

PSF- OSS: March 1945 (1st to 15th)

Box 171

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**


3 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

The enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, will probably be of interest to the President. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

  
Charles S. Cheston  
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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*O. S. S. folder 3-45*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

3 March 1945

*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, obtained from a well-placed and trustworthy source, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern:

A special meeting of high German officials was held at the Reichskanzlei in Berlin on 20 February which lasted until early morning, at which Hitler appears to have opposed the evacuation of Berlin. All previous evacuation plans prepared in the Ministries have been cancelled and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, which already had been partially moved to the west, has returned to Berlin.

Hitler's plan is to create a Stalingrad in reverse by counter-attack against the Soviets when they reach the northern suburbs of Berlin. He expects that this counterblow will meet with great success. Wehrmacht leaders oppose the idea on the grounds that there are insufficient German troops to keep the Soviets out of Berlin once the Oder Line has been breached. Moreover, they do not expect the Soviets to attack Berlin directly, but instead to by-pass it by a southward drive toward

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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- 2 -

the industrial areas of Saxony. German military leaders consider that, once the Soviets reach the Elbe River, further resistance will be impossible. Those German Generals who do not regard capitulation as the only possibility, feel that a counter-attack must be delivered in the present Oder triangle, if any military success is to be achieved.

*Charles S. Cheston*  
Charles S. Cheston  
Acting Director

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

5 March 1945

*file 7*

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum  
will be of interest to the President. Will  
you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

*The enclosure did not come to  
file 3/13/45 Act.*

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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46-29-1

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

CIA Letter 1 Nov 73  
BPA


DEC 11 1973

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum  
will be of interest to the President. Will  
you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

46-29-1

ED  
Letter

By R. H. Parks Date \_\_\_\_\_



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1945

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DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter  
9 Apr 73  
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 11 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

The White House

The Department recommends that an oral acknowledge-  
ment from the President to Thai Regent Pradit be made  
through the Office of Strategic Services which main-  
tains communications with Bangkok. An oral acknowledge-  
ment avoids the danger of written documents falling  
into the hands of the Japanese.

May I suggest that you request General Donovan  
to transmit the acknowledgement orally by one of his  
agents who might say to the Regent:

"The cigarette case was greatly admired  
by the President who appreciated the friendly  
spirit which prompted you to give it to him."

*Referenced  
this message  
to Putzell*

*G. T. Summerlin*  
George T. Summerlin  
Chief of Protocol

FOR DEFENSE



Enclosures:  
To Miss Tully from  
General Donovan  
To the President from  
General Donovan with  
Cigarette Case.

Let-B

~~SECRET~~  
46-29-1

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11  
CIA Itr (Nov 73)  
By SPS, NARS Date

The gold cigarette case which was presented to you recently, and which was a gift from the King's Regent of Thailand, was brought to this country by an OSS officer. The circumstances under which the case was received were as follows:

DEC 11 1973

Early in the morning of 26 January 1945, two OSS officers were infiltrated into Thailand by sea-plane. After a rendezvous with the Free Thai underground movement in the Gulf of Siam, these officers were escorted by the underground directly to Bangkok.

While in Bangkok, the OSS officers had frequent meetings with high officials in the present government who are prime factors in the underground movement. These officials included not only Admiral Luang Sangwan, the leader of the Thai Military Police, and Lt. Col. Sam Rueng, a member of the Thai General Staff, but also His Excellency, Luang Pradit, the King's Regent, who is considered the most powerful person in the present Thai govern-

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**SECRET**  
46-29-1

ment.

Luang Pradit requested one of the OSS representatives to return to the United States as soon as possible in order to inform our State Department of his sympathies with the cause of the United Nations. In addition, he asked this officer to present to The President of the United States the gold cigarette case. This gift has especial significance because of the affixed Royal Siamese Crown and the inscribed Royal Siamese initials. In making this gift, the Regent stated that he wished this present to be conveyed as a mark of his esteem for the United States and for The President.

The OSS officer complied with the Regent's request. He is presently in Washington and is expected to leave the country enroute to Bangkok on or about 9 March 1945.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11  
CIA ltr (Nov 73)  
By *MDJ* NAAB Date

DEC 11 1973

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

46-29-1

~~SECRET~~

24 February 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I should appreciate it very much if you would see that the enclosed cigarette case reaches the President. It is a gift from Luang Pradit who is Regent to the King of Thailand.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11  
CIA Hr 1 Nov 73  
NAAB Date  
1988

DEC 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing herewith a cigarette case which Luang Pradit, Regent to the King of Thailand, has asked us to forward to you. This gift was delivered by Pradit to an OSS representative who was recently in Bangkok and has just returned to this country.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11  
CIA Ltr 1 Nov 73  
By: *oss* NARS Date  
DEC 11 1973

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will  
find of interest the attached memorandum.  
Will you kindly see that it reaches his  
desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 007622 JUN 23 1975  
By SR Date \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*O.S.S. folder 5-45-*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 March 1945

*↑  
file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of the recent instances in which official classified material has been made public, you may be interested in considering as a model for action at a later time the attached declaration which the British use when they terminate the engagement of employees who have had access to official classified material.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 007622

By SR Date JUN 23 1975

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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### Declaration on Termination of Engagement.

My attention has been drawn to the provisions of section 2 (1), (1a), (2) and 8 (2) of the Official Secrets Acts, 1911 and 1920, which are set out below, and I understand the effect of these sections. I am aware that the office in which I have been working is a 'prohibited place' within the meaning of section 2.

Wrongful  
Communication, etc.,  
of Information.

#### OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS, 1911 and 1920.

2. " (1) If any person having in his possession or control any secret official code word, or pass word, or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to or is used in a prohibited place or anything in such a place, or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act, or which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under His Majesty or which he has obtained or to which he has had access owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty or has held a contract made on behalf of His Majesty or as a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such an office or contract,—

- (a) communicates the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate it, or
- (aa) uses the information in his possession for the benefit of any foreign power or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, or
- (b) retains the sketch, plan, model, article, note, or document in his possession or control when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it, or fails to comply with all directions issued by lawful authority with regard to the return or disposal thereof, or
- (c) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, secret official code, or pass word or information ;

that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(1a) If any person having in his possession or control any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information which relates to munitions of war, communicates it directly or indirectly to any foreign power, or in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

(2) If any person receives any secret official code word, or pass word, or sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information, knowing, or having reasonable grounds to believe, at the time when he receives it, that the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information is communicated to him in contravention of this Act, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless he proves that the communication to him of the code word, pass word, sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information was contrary to his desire.

Provisions as to  
Trial and Punish-  
ment of Offences.

8 (2). Any person who is guilty of a misdemeanour under the Official Secrets Act, 1911 and 1920, shall be liable on conviction or indictment to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding two years, or, on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding three months or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or both such imprisonment and fine."

I understand that the above clauses of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 and 1920, cover also articles published in the press and in book form, and I undertake not to divulge any official information gained by me as a result of my employment, either in the press or in book form.

Signature .....

Address .....  
(for future communications)

Witness ..... Date .....

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 March 1945


~~RESTRICTED~~

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne, which I believe the President will find interesting. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR date NOV 26 1973

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PSF; O. S. S. folder 5-45-

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~

6 March 1945

*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone report from the OSS Berne representative, which concerns alleged plans of the Germans to establish a maquis or a reduit.

*Donovan*  
William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 5 March 1945

#285

FROM

Barne

REG

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

~~RESTRICTED~~

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

~~RESTRICTED~~

I am sorry to have had to cancel so many calls recently, but there has been a very heavy pressure of work recently.

## GERMANY

I have reported several times about the alleged plans of the Germans to establish a maquis or a redut, or possibly several of them. On the whole, I am inclined to believe in this possibility, but I must admit that a critical analysis of reliable data received so far does not indicate that the preparations have as yet progressed very far.

There are a number of newspaper articles on the subject, with maps indicating the boundaries of the redut and generalities about great hidden stores of provisions, about the preparation of underground factories, and the like. Much of this is probably fiction or at least it is not proved as yet by reliable evidence. Quite naturally, some plants have been moved into the mountain or forest areas to be better protected from bombing. Hitler and other Nazi leaders have their castles in the Bavarian and Austrian Alps. Some preparations have undoubtedly been made, but not yet on the scale we have been led to believe.

If, as seems likely, the fanatical Nazis will fight it out to the bitter end, then something in the nature of a redut is inevitable, and the mountain and forest areas will be the last centers of resistance. I doubt, however, whether there will be the extent of prior preparation in the way of fortifications and supplies which propaganda stories have indicated. Persons well acquainted with the Austrian Alps who have recently been here see no real signs of serious preparations going on there as yet.

The fact of the matter is that Hitler may not yet be ready to concede the need of a maquis. He still stubbornly defends Berlin and plans counter-measures. The Germans have never been good in planning what they would do in the face of defeat. Their strength lay in planning for conquest; thus, their administration for the British Isles was complete in all details, and the freight rates for the transport of the Baku oil were published.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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Berne

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FROM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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But when it came to preparing beforehand for the evacuation of Paris and Strasbourg, they failed dismally to think ahead of time or take even normal precautions.

Further, in their present situation in the West, East, North, and South, they have neither the supplies, the transport or the men to spare any great effort to fortify and stock a vast inner fortress. And, from the practical angle, the talk of building in the mountains great new underground factories is nonsense. It would take years. There are some tunnels, some abandoned mines, some quarries, and the like, which can be used or adapted. But new construction on a great scale during recent months has been out of the question.

This does not mean, as I have suggested above, that we will not have to fight the Nazis into mountain retreats. It is likely that we will have to do so. Nature itself, without much preparation, as the Italian campaign has shown, may make the going slow, difficult, and costly. I do not believe, however, that months of elaborate preparation have been devoted to fortifying, arming, and stocking a great German redut. Much in the way of supplies and man-power may possibly be flung into this area at the last moment, unless our armies can cut off the Nazi retreat.

In connection with the German maquis, it is interesting to note that there are increasing signs that not all the leading Nazis are reconciled to sharing in this plan for last-ditch resistance. There may well come a split in the Nazi ranks before the end, and, if this goes deep enough, there might be only a relatively small number who would seek the maquis.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

7 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested  
in the enclosed message from our London representa-  
tive. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk?  
Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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Date

NOV 26 1973

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O.S.S. folder 5-45-

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

file →

7 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been obtained by the OSS representative in London from a source close to General Anders, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish armed forces:

Source declares that General Kopanski, the Polish Chief of Staff, recently called on Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, to ask what action Britain plans to take regarding the Polish armed forces, in the light of the Crimea decisions. Kopanski cited the oath taken by Polish troops pledging loyalty and obedience to President Raczkiewicz and the constitutional government of Poland, and said that in view of this oath he had no suggestions. He added: "It is up to Britain to untangle the mess into which she has dragged the Polish Army."

According to source, General Anders and Prime Minister Churchill recently had a two-and-a-quarter-hour conference, the first half of which was stormy, and the last half given over to pleasant small-talk. The interview apparently convinced Churchill of the futility of trying to influence the Polish High Command.

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Source declares also that the Polish forces will not accept mercenary status under Britain and that Anders will continue the policies of General Sosnkowski.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


7 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne, which I believe the President will find interesting. Will you kindly see that it reaches desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

  
William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26, 1973

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PSF; o. s. s. folder

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 March 1945

*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone report from the OSS Berne representative, which (1) summarizes a series of articles on the German problem published in the Gazette de Lausanne, and (2) sets forth the views of some late arrivals in Bern from Vienna, concerning Viennese reaction to Allied bombings.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 6 March 1945

#284

FROM Berno

HDS

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

TO

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DEFERRED

## DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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### GERMANY

A very interesting series of articles on the German problem has just been concluded in the Gazette de Lausanne. The articles are by Wilhelm Roespke, a leading anti-Nazi German publicist and author, who has been living in Geneva for some years. I give below a very brief sketch on his conclusions.

(Beginning of summary.) There is no doubt that there is a unique chance, the first such in more than fifty years, of effecting a complete reform of the structure of the German state and the destruction of Prussian mentality will present itself when the Reich collapses. This will be a military, political, economic, and cultural collapse such as the world has rarely seen. The German people will have received a blow which cannot be described in words. They will be ready to listen to an honest and profound analysis of the causes of the German disaster, and to turn a new page in history. The entire German edifice will crumble far more completely than in 1918. The entire form of its national economy, its monetary and financial system, its system of communications and of administration, which remained intact after 1918, will this time be dislocated. In contrast also to 1918, there will be no organized political life, no political platform, and no political group which can take over the heritage left by the Third Reich. There will be only prostration, fatigue, an immense desire for peace, for a civilized and ordered life. This desire will arise out of a nausea of regimentation, of propaganda, of organization and of centralization.

It will be necessary to treasure the usable reserves which will survive, particularly the peasant class, the authorities of the church, and regional leaders, and also the experience and prestige of some former syndicalist leaders.

It will be the centralized superstructure of Germany which will collapse under the blow of the military, political, and economic catastrophe. The local and regional organs will remain. There will no longer be orders from Berlin, and possibly not even the technical means of trans-

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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Berne

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FROM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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mitting them. But in the villages, and even in the cities, life will continue in most elementary form. The smaller the units, the greater the chance that a government of order can be set up.

Persons known in their communities as having capacity and integrity must take in hand the local administration. Demagogues will not have much chance to interfere in the small local units or regions. Once accounts are regulated with the Nazi Party, and once the efforts of agitators have been stifled, anarchy in Germany is most unlikely, unless we give the name of anarchy to that spontaneous decentralization which seems inevitable.

This spontaneous decentralization which is to be expected after the defeat of Nazi Germany will manifest itself with all the more force because of the desire to turn away from the center, namely, Prussia, which will be deemed a symbol of all that is to be rejected.

If the victorious powers desire a development along these lines, they should let local matters take their natural course with only encouragement and advice, tending towards the establishment of a democratic and liberal political life in each region. The Allies will do well to build up the local and regional groups and to cooperate with them, giving them the task of perfecting the local organizations. While we believe that the Germans, in a stupor, will be ready to listen to any honest analysis of the causes of the defeat, this must be given to them, and it must be given to them quickly, and Germans alone are really qualified to do it. The Germans must learn the terrible truth about the atrocities perpetrated in the name of Germany, and they must hear this from Germans.

Finally, the success of any policy to really solve the German problem requires that this policy be guided by cold logic and not by sentiments of hatred or vengeance. (End of Summary.)

The views presented above by Roepke, as regards the necessity of building up Germany from the bottom, correspond to those which I have frequently suggested. One can find the basis for a new political life in Germany in the small communities and then from there build on a completely federalized basis. Centralization in Germany for the next few years, under and after the military occupation of Germany, should be of a technical and non-political character, and even this administration should be moved away from Berlin as soon as possible. Berlin recalls Prussia and Bismarck and Hitler and centralization and dictation. It is a pity to honor Berlin by making it the center of the Allied administration, and it is yet possible that the siege of Berlin plus the bombings will so complete its destruction as to force us to take the wise political measure

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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FROM Berne

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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of establishing the central military authority for Germany elsewhere.

If German political life revives the local communities and then around the German pre-Bismarck states, the eastern and western frontiers of Germany will assume less importance, and eventually something more healthy might develop than anything seen in Germany since Bismarck.

On one point of his article, I fear that Roespke may be too optimistic. I am not confident that, immediately after the collapse, the Germans will be in the mood to listen to anything. Until they have something to put into their stomachs, and until they have roofs over their heads, there is little chance of getting any kind of normal human reaction or of finding an audience to listen to reason. I do agree, however, that the story of what has happened to Germany and what Germany has perpetrated on the world in the way of atrocities must be told in the first instance to the Germans by Germans, and not by foreigners. I also agree that, if the spirit of vengeance, natural and justified as it is, becomes the controlling factor in determining the settlement, the peace will never be of an everlasting nature.

AUSTRIA

I have just been talking with some very late arrivals from Vienna. Some of the Allied bombing there in the heart of the old city which has largely destroyed the Rathaus and the University, among other monuments, has caused a very unfortunate reaction. These buildings, according to my informant, were far removed from any military objective, and the moral effect on the population, which has been turning more and more anti-Nazi, was certainly detrimental to what we want to achieve. In view of the turn events are taking in Austria, with a growing resistance movement more and more in evidence, it would seem wise to take special precautions over the next few weeks to see that our bombing is concentrated on clearly defined military objectives in Austria.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 March 1945

~~SECRET~~

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached report on Political Trends in Bulgaria will be of interest to The President. I shall appreciate it if you will see that it is called to his attention.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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8 March 1945

*file 7*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following report embodies the personal conclusions of an observer who was in Bulgaria during the period from September to December 1944.

