUNG LIMB NOW RUSHING TO THE AID OF THOSE IT PROMISED TO DEFEND, LOSING EVERY BATTLE THAT IT IS NOW FIGHTING. NOW, LET US TURN FROM THE EAGLE AND LOOK AT HOW MAGNIFICENTLY THIS POWERLESS, SHATTERED FIGURE HAS BEEN DEPICTED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

"WE SEE A MIGHTY, UOEPLANING MAN, A MORTAL SAMSON, HOLDING IN ONE HAND 120,000 BOMBERS AND IN THE OTHER SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND TANKS. BUT THIS, ALAS, IS ALL ON PAPER. ON THENHNEZLW

IS NOTHINOHA SHARKS TOOTH, A WEAKENED AND HELPLESS ARMYJOSEEDXNAVY, TO

$LOO SP SIXTY BILLION DOLLARS.
WHERE DID THAT ZSYZLAU

AQUG ANYHERE WILL THE TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WHICH PRESIDENT ROSEVELT NOW ASKING THE AMERICAN PEOPX IF TITISPRESSB6TBOOGESEZBIMESZSZF

ZEDXAPPROPRIATION OF FIFTY-SIX BILL\n
BALANCE OF SIXTY-EIGHT XILLION DOLLARS HE HAS ALREADY ASKED OKAYED AND SPENT OUSTENSIBLY FOR ARYGA HE PROMISES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS WILL NOW BE TAKE

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J YEDCJF HZBILLION8
"This is the same President Roosevelt who maintained as recently as 1939, that every New Deal panacea of the last seven years was that of a Preparedness program, that everything the New Deal wanted to do was necessary to National Defense. And what cost of National Defense did President Roosevelt still set as spending tens, no hundreds of billions of dollars for such a National Defense that is so remiss that he is asking the American people today to let him have another fifty-six billion dollars to start all over.

President Roosevelt pledges that in 1942 the United States shall produce sixty-thousand warplanes and in 1943 one hundred and twenty-five thousand warplanes. He pledges that in 1942 the United States shall produce forty-five thousand tanks and in 1945 it shall produce sixty-five thousand tanks. By his same promises it is to be noted that the grand climax of this new orgy of spending will come in the year 1943, the next Presidential election year.

Today, barely a month after the Navy of which he is Commander in Chief suffered the worst naval defeat in history, after every American outpost in the Pacific has been toppled, President Roosevelt has the brazenness to go before the American people and to deliver to them a message of victory. Not even Prime Minister Winston Churchill of England had the effrontery to do that. President... Premier Churchill waited at least 18 months after the battles of Dunkirk and Yugoslavia and Greece before boasting about what (three words inaudible.)

President Roosevelt declared that he will build 120,000 warplanes and 65,000 tanks in 1942. If that is true, the President of the United States is the most intelligent source Japan and Germany could have. Our military forces are ready and willing to pay a million dollars for that information if it is (more) ---1/15/42...1130pST...(GE)
XXX IF IT IS TRUE JUST AS THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD BE GLAD TO PAY ANYTHING FOR THE EXACT FIGURES OF OUR MILITARY PRODUCTION. SO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN HARDLY EXPECT THOSE FIGURES TO BE CORRECT. IT IS JUST A BLUFF. AND, IF THOSE FIGURES ARE NOT CORRECT, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IS UNDER THE (ONE WORD INAUDIBLE) OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INTO SELF-COMPLACENCY, JUST AS HE LED THEM INTO A SENSE OF SECURITY DURING HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE ELECTION IN 1939, WHEN HE PROMISED THEM TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE WAR.

"AFTER SPENDING SIXTY-EIGHT BILLION DOLLARS DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS THE UNITED STATES STILL DOES NOT POSSESS A SINGLE HEAVY TANK OF THE TYPE USED BY GERMANY. TWO YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II BEGAN AND AFTER SPENDING SIXTY-EIGHT BILLION DOLLARS IN ACTUAL CASH, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT HAVE AS RECENTLY AS IN OCTOBER LAST YEAR ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO FIGHT, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASSURED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHEN HE ASKED THEM FOR THOSE BILLIONS, THAT THIS WOULD MAKE THE UNITED STATES IMPREGNABLE.


(MORE) JS1132PPST
"WHAT DOES PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT SAY OF THE COURAGE, THE
PATRIOTISM AND THE PREPAREDNESS OF MEN OF HIS FIGHTING

"TO DEFLECT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISASTROUS DEFEAT OF THE AMERICAN FIGHTING FORCES IN THE HAWAIIAN AND PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IS MAKING A LOT OF TALL PROMISES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. CAN HIS PROMISES BE ACCEPTED? ON OCTOBER 30, 1940, JUST BEFORE THE LAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IMPLANTED IN THE AMERICAN MIND THIS STATEMENT: AND WHILE I AM TALKING TO YOU, MOTHERS AND FATHERS, I BID YOU ONE MORE ASSURANCE. I HAVE SAID THIS BEFORE BUT I SHALL SAY IT AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN. YOUR BOYS ARE NOT GOING TO BE SENT INTO ANY FOREIGN WARS.

"ON NOVEMBER 2, 1940 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IMPLANTED IN THE AMERICAN MIND THIS ASSURANCE: THE FIRST PREMISE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS TO KEEP OUR COUNTRY OUT OF WAR. YET, NO SOONER WAS HE RE-ELECTED THAN HE DEMANDED THE CUTTING OFF THE NEUTRALITY ACT WHICH HAD SERVED ITS PURPOSE SO WELL THAT IT KEPT THE UNITED STATES (MORE) JS1137PPST
OUT OF ENGLAND'S WAR DESPITE ALL THE FRANTIC EFFORTS OF MR. ROOSEVELT AND HIS WAR CABINET. SO THE NEUTRALITY ACT WAS REVISED AND THE LEND-LEASE LAW PASSED, AND THUS WERE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOVED INTO THE FATE OF WAR AGAINST THEIR WILL.

"JUST BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, ON DECEMBER 8, POLLS OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOWED THAT BETWEEN SEVENTY AND EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WERE AGAINST THE ENTRY OF THEIR COUNTRY INTO THE CONFLICT. TODAY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WOULD HAVE US BELIEVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND HIM. THAT IS UNBELIEVABLE.

"LATE LAST YEAR SENATOR HIRAM JOHNSON OF CALIFORNIA, IN DENOUNCING MR. ROOSEVELT, DECLARED TAKE YOUR PEOPLE INTO THE WAR, IF YOU WISH--BUT, WHEN THE CASUALTY LISTS COME ROLLING IN, (REMEMBER THAT) CALIFORNIA DID NOT WANT TO GO TO WAR.

