MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On 2 September I sent to you and the JCS a memorandum containing my hypothesis of the German resistance we shall meet following the disintegration of open military opposition. I undertook to describe the forms of underground resistance we should find; the methods to be employed against it; the likelihood that we should meet carefully trained, specialized groups that would fight because of their identification with the party leadership--instead of a grass-roots people's army.

Acting upon that assumption, we are proceeding as follows:

1. We have set up an intelligence service, both tactical and strategic.

In the tactical sense we are making available to the armed forces through the service of OSS Detachments with our forward divisions agents whom we have passed through the lines. We are also employing Alsations, French workmen and other foreigners now in Germany.
In the strategic phase we have already penetrated certain German government offices (which intelligence you have received over a period) and have been particularly fortunate in establishing contact with certain elements of German labor groups who have been helping us with great gallantry and efficiency.

In addition we have been working with the French organization charged with aiding French Prisoners of War and deported laborers, and have made arrangements with the Danes and Norwegians for cooperation in the underground phase.

We have been undertaking this work from Sweden and Switzerland, as well as from the front lines.

2. We have in operation with the forward elements of the Allied Armies in Germany units engaged in counterespionage against the Germans. Operations of these units are similar to those in Rome about which I wrote you on 27 July 1944 and our more recent operations in France. Throughout we have kept the German underground problem in mind. In addition to work against Nazi agents, valuable data has been obtained on potential underground leaders. We have information on more than 250,000 agents.
SECRET

and suspects. SHAEF has been supplied with data on more than 50,000 suspects and underground personalities. Many German agents have been identified; several hundred have been arrested.

But we must also be ready to meet with appropriate counter-measures—physical and morale—the sabotage that will be carried on against us. There is already evidence of this in France, where we have been asked particularly to take counter-measures against enemy sabotage of communications lines.

In order to carry on this work in Germany after the cessation of organized military resistance, OSS has been asked by the Allied Control Council to participate as a unit in their work. Our services would be employed for intelligence, counter-espionage and countermeasures against enemy sabotage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have already approved this proposal in principle.

Some time ago I sent you a memorandum setting forth in detail the activities of a group of German nationals identified with the labor movement and an active group in the Lutheran and Catholic churches, with both of which we have established contact. They will provide invaluable aid in meeting the underground.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our Berne representative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am enclosing the latest radiotelephone report from our representative in Berne, which I think you will find interesting. This message sets forth some of the factors which lead to the conclusion that the German Volkssturm has proved a failure.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
GERMANY

An analysis of the various reports we have received here with regard to the Volkssturm indicates that this desperate measure of the Germans has proved a failure. Taken as a whole, probably it has had a weakening rather than a strengthening effect on the German internal situation. Here are some of the factors which lead to this conclusion:

1. The fact that the Volkssturm was announced in a message by Himmler, even though purporting to emanate from the Führer, tends to create the impression in some people's minds that it is a Party rather than a national measure, that it was intended to place the whole people more directly under the control of the SS. A report I have here quotes a German worker, age 48, as stating that he would respond if the people had called him up, but not if called up by the Party. Of course, this is probably a rare instance, and most of the people are too frightened not to respond.

2. It has brought home to the German people Germany's critical shortage of man-power as nothing else could have done. The fact that the Volkssturm, when they are called up, are not given adequate arms is also clear evidence to the German people of the shortage of war materials as well as the shortage of men.

3. The fanatical Nazis are mostly among the younger generation. The Volkssturm is composed mostly of the older generation. Among the Volkssturm, there are many who are sick and tired of the Nazis, and it is a dangerous experiment for the Nazis -- and they realize it -- to group these men together to give them a chance to exchange views. The fact that the Volkssturm are not allowed to keep any arms, except during the short period of actual training, shows how little confidence the Nazi leaders have in the men they are recruiting.

4. From an economic point of view, the recruiting of the Volkssturm, if it is really carried out as planned, would have disastrous effects. The workers are already working too long hours to have any strength left for drilling, and any strength they give to the Volkssturm training is a direct reduction of the time and effort which they can put in on their work in the
factories and munitions plants.

6. Finally, the arrival at the front of the ill-trained, ill-clothed, and semi-decent reinforcements is likely to have a most depressing effect upon the thinning ranks of the war-hardened veterans of the Wehrmacht. It will help to bring home to them the hopelessness of their struggle, to see that this rabble is all that Germany now has to offer for the front ranks.

Thus, it is safe to conclude that the depressing moral effects and the harmful economic effects of having been forced to resort to the Volkssturm will more than counter-balance the very slight military advantages of this expedient.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the attached memorandum, containing intelligence transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By Date JUN 11 1973

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following intelligence, dated 30 November:

Giuseppe Biccherai, secretary to Bishop Schuster of Milan, has just arrived secretly in Bern, having used a German exit permit. Biccherai asked to see the OSS representative in Bern and the British intelligence representative. He has brought a project said to have been prepared by ecclesiastical authorities in Milan, presumably after consultation with the Germans and the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, for a German evacuation of north Italy.

The OSS representative understands that the plan provides that the Germans will spare north Italy from destruction if Allied forces will allow them to withdraw unmolested. The interest of the ecclesiastical authorities in Milan is apparently to prevent disorders which they feel might lead to Communist domination of north Italy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622
By Date JUN 11 1973

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested
in the enclosed message received from our representative in Berne. Will you be good enough to see
that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Name]
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
067622
By Date JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, forwarded by the OSS representative in Bern, forms a sequel to my memorandum to you of 1 December concerning a proposed agreement, allegedly sponsored by the ecclesiastical authorities of Milan, for a German evacuation of north Italy:

Bicchierai, secretary to Cardinal Schuster of Milan, has presented the OSS representative in Bern, the British intelligence representative in Bern, and SOE, with a five-page memorandum. This memorandum, according to Bicchierai, represents the views not only of Cardinal Schuster of Milan, but also of the Cardinals of Turin and Genoa, who constitute the highest ecclesiastical authorities in the entire area of north Italy likely to be evacuated by the Germans. The four principal points of the proposed agreement are as follows:

1. The Germans are to agree not to destroy public utilities or other establishments of no immediate military importance, to cease deportations of men and the confiscation of livestock. The Germans may, however, destroy roads, railroad junctions, bridges, etc.
2. The Committee of National Liberation of North Italy is to agree through the ecclesiastical authorities not to obstruct the German withdrawal by armed or terrorist action. This agreement would bind bands under the control of the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy, as well as those bands which would be approached by the ecclesiastical authorities.

3. The geographical scope of the agreement, which could be so framed as to apply either locally or to the entire north Italian area to be evacuated, remains to be defined.

4. The agreement would presuppose the adherence of the Germans and of the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy, and at least a tacit understanding on the part of Anglo-American authorities.

Bicchierai comments that while such an agreement would appear to benefit the enemy by guaranteeing the security of the German rear during withdrawal, this advantage would be more apparent than real. For the most part the Germans use Fascist forces to check Italian partisan activity. Furthermore, the partisans themselves are disorganized by a lack of supplies to meet winter conditions. Finally, the plans drawn up by the Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Action Party for harassing the German withdrawal have already been discovered by the enemy, who remains ignorant only of Communist plans.
It is reported that when first approached, the German Ambassador to the Fascist Government, Rahn, was opposed to the plan, alleging that previous experience in Rome had shown that the Anglo-Americans broke their agreement by using for military purposes the bridges of Rome, which otherwise would have been destroyed by the Germans. During later conferences Rahn appeared more favorably inclined, but indicated that, in order for the understanding to be binding on all German forces, an agreement would have to be reached with SS General Wolff and Marshal Kesselring as soon as the latter has recovered. Rahn also insisted that the church authorities obtain the adherence of the Communists and pointed out that, whereas any German failure to fulfill the agreement would be apparent eight or ten days before evacuation (since widespread demolitions could not be accomplished in a single day), a breach on the part of the partisans and the Liberation Committee could take place without warning.

The Liberation Committee objected that the Germans would not keep their word and would seize upon any act of terrorism as evidence of violation of the agreement. They further argued that the agreement might be violated by Fascist elements. To meet this argument, the ecclesiastical authorities suggest a rapid evacuation of Fascist forces as part of the agreement, and the immediate transfer of administrative powers to trusted
persons. Finally, the Liberation Committee objected that to discontinue partisan warfare would be contrary to the whole spirit of the resistance, and would prejudice north Italy in the eyes of the Allies. The memorandum counters these objections by emphasizing the desire of the north Italian population to avoid any further acts of destruction and the necessity of preserving installations necessary to the reconstruction of north Italy.

Bicchierai states that the plan has been presented to General Cadorna (commanding general of the resistance forces under the Committee of Liberation of North Italy) through an intermediary, and that church authorities understand Cadorna is not opposed in principle, since he realizes the limitations to which partisan action is subject under present conditions. It is also reported that a copy of the memorandum is being sent to the Vatican by the Papal Nuncio in Bern.

Church authorities are said to believe that the plan may be accepted by the Germans and that the parties of the Liberation Committee might be won over, though the reaction of the Communists and the Action Party has so far been unfavorable. While no specific agreement is required of the British and American authorities, and it is not contemplated that Allied forces would allow the Germans to withdraw unmolested, church authorities feel that their plan can succeed only if strong pressure is brought to bear on the north Italian Communists.
by Anglo-American or Soviet authorities. Without Communist adherence to the proposed agreement, it is thought, the church plan could not be realized, and the only point of continuing negotiations would be to lull the Germans into a false sense of security.

The memorandum concludes with the statement that the Communists hope to profit from the total destruction of north Italy which would result from an abortive insurrection, and that, if the American and British forces wish to avoid Communism, they should prevent such an insurrection by supporting the plan advocated by the ecclesiastical authorities. Bicchierai, who impressed the OSS representative and his British colleagues in Bern with his sincerity, stressed the view of the Cardinals that the church now represents the only real authority for law and order in north Italy. He added that if the Allies could suggest some better plan than that set forth in the memorandum, and which fell within the proper sphere of church authorities, the latter would do their utmost to cooperate.

The OSS representative, the British intelligence representative, and SOE, stated that this was a matter for their respective military authorities, and that copies of the memorandum would be forwarded to them. Bicchierai is returning shortly to Milan, but could be called back to Bern at any time, providing a German visa could be obtained.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007/22
JUN 11 1973

By Date
The OSS representative in Bern comments that the above information confirms previous evidence received in Bern that the Germans desire to evacuate Piedmont, Lombardy, and other north Italian areas at the earliest possible date.

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  

Dear Grace:

I think the President would be interested in seeing the attached message from our representative in Kandy. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Kandy (Ceylon) has transmitted the following reliable information. The Japanese have strongly pressed Thai officials to surrender the custody of two (OSS) infiltrated Thai intelligence teams. General Yamada [Chief of Staff, Japanese Garrison Army in Thailand] himself went to the Thai Commander in Chief [General Yothin] with this request. The Thai agreed to send the groups to the Liaison Department for interrogation. This Department is under Thai jurisdiction and composed entirely of Thai officers, but Japanese Liaison officers have been temporarily assigned a separate reception room for interrogations. The groups may receive much better treatment than they would if turned over to the Japanese Military Police (Kempei, or gendarmerie).

The OSS representative also reports, on the basis of information received from British secret intelligence (SOE), that the Japanese have demanded: (1) the Thai Government deliver all infiltrated Thai agents to them, and (2) legislation be enacted to abolish the civil rights of Thai agents parachuted into the country. A forty million ticals payment ($16,-000,000 pre-war exchange rate) was set as penalty for failure.
to comply with these demands. The British source states that the Thai Government refused to comply and is considering payment of the penalty for fear the Japanese will flood the country with valueless occupation currency.

The Thai Government's attitude of cooperation with Allied objectives is further demonstrated by their taking downed British airmen to civilian internment camps, as reported by British (SOE) intelligence.

William J. Donovan
Director.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the enclosed radiotelephone message from our Berne representative will be interesting to the President. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence on Germany has been transmitted, via radiotelephone, by the OSS representative in Berne:

"1. Goebbels is getting very hard up for something to say in his weekly articles. This week, in *Das Reich*, he has descended to the depths of praising the accuracy of the German news reporting. Here is a brief summary of what he has to say:

"Mistakes are very rare in the German news service, but how often have our enemies been mistaken in their prophecies about the war? They have not even been close in their forecast of the course of the war or its duration. When a date which has been fixed for the end of the war proves wrong, they simply set another date. We cannot and do not wish to imitate them in this respect. It is for this reason that the German communiques contain the most serious and reliable war information. Not merely its dates, but also its pictures are exact, and, in case of doubt, the version unfavorable to us is given. When we lose a battleship, we publish the news the next day. In the U. S. A., the public must wait a year or more for such a report. The German news policy is based on complete
confidence in the German people. Our comment on war news is studied, sober, and objective. We usually leave it to the people to form their own judgments concerning the war and its problems. For over five weeks, the British war cabinet caused the public to believe that London was bombarded solely by V-1, while millions of people were witnesses of the use of the new German long-range weapon, which is incomparably more destructive than the V-1. In order to be able to judge a given war situation intelligently, and to develop far-reaching military and political plans based thereon, it is necessary to have not merely sterile technical knowledge, but above all respect for the existing circumstances.

