

OSF:OSS OCTOBER 1944 I

Box 169

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 October 1944

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PSF
OSS

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you kindly hand the attached memorandum
to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

007622

By ABJ Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

2 October 1944

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will find of interest the following report of conversations which our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, had with the King of Yugoslavia and with Subasic:

"On Wednesday September 27, I saw the King. He gave me a warm welcome and spent an hour with me chatting about the present situation. He told me that he regrets to say that his own mother is working against him by lending support to some Serbian political leaders who are trying to undermine his authority by criticizing his conduct and charging him with neglecting the Serbian people. He expressed satisfaction about the appointment of Ristich, an old Serbian General, as Minister of War. He told me further that Winston Churchill sent a sizzling telegram to Tito telling him in effect that the British Government has sent supplies and arms to Tito to fight the enemy and not to fight his own people. The King also said that this cable

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
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which was of a challenging tone and the sharpest yet delivered to Tito was provoked by a certain note sent by Tito to Churchill. Two days later this alleged cable by Churchill to Tito was confirmed by Subasic independently and without any questioning on my part. Subasic told me that Tito sent a cable to Churchill protesting vehemently against assistance rendered by the British to certain Chetniks in Switzerland and to other acts of assistance to Mihailovich. Subasic further informed me that Churchill sent to Tito a reply in which he rebuked him sharply for using arms and ammunition supplied by the British Government to fight the Yugoslav people instead of fighting the enemy.


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since entering the Low Countries the Allied armies have continued to receive assistance from patriotic native groups of the same type which proved so valuable in France. The effectiveness of this resistance activity is attributable both to the zeal of the Belgians and the Dutch, and to the support provided through clandestine operations based in England.

Responsibility for development of resistance in the Low Countries, as in France, was placed by SHAEF in Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), an organization staffed jointly by the Special Operations Branch of OSS/ETO and the British Special Operations Executive. Besides sending agents into enemy territory to establish liaison with patriot elements and guide them in organization, training, and operation, SFHQ directed aerial flights for delivery of personnel and materiel to the resistance groups, and maintained packing stations at which supplies were prepared for parachutage.

From the beginning of the year until D-day the OSS side of SFHQ had dropped 54 tons of supplies and eight men to Belgian resistance groups. These operations, however, took a

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relatively heavy toll of aircraft, and with the extreme urgency of the FFI supply problem there was a decline in deliveries to Belgium during June and July; but upon the passing of the crisis in France this trend was significantly reversed. Recent advice from SFHQ indicates that deliveries are now being made on a much larger scale than ever before. Moreover, supplies are being dropped by daylight: SFHQ has reported delivery of 55 tons on 10 September and 44 tons on 16 September.

Systematic sabotage of Belgian railways, waterways and telecommunications was initiated by secret military and civilian organizations following the SFHQ action signal on 8 June. Despite the deterioration of their position as re-supply operations dwindled during the summer, the Belgian resistance groups expended their available resources to good effect. After three months, they had made more than 1,100 rail cuts, derailed 80 trains and destroyed or damaged 800 railroad cars, 176 locomotives, 79 railroad bridges, 35 pumping stations, 27 watering points, 25 turntables and 15 signal boxes. During the same period they attacked the telecommunications system by severing more than 200 telephone lines and 100 cables and sabotaging 20 telephone exchanges, while on the waterways they destroyed or damaged 11 lock gates, 15 barges, three boats, and two floating cranes. One operation which offers an interesting example was made possible by the location of 36 tank-cars in a railway tunnel believed to contain a German headquarters. Belgians loaded a locomotive and two cars with explosives

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By SPS Date 11/19/83

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and quicklime, then set them in motion down the track into the tunnel, where they collided with the tank-cars. The enemy made an extraordinary effort to extinguish the fire, but it burned for more than three days.

The functions of Belgian resistance were considerably altered by the arrival of the Allied armies. Coming into the open as an auxiliary force, thousands of Belgians served as guides and flank guards for U.S. and British columns and participated in mopping up overrun areas such as Mons, Namur, and Charleroi. In territory still held by the enemy, they prevented the demolition of bridges, port facilities and other installations of prospective usefulness to the Allied forces. The retreating Germans looted and burned Belgian homes and shot some of their Belgian prisoners, but there was no weakening of the Belgians' determination to fight for the liberation of their country.

In Holland resistance activity developed more slowly than in Belgium. For a considerable time SFHQ had lost contact with the Dutch, suspecting an enemy penetration of the Council for Resistance. In August, however, SFHQ dropped seven agents and 15 tons of supplies into various parts of Holland. Contact was made with resistance groups and instructions were given as to sabotage objectives. As deliveries increased during September, the Dutch attacked five rail lines in compliance with a request from SHAEF. A railroad strike was

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By APL Date JUN 11 1973

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begun upon a signal from London on 17 September, the day of the airborne invasion.

A few days before, a special team including OSS personnel had been dropped into Overijssel province to make contact with friendly elements and enlist their services in organizing Dutch resistance. Four similar teams descended with the First Allied Airborne Army, one of them attached to Airborne Force Headquarters and the other three to the First British and the 82nd and 101st U.S. airborne divisions. Establishing contact with various Dutch resistance groups, these teams arranged coordination of activity and development of organization in accordance with the immediate requirements of the military situation. They also collected intelligence from the populace, advised formation commanders concerning employment of Dutch elements, identified members of resistance groups within Allied lines, and maintained liaison between the Airborne Force and SFHQ London. The team at Arnhem with the First British Airborne Division is reported missing as of 26 September. An officer accompanying that team was last seen the preceding night, slightly wounded, on the north bank of the Rhine.

The people of Holland have aided the Allied forces to the very limit of their capabilities. Resistance elements in the airhead have provided valuable tactical intelligence

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By WPS Date JUN 11 1973

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not otherwise obtainable, besides acting as guides, guarding prisoners of war and rounding up collaborationists. Outside the airhead the Dutch harassed and delayed the enemy forces converging for counter-attack. With the railroad strike developing well, the yards at Hertogenbosche, west of the airhead, were said to have been destroyed by sabotage. Forty-odd miles behind the German lines, the special team in Overijssel province reported that an armed group of 200 men in the area of Zwolle was sabotaging rail lines every night, and highways leading out of Hengelo were blocked by trees which the Dutch had felled. In the harbor of Rotterdam a resistance group sank three blockships, using limpets requested and delivered for that specific purpose. Plans have been perfected, in anticipation of an enemy withdrawal, for preservation of bridges between Rotterdam and Dordrecht. On the basis of recent progress in supply and organization, Dutch resistance may be expected to continue with undiminishing effectiveness.

W. J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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By ABS Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

4 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested
in the attached report concerning conditions in
Iraq. Will you kindly see that it reaches his
desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By ABS Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

007622
By NR Date MAR 8 1974

I believe that the following report from our representative in Baghdad on conditions in Iraq will be of interest to you:

"This week group petition and newspaper activity was renewed, demanding that the Government permit the creation of political parties. There is strong minority support for this demand. It is contended that permission to establish political parties was promised them in a speech from the Throne and that now, as usual in this country, any action is blocked.

"Friday, September 29th: Additional resentment is being created among the Kurds by the arrests of former liaison officers. Delegations protesting such action have been dispatched to Minister Wahbi, but naturally discover that he is without power to aid them.

"In Baghdad and in the north, certain Arab politicians continue to issue unqualified statements, taking as their cue the rumor that 'when the war ends, the Russians plan to separate the Kurdistan Republic'.

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Government spokesmen are taking advantage of this by refusing to expend any more Iraq money or effort on behalf of the Kurds.

"Conditions of intrigue, corruption, fraud in examination and favoritism, bad even for Iraq, are being laid bare by the shake-up in the Ministry of Education. The Foreign Affairs Minister and the Minister of Justice are now involved and are in a rage against Alusi. Additional heads may yet topple."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 October 1944

File

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum concerning the resignation of Cankar from Subasic's Cabinet. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By AB Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will find of interest the following report which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning the resignation of Cankar, the Minister of Education, from Subasic's Cabinet. As you may know, Cankar is a Slovene who was formerly Yugoslav Minister to Canada:

"Cankar, member of Subasic's Cabinet, submitted his resignation this afternoon. He gave as reasons the fact that Subasic did not succeed in obtaining Soviet Russia support and also the inadequate support so far given to Royal Yugoslav Government by British Foreign Office. Cankar expressed the opinion that the Clerical Party which he represents will wield greater power in Yugoslavia if he does not participate in Subasic's Cabinet. Cankar's colleague, Dr. Snoj, now in Slovenia, formerly a vehement foe of Tito declared himself yesterday in favor of the Partisans.

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"Subasic refused to accept the resignation in an effort to avoid a crisis and will not disclose to anyone Cankar's attempt to get out of the Government."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

October 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY
FILES.

F.D.R.

*Thank you. after reading
Norway's report I would
like to say in the words
of your son Johnny "So What?"
Henry*

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
MAY 1944

You may be interested in the following extract:

Capacity and Organization of the
Washington Embassy with Special
Reference to the Report...

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I should be much obliged if you will show
the enclosed memorandum to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 October 1944

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

By *WBS*

Date MAY 1 1974

You may be interested in the following extract from a report on the "Capacity and Organization of the European Agricultural Machinery Industry with Special Reference to Germany". This report was prepared by the Research Branch of OSS.

"1. The estimated pre-war annual output of the European agricultural machinery industry, excluding Russia, was \$355,000,000 or about 75 percent of the value output of the United States agricultural machinery industry in 1939. Almost 60 percent of Europe's agricultural machinery output, excluding Russia, was produced in Germany."