POLITICAL TRENDS IN BULGARIA

The "Bulgarian Workers Party" (Communist) seeks to increase its power and to hold it against all efforts on the part of other political forces. They have so far been successful, partly because of the direct or indirect support of the Soviet Government, the presence of Soviet troops on Bulgarian territory, superior party organization and tactics, and thorough advance preparation by party leaders in the country and in Moscow.

This observer says that Bulgarian rank and file Communists state openly that they seek to obtain absolute party rule and make Bulgaria an independent Bulgarian Soviet Republic or a part of the Soviet Union.

There appears to be little or no attempt to make the peasants accept Communist doctrine. By the masses, it is said that they refer to the workers of the cities.

This observer states that apparently the Bulgarian Communists

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want their power to be based on arms, fear, and the holding of key positions rather than on popular support.

According to this observer, Bulgaria now has about 3,500 regular officers. Of these about 500 are Communist Party men appointed as assistant commanders after 9 September. Another 650 are partisan chiefs who have been given regular commissions ranging from lieutenants to major generals. Some 200 regular officers with pro-Communist or strongly pro-Russian leanings have survived the Fascist regime. This makes a total of 1,350 Communist officers.

It is said that the Chief of Staff, General Kinov, the Assistant Commander-in-Chief, General Kosovski, the Assistant Minister of War, Blagoi Ivanov, the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Vranchev, and the heads of four of six departments in the Ministry of War are all alleged to be Communists.

It is claimed by this observer that association with American and British officers is considered against the national interest. An air force captain and a lieutenant who accompanied an American officer on a social call have been threatened with court martial for espionage.

Regarding Russian control and political influence, this observer reports the following. Opponents of the Communists are frequently heard to disclose that, if it were not for the Russian Army in

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Bulgaria, they could deal with the Communists. They say that though in general the troops quartered in the country do not participate in or interfere with political life, their presence gives the Communists a solid backing. The Agrarians claim that any armed rising against "Communist terror" would be put down by the Russians, and that the Russians would stand by if the Communists on their own took over the government.

A few Russian city commandants have actually taken sides in preventing the Agrarians from holding political rallies. The most widely discussed instance occurred on or about 10 December in Karlovo, when the local commandant prevented one of the Agrarian cabinet ministers from speaking. He is quoted as saying: "What is an Agrarian Minister?" Russian officers, members of the Party, often brag about making Bulgaria a Soviet "Gubernia" (province) when they are in their cups, but the Bulgarians do not put much stock in these claims. They are more disturbed by statements that the Russian troops are in Bulgaria to stay. Evidence on this question is not conclusive.

There are garrisons of up to 2000 or 3000 Russian second line and service troops in most of the Bulgarian towns over 20,000, and in areas near Sofia, and in Northwestern Bulgaria they have taken over whole villages. Some towns which formerly had garrisons, as

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

for instance Turgovishte, have been evacuated. The situation is more definite in Sliven and Stara Zagora, where the Russians have set up training camps for young soldiers and taken over all public buildings. The Russian explanation to local people was that there were no towns left in Russia that had facilities for training soldiers.

In the Northwestern corner of Bulgaria entire divisions with battle equipment and air force support are reported. These troops are apparently intended for use in Hungary, and many were brought to the Vidin area from Eastern Bulgaria.

Non-army Russian political control is more easily recognizable. The Communists freely admit their directives come from Moscow via Georgi Dimitrov, and members of the executive committee of the Communist Party, notably the triumvirate mentioned above, have been seen frequently visiting Lavrishchev, the Russian Political Representative. Communists who hold posts in the government are extremely careful not to be seen with Russians. There are reports that Moscow is not content with the Communist leadership, and since the beginning of December has checked carefully every communist move. Some extreme and some right wing Communists are said to have been "liquidated."

Control of movement for foreigners is extremely severe. They may not move outside a radius of five miles from Sofia without a

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special pass and a Russian liaison officer. Photostats of all mail of foreigners are inspected by Colonel Yasenko of the Russian Liaison Department.

Bulgarians travel freely, though the taking over of large numbers of passenger cars by the Russians has made travel very difficult. The Russians do not check identity cards except those of drivers of vehicles traveling from one town to another.

The Russians apparently work very well with the militia, and a fairly reliable source states that a large group of NKVD personnel is expected to arrive in Bulgaria in January to train and assist the militia. It is said that the personnel will remain after the bulk of the Russian troops have left.

For an as yet undisclosed reason the Russians have asked the Bulgarian authorities to make for them rosters of the Turkish population in Bulgaria, and to censor the internal and foreign mail of the Turks.

Winter camps for Russian troops are said to have been constructed by the Bulgarians along the Danube near Svishtov and Drehoovo, and one Russian officer in that area is reported as saying that some 2,000,000 Russian troops will spend the winter in Southeastern Europe. A winter rest camp has been set up at the resort town of Hissar north of Plovdiv.

Russian economic control in Bulgaria is not very extensive.

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Since the initial wave of plundering in September, requisitions have been made through the Ministerial Council. Buying for export to Russia so far has been negligible. German goods bound for Turkey that were found by the Russians were confiscated. In Ruse, for instance, they took 11,650 kg. of paints belonging to a Turkish firm, and in Svishtov they took 7,966 kg. of refrigerator parts.

The observer finally concludes that the consensus of Bulgarians interviewed is that the non-Communists in Bulgaria could not cope with the Communist threat to "democratic freedom" alone, and that only if Great Britain and America bring pressure on Russia will there be a real representative democratic regime. Those who believe that America has no interest in Bulgaria say that there is nothing left for the Bulgarians but to become wholehearted Communists and show complete submission to Soviet Russia, in the hope of retaining an independent political life.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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By SR NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

8 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

The enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, will probably be of interest to the President. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 March 1945

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By ABA Date JUN 11 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 9 and 26 February:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy, and a German High Command representative presumably from General Kesselring's staff, arrived in Lugano, Switzerland on the morning of 8 March. They are allegedly prepared to make definite commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in North Italy.

The OSS representative in Bern believes that, if Wolff is really working with Kesselring, the two Generals might effect an unconditional surrender. Absolute secrecy is essential to a successful surrender, and the OSS representative is ready to arrange with complete secrecy for the entry into Switzerland in civilian clothes of fully authorized representatives of the Supreme Allied Mediterranean Command.

It is not clear whether this move is separate from the Neurath negotiations described in the memoranda of 9 and 26

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February 7, but the OSS representative in Bern believes they will merge in so far as the North Italian situation is concerned. Wolff is accompanied by Standartenführer Dollman, who has in the past claimed that he represented Kesselring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster. Dollman and his aide, Zimmern, had made indirect contact with the OSS representative on 2 March, and promised to return on 8 March with credentials and definite proposals. On the earlier date the suggestion was made to Dollman that he bring with him an important Italian partisan leader as evidence of his good faith and ability to act. Dollman has reportedly brought along Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified Command.

The above information has been given to AFHQ by our Caserta representative.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945


Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be  
interested in the attached report. Will you  
kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

O.S.S. folder  
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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By Author CIA

007622

9 March 1945

By SR Date NOV 26 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is a report on the food situation in Florence as of 7 January 1945:

The conclusions of this report are based on interviews with AMG City of Florence officials concerned with supply problems, with supply officers of AMG 5th Army, members of PWB Florence, with the Mayor of the city, the rector of the University, one of the three secretaries of the Confederation of Labor, the leaders of the three so-called mass parties, the chief Italian liaison officer at G-2, 5th Army, the ex-commissar of the SEPRAL, and private citizens. There is unanimity among all persons interviewed that the situation is grave, perhaps as grave as any encountered in Italy with the exception of Naples and certain spots in Sicily just after liberation.

The Province of Florence with its predominantly urban population has always been on a food import basis. Its normal sources of food are partly to the East (Forli area), partly

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North in areas still in the battle zone or German occupied, partly towards the sea. Its dependence on territory south of Florence has been small. At present few supplies are coming in from the North for obvious reasons. There is difficulty in obtaining supplies from the western area. Flooding and destruction have caused food shortages in those very areas which in their turn have a substantial urban population (Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia, Livorno, Prato). South of Florence the Rome market competes for available supplies and apparently there is a tendency to supply Rome to the disadvantage of Florence.

The liberation of Florence was accompanied by the complete disappearance of all food stocks. With the bridges over the Arno destroyed, great difficulty was experienced in the early period in supplying the city. This period has left its mark on a population whose health situation had been deteriorating for a considerable time.

Since its liberation in mid-August 1944, i.e., for almost five months, the city has been 100 percent dependent on road transport. Thus all grain and household fuel has to be trucked from Siena and Grosseto, all imported supplies from

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Liborno, all fuel for hospitals and institutions from the Val d'Arno region, etc.

Shortage of transport facilities, accentuated since the advent of winter weather by bad road conditions and throughout the period by the prohibition of civilian traffic to the north has restricted the quantity of food and fuel brought into the city.

The use of Italian commercial vehicles encounters two main difficulties. First, since the fixed rates are considered too low by the truck owners, there is a strong tendency to avoid hauling goods for distribution.

Health conditions have deteriorated seriously and are not likely to improve. The death rate has been on the increase and while epidemic diseases have been decreasing, the death rate from these has risen sharply. Tuberculosis, particularly among children, is on the increase, a fact which is not unrelated to the practice of requisitioning hospitals and sanitariums for Allied use. According to Allied medical testimony not only are there many cases of specific deficiency diseases, but cases of actual starvation are to be found in the area. The shortage of fuel and electric power and the consequent inability to provide warm living quarters and

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food has rendered the shortage of calories even more serious.

The announcement made by President Roosevelt in November that the 300 gram ration would be extended to the whole of liberated Italy has continued to be uppermost in the minds of the people. A high local labor union official stated that the increase in the ration constituted a standard item in any resolution passed by any assembly of workers.

There is general agreement that poor as conditions are in the city, they will in all probability not lead to disorders. If there is danger of unrest, it can be said with confidence that it would come despite the endeavor of the political parties in the Committee of National Liberation to keep the population from expressing its undoubted discontent in violent forms. In political Italian circles it was pointed out, however, that the Fascists are still strongly organized in the city and that they are ready to exploit any incident for their own purposes. Any improvement in food conditions would take the wind out of the sails of the Fascist agents and would greatly enhance the prestige of both the Allied government and those forces among the Italians who are most ready

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to help in preserving order. Whatever danger of rioting and disorder exists would probably be removed by the granting of the 300 gram ration.

*W J Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file* 9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested  
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that  
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*W. J. Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you may be interested in the following information with respect to the food problem in Eindhoven.

The Problem.

A statement of the food supply and distribution problem in liberated Netherlands cannot be reduced to a generalization. The extent of need and the degree of deterioration of living standards vary from area to area, from village to village. Regardless of these differences, it is generally true that food supply available to the public is lower than at any time during German occupation. In Eindhoven the situation is really serious.

The problem has several aspects. First and foremost is transport shortage. Although some vegetables, eggs, and fruit are available in surrounding rural areas, there are few civilian automobiles, trucks, or horse-drawn vehicles to haul the produce to town. Individual sales at the farm

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are prohibited to those fortunate enough to have means of transport because these uncontrolled sales would merely encourage black market activities.

The limited supply of fuel and electricity also plays an important role in the serious food situation. Even those food processing facilities which were not damaged by enemy action can be operated only to a limited degree because the local electricity and gas supply was almost completely cut off. Recently, service has increased but not to former levels.

Administrative difficulties have also been a factor in the present food situation. The scarcity of paper, fuel, and light have hampered local officials in arranging for distribution of announcements and ration coupons.

Reaction of the Population to the Food Situation.

At first, the public accepted the sudden deterioration of the food supply position as a natural concomitant of military operations. After the first month of liberation had passed, people became sharply critical of the official agencies including Militair Gezag (Dutch Civil Affairs) and the restored municipal functionaries. Black market activities began to increase sharply.


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On Tuesday, 27 November 1944, the workers of Eindhoven demonstrated against the food situation. The demonstration, which was orderly, ended with an announcement of an increase in rations. There is evidence that the increase in rations had been decided upon before the demonstration took place.



William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested  
in the attached summary. Will you kindly see that  
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.


Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


I believe that you may be interested in the following summary with respect to Soviet rehabilitation policies and practice in the liberated areas of the USSR. This summary has been prepared by our research people.

1. Extensive destruction of municipal public utilities in the liberated areas of the Soviet Union has retarded industrial reconstruction and made living conditions extremely precarious and in many respects hazardous to health. Municipal utilities therefore receive a high priority in the reconstruction program. Water supply, electric power, and very primitive sanitary arrangements, have first priority, above even that of emergency shelter and communal feeding. More advanced sanitary facilities generally rank second, along with housing and medical services, while restoration of heating plant, fuel supply, and local public transport is allowed to lag until more urgent reconstruction -- including that of many important industries -- is well under way.

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2. The methods evolved to minimize the requirements and expenditure of scarce factors in the reconstruction of public utilities follow two main lines: first, advance planning and rationalization of the public utility systems, under the direction of the central government's engineers; second, reversion to primitive methods of servicing utility needs. This latter process is facilitated both by the stress on local ingenuity and by the backward condition of utilities before the war. In a country with technically more advanced services than the Soviet Union has had, such adaptation to very low standards would probably be more difficult.

The following methods will serve to illustrate Russian recommendations. For an emergency water supply where reservoirs and mains have been destroyed, artesian or shaft wells, as well as other local sources may be tapped. Short-cut methods of water purification are recommended for rather prolonged emergency use. In sewage disposal, composting instead of destruction is strongly recommended, to lessen the urgency of rebuilding wrecked sewerage systems. Special low-cost stoves for rubbish-burning and for household heating are being developed. Similar economy of effort is planned

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for the repair of all war-damaged utilities for the duration of the emergency, although no unusual techniques or substitutes for restoration of municipal light and power have been publicized.

3. The use of locally available tools, even if not specially designed for the purpose, and of plentiful materials, including extensive salvage, which do not require transportation, is stressed. The steady stream of manuals and instructions published since 1942 stresses the use of wood and clay, the old standbys of Russian low-cost construction, in lieu of unavailable metal and concrete parts. Tarpaper, pitch, cast-iron, scrap metal, rubble, low-grade waste -- all have uses as substitutes; and ingenious application of firemen's equipment, rafts, and rubbish is suggested in repairing or fitting out utilities or services.


4. Because of the inadequate number of engineers and public health specialists in the Soviet Union and the sharply increased demand for their services with the liberation of vast areas, special efforts are being made to use them effectively. Particular stress is laid on their role in assaying damage and in supervisory planning of restoration.

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Mobility and close cooperation with local, civil and medical authorities are stressed. At the same time, efforts are being made to increase the number of such experts.

5. The general shortage of skills and manpower force the considerable use of unqualified local people who receive the minimum needed training and instructions. Skilled workers are used at their highest appropriate skill while volunteers are drafted from the whole community to do mass jobs of clearing refuse and wreckage, digging, carting, and salvage. In addition, spare-time labor is drawn on by stringent regulations making housing managers and tenants responsible for the maintenance of sanitary living conditions.



William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Belgrade. Will you be kind enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the  
OSS representative in Belgrade:

In Serbia there is reported to be considerable dissatisfaction with the lack of a genuine Serb in the newly appointed Yugoslav regency council. [Srdjan Budisavlyevich is a Serb from Croatia, who is believed to have little or no following in Serbia.] The disappointment of anti-Partisan Serbs has contributed to a general feeling of despair among those Yugoslavs who had hoped that Subasich would exercise a restraining influence on the Partisans. General Alexander's visit to Belgrade also contributed to this feeling. At first the opposition interpreted Alexander's arrival as a sign of Allied pressure on Tito. When the General's convoy of fifty jeeps entered Belgrade, rumors quickly spread that this was the vanguard of an Allied armored corps, and Alexander himself was greeted by spontaneous demonstrations. The opposition's hopes were soon dashed, however, by the realization that the Western Allies were not prepared

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
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to rescue them from their predicament. In this atmosphere the announcement of the regency, while relieving the uncertainty of past weeks, has produced little evidence of the general rejoicing reported in Belgrade by the BBC.



William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our Bern representative, which forms a sequel to my memorandum of 8 March. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945

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By MS Date JUN 11 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following information, a sequel to my memorandum of 8 March:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff has shown willingness to attempt to develop a program to take the German forces in North Italy out of the conflict. He considers simple military surrender difficult and prefers that capitulation be preceded by a statement by German leaders in North Italy informing the German people that the struggle is hopeless and will merely cause needless bloodshed and destruction. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring has not yet been won over, and his adherence is essential. Wolff is proceeding immediately to try to sell the program to Kesselring, and will maintain contact with the OSS representative in Bern. Wolff states that Rudolph Rahn, German Ambassador to Mussolini's regime in North Italy, is in accord with the program.