"2. From reports reaching here, it seems likely that quite a number of persons whom we have written off as recently executed by the Gestapo will turn up quite alive at the end of the war. Possibly they will come out of concentration camps or prisons, but still alive. For example, I have just heard that the reports of the slaughter of the wife and children of Stauffenberg and his brother's family are incorrect. This story, and possibly other, similar stories, were apparently deliberately spread by the Gestapo to strike terror. As time goes on, we will probably find many other similar examples."

William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C.

4 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. Will you kindly see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Berne has transmitted, by radiotelephone, the following intelligence on France:

"I have here what seems to be an interesting comment regarding the American forces in France. It was given to a close friend of mine in the course of conversation. The remarks were made by one of the keenest Swiss writers of Leftist tendencies, who has often been inclined to be somewhat critical of us, because he felt America was somewhat of a plutocracy. My friend returned from the visit to France enchanted with what he had seen of the American troops. Here is what he had to say:

"All the talk about plutocracy as applied to the American soldier is nonsense; that is to say, plutocracy in the sense of an evil spirit to fear. Americans are not in any sense what the word implies, but there is the same reaction of fear for the Americans in France that he has experienced here in Switzerland: fear of their might, fear of their simplicity, and fear of their vitality, to say nothing of fear of their actual wealth.

"One of the most unsettling things for the French has been to recognize that the efficiency of the Americans surpasses
the efficiency of the Germans, even though this efficiency has the appearance of being less efficient. Americans at work are a gorgeous sight that leaves the Europeans gasping. The Americans should be seen at work and not at play to get a really positive picture of them.

"The contact between the French people and the Americans is excellent, and the fact that so much of the American efficiency benefits the Left rather than the Right is very helpful. Also, the fact that the Americans have very little effective spending money has worked out extremely satisfactorily. There was much apprehension that, with their money, the soldiers would bring inflation, that it was excellent for the French to see what it is like to find Americans with comparatively little money to spend."

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

5 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which contains information received from our representative in Caserta. Will you kindly see that it reaches him?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information from Belgrade has been transmitted and rated B-2 by the OSS representative in Cazerta:

Minor Partisan officials in Belgrade are reported to be placing obstacles in the way of foreigners who attempt to make any contact with local civilians. Politically reliable intellectuals, with whom contact had been established, are increasingly reluctant to see Allied officers because of unconfirmed but probably accurate reports of arrests resulting solely from visits to Allied officers and journalists.

It is reliably reported that the Partisans, in filling new government posts, are ignoring many Communists and democrats of long standing, who were imprisoned by the Nedich and pre-war Yugoslav regimes. This attitude is said to be causing considerable confusion and resentment among Yugoslav intellectuals. There is increasing evidence that the more prominent quislings and former Mihailovich supporters are being interrogated and tried with such haste that some are punished for trivialities, while some ardent collaborationists are acquitted.

William J. Donovan
Director
December 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN

I think you should show report on Latin America to Ed Stettinius and Nelson Rockefeller.

F. D. R.
30 November 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will find of interest the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
30 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a report on Latin America which has been made available to us by
I think it may be of interest to you.

William J. Donovan
Director
SUMMARY

United States prestige in Latin America is presently at its lowest ebb due to its own lack of a clearly conceived policy and to the adverse effect exercised by the Hispanidad or Latinidad movement, Spanish Falange-inspired clerical influences, the Nazi Fifth Column and the British.

The crux of the situation in Latin America is Argentina. Unless the Argentinian situation is changed, the United States is bound not only to lose its last shred of influence in Latin America, but its position in world affairs will be weakened as well. A Latin American bloc independent of the U. S. appears in the process of formation.

There is today in Latin America not a single organized group which is pro-United States. Our policy has alienated the democratic groups throughout Latin America. An anti-Yankee drive, as the United States reduces its purchases in Latin America, is in the offering. Unless the present trend in Latin America be reversed, it may find its position in world councils jeopardized by lack of the supporting vote of the 20 American Republics.

Of the three larger powers: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Mexico can be the only effective instrumentality for winning Latin American sympathies. If the United States antagonizes Mexico, we stand to lose out in all of Latin America.

CONCLUSIONS

1) Under no circumstances can we sit down with the present Argentine government at any Pan American Conference.

2) An early change in the Argentine situation is imperative and ought to be brought about by any of the methods outlined in the memorandum.

3) Mexico should be our main instrumentality in fostering a more friendly sentiment toward the United States in Latin America.
Re: Latin America

After visiting all of Latin America with the exception of Paraguay, Bolivia and Honduras and on the basis of previous visits to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, the writer has reached the conclusion that the United States is in real and immediate danger of losing whatever influence it has thus far exercised in Latin America.

United States influence has reached an all time low ebb in Latin America. However, much more than our influence in Latin America is at stake. The United States position in world politics will suffer unless the present trend is reversed. The United States may find itself isolated at the international councils and compelled to play a lone hand for lack of the supporting vote of the 20 American republics. Thus, our bargaining strength vis a vis Britain and Russia may be impaired.

A Latin American bloc - not guided by the U.S. - but independent and even to some extent hostile to the U.S. is in the process of formation - if not already existent.

There is concrete evidence for this assertion. The alacrity with which some Latin American governments welcomed the Argentine proposal for a conference, the united action taken by all Latin American representatives at the Chicago Aviation Conference, the opposition openly voiced by various Latin American governments to the decisions taken at Dumbarton Oaks offer abundant proof of the seriousness of the situation we face.

A good deal of whispering has gone on between various Latin American governments during the last six months. There can be hardly any doubt that at least some of them are acting in collusion.
No matter what the sentiments of Latin American governments and nations be regarding the Argentine situation, some of them enjoyed the spectacle of a Latin American government defying the U.S.A. and getting away with it. Even if some of them disapprove of the present Argentine regime they hope that Argentina will win in her struggle with the U.S. It would create a precedent they all desire. The resignation of Aranha, the premature action taken by Colombia—publicly announcing its consent to the Argentine proposal, the recognition of the Aguirre regime of El Salvador by Nicaragua and Honduras without prior consultation with the U.S. and the other governments, would not have occurred without the example set by Argentina.

We shall lose the last shred of influence and prestige we have in Latin America if the diplomatic offensive undertaken by Argentina proves successful. We cannot afford to accept the Argentine proposal after all the strong public statements we have made. The position of the Argentine Government has been already strengthened by the reception its proposal has received.

Sentiment against the U.S. in almost all countries is stronger today than a year or two ago. As we approach the end of the war we are facing the definite danger of an out and out anti-Yankee drive in Latin America.

The reasons are manifold. Nazi propaganda has been effective. Our counter-effort has not been as effective. The fear of the "colossus in the North" has been assiduously stimulated. Germany has not confined itself to press and radio propaganda. It has created a strong fifth column. Nazi influence even today still exists—and not only in Argentina. (In Caracas, for example, the crown and sceptre for the queen elected to preside over the International Baseball Series were purchased at the store of Johan Cathman and
exhibited in his show windows. J.C. is a well-known Nazi who subsidized Nazi propaganda.)

Germany pursued a different method than ours. Germany placed any number of officials in the various government departments, members of the cabinets, relatives of the presidents, persons in the army, navy, air force, and, invariably, the police on its payroll. In some countries, this was tantamount to taking over part of the administration. The German method was cheap and very effective. Our method was expensive and ineffective. We spent twenty times the German sum in impersonal credits, part of which disappeared in the pockets of politicians, but nobody was under specific obligations to the U.S. No one had to work overtime for the U.S. as many did for Germany.

Anti-U.S. propaganda has been greatly aided by Spain and by Spanish-influenced clerical forces. Many hundreds of pro-Falange priests have arrived in Latin America from Europe in recent years, many of them devoting themselves to propaganda against our country. Unfortunately the British also have done their bit in weakening our position. Their attitude is particularly surprising and shortsighted. The British spent less than ten percent of what we expended in Latin America. They have been sitting back, enjoying our blunders and profiting by them.

After the Revolution of 1812, French revolutionary ideas and British and American influence were dominant in Latin America. Today Latin America concentrates on one aim; to emerge from its semi-colonial status. The drive is directed not only against the U.S. but against the Anglo-Saxon world in general. (Argentina knows it is not strong enough to face both the U.S. and Britain at
the same time. But sooner or later it will inevitably turn against Great Britain as well. I pointed this out to Mr. Erwin, the British Minister in Panama, whose reluctant reply was "Perhaps you are right.")

What powers aim to replace the Anglo-Saxon influence? Hispanidad and Latinidad! A Latin bloc - Latin America linking herself with Spain, France, and Italy seems to be in the offing, and which Britain will attempt to manipulate.

This development can seriously affect the U.S. If, in the international organization which is to be set up, the countries in this hemisphere do not join us, our influence and prestige will be seriously reduced.

In addition to the array of powerful outside influences which are consistently working against us, we have weakened our own position because we have no policy. Not a single organized group in Latin America stands solidly with us. The Good Neighbor Policy has become identified with our non-intervention policy as practised toward Spain. It has been a Good Neighbor Policy between governments and not between the peoples of this hemisphere. We are a good neighbor to quite a few fascist and reactionary governments. We have thus antagonized the liberal and democratic elements in a number of countries.

Our only sincere and reliable allies can and will be only these progressive elements. Latin America tends to extremes. Latin American conservatives will be our ardent allies if we wish to be guided by fear of bolshevist tendencies. They will never cooperate with us in fighting reactionary or fascist tendencies.
The danger in Latin America today is not from the Left but from the Right. The progressive element in Latin America, if enjoying our friendship, will allow itself to be influenced and restrained by us. We will be aided in this by the growing middle class and the progressive industrialists.

A liberal Argentinian pointed out to me how weak American policy towards Argentina has been thus far. "The U.S. has made strong statements," he said, "but it has not followed through with action. On the same day Hull announced that our government would not be recognized, we read in our papers that the U.S. had bought 10 million pounds of our corn. As a matter of fact even your latest decision not to permit U.S. ships to dock in Argentine ports is not very impressive. You have continued to buy from Argentina. Your purchases will amount to two hundred million dollars this year - sixty million dollars more than in 1941. On the other hand, you have reduced U.S. exports to us from one hundred million dollars to twenty-five million, thus punishing only the American exporter. We would know that you meant business had you stopped all purchases; if you would not allow a single letter to or from the United States to cross our borders; if you would not allow a single plane to land on our territory. Such an economic blockade on the part of the U.S. alone - even without the participation of England - would have made a deep impression. In all likelihood it would have brought about the overthrow of the present government."

Our economic policy throughout Latin America has further entrenched our difficulties. Because of it, the rich in Latin America are richer and the poor are poorer. Because of this policy, antagonism to the U.S. has been
intensified. Take Brazil as an example. For no country have we done so much. Nevertheless anti-American sentiment there today is stronger than before. (I was told by an important industrialist that the Brazilian would prefer to buy from the English if their prices equalled ours.) The reasons are very illuminating. As in most other countries there is inflation in Brazil. Prices have climbed three to four hundred percent - creating grave hardships for the masses. The American who buys in Brazil is compelled to pay three or four times more than he did before but the Brazilian who imports U.S. goods is protected by a rate of exchange which we have pegged and by our price ceilings. Whatever he imports he sells at a profit of a thousand or twelve hundred percent, or more. Assiduous propaganda has been drilling into the Brazilian the idea that the U.S. is responsible for the terrific price rises. Thus we are the suckers and at the same time we are blamed and heartily criticized. This is one example out of many. (A real estate crash in Brazil appears to be inevitable. Real estate prices have mounted beyond reason largely due to insurance companies, whose coffers are bulging with new revenues obtained from the Social Security program, and by importers who, unable to do business with Europe, have invested heavily in real estate. The banks seem to be less involved, but nevertheless the real estate crash may lead to a serious economic crisis.)

We are now reducing our purchases in Latin America and in the future we will certainly not buy at the same high prices we paid during the war. When Latin America's economic difficulties will thus be further increased, anti-American sentiment will inevitably rise - particularly if an impoverished
Europe—unless financed by the U.S.—will not be able to replace American purchases.

The time has come when we can no longer afford to drift. We must take a position if we don't want to see all Latin America gang up on us.

The Argentine Government can and must be overthrown. This is imperative if we wish to regain our prestige and influence in Latin America. The situation is growing worse every day. Argentina's immediate neighbors live under constant economic and political pressure, and military threats on the part of Argentina.