"2. About 47 relatively large firms formed the nucleus of the German agricultural machinery industry. There were, however, 274 concerns which were members of the Fachgruppe Landmaschinenbau, the compulsory trade association for the German agricultural machinery industry. The German agricultural machinery concerns were widely dispersed geographically

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
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and the majority of firms specialized in the production of particular types of agricultural machinery."

"3. The industry in European countries other than Germany and the United Kingdom tended to specialize in the production of the lighter types of agricultural machinery. Sweden, for example, specialized in manufacturing cream separators and dairy equipment."

"4. Except for tractors, Germany was the chief source of supply for agricultural machinery for the importing countries of continental Europe. France, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Rumania were Germany's chief European customers."

"5. German agricultural machinery manufacturers were unable to organize a strong cartel organization prior to the advent of the Nazi government. By 1936, however, cartel arrangements existed in fourteen of the more important branches of the industry. The state, moreover, conferred broad market-regulating powers upon the Fachgruppe Landmaschinenbau. Manufacturers, acting through the Fachgruppe, were successful in asserting control over the dealers and distributors of agricultural machinery in Germany."



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I thought the President might be interested to see the enclosed summary of an article by Goebbels which was received from our representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF: OSS

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

9 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you may want to see the following summary of an article by Goebbels in Das Reich which was received recently from our representative in Berne:

"The war has reached its dramatic climax. Any intensification of the enemy's effort against Germany is not only out of the question -- the pressure cannot even be maintained at its present level very long. Germany has a good chance of coming out of the war favorably. A considerable reserve, which we are mobilizing, must be thrown in as soon as possible. It is a question of gaining time for the Allies as well, as the element of time is of decisive importance. Thus, the war has become a race for time.

"We must have a national effort which embraces and carries with it the whole German people. We know what we must do. Without fear or trembling, our soldiers must throw themselves against the enemy onslaught at the

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frontiers of the Reich, and behind them the people must stand firm as one man, prepared for anything and resolved for every effort in human power. The enemy must know what to expect if he intends to carry on meter by meter. It is our sacred home soil which we have to defend today, and directly behind practically every front stand German villages and cities, where our wives and children live. They would be lost if we fell back. If they fell into enemy hands, nothing but hunger, misery, terror and brute force would await them. What wretches every one of us would be if we did not sacrifice everything to save them such a fate (sic). We must fight against that with every fiber of our bodies, imbued with such fanaticism for our cause and flaming hatred against our enemies. We will carry on this battle unafraid and steadfast. Whosoever loses his life in this battle will enter the living soul of his nation, which must and will endure for ever.

"The enemy still underestimates the German people

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as he did at the outbreak of the war, but our
faith in early victory is inalterable and can
never be shaken."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

4 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you please see that it is delivered to him?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

W. J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA
007622
By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20545

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1. General Zymlerski, set up 5 October 1944 Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces, does not have the confidence of the people of Poland.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach reports which we have received from our representatives abroad working closely with the Polish underground movement.

of the Polish Home Army will be destroyed by the Germans. This would free him from the necessity of liquidating *Donovan* them.

b. By asserting that *William J. Donovan* Director of the Office of Strategic Services is a traitor between the Polish Government in London and the Lublin Committee, Stalin is trying to foment a civil war in Poland between the "so called Committee of Polish Patriots" and the Polish Home Army, loyal to the Polish Government.

c. The Polish people feel that Stalin is not sincere in his declaration regarding a strong and independent Poland and that the effect of the report

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007622
By DBJ Date MAR 8 1974

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REPORTS CONCERNING POLAND

1. General Zymierski, set up by Stalin as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces, does not have the confidence of the people of Poland.

2. Many of the resistance leaders believe that Stalin has the following views with regard to the settlement of the Polish problem:

a. By his delaying operations for the liberation of Poland, the leaders of the Polish Home Army will be destroyed by the Germans. This would free him from the necessity of liquidating or deporting them.

b. By asserting that the Polish-Soviet controversy is a quarrel between the Polish Government in London and the Lublin Committee, Stalin is trying to foment a civil war in Poland between the "so called Committee of Polish Patriots" and the Poles of the Home Army, loyal to the Polish Government.

c. The Polish people feel that Stalin is not sincere in his declaration regarding a strong and independent Poland and that the attack by the Lublin

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By ABS

Date

MAR 8 1974

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Committee on the Polish Government in London is arranged by Stalin to test the sincerity and strength of British and American support of the Polish Government in London. The necessity of showing to Stalin that there is no weakening of that support is stressed.

The following is the full text of radio message received by Polish Government in London from the Home Council in Poland:

"Sending following resolution Home Council of Ministers: The Council, without for time being considering merits of matter due to lack necessary elements and taking into consideration only actual importance which we see from outside, asserts that in matter of Commander-in-Chief's dismissal it was not consulted at all despite the fact that from 7 to 22 September there was sufficient time. Resolution of Council of Ministers London fills us with fear that it was adopted under pressure of foreign factors. This would be dangerous precedent. Allowing foreign press to examine matters concerning our authorities and personnel is compromising for Poland. Political

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gain of insurrection which is most weighty factor has been entirely reduced by this also by matter of Commander-in-Chief. We also call attention to consequences which this whole matter may cause in ranks of army both abroad and at home. Signed Home Council of Ministers."

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

5 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

007622

By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will find of interest the following dispatch which we have received from our representative in Bucharest:

"1. According to a Rumanian industrialist and ex-Cabinet member in a position of great influence, there appears to be definite evidence of Soviet interference in the internal policies of Rumania. There are a number of political officers in Bucharest who address public meetings. Two newspapers are published in Rumania by the Russians, ostensibly for the Red Army, but naturally they can only be understood by Rumanians. New members of the Communist Party are reported to be receiving certificates which permit the reclamation of confiscated radios. The Soviet radio 'Rumania Libera' gives daily broadcasts from Russia in Rumanian and attacks Maniu and Dinu Bratianu. The source says that due to lack of arms, spare parts, repair facilities, and poor gasoline and machine gun ammunitions and bombs, the Russians have been undergoing many military

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By WPS Date MAR 8 1974

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difficulties. Approximately one thousand Soviet pilots have been waiting about three weeks at Constanza for aircraft.

"2. An American Officer saw a Japanese in the area of the Ploesti field on September 28th, although no one without Russian authorization is allowed in the area. The Soviets, as of September 28th, have taken over most of the Germans who had been captured by the Rumanians, but the Rumanian General Staff does not know the exact figures.

"3. A member of the British Foreign Office who is attached to the Armistice Commission, has confirmed the fact that Stirbey is being put forward as the sole possibility to head the government and that the governmental change will take place before October 15th. Another source who is probably the most influential industrialist and strongly pro-ally repeats that he has no regard whatsoever for the current government due to their anti-Soviet sentiments and feels that their vacillation and refusal to recognize the inevitable has jeopardized the Rumanian position. Thus there is a need for a strong government

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
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which would be headed by people that both the National Peasant leaders and Communist trust. The only one with enough prestige for the position is Stirbey. As a matter of fact, Maniu has been asked by the Communists if he would accept Stirbey. According to this source, Stirbey wants free rein to choose ministers. Maniu will have some say in the choice, but he can be steered away by Stirbey from the machine politicians of the Peasant Party.

"4. According to Starcea, Patrascanu came to the palace, but demurred taking the official oath to the King. He claims that although he recognizes the monarchic principle, the Communists would misunderstand his taking of the official oath and his position with them would be in jeopardy. Starcea concludes from this that since a strong character would declare himself one way or another, Patrascanu is insincere and unreliable."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 October 1944

file
October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

W. J. D.

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF: DSS

~~The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung~~ 5 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received from our representative at Berne the following report which I think you may find of interest.

"A good Swiss source says that south German units, mostly Catholics, are sent to the eastern front where they fight, fanatically believing in Bolshevist peril. All leave has been cancelled on the Eastern front. Against the Anglo-Americans the Nazis send picked Aachen troops who are told that not the Russians but Britain and America are the most formidable enemies. Many workers in northern Germany greet each other with the password "SRGD" meaning Soviet Republic Grosse Deutschland.

"The Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Berlin Correspondent, October 1 reports:

'German press featuring final stabilization of Western front after SS saved German divisions from complete disaster.'

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"The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

'The conception of terror which was to end the European war has proved erroneous. The enemy can no longer act on that basis but must improvise now. This prophesizes that an entirely new plan for the continuation of the strategy in Europe must be devised. More storms may come, but the recent developments strengthen the hope that the defense is now broken and Germany's power will be decisive in the battles to come.'

"A good local source reports fear and wide-spread disorders in Vienna. This unrest was prevalent during the week of September 17-23. Gestapo and SS were in force making numerous arrests and a reign of terror existed. Anti-Nazi movement in Vienna comprises 6,000 militarists, 4,000 more in the rest of Austria-organized in small groups. General upheaval is possible in 3-4 weeks.

"The same source states that although the majority of Germans feel the war is lost, it would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the Hitler regime. This can hold out several months longer.

"Not much credence should be placed in reports that the

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people, especially in south Germany, would fight the Anglo-Saxons. On the contrary, the Allied forces would be welcomed as liberators. Hitler and other Nazis have lost fate. Hitler jokes and severe criticism are common. One of the stories is that Hitler bought, or otherwise obtained, **** of Jewish origin. Another is that Ribbentrop's wife wears an ermine coat formerly the property of a Jewess. Another states that Dr. Ley is drunk all day long. People know that Nazis have enriched themselves at the expense of Jews and opponents of the regime. They are building sumptuous homes and villas and estates. The day after Dr. Ley bought a big estate, he found a note on his door saying 'Ley, where did you get the money?' Ley then offered a reward of 3,000 Reichsmarks for the author of the note. Then the next day, he found another note on his door saying 'Ley, where did you get those 3,000 marks?'