"IN HIS MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DECLARED THAT AMERICA IS FIGHTING TO UPHOLD THE DOCTRINE THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL IN THE SIGHT OF GOD. A GREATER PRESIDENT THAN ROOSEVELT MUST HAVE TURNED IN HIS GRAVE WHEN HE ASKED THAT, FOR, IN THE SIGHT OF GOD, THE AMERICAN NEGRO IS THE EQUAL OF ANY WHITE MAN. DOES FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIGHTING JAPAN TO UPHOLD THAT DOCTRINE, OR THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE YELLOW RACE, WHO ARE BARRIED BY LEGISLATION FROM ENTERING AND FROM BECOMING CITIZENS OF THAT COUNTRY, EXCEPT BY BIRTH IN THE UNITED STATES? IS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TELLING US THAT HE IS FIGHTING TO UPHOLD THE DOCTRINE THAT WE ARE CREATED EQUAL? THAT IS SOMETHING WE OBSERVE, THAT IS WHAT WE ARE FIGHTING FOR. THAT IS WHAT WE KNOW TO BE RIGHT IN THE SIGHT OF GOD.

"A MUCH GREATER, A VERY MUCH GREATER PRESIDENT THAN (MORE)
SX80...7...(JAP-ROOSEVELT)


IN DEFENSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, LET PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S HYPOCRISY LIE WHERE IT BELONGS. AND YET, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SOMEWHAT TO BLAME. KNOWING BETTER, THEY ARE PERMITTING THEIR BOMBASTIC, EGOISTIC, (1 WORD INAUDIBLE) LEADER TO DECEIVE THEM.

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE JUST HEAR HAJIME ARIMA SPEAKING IN THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF HIS RADIO ADDRESS ON THE SUBJECT "ROOSEVELT'S FAULTS AND PROMISES." LET US HOPE THAT THE INFORMATION AND FACTS LAID BEFORE YOU BY MR. ARIMA MAY HELP YOU TO VISUALIZE THE TRUE SITUATION AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.

"FROM THE LAST 25 MINUTES YOU HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO RADIO TOKYO IN ENGLISH....."

END

EGGLESTON SX 1/15/42 JS1146PPST

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The following is a digest of a secret survey of home morale in England for the week ending January 12, 1942:

Public confidence is fairly high, but because of the remoteness of the theatres of war, there is a slight revival of complacency and apathy.

In the minds of a great majority, the most cheering factor is Russia, with considerable enthusiasm evidenced for the regime in Russia. Appreciative comment was made on Stalin's "war aims." The widespread horror and interest produced by Molotov's statement is summed up as "our leaders have much to learn from the Russians."

Serious anxiety over the Far East is confined to the "intelligent minority." There is, however, widespread criticism "muddle and unpreparedness," with a disposition to blame Duff Cooper, Churchill, and Simon. The feeling is that Brooke-Popham is being made scapegoat. There are misgivings as to whether the wholehearted carrying out of scorched earth policy was prevented by private interests. The Wavell appointment was approved, with widespread satisfaction that an American was not chosen. A minority, especially the industrial areas, favors dominion status for India.

Roosevelt's speech was approved by 10 out of 12 regions. 8 out of 10 doubted the possibility of realizing the figures.
"America still talking big, acting small" was said in some regions, especially the North Midlands.

There was not unanimous approval of proposed American forces for England, but the possibility of an AEF was welcomed. There were some caustic comments to the effect that America was garrisoning England so that Englishmen may actually bear the brunt of fighting elsewhere.

Great speculation as to length of war. Most think that Japan's entry will prolong war in the East, despite American power, whereas Russia may break German power more quickly in the West.

There are renewed complaints that the radio is trying ineffectually to gloss over defeats and keeping facts from the public.

There was little interest or approval in the dropping of American leaflets on France. It is described as a waste of paper, more bombs on Germany would have been preferred.

There was a marked change in Eire's attitude caused by American entry into the war. 800 out of 950 letters from Eire predict Anglo-American victory, nearly all expect Eire will be affected, through commerce and bases, by American entry. It is generally believed that American will take over Eire bases, and there are no signs indicating the possibility of resistance.

On the home front: the cut in rations was accepted philosophically. The question of service pay and industrial wage is causing increased disgust and dissatisfaction.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have received the following cable from London:

"According to high RAF circles, all propaganda mention of American flying fortress planes is being banned. This is because the first type supplied to the British has been found to be extremely poor, especially as regards difficulties in maneuverability and vulnerability of armament.

"Kittyhawks, Tomahawks, and Marylands are being given high praise.

"Navy circles tell me that propaganda mention of the British navy's activity in the Mediterranean is being discouraged. This is due to the fact that two Axis convoys, including one of nine large ships, have succeeded in getting to Tripolitania. The British navy based at Alexandria was to prevent their passage. The whole Italian fleet served as escort."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a cable coming to me from our London representative relating to German domestic propaganda:

"German domestic propaganda has entirely abandoned the attempt to subordinate Russia to the Far East and now seeks to cover retreats by deliberately creating confusion over geographical location of new German positions. Little was said about the stabilization of position or winter quarters.

"Clothing collection was featured with implied admission of compulsion such as Gauleiter Hanke: 'only extent of gift is voluntary, not the principle.'

"Revolution in Germany was said to be impossible because (a) the enemy expect it, (b) clothing collection shows home solidarity.

"Japan's economic and strategic gains, threat to Singapore plugged as meaning interruption Anglo-Saxon sea communications with India, Australia, hence loss of half of Asia."
No. 161
January 19, 1942
8:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached cables refer:
(1) To Britain's estimate of Eire's attitude
(2) To Britain's unwillingness to engage in propaganda in Eire.

"I am informed by Lord Cranborne that British Gov't believe that present conflict can be 
considered a defensive war and that all imperialist war and that all 
commercial matters must be sub-
ordinated to the attainment of a free way of life.

It will be seen that Britain's estimate of Eire's attitude has in realistic 
terms become a dangerous fiction which to people who value 
freedom and a free way of life can doom for its own sake to 
maintain.

"Lord Cranborne points out that, although perhaps seventy 

and eighty percent of citizens of Eire favor neutrality, a 
very rapidly growing majority favored a British victory, even 
before America's entry into war.

"Exact figures on southern Irishmen now serving in British 
armed forces are unavailable because Eire's neutrality has 
made it necessary for volunteers to enlist under technically 
fake pretenses, usually by evading through from the 
British border. Cranborne states, however, that between 
120,000 and 130,000 southern Irishmen are serving. In 
addition large numbers of Irish laborers are engaged on air-
port radars and other vital war work in the British Isles.
No. 1

"I am informed by Lord Cranborne that British Government's attitude towards Eire will be that present conflict can no longer be regarded as an imperialist war and that all specifically Anglo-Irish controversial matters must be subordinate to the joint struggle to maintain a way of life and a civilization which Eire herself enjoys.