Intervention decades ago may have been a reactionary policy. Today non-intervention against a fascist regime in the midst of a war against fascism in Europe is a reactionary policy for which the democratic and liberal elements are not grateful to us. Intervention if not in the interest of the U.S., but in order to help the people to choose their own government is an entirely different matter. It would be a deed of liberation. We cannot continue our policy of appeasement or Chamberlainism.

The democratic elements are not strong enough to overthrow their fascist governments, some of which have received tanks and planes from the U.S. with which they are holding down their people. Foreign assistance is indispensable. This is true not only of Latin American countries but even of Spain, whose entire history is one of governments being overthrown by foreign intervention, and which today will be hardly able to rid itself of Franco without foreign help. However, open intervention may not be necessary. The Argentine Government is very weak. It is divided. Perón, Peluffo and Farrell
are rivals for power. (By the way, Farrell is not a dummy. He is pro-
Nazi and exercises quite some influence.) The Government is not backed by a
single political party - not even by the Nationalists for whom this Government
is too moderate. The army too is divided in not less than six groups. The first
is for Peron, the second is for Peluffo, the third is for Farrell, the fourth
is for the Nationalists, the fifth is indifferent, (or rather wishes to see
the army get out of the government - believing that the army is being dis-
credited by the Government; this group wants all generals to get out, including
Peron), the sixth sympathizes with the opposition. However the opposition too -
and this is one of the main difficulties - is divided. Argentina's Radicals -
the country's most important party - have not joined the opposition. They be-
lieve the Government's assurances that elections will be held. For this reason
the Radicals, who have won all elections since 1916 which were not manipulated
by the Government, do not see any reason to share the power with other parties.

The opposition today consists of Conservatives, Socialists, Communists
and a sprinkling of Radicals. The Government is aware of its weakness since the
demonstration on the day Paris fell. This is the main reason why it is trying
to retrace its steps. Unless we strengthen this Government by sitting down with
it at a Pan-American Conference it may be overthrown by the huge demonstration
to be expected on the day Germany breaks down. Today the opposition is col-
lecting funds in Argentina in order to buy arms. Seven to eight thousand
people going into the streets with arms could, in my opinion, overthrow the
regime. The military force at Campo de Mayo is only ten thousand strong and
is divided. The soldiers stationed there will not be keen to shoot their
countrymen. However, private fund-raising can not be relied upon to furnish the supplies of arms which the opposition requires.

Argentina is better prepared than any other Latin American country for a democratic regime. Seventy-five percent of her people belong to the middle class. There is no other Latin American country with such a large one. Nor has any other Latin American country as independent and powerful a press - comparatively free from corruption - as has Argentina. The middle class is the backbone and the greatest source of strength for an existing democracy. But the middle class is not a revolutionary class which creates a democracy. If we go ahead and sit down at one table with the Argentine Government, thus strengthening its fascist regime - we will antagonize every liberal-minded Argentine citizen who today hopefully looks to the U.S.

There is more than one way of overthrowing the present Argentine government:

1) Joint American British action. An economic blockade effected by the United States and Britain would bring about the overthrow of the government in very few weeks. The economic help Britain receives, and further help it expects from us, is not the only argument. Britain is busy establishing a west European bloc, which may afford the British a stronghold on all undeveloped territories of the world and weaken our possibilities. If it desires our cooperation or acquiescence it should give us full cooperation in our hemisphere - though this would hardly be a sufficient quid pro quo.
2) Collective action by all American republics. This will be more difficult now than a year ago. It would mean supplying Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Brazil with all the necessities they receive today from Argentina, and at the same prices. This would be a protracted and costly process.

3) Encouraging the opposition within Argentina by supplying it with funds and arms. Committees "to help free Argentina" should be established in various Latin American countries, and a considerable part of the support should reach the opposition from the various Latin American countries. This movement could be quickly and effectively organized. This movement would create, for the first time in years, an intimate bond between all democratic elements in Latin America and the United States.

We can not look on passively while within our hemisphere a fascist country arms herself to the teeth constituting an ever-increasing threat to her neighbors.

We must cease playing the sucker. Latin American politics are full of subtleties and subject to intricate thinking. Let us take Brazil again as an example. I have it from an excellent source that on the day Hull announced the U.S. would not recognize the Argentine regime Vargas told a friend of his, "Hull is going too far. His policy is too harsh. If he had asked me to, I could have straightened out the difficulties with Argentina." With this remark Vargas betrayed his true sentiments. He prefers a dictatorship in Argentina to a democracy. The reason is obvious. If, with Germany's defeat, a democratic
wave should sweep the world, the Vargas regime would be more isolated and endangered if Argentina becomes a democracy. Nevertheless, Vargas does not see any reason why he should not exploit the Argentine situation to the fullest extent. With the Argentine situation remaining unsettled Brazil is more important than ever for us. Vargas sees no reason why he should not obtain from us additional arms supplies as well as commercial and political benefits.

There is another thought in his mind. Opposition against him is today stronger than ever. Even many industrialists and landowners are against Vargas because of higher taxes and of course they would prefer a more secure legal system. If the opposition should reach a dangerous degree, a war against Argentina would divert attention from internal difficulties; consolidate his regime. If Vargas sends troops to Southern Brazil they are not necessarily intended for protection of his frontiers but for his own protection. Most uprisings in Brazil originate in the South. At the same time - while Brazil is protesting her friendship for the U.S. and clamoring for further assistance - prominent Brazilians are assuring their Argentine friends, "You know we are with you. We share your ideology; you have all our sympathies but we are being pressed by the U.S."

Such a policy of insincerity and inner contradictions is nothing new in Latin America. To some extent we have ourselves worsened the situation by paying excessive attention to every gesture made by Latin American governments. We are making too much noise and appear to be no end preoccupied with Latin American problems. Latin American countries today are suffering from a highly inflated feeling of self importance.

The longer we delay taking a position the more hopeless the situation grows. We must make up our minds who are our real friends and we must work
with them. We cannot continue in a political vacuum. Our present policy of neutrality merely alienates those who base their hopes on us. This was forcefully demonstrated to me when I visited El Salvador. That country's police chief installed himself as its president after forcing out former President Menendez at pistol point. The head of the Supreme Court, Dr. Molina, is, according to all indications, the legitimate and constitutional provisional president. The U.S. Embassy in El Salvador received petitions signed by not less than twenty-five thousand Salvadoreans repudiating Aguirre and asking for U.S. recognition of Molina as President. The Salvadorean people do not understand why we have not done so and why their legitimate government receives no encouragement from us. We are quickly losing the sympathy of these people to whom our policy is a source of great disillusionment.

Just as unpopular as the U.S. is making herself with her aloof and indifferent attitude towards the keyed-up, passionate sentiment of the democratic element - just as popular is Mexico. Mexico because of her consistent policy with regard to Franco has won the heart of all liberal-minded people in Latin America. The Mexican Embassy in El Salvador is crowded with political opponents of Aguirre to whom it is affording asylum. Mexican popularity in all parts of Central and South America is very strong. Mexico has become the focal hope of the suppressed masses in all Latin America.

Another important point in the Latin American situation - we must decide which of the Latin American countries can be our most important ally and whose influence in Latin American affairs we are prepared to strengthen. Of the three major countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Mexico is the only possible choice. We cannot choose Argentina even if it were a democracy because
of the predominating British influence. We cannot choose Brazil because of the type of regime it possesses — unless we wish to further antagonize the democratic elements in all Latin America. (Also because of her different language, Brazil exercises little influence in Spanish-speaking Latin America.)

If we lose Mexico, instead of more firmly than ever attracting it to our side, all of Latin America will be lost to us. As the situation now is, should Mexico be estranged from us, we would precipitate a development which would hasten the process we are now witnessing: that of a Latin America turning away from the U.S. and even adopting an antagonistic attitude. This under all circumstances must be avoided.
5 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing a copy of the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne, which I think the President will find interesting. Will you be kind enough to see that it is drawn to his attention? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the attached radiotelephone message from the OSS representative in Berne, which summarizes an article in a recent issue of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
GERMANY

Here is a summary of an interesting article in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of December 3:

There are some indications that Hitler's influence has waned in Germany. This is not because of his invisibility and silence; it also seems to be evidenced from the trend of German policy. For instance, the playing up of Vlassov and his Russian Committee of Liberation conflicts with the consistent policy of the Fuehrer. Hitler would never countenance any idea of a Russian Army of Liberation, and as Vlassov has undoubtedly attached certain conditions to his collaboration along these lines which Hitler has always refused to accept heretofore, the fact of Vlassov's quasi-recognition now seems to prove that the Fuehrer is no longer the power behind the throne.

There has been an uncomfortable feeling among the leaders of German foreign policy since July 20 last, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop missed a good chance of positive and beneficial action in the days of German successes and has been unable to take any steps to improve the situation when the darker days came because of Hitler's absolute refusal to change his attitude. In the case of Poland, Hitler long refused any concessions whatever, although the trouble between Poland and Russia afforded very favorable occasions for a change in German policy towards Poland. It seems likely that Hitler practically had to be hoodwinked into an effort to conciliate the Poles. This also is an indication of the decline of Hitler's influence.

These are more sign-posts, but they seem to fit in with the theory that for several months Hitler has had a small influence in military and political decisions. It appears that there is a direct connection between the twelfth of July and this situation. Hitler escaped with no immediate impairment of his health and faculties then, but soon afterwards many serious consequences became manifest, indicating, at least, some impairment of his capacity to make important decisions. Actually, there is nothing to prove that this is anything but a passing phase.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think?

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622

By SR Date: NOV 27 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our office in Sweden has raised for immediate decision a question which will arise with increasing frequency in connection with those of German nationality who work for us behind German lines. We are asked specifically what we are prepared to do in their behalf in regard to offering firm guarantees of protection and post-armistice privileges to Germans whom we recruit and who work loyally for our organization. Among these privileges would be permission for entry into the United States after the war, the placing of their earnings on deposit in an American bank and the like. We shall, of course, institute appropriate controls.

On this we will need authority which only you can give.

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C.I.A.

SECRET
By 8K Date NOV 27 1973
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

5 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum for the President, containing intelligence transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta, which is a sequel to my former memoranda to him of 1 and 2 December. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By Date 11/14/1973
5 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence, transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta, forms a sequel to my memoranda to you dated 1 and 2 December, concerning a proposal, allegedly sponsored by ecclesiastical authorities in Milan, for a German evacuation of north Italy:

According to Ferruccio Parri [Action Party Leader] of the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy, Bichierai is not the secretary of Cardinal Schuster. In approaching the British intelligence, SOE, and OSS representatives in Bern, Bichierai claimed to be secretary to Cardinal Schuster of Milan, and asserted that the memorandum he presented was sponsored by Schuster and the Cardinals of Turin and Genoa. Parri characterized Bichierai as untrustworthy and stated that he has had close relations with German authorities as well as with a Commendatore Benucci, who is reputed to be a German spy and double agent. It is reported that in September the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy was approached indirectly by the ecclesiastical authorities of Milan (in particular through one Manozza, a Christian Democrat and friend of Bichierai) regarding a possible armistice
in Milan, in return for which the Germans were to have left Milanese industries undamaged. The Liberation Committee, according to Parri, refused to take part in any negotiations at that time or since.

\[\text{Signature:}\]

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a report on present conditions inside Germany which I think will be of interest to the President. I will be grateful if you can see that it reaches him.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

6 December 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There follows a report on conditions inside Germany which the Office of Strategic Services has received from its representative in Bern. In view of the continuing accomplishments and experience of this representative in securing authentic material from German sources and in developing intelligence of a high order in German technical matters, it is believed that his reports are entitled to particular credence:

"It is extremely difficult to appraise the various reports that come out of Germany as to what is taking place there. Here is a report which on the surface appears not improbable, but that is all one can say for it.

"Hitler has serious throat trouble which prevents him from speaking, and is now reported to have gone to Bad Ischl for treatment. In addition to throat trouble, he also had a nervous collapse provoked by the event"
of July 20. His periods of depression and elation are so incalculable that his entourage cannot tell half an hour in advance how he will behave in a given situation. The main authority in Germany is, therefore, being exercised for the moment by a triumvirate -- Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann, of course, in the name of the Fuehrer. Himmler, profiting by Hitler's illness, has been working to divide the generals. Both military men and even certain high governmental officials who are suspected of oppositional tendencies are being sent to work in munitions factories. Among the high officials of the Foreign Office who are reported to have been treated this way is von Grobbba, former head of the Near Eastern Department.

'With the generals who are prepared to go along with the Party, led by von Rundstedt as commander of the Western Front and Guderian as commander of the Eastern Front, Himmler is reported to have made a pact along the following lines:

'Territory disposition is to be directed solely by strategic considerations. If necessary, withdrawals
can be effected independently of prestige considerations or any wild orders of the Fuehrer. On the other hand, the military will participate with the SS in perfecting the Nazi underground organization. This underground organization is said now to consist of two to three hundred thousand members of the SS, the Hitler-jugend, and the Bund deutscher Maedchen. The most active members of the underground are the young men trained in the Ordensburgen.