"Many would quit the party except for fear of the Gestapo. A revolt is growing even among the SS, many of whose members were recruited by force and have been unwilling witnesses of revolting dramas. The combing of the country for manpower has resulted in the employment of many inexperi-

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enced workers in factories who are much less efficient than foreign workers. Excellent relations prevail between Germans and foreign workers. The former upholding sabotage by the latter. The Germans are striving to break up the friendly relationships but mostly without success. When the Nazi regime collapses, those Germans opposed to the Nazis and the foreign workers will act together."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following message was received from our London office:

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I would appreciate it if you would see that the attached memorandum relative to aid in evacuating Poles from Rumania reaches the attention of the President as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 October 1944

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By PPS Date SEP 10 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following message was received from our London office relative to aid in evacuating Poles from Rumania:

"Col. Gano, Director Intelligence Polish General Staff, London, urgently requests our help in getting out Rumania Poles including 3 officers who represented Polish intelligence Rumania in work against Germany. These men now in grave danger capture Soviet NKVD (sic), who reportedly already inquiring for some of them.

Names and places of residence follow: Capt. Boleslaw Ziemianski, Capt. Bronislaw Eljasiewicz, Col. Zadeusy Schaetzel, civilian Bocuta Spiechowicz, civilian Doman Rogoyski. All these in Bucharest. Domoyski's address Toma Stelian 2. Also civilian Andrzej Schally, Bukavat 22 Ccaiova. These men may be contacted through Swiderski, Polish YMCA director, Bucharest, also through British Col. Gibson, reportedly British SI man in Bucharest. Spiechowicz is son commanding general 1st Corps Polish Army. Shally is son general who is Polish Liaison with SHAEF. In Italy this matter known to General Anders,

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commanding 2nd Polish Army Corps, also to Colonel Szymanski, American Liaison Officer to Anders. Col. Gano believes that evacuation of named Poles from Rumania may conceivably be affected by aircraft 15th Air Force if Bucharest operations still taking place."

We understand that the British have withdrawn previous assent to evacuate them. We are also advised that the matter is being handled by AFHQ with its political advisers, and that a decision will be forthcoming shortly.

We are notifying our representative in Bucharest that he should do nothing until policy has been determined.

William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

5 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

007622

By WBS

Date

MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
5 October 1944

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message not to be revealed

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

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By DRS Date MAR 8 1974

We have just received the following dispatch from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning a cable which Subasic has received from Stalin:

"Tonight Subasic informed me that he received a cable directly from Stalin in which Stalin stated that the National Committee of Liberation agreed to the Red Army's entrance into Yugoslavia.

"Stalin stated that the Red Army will liberate the Yugoslav people from the yoke imposed by the enemy. Stalin extended his best wishes to Subasic personally as the Prime Minister of Royal Yugoslav Government to carry out successfully the policies inaugurated by his government.

"Subasic asked that contents of cable from Stalin to him not be wired to Washington because he has not informed the British about it."

In view of the nature of this communication and the fact that the value of our informant might be seriously jeopardized, Mr. Yarrow has requested that contents of the

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message not be revealed.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

6 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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6 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that the following dispatch which we have just received from our counter-espionage sources in France will be of interest to you:

"1. Government has no effective control over large sections of the population, primarily Paris suburbs, and southwest. Because of lack of confidence of subordinates in superiors and public's lack of confidence in officials, there is little discipline in public offices, particularly police. Situation outwardly calm, but competent officials including Pelabon, now head of French Policement, admit they have no effective means to counter general disturbances. Independ policing by small groups widespread and is not brought under control.

"2. Conversations with many people reveal desire to have American police protection. They have vague fear of impending chaos usually associated with Communism, although this is not fully articulated.

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
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By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

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Palling and other government officials stated American protection imminent necessity. It is reported DeGaulle asked American troops be sent to Paris region and southwest primarily for moral effect.

"3. Situation is particularly serious in the Bordeaux-Toulouse area where complicated by presence of armed Spanish Republicans and Communistic groups.

"4. Situation described not presently acute, but delicate with impossibility of determining way events will turn."



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

007622
By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

Donovan folder 2-44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 October 1944


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received from our representative in Bari the following dispatch concerning a meeting between the British and Greek resistance leaders:

"A joint meeting was held near Bari, September 27, of Zervas, Serafis, and the British, according to the latter. Since the reputed British plan is to have their forces that are now in Albania drive south, link up with Greek forces driving north, to cut only roadway allowing Hun escape from Corfu, this seems significant."


William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By *ALB*

CIA

MAR 8 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 October 1944

PSF
OSS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following report from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

"Subasic is out of touch with present developments in Yugoslavia. He has no direct contact with Tito and is perturbed about lack of support from the British to Royal Yugoslav Government.

"Subasic lunched with Churchill on August 3 and asked him to provide two divisions to invade Yugoslavia, promising to capture Belgrade with assistance of Yugoslav troops within short time. Churchill stated cannot spare two divisions but assured Subasic of whole-hearted support. Before leaving for Quebec, Anthony Eden spoke to Subasic about moving government to Italy in anticipation of liberation of Yugoslavia. Subasic heard no more about it and is mystified by British verbal promises of support and lack of any real backing. Subasic believes that British in concert with Soviets working


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By Authority of CIA

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By WBS Date MAR 8 1974

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- 2 -

with Tito only, disregarding royal Government."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

6 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

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Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

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Donovan folder 2-44

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF
OSS

6 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the following dispatches concerning the situation in Lithuania. These dispatches were sent to me by the Lithuanian Minister to London who received them from Stockholm for transmission to me:

1. Dated July 10, 1944

"Supreme Committee for Lithuania's Liberation report that Lithuania is on the edge of precipice as another Red invasion means extermination of our nation. In town of Svyriai (Svir) all Lithuanians have been massacred. Committee entreat international aid and ask you to do your utmost to save Lithuanian nation.

2. Dated July 31, 1944

"Ten of our (Lithuanian) refugees state that German Civil Administration left Lithuania on July eighth after burning certain archives. Reds occupying Lithuanian localities shoot all Lithuanian patriots and employees of all institutions. Others aged fifteen to sixty-five

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By DBS Date MAR 8 1974

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- 2 -

are being taken into the Red Army. Food taken from the farmers up to the last morsel.

"Germans furious for active resistance during occupation do not allow Lithuanian refugees to escape to Reich but Russian refugees are admitted freely. Western part of Lithuania overcrowded with Lithuanian and Russian refugees from Orel, Smolensk and Orsha. Lithuanians of western part of Lithuania are being taken by pressgangs to dig fortifications along German frontier.

"Situation of our people is most desperate, they having no chance of escape since all boats are seized by the Germans. Hunger is already acute for refugee masses are devouring remaining food stocks and new harvest like clouds of locusts. Most of our troops who recently defied German attempts to disband them are hiding in forests and still fighting Germans with arms in hand.

3. Dated August 18, 1944

"Over one hundred Lithuanian refugee farmers, intellectuals, fishermen and workmen have arrived in Sweden and more are expected. All of them state:

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
The NKVD (name used for the Soviet Security Police, former CHEKA and GPU) in occupied areas of Lithuania distribute questionnaires with five following questions:

- (1) Why did you stay in Lithuania when the Red Army retreated?
- (2) What did you do during German occupation?
- (3) How did you help Germans?
- (4) What sabotage did you organize?
- (5) Mention names of three saboteurs.

"Questioned people receive summons: green summons for labor service, red summons for military service, white for deportation. Those receiving no summons are executed on the spot. Many people have been shot by machine guns or hand grenades in Vilna's and Utena's Squares.

"Soviet officials threaten to exterminate all anti-Soviet elements before USA will be able to restore Lithuania's independence. Denunciation offices are being established everywhere.

"Thousands of Lithuanians are fleeing Germanywards."


William J. Donovan
Director

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

7 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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7 October 1944

file

*PSF
OSS*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the following cable which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning Subasic's relations with the Soviet Government:

"Subasic discussed with me on Sunday, October 1st, his experiences with the Soviet Government. Soon after Subasic assumed office as Prime Minister he sent a cable to Molotov expressing the hope that the Soviet Government will lend its support to the new government headed by him. Molotov answered that the Soviet Government's cooperation and support will depend entirely upon whether or not Subasic will be able to come to an understanding and agreement with Tito.

"After Subasic reached an agreement with Tito he sent another cable to Molotov expressing the wish to come to Moscow and discuss with him in person the Yugoslav situation and expressing the hope that his visit will improve the relationship between the Yugoslav

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By APB Date SEP 10 1974

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Government and Soviet Russia. Molotov sent a very cordial reply saying that Subasic's visit to Moscow will be welcome and that he leaves it to Subasic to set the date of his arrival in Moscow. Then Subasic sent a cable to Molotov stating that he would be in Moscow within eight days thereafter. After the lapse of seven days and the day before his contemplated departure, Molotov sent another cable to Subasic saying that he realizes the difficult tasks confronting Subasic in his new office and made the suggestion to postpone his trip. Molotov suggested no other date and clearly implied that the trip is to be postponed indefinitely.

"A couple of weeks ago Subasic had a very long talk with the Russian Ambassador, Lebedev. Subasic told him frankly that he is puzzled by Molotov's cable postponing indefinitely his trip to Moscow and told Lebedev that if the Soviet relies on Tito alone to get a picture of the Yugoslavian situation they will only see one side of the picture and not an objective view of the situation. He told Lebedev that the Soviet Government will burn its fingers by following only Tito's

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- 3 -

point of view, saying that the Yugoslav people are deeply religious and will not stand for the experiences that the Russians went through from 1918 to 1922. Lebedev was non-committal and evasive and Subasic could not get anywhere with him.