"It will be pointed out that neutrality has in realistic terms become a dangerous fiction which no people who value freedom and a free way of life can dare for its own sake to maintain.

"Lord Cranborne points out that, although perhaps seventy to eighty percent of citizens of Eire favor neutrality, a very rapidly growing majority favored a British victory, even before America's entry into war.

"Exact figures on southern Irishmen now serving in British armed forces are unavailable because Eire's neutrality has made it necessary for volunteers to enlist under technically false pretences, usually by infiltrating through from the Ulster border. Cranborne declares, however, that between 100,000 and 150,000 southern Irishmen are serving. In addition large numbers of Irish laborers are engaged on airport buildings and other vital war work in the British Isles..."
with the consent of Dublin authorities.

"Sir Eric Machtig, head of Irish Department at Dominions Office, points out that the number of men with Irish blood in England, Dominions and America now serving in anti-Hitler armies totals more than the whole population of Ireland of military age.

"Sir Eric promises to supply any material on Ireland you may want if you make specific request for it through me.

"Gilbert is seeing Lord Dufferin of Ministry of Information tomorrow."

"Morice says British government whole-heartedly appreciates our propaganda to Ireland, but believes it should be purely American in every way.

"He suggests that if we take line that Ireland should enter our war it might be extremely useful to allow British government to see our material before we put it out so that misunderstandings do not arise."
No. 2

"Morton believes H.M.G. would probably not care to take part in propaganda which might be designed to convince Eire to enter war.

"Believed here that advantages such as using ports might be offset by disadvantages such as need to protect Eire against bombing and against enemy submarines using waters adjacent to her. For example, installation in Eire of anti-submarine devices now used in Britain might take six months.

"It is also felt that whereas no important questions now divide Eire politically, entry into war might cause serious internal situation.

"Morton says British government whole-heartedly appreciates our propaganda to Eire but believes it should be purely American in every way.

"He suggests that if we take line that Eire should enter war it might be extremely useful to allow British government to see our material before we put it out so that misunderstandings do not arise."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached comes to us from our London office and shows the material sent out by the British Ministry of Information as weekly guidance.

"Libya: As long as Rommel's forces remain at present strength strategic object of campaign not wholly achieved. Rossel's strategic retreat not to be treated as 'Rommel on the run'. Free French contributions to England to be stressed.

"Inside Germany: In assessment stories of unrest remember change in High Council do not alter fact that Hitler remains undisputed dictator of nation and army. As long as Gestapo remains in power there is no possibility of revolt of the people. Unlike 1918 there are now no organized centers of resistance. While propaganda continues to encourage collapse of German morale it also unites people in their resistance to use of German people in extermination of Jews of Netherlands. Treat every story of disaffection with utmost caution. None may be of Jewish origin."
"Present Japanese superiority on land, air, and sea makes inevitable continuance of her advance down Malayan Peninsula. Singapore itself will be defended with utmost tenacity. If advance halted on mainland Japanese will probably try encircle Singapore and reduce it rather than attack directly.

"Reports from Singapore designed to cheer up local population, do not give an accurate picture and should be treated cautiously. Situation is critical and should be so treated. Should play up any authenticated evidence of scorched earth and demolition during retreat.

"Libya: As long as Rommel's forces remain at present strength strategic object of campaign not wholly achieved. Rommel's strategic retreat not to be treated as 'Rommel on the run'. Free French contributions to campaign to be stressed.

"Inside Germany: In assessing stories of unrest remember changes in High Command do not alter fact that Hitler remains undisputed dictator of nation and army. As long as Gestapo remains in power there is no possibility of revolt of the people. Unlike 1918 there are now no organized centres of resistance. While continued Russian advance may cause sudden collapse of German morale it also unites people in desperate defense of Fatherland. Treat every story of disension with utmost caution. Some may be of German origin.
There are signs that the major German propaganda campaign charging Britain with selling Europe to Stalin and giving up her influence in Near East may have some effect in occupied countries, also Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain. These should be countered by reference to the source or the non-existent source of the story, and positively by displaying concern and responsibility for post war arrangements in Europe and Near East.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

COL. WM. J. DONOVAN

The enclosed program is very interesting and I think before any decision is made you should talk it over in a conference with General Marshall and Admiral King.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

As you know, any plans that we work out in political and psychological warfare we have passed upon by a committee on which sit representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments, and from time to time such other agencies of the Government as are particularly concerned.

I am attaching a plan that is to be used simply as a basis of discussion, but before taking it up with the committee, it would be very helpful for us if you will look at it and let us know whether or not it is consistent with your policy.
OUTLINE FOR WAR NEWS PROPAGANDA PLAN

I. Strategic Aim

The basic aim of American propaganda strategy in the present phase of the war must be to convince public opinion throughout the world that American participation in the war makes an eventual Allied victory certain, thereby laying the foundation for future campaigns to undermine enemy morale and bolster the morale of our allies and of our friends in occupied territories.

II. Appreciation.

1. The fact that we are on the defensive, that it is the Axis which has declared war on us, that important U. S. and Allied strategic positions in the Far East are gravely menaced, that we have lost the Philippines and that we began the war with a crippling and humiliating naval defeat, all tend to weaken our propaganda and strengthen the propaganda of the enemy. He is in the strong position of being able to base his propaganda upon
facts whereas we are in the weak position of having to base ours upon promises -- i.e. expansion of war production, creation of eventually powerful expeditionary forces, restoration of the navy, etc.

2. To accept this situation and content ourselves with a purely defensive policy of counter-propaganda while awaiting major American military victories would be the negation of all political warfare strategy.

3. On the other hand, to disregard our temporary reverses and inferiority and attempt to give our propaganda the form and content suitable to that of a successful belligerent would merely expose us to ridicule (vd. The present worldwide reaction to Mussolini's bombastic propaganda).

4. The psychological requirements of the situation are clear:

   a) Before taking the offensive in our propaganda
we must wait some favorable news from a battle area in which American forces or American strategic interests are directly engaged;

b) but we must not wait for a positive victory over the enemy.

5. To take the offensive in our propaganda we can base it upon a negative victory as the British did with Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain and as the Russians have successfully done on a number of occasions. As soon as the enemy has encountered a tactical set-back, we can use this to create a myth of a great strategical defeat.