"It is Himmler's idea that the present stubborn military resistance will provide time for organizing the underground. At the same time, Hitler is still speculating on tiring out or dividing the Allies. The Germans hope to raise the figure of Allied losses to such an extent that Allied public opinion will be alarmed. Recent events in Canada have encouraged speculation along these lines.

"As a part of their program, the Germans are said to be accumulating a reserve of fighter planes, including
a high proportion of jet-propelled planes. While they do not have the necessary gas reserves for continuous use of a large number of planes and also meet their other vital needs, they propose to hold these planes for certain mass attacks against the Allies. When we come in, for example, with one of our two thousand-plane bombing attacks.

'Another alleged point in Himmler's program is a mass attack by small one-man type of submarine launched from mother ships to strike at particular Allied convoys.

'The Germans, according to this report, are basing their estimates on the theory that not only Germany, but also England has really lost the war. They expect de Gaulle at Moscow to secure backing, not only against a German revival, but also against Anglo-Saxon predominance in Western Europe. The Russian-French alliance would then become the dominating factor on the Continent and, in the long run, would
eliminate British and American influence.'

"End of report.

"As I stated at the outset, such reports are impossible to check, some of the items seem rather fantastic, and the best we can do is to try to be sure that the sources we quote are reasonably honest."

William J. Donovan
Director
6 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President would be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Athens. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Athens has transmitted the following information:

The EAM guerrilla organization in Greece continues to foster pro-American demonstrations in what may be an effort to embarrass the British. On 4 December the Communists in Piraeus distributed handbills featuring Stettinius' statement that the United States will not interfere with the internal politics of liberated countries. The Communist daily RIZOSPASTIS on 4 December published an article alleging falsely that a US protest had been made to British Ambassador Leeper stating that the Constitution Square shooting violated the Teheran and Caserta agreements.

The OSS representative in Athens comments that the EAM is apparently attempting to convince the Greek people that the US Government disapproves of British policy in Greece.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum, containing intelligence received from our representative in Rome, and forming a sequel to my memoranda to him of 1, 2 and 5 December. Will you kindly see that this reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622

By [Signature] Date JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, dated 5 December and forwarded by the OSS representative in Rome, forms a sequel to my memoranda to you of 1, 2 and 5 December, concerning a proposed plan for the German evacuation of north Italy:

Representatives of the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy (CLNAI) now in Rome state that before their departure from north Italy on 1 December, official orders were issued by the CLNAI and the military command of the resistance movement forbidding any negotiations with German authorities. The CLNAI representatives further assert that they left no one in north Italy with the authority to act on matters of high policy such as are involved in the proposed agreement for a German evacuation.

It is felt that the fear of Communism in north Italy ascribed to the church is exaggerated and unfounded, and that it exists chiefly among the high ecclesiastical authorities. While they acknowledge that the church exercises some influence in the north, spokesmen of the CLNAI claim that CLNAI unity is sound and that it is capable of maintaining law and order.
The only basis on which negotiations leading to a truce for a German evacuation might be possible would be the preservation from damage of electric power installations in north Italy, since these plants form the nucleus of the whole Italian economic structure. It is feared, however, that the Germans would break their promises and destroy the plants. While the leaders of all parties represented on the CLNAI are said to be unanimously opposed to any negotiations with the Germans, it is admitted that a few followers outside the CLNAI of the Liberal, Christian-Democratic, and Socialist Parties are inclined to favor a plan of the type advanced by Bicchierai. One representative of the CLNAI in Rome believes that the Communists might possibly agree to negotiations if the order came from Moscow. All representatives, however, emphasized that a nation's honor cannot be bartered. They feel that the outside world would severely criticize the resistance movement if it should enter into any accord with the enemy.

William J. Donovan
Director
8 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach Black Series reports numbers 12, 13 and 14. No. 12 relates to Inroads of Communism in Italy; No. 13 to Conditions Among the Arabs in Algiers and No. 14 to Gestapo Imprisonment and Torture of German Catholic Priests and Increase in Collaboration between German Protestants and Catholics.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007632
By SR Date NOV 27 1973

William J. Donovan
Director
Special Black Report #12

(October 23, 1944)

INROADS OF COMMUNISM IN ITALY

By:

Date: NOV 27, 1973

In Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in stabilized democracies, such as Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, it is clear that communism is not a real danger but a bogey. In Italy there is no possible doubt that communism is a real danger. The concrete revolutionary program of socio-communism (both parties are intimately linked) has an immense appeal to the poorer classes which is shown by hundreds of little signs, including the sale of their newspapers. Take the Communists paper for instance: "L'Unita", daily paper of the Communist Party, has a circulation of about 60,000. The sales in Rome are between 30,000 to 35,000; in the provinces about 10,000, and the rest are given away.

If the Communists should obtain a majority and dominate the government, there is serious fear that they will introduce dictatorship. This fear is based on the brutal dictatorial methods they are using:

a) for gathering memberships. In Rome, impressive proofs were given to show how communist propagandists go from house to house to demand signatures on communist membership cards. Threats are often added, and in some cases, the propagandist is armed. Large
numbers of poor and ignorant people sign in order to avoid trouble. Reports from the country show the same phenomenon happens there and even many small factory owners join the party, convinced that communism will win anyhow.

b) where communist mayors or officials have been appointed, they are quasi-dictatorial in trying to avoid the growth of other parties. Meetings are broken up, posters forbidden, etc.

c) in Italy, communism does not produce, with brutality, greater efficiency, but only with brutality, anarchy. Numerous cases are quoted of mobs acting violently. People who live in the country are often awakened by shots at night; the proprietors have to defend their goods against robbers or excited bands.

d) Italian communism, though officially respectful of religion; is showing signs of recurring anti-clericalism. Many stories about communist mobs threatening priests, making anti-religious inscriptions, etc., have been checked.

These facts do not produce the conclusion that freedom should be suppressed in Italy for communists, but do indicate that a strong executive power is necessary to safeguard the essential
human rights and principles of democracy, if necessary, against the claims of an excited proletarian majority.

Comment: Further studies on this subject are being made.
(September 28, 1944)

CONDITIONS AMONG THE ARABS IN ALGIERS

1. The intelligent younger Arabs are very embittered about practical discrimination. Theoretically they are equal, but in fact they cannot rise to higher posts in the Army and the Administration, even when they are capable and honest. The military discipline has been the best moral education for Arabs up to now. Their religion allows all moral faults except inhospitality.

2. Racial hatred, Anti-French and still more, anti-Semitic, sown by German propaganda, is still growing. French authorities, ignorant of the language, seem to be insufficiently informed. It is reported that Rene Capitant, Commissioner of Education, attended a congress of Mussulmen chieftains recently, at Tetgini, and the rebel agitator leader "Tarhalt Abbas" had the whole assembly sing revolutionary independence songs in his presence. Their political passion is rising more and more, and a secret traffic in arms is becoming better organized. There is no fear of immediate danger, and it is inadvisable to make any concessions at this time as the Arabs are evidently not ripe for self-government.

3. The only man who really won the respect of Mussulmen was General Weygand. He knew how to be very severe, and Mussulmen like
a man who can show himself a "Great Chief". He showed respect for them.

Pétain was considered in a favorable light, more or less, because he was the "Marshall", and because of the anti-Semitic laws. The latest Governors and also Catroux are considered by Mussulmen to be feeble and ignorant of their problems.

* * * * * * * *

Note: The above is a summary of reports from a reliable and intelligent observer.
In an interview with a Monsignor whose name cannot be disclosed, details were given of systematic inquiries made in Germany by priests who traveled from house to house and also indirectly received information from guards at concentration camps. These inquiries which have been made show that more than a thousand German priests have been imprisoned for indefinite periods for activities considered anti-Nazi. Of these, close to 950 have died as a result of their tortures. In Dachau alone 70 have perished.

Our spokesman, who has a scientific mind and the customary prudence of Monsignori, stated that the tales of torture had not been exaggerated but, on the contrary, understated. He explained how he has found in Germany, a double terror: the fairly common knowledge of the extreme tortures inflicted for the least anti-Nazi activity, and the terror exercised against those who would want to communicate their knowledge to foreigners. The torture is not only fantastic in the invention of various sources of pain, but also in the degraded forms of imposing humiliation. The Monsignor said that when he first knew that the ninety year old Dean of Trier had been obliged, by a concentration camp guard,
to model his cathedral in human dung, he had thought this a wild exaggeration. Having checked the case, he found it to be correct.

A recent interview with the Monsignor disclosed how, in many instances, the reasons for the imprisonment and torture of German Catholic priests are often flimsy and far-fetched. Father Koch, for example, was editor of the "Kirchenzeitung" Idiocean weekly of Church affairs) in Munchen. This paper was demanding that editors of Church papers should be lay people and members of the Nazi corporation "Reichspressekammer". A layman took over and the paper continued. Father Koch was later imprisoned because "he had used the lay director as a straw man".

DECLASSIFIED
Special Black Report #14 (continued)

INCREASE IN COLLABORATION BETWEEN GERMAN PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS

In a recent interview with a German priest, whose name cannot be disclosed for obvious reasons, he told how, in his travels from house to house and also through the information he received from guards at concentration camps, he was impressed by the development under Nazism of religious life in Protestant groups. In some regions where the "confessional" church is strong, certain forms of religious community life, similar to the orders and other societies of "regulars" in the Catholic Church, may be found. This way of life which was totally centered on religion, was forbidden by the Gestapo, and the members were ordered, without further notice, to leave. The founder of one of the communities was later put in a concentration camp. Protestant seminaries which had developed have now been suppressed. The lay organizations consisting of pastors' helpers were the only ones to escape Nazi attention.

In many Protestant circles with which our spokesman was in contact, he remarked that the spirit of denominational controversy was being replaced by frank and open-minded examination of other religious viewpoints. Many Catholic books are read by Protestants, and Protestant books by Catholics, a condition which was formerly rather rare.
Among earlier examples of the development of a strong spirit of Christian cooperation are the following:

After the destruction of St. Hedwige's Cathedral in Berlin, two pastors of the Protestant Confessional Church called on Monsignor Banasch, Dean of the Chapter, to offer their churches which were located in the neighborhood, for Catholic services. Because of liturgical regulations, it was impossible to accept this offer. Monsignor Banasch, however, emphasized his gratitude and appreciation for this act which has strengthened Christians in their resistance to Nazi paganism.

Since the day in 1934, when Cardinal Faulhaber, in his famous sermon commemorating the coronation of Pope Pius XI, offered the German Evangelical Church the brotherly cooperation of Catholics in defense of their common Christian heritage, solidarity between Catholics and Protestants has grown stronger from year to year. Today, as a matter of course, a Catholic priest attends the funeral of a pastor of the Protestant Confessional Church and vice versa. Protestant pastors have frequently attended meetings organized by the Catholic clergy. Catholic priests have taken care of the families of Protestant pastors imprisoned by the Gestapo.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Note: The above is a summary of reports from an unusually reliable and well-informed source.
8 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the enclosed memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

Enc.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Enclosed are two reports (Numbers 8 and 9) of the Black Series. They deal with Catholic Radio Activities in Italy and Radio Vaticana.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enc.
CATHOLIC RADIO ACTIVITIES IN ITALY

The Catholic Radio Center was established by the Cardinal's Commission for the Direction of Italian Catholic Action (founded by the Holy Father), in May 1940, with the aim of morally and spiritually influencing, by direct and indirect means, the national radio programs, which had been monopolized by the Government and used exclusively for Fascist political, cultural, informational, educational and military propaganda after that Party gained its foothold, and especially from the time of its conquest of the Empire.

All radio programs, even the most harmless (as, for example, programs of chamber music) had in some way to comply with the absurd regulations set up by Ministerial functionaries placed in charge of program revision, and had also to meet with the approval of the heads of the various institutions of the totalitarian State: G.I.L.; O.N.D.; O.N.M.I.; schools; etc. - regulations which, as one may easily realize, sought blindly to exalt power-drunk and rapacious military nationalism. And this could not but lead to fatal injuring of morals and of religion.

The broadcast of Sunday Mass, the Gospel comment
(controlled), a few plays with religious themes during the periods of the major Church feasts, and a few selections of liturgical music occasionally included in regular concert programs, should have satisfied (according to the Fascist directors) all the spiritual needs of a Catholic people, and silenced their scruples in that direction.

From this situation arose the necessity of influencing the programs, not with the negative system of destructive criticism, of empty polemics, of recrimination and protests, but with the activity of an intelligent and wise collaboration which would interest listeners and which would prove at the same time acceptable to those in charge of government policy.

