The State Department is sending itsFROM OFFICE OF THIS PARK.
Dear Miss Tully:

I am returning herewith the release covering the 30-point program. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Secretary of State,
Washington.

481, October 15, 7 p. m.

There follows in translation "the program of the National Reich's Church of Germany" which has come into my possession from an absolutely reliable source. This program emanates from the intimate circle of Alfred Rosenberg and I am informed that practically nothing is known of it abroad, it having arrived in Switzerland only few days ago trustworthy channels. The influence of Rosenberg is reported to be on the increase due to the turn of the Russian campaign.

The 30 points of the program follow:

First. The National Reich's Church of Germany (hereinafter called the N.R. and represented in this telegram by the symbol "N").

Categorically claims the exclusive right and the exclusive power to control all churches within the borders of the Reich; it declares these to be national churches...
national churches of the German Reich.

Second. The German people must not serve the N. The N is absolutely and exclusively in the service of but one doctrine: race and nation.

Third. The field of activity of the N will expand to the limits of Germany's territorial and colonial possessions.

Fourth. The N does not force any German to seek membership therein. The N will do everything within its power to secure the adherence of every German soul. Other churches or similar communities and unions particularly such as are under international control or management cannot and shall not be tolerated in Germany.

Fifth. The N is determined to exterminate irrevocably and by every means the strange and foreign Christian faiths imported into Germany in the ill-omened year 800.

Sixth. The existing churches may not be architecturally altered, as they represent the property of the German nation, German culture and to a certain extent the historical development of the nation. As property of the German nation they are not only to be valued but to be preserved.
Seventh. The N has no scribes, pastors, chaplains or priests but National Reich orators are to speak in them.

Eighth. The N services are held only in the evening and not in the morning. These services are to take place on Saturdays with solemn illumination.

Ninth. In the N German men and women, German youths and girls will acknowledge God and his eternal works.

Tenth. The N irrevocably strives for complete union with the state. It must obey the state as one of its servants. As such it demands that all landed possessions of all churches and religious denominations be handed over to the state. It forbids that in future churches should secure ownership of even the smallest piece of German soil or that such be ever given back to them. Not the churches conquer and cultivate land and soil but exclusively the German nation, the German state.

Eleventh. N orators may never be those who today emphasize with all tricks and cunning verbally and in writing the necessity of maintaining and teaching of Christianity in Germany; they not only lie to themselves but also to the German nation.
-4- #481, October 15, 7 p. m., from Zurich.

goaded by their love of the positions they hold and
the sweet bread they eat.

Twelfth. N orators hold office, government
officials under Civil Service rules.

Thirteenth. The N demands immediate cessation
of the publishing and dissemination of the Bible
in Germany as well as the publication of Sunday papers,
pamphlets, publications and books of religious nature.

Fourteenth. The N has to take severe measures
in order to prevent the Bible and other christian
publications being imported into Germany.

Fifteenth. The N declares that to it, and
therefore to the German nation, it has been decided
Führer’s "Mein Kampf" is the greatest of all
documents. It is conscious that this book contains
not only the greatest, and that it embodies the
purest and truest ethics for the present and
future life of our nation.

Sixteenth. The N has made it its sacred duty
to use all its energy to popularize the coeternal
"Mein Kampf" and to let every German live and complete
his life according to this book.

Seventeenth. The N demands that further editions
of this book, whatever form they may take, be in
content
content and pagination exactly similar to the present popular edition.

Eighteenth. The N will clear away from its alters all crucifix plural Bibles and pictures of Saints.

Nineteenth. On the alters there must be nothing but "Mein Kampf", to the German nation and therefore to God the most sacred book and to the left of the altar a sword.

Twentieth. The N speakers must during N services propound this book to the congregation to the best of their knowledge and ability.

Twenty-first. The N does not acknowledge forgiveness of sins. It represents the standpoint which it will always proclaim that a sin once committed will be ruthlessly punished by the honorable and indestructible laws of nature and punishment will follow during the sinner's lifetime.

Twenty-second. The N repudiates the christening of German children particularly the christening with water and the Holy Ghost.

Twenty-third. The parents of a child (or if a new born child) must only take the German oath before the altar which is worded as follows: The man:

"In the name
"In the name of God I take this Holy oath that I, the father of this child, and my wife, are of proven Aryan descent. As a father I agree to bring up this child in the German spirit and as a member of the German race."

The woman: "In the name of God I take this Holy oath that I (name) bore my husband a child and that my husband is the father of this child and that I, its mother, am of proven Aryan descent. As a mother I swear to bring up this child in the German spirit and as a member of the German race."

The German diploma can only be issued to newly born children on the strength of the German oath.

Twenty-fourth. The N abolishes confirmation and religious education as well as the communion the religious preparation for the communion. The educational institutions are and remain the family, the schools, the German youth, the Hitler youth, and the Union of German girls.