Wolff apparently controls all police and border forces on the entire Swiss-Italian frontier and can arrange quick contact with top German personalities in North Italy. Wolff, who in

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his SS and Police capacity is directly responsible to Himmler, claims that Himmler is unaware of his activities. [The OSS representative comments that this may or may not be true.]

The Italian partisan leader, Ferruccio Parri, whose delivery in Switzerland was requested as an evidence of good faith [cf. memorandum of 8 March], was turned over unconditionally to the OSS representative even before the latter saw Wolff. Parri is in good health and does not know the reason for his release.

A further meeting with Wolff was to take place during the day, 9 March.

[AFHQ and SHAEF have been informed of the above.]

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

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Sincerely yours,

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Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

The enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence forwarded by our Bern representative, will probably be of interest to the President. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence, obtained from a well-placed and trustworthy source, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern:

A Soviet Army order captured by the Germans is reported to contain the following directives for the behavior of Soviet troops in Germany: All acts of violence and plundering are forbidden; troops are to be absolutely correct in dealing with German civilians. Members of the Nazi Party will be dealt with by administrative and police officials who follow the troops. The order added that soldiers and officers who had violated these directives had already been shot. The German Ministry of Propaganda is said to have issued the strictest instructions that this captured document is to receive no publicity.

Hitler is reported to have been so aroused by Allied air attacks on Dresden that he proposed to have several thou-

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
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sand English prisoners shot in reprisal. He is said to have abandoned this plan only at the urgent request of Himmler, who may have seized this opportunity to appear again in the role of a "moderate".



William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested  
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that  
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

PSF: O. S. Jordan 5-45

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will be interested in the enclosed report on the strength of the Germany Army as of 1 October 1944. This report was prepared by our Research and Analysis Branch.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By E. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A 2349.2

ACTUAL STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY,  
1 OCTOBER 1944

Description

An estimate of the actual strength of the German Army on 1 October 1944 based on an analysis of recent intelligence materials.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C. 51 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

7 February 1945

Copy No. *8*

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By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1972

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SUMMARY

1. September 1942 is believed to be the last date at which the prescribed strength of the German Army can be used as a reliable index of actual strength.
2. Because of the divergence between actual and prescribed strength there has been a continuous downward revision of prescribed strength. The most fundamental revision of prescribed strength is dated 1 October 1943.
3. The actual strength of the German Army on 1 October 1944, based on an analysis of intelligence from all active fronts, is estimated at 4,320,000 men. This represents a decline in strength of 800,000 men from 1 June 1944 and 2,900,000 men from the peak strength of June 1941.

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ACTUAL STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY, 1 OCTOBER 1944

I. PRESCRIBED AND ACTUAL STRENGTH, SEPTEMBER 1942

Estimates of both the prescribed and the actual strength of the German army are dependent on an order of battle by type and location which fully covers all units at least through the divisional level. This type of order of battle analysis was firmly based by September 1942, in turn making possible an estimate of the prescribed strength of the German army. At this time, it was believed that prescribed strength was an adequate rough measure of the actual strength of the German army. While the German army had already suffered heavy losses on the Eastern Front, its replacement-training system was evidently functioning so as to meet the personnel needs of the first year of warfare against the Soviet Union.

II. PRESCRIBED AND ACTUAL STRENGTH IN THE WORLD WAR, 1914 to 1918

The measurement of actual strength as a function of prescribed strength was, however, a temporary expedient during this period, in the absence of direct evidence bearing on actual strength. The experience of the German army in the period 1914-1918 seemed to indicate that the equation with prescribed strength provided a reasonable estimate of the German position in 1942. The 1914-1918 material revealed

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four distinct phases in the development of the position of the German Field Army: (1) the short initial period of rapid mobilization during which actual strength exceeded prescribed strength; (2) the period from 1915 through the first half of 1917, when prescribed and actual strength were increasing, but actual strength was already below prescribed strength; (3) the period roughly from the last half of 1917 through the unsuccessful German offensive launched in March 1918, during which actual strength fell while prescribed strength increased; and (4) the final months of the war during which organizational changes and make-shifts failed completely to meet the army's replacement needs, as a result of which actual strength fell far below the declining prescribed strength. The nature of the German position in 1942 served to indicate that, in terms of comparative army strength development, it was no later than the middle of 1917, -- (the end of period 2 above).

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESCRIBED STRENGTH  
IN THE PRESENT WAR

The first evidence indicative of a widespread manpower crisis in the German army was the shifting of most of the training and replacement units from Germany to German-occupied areas in the fall of 1942. This organizational change broke up a system which had ensured a steady flow of replace-

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ments to units in the field by placing the training units in the dual role of replacement organizations and potential combat units.

Up to 1 October 1944, the German Armed Forces had suffered an estimated 7,675,000 permanent losses and an additional 945,000 men had been disabled for combat duty. Most of these losses have been concentrated in the combat-fit classes aged 18-37, so that of 11.4 million combat-fit German men originally available, there remain only 3.5 million, or 31 percent of the original total.

Heavy losses and the resultant deficiency of combat-fit manpower were given formal and probably belated recognition in the fall of 1943 by the OKH. Captured German documents dated 1 October 1943 carried an order of the German High Command providing for a radical downward revision in the prescribed strength of infantry, mountain, and light divisions, comprising some three-fourths of German first-line divisional strength. The application of this revision to infantry divisions was as follows:

- (1) Reduction of the size of infantry regiments from three to two battalions plus 9th and 10th companies.
- (2) Various reductions in other divisional units.

These orders, together with evidence on strength which is tabulated in appendices B and C, indicate that the

prescribed strength of the infantry division is approximately 13,000 men as against the previous prescribed strength of 17,000.

It is altogether unlikely that this change was an orderly process motivated by tactical considerations. In view of the overwhelming mass of evidence pointing toward an acute manpower shortage, it is reasonable to suppose that the changes in prescribed strength ordered in 1943 parallel the situation of the German Field Army in 1918. In 1918, the Germans were unable to maintain their field units at prescribed strength, even after successive downward revisions of prescribed strength.

In evaluating the significance of this type of organizational change, it is important to bear in mind the ever-increasing disintegration in the administration of personnel replacement in the German army during 1943 and 1944. In view of the chaos in army affairs indicated by the employment in combat of such ill-prepared units as Marsch-battalion, training divisions, GAF personnel, and the accelerated use of unreliable foreign elements, it is improbable that the projected reorganization of infantry divisions could have proceeded in an orderly manner.

There is no substantial body of evidence comparable to that on the infantry bearing on changes in the prescribed

strength requirements of mountain and light divisions in 1943. There is good evidence, however, which indicates that in 1944 the prescribed personnel strength of the Panzer division was revised downward from 17,400 to 13,700, a reduction of some 21 percent.

Practically all German second-line divisions -- static, coast-defense, reserve (including those sent into active service as field divisions), security and field-training -- can be said to have a definite prescribed strength only by an extension of the meaning of the term. These types of units are known to suffer in varying degree from inadequate and inexperienced personnel, qualitative and quantitative equipment deficiencies, and to be subject to raids on their personnel in favor of first-line units. Evidence bearing on such units in western Europe, including both active and inactive areas, indicates that a figure of 10,000 men per division by way of a nominal proscribed strength, can be set as an upper limit on their strength. As will be noted in the appendices, in practically every case second-line divisions fall far below this upper limit.

The order of battle of the German Army as of 1 October 1944 is therefore estimated as follows:

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>Number</u>
Army Group	10
Army	22
Offensive Corps	75
Defensive Corps	11
Panzer Division	34
Motorized Division	13
First-line Infantry Division	93
Second-line Division	96
Mountain Division	12
Light Division	11
Paratroop Division	4

In addition to the above units, there are training, administration, and garrison troops in Germany and administration troops in German-occupied Europe. There are also remnants of some 62 divisions in Germany which have been so severely depleted that they are no longer able to serve as combat units. It is believed that these 62 can serve as the basis for some 20 reconstituted divisions.

As of 1 October 1944, the prescribed strength of the units listed above was estimated as follows:

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>Strength per Unit</u>
Army	30,435 <sup>a</sup>
Offensive Corps	4,305 <sup>a</sup>
Defensive Corps	1,500 <sup>a</sup>
Panzer Division	14,000
Motorized Division	14,000
First-line Infantry Division	13,000
Second-line Division	10,000
Mountain Division	16,000
Light Division	13,000
Paratroop Division	16,000

a. TIRS/APPREC 145/44, 16 February 1944.

The estimated prescribed strength by theater as of 1 October 1944 is as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Prescribed Strength</u>
Eastern Front	2,150,000
Norway	160,000
Denmark	60,000
Western Front	800,000
Italy	440,000
South East Europe	330,000
Germany	600,000 <sup>a</sup>
Poland	<u>200,000</u>
Total	4,740,000

a. Exclusive of the remnants of the aforementioned G2 divisions.

#### IV. PRESERT ACTUAL STRENGTH

Evidence for the actual strength of the German Army is of two sorts -- summary statements from the Soviet and Allied commands, and detailed reports on individual units from various sources. In the absence of any dependable global reports, appraisal of the actual strength of the German army is dependent on a summary of a mass of documentary evidence secured on the respective fronts through contact with the enemy in the field. The flow of such material into the hands of the Western powers began with the over-running of the German forces in North Africa in 1943 and was continued with the invasion of Italy. The volume of such material reached substantial proportions almost immediately following the invasion of France in June 1944. It is now sufficient to make possible a direct estimate of actual strength.

For convenient reference, a compendium of the most important summary statements and individual reports is supplied in Appendices B and C.

Considering first the estimate of divisional strength on the Eastern Front from the Soviet High Command, it should be noted that the Soviet government has tended to emphasize the magnitude of the Soviet contribution to the war against Germany. In particular it has repeatedly called attention to the relatively high concentration of German forces on the

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Eastern Front. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Soviet Command would knowingly understate the strength of the German forces on their front. Inasmuch as the Soviets probably have good information on the enemy forces in Eastern Europe, their estimate of 8,000 men per division can be taken as the maximum average strength on that front.<sup>1</sup>

From the substance of the report from the Soviet Command, it is clear that the estimate refers to actual strength.

The estimate from Allied Force Headquarters for strength on the Italian front is clearly an actual strength estimate. By the date of the estimate, mid-August 1944, the Allies had in their hands a very large mass of information on the German forces on that front. It is considered that this estimate is firmly based.

Similarly in the case of the SHAEF estimate for the Western Front, which puts the number of German divisions at 57, equivalent to 26 normal divisions, it is evident that actual strength is meant.

The estimate for Norway is undoubtedly also an actual strength estimate. As it is believed that this estimate is based on excellent detailed information, it has been adopted outright.

Taking the above summary estimates as a point of  
1. See Appendix B, paragraph 1.

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departure, actual strength of the German army is estimated as follows:

EASTERN FRONT

Army Group	5	1,000	-	5,000
Armies	9	30,435	-	273,915
Offensive Corps	50	4,385	-	219,250
Defensive Corps	2	1,000	-	2,000
Divisions	146	8,000 <sup>a</sup>	-	1,168,000
Total				<u>1,668,165</u>

a. See Appendix B, paragraph 1.

WESTERN EUROPE

Overall (See Appendix B, paragraph 3). 500,000

ITALY

Army Group	1	1,000	-	1,000
Army	2	30,435	-	60,870
Offensive Corps	5	4,305	-	21,925
Divisions	15	17,000 <sup>a</sup>	-	255,000
Total				<u>338,795</u>

a. It is assumed that this is the norm to which AFHQ refers. See Appendix B, paragraph 2.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Army Group	1	1,000	-	1,000
Army	1	30,435	-	30,435
Offensive Corps	4	4,385	-	17,540
Defensive Corps	1	1,000	-	1,000
Divisions	18	10,000	-	180,000
Total				<u>229,975</u>

NORWAY

Overall (See Appendix B, paragraph 3). 133,000

DENMARK

40,000

POLAND

150,000

GERMANY

1,260,000

GRAND TOTAL

4,319,935

In addition to the summary estimates mentioned above, detailed evidence for the strength of German units so far as it is available is presented in Appendix C. While there is no simple method of processing these specific reports in order to get an overall estimate, it will be noted that the specific estimates taken as a whole support the summary reports very well. For instance, the average actual strength of units in France listed in Appendix C comes to approximately 6,000.

In the case of Germany and Poland, definite order of battle intelligence is lacking, and strength has been estimated on the basis of general considerations. For the three major active fronts, the evidence indicates that actual divisional strength is of the general order of one-half prescribed strength. It is believed that the German army has attempted to maintain army and corps strength and these have been estimated at full prescribed strength. In the case of troops in Germany, itself, evidence bearing on actual strength is virtually non-existent. It seems probable that actual strength is running above prescribed strength due to organizational confusion and the necessity for transferring to Germany the bulk of the training program and convalescent units on account of the loss of most of western Europe. The estimate for strength in Germany includes remnants of some 62 divisions with an average strength of 5,000 men.

Between 1 June 1944 and 1 October 1944, the actual strength of the German army declined by approximately 800,000 men. The present actual strength of 4,320,000 men contrasts with an estimated peak strength in June 1941 of 7,200,000 men. This quantitative decline has been accompanied by a qualitative decline in the army through the lowering of physical standards, the induction of foreigners, and the breakdown of the replacement training system.

APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS

There are no less than 6 definitions of strength in common use in the German army, corresponding to the various requirements of strategic planning, organization of supply, and of the bookkeeping transactions necessary to the house-keeping of all armies.

Among the Allies German strength has been discussed in terms of Establishment Strength, Ration Strength, War Establishment Strength, Table of Organization Strength, and Battle Strength. These terms derive from the analogy of Allied practice, and do not in every case correspond with German terminology or practice.

The recent capture of numerous German documents bearing on the strength of German units and on the forms of strength returns raises the problem of uniform terminology, since the records of the German units are ordinarily not expressed in a form consistent with present Allied usage. The strength classifications which are probably the most useful for the purpose of evaluating the general German manpower position are Prescribed Strength (Sollstärke) and Actual Strength (Iststärke). These were the terms in which were kept the central records of the German army in the World War, and the terms of discussion between the High Command and the other branches of the German Government. Captured documents indicate that these terms are still in use.

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Prescribed Strength in German usage corresponds to the Tables of Organization in American usage. This classification reflects the tactical doctrine of the High Command, in that it sets up the optimum complement of personnel for the units in question without regard, in the first instance, to the actual replacement situation. The records of the German army show that during periods of rapid expansion, Actual Strength frequently ran well ahead of Prescribed Strength. On the other hand, in periods of declining Actual Strength the German command has tended to cling to a pattern of Prescribed Strength which could no longer be maintained.

Actual Strength in German usage, is based on the nominal rolls of the units, headquarters, detachments, etc., including personnel on leave or furlough of all kinds, and personnel hospitalized up to 8 weeks. While Actual Strength so defined is considerably above the number of men who may be actually available for duty at a given moment, particularly after sustained periods of general action, it is probably the most practical general index of overall strength.

A third classification in German usage, Day Strength (Tagesstärke), covers the daily roll call of personnel available for duty. Day Strength is a measure of the effective strength of the army at a given moment, in contrast to Actual Strength which includes a variable, and on occasion substantial,

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number of men not immediately available. Day Strength is evidently a useful classification for appraising the immediate operational resources of the enemy. However, it does not appear feasible to use this classification in discussions of the overall manpower position, because of the dearth of information in terms of Day Strength and because the term ordinarily applies only to units of divisional strength and loss.

Gefechtsstärke (Battle Strength) is that part of Day Strength which is used in fighting, including medical personnel and drivers of front-line transport, but excluding rear echelon transport, ration, and repair detachments. According to a letter from HQ 362 Inf. Div.,<sup>1</sup> Battle Strength should be 80 percent, and in any case not less than 75 percent, of Actual Strength (less absent personnel).

Grabenstärke (Trench Strength) consists of those who bear weapons and take part directly in the fighting. Ordinarily Trench Strength is Battle Strength less Battle Transport. According to the regulations laid down for 362 Inf. Div. medical personnel are also excluded from the count of Trench Strength. The same source indicates that Trench Strength should be 65 percent and not less than 60 percent of Actual Strength less absent personnel.