6. Barring unexpectedly favorable developments in the European theater, it seems advisable to key our propaganda strategy to possible favorable developments in the Pacific. After consultation with the President and high military and naval authorities we should therefore set ourselves
the following propaganda objectives:

III. Objectives.

1. To commit the Axis to a Japanese victory over the United States and Britain -- i.e. to establish in the public mind in all countries--including Axis countries--the conviction that Japan is Hitler's last desperate card, that the Nazi strategy triumphs or collapses according to whether Japan fails or succeeds in smashing England and America as Pacific powers. (At first glance it might seem a reversal of the proper strategy to proclaim a victory over Japan necessary to achieve a victory over Hitler. The reason for this is as follows:--

It is Japanese not German victories against the United States which cripple our propaganda at the moment. We are not likely to have any effective propaganda until we can at least stabilize our lines in the Far East.
When we have done this, we might as well get the Maximum benefit out of it by claiming that it automatically insures the defeat of Hitler as well as of Japan. No real harm is done abroad if logically this seems to conflict with our official line that Hitler is the real enemy.)

2. To commit the Japanese to objectives they are unlikely to attain -- e.g. establish that Japanese victory depends upon destroying the U.S. fleet, occupying Australia or Alaska, cutting the Panama canal, etc. (List of Japanese strategic objectives need not convey any useful information to the enemy because we can select objectives which, from a Japanese point of view, are quite imaginary.)

3. Await the first Japanese set-back in the attainment of an unattainable objective fixed for them by us,
then dramatize by every means this set-back as a turning point in the Pacific campaign and therefore in the war.

IV. Conditions for Realization.

1. The Japanese objective, the non-attainment of which is to be dramatized, must seem a reasonable one and the more modest it is, the more disastrous will seem the set-back. Singapore is the ideal objective for this purpose if sound military opinion is that it can be held.

2. To proclaim a turning point it is not necessary to be able to name a single decisive engagement, but it is necessary to be able to name some date in a continuing campaign on which it is possible to announce categorically that the Japanese attempt to capture Singapore has failed or that the Japanese fleet has been put on the defensive, etc.

3. To be really convincing this turning point must be followed by a veritable landslide of favorable and
optimistic news from America, and no major reverses in our battle area must be in prospect.

4. Similarly it must be possible to announce that for us the defensive phase of the war is over and that we are at last preparing our offensive. This implies:

a) That our defensive bases in the Pacific are fully equipped so that all supplies from then on will be available to our allies or for the offensive use of our own forces.

b) That at least token American expeditionary forces have been dispatched to some war theater or are about to be dispatched.

c) That the O.P.M. and military and naval authorities are able and willing to supply us with a considerable amount of favorable information about supplies and effectives.
d) That we can obtain from official sources or from prominent public figures a number of strikingly optimistic and confident statements.

e) That the shortwave radio will cooperate with us in following instructions regarding the tone of voice of speakers, manner of presenting news, etc., and that the censorship authorities will cooperate by suppressing or discouraging news conflicting with the themes we wish to emphasize.

V. The Campaign

1st Phase. The Public at home and abroad will gradually be familiarized with the strategic themes mentioned in III - (1) and (2). All "good" news that can be withheld during this phase will be withheld and all comments minimizing the enemy's gains will be discouraged so as to benefit from a strong emotional reaction when the turning point comes.
(In foreign propaganda these directives may be disregarded when it seems vital to keep morale from dropping in a given area).

2nd Phase. There must be created rapidly and for a brief period, a state of suspense and acute alarm. Theme III (3) must be played up and the home and foreign public made to feel that an historically decisive battle in which the odds are against the United Nations is looming.

3rd Phase. The turning-point is proclaimed.

4th Phase. The victory is exploited. A great American or Allied counter-offensive must be made to seem imminent even at the risk of some let-down if it is delayed.

Appendix: The following questions and suggestions should be submitted to the military authorities to determine the possible events on which our propaganda strategy can be based:
1. What is the soundest or at least the most plausible argument which can be invented to support the thesis that an Axis victory is only possible if Japan can knock out the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

2. Could the Japanese in propaganda, be committed to such objectives as the following without the suggestion seeming absurd?
   a) Alaska?
   b) Australia?
   c) The Canal?
   d) The Hawaiian Islands?
   e) India?

3. If so, with which of these objectives can any Japanese offensive operations likely to occur in the near future be most directly and plausibly related?

4. Of the real Japanese objectives, which, if any of the following, are they unlikely to attain:
a) Singapore?  
b) Java and Sumatra?  
c) The Burma road?

5. Assuming that one of the objectives listed above stands some chance of being successfully defended by us, will it be possible to claim at least a share of the credit for the victory for the United States. (Even relatively insignificant U. S. reinforcements might suffice for propaganda purposes).

6. Instead of basing the plan purely upon territorial objectives, it might be possible to base it upon keeping open an American supply line to the Far East. In that case the Japanese would be committed as their major objective to isolating Malasia and Australia from American aid and we would announce winning the "Battle of the Pacific," as we have won the Battle of the Atlantic. This would only be effective if some marked slowing down of the Jap
offensive were apparent after the announcement. The theme might well serve to play up the American contributions whenever it appears that the Allied position in the Far East is improving. The "Battle of the Atlantic" has been somewhat unsatisfactory from the propaganda point of view because of its indefiniteness. Some specific factor, limited in time, must be dramatized to make the theme effective.

7. Enormous propaganda use could be made of any sufficiently dramatic re-appearance of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific battle picture. If the Navy Department feels confident that the fleet will be heard from somehow before Spring, this could be taken as the basis of our propaganda strategy. It is not necessary for the Fleet to win a major victory over the Japanese fleet; it is sufficient that it show power to strike, if only symbolically from
home bases.

If the Navy feels hopeful on this point, we would begin at once working up the theme that destruction of the U. S. Fleet was the principal Jap objective and the key to the whole question of the outcome of the war.

8. If the United Nations are likely to achieve air parity at any point in the Malasian campaign, this might serve as the dramatic turning point of the battle for propaganda purposes.

9. In committing the Japanese to any objectives at all, efforts should be made to inject the time-factor. If, for instance, we can say that the Japanese must take Singapore before the snow melts in Siberia, or before the Libyan desert gets too hot for an Axis thrust against Suez, there is an obvious advantage. If the objective falls after the time-limit set, it takes some of the
sting out of it, and if it doesn't fall at all, it makes the victory a more positive one.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

I am sending you the attached paragraphed summary.

Paragraphs A and B have been obtained through very reliable channels entirely independent of that through which the remainder has been obtained.
A. **THE JAPANESE**

The Japanese Embassy in Stockholm in intimate conversation at the end of December last, spoke very pessimistically on the German outlook. They remarked that the situation was critical and even dangerous and might have unforeseen consequences. Crisis in High Command coupled with economic difficulties made it hard to see how Germany could carry on and win. Holding down the whole of Europe might also react seriously on the position at the front.

B. They went on to say that the Far Eastern situation was quite separate. Japan intended to bring her war to a successful conclusion at great speed before the United States and Britain could get ready. Japan would then be prepared to conclude compromised peace. They might even be prepared to give up a little.