Twenty-fifth. In order that school graduation of our German youth be given an especially solemn character all N must put themselves at the disposal of German youth, the Hitler youth and the Union of German girls on the day of the state's youth which will be
-7- #181, October 15, 7 p. m., from Zurich.

will be on the Friday before Easter. On this day the leaders of these organizations exclusively may speak.

Twenty-six. The marriage ceremony of German men and women will consist of taking an oath of faithfulness and placing the right hand on the sword. There will not be any unworthy kneeling in N ceremonies.

Twenty-seven. The N declares the tenth day before Whit Sunday to be the national holiday of the German family.

Twenty-eight. The N rejects the customary day of prayer and atonement. It demands that this be transferred to the holiday commemorating the laying of the foundation stone of the N.

Twenty-nine. The N will not tolerate the establishment of any new clerical religious insignia.

Thirty. On the day of its foundation the Christian cross must be removed from all churches, cathedrals and chapels within the Reich and its colonies and it must be superseded by the only unconquerable symbol of Germany the "Haken Kreuz".

STEWART.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

BILL DONOVAN

I have yours of December 22nd, 6 P.M., in regard to organizing guerrilla warfare of two types. I want you to take this up with Mr. Churchill and find out whom we should work with in England toward this end.

F. D. R.
March 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

Will you arrange for me to see Bill Donovan some time after I return from Hyde Park?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Grace Tully has told me that you will see me.

During these past months I have hesitated to encroach upon your crowded days. This course (however excellent the motive) has perhaps failed to keep you aware of the manner in which we have been endeavoring to fulfill the responsibilities you gave us.

I would like to tell you about these activities.

Though I have seen articles in the press to the contrary, this Organization has no quarrel with OWI. It is not true that we have in any way invaded the province of OWI.

(1) We do not duplicate their activity in the open propaganda assigned to them by your Directive. We do not possess either equipment or personnel to do such work. In fact,
we have not thus far even secured all the equipment necessary to operate in the field of black subversion - an arena in which OWI has always disclaimed any interest.

(2). I suspect that confusion has arisen because the word "psychological" has been given different meanings by different American and English agencies. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have used the word in the general sense employed by the German and other Continental armies as applying to all unorthodox methods. They call this weapon of warfare psychological only because of the effect produced rather than as a description of the means employed.

(3). In the subversive field of unorthodox warfare we do not impinge upon the assigned functions of any other agency. The Joint Chiefs made a thorough inquiry into our organization and issued a Directive clearly limiting our duties within our assigned field.

(4). I have heard that a suggestion has been made that you consider transferring this Agency to the War Department.
This would, in my opinion, disrupt our usefulness. You early recognized that this work could not live if it were buried in the machinery of a great department. You saw that it must have elbow room and made us an Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs should have every facility which can effectively aid them. We are prepared to act for them in unorthodox warfare through a far-flung net of organizers and agents throughout the theaters, -- except for the moment in the South Pacific.

Our connections with underground channels will, as has already been demonstrated, count heavily when invasions are ready.

To disrupt such plans at this moment would, I believe, be a valuable gift to the enemy.

I hope you will examine the situation and ascertain the truth.

I anticipate the privilege of talking with you soon.

Bill.
February 27, 1943

Dear Grace:

If you think this should be handed to the President the night before I see him, please use your judgment.

Bill.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: William J. Donovan

May 7, 1943

As part of our staff in North Africa we have Captain Franklin Holcomb, son of the Commandant of Marines, as Assistant Naval Attaché to the Tangier Legation acting on our behalf at Fez. In the course of that work he has had considerable contact with Moslem elements who have been helpful to us in collecting intelligence.

Through the confidence of the Moslems in him they suggested that he should meet the Sultan in secret. This he has avoided until he could receive instructions from here.

We have called him back for consultation and before his departure certain spokesmen of the Nationalist Party asked if he would see the Sultan and secretly bear a letter in answer to your letter to the Sultan.

This he was able to avoid, but it has been stressed with him by the Moslem groups that the Sultan was eager to have secret communications with the President of the United States. In view of the delicate situation there I felt that nothing should be done except to call this directly to your attention for your advice and instruction.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you let the Yugoslavian Minister know the contents of this memorandum, in confidence, and then please return for my files?

F.D.R.

Memorandum to the President, 5-11-43, from Wm. Donovan, Office of Strategic Services, giving report, in reply to President's memo 5-10-43 re desire of the Yugoslav Minister that concentrated food now in Cairo be delivered to Yugoslavia.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. WILLIAM DONOVAN

The Yugoslav Minister is most anxious (a) that we get forty tons of concentrated food now in Cairo delivered (I suppose by air to Yugoslavia) and (b) that we establish definite liaison with Michaelovich. I understand British contacts are in effect and that they have ten officers in Yugoslavia. We should not cross wires with them but the Ambassador thinks it would be good if we could get one officer into Serbia.

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to Col. Donovan.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum to me of May 13, I have informed the Yugoslav Ambassador of the contents of Colonel Donovan's memorandum to you of May 11. The Ambassador has asked me to communicate to you his gratitude in the name of his Government for the helpful action which has already been taken.