"Subasic told me that contrary to the dispatch by Tass that the Red Army entered Yugoslavia with the consent of the Yugoslav Government, it is absolutely untrue and that the Soviet Government or Red Army never sought the consent of his government before entering Yugoslavia and he thinks that they asked Tito alone. Subasic told me that he regards Tito as a definitely Moscow man who will do only what Moscow tells him to do."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

7 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached reports. Will you kindly see
that they reach his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

007622

By ASJ Date MAR 8 1974

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

7 October 1944

file

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OSS*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will find of interest two

reports which I am enclosing concerning
developments in Estonia as a result of the
Russian advance.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

The state of morale at this time is very disheartening. The German's evacuating to Germany has made the native people doubt Germany's intentions to defend the country (Estonia). A considerable part of the population has, because of lack of arms, been prevented from taking part in the training areas, the Germans preventing them from engaging in a more decisive way in the defense of their native country. The Germans have been using the Estonian volunteers to raise the morale of the soldiers as well as the home front in their desire to make up deficiencies of the SS-voluntary division, a part being at Kizogor and other for training. The Germans do not consider as officers those who received their officer's training in Finland. As a result of their activity about twenty of the soldiers of the regiment have escaped back to Finland.

Evacuation and displacement have brought about disorder in the evacuation activity in the southeastern and southern parts of the country. Evacuation orders (directions) are often given the late or not at all, and very little time is given for preparation in which case the people have had to start out without the necessary articles of clothing, food, etc. Shunks, arms and rubble have been left by the Germans or left to be taken away by the oncoming Russians. In addition it has happened that the German soldiers have robbed those in flight.

As a result of the rapid German retreat and deficient evacuation preparations a large part of the southeastern Estonian people were left in Russian invaded territory. In back of the front troops were the disciplinary commanding corps, in which the military men of the 1st SS-Jeb without delay, when they were evacuated, were taken to the rear and the rear area was not only the "back" of the Russian advance but also the "back" of the German retreat.

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By ARS Date MAR 8 1974

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COPY

Sept. 10, 1944
 Source: Head of Finnish Military
 Intelligence

DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTONIA

The state of morale at this time is very disheartening. The German's evacuating to Germany has made the native people doubt Germany's intentions to defend the country (Estonia). A considerable part of the mobilized men, because of lack of ammunition and supplies, are inactive in the training areas, the Germans preventing them thus from engaging in a more decisive way in the defense of their native country. The Germans have not approved the forming of new independent Estonian fighting groups and the regiments of mobilized (Estonian) men are made subordinate to German divisions. The forming of Estonian fighting groups would surely raise the morale of the soldiers as well as the home front in their desire to fight for their own national freedom. The return of the Estonian Regiment that had been stationed in Finland was arranged in the most inconspicuous manner, and its treatment after that has aroused great bitterness and discouragement among those who are in the Regiment. The Regiment is not used as a whole, as the Estonians had hoped, but about 20 Estonians have been used to make up deficiencies of the SS-voluntary division, a part being at Kloogas and Kehra for training. The Germans do not consider as officers those who have received their officer's training in Finland, but have intended to send 113 of them to Germany for further training. As a result of this activity about twenty of the men from the regiment have escaped back to Finland.

Distrust and bitterness have brought about disorder in the evacuation activity in the southeastern and southern parts of the country. Evacuation orders (directions) are often given too late or not at all, and very little time is given for evacuation in which case the people have had to start out without the necessary articles of clothing, food, etc. Abundant grains and cattle have been left by the Germans or left to become a prey to the oncoming Russians. In addition it has happened that the German soldiers have robbed those in flight.

As a result of the rapid German retreat and deficient evacuation preparations a large part of the southeastern Estonian people were left in Russian invaded territory. In back of the front troops come the disciplinary commanding corps, in which are NKVD men, former militia men of the locality and communists, who do their "mopping up" job without delay, when those who had operated with the Germans are shot and the rest sent to march in inside Russia. Not only "the selected" but all without exception are to be taken to the Russian colonies. The terrorizing activities of the Russians have aroused a general fear in the land and thus strengthened

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the Estonian determination to fight against the communist control. In the other direction the apparent unwillingness of the Germans to furnish ammunition and supplies to the mobilized men as well as to give freedom of action to the Estonians has aroused great bitterness and feeling of hopelessness among the populace.

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By DBL Date MAR 8 1974

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CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION
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OF THE OFFICE TO THE
CONTROL. IN THE OFFICE
THE ESTONIAN REFUGEE

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September 12, 1944

STATEMENT BY DR. OSCAR LOORITS

Docent in the University of Tartu, Director of the Estonian Folk lore Archives, now political refugee in Sweden. (The recorded events all took place in southeastern Estonia.)

The prefect of the Valk police, Osmo Tammenagi, told me on August 12, 1944, that on the Voru front the petrol shortage was such that 440 horses had to be sent to the front for the transport of ammunition. At the same time the local German fuehrers had enough petrol for their pleasure trips and the petrol reserves at the Keeni railway station remained untouched.

After the departure of the Germans from Laura a number of local people went with red flags to meet the Russian "liberators". Later, when the Estonian Self-Defence Corps recaptured Laura, it appeared that the Russians had before their retreat killed all those who had thus hoped to save their lives. As a rule, however, civilians are not killed on a large scale by the Red Army. This is done some days later by the NKVD units.

The chief of the Self-Defence Corps of Vorumaa, Tiivel, told me on August 16, 1944 that immediately after a Russian tank unit had entered Antsla, the local Communists formed an Executive Committee which shot 30 persons. The officers of the Estonian Self-Defence Corps at once organized resistance, giving orders to open fire not only on the attacking Russians but also on the fleeing Germans. The town of Antsla was encircled and retaken, all the Soviet tanks being captured. The members of the Executive Committee, among them a former German SD-official, were shot. The Germans set fire to the town while retreating but the local Estonians extinguished the fire. Similarly, the town of Voru was set on fire by the retreating Germans. Nearly the entire population had fled for fear of the Bolsheviks. The head of the province, Hansen, and Tiivel, proclaimed the Estonian Democratic Republican regime in the town after the Germans had left and the Voru Self-Defence Corps fought not as a German, but as an Estonian Republican military unit, displaying blue-black-white banners. This national regime lasted only ten hours, then the Russian tanks entered the town but were afterward repulsed. At the time this story was told, heavy fighting was going on in Voru with Russian infantry. The Russians were drunk and sang, whereas the Germans abandoned their equipment and fled into the forests, Rouge was recaptured after its having first been taken by the Russians.

The apothecary Kuusk told me on August 23, 1944, that when the Soviet troops came to his father's farm near Otepaa he had hid under the floor of the farm house. His father and other farmers were ordered to transport Russian wounded soldiers. Kuusk heard how the Russians gave instructions

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By WPS Date MAR 8 1974

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to shoot all the farmers after taking the wounded to their destination. Two days later Otepaa was recaptured but none of the farmers returned.

The wife of the mayor of Otepaa, Mrs. Tiitsmaa, described how the Germans had ordered the people to evacuate long before the arrival of the Russians. In the meantime the German troops looted the houses of the town exactly as Narva had been looted last winter. Even the Mayor's library had been ransacked.

The flier, Uuesson, said on August 20, 1944, that he had seen on a reconnaissance flight how long columns of women and children were being marched by Red soldiers from Vorumaa towards Pskov. Those who collapsed were left on the road. Most of the children had been separated from the women.

September 12, 1944

/Signed/
Oskar Loorits

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

9 October 1944

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E. O. 12958, Dec. 17, 1993 and (U) at (S)
Date MAY 1 1974


Miss Grace Tully is interested in the following report
The White House our intelligence team in Bucharest in
Washington 25, D. C. sent several days ago, requesting the

Dear Grace: in the Roumanian Government who might be

Will you kindly hand the attached memorandum
to the President. I will be glad to answer questions for you.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

9 October 1944

file

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OSS*

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 907622

WBS

Date MAY 1 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the following report which was forwarded by our intelligence team in Bucharest in reply to a cable which I sent several days ago, requesting the names of individuals in the Roumanian Government who might be included in a list of war criminals:

"That question difficult to answer precisely for reason that Roumanians themselves cannot agree and further since names included would depend upon who ultimately prepared list. As previously advised, various official and unofficial persons are working independently on their own lists.

"It is, however, generally agreed by Roumanians that present Government includes none of most guilty war criminals. Persons in Government most frequently mentioned, as war guilty were lesser lights and tools of Antonescu and the Germans as well as certain generals who are said to be on Russian black-list because of their zealous and vigorous prosecution of campaigns against Russia. Generals most frequently mentioned are Racovitza, Minister of War and Potepenau, Minister of National Defense, although both have many apologists and all


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- 2 -

agree that these two contributed very valuable even though
llth hour support to the coup. Characteristic of non-military
officials are Andonie, who is General Secretary of Ministry of
National Economy, Negel, who is Minister of Justice and until
recently served also as Minister of Supply; and Burchi under
Antonescu who are reliably reported to have been important and
effective instruments of German economic policy. Intelligent
and well informed observers state that even though such men are
not in a class with the Antonescus, there should be no place
for them in a Government which should be all out in its prosecu-
tion of the war against Germany.

"In the near future, we are forwarding lists of the various
categories of war criminals and collaborationists as well as
dossiers on all members of present Government."



William J. Donovan
Director

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

10 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944

PSF
OSS
file
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following dispatch which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:

"Saturday October 7 Churchill conferred with King Peter. The King telephoned Subasic from 10 Downing Street asking him to prepare a speech to be broadcast by the King upon liberation of Belgrade. Churchill wanted to see the speech by 5 P.M. The speech was prepared on time. Briefly, the King will congratulate people of Yugoslavia for bringing about their own liberation. He will thank Tito, Red Army, and American and British Allies for assistance rendered, and will appeal for unity.