C. **GERMAN MORALE**

A good neutral source in Berlin (independent of those previously quoted) reported on Christmas Day that the atmosphere was one of gloom and pessimism, but there was considerable perturbation that the United States was now a direct enemy, as hopes of a compromised peace had been dashed.

Reverses in Russia and North Africa are not under-rated by
the German people, and they were a great shock, as the
german Army is always believed to be invincible. They
are beginning to wonder whether the eastern war is not
a major blunder after all.

Doubt and depression is increased by Brauchitsch's
removal, this being taken as confirming previous rumors
that all is not well between Hitler and the High Command.
Another cause of gloom is the serious food and other re-
lstrictions.

D. FRANCE

It is reported, on what should be good authority, that
the proposed Petain tour of Occupied France in the first
half of January has been cancelled owing to strained rela-
tions between Vichy and Berlin.

E. NORTH AFRICA

General Juin is in favor of disarming Axis forces if
driven into Tunisia; Vichy's attitude considered doubtful.

F. The German Armistice Commission is pressing for half of
the total petrol stocks in Algeria being sent to Tripolitania.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

I think you might be interested in being informed of the material we are stressing with the short-wave stations in exploiting the following paragraphs of your speech:

"These figures and similar figures for a multitude of other implements of war will give the Japanese and the Nazis a little idea of just what they accomplished in the attack at Pearl Harbor."

"And I rather hope that all these figures which I have given will become common knowledge in Germany and Japan."

I. Immediate Handling on Short-wave U.S. Radio Stations:

The speech itself was translated into all languages broadcast, including German and Japanese. It was broadcast in full in the chief languages and in summary, in others. BBC also broadcast the speech in full to Germany; this could be picked up on German domestic radios not yet within our range.
One minute "spots" - similar to commercial plugs on the American domestic radio have been used one hundred and seventy-five times since the speech, in eleven languages by all ten U.S. short-wave stations. This will continue for at least ten more days.

Stories breaking down the production figures for comparison in enemy and occupied countries have been prepared and used, i.e.: the fifty-six billion dollar program is so big it is six times the total Japanese national income; or, it would provide six hundred and forty-four winter overcoats "for every German soldier alive before the Russian campaign and retreat". Neutral countries -- Sweden, Turkey and Spain -- were also given such examples.

II. Continuing Program for Short-wave Radio

Daily from five to fifteen stories on arms production are furnished the stations. Virtually all contain a reference to "President Roosevelt's program for sixty thousand airplanes this year...." All regular broadcasts, usually fifteen minute scripts, contain references to the program.

Stories are being prepared daily with reference to our ability to carry through the plan -- our manpower, our material wealth, our machinery, our financial strength.
III. Long Pull Plans - Radio and Others

A regular fifteen minute feature program, "United America Fights", going to Europe and Asia, is being altered so that its prime objective is to show that the President's production program can and will be accomplished. The broadcast will end with some such statements as: "While you were listening to this fifteen minute broadcast two of the 60,000 planes America will make this year were finished."

New "spot" announcements, similar to the one cited are being prepared with sound effects -- planes, motors, grinding tanks, marching men, riveting machines, and so forth -- to emphasize that the job is being done.

"U.S. Leaflet No. 2" is being dropped by the R.A.F. over occupied France and possibly over other occupied nations. The leaflet contains the President's production figures and quotes from his speech together with full color photos of our best plane types and 60,000 tiny silhouettes of a plan, to get over the idea of the overwhelming number of planes we will make THIS year. Such a leaflet will be aimed at building up hope of deliverance and consequent resistance to the Nazis.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

In order that you will be fully informed on

the subject of our Foreign Nationalities Branch,

I attach a copy of my letter of January 12, 1942,

to the Secretary of State, and a copy of his reply

of the same date.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Deputy, William J. Donovan,

Coordinator of Information.
COPI

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

January 12, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of January 12 and also photostatic copy of your memorandum to the President, relating to proposed set-up of a branch in your office which would study and report upon foreign politics as it unfolds in the United States in connection with our foreign nationality groups. I observe from your copy that Mr. Welles on behalf of the State Department requested such action by you, and that the President has given his OK to this proposal.

I am satisfied, of course, that the merits of the proposal are all that is indicated, and I cheerfully concur in the action of the President and Mr. Welles.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) CORDELL HULL

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.
The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Conversations took place some time ago between Mr. Welles, Mr. Berle and others at the State Department and myself in the course of which I was asked to undertake for the State Department the study of foreign political activities and trends in the United States. The project was submitted to the President and received his written approval. I proceeded with the necessary organization, and results of some importance have already begun to appear.

Last week estimates to provide for the new Branch were presented to the Bureau of the Budget. It then transpired that,
according to the understanding of the Budget, the Department of State felt that the situation had changed. Similarly it was indicated during a conversation on Saturday between Mr. Berle and Mr. Poole that the Department might no longer desire to have the Office of the Coordinator undertake to render the service in question.

From Mr. Berle's remarks, it appears that misunderstandings may have arisen. In order to remove any misunderstanding which may in fact exist, I take pleasure in assuring you again that it would not be the purpose of the Branch which I am in course of setting up under the direction of Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole to interfere in questions of policy. Such are of course the province exclusively of the Department of State. The new Branch would gather information such as the Department of State may desire from time to time on foreign political activities and trends in the United States and submit to the State Department memoranda and reports.
I should be most grateful if you would let me know as soon as you conveniently can whether the State Department has in fact changed its mind and no longer desires me to undertake this work on its behalf. If such is the case, I shall of course make the needed readjustments. At the same time I should point out that I cannot fulfill the general directive given me by the President without entering to some extent into this field of foreign nationalities.

On the other hand, if you still desire me to assist in this matter I shall be most happy to do so. In order that we may start, will you kindly send affirmative word to the Bureau of the Budget, or indicate your desires in a letter to me?

Sincerely,

(signed) WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

On January 2nd, source was invited by Otto Strasser to have tea with him. Strasser is living with his secretary, Mme. Margaret de Planellas, in an apartment-building at 400 Kensington Avenue, Montreal - Apartment 44, telephone Firzroy 4559. He appears locally under the name of Oswald Bostock, although his presence in Canada is now fairly widely known. Source had previously been introduced to Strasser under an alias. The interview, which lasted for two hours, was most friendly.

Strasser began by saying that, thanks to the English he had succeeded in making a very fortunate escape from
Portugal when the Gestapo were close on his heels. He was also particularly indebted to the British for enabling him to remain in the seclusion of Bermuda for seven months. He paid a special tribute to Major Eric Cutton, H.M. Colonial Secretary in Bermuda, whom he appeared to think possessed an unusually high type of intelligence for a member of the British Colonial Service.