But to obtain such a form of collaboration, without having been previously enrolled in the Fascist Party, or without offering the guarantees of blind obedience which were exacted (by which no one, for any reason, could be presented over the microphone unless his name, even before his text, were approved by the authorized section of the Ministry of Popular Culture) was almost impossible—especially in view of the fact that the Catholic Radio Center was careful to select its collaborators from among those artists and scholars who had preserved, in the face of dictatorship, their faith in independence and liberty and their firm hope that the
people would return to normality (though, of course, after a hard struggle).

Nevertheless, drawing on the faithful friendship of certain functionaries of the E.I.A.R. (Italian Committee for Radio Auditions), the Catholic Radio Center succeeded in securing approval for a modest schedule which, from year to year, was improved and developed:

1) Monthly broadcasts of organ concerts of sacred music, polyphonic and Gregorian;
2) Periodic commemorations of saints;
3) Notices of activities at abbeys, Basilicas, Catacombs, etc;
4) Inclusion, in the regular schedule of radio-drama of plays by Catholic authors chosen by the Catholic Radio Center and of plays on sacred themes or basically spiritual, chosen by the Catholic Radio Center.

All this was granted us.

The requests for talks on higher religious and liturgical culture were adamantly refused, as were those requests for catechetical lessons, for a fifteen minute Mission program, (informative broadcasts on the activities of missionaries throughout the world with backgrounds of song and music, dialogue presentations of carefully authenticated episodes, anecdotes, etc.)
The collaboration began in October 1940, six months after the organization of the Catholic Radio Center. The names of the chosen collaborators were closely guarded, even though they were religious - the only ones to whom was granted the right of exclusion from the Fascist Party pledge without being suspected of subversive activities.

Very few laymen were found suitable, and, in any case, they were denied the right of reading directly over the microphone but had to broadcast through means of an authorized "reader" - a specialist who invariably robbed the most significant passages of their intended impact.

Meanwhile, although relationships with representatives of the General Governing Board of the E.I.A.R. preserved an appearance of cordiality and correctness, contacts with the technical under-staff were characterized by brusqueness and animosity. Each one of these men enjoyed the exclusive privilege of his professional capacity and claimed that the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center should limit his activity to acting as intermediary between the religious authorities of the places from which were to be broadcast radio adaptations of sacred documents, leaving to them (these technicians) the liberty of interpreting the themes, from the historical, artistic and liturgical aspects. This was asking a bit too much.

DECLASSIFIED
The Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center, of anything but a conciliating temperament in religious and artistic matters, knowing well the organic incapacity and the cultural insufficiency of these little crowing roosters, held firmly to his rights of spiritual and artistic supervisor, and the first broadcast which was to be made from the lower Chapel of St. Peters on June 29, 1941, was called off rather than have it go over the air badly handled.

The second, which was made from the underground Basilica of San Clements in Rome, turned out like a military operation between two opposing armies. But the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center gained his point.

The program director of the E.I.A.R., confronted with construction problems arising from the architectural differences of buildings of various eras, began to admit that he was a bit confused; he had to exchange broadcasting studio of the republican era for a catacomb, and the solving of the little difficulties vexed him; he was completely baffled by the frescoed walls of the third century which told of the miraculous lives of the Saints, and was non-plused by writings in the first "vulgar" tongue which he had met. Clearly influenced by the tomb and the mosaic of Saints Cyril and Methodius, he characterized those people converted by St. Cyril in Slavic territory as having pale blue Gothic lettering issuing from their mouths!
This final mix-up overcame all his objections. He calmed down and admitted, with understandable reticence, that he found himself in a world new to him, and that his cultural equipment was lacking in the matter of history, of religion and (yes, why not admit it) even in artistic matters.

The reception which the broadcast of that documentary drama received served him as proof enough, and as a result of that fact, in the broadcast about the Lenten Stations, made from the Basilica of San Paolo fuori le Mura, he agreed, although he did not think it opportune but because he wished to save face, that the following gem be included in the text:

"To pray and to fast are, in substance, the same thing".

On another occasion, in an earlier broadcast from the catacombs of San Sebastiano on the Appian Way, he had added, without authorization, to the Litany of Saints, "Saint Rose, pray for us".

It is to be noted that the good man was from Viterbo; perhaps he thought to secure for the patroness Saint of the countryside of his birth, a place which, through oversight, the Fathers of the Church had denied her.

In this atmosphere of happily won cooperation, the organized collaboration of the Catholic Radio Center was progressing regularly when an unforeseen event took place on May 28, 1943.
The Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center was arrested by the Fascist police, accused of subversive underground activities and sentenced by the Special Tribunal to Political imprisonment.

The Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center boasts now of having made the accusation legal through an authentic underground work of anti-Fascist propaganda and organized spreading an attitude of defeatism towards the Italian war. It was the only useful way for a man such as he to occupy fruitfully the free time which was at his disposal in prison.

During his stay in the Roman prison of Regina Coeli, the Catholic Radio Center's radio schedule, in collaboration with the E.I.A.R., continued to be broadcast regularly, thanks to its having been very well planned.

The famous and now historic July 25, 1943, restored Italy to the free Italians and the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center to liberty.

In the period from July 25 to September 8, 1943, relationships between the Catholic Radio Center and the E.I.A.R. became most friendly, and, after the momentary confusion natural in such crises, a study of the programs in need of most careful consideration, especially those directed to boys and young men, was carried on between the Catholic Radio Center and the directoring officer of this program division, with mutual satisfaction.
On September 8th, everything stopped. In the collapse of the nation all promising projects for the future were destroyed. The E.I.A.R., transformed into Radio Rome, became a German stronghold with Fascist Republican policing.

Our collaboration would have been, it is sufficient to say, most welcome, but it would have signified collaboration with the enemy, recognition of the republic, and serving the new and worse Fascism.

The orders and the advice of the Italian Catholic Action leaders were as always cautious and prudent: act according to opportunity, in the best possible way.

Of opportunities, the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center from September 8th on, found only one: immediately to resume his anti-Fascist and anti-German work, participating actively in the most dangerous but stimulating plans of the Underground Resistance Front movement of which he was one of the first initiators, organizing, controlling, arming and assisting one of the largest partisan groups of Rome: that of the district of Monte Mario.

The office of the Catholic Radio Center, in Via Stazione San Pietro No. 3, became the "quartier generale" of the partisan group of Monte Mario, and, in view of the futility of attempting to produce radio programs under current conditions, its Secretary studied plans of sabotage and counter-espionage; organized the
G.A.P. (Active Partisans Groups) of that area, assistance to disbanding soldiers, and the hiding of Anglo-American prisoners-of-war who were escaping from concentration camps.

Among the many activities carried on by the Basari Partisan group (named after the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center who was its leader), the group which later became the head of the Coordination Center of the Partisan Bands of Monte Mario - one activity was particularly close to the heart of its leader: the radio situation in Rome. Nothing would have been more natural.

The Germans took over, destroyed and dismantled all the local radio-sending stations and threatened the buildings and the equipment rooms. It was necessary to resort to a most daring act of anti-sabotage and of retrieval.

It was too late to intervene by means of the short-wave station of Prato Smeraldo (RomeII), whose dismantled equipment had already been hurried on to Bolzano.

There followed the work of dismanteling the long-wave sending equipment of Monte Mario (Rome III), done by disarmed Austrian soldiers supervised by German S.S. men.

With the help of two resolute Signal Corps officers stationed at Fort Monte Mario, we were successful in carrying off, in an almost romantic manner, eight large valves and the complete nucleus of three military receiving stations with radio dials; but
the remainder of the material, followed until it reached the railroad station of Porta S. Paolo, it was impossible to recover, due to the last-minute failure of a key group which was terrorized from acting because of intensified watchfulness on the part of the German S.S.

Meanwhile, at the medium-wave station of Santa Palomba (Rome I), in collaboration with the engineer Blasucci of the E.I.A.R. and his technicians, a work of sabotage was successfully begun in attempt to destroy anti-tank mines hidden, by the thousands, in the installations; a band of fifty men magnificently armed, under a navy lieutenant was prepared for action coordinated with the advance operations of the American Army.

The delay of the liberation offensive permitted the Germans to discover the plans to render the mines useless and all was lost.

The Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center went to the radio station of Santa Rose alla Storta, near Rome (most powerful sending and receiving military station, then controlled by the navy) taking with him two partisan leaders from the Italian navy; he organized a band of saboteurs among the Italian personnel impressed by the Germans into the work of dismantling, and gave them the task of destroying thirty-six gigantic mines installed in the equipment chambers of that monumental work for which the Government had engaged...
the talents of the most brilliant Italian engineers, the best possible kind of specialized labor, and had spent 125,000,000 lire - and which the enemy wanted to destroy.

The work having been begun, the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center allowed it to be carried to its conclusion by the navy partisan group commanded by Frigate Captain Gomel, now head of the Marine Ministry in the Cabinet.

Commander Gomel was a man who knew what he was doing: the stroke succeeded perfectly. All thirty-six mines were sabotaged and the station was saved.

At Monte Mario, the military radio-receiving station of Via Mauro was dismounted, again at the instance of the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center as head of the zonal partisan movement, and it was hidden.

Eight receiving stations complete with antennae and radio dials, were thus saved from German vandalism and from the greed of the Fascist Republicans.

On April 18, 1944, betrayed by an officer of his group, the Secretary of the Catholic Radio Center was arrested for the second time in his office, which was invaded by a band of thirty police while he was in the full swing of his anti-Fascist activities.

Five charges were brought against him by his accusers, proved and shown: it only remained to await more or less summary
execution. And he awaited it with a spirit and a strength of soul which won him the admiration of his companions of adventure and misadventure, after having constantly made sport of and confused his prosecutors.

The accelerated march of the Allied armies for the liberation of Rome saved his skin and led him once again to his family and his work.

Now, the American Control of Radio Rome, the deficiency of equipment, the lack of sufficient electrical energy, contribute to hindering a speedy resumption of collaborative activities.

Actually, a request for collaboration is in progress, through present tentative schedule:

1) A weekly fifteen minutes to maintain contacts with the Catholic Action organizations of the North of Italy; to give courage to parish-priests who are aiding and sheltering patriots; to re-awaken in the people the mystical religious fervor of the great Crusades; to urge the Bishops to intensify the work of moral, spiritual and material assistance among the most unfortunate people; to encourage religious institutions to continue their protection of patriots in the countryside and in the mountains;

2) Resumption of broadcasts of mystical and spiritual
plays;
3) Publishing labor news;
4) Publishing news about the destruction.

The Americans placed in charge of the programs of Radio Rome are evading the answer; to the question of a weekly program for inclusion in the program of "l'Italia combatte", they prefer not to answer.

We have great hopes for the future, and above all we are not discouraged: God and ourselves; our cause is a holy one.
In accordance with the wishes of Our Holy Father Pius XI, of holy memory, to restrict itself in the beginning to a purely religious character, the Vatican Radio still has its original experimental nature. In its very functioning it proves the general inadequacy of its equipment to serve as authoritative and effective instrument for spreading the words of the Holy Father throughout the world, as is so essential to do, especially is this chaotic period when so many men have lost their consciences.

Supplied with six short-wave lengths and a single transmitter, it is set up to broadcast its news in successive transmissions in order to cover the surface of the civilized world; hampered by atmospheric disturbances, by differences in time and by interference from other stations, it is not able to use a group of air-waves simultaneously.

To the lack of transmitters must be added the lack of medium waves which obliges Radio Vaticana to ask Radio Nazionale for relay towers so as not to exclude, from its broadcasts of universal interest, part of Italy, France, Germany, and of the Balkan countries, and all of Switzerland and Austria; a serious if not humiliating relationship of dependence, and one diplomatically exploited by the former Fascist government because it was not always
Father Filippo Soccorsi, director of the Radio Vaticana, preoccupied by this discouraging state of inferiority which in the future if not already in the present, can have most serious consequences, has made it an object of moral scruple, and with very sharply-worded memoranda and with detailed and precise plans, has denounced the danger to Ecclesiastical authorities, urging them to foresee it.

This urgent request has remained a dead letter; in this very moment of grave international anxiety, Radio Vaticana can and should perform a persuasive work of propaganda on behalf of justice and peace, correcting errors and misunderstandings, dispelling doubts, defining and illuminating complex situations of people and of nations, spurring people on to work, inviting them to order, instilling in them the spirit of sacrifice - and instead, it is silenced; even that little, emaciated programmatic skeleton which gave it a reason for existing has been suppressed, for reasons not justified in the eyes of all. Is this due to over-cautiousness?

This tremendous work, discontinued because of the Office of Information, is not such as to exclude absolutely an organic program, even though it be circumscribed.
There is a feeling of running into the obstacle of absurd and deplorable incomprehension on the part of a narrow group of opponents who are either blind or unconscious.