"Subasic believes Tito still in Serbia with troops, not in Moscow as rumored."

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
By *ARJ* Date MAY 1 1974

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

10 October 1944

file

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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10 OCT 1944
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944


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PSF
OSS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following message which we have received from our representative in Bari will, I believe, be of interest to you as an indication of conditions in Yugoslavia:

"Nationalist leaders Moslem and Serb are ignorant of fate Allies intend for them. Guerrilla war will continue to flare up, if they are abandoned to Partisan military subjection, with much suffering. I think early cessation of Nationalist resistance can be had if the Allies will guarantee free elections after withdrawal of the Germans. Weak German garrisons unattacked by the Partisans still hold Cacak, Pazega, Kraljevo and Uzice. South of Nis, Bulgar regular units with Serb Partisans still attack Nationalists and have reached Morava. From Kraljevo, Skoplje, German troops still move by night, not generally attacked by Partisans."



William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By

ABJ

Date MAY 1 1974

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~

10 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
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that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

~~RESTRICTED~~

PSF: OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received from our representative in Bern the following report containing a summary of an article written on 5 October by the Berlin correspondent of the newspaper, La Suisse:

"With the occupation of certain German territory by the Anglo-Saxons, German military circles are beginning to talk about a partisan movement composed chiefly of SS. It is said that an SS general has already been designated to command these German partisans.


"The SS paper DAS SCHWARZE KORPS writes about this organization today for the first time. It admits that the various Maquis in France, Russia, the Balkans and even Italy have caused the German military authorities a lot of trouble and inflicted losses. Their activity played an important part in the strategy of the Allies. However, the German partisans will be a much more dangerous adversary for the Anglo-Saxon invaders than the Balkan partisans are for the Germans now. The German

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- 2 -

partisans will have the most modern arms and equipment and will be thoroughly prepared for this kind of warfare. The Allied supremacy in tanks, planes and artillery will not be so effective against the German partisans as at the front today.

"It is possible that the Allies may find some Germans are ready to assist them in the administration of occupied territory, but any such form of collaboration would not last more than a month because the partisans would liquidate such collaborators as soon as possible, murdering them day and night in their offices and their homes."



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944

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Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF:OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the following report from our representative in Bern summarizing dispatches in two Swiss newspapers:

Tribune de Geneve. Berlin Correspondent, October 2

"There is much speculation in Berlin official and private circles, especially after the speeches of Churchill and Eden as to what Germany and Europe would have to expect in the event of unconditional surrender. Almost everybody is convinced that the conditions outlined by the British statesmen are so severe that no Germans could be found who would reveal them to the German people, and guarantee their execution. Apparently the Allies aim at the complete destruction of the basis of German economy whether industrial or agricultural.

"The repercussion of the German collapse on the rest of Europe, especially England, seems to afford a fertile field for discussion. Not merely the economic structure of Europe but also that of Great Britain would be menaced and Eden said that England was far more dependent on

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Europe than was generally thought. If the western powers decided to effect the proletarianization of Germany, of throwing the country into chaos, the proletarianization of Europe would necessarily follow. The repercussions of the decline of German economy between 1918 and 1938 on the world economic structure are cited in example. The impoverishment of the Axis powers and their populations of more than 150,000,000 would certainly affect all the other European countries. It is argued in Berlin that the lowering of the standard of living in Central Europe, coupled with the destruction of so many European cities, might lead to the idea that the Soviet system offers the only solution.

"What would happen to England in that event? The Nazis are certain that the Bolshevist economic plan would mean the end of England as a world power. Not only would the Empire lose a necessary market for its products but the new kind of Europe would be a dangerous competitor for English merchandise elsewhere. The British Empire cannot meet its internal obligations without building its foreign trade to a higher level than before the war.

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Under these circumstances, Berlin diplomatic circles believe that England's present policy is bound to lead to national catastrophe tantamount to suicide.

"That policy goes back to the Entente Cordiale of 1902, and received a fresh stimulus after Munich. It is based on the fixed idea that Germany must be considered Public Enemy #1. It is necessary to compare the position of England today with that which existed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, in order to understand how much that fixed idea has cost the British Empire already and - with all that Germany has not been destroyed. The opinion has been expressed in Berlin that England has been suffering from a lack of political intelligence for a long time. Even since the period preceding the first World War this lack of perspicacity is equally evident in the false ideas of the British to discount the amount of material and moral resistance which Germany still had at its disposal.

"These arguments are taken very seriously in well-informed German circles, as they are based in part on fact and observations difficult for a foreigner to detect.

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Berlin is convinced that if Germany were to lose the war, there would be a definite swing to the left in Europe, and that the British pseudo-liberal system would be powerless to do anything effective to counteract the consequences of such a state of affairs.

Journal de Geneve, October 3


"The reports of the organization of a German Maquis are to be taken quite seriously as considerable progress has already been made in that direction. German and foreign correspondents in Berlin have been notified to be prepared to leave for southern Bavaria. Government officials know that they will be transferred to the neighborhood of Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Between Berchtesgaden and Garmisch considerable has been done to control telegraphic and telephonic communications. The heart of the German Maquis will be in the Salzaannertut, a rather inaccessible region where high mountains protect the main links. Hitler's residence might be termed the capital of the Obersalzberg, at the western end of Salzaannertut. A little farther on is the Platterhos where the Nazis have stored their archives underground. At Hainzk, across the

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mountain range, is a surprisingly modern house belonging to Goering. A few kilometers farther on is Ribbentrop's chateau at Suschl near Salzburg. From Obersalberg as far as Wels and Szbyr are nothing but salt mines. This is the center of the German Maquis. In the mines are vast underground factories inaccessible and invulnerable in their rocky depths. Barracks, supplies of food, ammunition, and materials are to be found in them. The chains start at the north Koanigsseb salt mines only 3 kilometers from Obersalzburg. Hitler and Himmler are fascinated by the great triumph of the French Maquis. They are determined that their own shall be built in the Salzaannertut where the history of the Nazi resistance shall be written, in letters of blood at the crossroads, on the hills and in the valleys, and the plains and particularly in those impenetrable, deep salt mines which they are already speaking of among themselves as the 'salt mines of death'."



William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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SECRET

11 October 1944

file

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you please see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

W. J. D.

William J. Donovan
Director

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 October 1944

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *ABJ*

Date MAY 1 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received through our representative in Bern the following report from a reliable source inside Germany, concerning the characteristics of the German V-2 bomb:


"A-4 is the designation applied to the V-2 bomb by the experts, but there are many conflicting reports concerning it. It is reported to be manufactured at Saint Gallen in Austria southeast of Steyr. The parts are assembled at MDW (Mittel-Deutschen Werke) Harz (sic) and all buildings for this work are located beneath the earth. The most effective way to cripple this production would be to smash the lines for rail shipment. The weapon is claimed to be capable of a speed of 1 kilometer per second and to sustain itself in flight for a distance of 500 to 600 kilometers. It carries anywhere from 1 to 2 tons of explosive charges and has a weight of about 20 tons. It is not directed by remote control, however. The fuse is manufactured in Moertingen near

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Augsburg. The bomb is propelled from steel plates which are mounted on a movable track. The Germans are said to be all ready to employ the weapon in Norway. On October 3, a wire was sent by General Jodal to the Oberbefehlshaber in the West that this is not a propitious time, politically, to launch these bombs against Paris, and no attack should be made in that region now. It is the opinion of everyone that any talk of other so-named V weapons is mere propaganda, or, at least if there are such bombs, they will not be ready for use till March or April of next year. If the V-1 or V-2 are directed by remote control they use a wave length frequency of 24 to 56 centimeters. Operations have been resumed at Peenemuende."



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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SECRET

12 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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12 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CIA 007622
By [signature] Date MAY 1 1974

I believe you will be interested in the following report concerning a German attempt to make contact with the Russians. This report from an agent in Germany was forwarded to us by our Bern representative.


"During the first part of last month Herr Kleist, the ministerial dirigent of ost ministerium travelled to Stockholm as the agent of the top ranking officials, surely Ribbentrop or perhaps even Hitler, to attempt to make contact with the Russians. In Stockholm, the Russian botschaftsrat, Semeneof however undoubtedly served notice that this action was not suitable (abgewinnt). In spite of this, efforts are still being pushed along these same lines. They are now trying to work through Herr Dankwort of the German Legation in Stockholm in an attempt to bring about closer contact. When Koecher was here he was questioned about the chances for him to get next to the Russians in a quiet way in Bern, but he too, said that this did not seem suitable (abgewinnt). Hitler has not entirely put aside the idea

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of reaching an agreement with the U.S.S.R. He did, however, want some definite proposals to be made. Kleist can be identified by his sunken chest; he is nearly 50 years of age, about 180 centimeters tall, dark eyes and hair, has a sallow complexion and long tapering fingers of a composer."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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12 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

W. J. Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF: OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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12 October 1944

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received from our representative in Bern the following report which I believe you will find of interest:

Tribune de Geneve, Berlin Correspondent, October 7

"New theories from Berlin: Berlin official circles agree, after studying Morgenthau's and other plans, and British comment on them, that the post-war program elaborated at Quebec was largely negative. They are convinced that the absence of a positive, constructive and reasonable post-war plan is beginning to cause some apprehension in England, which is definitely interested in reaching this time a better solution of European problems than after 1918. England's future is largely dependent on durable peace in Europe. America and Russia are not so immediately interested in that. It is significant that it was brought out in the House of Lords that while England has a fleet of 10 million tons, America has 30 million tons, and that the Counciler of the Exchequer

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took pains to outline the tremendous difficulties in the economic field which England must face after a war which has really lasted 30 years. The mere cessation of hostilities will not be enough. It is imperative that all causes of friction and conflict be eliminated once and for all.