1. AFHQ G-2 Intelligence Notes No. 64, 20 June 1944.

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Kampfstärke (Fighting Strength) seems to be roughly equivalent to Trench Strength. A captured document from 3 Engr. Bn.<sup>1</sup> indicates that Fighting Strength, unlike Trench Strength, includes motorcycle dispatch riders and medical personnel.

An example of the way in which these terms are used in reporting strength was found among the captured records of 198 Infantry Division.<sup>2</sup> On 8 August 1944 the Actual Strength of 235 Arty. Regt. which was at that time well up to prescribed strength, was broken down as follows:

Actual Strength	2015
Less Absent Personnel	- 305
	<u>1710</u>
Plus attached Personnel	<u>55</u>
Day Strength	1765
Trains	536
Battle Strength	1232
Combat Strength	776

Markttonderreiversorgungsstärke (Commissary Strength) and Verpflegungsstärke (Ration Strength) derive their importance from the fact that captured documentary evidence on unit strength occasionally is in this form. While such figures are not altogether reliable for short periods because of variations in food stocks and food requirements, Ration Strength yields an approximation of Actual Strength. Commissary Strength

1. AFHQ G-2, Intelligence Notes No. 60, 8 August 1944.

2. AFHQ G-2, Intelligence Notes No. 73, 12 September 1944.

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seems to be derived by adding 10 percent to Ration Strength and rounding to the next ten. For example, a captured document<sup>1</sup> shows how Commissary Strength was computed for 243 Inf.

Div.:

Ration Strength	8,559
Plus 10 percent	<u>856</u>
	9,415
Add to round up	<u>5</u>
Total	9,420

1. AFHQ G-2 Intelligence Notes No. 68, 8 August 1944.

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO INSURE LEGIBILITY.

APPENDIX B. SUMMARY STATEMENTS ON ACTUAL STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN ARMY

<u>Theater</u>	<u>Strength Comments</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>
Eastern Front	The average strength of German divisions is estimated to be 8,000 men. There are great variations in individual divisions; on 22 June for example 78 Infantry had 16,000; 60 Panzer Grenadier Division had 12,000; 31 Infantry Division 10,000. 60 Panzer Grenadier, when reduced to 5,000, was removed from combat as GO claims a division as low as 5,000 is not fit for combat. After receiving 7,000 reinforcements it went back into battle. All figures include divisional services.	1 Sept. 44	Soviet General Staff, Cable from "Military Mission, Moscow
Italian Front	"...brings the total of German divisions in Italy to twenty-seven, estimated equivalent to fifteen full-strength divisions."	August 44	GRI GHQ MSP, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 202, 13 August 1944
Western Front	"The total strength of the German armies engaged in the west is estimated at between 150,000 and 500,000 men, with a maximum of 700 tanks. These represent the remnants of some 78 nominal divisions."	11 Sept. 44	Allied Force Headquarters G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 106
Western Front	"The number of German divisions in the west in this week put at fifty-seven. Their equivalent strength, however, is estimated as not more than twenty-six normal divisions."	2 Oct. 44	Allied Force Headquarters G-2, WIS No. 103.
Western Front	"There has been a slight increase in the nominal strength in divisions of all types to roughly sixty, of an equivalent fighting strength of thirty. This nominal increase may however well be offset by recent losses."	9 Oct. 44	Allied Force Headquarters G-2, WIS No. 110.
Western Front	"Only a sizeable 81,000 Army men have been found trickling to the battle area over a two-month period during which the Army losses in	24 Aug. 44	CAFBS, Intelligence Notes No. 24

theater

Strength Comments

Date

Source

Hitler, through the months reached a total of 200,000. The failure of the late-1942 decision to set up training (Reserve) Divisions has not become apparent; for the majority of these divisions, given initially an occupational role which did not impair their training functions, and most of these in the West were further placed in coastal sectors and finally "upgraded" to field divisions, which precluded any supply of replacements to the fighting divisions. To take one example, the former 101 Training Division will now enter battle as 49 Infantry Division to be decimated with even less hope of loss-replacements than those destroyed divisions of the field army, which by rights it should have kept alive with drafts."

Western Front

"Total combat infantry strength opposing Sixth Army Group equals 25,000-30,000 men." (This figure represents the remains of nine divisions, two of them "first-line", a number of battle groups and other miscellaneous units."

30 Sept. 44

G-5 Periodic Report No. 119  
HQ Twelfth Army Group,  
2 October 44.

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Germany

27 Sept. 44

IFO II 500/44

APPENDIX C. REPORTS ON UNIT STRENGTH IN THE GERMAN ARMY

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Sub-source</u>
11 Pz Div	West Front	8-9,000	15 Sept. 44	Bilan de Quinzaine	U.S. Seventh Army
16 Pz Div	Italy	15,362		JICAME (10 Nov. 43)	
21 Pz Div	West Front	3,500	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
26 Pz Div	Italy	14,189		JICAME (10 Nov. 43)	
5 SS Pz Div	East Front	7,000	Feb. 44	Soviet Communique	P/W
Pz Lehr Div	West Front	14,899	undated presumably c. June 44	AFHQ G-2 Intelligence Notes #72 (5 Sept. 44)	
15 Pz Gren Div	Italy	14,899	6 May 44	AFHQ	From captured document giving ration strength
15 Pz Gr Div	West Front	7,000	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
90 Pz Gr Div	Italy	12,000	31 Mar. 44	OSS	
60 Pz Gr Div	East Front	12,000	22 June 44	Cable from US Military Mission, Moscow	
16 SS PG Div	Italy	13,597	10 June 44	AFHQ	Captured document
18 SS PG Div	Hungary	15,000	7 July 44	OSS	
12 Inf Div	East Front	8,000	May 44	Soviet Communique	P/W
16 Inf Div	West Front	1,500	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
30 SS Div	West Front	3,000	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
31 Inf Div	East Front	10,000	22 June 44	Soviet General Staff	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Sub-source</u>
77 Inf Div	West Front	10,555	2 June 44	SHAEP	
78 Inf Div	East Front	16,000	22 June 44	Soviet General Staff	
91 Inf Div	West Front	6,810	10 June 44	SHAEP	Captured document
162 Inf Div	Italy	12,000	19 Dec. 43	USAPME	
163 Inf Div	Finland	12,600	1 Oct. 44	OSS	
169 Inf Div	Finland	11,300	1 Oct. 44	OSS	
198 Inf Div	France	12,931	2 Aug. 44	AFHQ Intelligence Notes #73	Captured document
198 Inf Div	West Front	1,100	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
199 Inf Div	Finland	12,000	Sept. 44	Royal Norwegian Intelligence	
210 Inf Div	Finland	15,600	1 Oct. 44	OSS	
269 Inf Div) 274 Inf Div) 296 Inf Div) 702 Inf Div) 710 Inf Div)	Norway	average 9,000 each	Sept. 44	Royal Norwegian Intelligence	
243 Inf Div	France	8,559	17 Apr. 44	AFHQ	Captrued rations list
338 Inf Div	France	12,760	Jan. 44	AFHQ	
338 Inf Div	West Front	400	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	
352 Inf Div	France	16,505	March 44	AFHQ	From captured document showing commissary strength -- probably 10 percent higher than actual strength.
352 Inf Div	France	13,005	28 Apr. 44	SHAEP	

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By R. H. Parks Date 11/11/72

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Sub-source</u>
359 Inf Div	East Front	3,000	Sept. 44	OSS	
373 Inf Div	Balkans	13,000	20 Oct. 43	OSS	
392 Inf Div	Balkans	7,000	9 Feb. 44	OSS	
715 Inf Div	France	13,000	Jan. 44	AFHQ	
716 Inf Div	West Front	4-5,000	15 Sept. 44	Bilan de Quingaine	US Seventh Army
719 Inf Div	West Front	8,000	15 July 44	OSS	
569 Gr Div	West Front	600 per regt	Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	from P/W
230 Coast Def)					
270 Coast Def)	Norway	4,500	Sept. 44	Royal Norwegian Intelli-	
280 Coast Def)		(average)		gence	
11 GAF Fd Div	Balkans	10,000	1 Aug. 44	AFHQ	
14 GAF Fd Div	Norway	8,000	Sept. 44	Royal Norwegian Intelli-	
				gence	
148 Trg Div	France	13,600	8 Jan. 44	AFHQ	
159 Trg Div	West Front	2,400	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	Includes some miscellaneous units
189 Trg Div	West Front	1,500- 2,000	30 Sept. 44	HQ Twelfth Army Group	Includer some miscellaneous units

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Date JUN 1 1974

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Rome. Will you be kind enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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*O.S.S. folder 5-45*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1945

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By Authority of CIA

007622  
By APB Date JUN 11 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following intelligence has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Rome:

On 28 February the OSS representative in Rome was informed by Captain Guirche, a French intelligence officer, that his Chief in Paris, Soustelle, had received a directive from General de Gaulle stating that France has political objectives, possibly including a demand for annexation, in the [French-speaking] Val d'Aosta border region of northwestern Italy. The French are said to have kept information on this matter out of their political and diplomatic channels. French strategy, according to Guirche, is to stir up apparently spontaneous disorders in the Val d'Aosta, whereupon French troops would cross the border. Guirche, who requested that his information be treated with the utmost discretion, anticipates serious trouble if this alleged French plan should be realized.

At a meeting on 3 March with the OSS representative in Rome, Captain Guirche reaffirmed his previous statements on French intentions in the Val d'Aosta, and asked whether the

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United States Government had been informed. The OSS representative replied that he was concerned in northern Italy exclusively with military operational matters, and that Captain Guirche's statement had not been transmitted to civil government authorities. Guirche, however, stated that the United States Government should be informed, adding: "What I told you is official." To the question: "Are you authorized to release this information?" Captain Guirche replied: "My mission is to have you understand our position." Guirche, who characterized his mission as unpleasant and embarrassing, was unable to explain the French position. He stated that this policy, which would breed serious trouble, is being fostered by three or four persons in the French Provisional Government. He added that he would cable his Chief in Paris as of 3 March that the United States Government had not yet been informed.

The above matter has been brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff, Sixth Army Group. As a result, the Sixth Army Group Command, to which the Alpine Front Command is directly responsible, has received orders from SHAEF not to cross the Franco-Italian border.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

*William J. Donovan*  
William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested  
in the enclosed message from our Bern representative.  
Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank  
you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By APB Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10 March 1945

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By Authority of CIA

007622

By AS Date JUN 11 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has forwarded the following information, supplementary to my memoranda of 8 and 9 March:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, who has arrived in Zurich to discuss a definite program for taking German forces in North Italy out of the war, is accompanied by the two men who made the preliminary contact with the OSS representative (Standartenfuehrer Dollman and his aide, Zimmern) as well as by Wolff's military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner, and an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli. The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich, then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff is a distinctive personality, and evidence indicates that he represents the more moderate element in Waffen SS combined with a measure of romanticism. He is probably the most dynamic personality in North Italy and, next to Kesselring, the most powerful.

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Wolff stated that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war in order to end useless human and material destruction. He says he is willing to act and feels he can persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two control the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff states that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declares that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler powerless to take effective counter-measures like the ones they employed in the 20 July crisis. Also Wolff feels that joint action by Kesselring and himself would have a vital repercussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal viewpoint.

Wolff envisages the following procedures to bring about action: (1) He will meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's

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problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Kesselring has insisted that, after a long military career throughout which he had always kept his oath, he was too old to change. Nevertheless Wolff believes he can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed by themselves, Rahn (the German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy), and others. The appeal will set forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' responsibility to the German people to end it, will call on military commanders in particular and Germans in general to disassociate themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will state that the Germans in North Italy are terminating hostilities.

(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the German people and military commanders via radio and wireless.

(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he and Kesselring would come clandestinely to Switzerland within the week in order to meet Allied military men and coordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal. Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to represent him

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for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet having been acquainted with the plan.

As evidence of his ability to act, Wolff has already unconditionally delivered Ferruccio Parri, Italian patriot from North Italy, and, by Parri (5), a former OSS agent in Milan, to the OSS representative in Bern. Parri had been imprisoned in Verona, who is in Milan. Their release was requested of Dollman during the preliminary negotiations of 2 March, and both men assumed at the time they were taken away by the SS that they were being led to execution. Neither yet knows the reason for the release. Wolff fully realizes Parri's importance, and remarked to an intermediary that he was giving up his most important hostage.

Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by: (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans, merely keeping up whatever pretense is necessary pending execution of the plan; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bozen (Bolzano); Wolff claims he has refused any ransom money offered in this connection, although some has possibly already been swallowed up by intermediaries; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety and good treatment of 350 British and American prisoners at Mantua, of whom 150 are in the hospital and 200 on the southern outskirts; Wolff claims that

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these are all the British-American prisoners held in North Italy, since they had been currently transferred to Germany; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, ~~his~~ <sup>his</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~esc~~ <sup>esc</sup>, an Italian patriot working with CLNAI and the British; his release is particularly desired by Parri; (5) facilitating as much as possible the return to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany, who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.

In reference to Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano [whose part in earlier peace feelers is described in my memoranda of 9 and 26 February], Wolff will welcome von Neurath's help since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff will invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claims that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the North Italy situation, but received no definite instructions from them.

The OSS representative has made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course. The OSS representative comments that, if the results of the Wolff-Kesselring talks are favorable, this plan may present

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a unique opportunity to shorten the war, permit occupation of North Italy, possibly penetrate Austria under most favorable conditions, and possibly wreck German plans for establishment of a maquis.

The OSS representative in Caserta has advised AFHQ of the information transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern. General Alexander has outlined to Marshal Brooke the procedure which AFHQ proposes to follow, including a plan for two senior staff officers to go to Switzerland to meet with German representatives. Apparently Alexander has furnished this information to Brooke as a matter of courtesy and will go ahead on his own initiative, although he will cooperate with Brooke if London wishes to send other people to join in the meeting. OSS has been directed to submit a plan to carry out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss meeting place, transportation to and from that place to the French-Swiss border, as well as transportation from the Annemasse airport or vicinity to French-Swiss border. In addition, OSS will be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary safeguards for the security of operations. The OSS representative in Bern will select a safe meeting place, arrange transportation from Annemasse to and from that place,

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By WBS Date JUN 1973

and issue appropriate instructions to secure and provide arrangements for meeting the party at the Annemasse airport and supervising arrangements to and from the French-Swiss border. The total number of the party is unknown at this time, but all plans are being made to include arrangements for 15 to 20 people. OSS is withholding all these plans from the German representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date for the meeting.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

*If it were feasible  
I plan to go to Italy  
as one of the group has  
been designated to set  
up communication etc*

*D.*

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By DBL Date JUN 11 1973

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed report from our representatives in Bern and Caserta. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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O.S.S. folder 5-45

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 March 1945

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*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representatives in Bern and Caserta have forwarded the following information, supplementary to my memorandum of 10 March:

Acting under instructions from AFHQ, OSS is going ahead with plans for the impending meeting between German and Allied representatives to discuss a definite program for taking German forces in North Italy out of the war. OSS Bern has been requested to secure from Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff statements that Wolff and his associates, equipped with acceptable credentials, will proceed to the Bern meeting-place when AFHQ selects the date.

Final word has not yet been received from Wolff, and success in the operation depends on assurance of Marshal Kesselring's cooperation.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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007622  
By ARL Date JUN 11 1973

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 March 1945

*file  
personal*

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I will appreciate it if you will bring  
to The President's attention the attached memorandum  
and report.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

PSF; O. S. S. folder  
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


12 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


I am attaching here a copy of a study that we make up for our group in Europe. As you will see, it is simply a pulling together of the material obtained by our Intelligence and Research unit.


It is designed only to keep our own people informed, but several of the military units in the theater desire to read it.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan  
Director





## SUMMARIES

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New Nazi Courts-Martial; More Changes in Essen Government; Himmler and the Officers; Crisis Brewing in Rumania	
<u>World Trade Union Conference</u>	6
The most inclusive representative labor conference ever held came to an end in London on 17 February. The conference passed resolutions on various aspects of the war and of the peace to follow, but its most important action was to lay the foundations of a new international federation of trade unions. This new body will be in existence by the end of the year, and labor will be in a position to make its voice heard on the great international issues of the day.	
<u>The Evacuation Crisis in the East</u>	11
The Nazis have now openly admitted the full gravity of the recent evacuation crisis in the east. The situation has somewhat eased for the time being, but large-scale movement is still continuing. Berlin apparently will not be evacuated. Fear of Russia as an incentive to evacuate does not seem to have been nearly as effective as had been anticipated.	
<u>The Settlement in Greece</u>	15
The fighting in Greece was brought to an end by the signing of the so-called Varkiza Agreement on 12 February. The Agreement calls for an amnesty, building a national army, disarmament of ELAS, and the establishment of democratic liberties. The Right would have liked to destroy EAM, and the latter is relatively satisfied with the terms of the Agreement. British policy is responsible for the fact that the civil war was not followed by terror and dictatorship. For the future, the problem of the Right is still how to beat EAM, this time at elections.	