The Catholic Radio Center has, since its foundation, been concerned with the technical inadequacies of Radio Vaticana, and has carried on an active work of propaganda, both among Italian Catholics and with the Papal Secretary of State, to find suitable moral and financial means to overcome the afore-mentioned deficiencies. His Eminence Cardinal Lavitrano, Bishop of Palermo, President of the Cardinal's Commission for Direction of Italian Catholic Action, having been informed on this matter, made himself our spokesman before the Holy Father and met with warm interest; and, in consequence of this first meeting, the sum offered by the Church of Sant'Eugenio to the Holy Father on the occasion of his jubilee was designated, by the committee, for Radio Vaticana, and this contribution was the first to the fund necessary for repairs to the already existing equipment and for new installations - the cost of which was estimated at the time, by the Reverend Father Soccorsi, at 20,000,000 Lit; that sum today, if Italian money does not undergo further devaluations, would have to be multiplied by ten.

If it were possible for America, through the local Catholic press or through direct intervention on the part of authoritative
Commissions, to voice its concern over these limitations of Radio Vaticana and its desire for effective facilities for broadcasting programs which would be most welcome and received with enthusiasm by Catholics in non-Catholic countries, we would have the assurance that our efforts would not meet with further obstacles and dangerous deferments. For it is urgent that we be equipped with the medium wave-lengths so necessary, at the present time, to the redistribution of wave-lengths, already secretly determined by competent Anglo-American authorities.
8 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the enclosed memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enc.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Black Series report which is enclosed (No. 11) has as its subject German Catholic Resistance to the Nazis.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enc.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By SK NOV 27 1973
Typical stories of solid resistance of German Catholics to Nazi totalitarianism were told in an interview by a German priest who has, for several years, visited bishops and clergymen regularly on special missions. His name and whereabouts may not be revealed for obvious reasons. Although no arms are available for offensive action against Nazism, the ideological opposition is systematical and undoubtedly considered very dangerous by the Nazi Masters. The best proof of this is that the arrest of priests is steadily mounting. More than two hundred priests are known to have died in concentration camps. Sometimes their ashes are sent to relatives; sometimes no news at all is available and the news of death leaks out through guards at the concentration camp. More than three hundred priests are now in these concentration camps. Among them is Msgr. Neuhausheler, head of the Cathedral Chapter at Munchen (and right hand man of Cardinal Faulhaber). To judge about the numerical importance of these arrests it is necessary to remark that most of the younger priests are in the army so that the fact that 300 cases of opposition were grave enough to compel the Gestapo to act, is a sign of widespread resistance. That the Gestapo is reluctant, for political reasons, to imprison priests,
and more still, bishops, is shown by the following episode:

Bishop Ehrenborg of Wurzburg had defied certain Nazi regulations and the Gestapo recurred to an old trick used before on Cardinal Fauhaber, Cardinal Innitzer and others: they staged a popular demonstration against him with the aim of frightening him. The masses, mostly imported from outside, had shouted menaces and thrown stones for some time before the Gestapo entered the Bishop's palace to take him "under protection". The Bishop opened the balcony window and cried to the people - "God be praised the Gestapo is finally taking a bishop prisoner". The Gestapo chief then started backing out and nothing happened: the Gestapo has orders to avoid at all price, making martyrs. In one case the Nazi methods succeeded in driving a bishop from his diocese: Bishop Sroll of Rottenburg is still not allowed back, and is living as an ill man near Munchen.
MISS GRACE TULLY
THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR GRACE:

I think the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which is a sequel to my memoranda of 1, 2, 5 and 7 December. Will you kindly see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

BILL

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
DIRECTOR

ENCLOSURE.

DECASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622

By Date JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence, dated 5 December and forwarded by the OSS representative in Bern, constitutes a sequel to my memoranda to you of 1, 2, 5 and 7 December, concerning a proposed agreement for a German evacuation of north Italy:

The Papal Nuncio in Bern, with whom close OSS contact has been established, asserts that Bicchierai is a priest who has been closely associated with Cardinal Schuster of Milan and who has been used by the Cardinal for important confidential matters. Prior to Bicchierai's arrival in Bern, the Nuncio received three letters from Schuster accrediting Bicchierai and referring to the evacuation plan. The Nuncio's personal impression of Bicchierai is that he is sincere and honest. Before Bicchierai's departure from Bern, however, the Nuncio received a fourth letter from Cardinal Schuster stating that the plan was a personal project of Bicchierai. The OSS representative received the impression that the Nuncio felt this last letter was sent by Schuster merely to avoid any future complications which might arise from the Cardinal being personally identified with a project presumably doomed to failure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622
By Date Jun 11 1973
The OSS representative in Bern comments that his cables on the evacuation project are sent for information purposes, since the plan would appear difficult of realization and possibly undesirable from the viewpoint of the Allied military situation. He adds that Parri (the representative, now in Rome, of the Committee of National Liberation of North Italy), who characterized Bicchierai as untrustworthy, undoubtedly reflects the hostility of the plan which Bicchierai ascribed to many members of the Liberation Committee.

William J. Donovan
Director
8 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By SR Date NOV 27 1973
8 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached Black Series report
(No. 10) relates to the activities of a monk
in aiding French Resistance.

Attachment

William J. Donovan
Director
(September 11, 1944)

Commandant Lemoine, second to the Chief of the "Maquis" R.1, the now famous Colonel Bayard, arrived by plane in Rome today (11 September) having left Lyon yesterday and bringing an authentic account of the growth of the "Sud-Est". R.1 means "Resistance here region" and groups the departments of Drome, Jura, Ain, Rhone, Savone et Loire, Savoie, Haute Savoie, Isere, Ardeche and Vercors. The Maquis of R.1 which has now come into the open as French Force of the Interior, counts 40,000 men, divided in a great number of small groups which have been supplied systematically, although irregularly, with American arms. Sometimes seventy planes came over from Algiers, London, or Normandy; sometimes only one dropped it fifteen parachute supplies. One parachute alone generally brought fifteen containers with machine guns, submachine guns, bombs or the most appreciated ammunition, the "plastics", small sticks of very powerful explosive. The Maquis R.1 has so disrupted the German communications that the Allied troops which were scheduled to arrive at Amberieux in sixty days got there in seventeen days.

When the American troops had encircled Lyons on Saturday, September 2nd, the Maquis entered the town in stolen motor cars
and tanks and managed to subdue the stubborn German resistance in the town. Arms had also been taken from hidden depots organized at the moment of the French capitulation and a great part of the FFI was clothed in the French uniforms which had also been kept for D-day.

Commandant Lemoine bears his assumed name truthfully for as the name signifies, he is a monk of one of the great old orders. He was one of the founders of the now famous illegal "Cahiers du Temoignage Chretien" of which he brought to Rome the last issue (July 1944), printed in 180,000 copies and also the last issue (No. 10) of "Courier Francais du Temoignage Chretien", popular edition printed in nearly half a million copies. He collaborated in the foundation of the first "Maquis" in Savoye, end of 1941.

The leader of the group was Faure, whose real name may now be known: La Vatelle d'Osia, French officer, father of seven children who organized the first armed bands in the mountains. LaValletta was taken prisoner by the Germans, but escaped, jumping from the train which was to take him to prison. He escaped to North Africa through Spain and is now back in France, member of the Staff of General Cachet, who leads the French Forces of the Exterior in Southern France, as General Koenig does in the Paris region.

Similar armed groups of other provinces were united in the R.I of the Southeast region by Colonel Bayard who is still leading the FFI
groups there. Commandant Lemoine who was a reserve officer before
the war was regularly mobilized by mandate of General De Gaulle after
having served "illegally" for some time. He travelled several times
in various disguises to Paris, Belgium, Switzerland for contact
work and led military operations during the last five months. He
worked also with the president of the "Mouvements Unis de la
Resistance" organized at Lyon (Alban). The Communists who are
organized apart have their delegates at all the central headquarters
the though working efficiently, refuse to be members of the "United
Movement of Resistance" receiving their orders only from their
delegates. It is typical that the present general leader of the
FFI "Sud-Est" as well as the initiator Lavallet d'Osia, and
"Alban" the president of the Lyon Group of the United Movement of
Resistance as well as Georges Bidault, president of the General
Council of Resistance in Paris, are fervent Catholics. It is
touching to hear that the leader of the R.I "Sud-Est", Colonel
"Bayard" received Holy Communion from the hands of his second
Commandant Lemoine every day they spent together in the Maquis.
Commandant Lemoine is now back in France, having left by plane
one day after arrival.

The forces of the FFI who have been partly instructed
by the officers parachuted to them, or coming from the regular army,
are unanimous in the desire to carry the fight into Germany. Their
tales of German atrocity are convincing. The cooperation of Catholics and non-Catholics is splendid for even the non-Catholics feel that the patriotic motives have deeper roots in the revived Christian tradition of France.

Comment: This information has been received from an unusually reliable and well-informed source in Rome.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

9 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Belgrade. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
307/22
By Date JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information from Belgrade, dated 5 December, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta:

In a lengthy conversation with the OSS representative in Belgrade on 5 December, Subasich indicated that his visit to Moscow had been a difficult ordeal. Much time was spent discussing questions of government procedure pending a plebiscite, which Subasich feels will take place six months after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia. According to Subasich, Stalin insisted on the free expression of popular opinion in Yugoslavia and expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav "experiments" in Communism or Bolshevism. Stalin appeared shocked to learn that some delegates to the Serb congress (the Supreme Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Serbia, held in mid-November 1944) were elected by acclaim, which he characterized as an undemocratic procedure.

Subasich reportedly admitted to British authorities in Belgrade that the return of King Peter was out of the question at present. To the OSS representative Subasich admitted surprise at the attitude of the Serbs, whom he had considered monarchists, and added that if King Peter were to return it
would cause riots and disorders. Subasich, who apparently felt that his visit to Moscow had been a failure, was scheduled to leave Belgrade on 7 December to report to King Peter in London. He gave the impression that he intended to urge the King strongly to accept the Tito-Subasich agreement as the only means of preserving the monarchy, "at least until the election of a constitutional assembly." The OSS representative reports that there seems "good reason to believe that unless Washington objects, the union of the two governments [the Tito administration and the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile] will shortly be accomplished."

The OSS representative in Belgrade comments that while Subasich probably did not expect Soviet support for the monarchy, he apparently went to Moscow to ascertain for himself what help he could expect from the USSR in maintaining a democratic Yugoslavia. Apparently the picture he received of Soviet democracy at work, taken with Stalin's protestations of support for democracy and free expression in Yugoslavia, raised some doubts in Subasich's mind as to whether they were talking about the same thing. The OSS representative doubts that the visit in any way modified the Tito-Subasich agreement; it simply modified Subasich's conception of the meaning of the words.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  

Dear Grace:  

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. I will appreciate your seeing that it reaches his desk.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am enclosing for your information copy of a radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne. This report deals with (1) Himmler's campaign to seize all posts of strategic importance in Germany; (2) indications that morale in Germany has strengthened, and (3) summary of an article in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of 7 December.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
GERMANY

1. It is reported that the Himmler campaign to seize all posts of strategic importance in Germany is going forward actively. It is even reported that Himmler is building up for himself a propaganda bureau alongside of that of Goebbels. All the radio stations in countries which are occupied by Germany, particularly Slovakia, Holland, Bohemia, etc., are being taken over by SS General Reincke, according to this report, and Himmler now has control of all the information and press services for these occupied countries.

It is also reported that the control of the German communiques and other military reports from the front, has passed from the hands of the OKW under the control of Himmler, who will hereafter name the correspondents sent to the front.

It is also reported that Himmler has given secret instructions to minimize references to Hitler and to develop articles and reports dealing with his own -- that is to say, Himmler's -- activities.

2. I have two reports here both of which indicate that morale in Germany has strengthened as a consequence of the fact that the Allied and Russian forces are now approaching vital points of German territory. The people are being told that the war is a "sacred war" of self-defense. They are coming to believe this to some extent, and under such slogans, men, women and children are flocking into various auxiliary war activities.

This is the essence of the two reports:

It is a fact, I believe, that Germany has recently had some encouragement from the internal difficulties in liberated countries, that is to say, Belgium, Greece, Italy, and so forth. At the same time, much publicity has been given in Germany to the troubles in Canada with regard to sending more men overseas. Some few Germans do still nourish the hope of tiring out or dividing the Allies if they can hold through this winter.

Also, Goebbels has been fairly successful in persuading the German people that their position is hopeless in case of defeat. On our side, we
have recently been able to do little effectively to counter this propaganda.
The soldiers at the front feel that they are as well off fighting and
possibly dying as they would be if they went back to a country where in-
dustry is largely destroyed, where there would be no work and, they believe,
no future.