"The Governor of the Bank of England said 'Britain's national debt when this war is over will be three times the burden which had to be carried after the last war. This huge debt can never be liquidated unless there is a constructive peace insuring a prosperous Europe offering a fertile economic field.'

"Important people in Berlin affect poor comprehension of England's problem. It seems that under the pressure of military events and their utterly unpredictable consequences, at least none of the political crowd are willing to listen to the voice of reason. It is regretted that the enemy peace plans and terms for the future so far published are not marked by that reason and moderation which are so rarely indeed shown by a conqueror.

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German Internal Situation.

"It is learned from a good source that the clashes between the Nazi Party and the Generals which followed July 20 have now been resolved. Hitler is now following the advice of the Generals and they are in agreement with him concerning the prosecution of the war, even on the home front, without regard to the civilian population, or the terrible damage which must necessarily ensue. A scorched earth policy will be adopted. The civilians will be forcibly evacuated from all menaced areas.


"However, this makeshift agreement does not mean that these same Generals would not abandon Hitler tomorrow if they saw a chance of saving the Wehrmacht and its future. They feel they have some hope of a deal with the Russians.

"Considerable progress is being made with the preparation for underground warfare in Germany after the armistice. The SS, Laval's Milice, and the neo-Fascists are part of the organization. Special schools for the French Milice exist at Heiburg and Stuttgart, instructing the men for underground work in France. All agents are

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- 4 -

given false identity papers with names of many bombed out Germans who have lost all their papers. To test the scheme out, Himmler issued false papers to some thousand SS men and sent them all over Germany and occupied territory. Then the Gestapo were ordered to find them but not a single one was located."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 October 1944

MISS GRACE TULLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
These follow a summary of an article which appeared
in the "New York Times" and which was forwarded
to the President by the U.S. representative in
Switzerland.

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested to see the enclosed summary of a recent German article concerning preparation for a German resistance movement which was forwarded to us by our representative in Switzerland.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF:OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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file 13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There follows a summary of an article which appeared recently in "Das Schwarze Korps" and which was forwarded to the Washington office by the OSS representative in Switzerland.

Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Berlin Correspondent, October 6.

Preparations for a German Maquis: It is evident from a recent article in Das Schwarze Korps, believed to have been inspired by Himler, and from various other indications, that the Nazi Party is in charge of the organization of a German partisan movement or People's War as it is called.

It is of interest to follow developments in the German territory occupied by Allied troops. There are stories of American soldiers giving chocolate and biscuits to German civilians. This called for an earnest warning in the Koelnische Zeitung against the offense of "candy propoganda" to win over unsuspecting German civilians. The paper writes: "The German people will not accept any gifts from the hands of murderers but will take such offers as a gross insult. These shameless

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
inhabitants who reach out plaintively for the bait or who fail to teach their children what they should do will be called to order by the genuine German population as soon as our soil is again liberated in the interest of our National Cleanliness. Separatists and other unpatriotic rabble will be dealt with in the proper way too. There must be no filth or uncleanness in our communities."

Here is the last part of the startling article in Das Schwarze Korps: "What does the enemy want coming into our country? They have proclaimed it countless times-- the downfall of Germany, the end of our people, Bolshevization, slavery. Even this project cannot be completed in a day. It cannot force a whole nation against the wall, nor can it deport millions and millions all at once. It will mean a long time to do what it proposes, that is to say, to let us stew in our own juice--to starve us to death-destroy our industries-cripple our agriculture-banish our children. It would be exclusively an administrative pressure and our task is to prevent it. Whosoever loses his life in this struggle will have died on a battle field. Whosoever loses his life as a traitor will have had his just desserts. But whosoever suffers

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misery, pain and death will have suffered not as an innocent civilian, as the apostles of humanity like to say, but as a manly German suffering for his own country in his own way. We will have lived and suffered and died like a soldier- that others might live and he will have helped to gain the time which we need for victory."


William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
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13 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 October 1944

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PSF
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think you will be interested in the following report which we have received from our representative in Cairo concerning conditions in Iran:

"All negotiations regarding oil concessions will be suspended until the Armistice. This statement is to be submitted by the Iran Government to the three embassies on the 9th or 10th of October. The Government has adopted this policy in order to avoid compliance with the Russian demands, accompanied by warnings, that Iran grant oil concessions in the entire north Iran area. It was the Soviet intention also to transform this region into an industrial section using Russian schools and workers as instruments of conversion. The Russian attitude toward this move is a source of apprehension in the Iran Government."

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *ABS* Date MAY 1 1974

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DECLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested in the enclosed report from our representative in Bucharest describing a conversation which he had on 3 October with Prince Stirbey. Would you kindly see that it reaches his desk?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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file

13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received a report from our representative in Bucharest describing a conversation which he had on 3 October with Prince Stirbey. This report, which I believe you will find of interest, reads as follows:

"According to Stirbey, he has heard more about his taking over the government from his friends and from the newspapers than from the heads of the political parties themselves. No approach has yet been made officially to him with regard to the possibility of his assuming control. He asserted he did not seek the job and that he would accept only under the following terms:

"1. That the leaders of all the political parties should ask him to take control in such a way as to convince him that they would support him sincerely and honestly throughout.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *PSJ*

Date MAY 1 1974

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"2. That a political armistice would be declared for 6 months, under a guarantee that parties would refrain from attacking one another during that period and work together for the common cause. (It would take 6 months, according to Prince Stirbey, for the country to assume a normal condition so that democratic elections could take place.)

"3. That he would be able to choose ministers freely and likewise the principal officials of government departments and that it would be understood that in addition to representatives of the various political parties, he would be able to place good administrators and capable business men in important posts, including men with no political background at all.

"4. That the 'War Guilty' trials be handled in a judicial and orderly fashion.

"Stirbey admitted having had talks with Communist Leaders. The Russian Army has left his country estates alone and there are other signs which point to respect both to his person and his property, on the part of the Soviet Forces. Stirbey further claimed that almost all the members

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
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of the present cabinet and that party leaders as well, agreed that a change in the government was necessary. The deadlock is due to the insistence on the part of the Communists that the government include such men as Tatarescu, former Prime Minister under King Carol, and Mihai Hralea, ex-Minister of Labor under Carol, who broke with Maniu in 1938 and is known as violently pro-Russian. Stirbey agrees with Maniu to the extent that these upstarts and 'partyless leaders' have no place in the government. Patrascanu and other Communists insist on the inclusion of these men and continue violent attacks on the leaders of the 3 major political parties. Stirbey believes that Patrascanu's position is weak and that he is anxious to strengthen it by including men who would side against Petrescu, Maniu and Bratianu. No official approach has been made to Stirbey as yet. He (Patrascanu ?) feels Stirbey is not experienced enough as a politician to assume the job at this time, that he could not operate successfully as the head of a government during such trying times. Lugosianu feels Maniu would be more successful and believes he will ultimately be chosen for the post.

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"Stirbey feels that the Russians are quietly and unofficially building up the Communist Party. Apparently the party has plenty of money now, though bankrupt until very recently. With the support of the Russians and with the money they now possess, they can publish newspapers in quantities, while the old political parties can barely afford one newspaper each. The newsprint which two of the Communist papers use comes from stocks which the Russian Army confiscated. Stirbey said he had reached this conclusion with reluctance, despite the assurance from Russian Journalists and other Russians that Molotov was sincere in his declaration that Russia would guarantee the integrity of Roumanian Sovereignty and would not interfere internationally in Roumanian political affairs.



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

13 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 October 1944

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CIA 007622

By *APL*

Date MAY 1 1974

We have just received from our representative in Baghdad the following report concerning conditions in Iraq:

"To date there has been no selection of the first Lebanese Minister to Iraq. However, the signs point to the appointment at an early date of Dr. A dil Arselan, formerly the Minister of Commerce in Beirut.


"The determination of London to form a Jewish brigade, as announced over the radio, is causing excitement in Arab political circles here which is speedily becoming more heated. Since all the newspapers have been ordered to refrain from remarks, there has not as yet been any reaction from the people at large. As the shootings continue in Palestine, the anger of the Arab population here is becoming more and more violent at the Anglo-Americans for continuing their favored treatment of the Jews instead of punishing them.

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"It is reported that the present Mutassarif of Mosul will soon be replaced by the lately expelled Minister Tahsin Ali. If true, this will constitute a very bad move and will be regarded as one more political insult to the North.

"After they had been followed and placed under arrest here, two students of Roberts College, of prominent Iraq families, have confessed that they were working for the Germans as spies, operating out of Istanbul. At present they are being kept in the capital with a trial for treason awaiting them."


William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DECLASSIFIED

14 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you please see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DECLASSIFIED

14 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Miss Grace Tully
I believe you will be interested in the following report which we have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow:

I believe the President will be interested in this report. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.
"Saw King today, October 10. He related to me his conversation with Churchill on October 7, before latter's departure for Moscow. Churchill said that he is dissatisfied with Tito's continuous non-cooperation, and will find new ways to bring pressure to bear upon him. He assured the King that he will discuss with Marshal Stalin the whole situation, and will seek Stalin's assistance to exert his influence over Tito with thought of forming a single government upon liberation of Belgrade."