## CURRENT NOTES

New Nazi  
Courts-Martial

ALL Germans in "Reich Defense Areas threatened by the enemy" are now subject to summary trial by new Party-appointed courts-martial (Standgerichte) set up "to try all crimes by which German fighting strength or fighting determination are endangered." The new courts are directed to pay particular attention to "anyone who tries to escape his duties toward the community, especially if he does so out of cowardice or selfishness."

Under a decree dated 15 February and signed by Thierack as Reich Minister of Justice, Himmler as Reich Minister of the Interior, Bormann as Leader of the Party Chancellery, and Lammers as Chief of the Reich Chancellery, the Standgerichte will be composed of a criminal judge, acting as president, and two assessors (Beisitzer), one a Party political leader or section leader, the other a member of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, or the police. All three, as well as the public prosecutor appearing before them, are to be appointed by the Reich Defense Commissioner, who is identical with the Gauleiter. The Standgerichte may only sentence to death or acquit; otherwise the case passes to the regular courts. Verdicts require confirmation from the Reich Defense Commissioner, but when he "cannot be reached and immediate execution of sentence is absolutely essential," the public prosecutor may substitute as the confirming authority.

The relationship of the Standgerichte to the older Nazi courts, the Sondergerichte and the Volksgericht, is not entirely clear. Presumably, a Standgericht can be set up whenever necessary as an ad hoc instrument to deal with specific cases where the older courts were not functioning, or where their procedure might be too slow to furnish the necessary example of terror. Standgerichte are probably intended to be temporary courts, and proceedings before them will in all likelihood be of a drum-head nature. There appears to be no limit to the number of Standgerichte that can be appointed.

The new courts-martial seem designed chiefly to deal with civilians, and especially with officials who show signs of weakness. The right of the Wehrmacht to try its own offenders is so deeply grounded and so jealously guarded that if soldiers had been a major concern of the decree, the point probably would have been made explicit. Nevertheless, nothing in the order specifically exempts Wehrmacht personnel, and the presence of an Army man as one of the three judges on each Standgericht may presage the use of the courts against military personnel in cases of extreme emergency.

More Changes in  
Essen Government

THE Nazi policy of decentralizing municipal administration in cities subject to heavy air bombardment, while at the same time directing popular grievances into Party-supervised channels, has now

been carried one step further in Essen, where Allied attacks caused a serious crisis last November (see EPR, 8 December 1944). At a Kreis meeting on 30 January, an administrative reorganization for Essen was announced which clearly aims at both objectives.

The city's ten existing administration centers are turned into District Offices, and are supplemented by six additional Besirksämter. The several Ortsgruppenleiter in each district are to form an Advisory Council, with authority to appoint additional members "from among the citizens, primarily men who are in close contact with the population." These popular representatives are to deal with such tasks as "helping find dwelling space which is not being fully utilized, and advising the reconstruction official as to where help is urgently needed in order to restore the functions of vital institutions." The Advisory Councils meet as often as necessary, but at least once a month, and the individual districts are promised "greater independence" and "greater freedom of decision" for their own administrators.

These innovations have been introduced, according to the official announcement, because "the war, and particularly enforced self-help due to the air terror, have necessitated concentration on the creative forces of autonomy." In plain language, this is a rather frank admission that in badly bombed cities the authorities are forced to rely increasingly on the initiative of the population itself. At the same time, special care is still taken to keep all municipal functions under close Party supervision. In their new role as District Advisors, the Ortsgruppenleiter will not only solicit aid from among the citizenry, but will also help to make sure that popular resentment does not get out of hand.

Himmler and  
the Officers

THE text of a confidential speech made by Himmler to the officers of a newly constituted division on 26 July 1944 has recently become known.

The most striking feature of the speech is the outspoken way in which Himmler criticized the officer corps. He bluntly told the officers that they were inefficient and lax in their devotion to duty: "I have the impression that in this war there has been a lack of tireless devotion to duty and of effort among many officers....Our own war history will take us severely to task on this point, when once the situation maps, photographs, and aerial photographs of the German positions on the Don, Donetz, Dnieper, and Dniester are exposed - as they certainly will be - and are compared with those of the Russians. We officers will then really have to hang our heads in shame, for we did not work hard enough." He accused the officers of composing untruthful reports: "I have the impression that sometimes we have adopted an almost Roman-Italianesque phraseology, ranging from prevarication to the most cruel self-deception. I consider it self-deception if it is stated that the division, battalion, or company has withdrawn to orders, or if the CO of an army or division reports to higher headquarters that his unit has

withdrawn according to plan, when it was perfectly clear to us that the company ran away - in fact a case of showing a clean pair of heels, pure and simple." He indicted the officers for protecting unworthy colleagues: "I do not wish a court-martial case ... to come to my notice which I have to reject as has happened on past occasions in my own units of the SS and Police where I had to say: Typical officers' judgment, typical! There two officers have pulled out a third. It is an association of colleagues ... in which the small man is punished... and in which the superior is not because he belongs to the society in which one member does nothing to the other."

Himmler clearly wanted to impress upon his hearers that he did not think much of the traditions and spirit of the officers' corps and in fact regarded them as a positive menace. He softened the blow to a certain extent by saying that the officers' corps is no longer what it was at the beginning of the war and that new methods are now needed. The higher commanders can no longer be satisfied to give orders; they must also look to the execution of orders. The officer, in addition to fulfilling the customary duties of his rank, must to a certain extent take care of the duties of lower echelons as well. But despite these admissions of extenuating circumstances, the fact remains that Himmler showed none of the customary German military respect for the officers' corps; in his view it is an instrument of state policy to be judged by the same standards as any other.

Himmler's speech also revealed the great interest which he takes in the technical details of military affairs. Criticisms and suggestions in the speech pertain to such varied questions as the establishment of positions, the principles of digging field trenches and the disposition of artillery, relations with the men, and the composition of military reports. It is interesting that he placed particular emphasis on the care and training of the individual soldier. The speech may be regarded as an important clue to a question which has been much discussed since Himmler was recently appointed to command of an Army Group in the east, namely, whether his functions will be confined to problems where civilians are concerned or whether he will take an active part in directing military operations. In the light of the July speech, which shows that Himmler considers himself to be a perfectly competent military leader, the latter alternative seems the more likely.

The end of the speech contains a summary of Himmler's version of Germany's war aims. Thirty million people of Germanic blood - Danes, Flemish, Norwegians, and Dutch - must be incorporated into the Reich, and Germany's frontiers must be extended to a line 500 km east of the 1939 frontier. In addition, Germany would have to dominate a vast security zone beyond its frontiers, since any nation which in the future does not have air-raid warning posts 2,000 km beyond its borders will be doomed.

The statement of such far-reaching war aims at the very time

when Germany was suffering from heavy defeats in east and west may seem strange. In part the explanation may be that Himmler wished to assure those to whom he was speaking that they were fighting for Germany's future existence and not merely because of the whim of the Nazi leadership. The fact that during the whole speech he made no mention of the party would bear out this interpretation. But it is no doubt equally true that Himmler and his Nazi colleagues do not think of Germany as on the brink of final defeat. They expect the Nazi movement, if not themselves, to live on and eventually to achieve the goals which the founders have set for it.

Crisis Brewing  
in Rumania

THE congress of Rumanian Trade Unions, held in Bucharest during the closing days of January, was the occasion for the launching by the left-wing National Democratic Front (FND) of a vigorous campaign to take over the government. The program put forward by FND was primarily directed against "fascists" and "reactionaries" in the present government; the claim was made that only an FND government could bring about an improvement of relations with the USSR, gain a status of co-belligerency for Rumania, secure the return of northern Transylvania to the jurisdiction of the Bucharest government, and bring about the repatriation of P/Ws from the Soviet Union. Earlier demands for the nationalization of banks and large-scale industry were dropped, but the immediate break-up of large estates was called for.

The fact that two prominent Communist leaders, Gheorghiu-Dej (Minister of Transport) and Ana Pauker, had just recently returned from Moscow, gave rise to a spate of rumors that the new FND campaign had Soviet backing, though this was categorically denied by a source close to the Rumanian Communist Party, who stated early in February that the Russians and the British were urging the government to stand firm against FND demands.

The FND adopted aggressive methods in pushing its campaign. Large street demonstrations were organized, and members of the printers' union refused to publish an issue of the Peasant Party paper which attacked the FND. The Ploughman's Front - left-wing agrarian party which has been gaining strength at the expense of Maniu's Peasant Party - published a manifesto which could be interpreted as an invitation to village committees to take over land from large estates.

On 11 February, Prime Minister Radescu hit back vigorously against FND and its methods. In a public address - the locale of which had to be changed because FND members had broken into and occupied the Scala Theater which had originally been scheduled for the purpose - Radescu flatly rejected criticism of members of his government as fascists or reactionaries, denounced suppression of newspapers by unions, stated his opposition to immediate land reform, and repudiated the suggestion that any one party or group could be held responsible for the development of Rumania's international status.

Demonstrations by both FND and the Peasant Party took place the same day, and on 12 February Radescu spoke over the radio explaining the change in meeting place the day before. On 13 February a large FND demonstration in Bucharest was attended, according to estimates of various American observers, by 50,000 to 200,000.

There has been no evidence as yet to indicate what attitude the Soviet authorities are taking with respect to these events. Some Rumanian leftists are reported as believing that Radescu's firm stand marked a definite check to the FND initiative, at least for the present, and that the Crimea declaration, with its emphasis on the desirability of broadly representative regimes in liberated and ex-enemy countries, rules out an exclusive FND government. Nevertheless, latest reports indicate that the campaign is still going strong. Leftists are said to have attempted, successfully in at least one case, to seize several prefectures, and the air of optimism which pervaded conservative circles following Radescu's speech has given away to gloom. Meanwhile, the FND is reported to have adopted the line that only an FND regime can make the Crimea decisions a reality for Rumania. The struggle for power is clearly still in full swing, and the outcome is far from decided.

## WORLD TRADE UNION CONFERENCE

THE World Trade Union Conference (WTUC), meeting in London from 6 to 17 February, was a landmark in the history of the international labor movement and a significant political event. The basic issue of the conference was whether unity of international labor could now be achieved - thus overcoming the inter-war dissipation of strength between the Socialist Second International and the Communist Third International - in the interest of enduring peace and the eradication of fascism in all of its forms.

### Political Character of the Conference

Despite repeated statements that the conference was not concerned with political issues, the delegates were in fact preoccupied with politics not only because of the objectives sought, but also because they were in a broad sense representative of left-wing political movements in their respective countries. For example, M.H. Pauwels, Belgian delegate, left the conference to become Minister of War Victims in the Van Acker Cabinet. And Sidney Hillman, United States (CIO) delegate, brought with him the prestige associated with his position as Chairman of the Political Action Committee, which played an important role in the recent American presidential election.

Further evidence of the political character of the conference was the emphasis placed on the same issues which were simultaneously being dealt with at Yalta. That the two conferences were being held at the same time (Citrine opened the WTUC in London with an announcement that the Crimea Conference was in progress) was accidental. What was not accidental was that the trade unionists were most concerned not with the traditional issues, such as wages and hours, but with peace, fascism, and full employment - the primary political problems of the day.

### Conference Resolutions

The resolutions of the conference paralleled the decisions of the Big Three. The resolution on furtherance of the Allied war effort called upon workers to maximize their contributions to the war. It urged the application of democratic policies in liberated countries and the equipping of their armed forces. Further, it called upon United Nations governments to reconsider economic and other relations with Spain and Argentina. The resolution on the peace settlement demanded the eradication of fascism in all of its forms and asked that labor be given a voice in all matters relating to the peace settlement. The resolution on postwar reconstruction was primarily concerned with the elimination of unemployment and the raising of labor standards. It was on the resolution concerned with a new world federation of labor that the most significant developments in the labor movement were re-

vealed. This problem is examined below.

#### Representative Character of the Conference

Representation from almost every genuine trade union center in the world, with the notable exception of the American Federation of Labor, made this the most nearly world-wide labor meeting ever held. At the outset, there were delegates representing 15 international bodies, and 43 United Nations and neutral national centers. The conference itself voted to invite representatives from the ex-enemy countries, and several of these arrived during the closing days. All in all, the delegates represented an actual Trade Union membership of well over 60 million. The inclusive and representative character of the conference not only guaranteed that its decisions would command widespread attention but also proved to be one of the determining factors in connection with the organizational structure of the proposed new world federation of labor.

#### The Form of the New World Federation

There were two organizational alternatives - to reconstruct the existing International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), or to create a new body. The IFTU cannot be understood apart from the political history of the inter-war period. In that period, labor politics were polarized around the two Internationals, the Socialist Second and the Communist Third, the former a gradualist, reformist body and the latter activist and revolutionary. Dissension between the two Internationals divided labor in country after country, precluding the degree of unity which was a prerequisite to effectiveness in labor's fight against the rise of fascism.

The IFTU is the economic and trade union expression of the Socialist International, a fact which identifies it with the suspicions and bitterness of old quarrels and old issues. Moreover, the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war finally discredited, in the eyes of the working class, all of the international organizations which were specifically designed to protect the interests of labor. This applies as much to the Third International and its one-time Profintern (Red Trade Union International), as it does to the Second International and its IFTU. The Third International, probably partly because of a realization of this fact, disbanded relatively early in the war.

The desire to make a clean break with the failures of the past motivated the Latin American, the French, and the bulk of the British colonial and Dominion delegations, to back the CIO and Soviet delegations in their demand for a new world federation of labor. The last two, since they are not members of the IFTU, had an added incentive to push for a new international organization in which they could play a role commensurate with their own importance. On the other hand, the

British would have preferred to see the IFTU retained and expanded. This was partly because they had long been the dominant power in it, partly because they wished to retain the existing structure whatever its weaknesses in preference to launching a new and untested organization.

The strength of the British position lay in the fact that if the TUC decided not to go into the new organization but instead to throw in its lot with the AFL in a reconstituted IFTU, the new project might well have been still-born. The weakness of their position lay in the fact that as long as the AFL refuses to be associated with Soviet or CIO Unions, the IFTU could hardly attract the support of the majority of the delegations to the conference and would remain a narrow and relatively uninfluential body. Moreover, although supported by delegations from China, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries, as well as by those from the IFTU and the International Secretariats, the British were clearly in a minority position.

The speech of Sidney Hillman calling for the immediate establishment of a new federation was a statement of the maximum CIO and Soviet Union demands. Hillman recommended that the IFTU be scrapped because "it does not meet the demands made upon international labor in these crucial days." He demanded the creation of a new body which should be given full authority and which should begin work at once.

Eventually, Sir Walter Citrine, on behalf of the British delegation, accepted the basic demand for a new federation but secured a compromise on the procedure to be adopted in creating the new international. Instead of declaring a new federation to be in existence, a Continuations Committee, empowered to be the interim authority of the conference, was established with headquarters in Paris. This committee has full authority to deal with governments in the name of world labor and to demand representation at peace conferences. It is to draft a constitution, submit it to the constituent bodies for amendment and ultimate ratification, and before the end of 1945 reconvene the WTUC for the purpose of adopting a final constitution.

#### The French Delegation

The French, as representatives of the largest and most important country that has suffered from Nazi occupation, played an important role throughout the conference. The primary problem facing this delegation - fifteen from the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and four from the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions - roughly resembled the main political problem France faces on the international scene; that is, obtaining recognition as a major power. The delegation was very successful in this respect. It obtained representation on every committee; and in the Continuations Committee equal voting strength was given to France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Moreover, the decision to make Paris the headquarters of the Continuations Committee will serve both to strengthen

French influence in the international body and to give tangible recognition to the restored international status of France.

The French delegation conceived of its role as that of a bridge between the Soviet and the British delegations. Already committed to the establishment of a new federation by decisions taken in the Franco-Soviet Trade Union Committee, much of the strength of the French delegation was in fact based upon their close working relations with the Soviet unions. The French, however, have no intention of becoming too dependent on the Russians; it is understood that negotiations will soon be undertaken to revive the old Anglo-French Trade Union Committee. Like the governments of their respective states, the trade unions seem to be developing a series of bi-lateral agreements which will operate within the broader framework of an all-encompassing international body.

In its actions both in committee and on the floor the French delegation revealed the existence of an established working relationship between the CGT and the Christian Trade Unions, and at no time did the latter show any inclination to line up behind the old IFTU. Within the CGT delegation itself, no evidence of Communist-Socialist disagreement was apparent.