His main theme, to which he continually recurred during the course of the conversation, was the possibility of an internal revolution taking place inside Germany in the near future. He thinks this will come in 1942. The proximate cause would be the secession of the more influential elements in the Reichswehr from support of the present regime. In this connection he foresees Hitler's dismissal of von Brauchitsch as the
beginning of the rift between the Fuehrer and the army.

However, he thought that England was not doing enough to promote internal subversive elements in Germany because:

1. She is practical rather than theoretical;
2. She is constitutionally opposed to the idea of promoting internal revolution anywhere;
3. She is still pinning hopes on the ultimate achievement of military superiority.

In this last connection, he went on, the situation with the Allies in the Far East is extremely serious, because, as he put it, "even if the British army finds itself in Berlin and at the same time Singapore and Burma are in the possession of the Axis, then you cannot say that the war has been won."

Asked by source for recent proofs of popular
discontent in Germany, Strasser replied that letters and reports which reached him regularly via Switzerland were most encouraging. For instance, a well known S.A. leader in South Germany, who commanded 100,000 men, was already deep in a conspiracy against the present rulers.

"That is not enough", he continued, "the allies must play their part in psychological warfare -- in propaganda, Fifth Column and so on. You must fight Hitler with his own weapons -- above all with the very secret weapon of which he has boasted. This secret weapon is simply the Fifth Column whose enjoyment in the Occupied countries of Europe before their fall was so conspicuously successful." Questioned about the attitude of the police and Gestapo, Strasser expressed the opinion that they would soon come over to the side of the revolutionaries simply out of self-interest,
since many of them and the army have already realized that Germany cannot now win the war.

Strasser feels certain that Von Papen, whom he hates more than any of the men surrounding Hitler, is intriguing with the Reich Generals against the Fuehrer. On the other hand, Strasser thinks that Turkey, by reason of Papen's subterranean diplomacy, may shortly throw in her lot with the Axis powers, largely because Germany has more to offer her physically and economically than the Allies.

Turning to South America Strasser expressed the view that the Nazis by covert as well as open means were making every effort to enlist support. Their great argument was that Germany would always have more to offer them in the way of commercial advantages than either the United States or Great Britain. In this connection he
mentioned the recent arrival of Herr Buest as a successor to Gottfried Sanstede in charge of Gestapo and Secret Intelligence operations. He mentioned Peru, Argentina, Brazil and Columbia all as providing danger spots.

Questioned about his attitude towards Dr. Fernando Artuccio, Strasser stated that although he sympathizes with Artuccio's anti-Hitlerian aims, he felt that Artuccio possessed too deep left-wing affiliations for his liking. "Artuccio is almost a Communist", he said. Nor did Strasser attempt to disguise his anti-Semitic leanings which have certainly alienated sympathy from him and his Free German Movement in South America.

Strasser was at no pains to conceal his fears for what he considers will be the future effect of the Russian alliance on the western democracies. He is
convinced that after the general peace has been concluded the Soviet Union would endeavor to proselytise her former Allies politically and will not hesitate to take the most drastic steps towards the achievement of her aims.

As for the peace itself, Strasser feels that so far as Germany is concerned, there will be a reversion to a confederation of states on the pre-1870 basis. The military elements will endeavor to obtain as satisfactory terms as possible, having ousted the party from power and stressing the fact that they had never been in agreement with either the principles or aims of the party.

Strasser gave the general impression of an idealist whose enthusiasm is great and who occasionally exhibits...
real flashes of insight but whose judgement on many matters is imperfect. He is not a political leader nor has he the makings of one, although he would very much like to be one. Above all he is by no means so much anti-Nazi as anti-Hitler and anti-present Nazi leaders. At heart he subscribes to the principles of National Socialism, although he naturally cannot endorse the manner in which those principles have been applied by the present leaders who were responsible for the murder of his brother, Gregor, and for the placing of a price upon his own head. He thinks in terms of weltpolitik to the exclusion of ideas of the Liberal and Social-democratic school, and he believes that some form of authoritarian rule in which the elements of confidence order and fear appear, is best suited to the German people. There is, however, no doubt of his intense
hatred of the present rule in Germany, to whose over-
throw all his energies and those of his followers
are primarily directed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I have received a report from our London Office that a showdown between Churchill and DeGaulle is imminent and DeGaulle may be ousted.

DeGaulle has been openly flirting with the Russians and may go to Moscow. He has been saying he would never deal with the Americans again.

Comte de Paris may come into the foreground.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following, which came to us from a British source, is of possible particular interest currently:

"We have been informed that on the morning of January 15th, Italoable informed the German Embassy in Rio that they were unable to transmit cypher telegrams to the German Embassy at Buenos Aires, because new instructions issued that morning stated that cypher telegrams from missions of European countries may be sent only to their own country. (Note: This regulation has not been enforced against the British as yet.)

"Further, the German Embassy has a load of ashes which tends to confirm the newspaper report of three days ago that the Germans were burning documents, but which Rio discounted as probably being put out deliberately by the Germans. The Embassy also ordered three strong packing cases and previously they ordered several beds."

No. 169
January 20, 1942
6 P.M.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following information has been furnished me from a source in a position to be well informed and in whom I place very high confidence:

POSITION OF GERMAN FORCES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT AS OF DECEMBER 1st, 1941

Total number of divisions on Russian Front - 165

Divided as follows:

FINNISH FRONT, under command of General Dietl.

2 army corps, in which are included the following divisions: 163rd, 169th, 186th, 199th

One division of S.S. troops

Composition of the remainder of this force will be furnished later.

NORTHERN SECTOR, under General Ritter Von Leeb

2 armies - divisions among which include the following:

1 - 11 - 12 - 30 - 32 - 58 - 121 - 122 - 214 - 215

A total of 16 divisions are under the command of General Busch and 18 under General Kuchler.

GENERAL SECTOR

3 armies under General Von Bock, with a total of 40 to 45 divisions, included among which are the following:
The army commands are as follows:

2nd army - General Von Weichs
4th army - General Von Kluge
9th army - General Strauss

Also under General Von Bock's command are 12 Panzer and 10 mixed divisions, the latter representing armored vehicles and light tanks. The Panzer divisions are as follows:

1 - 3 - 4 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 10 - 12 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20

The known mixed divisions are as follows:

2 - 10 - 13 - 20 - 29

The whole of the Panzer and mixed divisions are under the general command of General Reinhardt, who in turn has three separate divisions under the command of General Guderian, General Hoth and General Hoppner.

SOUTHERN SECTOR, under General Von Runstedt, composed of three armies with a total of 40 divisions, plus six Panzer and six Mountain divisions, of which the following are definitely identified:

95 - 113 - 170 - 184 - 190 - 198 - 221 - 239 - 296 - 297 - 299
The three army commands are as follows:

- 6th army - General Von Reichenau
- 11th army - General Von Manstein
- 17th army - General Von Stulpnagel

The first Panzer division, including the mountain troops, is under General Von Kleist.