There is a fatalistic indignation (?) in the German resistance and,
as a result, I doubt whether we can expect any internal convulsions until
the front itself breaks and the foreign workers and prisoners and, possibly,
the syndicalists and the Communists start a revolutionary movement. This
means that there will have to be a clean-cut, decisive military victory
with the German armies largely routed or captured, or possibly the end will
come when these armies are deprived of their vital supplies as a result of
the breakdown of the German communications system. The desperation of the
German people will not long protect their frontiers when the German military
machine can no longer function smoothly. No desperation of spirit or sui-
cidal determination can take the place of tanks, aircraft, and transpor-
tation.

3. Here is a summary of an article in the Neue Zuercher Zeitung of
today, which has some points of interest:

After prolonged inactivity in the diplomatic field, Germany is now
seizing every opportunity to assert itself, naturally on occasions offered
by the Allies themselves. The German threat of reprisals against strict
measures against collaborationists is a case in point. Germany is grasping
every straw. The disavowal of British policy in Italy by Washington was
another opportunity which has even brought the shadow of Hitler back on the
political scene. With infallible punctuality, the Germans react with a new
report of an interview between the Fuehrer and Szolasi, to show that Hitler
is no longer invisible and inaudible. The story shows him again in the
circle of his aides and counselors, including Ribbentrop, Keitel, and
Guderian. The numerous decrees and proclamations signed by Hitler also
tend to show that he is more tangible than for a long time. It may be dis-
puted whether this is an accident or a trick, but, in any case, the situ-
ation today, with all its complications in the form of Allied dissensions
concerning Poland, Italy, France, and Greece, seems to favor a more active
role on the part of Germany, whether or not Szolasi came merely as a fugi-
tive messenger of distress, or to indicate new hope for better times.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum of the utmost secrecy for the President. Please place it in his hands.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wanted you to know that our chief representative in Stockholm was able to obtain three diplomatic codes and one military through special sources. We have made the necessary payments and have just turned over these codes to the State Department and War Department respectively. At the same time we were able to discover and to have it confirmed by our experts that certain codes of the State Department had been tampered with by the enemy. A new system has now been put into effect.

You are the only one to whom I have disclosed these facts.

[Signature]

Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
11 December 1944
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

The President will probably find interesting the enclosed memorandum, containing information received from the OSS representative in Caserta. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information from Belgrade has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta:

MacLean has shown the OSS representative in Belgrade a lengthy, strongly-worded, and slightly menacing message from Churchill to Tito, protesting against the non-cooperative and discourteous attitude of Tito and his subordinates toward the British. The message mentioned a number of incidents involving British naval and military operations on the Dalmatian coast. MacLean states that Tito appeared much disturbed by the communication and offered profuse apologies. At the same time, however, Tito complained that the British had failed to keep him informed of their operations, and stated that the incidents were due largely to the unexpected appearance of strong British forces in various areas.

Churchill's message also emphasized the necessity for genuinely democratic elections in implementing the Tito-Subasich agreement, and expressed the hope that all democratic groups will be free to put forward their candidates and support them in election campaigns. Churchill added that he expects the question of the monarchy will be put directly to the electorate and that the vote will be by free and secret ballot. (Subasich had informed the OSS representative in Belgrade that present plans call for a
constitutional assembly and not the electorate to decide this issue.

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
Date JUN 11 1973
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Belgrade. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Belgrade reports that he has learned in strictest confidence that Field Marshal Alexander has proposed a conference with Tito and Marshal Tolbukhin in Belgrade sometime between Christmas and New Year's Day. Tito has concurred with great enthusiasm.

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.  

Dear Grace:  

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.  

Thank you.  

Sincerely,  

William J. Donovan  
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the following report which we have just received from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow:

"Friday, December 8th, Kosanovic saw the King and informed him that Subasic due London this weekend. He complained about Subasic's delayed return stating that the government had practically stopped functioning as the British refuse to deal with anyone awaiting Subasic's return. Late the same afternoon Marusic visited King and stated that Subasic, counter to earlier reports, is still in Belgrade and will not be here this weekend. King requested Marusic to retire Dusan Marinovic, Minister of Court and Jorevic, Secretary of Chancellery, because they were playing double game maintaining contact with Puric and conniving with Queen Mother. Marusic readily agreed that these two are not trustworthy to be King's entourage and agreed to immediately call cabinet meeting to vote
upon their retirement. Marusic further told the King that as soon as united government is formed he is anxious to step out of public life.

"The King spent the evening with me and again emphasized his determination not to sign the proposed Tito-Subasic agreement even if Churchill insists upon it.

"Subasic arrived Sunday, December 10. The highlights of my discussions with him are as follows:

"Three supplementary agreements were signed December 7 by Tito and Subasic. The first deals with convocation of constituent assembly, providing that 3 months after complete liberation of Yugoslavia a date should then be set for convocation of constituent assembly. It defines election procedure of delegates, method of voting, etc. All collaborationists are to be deprived of franchise also those suspected of aiding enemies of Yugoslavia. The second agreement safeguards the rights of property of King during his absence and stipulates that Regency administer it for his benefit. It contains clause guaranteeing free communication between King and Regency during his absence and
also power of King to approve successor if any one member of Regency dies, said approval to be given to persons proposed by government. The third agreement enumerates names of 26 members of new government. Seven are party Communists. Cabinet will consist of eleven Serbs, seven Croats, three Slovenes, two Macedonians and one Moslem. Tito is to be Premier and Minister of War, Subasic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cardel vice-Premier and in charge of Ministry for constituent assembly.

"Stalin asked Subasic why King Peter Interferes with government policies and reasons for King's dictation. Subasic states that he told Stalin that King is young and was formerly surrounded by Bad advisors hence not responsible for them. Stalin reported King of 21 is not young to avoid responsibility, that Peter the Great of Russia at 17 knew how to handle his advisors. Stalin emphasized that he does not wish an experimentation of Communism in Yugoslavia and is against designation of delegates to anti-Fascist council. Stalin said they must be elected by the people and express the will of the people. He emphasized his desire to cooperate in the Balkans with Great Britain
and stated that if the people of Yugoslavia do not wish
monarchy nobody should force them.

"I have personally read all supplementary agreements
mentioned above. Subasic indicated that King Peter's
chances of returning to Yugoslavia are very slim. He
will press King and Churchill to approve agreements and
will state that failure to do so will result in formation
of separate government by Tito."

[Signature]
William J. Donovan
Director
12 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have talked with Dr. Kung about the need for intelligence on Japan. He has agreed to recommend to the Generalissimo that he approve the following action:

All intelligence activities in China shall be centralized under General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. The intelligence material and facilities of Dr. Kung's own Intelligence Service will be made available to us, and we will help maintain and improve these facilities. In addition to intelligence provided through SACO by General Tai Li's organization, we will be authorized to obtain intelligence from all Chinese sources.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

12 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

The President will probably be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from our Berne representative. I will appreciate your seeing that it reaches his desk.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
12 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the attached message from the OSS representative in Berne, which came to us via radiotelephone. This report deals with (1) a recent incident on the French-Swiss frontier opposite Alsace, and (2) Goebbels' article in Das Reich, concerning Germany's reconstruction of her defense against Allied aerial warfare.

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
Germany

1. Here is a report of a recent incident on the French-Swiss frontier opposite Alsace. A German officer and a group of German soldiers crossed the Swiss frontier and requested permission to surrender themselves for internment, but only on condition that no names be forwarded to the German government, as they feared that their families would suffer. The Swiss officer stated that he had no authority to give such an assurance and called his colonel, who replied in a similar vein, saying that he had to refer to his superiors in Berne. The latter received word that, under the Geneva Convention, Switzerland was obliged to submit a report giving names and details of the internees. The German officer requested a half-hour to consult with his men, as he did not wish to assume the responsibility for their surrender. He returned and informed the Swiss officer that they had decided to continue fighting, as none of the soldiers desired to assume responsibility for the reprisals which would be taken in Germany against their families if they allowed themselves to be interned.

2. In the weekly article in Das Reich last week, Dr. Goebbels states that, while the German people have not yet felt any relief from the effects of aerial warfare, that, he says, will come, and Germany is working feverishly to that end. Here is a brief summary of the balance of the article:

The time factor enables Germany to reconstruct her defense on all fronts, and, in addition, to mobilize a man-power potential sufficient to meet any critical developments anywhere. Other important measures have also been taken, especially in the field of new weapons, which are being perfected one by one, although very little can be published about them.

Today Germany resembles a fortress bristling with guns which she herself has built and equipped. Our defense of the inner line relieves us of almost insuperable difficulties, and, above all, we are fighting for our life. The enemy makes the mistake, and repeats it almost daily, of telling us frankly just what they intend to do with us if they are victorious. But whosoever fights for his life is always victorious.

Total mobilization has provided fresh reserves in numbers inconceivable three months ago. We are now entering the classical round of this conflict; we are already in it. No one can say how long this round will
last, but it is certain that it will be decisive. The blows which strike us can only wound us, but never shake us. It is this difference which characterizes the new war picture. We would wipe up the floor with each one of our adversaries singly, to say nothing of what would happen to him if we were to march against him with one or perhaps both of his allies. As things stand, we are forced to defend ourselves against their combined coalition of hatred.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  

Dear Grace:  

I am enclosing a copy of the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne, which I think the President will find interesting. Will you be kind enough to see that it is drawn to his attention? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,  

William J. Donovan  
Director  

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe you will be interested in the attached radiotelephone message from the OSS representative in Berne. This report deals with the question of future relations between Germany and Japan.

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure
GERMANY AND JAPAN

The somewhat drab and forced "celebration" of the anniversary of the tripartite pact by the foreign ministers of Germany, Japan, and Fascist Italy brings to the fore the question of future relations between Germany and Japan. It is interesting that the pronouncement regarding this anniversary was made by the foreign ministers only, as Mussolini apparently acted in this capacity. This may have been done to relieve Hitler of the necessity of making any statement, or possibly it was for the purpose of putting the "celebration" on a modest level. This program was carefully thought out and planned. It would have been too obvious if the occasion had passed unnoticed, and too incongruous if it had been given much prominence.

It seems clear that the relations between Germany and Japan are not of the best. Formally and on the surface, the social amenities are being observed. Underneath the surface, there is much bitterness on both sides. It seems likely that, when Germany collapses, the situation of the Japanese who remain in Germany will not be pleasant.

In the minds of many Germans, the Japanese alliance is blamed for having brought the United States vigorously into the war. Many Germans realize that the feelings of the American people towards Germany greatly altered when Germany had allied herself with Japan. On the other hand, we have had reports that the Germans in Japan feel far from happy at the prospect which will await them at the hands of the Japanese government and people once Germany has collapsed.

Both sides have plenty of cause to blame the other. The Germans feel that Japan betrayed them in failing to attack Russia in Siberia at the time when the German armies were threatening Moscow. They suspect the Japanese of having played with the Russians and helped them in various ways. In addition, of course, it has never been entirely easy for Hitler to reconcile his Nordische Herrschaf theory with his Japanese alliance.

The Japanese, on their side, have the utmost scorn for the manner in which Hitler has handled his military operations here.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM Bern to DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

quite realistic in their conclusion that the time is certainly coming
when the German resistance will terminate and they will be left without
European allies.

There are good reasons to believe that the Japanese in
Europe are cold-bloodedly analysing this situation and are trying to deter-
mine the course of action they will take to prepare against the day of
the collapse of Germany. Naturally, they have built up in German-occupied
Europe and in Germany a substantial diplomatic, consular, and political
organization with all the appendages of political, commercial, and mili-
tary espionage and intelligence. This organization must be moved somewhere
or divided up between a relatively small number of countries. The possibil-
ities open to the Japanese are few, of which Switzerland and Sweden are to
them the two most attractive possibilities. Spain would also be a possi-

bility except for the difficulty of getting personnel and records safely
to Spain, but only the somewhat precarious air routes to Spain are now
available. Also in Spain they face the possibility that the Franco govern-
ment may not last for ever, and then they might find less congenial sur-
roundings. Also Spain is further removed than either Switzerland or Sweden
from the area of their particular interest in Europe. The same considerations
apply to Portugal.

Between Switzerland and Sweden as places of possible re-

fuge it appears that Switzerland has the preference for the Japanese. The
reasons for this decision are fairly obvious. Switzerland is more central
and a better point for reporting on developments on the Continent and in
the Mediterranean area, but, more important still, if Russia, as seems
possible, eventually joins in the war against Japan, the position of the
Japanese in Sweden might be more exposed than it would be in Switzerland.
Further, at the present time the relations between Sweden and Germany appear
to be more strained than the relations between Switzerland and Germany.
And finally, Switzerland's long and legal tradition of neutrality is un-
doubtedly another element which would influence the Japanese decision.

In any event, evidence is accumulating that the Japanese
would like to transfer to Switzerland as large a part of their establish-
ment in German-occupied Europe and Germany as they can squeeze over these
frontiers. They already have here in Switzerland a considerable establish-
ment, which has been substantially augmented in recent weeks. It is reliably
reported that many Japanese are applying for visas to come here. There is
every reason to believe that, in coming here the Japanese plan a long sojourn,
probably with the idea of using Switzerland as a lookout point and main
observation center for all of Europe during the period following the German
collapse, with the prospect that, when Japan itself collapses, they might
become more or less permanent guests, as even their homeland might then be
closed to them.