#### Attitude Toward Germany

The conference was united in supporting Allied plans for punishing German war criminals, disarmament, reparations, etc. With regard to the treatment of German labor, there was agreement that it would be used for reconstruction purposes in devastated countries. But, in the words of the relevant resolution, "the employment of German labor, if used in restoration work, must be placed under international supervision, with Trade Union participation, in the determination of labor standards in a way that will not reduce the standards of other workers." Such labor, it was stressed, must not alone be held responsible for the crimes of the German people. Most important from the purely trade union point of view was the decision to establish as speedily as possible during the period of occupation, a democratic trade union movement in Germany under international trade union supervision. This decision probably foreshadows an approach by the new international labor organization to the Allied authorities for the right to participate, in some as yet undefined way, in the handling of German Civil Affairs.

#### Conclusions

A new World Trade Union Federation will be a fact before the end of 1945. The newly-won unity of international labor may well prove to be an important political force in the closing stages of the war. That the conference approved the major policies of the Big Three should not be interpreted as meaning that the national labor groups

are merely echoing the decisions of their respective governments, but rather that the shape of things to come as outlined at Teheran and Yalta is, in the view of the conference, worthy of labor's support. But that support, as various delegates explicitly stated, can be withdrawn. It is for these reasons, along with others already suggested, that the WTUC, although ostensibly a trade union assembly, was in fact a major international political conference.

It has been under the pressure of war that international labor unity has been achieved and that organizations with the most diverse cultural, political, and ideological backgrounds were able to submerge or reconcile their differences. It is to be expected that as that pressure is relaxed, and as the new federation gets into operation, conflicts will arise. But the problems of maintaining peace and of eradicating fascism, as well as the achievement in peace time of a high level of employment, are so international in character that it is unlikely that this new-found unity will be abandoned. As labor faces up to these problems, it will become increasingly apparent that the new federation is in fact a new type of international, uniting in one body the economic and political internationals of the past.

Finally, the existence of a World Trade Union Federation of truly world-wide scope and authority should tend in the long run to exert a unifying influence on national trade union bodies and through them on national political groupings. In view of such a possible development it could well be that although international labor unity has been achieved because of the exigencies of the war, and although attention is now concentrated on the immediate labor problems connected with the peace settlement, the effects of this conference will be felt most not in the near future but in the years to come.

## THE EVACUATION CRISIS IN THE EAST

IN the past week, after the worst of the evacuation chaos had subsided and a temporary stabilization of the northern Oder front had been achieved, the German press and radio began admitting - undoubtedly because refugees had already spread the news deep inland - the full gravity of the evacuation problem in the east. These admissions cover the following points:

- (a) The number of evacuees who would have to be moved was greatly underestimated. Hahn writes that plans had to be made "overnight" to take care of three instead of one and a half million evacuees, and DNB quoted a neutral correspondent's figure of "four to five million" people who had to leave their homes.
- (b) The speed of the Soviet advance precluded evacuation of many towns, and additional thousands were caught on the roads. A DNB broadcast (abroad) stated that "the great majority" of the population in the eastern German provinces "have remained behind."
- (c) The sufferings of the "trekkers", i.e., those who had to make their own way without benefit of rail transport, were tremendous; many died, others had limbs frozen, and "panic-like phenomena" developed. The leadership was confused and long columns of refugees were misdirected.
- (d) There was defeatism and cowardice among the responsible Party leaders, and many men and boys evaded Volksturm mobilisation and left with the women and children.

The Situation Now

Thousands of refugees are still on the move, and many who had settled in Pomerania, Mark Brandenburg, and Saxony are being uprooted for the second time in a few weeks as the Soviet penetration deepens. The movement is now more orderly, and the weather has improved. Evacuation takes place in two stages: partial evacuation (Auflockerung) involves only pregnant women and sick persons; it is not clear who has authority to order this move, but it seems to be up to the Gauleiter. Evacuation proper (Räumung) extends to the following groups in the order given: women with children under 14, women without children, and finally male workers unless they are in the Volksturm or subject to separate evacuation with their enterprises. Foreign workers are evacuated on principle, but theirs is the lowest priority and they seem to be left behind when emergency conditions limit transport.

Räumung occurs only on Hitler's orders, although Himmler may

substitute for the Fuehrer in the east. Only in case of extreme danger can the Gauleiter, in his capacity as Reich Defense Commissioner, order Raumung on his own authority. To date the only towns where civilians have been permitted to stay on when the town is being fought for are those which have been encircled by the Russians (Breslau, Elbing, Schneidemuehl, and Koenigsberg), but in all these cases evacuation measures were carried on as long as possible.

#### The Situation in Berlin

Berlin appears to be a special case. German soldiers have been told in a Forces broadcast that the large-scale evacuation of Berlin is "impossible" because of transport difficulties and because "the reception area itself has shrunk." Women as well as men will continue to work in Berlin in case of battle. Presumably the troops would not be given this grim news about the future of their families in Berlin if it were not intended to make a second Stalingrad out of the capital.

The same broadcast outlined the total defense measures being taken in the city. Noteworthy is the decentralisation of control, with the metropolitan area divided into defense zones in each of which the military commander will work closely with the Kreisleiter who, under Goebbels, is in charge of civil defense. Preparations seem designed to create local autonomy in the separate defense districts: news will be disseminated through small local newspapers and posters, and civilians will be fed army-style at canteens established by the Ortsgruppenleiter. The Volksturm is already at work building fortifications and road blocks.

The Nazis vigorously deny that the Government is being evacuated from Berlin, but it is known that important archives were moved out some time ago, and many ministries maintain only skeleton staffs in the city, with the main offices either in the outskirts or in Southern Germany.

#### Morale Effects

Last autumn's experience in western Germany demonstrated that the flight of party leaders on the approach of the enemy infected the civilian population with apathy and defeatism. Now, with large numbers of Volksturm men dependent on party leaders for orders and encouragement, the latter are doubly vulnerable. Not only does their flight weaken armed resistance; it also signifies clearly that those in the know consider the situation hopeless. Significance therefore attaches to the form and quantity of nationwide publicity given to the execution of party leaders and to the new super courts-martial which have been established - see the note above, "New Nazi Courts-Martial." The intention apparently is not only to discourage further desertions by officials but also to assure the public that the party

is still in control of the situation and capable of dealing with defeatism in its own ranks.

While it is extremely important that the population be convinced that Party leaders stay on in threatened towns "to the last", the Nazis are no doubt reluctant to lose their active leaders by death or capture, and the leaders themselves are probably convinced by now that as war criminals their future, if captured, is at best uncertain. Wherever possible, therefore, it is likely that the party evacuates high-ranking officials and keeps them out of the public eye until the situation has been stabilized. Something like this has probably happened in the case of Gauleiter Koch of East Prussia, about whom nothing has been heard for some time.

The Nazis admit that the sight of long columns of evacuees trudging through the snow was a depressant to the morale of German troops and that some of the soldiers even advised refugees to abandon their flight and return to their homes. More recently, propaganda revealed that civilians living in rear areas were also affected; they are told that "we must not lose our nerve when a stream of refugees passes us."

#### Fear of Russia as a Spur to Evacuation

It has generally been assumed that the eastern German's fear of Soviet Russia would significantly reduce resistance to evacuation and simplify the Nazis' task of clearing civilians out of endangered areas. A confidential circular to NS Guidance Officers in the Navy, dated 3 January 1945, shows that the Nazis, too, expected that in the east people would "willingly accede to the appeals for evacuation," whereas "in the west compulsion had often to be applied in order to get individuals out of the threatened areas." Reasons given for resistance in the west were, first, the people's refusal to believe that the Anglo-Americans are barbarians, second, the uncertainty of the future for refugees, and third, anxiety over property left behind.

The evidence so far available strongly suggests that the Red Bogey, while an important conditioning factor, has by no means played the role expected of it in the east. Apathy, attachment to home and property, fear of endless suffering on the road, and the conviction that the enemy are "after all, human beings" have again combined to persuade an important minority to evade or avoid evacuation in the east, just as they did in the west. In this connection, it must be remembered that in the west, too, most of the people left; in Aachen, for example, only about 10,000 out of a population of more than 150,000 stayed behind.

German propaganda provides illuminating material on all these points. There is the broadcast, already cited, which claimed that the "great majority" had been left behind. This is undoubtedly an intentional exaggeration, and it was not broadcast at home, but it in-

dicates at least that large numbers of Germans are living under Russian occupation. A broadcast on Soviet atrocities tells of the woman who refused to leave: "I have my house here and all my possessions.... after all, the Russian Bolsheviks are human beings. They cannot be as bad as all that." This broadcast is doubly interesting because it was beamed to German soldiers in the east, who, according to Dittmar's recent statement, have "misguidedly" advised civilians to stay in their homes.

The fact that fear of Russia does not seem to have been a decisive motive in determining the scale of evacuation in the east is not of itself sufficient ground for overall political generalizations on the subject. It is probable that the terrible winter weather conditions, plus the knowledge that travelling westward means moving into a zone of Allied bombing instead of into a zone of relative safety, operated to counterbalance the Nazis' long and persistent anti-Bolshevik propaganda.

In any case, the result is that the Nazis are now facing in the east a situation which they have so far been able to prevent in the west, namely, the existence under enemy occupation of areas of the Reich which are large enough and probably sufficiently well populated to make possible the early resumption of something resembling normal civilian life.

## THE SETTLEMENT IN GREECE\*

A TREATY between the Greek Government and EAM, putting an end to a state of war which had lasted for more than two months, was concluded on 12 February. The Varkiza Agreement, so-called after the place near Athens where the peace negotiations were held, consists of nine articles plus three annexes dealing with detailed legal and military problems.

The general principles embodied in the Varkiza Agreement are straightforward and simple. They may be summarized under the following headings: establishment of the usual democratic liberties, amnesty for political offenses, release of hostages, building of a national army based on the principle of regular call-ups, demobilization of ELAS, purge of the state apparatus of incompetents and collaborators, and finally, holding of a plebiscite on the monarchy and of elections to a constituent assembly in the presence of Allied observers.

When it comes to the question of the implementation of these principles, however, it is more difficult to evaluate the Agreement. In some respects, the terms seem to be sufficiently explicit so that, assuming good faith on both sides, there should not be much difficulty in reaching the stated goal. This is true, for example, of the amnesty which is provided for in Article 3 and which is carefully delimited and guaranteed in an annex. It is also true with respect to the disarmament of ELAS. It is not true, however, of two of the most important provisions of the Agreement, namely, those dealing with the formation of a national army and with the purge of the state apparatus. The difficulty of evaluating these sections of the Agreement stems in part from textual obscurity, which in turn may be partially attributable to inadequacies in the broadcast version presently available. But even more important is the fact that both the character of the new army and the thoroughness of the purge will depend largely upon the motives and intentions of those in charge. Since the government will apparently appoint the responsible officials and committees, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these questions will ultimately be settled by the government itself, acting under a great variety of political pressures. To a very large extent, therefore, the meaning of the Agreement must be sought not by way of textual interpretation but rather by an analysis of the overall political situation which will condition the manner in which it will be carried out.

The Attitude of the Greek Right

There can be little doubt that the bulk of the Greek Right, including not only royalists but also republicans like Plastiras who have been equally opposed to the monarchy and to EAM, hoped that the recent crisis would result in the destruction of EAM, and more particularly of the Greek Communist Party. Until the actual commencement

\* For the background to the settlement, see EPR for 15 December 5 January, and 26 January.

of the peace conference there were few signs of a sentiment favorable to compromise among supporters of the government, and the government itself showed in various ways that it was strongly influenced by the desire to proceed with the liquidation of EAM. A few examples of this intransigent mood of the Right may be cited. Both before and after he assumed the office of prime minister, Plastiras made declarations which could only be interpreted as a demand for unconditional surrender. Shortly after the new government was sworn in, the announcement was made in Athens and reported in the British press that warrants had been issued for the arrest of all the leaders of the "rebellion." This made a poor impression in Britain and was subsequently denied. The large pro-government demonstration in Athens on 14 January, which was described by the London Times correspondent as "an EDES demonstration," was punctuated with cries and banners calling for "no amnesty." Even while the peace negotiations were in progress, certain alleged terrorists were sentenced for carrying arms against the state in spite of almost simultaneous assurances that only common law crimes would be prosecuted. Almost until the end of the negotiations, Athens newspapers were denouncing EAM in the strongest terms and urging a policy of no compromise. Finally, the statement of the regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, on the occasion of the signing of the Varkiza Agreement implicitly recognized the existence of opposition to the government's decision. "Despite reasonable objections which have been or may be formulated," the Archbishop nevertheless expressed his belief that the Agreement was really in the interests of the country.

The reason why the government, in spite of such strong opposition both among its supporters and from within its own ranks, came to an arrangement with EAM is clearly to be sought in the attitude of the British Government. British troops did most of the fighting against ELAS, and their support is the pre-condition of the present government's continuation in office. The British attitude will be examined below; for the present, it is only necessary to note that the Greek Government, in negotiating a peace treaty, was not acting as a free agent. It is to be expected, therefore, that it will continue to maintain a hostile attitude toward EAM and to use every opportunity to interpret the Agreement in a sense unfavorable to EAM.

#### The Attitude of EAM

EAM took up arms after 3 December in the hope that it would receive effective international support, especially from the USSR and the USA. When it became obvious that such support would not be forthcoming, EAM concluded that it would be essential to make extensive concessions in order to bring about a speedy solution of the crisis. The withdrawals stipulated in the January truce were accordingly agreed to, and plausible reports on EAM policy in the second half of January stated that delegates to the forthcoming peace conference would be empowered to yield to whatever extent might be necessary to reach an agreement.

Against this background, it is not surprising that EAM spokesmen

have greeted the Varkiza Agreement, not with enthusiasm to be sure, but with considerable satisfaction. From the Left point of view the essential point is that EAM itself and its constituent organizations, including the Communist Party, remain legal and free to carry on their political activity. Following the signing of the Agreement, a number of EAM leaders issued statements, all of which echoed the sentiments expressed by Siantos, Communist leader and head of the EAM peace mission. Siantos made two main points. First, that "the agreement is not such as the Greek people wanted nor as the right wing wished." It is clear that by "the Greek people" Siantos meant EAM, which had failed to secure its demands for a general amnesty and for representation in the government. As for the disappointment of the Right, Siantos was evidently referring to the frequent demands for the final liquidation of EAM. The second main point was expressed by Siantos as follows: "We pass to a political struggle by peaceful means."

It seems almost certain that EAM will now devote its energies to preparations for the forthcoming elections in the hope of securing that measure of real power which it feels entitled to but which has so far eluded its grasp.

#### The British Role

British policy toward Greece from the beginning of the German occupation to the outbreak of the recent crisis seems to have been designed to achieve two related goals: (1) to keep the way open for a possible return of the King, and (2) to forestall the emergence of a predominantly left-wing government such as has inherited power under similar conditions in neighboring Yugoslavia and Albania. Under the impact of the crisis, this policy has been gradually modified. The cause of the monarchy suffered a severe blow when Churchill and Eden, following their Christmas trip to Athens, brought sufficient pressure on King George to induce him to agree to a regency and to announce that he would not return to Greece unless called back by a popular plebiscite. The appointment of the Plastiras government, with British approval, constituted another set-back for the king, since the present Greek Government, despite its predominantly rightist character, is known to be overwhelmingly republican in its views on the constitutional question.

Moreover, ever since the conclusion of the January truce, the British have exercised a restraining hand on the Greek Right. As noted previously, it was British influence which induced the Greek government to come to an understanding with EAM on terms which are relatively satisfactory to the latter. That a Balkan civil war should end on a note of moderation, and with both victor and vanquished retaining their organizational structures and their freedom of political action, is an unprecedented occurrence for which British policy must be given exclusive credit. Furthermore, since the British Government is supporting the principle of free elections in Greece, and since it is EAM which hopes and expects to gain from the elections, it follows that Britain is now pursuing the only policy in Greece which might lead to the estab-

lishment of a predominantly left-wing government.

### British Public Opinion

This rather surprising reversal of the British role in Greece is probably to be attributed in part to a desire to reach an early settlement and thus to avoid having Greece become a potential source of international misunderstanding and ill-will. The expulsion of KAM from the Athens area required a considerable military effort, and if the war had been continued in the remoter and largely mountainous regions of the country it might have dragged on for many months. In the interest of smooth inter-allied relations, a quick and lasting settlement was clearly desirable.