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *DBJ* Date MAY 1 1974

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file

PSF
OSS

14 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested to see the enclosed report on "Political Tendencies in Northern Italy", and I should much appreciate it if you would show it to him.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

FIELD MEMORANDUM 35 (FR-66)

21 September 1944

Rome, 2 September 1944

POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN NORTHERN ITALYIntroduction

The present report represents a preliminary evaluation of the anti-Fascist political currents prevalent in enemy-occupied Italy. It seeks to analyze these currents in terms of their present influence and their possible role in the political reconstitution of the country. When the great urban centers of the north, such as Turin, Milan, Genoa, Bologna, and Venice are liberated, the main political forces found there will vitally affect the direction in which Italian politics will move. They may well prove the determining factor in eventual cabinet changes as well as in the decisions of the constituent assembly which is to frame the future Italian state.

Reports from many sources continue to strengthen the impression that the Communists, Christian Democrats, and the Socialists are the only parties which possess mass support, though the Action party has militant leaders in both the Committees of Liberation and among the partisans. The Christian Democrats in the north are generally conceded to be considerably more radical than in the south, which means that the real leadership of the anti-Fascist movement is leftist and that this leadership will be in a position to strengthen its hold on the masses when the area is freed. Admittedly, release from Nazi and Republican-Fascist oppression will emphasize anew the differences between the three mass parties, and will also make possible a greater degree of organizing activity and propaganda on the part of other parties which are now inactive in the north or have only a passive role in the resistance movement. But available information on conditions in the north, which Allied experience as our armies move up the peninsula has confirmed, leaves little question that the great preponderance of organized political power will be exercised by the Left, and that the bonds which hold these groups together will be stronger than the interests which would tend to separate them.

The Communists.

Of all the anti-Fascist parties, the Communists are universally credited with the most efficient organization and are acknowledged to be best equipped for clandestine political warfare and other forms of resistance such as sabotage. Most Italian and foreign sources tend to agree that the Communists will have a very powerful position in the north, at least during the early days after liberation. Like the Socialists, their main strongholds are the urban and industrial centers, but evidence exists that their influence

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73

By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

is spreading in the rural communities, especially among the landless farm workers. The party is said to be exceptionally strong among the working classes of Turin. In addition it commands support in or around Genoa, Livorno, Alessandria, and Milan, as well as in certain parts of the provinces of Bergamo, Reggio Emilia, Forli, Ravenna, Ancona, and Pesaro. Party leaders in Rome say they have 250,000 active followers in the north, in addition to which they count on a considerable number of sympathizers.

Among the partisan bands Communist primacy seems clearly established, some sources estimating that about 60 per cent of the bands are under Communist control. While this does not mean that such bands consist entirely of Communists, nor even that the rank and file have a very clear understanding of Communist doctrine, it is obvious that they are susceptible to the kind of indoctrination which will keep them under Communist influence for some time after the war. Particular evidence of Communist, or leftist, control and influence among northern resistance groups is found in the agreement reached by representatives of the Committee of National Liberation for northern Italy with Tito's political organization for cooperation in the fight against the Nazi-Fascists in the Adriatic zone. The pact also provided for postponement of discussion of the Italian-Yugoslav boundary and for a sort of local autonomy in the disputed areas, with Italian or Yugoslav liberation committees acting as the local administrative authority either separately or jointly depending on the degree to which the two nationality groups are mixed in specific zones. It was also agreed to form committees of "Working Class Unity" for support of the military resistance groups, for sabotage of the enemy's effort, and for greater unity of the working masses regardless of nationality or politics. The nature of this accord is strongly suggestive of the unity and collaboration which characterize the program of the leftist parties in general, and of the Communists in particular.

The Socialists.

The Socialist movement has long had deep roots in northern Italy, especially in the industrial regions of Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, and Emilia. Despite a certain factious tendency and an excessive emphasis on pre-Fascist techniques and slogans, and though lacking the firm party discipline of the Communists, the northern Socialists play an important part in the resistance movement. Their leaders are in the forefront of the local committees of liberation and in the central committee at Milan. In the latter city they undoubtedly surpass all other parties in their influence and following, and even Togliatti concedes them a dominant position there. The party is also considered strong in such places as Bologna, Ferrara, Novara, and among the agricultural workers in Emilia and Romagna. Pietro Nenni, Socialist leader at Rome, estimates the party's active membership in the north at approximately 300,000, though this seems exaggerated. In some places, such as Turin and Florence, the party seems scarcely distinguishable from the Communists. The two parties have generally acted together in promoting the strikes of industrial workers at Genoa, Milan, and Turin during the last eighteen months. The Socialist clandestine press is reported to be exception-

ally active, publishing, in addition to the Avanti!, papers for professional technical, and clerical workers (La Citta Nuova), for the proletariat (Operaio), and for the patriots (Il Partigiano).

It is difficult to assess the relative importance of the Socialists in the partisan movement, since the political color of the bands, at least superficially, seems to derive from that of their leaders. Those, according to most reports, are chiefly Communist or Action party representatives. Some sources, however, attribute to the Socialists a role among the partisans second only to that of the Communists, with perhaps 20 per cent of the bands under their control.

It seems probable that when direct and open contact is restored between the Socialists of the north and the national party leaders now in liberated Italy, organization will be strengthened, policy will be more clearly defined, and membership will increase. The party possesses the advantage of strong political tradition in Italy, and its members are likely to be confirmed believers in party doctrine rather than chance adherents. Socialism in the north, as elsewhere, has its dissident wings and factions, but it may eventually attract within its fold significant marginal groups from both the Communists and the Action party.

The Christian Democrats.

The strength of the Christian Democrats in the north is much more difficult to estimate than that of the other mass parties. This is due to the lack of a well-knit Christian Democratic party organization, and to their more passive role in the underground resistance movement. The Christian Democrats depend largely on the surviving influence of the old Partito Popolare, and obtain considerable support from Church organizations such as Azione Cattolica. As elsewhere in the country, their following is mainly among the small independent farmers and the strong Catholic elements of the bourgeoisie, though they are reported to be making some local progress in organizing the workers politically in small factories in Vicenza and elsewhere. Party sources at Rome claim, and spokesmen for other parties concede, that Christian Democracy has a very considerable following in Venetia, Emilia, upper Lombardy, the Trentino, the Alto Adige, and Vicenza, and in rural sections of other northern provinces. It is estimated that the party can count on between two and three hundred thousand adherents now in the areas under German occupation, and on considerably more whose sympathies will be with them when free political life can be resumed.

The significant feature about the party in the north is its radical, leftist tendency, in marked contrast to the conservative orientation of the Christian Democrats in the south. This tendency takes the form of collaboration with the Socialists and Communists, of a more pronounced aversion to the monarchy and certainly towards its present representatives, and of a desire for sweeping social and economic reforms in the fields of industrial organization, land distribution and ownership, and the rights of labor. This attitude is one of the reasons why De Gasperi, Christian Democratic leader in liberated Italy, scrupulously avoids taking a stand on the major political issues of the

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78

By R. H. Parks Date 11/11 1972

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moment, and felt it necessary to warn the Lieutenant General that he must not count on the party to back the monarchy when the time came to decide the institutional question.

There is little indication that the Christian Democrats play an active part in the direction or control of the partisans, though they probably have a number of adherents in some of the bands. For the most part, their adherents are said to contribute to the resistance movement by providing food, shelter, and information to patriots, individually or in small groups. Members of the lower clergy and of monastic orders are active in this sense, and there can be little doubt that their behavior is strengthening the influence of the party.

The Action Party.

Most reports indicate that, while the Action party has a number of vigorous representatives in such centers as Milan, Venice, Bologna, Florence, and Genoa, it has not yet been able to attract much of a popular following. Though undoubtedly in the forefront of the militant anti-Fascist forces in the north, Action party leaders apparently have difficulty in mobilizing the professional and intellectual classes and other categories of the bourgeoisie to whom they believe their program should logically appeal.

The Action party finds its chief role in the field of active guidance and organization of partisan warfare. At Milan one of its representatives shares with a Communist leader the supreme military command of the Italian resistance movement. This work is closely tied in with that of the Milan Committee of Liberation, the most important of such committees in the north. Allowing for the differences in reports from various sources, it appears that the Action party controls or guides the activity of between 15 and 20 per cent of the patriot bands. Their influence is believed to be important in Piedmont, Venetia, and the Romagna, and perhaps to a lesser extent in Lombardy. Several sources credit them with a leading role in the partisan movement in Tuscany, especially among the bands recently operating in and around Florence.

A generous estimate places the number of active Action party supporters in the north at about 100,000, but this following does not seem nearly so homogeneous as that of the three "mass" parties, and it may not hold together once the cementing force of the common resistance against the Nazi-Fascists is no longer operative. When northern Italy is liberated and open political activity is possible, the position of the Action party may be considerably weakened unless it is able to resolve the internal conflict between the conservative and radical wings in the party directorate, and to produce a program with a broader appeal. At present republicanism is the only clear goal of the party, the rest of its program lacking the consistency necessary to give the party real stability after the war.

Other Parties.

Of the other parties in the six-party coalition, the only one with traditions and roots in some parts of the north is the Liberal Party. To the

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extent that they are organized, their chief strength is in Piedmont and Lombardy, where the influence of old Giolittian groups persists. Though the Liberals are generally represented on the committees of liberation, their role is a passive one. Mention is hardly ever made of their playing an active part in the military resistance of the partisans. Though they claim a sizeable following among the artisans and the business and professional classes, it seems likely that at present this represents more a hope than a reality. The party is publishing clandestine journals in such cities as Venice, Genoa, Milan, and Padua, though their circulation cannot be ascertained.

The Democratic Labor party, a newcomer in southern and central Italy, is little if at all known in the north and cannot be regarded as a serious political factor. If the cases of recently-liberated Siena and Perugia are typical, it probably is not even represented on most of the northern committees of liberation. In Siena the Labor Democrat members were only added to the committee after the city was freed by the Allies, while at Perugia the sixth seat on the Committee was occupied by a member of the Republican party.