This is a prospect which is not being viewed with any en-
thusiasm here is Switzerland, and Japanese applications for visas will
probably be carefully scrutinized.

SECRET
13 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

[Declassification notice: Declassified by Authority of CLA.]]
13 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will find of interest the following report from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow:

"Subasic reported to the King December 11th and 12th.

"Subasic told the King that Stalin approved of the proposed agreement setting up a Regency and that Stalin had asked Subasic to convey that message to Churchill.

"On 12 December the King sent a message to Churchill reading as follows:

"Information has reached me of such vital importance not only as to myself but to the British Government as well that I am sure it warrants my seeing you at your earliest convenience.

"I would ask you please not to see my Prime Minister before I had a chance to give this information to you".

"On December 13 Churchill requested to see the King at 3 p.m."
13 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

13 December 1944

I believe you will be interested in a report which we have just received from our representative Mr. Bernard Yar­row. This report sets forth the text of three supplementary agreements between Tito and Subasic, signed at Belgrade on 7 December 1944. A translation of these agreements, the original Slavic text of which I am attaching hereto, reads as follows:

"Text of Supplementary Agreement #1.

"In the discussions which have taken place in Belgrade between the President of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip Broz Tito and the President of the Royal Yugoslav Government, Dr. Ivan Subasic, during the period of before and after Dr. Subasic's visit to Moscow, up to including December 7th, current year, the question of forming one single Yugoslav Government was fundamentally discussed, as well as the question of the Administration, to the time of decision of the Constitutional Assembly, regarding the form of government in Yugoslavia.

"It was decided that one government should be formed
from among the representatives of all the peoples and federative units in Yugoslavia, and in it have the right of expression men belonging to all different political orientations, and assisting the fundamental aspirations of the national liberation struggle. This government must as soon as possible form the civil administration in the land, to go forward with the economic restoration of the country, and to prepare and to carry through the elections for the constitutional assembly.

"Resolutions were made which guarantee to the people of Yugoslavia that in the elections for the constitutional assembly they may in complete freedom express their true will.

"During these discussions the question of provisional and temporary government for the period up to the constitutional assembly was fundamentally considered, taking in consideration the gains of the National Liberation struggle, the circumstances and the disposition in the country as well as the international-legal position of Yugoslavia in the society of Allied nations.

Belgrade. December 7, 1944

J. B. Tito

Dr. Ivan Subasic

"Text of Supplementary Agreement #2.

"Re the elections for the Constitutional Assembly, and the
organization of the government.

"1. The elections for the Constitutional Assembly will be ordered not later than three months after the liberation of the country. The elections will be held according to the law for the Constitutional Assembly which will be made in proper time. With this law will be guaranteed: full freedom of election, freedom of assembly and speech, freedom of the press, general and secret voting, as also of placing of lists of candidates of individual or united parties, corporations, groups or individuals who have not cooperated with the enemy. Active and passive right of vote will be taken away from all those who might be proven as having cooperated with the occupators.

"2. Up to the conclusion of the work of the Constitutional Assembly the legislative authority will be performed by the Anti-Fascist Committee of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

"3. Organization of executive authority belongs to the jurisdiction of the administration.

"4. One of the first tasks of the new administration will be the forming of the judiciary in the country in a democratic spirit. The Courts in their judicial matters will be independent, and they shall judge according to law and their consciences.
Belgrade. December 7, 1944.

J. B. Tito

Dr. Ivan Subasic

"Text of Supplementary Agreement #3.

"Re the Estate of H. M. the King, and re Royal Regency:

"1. King Peter II during his absence may dispose about his property and possessions in the country. The administering of King's properties during that time will be under the control of the Royal Regency.

"2. The necessary order and usual contacts and communications between H. M. the King and the Royal Regency will be made possible and guaranteed.

"3. In case of infirmity, sickness, death or resignation of one of the Royal Regents, H. M. the King will, at the motion of the administration, appoint another regent in his place.

Belgrade. December 7, 1944

J. B. Tito

Dr. Ivan Subasic

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

William J. Donovan
Director

AUN 1.1 1973
"U RAZGOVORIMA KOJI SU SE VODILI U BEOGRADU IZMEĐU PRET-SJEDNIKA NACIONALNOG KOMITETA OSLOBOĐENJA JUGOSLAVIJE MARSALA JOSIPA BROZA TITA I PRETSJEDNIKA KRALJEVSKE JUGOSLAVIJE VLADE DR.-A IVANA SUBASICA, U VREMENU PRIJE I POSLJE POSJETE DR. I. SUBASICA MOSKVI DO UKLJUCIVO 7 DECEBRA T. G., TEMELJNO JE RAS-MATRANO PITANJE OBRAZOVANJA JEDINSTVENE JUGOSLOVENSKE VIADI, KAO I PITANJE REZIMA DO ODLIKE USTAVOTVORNE SKUPSTINE O FORMI VLADAVINE U JUGOSLAVIJI.

"ZAKLJUCENO JE DA SE OBRAZUJE JEDINSTVENA JUGOSLOVENSKA VIADA OD PRESTAVNJKA SVIH NARODA I FEDERATIVNIH JEDINICA JUGO-SLAVIJE I DA U NOJ DODU DO IZRAZAJA LJUDI KOJI PIPADAJU RAZ-NIM POLITICKIM ORIJENTACIJAMA, ALI POMAZU OSNOVNE TEZNJE NARODNO-OSLOBOĐILAČKE BORBE. OVAKVA VIADA TREBA DA STO PRIJE ORGANIZUJE GRADJANSKE VIASTE U ZEMLJI, DA PRISTUPI GOSPODARSKOJ ABNOVI ZEM- LJE I DA PIPREMI I PROVEDE IZBORE ZA USTAVOTVORNJU SKUPSTINU.

"DONESENI SU ODLIKE KOJE OBESBJEDJUJU NARODIMA JUGOSLAVIJE DA U IZBORIMA ZA USTAVOTVORNJU SKUPSTINU U PUNOM OSLOBODIćUZRAZE SVOJU ISTINSKU VOLJU.

"U RAZGOVORIMA JE TEMELJITO RASMATRANO PITANJE PRELAZNOG I PRIVREMENOG REZIMA U PERIODU DO ODLIKE USTAVOTVORNE SKUPSTINE, IMAJUCI U VIDU TEKOVINE NARODNO-OSLOBOĐILAČKE BORBE, PRILIKE I
SIAVIJE U DRUSTVI UJEDINJENIH NAROD

BEograd, 7 Decembra 1944 g.

J. B. Tito Sr.

Dr. Ivan Subasic Sr.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NO. 2:

"O IZBORIMA ZA USTAVOTVORNU SKUPSTINU

I ORGANIZACIJI VLASTI

1. IZBORI ZA USTAVOTVORNU SKUPSTINU OREDIT CE SE NAJ-

KASNIJE TRI MJESeca PO OSLOBODJENU CIJELE ZMLJE. IZBOTI CE SE

VRSITI PO ZAKONU O IZBORIMA ZA USTAVOTVORNU SKUPSTINU, KOJI CE

BITI PRAVOV-REMEM NO DONESEN. Ovim zakonom biti ce ZAGARANTOVANA

PUNA SLOBODA IZBORA, SLOBODA ZBORA I DOGOVORA, SLOBODA STAMPE,

OPCE I TAJNO GLASANJE, KAO I POSTAVLJANJE KANDIDATSKIH LISTA

POJEDINIH ILI UDRIJENIH POLITIČKIH STRANAKA, KORPORACIJA, GRUPA

ILI PROJEĐINACA KOJI NISU KOOPERIRALI SA NEPRIJATELJEM. AKTIVNO

I PASIVNO PRAVO GLASA BITI CE ODUZETO SVIMA ONIMA KOJIMA Bude

DOKAZANO DA SU SARADJIVALI SA OKUPATOROM.

2. DO ZAVREŠTAKA RADA USTAVOTVORNE SKUPSTINE ZAKONODAVNU

VLAST VRSI ANTIFASISTICKO VIJECE NARODNOG OSLOBODJENJA JUGOSLAVIJE.

3. ORGANIZOVANJE IZVRSNE VLASTI SPADA U NADLEZNOST VLADE.
4. JEDAN OD PRVIH ZADAOKA NOVE VLADE JE ORGANIZOVANJE SUDSTVA U ZEMLJI U DEMOKRATSKOM DUHU. SUDOVI SU U SUDOVANJU NEZAVISNI, A SUDE PO ZAKONU I SAVJESTI.

BEOGRAD, 7 DECEMBRA 1944 G.
J.B. TITO S.R.

DR. IVAN SUBASIC S.R."

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT NO. 3:

"O IMOVINI NJ. V. KRALJA I O KRALJEVSKOM NAMJESNISTVU

1. KRALJ PETAR II. XOZE ZA VRIJEME SVOJE OTSUTNOSTI RASPOLAGATI SVOJIM IMETKOM I DOBRIMA U ZEMLJI. UPRAVA KRALJEVIH DOBARA STOJI KROZ TO VRIJEME POD NADZOROM KRALJEVSKOG NAMJESNISTVA.

2. OMOCITI CE SE I GARANTOVATI POTREBNE REDOVNE VEZE I OPCENJENJE IZMEDJU NJ. V. KRALJA I KRALJEVSKOG NAMJESNISTVA.

3. U SLCUJU IZNEMOGOSTI, BOLESTI, SMRTI ILI OSTAVKE JEDNOG OD KRALJEVSKIH NAMJESNIKA, NJ. V. KRALJ CE, NA PREDLOG VLADE, IMENOVATI NA NJEGOVO MJESTO DRUGOG NAMJESNIKA.

BEOGRAD, 7 DECEMBRA 1944 G.
J.B. TITO S.R.

DR. IVAN SUBASIC S.R."
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached report. Would you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received an additional report from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow describing a conversation between the King of Yugoslavia and Prime Minister Churchill on 13 December 1944. This report, which I believe you will find of interest, reads as follows:

"King saw Churchill at 3:00 P.M. on 13 December. The conference lasted 1 hour. King informed Churchill that he received from Sutej, Minister of Finance of Yugoslav Government, in utmost secrecy following information:

"Tito told Subasic that he will give his support to FLAS and EAM. If necessary, will even send military assistance. Tito indicated that would meet with Russia's approval. King informed Churchill that Sutej advised King neither to sign agreement providing for regency nor give categorical refusal to sign it but to play for time and attempt to have agreement modified.

"King told Churchill that he was informed by Subasic that Stalin approved agreement as it stands and that Stalin
asked Subasic to convey to Churchill that message. King asked Churchill again to arrange conference between him and Tito because King hopes to convince Tito to form government swearing allegiance to King instead of having impotent regency thereby bringing end to dynasty. Churchill thanked King for bringing this information about Tito's alleged intentions to help ELAS and EAM. He said he had some indications of it already. He informed King there was trouble brewing among Yugoslav Partisans in Dubrovnic where 2 British warships are anchored and Churchill sent a notice to Tito about it, warning against any attempts to cause trouble.

"In discussing Tito-Subasic agreement Churchill said, 'I advise you to sign this agreement for with it the constitutional monarchy is helped to some extent and it is not as bad as it looks. If you sign it there is still a chance for you. If you refuse to sign Tito may form his own government and banish you forever from Yugoslavia. I cannot make up your mind for you. It will have to be your own decision. You are your own master. Think about it and don't rush. You can take your time and we shall discuss it further.' Churchill suggested that King and Subasic meet with him on Friday at 5:00 P.M. King agreed. By Authority of C/A 002622 DECLASSIFIED By Date JUN 1 1 1973
"King is very perturbed and is still very reluctant to sign the agreement as it stands. He is taking no definite steps for time being but indicated to Churchill that he regards present agreement as an attempt on the part of Tito to get him out of the picture."

Subsequent to the receipt of the report set forth above we have just received another dispatch dated 14 December 1944 from Mr. Yarrow, which reads as follows:

"King Peter decided to seek advice and assistance of godfather, King George of England. Peter telephoned him today and will see King George this afternoon or tomorrow morning."

William J. Donovan
Director
Mr. William J. Donovan
Director

15 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received a report indicating, on the basis of information transmitted by an agent in Thailand, that we now have a channel of entry into Thailand through Indo-China for additional agents. These agents together with radio equipment can be taken through Indo-China over our regular courier routes. According to advice furnished to us by the Thai underground the police chief in a border town is working with us and can be relied upon to put the agents in contact with underground's representatives. As we are now established from Szemao to the Thailand border, it is anticipated that the agents can be taken across Thailand with very little danger to themselves.

William J. Donovan
Director