The following compose the six Panzer divisions:

5 - 9 - 11 - 13 - 14 - 16

Included among the six mountain divisions are the following:

16 - 25 - 60

In addition, there is a division known as the Viking. Whether this is included among the six mountain divisions is uncertain.

The actual numbers of the divisions given in the several groups of armies are definite. All divisions not identified have been omitted.

Since December 20 two divisions, 81 and 88, have left France for Russia. Within the last three weeks four or five divisions have returned to France from Russia, including the 5th and the 28th.

The casualty figures in the German army up to November 30 are conservatively estimated at:

- Dead 1,100,000
- Wounded 1,200,000

I have sent copies of this to the Army and to the Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a statement made on December 29, 1941, by the Venezuelan Minister in Washington to his Government, commenting upon Mr. Churchill's visit to the United States:

"The principal object of Churchill's journey was undoubtedly to discuss with President Roosevelt the problem of the uniting of the Allied Commands. Strictly speaking, this object was not obtained, owing; among other things, to the peculiarities of the present war, whose fronts are scattered in the most various and distant corners of the globe. Unlike the war of 1914-1918, there is now no front on which Allied Armies are fighting side by side; the Russians are struggling alone of the four thousand kilometers of the Eastern Front; the British Empire Forces, except for a little help from the De Gaulle Frenchmen and the abyssinians, are defending the British Isles and fighting alone in Africa and Malaya; the Chinese Army has practically no foreign personnel on Chinese territory; nor have the Dutch in the Indies. The North Americans
are fighting in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands.

Although an unification of the allied naval forces under a single leadership would present less difficulties than in the case of land forces, it would also lead to confusion and delays in action owing to the different methods, tactics and terminology of the English and North American fleets."

He continues: "Mr. Churchill, while dispelling, by his answers to the Press any possibility of a Combined Command being set up for all Allied Forces, did not altogether exclude the possibility of a Combined Command for naval forces." The Minister considers that the chief results of the meeting between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill has been "the elaboration of a vast strategic plan, it appears that this plan divides the world into various strategic regions, each of which will be under an independent command, which will be united by a Supreme War Council. Possibly the leadership of each area will be, as hitherto, in the hands of the Nation directly concerned in that region: the Russians on their own territory; the British Empire in Africa and the Near and Middle East, the Americans in the East Pacific and the Philippines; the Chinese on their own front; and the Dutch and French cooperating on the British Empire's
various fronts".

He considers that naval problems were the main point of discussion at the Washington meeting. "It is believed that the naval strategy agreed upon was that of defending the vital lines of communication, which serve today for the transport of material to danger-spots and will, in the future, serve for the transport of great masses of troops for the offensives of 1942. Each fleet will remain independent for the time being, and will co-ordinate their activities in such a way that the North American fleet can concentrate in the Pacific and the British fleet can control the Atlantic and the Mediterranean."
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Following the direction in your memorandum of January 19 on our outline for a war news propaganda plan, I talked yesterday afternoon to General Marshall and Admiral King.

They felt, first, that the one thing which could be stressed now was the tactical action in the Pacific which had resulted from unity of command; also, that we had played an important part in those actions through our air power. Second, that until there had been stabilization no definite positions could be stated -- the failure to capture which would be considered a defeat for Japan.

At my suggestion that it was necessary to prepare for these things long in advance, they agreed that they would have our proposal (which I said was intended to be provocative) taken up with their people.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is an excerpt from a letter written on December 4, 1941 by a resident of Switzerland to his brother in New York City:

"Today one hears nothing but very bad news from Germany. A Swiss Doctors' Mission went to the German East Front and now one hears, on the quiet, that the conditions there are really frightful. Nothing but amputations day and night in incredible dens and damp cellars, terrible wounds and horrible cripples. And other reports that Hitler is obliged to keep on talking about victory in Russia, because the people themselves are beginning to doubt......Most of the people here are more or less convinced that Germany has already lost the war and now this conviction is also said to be growing amongst the Germans themselves....They will, of course, defend themselves madly to the end and will go to inhuman lengths when they are threatened with complete defeat.
It is anticipated that they will then resort to the most terrible gases.

"In the October number of The Readers' Digest, was an article about the Swiss Army, by Denis de Rougemont.... introduced thus: Denis de Rougemont is a Swiss, so outspoken against the Nazis that his government has sent him off on a 'mission' to the U. S.

"Rougemont was sent to America by a private company, the Gottharbund or the 'Oxfordianer' and had absolutely no official mission. Moreover, the Anti-Nazis are not sent away by us, we still have much more outspoken Anti-Nazis than Rougemont."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in the attached map which shows the distribution of Japanese in the South British Columbia District.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Steve has checked on Lamont Belin. State Dept. says he is all right -- very wealthy man who was nominated by Hoover as Ambassador to Poland; was never confirmed by the Senate because it was a last minute appointment before you came into office; he went to Poland and stayed there for several months without pay.

Donovan would like him to represent him and Byron Price says it is all right. It is not a very important assignment.

Steve thinks it would please Donovan to give him the "green light".

G.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

We need to select a representative for the Censorship Board. It requires a man with an appreciation of world communications and the significance of the censorship raw material for intelligence. State Department experience is desirable. Lammott Belin, formerly Ambassador to Poland, may be available. Before asking him to serve, I would like to know if you have any objection.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

We have received the following through our representative in London:

"This information is from the highest secret sources. In spite of growing doubt in high quarters at Vichy about the certainty of German victory, negotiations begun early in December between Berlin and Vichy are continuing on the German proposal to return 850,000 prisoners and abolish at Pas de Calais the 'forbidden zone' in exchange for:

a. The creation along the Mediterranean of the forbidden zone and free German use of Toulon and Marseilles.

b. Free passage through and permission for Germans to remain in the unoccupied area.

c. Permission for the German forces to enter Algeria, Tunis, and perhaps Morocco.

"As a result of Petain's request, a further demand that Vichy call up four additional military classes has been dropped in return for Vichy's offer to supply Germany with equal number of laborers.

"In Spain, anti-German feeling is increasing because:

a. Japanese bombings in the Philippines

b. Fear lest supplies from the Argentine will be cut off."
c. Fear of whatever action the Germans may take if the British reach the Tunisian frontier and win over the French in North Africa.

"In Spain, the Germans are conducting intensive whispering campaigns that Britain and America will soon occupy the Canaries and the Azores."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Yesterday I carried along further our negotiations relative to establishing communication between the Cape Verdes and the United States. We now have up with the Maritime Commission the question of obtaining a ship. We do not need more than 1500 or 2000 tons.