The Republican party, which constitutes a revival of a pre-Fascist political current, began to organize in the period after Mussolini's fall. Though fairly insignificant in the south, it appears to have more support in Rome and is reported to show some strength in Venetia (Treviso and Montebelluna) and Romagna. It finds a following among farmers, lower middle class elements, artisans, and workers. Where Action Party influence is strong the Republican party is less in evidence, since both parties have much in common. Since the direction of partisan activities is so closely correlated with the committees of national liberation, and the Republican party does not have a place on most of these, its connection with the patriots is somewhat obscure. It probably has some adherents in the bands themselves. It is extremely doubtful if the active membership of this party exceeds 35,000.

Monarchist and Badoglio Groups.

There can be no doubt that pro-monarchical elements exist in the north among conservative groups, and will be in a position to express themselves politically when the territory is freed. There is no indication that they are now providing any sort of active anti-Fascist leadership in the urban centers. On the other hand, there is evidence of a decided monarchist coloring among those partisan groups in which regular army or navy officers have assumed the leadership. This is particularly true in groups composed largely of ex-service men such as the Bersaglieri and the Alpini. The monarchism of such groups is said to be of a moderate character, and army or navy officers or ex-soldiers, where they form parts of patriot bands, are gladly accepted by other political elements because their efforts are primarily the expression of a patriotic spirit and the desire to free the country from the Germans. In certain areas, also, there are said to be small bands which were activated by Badoglio when he was head of the government. Recent reports indicate that such groups have recently been active above Florence and in the frontier districts of Piacenza and Liguria. These bands must also be considered

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By R. H. Parks Date

JUN 1 1972

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as monarchist in character, but there is little ground for believing that they are numerous or widespread. In general it seems evident that monarchist influence in the military resistance movement is not such as to warrant the supposition that it can build a sizeable following in the north on the basis of anti-Fascist activity.

Other Trends.

The residual elements of Fascism will no doubt split into their component parts - conservative landowners, bankers, and industrialists, who willingly acquiesced in Fascism, and careerist politicians, who embraced Fascism as a profession. The former will very likely drift into the ranks of the party or parties furthest to the right. Some of the latter, who have recently sought to revive under the "Social Republic" the radical, neo-socialistic principles which Fascism proclaimed in its earliest days, may find it possible to make a transition to the extreme left, perhaps to the Communists. The extent of this movement will of course be limited by police measures against the more compromised of these elements, especially those who collaborated with the Nazis.

The great masses of politically inarticulate people, especially among the peasants, will tend to follow along with whatever party or parties have the greatest anti-Fascist prestige and/or the strongest pre-Fascist tradition in their immediate locality.

Conclusion

Among the anti-Fascist parties it seems clear that leadership and popular support belong to the Communists, Socialists, and the Christian Democrats, and that the Action party has leadership but lacks a mass following. The three "mass" parties now claim, between them, about 800,000 active adherents or sympathizers in the north. When free political life is resumed they will probably enlist the support of many tens of thousands more. Whatever enduring support the Action party may retain will probably serve to accentuate this leftward trend. It is too early to judge how far to the left the Christian Democrats will remain when they are able to clarify their position after liberation. A factor which will tend to emphasize the leftist tendencies of the northern wing of the party is the collaboration in liberated Italy with the Socialists and Communists in the General Italian Confederation of Labor (CGIL). This organization has good prospects for playing the leading role among the working masses of the north.

The political temper of the north is in the nature of things more militantly anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist, more radical, more anti-monarchical, and more uncompromising than that of any other part of the country. Despite some evidence that republicanism has fallen into temporary disrepute among certain groups in the north because of the detested Fascist example, it is doubtful whether the masses have ever regarded Mussolini's social republic as anything but a distorted mockery. The representatives of the monarchy, if not the institution itself, are believed to be thoroughly discredited, so that a reaction against the Fascist republic is not likely to stimulate a strong pro-monarchist movement.

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By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

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When such cities as Milan and Turin are freed there will be strong and probably irresistible pressure for changes in the Italian cabinet in a leftist direction. This will probably be accompanied by insistent demands for further relaxation of Allied controls and greatly increased independence of action by Italian authorities. The collaboration of the three "mass" parties will strongly influence the nature and the actions of the Constituent Assembly. It is too much to say that these "mass" parties will remain as closely united as at present or will permanently dominate the political scene in Italy; but they will certainly be the main political forces during the period immediately following the war. It will probably require some time before any real center party with a vigorous democratic program could take shape and attract significant numbers of people who were unwilling to accept either Marxism, a Catholic political program, or a conservative solution to Italy's problems.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET
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14 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you please see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that the following report which we have just received from our representative in Bucharest will be of interest to you:

"Starcea advises that the situation is more critical now than at any other time since the coup. The different political factions in the government are bickering while the country is falling apart. He said that in spite of the fact that the King wants to stay out of politics, it may be necessary for him to interfere and take decisive action to form a strong government. Two more observers agree that this government impasse will not stop until King or the Russians act decisively. It is believed that Starcea may be influencing King to act.

"An American Air Force Colonel motored from Bucharest to Craiova and back on October 1-2. He reports that peasants in the villages and the city inhabitants seem to have enough food.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622

By *AB*


Date MAY 1 1974

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"Two American Officers who went to Brasov from Bucharest on October 3-4 reported the Brasov stores to be well-stocked and the city prosperous. Russian mounted military police and troops were in the town but not in the stores. Everybody seemed to behave well, and the general impression was of quiet and order.



William J. Donovan
Director

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WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

14 October 1944


Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you please see that
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

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*PSF
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14 October 1944

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA 007622
By *APB* Date MAY 1 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that the following report which we have just received from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow will be of interest to you:

"General Velebeit, who for many months refused to meet King Peter, requested on 11 October an audience with King. He said that as representative of National Army of Liberation he must before departing with Subasic pay his respects to King. The meeting will take place on 12 October at 5 P.M.

"Cankar's resignation was accepted by Subasic. No new Minister will be appointed by Subasic for the present."


Another dispatch which we have recently received from Mr. Yarrow describes a conversation which he held with President Benes, Smutny and Masaryk:

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"I lunched on 11 October with President Benes, Chief of his cabinet Smutny. Masaryk joined us later. Benes discussed at length the Polish situation and the impracticability of a Danubian confederation. He also gave an outline of his conversation with Stalin regarding Poland."


William J. Donovan
Director

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~~TOP SECRET~~
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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16 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the at-
tached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By Authority of CIA

007622

By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

Jim
2 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you kindly hand the attached memorandum
to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested to see the following summary of a letter dated 22 September 1944, which was received by an OSS representative from [REDACTED]. The letter contains observations on members of the new Bulgarian Cabinet, several of whom are known personally to [REDACTED] who was formerly a member of the Supreme Economic Council in Bulgaria and of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce:

"The character of the new Bulgarian Cabinet is leftist, but not Communist. The most influential member is the War Minister, Damian Velchev, for many years Chief of the Military College at Sofia. The Minister President, Kimon Georgiev, and the Minister of Propaganda, Dimo Kazassov, are friends of his, and the three represent the political group of Zveno in the Cabinet. All three are honest and incorruptible. They are strongly anti-German and in favor of a federation with Yugoslavia; they are anti-Communist, but in favor of an understanding with Russia."

[REDACTED] is well acquainted with these men and is therefore

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in a position to know what their ideas are. For the same reason he can speak with regard to two other Cabinet members, Dimitr Neikov and Grigor Cheshmedgiev, who are representatives of the Independent Social Democrats. At one time they were members of the Second Socialistic International and were opposed to Bolshevism. They are now strongly democratic and in favor of a federation of the Balkan states."

"Two other members of the Cabinet who are pro-democratic and anti-Communist are Professor Petko Stainov and Professor Petko Stojanov. The former was once a member of the Democratic Union, but became associated with the Zveno group after the revolt of 1934. The latter once belonged to the Radical Democratic Party. Of the other Cabinet members, two are known as Communists with connections in Moscow: Minister of the Interior Anton Jugov, and Neichev."

"The Cabinet is supported by the Left Farmers Party, which is represented by Nicolai Petkov, Bumbarov, and Derjanski. These men are said to be democrats and friendly to the United Nations."

"The Cabinet is democratic in nature and intends to liquidate quickly the Fascist and pro-German elements in the country, and then give the people a chance to form their

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By DRS Date JUN 11 1973

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
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own government. [redacted] believes that the Minister President is sincere in this intention."

"In the approaching elections, there may well be a bitter fight between the democratic and the pro-Bolshevik elements, but [redacted] believes that the former will prevail with a large majority. This will be certain if the Right Agrarian Party, whose leader is Gichev, is represented in the Cabinet. In any event, [redacted] believes it is sure that the large majority of the people will favor a federation with Yugoslavia.



William J. Donovan
Director

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached report. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF: OSS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 October 1944

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will find of interest the following report which we have received from our representative in Bern:

"The Swiss press publishes a report from Chiasso of a new military revolt in Germany under high Wehrmacht officers. There is no confirmation of this report.

"A report by the Budapest correspondent of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung on October 9 says that there is great alarm among the Swiss colony in Budapest but no general evacuation as yet contemplated.


"The same paper reports a Sofia broadcast on October 6 by two former Hungarian diplomats announcing that three Hungarians in Bulgaria formed a PETOFI Society and a KLAPKA Committee named after Polish Generals who fought for Hungary's liberty against Austria in 1848. The paper said that all Hungarian

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diplomats in free countries broke with the Quisling
Budapest government when the Germans occupied Hungary
and are in contact with the United Nations.



William J. Donovan
Director

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