Of perhaps even greater importance in this connection, however, were the domestic political pressures to which the Greek crisis gave rise. The outbreak of fighting focused attention on Greek affairs to an unprecedented extent. The government's Greek policy, which previously had received relatively little attention, suddenly became a burning issue of domestic politics. From the outset, the labor movement strongly disapproved of the government's policy; this was demonstrated most clearly at the Labor Party Conference early in December. Observers of that meeting agree that it was only the overriding desire to maintain the coalition until the end of the war which prevented the delegates from overruling the Executive and passing a strong vote of censure on the government's Greek policy. Moreover, several of the country's most respected newspapers, including the Times and the Manchester Guardian, were highly critical of the government's actions.

That dissatisfaction has not been confined to the Labor Party and certain organs of the press is clear from a poll of public opinion taken during the second week in January (i.e. after the establishment of the regency and the appointment of the Plastiras government, but before the cessation of fighting). This poll was one of a regular series conducted by the British Institute of Public Opinion - the counterpart of the American Gallup Institute -, and its results would normally have been published by the News Chronicle. Actually, they have not yet been published.

To the question, "Do you approve or disapprove of Mr. Churchill's attitude on the Greek question?" the answers were: approve - 43 percent; disapprove - 38 percent; don't know - 19 percent. The approval rate is remarkably low and the disapproval rate remarkably high for a major wartime policy. Equally striking is the fact that the same poll revealed that Churchill's popularity as prime minister and general satisfaction with the conduct of the war had gone down respectively by ten and nine percentage points since the end of October. In the case of the decline in the prime minister's popularity, this is the largest drop between two polls which has been recorded during the war. In the case of the decline in general satisfaction with the conduct of the war, the only sharper drop was that which followed the fall of To-

bruk in 1942.

Since it is likely that dissatisfaction with the government's policy was even more pronounced before the Churchill-Eden Christmas trip to Athens, it seems reasonable to conclude that both the trip itself and subsequent modifications of British policy were the outcome - normal to a democracy - of organized political pressure accompanied by a swing in public opinion.

Of course, the reaction of the British government to the domestic political situation was not confined to modifying its policy in Greece. During the second half of January, government spokesmen, seconded by a Trades Union Congress delegation to Greece, put a great deal of emphasis on atrocities committed by ELAS. Judging from press reactions, the effect on public opinion was considerable. Now that sympathy for EAM has been partially alienated and a settlement between the rival Greek factions reached, it would appear that the whole question has passed through its acute phase and, assuming no new flare-up, is unlikely again to assume a dominating position in domestic British politics.

#### The Outlook in Greece

If the foregoing analysis is sound, it seems reasonable to look forward in Greece to a period of intense, but on the whole peaceful, political activity in preparation for the coming plebiscite and elections. The government and its right-wing supporters will do their best to entrench themselves in power, while EAM will exert itself to mend its political fences and rally popular support behind its program of relatively mild economic and social reform. The British will remain as the stabilizing factor in the situation, and their prestige will be raised in proportion to the success of Military Liaison and/or UNRRA in relieving the desperately bad economic position of the Greek people. It will take some time to establish the authority of the government throughout the country and to construct adequate voters' lists, but there is no reason to suppose that the terms of the Varkiza Agreement, which call for a plebiscite before the end of the year, should be impossible of fulfillment.

As to the probable outcome of the plebiscite and elections, very little can be said at this time. The situation is still too fluid, and the full repercussions of the recent fighting will probably not be known for some time to come. Nevertheless, it does seem safe to say, first, that the position of the king has been seriously weakened; and, second, that EAM, as a coalition of liberal and left-wing parties, will continue to hold the center of the political stage. Presently available information suggests that reports of disintegration within EAM, which were widely circulated during January, were greatly exaggerated. No prominent EAM leader has publicly dissociated himself from the movement, and many of them have issued statements of solidarity since the signing of the Varkiza Agreement. For the governmental and right-wing parties, the problem is still how to beat EAM.

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
12 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Berne, which I believe the President will find interesting. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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
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12 March 1945

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in the enclosed radiotelephone message from the OSS Berne representative. This report summarizes the reasons for (1) the continuing stubborn resistance of the German Army and Officer Corps, and (2) the brutal form of the execution of the generals after the 20 July affair.



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 9 March 1945

#286

FROM	Berno	HBG	PRIORITY
TO	DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES		ROUTINE
DISTRIBUTION			DEFERRED
(FOR ACTION)		(FOR INFORMATION)	

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

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## GERMANY

One of the chief reasons today for the continuing stubborn resistance of the German Army and Officer Corps is the oath of allegiance to the Fuehrer. The German sense of discipline and obedience is controlling. The old-line officers, most of whom are not Nazis and whom we should expect to find in revolt today against the needless continuation of the struggle, are often the most difficult to win over. The Prussian military tradition dies hard, and at the core of that tradition is that breaking the military oath is the most heinous of crimes.

One of the reasons for the brutal form of the execution of the generals after the July 20 affair was the desire of the Nazis to emphasize the character of the crime committed, namely, what the Germans call "Eidbruck" (sic) -- breaking the oath. The Nazis realize that once the sanctity of the oath to Hitler falls, then the break between the Party and the Army would be complete and the end of military resistance would come. This is also the reason why it is essential for the Nazis to keep Hitler in evidence, to bring him out from time to time, to show that he is still alive and acting. Himmler may exercise the real power, but it is only because Hitler is there that he can do so. If Hitler disappeared, then the struggle of conscience, which many Wehrmacht officers have today would be ended. They would no longer be bound by their oath, and revolt would be general.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

12 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

The enclosed memorandum, containing intelligence forwarded by our representative in Kandy, will probably be of interest to the President. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*W. J. Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 March 1945

*files*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Kandy has transmitted the following information:

On the night of 9 March, the Japanese Military Staff in Bangkok demanded that Thailand close its Indo-China border, seize the arms of all French soldiers crossing the border, and arrest all Indo-Chinese and French residents in Thailand. Furthermore, the Thai were refused contact with their diplomatic representatives in Indo-China. The Japanese explained that their request for further controls in Indo-China had been refused by the Decoux Government on the morning of 9 March, whereupon the Japanese took over the control of all communications and began disarming French Indo-China troops and police. Fighting had begun by the night of 9 March with the Japanese moving against French Indo-China positions at Saigon and Hanoi.

The Thai Cabinet, being in no position to resist, agreed to comply with the Japanese demands and to hold Thai troops in a state of readiness. Later, however, high Thai

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
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

- 2 -

officials urged source to advise the Allies to bomb Indo-China communications objectives immediately, pointing out that such a step would stimulate the resistance of the local population.

  
William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing a memorandum for the President, which is a sequel to my memoranda to him of 10 and 12 March. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 March 1945

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By Authority of CIA

007622  
By MBJ Date JUN 11 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following information, a sequel to my memoranda of 10 and 12 March:

The Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli, has just returned with word from Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, that Kesselring has just gone to Hitler's headquarters. Wolff expects Kesselring back in three days, but there is a chance that he may never come back. The OSS representative surmises that, unless Kesselring convinces Hitler and Himmler that he will cooperate in their plans for North Italy, Kesselring will be given a new command or will be imprisoned.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the meeting with Allied representatives has been postponed pending information from Kesselring, although AFHQ had decided to move at once and at noon 13 March dispatched two representatives (accompanied by an OSS representative) for Lyon.

The OSS representative in Bern suggested to Baron Pirelli that Wolff indicate (1) what he proposes to do if Kesselring does not return; (2) what he will do if he is ordered to report to Hitler; (3) if he should refuse an order to report to

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Hitler, what are his plans and the forces with which to carry them out; (4) what areas he could temporarily control for possible contact with Allied forces even if the principal German Army commanders did not cooperate.

Upon his return to Italy, Wolff received a telegram from Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of Security Police and Security Service, advising him to avoid establishing contact with the Allies in Switzerland since it would hinder, perhaps catastrophically, Kaltenbrunner's plans. Wolff discovered upon investigation that Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Police in Italy and Wolff's subordinate, had telegraphed Kaltenbrunner that an attempt to make contact with the Allies in Switzerland was probable. According to Pirelli, Wolff believes Harster is dependable and was merely trying to cover the tracks of Wolff's intermediary, Standartenfuehrer Dollman.

In November 1944 Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, declared that he was acting as intermediary for Harster, who had been given a special assignment by Himmler to contact the Allies. It appeared significant at that time that such a mission should have been given to Harster rather than to his superior in the SS hierarchy, Karl Wolff.

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At the end of February 1945, an Austrian industrialist in contact with Austrian SS leaders, asserted that Kaltenbrunner had asked him to make contact with the Allies in Switzerland. According to this source, Kaltenbrunner claimed that he and Himmler were extremely anxious to end the war and were contemplating the liquidation of ardent Nazi "war mongers".

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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13 March 1945

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representatives in Bern and Caserta, is a summary of preliminary negotiations and arrangements concerning approaches looking to the termination of German resistance in North Italy and on the Western Front:

On 8 February, Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, asserted to the OSS representative in Bern that he had just returned from a meeting with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Rudolph Rahn (German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy), and Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff. Kesselring, who has close relations with Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt, had just returned from a conference with him. Neither Kesselring nor von Rundstedt was then ready to come over to the Western Allies. Von Neurath, who served for two years in Africa as liaison officer with Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, suggested that he confer with Westphal.

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He was advised by Kesselring not to attempt to see Westphal immediately in view of the suspicions which such a trip might arouse.

On 10 February, however, while von Neurath was visiting his father near Stuttgart, Marshal Kesselring advised him by telephone to go to a secret rendezvous where he found General Westphal and Marshal Johannes Blaskowitz, until recently commander of Army Group "G" on the Western Front. The three frankly discussed the possibility of opening the Western Front to the Allies. Westphal and Blaskowitz were reluctant to take this step, if they were merely to be considered as war criminals. They added that it was increasingly difficult to organize such a move because of SS control and the state of mind of the troops. They said that their armies included many Germans from East Prussia and eastern Germany whose will to fight had been stiffened by the Soviet occupation of their home areas. These troops, they explained, felt that they had already lost everything, and preferred to stay on and fight.

Although neither Westphal nor Blaskowitz made definite suggestions, they appeared to be working with Kesselring, and to be approaching the point where they might discuss, on purely military lines, the opening up of the Western and Italian Fronts.

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Von Neurath declared that he would report the results of this conversation to Kesselring.

On 24 February, the OSS representative in Caserta reported that AFHQ was interested in obtaining authentic confirmation of Kesselring's disposition to negotiate with the Allies. AFHQ felt that if Kesselring wished to dispatch an emissary with an official message, he could find means to do so.

On 2 March, Standartenfuehrer Dollman, who has in the past claimed that he represented Kesselring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster, made indirect contact with the OSS representative in Bern, and promised to return on 8 March with credentials and definite proposals. It was suggested to Dollman that he bring with him an important Italian partisan leader, then held as prisoner, as evidence of his good faith and ability to act.

On 8 March, General Wolff and a German High Command representative, presumably from Kesselring's staff, arrived in Lugano, allegedly prepared to make definite commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in Italy. Wolff was accompanied by his military expert, Sturmabandfuehrer Wenner; by an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli; by Standartenfuehrer Dollman; and by the latter's aide, Zimmern. As evidence of his

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good faith, Dollman brought along Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified Command. General Wolff also brought with him \_\_\_\_\_, a former OSS agent in Milan. Both of these men, who were in good health, were delivered unconditionally to the OSS representative. Neither of them was aware of the reason for his release.

The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich, then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff stated to the OSS representative that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war. He said he was willing to act and felt he could persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two controlled the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff stated that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declared that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler powerless to take such effective counter-measures

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as were employed in the 20 July crisis. Also, Wolff feels that joint action by Kesselring and himself would have a vital repercussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal viewpoint.

Wolff envisaged the following procedures to bring about action:

(1) He would meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Wolff, however, believes Kesselring can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and to admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed by themselves, Rahn, and others. The appeal will set forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' responsibility to the German people to end it, will call on military commanders in particular and Germans in general to disassociate

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themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will state that the Germans in North Italy are ending hostilities.

(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the German people and military commanders via radio and wireless.

(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he and Kesselring would come secretly to Switzerland within the week to meet Allied military men and coordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal. Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to represent him for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet having been acquainted with the plan.

Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bolzano; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety of the 350 British and American prisoners who have not been sent on to Germany from North Italy; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, ~~rather of course~~ an Italian patriot working with CLNAI and the British (whose release is particularly desired by Parri); (5) facilitating as much as possible

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By DBS Date JUN 11 1973

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By ABJ Date JUN 11 1973

the return to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.

Wolff said he welcomed von Neurath's help in the peace negotiations since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff said he would invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claimed that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the Italian situation, but received no definite instructions.

The OSS representative made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course.

Meanwhile, General Alexander has outlined to Marshal Brooke the procedure which AFHQ proposes to follow, including a plan for two senior staff officers to go to Switzerland to meet with German representatives. Apparently Alexander has furnished this information to Brooke as a matter of courtesy and will go ahead on his own initiative, although he will cooperate if London wishes to send other people to the meeting. OSS has been


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directed to submit a plan to carry out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss meeting-place, and for transportation to and from that place to the French-Swiss border. In addition, OSS will be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary safeguards for the security of the discussions. The OSS representative in Bern, in conjunction with the representative at Caserta, have undertaken to make all these arrangements. OSS is withholding all these plans from the German representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date for the meeting.



William J. Donovan  
Director

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WASHINGTON, D. C.


13 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, containing information forwarded by the OSS representative in Caserta. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 March 1945

*O.S.S. folder 5-45*

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*file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Caserta, was obtained from a well-informed Rumanian Communist:

The new NDF Government is weak and may not last long. It will not be able to live up to its promises of a quick solution to the basic economic and social problems; it could succeed only with Soviet aid, and it is uncertain whether the Russians are willing to provide Rumania with the necessary industrial and agricultural machinery. According to reliable information, the informant says, wholesale liquidation of political opponents will not take place during the coming weeks; in fact, even the needed purge of Fascists may not take place.

With regard to the events leading to the formation of the new Government, the informant thinks the Russians were forced to interfere because the Left had committed so many errors and because the Anglo-Americans continued to support Maniu and the historical parties. The latter threatened Russian prestige vis-a-vis the Anglo-Americans, and the Russians were thus forced to insist on a Government such as Groza had formed.

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*William J. Donovan*  
William J. Donovan  
Director

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945 .

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested  
in the attached report. Will you kindly see that  
it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

*O. S. S. folder 5-45*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*file 7*

14 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following report on the organization of labor in Yugoslavia has been submitted by an observer who was in that country during the last month:

Organized labor was a negligible factor in pre-war Yugoslavia and has remained so during the present war. Before the war, industrial workers numbered only some 650,000, or about four and one-half percent of the total population. Independent labor organizations, distrusted and persecuted by the pre-war governments, were numerically weak, torn by factional and political disputes, inefficient and poor. During the present war industrial labor -- concentrated in the principal cities and hence more readily supervised--was rigidly controlled, thoroughly exploited and drafted in large numbers for forced labor in Germany, and so contributed little to the National Liberation Movement. For the first few months after the liberation of Belgrade the Provisional Government made little effort to win

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labor support. On the contrary, many of the general economic measures adopted during this period, such as the establishment of a maximum wage, alienated the working classes.

It was not to be expected, however, that organization and alignment of this element of the population would continue to be neglected by the present governing group which includes many long-time students of the problems and potentialities of labor. Within the past month considerable attention has been devoted to labor questions.

These efforts culminated in the creation of a new organization, entitled "The United Labor Syndicates", formed at meetings held in Belgrade from 23 to 26 January 1945. Prominent among the participants were representatives of the two principal pre-war labor organizations, i.e., the United Alliance of Labor Syndicates and General Alliance of Labor Syndicates.

Although its declared aims differ but little from those long advocated by previous, independent Yugoslav labor blocs, the United Labor Syndicates is distinguished from its predecessors by its government support, its centralized

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union of all syndicates, its closely integrated structure, and its appeal to all wage earners -- agricultural laborers, clerks, government employees, intellectuals, and industrial workers alike.

Structure of the New Movement

In its hierarchy of power, its representative characteristics, and regional features, the organization of the United Labor Syndicates bears a close resemblance to the structure of the National Liberation committees, the National Youth Alliance and other monolithic institutions of the new Yugoslavia.