I have worked out arrangements with the Cape Verdians here and also with Bensaude, who is to obtain clearance with the Portuguese.
MEMORANDUM For The President.

From: William J. Donovan.

The following is a reliable RAF aircraft report in the Libyan Campaign:

Total number of aircraft available at start of the campaign in November, 1941: 925
Total number available January 8, 1942: 975
RAF combat losses from November 13, 1941, to December 14, 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was estimated at first by the British that the Axis losses were running about 50% higher than their own. The very latest figure however admitted that the Axis losses were about equal to their own. This figure is combat losses and does not include the large quantities of aircraft destroyed on the ground by the RAF.

RAF losses from the start of the Libyan campaign in November to December 25, 1941, by type:

- 6 - Beauforts
- 134 - Curtiss Tomahawks
- 9 - Douglas Bostons
- 20 - Beaufighters
- 124 - Hurricane I's
- 76 - Hurricane II's
- 38 - Martin Maryland's
- 32 - Wellington I's
- 16 - Wellington II's
- 100 - Blenheim III's

(Supplies required by RAF daily: Ammunition - 40 Tons, Gasoline - 200 Tons)

(It is estimated that between 35% to 50% of these aircraft are repairable.)
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The Flomarcy Company (which is owned by Bensaude, the Portuguese shipowner with whom we are working on West Africa) has been requested by the Post Office Department to consider carrying the U. S. Mails for Europe and the Azores in the vessels which it operates in a transatlantic service between New York, the Azores and Lisbon. Flomarcy is willing to do this but wants to do it on a basis which will enable it to assure the Post Office of regular and satisfactory service within the limits of existing emergency conditions and at the same time obtain a dependable minimum compensation.

The mails have a volume of about 3000 bags every two weeks, divided 1/3 First Class and 2/3 Third Class.

The Flomarcy Company would wish for this work a guaranteed minimum payment of $20,000 for each voyage on which these mails were carried and would be willing to conclude an arrangement upon this basis, subject to the approval of the Portuguese Maritime Commission, which it is believed could be readily obtained.

If we could be assured of such service it would give us access to the Azores which we do not have now.

If you approve of this, I will take the matter up with Frank Walker.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

David Lu of the Washington Bureau of the Central News Agency of China reports that he has received a telegram from his head office saying that they are receiving all of the material we are sending to Chungking. As our request, Jack Benny and a group of Hollywood celebrities will present a one-hour program at the time and on the frequency requested by General MacArthur.

On Thursday of next week, there will also be a one-hour program which we have arranged to be broadcast by Bing Crosby and which will be dedicated to General MacArthur and his troops.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I received another cable from MacArthur asking us to put on a Hollywood radio program for them for tomorrow night. This has all been especially arranged at our request. Jack Benny and a group of Hollywood celebrities will present a one-hour program at the time and on the frequency requested by General MacArthur.

On Thursday of next week there will also be a one-hour program which we have arranged to be broadcast by Bing Crosby and which will be dedicated to General MacArthur and his troops.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is one segment of our attack on North Africa. It deals with the Navy, and I propose to take it up with Admiral King:

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in the event of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:

   (a) desert with their ships to our side;
   (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
   (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American Forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us nominal.

2. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Target:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should
be directed primarily at career officers actually serving in ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen in the French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders received from their superiors. At some French Naval stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

III. Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

(1) Radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.

(2) Officers of French Naval Intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.

(3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardroom are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to
shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

IV. Form of Broadcasts

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ships, the third of the channels mentioned above -- collective listening in wardrooms -- is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be banned at least at some stations.

(1) Immediately following a short program of music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.
(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases would be something quite innocuous and non-political -- for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France -- but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects -- especially from French Colonial and naval history -- are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

It is desired to ask the approval of the Navy Department with a view to the prompt inauguration of a detailed Radio program which, due to its length, has been omitted from this particular memorandum.

In principle the project is approved it is suggested
that a representative of the Navy Department be assigned to cooperate closely with the Radio Division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have just been able to get a 1500 ton coal burner, eight knots, now in Philadelphia, which will be ready the first week in February.

We have having Bensaude go down there and look at it, and his next step will be to get the assurances of the Portuguese Government to leave it exclusively for this run.

As I told you previously we expect to have it in touch with the Canary Islands.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: William J. Donovan

January 24, 1942

We have just returned from our visit to Dakar. We have discussed the possibility of setting up a special radio station for a future mission in French West Africa. We believe that this would be highly advantageous for our objectives.

As part of our penetration for Dakar we are arranging for a young Frenchman named Basset who has been Assistant to our Consul at Dakar for three years and who is now ready to return to Dakar, ostensibly representing Pan American Airways. Through him we are hopeful of not only establishing a line of communication but also some more affirmative action. When next I see you I can tell you more about this.

I have just arranged to get in by pouch a Sonotone hearing set for the French Governor of Dakar.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM: William J. Donovan

We have brought on from the Coast Nordhoff, of Nordhoff and Hall. He knows the Islands of Tahiti intimately and has described the only available site for a major airdrome on the Island, together with its facilities, approaches, etc. He is familiar with all of the Society Islands, but thinks that nothing can be done there from an airdrome standpoint. He has, however, a lot of suggestions for sea planes.

He knows the Caledonia situation only second-hand as he does the Marquesas.

As soon as we have a complete statement you may be interested in seeing it.

Harry Hopkins spoke to me about him in the hall and we are trying to see what might be done by having him work through Hall, who is now in Tahiti.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

As I told you previously we have for our S.I.S. service in the Far East, Dr. Esson Gale. We have made arrangements with the British for a tie-up with him through representatives we are sending out in India and Australia. He is going to negotiate for us the possibility of using the Koreans to operate against the Japanese in Japan proper and in Korea and certain occupied areas on the Continent, including Manchuria.

The distribution of the Koreans in important centers opens the way for their employment in intelligence and sabotage work against the Japanese. This is not the case with other nationals, particularly whites and Chinese, who are readily identified in the Japanese Domain.

Korean sources report a so-called Korean provisional government army in China. The total given of 35,000 men I think is questionable. Of these, 9250 officers and men are said to be in Chungking, where the exiled Korean provisional government is functioning.
It is believed that this national bloc can be utilized to play a highly effective part in S.O. work against the Japanese.

I have obtained the permission of General Marshall to bring Lieut. Colonel Morris B. DePass, Jr., from Fort Benning, Georgia to take charge of a selected group of Americans experienced in the languages, terrain and people of designated East Asiatic areas. This group will have special training at the Toronto school so that they may be prepared to conduct a training school for Koreans. In the meantime, we are exploring the situation with the State Department and the War Department, and as soon as we have our plans definitely set we will take it up with the Chinese military authorities and the American Military Mission in China.