The new labor unions will be organized vertically. Workers of every plant with a minimum of thirty employees, in exceptional cases fifteen employees, will be organized into a union (podruznica). All the unions of the same trade will be represented in regional trade alliances, centralized in the capitals of the six federal units. There will be twenty-one basic trade alliances differentiated by the type of work performed. For example, the workers of the Iron and Steel Works in Zenica will have their own union, embracing all employees regardless of the specialized nature

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of their work. This union, in turn, will be a member of the alliance of unions of metallurgical workers for the federal unit of Bosnia and Hercegovina. These regional alliances will then be represented in a central alliance for all Yugoslavia.

At the same time, in each of the federal units, there will be created a regional committee of the united syndicates, in which all the various trade alliances will be represented. All the regional committees of the united trade unions will, in turn, be represented in a central alliance of the united syndicates which will cover all Yugoslavia.

White collar workers, employees of government and private firms, are encouraged to organize unions of their trades to fit into the general pattern. Similarly, some 300,000 agricultural workers, mostly sharecroppers, untouched by social legislation in pre-war Yugoslavia, will be organized into their own syndicates which will enjoy the same rights as other labor syndicates.

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Aims

The general aims of the new organization were stated by the conference to be: the maintenance of factory discipline to prevent sabotage of the war effort, the improvement of working class living conditions, and the establishment of relations and cooperation with the labor movement in Allied countries. The conference devoted considerable attention to means of ameliorating the social and economic conditions of the workers. Suggested measures included creation of consumers' cooperatives to furnish workers with groceries and other supplies at minimum prices, introduction of a fixed wage scale, and the institution of free medical treatment for laborers.\*

According to the list of subjects upon which the labor conference requested legislation, the more immediate and specific aims of the organization include the inauguration of an eight-hour day at the conclusion of the present war emergency, obligatory collective bargaining, provisions for the protection of mothers, children, and adolescents, and the introduction of hygienic working conditions.

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Comment

The employers, disturbed in advance by authoritative intimations concerning future employer-employee relations, have received the new labor organization and its proposals for social legislation with fear and growing discontent. The entire situation, clouded by the vague statements of the new labor leaders and the lack of clear-cut government pronouncements, is still to be cleared and adequately defined. It should be borne in mind that all the decisions at the Belgrade conference about social legislation, supervision of production, and nationalization of medicine do not have the effect of laws or decrees but are suggestions and proposals. Although it is expected that the government will grant large concessions to labor, it can hardly be expected that the interests of industrialists will be denied consideration and some protection. Experience has shown that in all the factories in which the National Committee has installed its own commissions to manage work, production has lagged considerably behind that in plants managed by owners. In several instances, the National Committee has withdrawn its commissions and authorized the owners to resume control.

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The workers, confused and financially insecure, have shown no pronounced enthusiasm for the new movement. The Provisional Government has made several mistakes in handling labor. During November and December when National Liberation Fronts were created in every factory, workers were warned time and time again that their contributions in the struggle against the occupying forces had been and continued to be meager. Although it is true that labor was poorly represented in the National Liberation Movement, such criticism merely antagonized the workers who have been only partially appeased by the recent efforts of Partisan leaders to glorify the part that labor has played in the fight against fascism.

Further, throughout November and December workers employed in plants managed by specially appointed commissions received virtually no pay. If the Partisans expected that sheer enthusiasm would be sufficient to keep up production, they badly miscalculated. Not only did production decrease, but the enthusiasm for the new scheme of things began to die out in general.

Sweeping mobilization measures have also been shown to be in error. The production of coal badly needed by industry


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has, for example, greatly decreased, among other reasons because mine laborers had been drafted for service at the front. The authorities are now endeavoring to rectify this mistake by demobilizing all miners and workers in essential industries. In this, as in the other instances mentioned above, however, the trial-and-error method adopted by the Provisional Government in its relations with labor has annoyed and bewildered the workers. In order to secure whole-hearted labor support, it is considered that it will be necessary for the authorities to pay close attention to the economic position of the workers and to undertake the implementation of labor's most immediate social aims.

  
William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

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Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am enclosing the latest radiotele-  
phone report from our Bern representative, which I  
think the President will find interesting. Will you  
be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*WJRD*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the latest radiotelephone message from our representative in Bern, giving the impressions of a German official, recently arrived in Bern after a 24-hour trip from Berlin by auto, concerning the efficacy of the German reduct.

*Donovan*  
William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE	12 March 1945	#286
FROM	Berne	HBG
TO	DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	PRIORITY
		ROUTINE
DISTRIBUTION		DEFERRED
(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)	

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

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## GERMANY

A German official, who arrived here very recently from Berlin after a twenty-four-hour trip by auto, gave us his impressions as follows:

He said he did not believe in the efficacy of the reduct and did not think that the German population would give sufficient support to guerrilla warfare to make it worth while. The mass of the population, he is convinced, is worn out and has only the wish that the war should come to an end. He remarked that a few weeks ago the Government's policy of evacuation of populations has been changed. In the West, these populations will be left behind the retreating troops, while in the East, the evacuation will continue. This change has been made because there is no place to accommodate populations from both fronts. Already the center of Germany is crowded to the breaking point. In the East, efforts will continue to be made to evacuate populations because of the Russian deportation policy and because there has been a number of instances of mis-handling of civilians.

He stated that, along the lines of this policy, civilian administrative offices, insofar as they are not conspicuous Nazis, will remain with the civilian population in the West. He expressed the opinion that the attitude of these people will be correct and cooperative insofar as maintaining order and routine existence requirements are concerned.

He also stated that, while plans have been made to move administrative organizations of the German Government from Berlin to Central Germany, very few offices, except parts of the Air Ministry and War Ministry, have as yet left. The Foreign Office is still at the Wilhelmstrasse. In spite of bombings, recent attacks have been largely towards the East of the city, the local transportation system functions, and Berlin is still distinctly the center of the country.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

14 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

The President will probably be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Caserta. I will appreciate your seeing that it reaches his desk.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

14 March 1945

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Politika (9 March) carried a statement by Milan Grol, Vice Premier of the new Yugoslav Government, in which Grol (1) insists on the continued independent existence of the Democratic Party [of which he is a member] ("We Democrats are not making any compromise with the Communist program, although we agree with them on that which is vital in a constructive sense."); (2) asks for evolution rather than revolution; (3) stresses the need for stability inside Yugoslavia so that foreign assistance can be obtained; and (4) makes a plea for toleration. The Yugoslavs cannot solve their problems by exterminating one another, Grol declares. He also announces his Party's agreement to Macedonian autonomy, but urges the Government to make sure that Pan-Serb chauvinism is not replaced by an equally harmful chauvinism of another brand.

Competent observers state that Grol, by deploring Macedonian chauvinism, by emphasizing his Party's independence, and by pleading for tolerance toward non-Partisans, has made a

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strong bid for the support of those Serbs whose opposition to the Partisans is constructive rather than intransigent. Grol, who has never attacked the King, is considered to be still a monarchist.

Borba and Politika, in official editorials on the new Government, emphasize the unity, permanence and superior qualities of what both papers call "the best Government Yugoslavia has ever had."

*Donovan*  
William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in seeing the attached memorandum.

Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

*Bill*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*O.S.S. folder 2-43-*

*file*

14 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

During the recent civil war in Greece approximately 1,000 British prisoners were located in ELAS territory by OSS personnel who, with the consent of the British and American authorities concerned, helped them first to obtain greatly needed food and clothing, and thereafter to return to British territory in an exchange of prisoners. Since the ELAS had been unable to give them proper care, many of these prisoners were in bad physical condition and required prompt evacuation. Despite difficulties of travel and negotiation, the entire operation was completed in ten days.

An important part of this work was performed by OSS personnel originally parachuted into Greece long before the German withdrawal to operate a hospital and distribute medical supplies in ELAS territory. The first information concerning the British prisoners was received from the OSS station at Lamia where, with the assent of ELAS, a sergeant had made available to the prisoners the meager stocks of food and clothing and even given up all of his own clothes except what he wore. In Athens this information was relayed

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through Allied Military Liaison to the British, who delivered to OSS a truck-load of clothing and medical supplies with a request to distribute them at Lamia and an authorization to arrange, if possible, for an exchange of prisoners.

Leaving Athens on 14 January, three OSS officers drove that day to within 30 kilometers of Lamia, passing at one time through cross-fire between the Andartes and the British. Since the road had been blown up, they were obliged to continue on foot the following day. At Lamia they learned the prisoners had been withdrawn to the north. On 16 January they found 26 British prisoners in a hospital at Larissa, and radioed to Athens a request for additional supplies to be delivered by air. The supplies were dropped at Larissa airdrome on the morning of 18 January, and distribution was thereupon made to the prisoners.

On the same day the OSS officers met the ELAS Central Committee at Trikkala. There they persuaded the Central Committee to inform them of the location of the camp at which the main body of prisoners was being held and to allow OSS personnel and communications to be established at that camp to arrange further aerial supply deliveries. ELAS consented

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to these operations on condition that the RAF planes would fly unarmed and drop no propaganda. As a result of these arrangements 15 supply drops were made to the prison camp in the next few days.

When an exchange of prisoners was mentioned the Central Committee was at first reluctant but finally agreed to negotiate if the OSS officers would act as intermediaries. Together with two ELAS representatives the OSS party returned to Athens on the night of 19 January. A difficult situation arose when the British insisted on guarding the ELAS representatives, instead of allowing them to remain in OSS custody as had been promised. Nevertheless an agreement was reached on 20 January for an exchange of prisoners to be made at Volos. At the request of the British and with the approval of the U. S. ambassador and the U. S. Section of Allied Military Liaison, OSS agreed to arrange for the evacuation after securing plenary authority in writing from the British commander-in-chief. Similar authorization was obtained on 22 January from the British commander at Volos, who gave his promise, for transmission to the ELAS, that the British side of the exchange would be expedited. The approval of the International Red Cross was also received.

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On 23 January the OSS party of three officers entered ELAS territory with a British convoy of fifty trucks and nine ambulances. Two of the OSS officers proceeded to Trikkala and made final arrangements with the ELAS Central Committee. After guiding the convoy to within ten kilometers of the main camp, they traveled the remaining distance by jeep, across fields and along river beds. The prisoners were thereupon led out to the convoy. Carts were obtained to carry out the sick and wounded, with the jeeps used to expedite the movement. Meanwhile the third member of the OSS party had arranged for aerial evacuation of the prisoners in the hospital at Larissa, but after preparations had been made for use of the air field the plan was abandoned. Those prisoners were therefore taken out by ambulance, together with a dozen Germans whom the ELAS were willing to turn over to the British. The convoy reached Volos at 0800 on 24 January, two days earlier than the British had expected. At the same time the ELAS prisoners had begun to arrive from British territory.

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*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

*WJD*

William J. Donovan  
Director

Attachment

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By Authority of CIA

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By SR Date NOV 26 1973

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*O. L. S. Friedman 5-45-*  
*file*

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is a summary of a study made by our Research Group on Russia's Food Consumption and Nutritional Levels:

1. The military success of the Soviet Union in this war has been founded upon the maintenance of the working efficiency of all elements of the population contributing to the war effort. Judged from the standpoint of caloric content, diversity of foods, and provision of proteins, fats, carbohydrates, minerals and vitamins, the food provided Red Army men, essential war production workers, and most of the farm population has been adequate to maintain health and to permit efficient performance of required tasks. Children, too, have fared relatively satisfactorily during the war, except for a major calcium deficiency, resulting from the extreme shortage\* of milk, and some lack

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of vitamins A and D. Less essential workers and adults not directly engaged in the war effort (housewives, the sick, the aged, crippled, etc.) have fared poorly and borne the brunt of food shortages so that widespread malnutrition probably exists among these two groups.

2. The most favored group in the Soviet population is the Red Army whose members receive food allowances which are fully comparable in many respects to those of the American Army, after allowance is made for the differences in national food habits. Both combat and rear echelon troops are allotted food equivalent to more than 4,000 calories daily. Their diet includes a wide variety of vegetables, as well as satisfactory amounts of meat, fish, fats, oils, and sugar. All available evidence indicates that official ration schedules have generally been met. Sporadic nonfulfillment has been caused by transport difficulties.

3. In the main the farm population has been well fed, despite heavy government demands for food to feed troops and the urban population. Compared

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to the relatively prosperous levels of rural consumption prevalent in 1927, 1943/44 farm consumption of major foods has been lowered relatively little except in the cases of sugar and meat, which are traditionally less important in the peasant diet than grain, potatoes, fats, and oils. What food distress has occurred among the farm population has been largely confined to areas which before the war specialized in non-food crops, and which have therefore had the most difficult adjustment to make as the result of general cessation of government inter-regional grain shipments for the civilian population.

4. Feeding levels vary widely among the different groups in the urban population. These differences have resulted primarily from the differential rationing system instituted at the beginning of the war to regulate the distribution of the bulk of the food received by city dwellers. The highest food allowances are received by those who contribute most directly to war production and have the greatest energy expenditure, while less essential and less active groups receive smaller rations. Children's rations

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are based largely on their special physiological needs. When the official food allowances cannot be fully honored because of shortages, war workers are usually most favored in the distribution of available supplies. Many war workers also benefit from institutional feeding in war plants. Supplementary food not subject to the ration system is available to urbanites from the large number of family "victory gardens," as well as from farmers' markets and special government food stores in many cities, but the last two are only of minor significance because the high prices prevailing in them restrict their patronage.

5. Taking all the above factors into account, it is estimated that the best fed category of urbanites -- essential war workers -- received during 1943/44 a diet providing daily an average of over 3,000 calories in most cases. Miscellaneous and less essential war workers probably consumed an average of about 2,500 calories daily, while minor white collar employees and children averaged about 1,500 calories daily. Adult dependents (housewives, the aged, the sick, etc.) are the poorest fed group and probably averaged

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little more than 1,000 calories daily per capita. The severity of the impact of these sharply different consumption levels is softened somewhat by sharing of food by individuals in different ration categories who belong to the same family.

6. Despite the differential feeding system outlined above, the diet of all urban groups in the USSR - including the highest ration category - has deteriorated appreciably during the war as compared with prewar levels. A measure of the quantitative reduction in food consumption is provided by the fact that the average caloric intake of an urban person during 1943/44 was only about 1,000 calories as compared with over 2,500 calories in the year before the Nazi invasion. Qualitatively, the city dweller's diet has suffered most from the sharp drop in the availability of the major non-grain foods: meat, dairy products, sugar fats, and oils. Except for sugar, these are essential because they supply animal proteins, vitamins, and minerals which are not to be obtained from bread and cereals, the foods comprising the bulk of urbanites' consumption.

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The extent to which any particular individual has suffered from the consequences of this quantitative and qualitative dietary deterioration has been largely determined by the ration category to which he belongs.

7. When both the caloric content of the diet and the diversity and balance of the foods composing it are compared with the physiological requirements of the individuals in each ration category, the conclusion is justified that practically all war workers, both in the first and second ration categories, and most children receive sufficient food to maintain health and efficiency. Even after family sharing is taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, it is clear that most adult dependents and less essential white collar workers, as well as small numbers of persons in other categories - all of which groups probably aggregate about 40 percent of the total urban population - do not receive adequate food, with the result that malnutrition is prevalent among them. Even in the case of the best fed categories of urbanites, however, a greater quantity of food and increased diversity of diet, with emphasis upon

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non-grain foods, would be desirable.

*Donovan*

William J. Donovan  
Director

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
15 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

The enclosed memorandum contains intelligence, forwarded by our Bern representative, which I believe will interest the President. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,



William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.

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*O. S. S. folder 5-45-*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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15 March 1945

*file 7*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, obtained from a reliable source with contacts among high Nazi Party leaders, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern:

Source states that Field Marshal von Rundstedt is being retained as nominal commander of the German forces in the West, while Field Marshal Model (last reported as commander of Army Group "B" on the central sector of the Western Front) is directing operations and issuing all essential orders which von Rundstedt is required to sign without dispute. The following reasons are advanced by source for this situation:

(1) Von Rundstedt vigorously opposed an order from Hitler's headquarters to carry out a last-ditch defense of the left bank of the Rhine.

(2) Von Rundstedt is willing to accept the humiliation of having his subordinate direct operations in order to protect his family from Himmler's SD, which is openly opposed to him. His wife, Louise von Goetz, and their son Gert, allegedly were implicated in the 20 July plot, and a cousin of his

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
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wife reportedly was executed for participation in the plot.

Source declares that Model has promoted Hans Krebs (last reported as Model's Chief of Staff for Army Group "B") to the rank of full General of Infantry, and has made him Chief of Staff for the Western Command.

COSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Krebs thus apparently replaces Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, last reported as Rundstedt's Chief of Staff in the West. Attention is invited to our memorandum dated 26 February 1945, which may suggest other reasons for Westphal's reported replacement.7



William J. Donovan  
Director

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