In accordance with your request, I am returning Colonel Donovan's memorandum to you herewith for your files.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

In response to your memorandum of May 10, 1943, regarding the desire of the Yugoslav Minister that concentrated food now in Cairo be delivered to Yugoslavia, and that liaison be established with General Mihailovich, I am able to report that the following steps have already been taken.

1. On May 4, 1943, our representative in Cairo cabled that (a) the distribution of food has definitely been planned and will be carried out when arrangements are completed with the Theater; (b) that the Theater Commander has been requested to requisition approximately two hundred and eighty-four tons of dehydrated food, at present in the possession of OSS, in this country. We can have the food as soon as this requisition has been approved.

2. Two OSS representatives left yesterday for Cairo by
air, one of whom is to establish liaison with General Mihailovich in Serbia, and the other to be attached to the Partisans. Each of these men is fully trained in Intelligence and Subversive activities, is a qualified radio operator, and has the necessary language qualifications.

I am requesting certain additional information from our representative in Cairo, which I shall transmit to you as soon as received.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
BILL DONOVAN:

The President asks me to
thank you ever so much for your
memorandum of June fourteenth and
to tell you that he is very much
pleased.

G.G.T.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You may wish to be advised that:

1. We have established contact abroad with a number of underground labor organization with networks within enemy and enemy occupied countries--particularly the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF).

2. We have also worked with the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) which maintains headquarters in London.

3. We have had the assistance here of the Railway Labor Executives' Association which cooperates with the International Transport Workers Federation.
June 14, 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please see that this gets to the President?

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director
August 16, 1943.

Dear John:

The President asked me to thank you ever so much for that very interesting memorandum which you sent to him.

It was nice to see you and Irena the other night and I hope we can get together soon again.

My best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

Honorable John C. Wiley,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.
August 11, 1943

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a note and a memorandum. I would be deeply grateful to you if you would have them reach the President.

Best regards,

Yours sincerely,

John C. Wiley

Enclosures
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 11, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

Since I served so long in Germany and Eastern Europe, including Moscow, I have succumbed to the urge to write a memorandum. I hope you will forgive me for trying to inflict it on you.

With best regards,

Respectfully and sincerely yours,

[Signature]

John C. Wiley

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM

COMMENTS ON THE MOSCOW MANIFESTO TO GERMANY

On July 12 and 13 a Free German Committee had meetings in Moscow. On July 21 a manifesto to the German people was made public.

This Committee is built around the German section of the Comintern (Communist International) "in dissolution". Among its members are former Communist deputies of the Reichstag who have long played leading roles in the Executive and Presidium of the Comintern. There are a great-grandson of Bismarck, authors and a number of German officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers among its 33 signers. The Committee has been given Soviet press, radio, and other facilities.

The manifesto, a brilliantly drafted document, addresses itself in the popular front manner to the German people. It said, in substance, that if the German people proved in good time that they want to be free and eliminated Hitler, they could decide their own fate. The manifesto threatened that Anglo-American armies were at the gates of Europe and that Germany could not hold out much longer. After exclaiming that Germany must not perish, the manifesto declared that a military defeat would mean dismemberment and the end of Germany. Germany was then called upon to form a strong, implacable democracy, having nothing in common with the Weimar
republic. It should recall German armies to the Reich's frontiers, abandon conquests, and then embark on peace negotiations, thus placing Germany on an equal footing with other nations. The manifesto spoke of the restoration of private property, the punishment of the guilty, freedom of speech, right of assembly, and a number of other democratic privileges. Amnesty was promised for all Hitler adherents who renounced him in good time and joined the movement for Free Germany.

On August 6, PRAVDA, official Communist Party organ, reproved the U. S. and Great Britain for failure to observe their pledges to open a second front.

Official emanations from Moscow have revealed resentment over Anglo-American intentions to work out the peace settlement in Europe, hostility to any project for federation of small European states, and a determination to insist on the importance of Russia's role in the political future of the continent.

To prepare for the future, Soviet policy is being directed towards Hungary; Poland (with a Polish Committee built on the structure of the old Polish Section of the Comintern); the 5 counties of northern Iran; a revival of Pan-Slavism (which has been centered around the All-Slav Congress); special relations with Czechoslovakia; support of the Yugoslav Partisans; and, finally, the Free Germany movement.

The Free German manifesto was no spontaneous gesture. It was not mere repartee to the Roosevelt-Churchill Joint Message
to the Italians. Stalin's speeches and a number of inspired articles and developments over the last nine months give a pattern. Between the Kremlin, the Politbureau and the Comintern there is political planning of the highest order; the manifesto and the studied grumbling over the second front reflect this planning.

Great Britain --

British policy towards Russia has undergone violent gyrations. In 1939 Great Britain hoped for a military alliance. During the Winter War (first Finno-Soviet conflict) Great Britain was on the verge of hostilities with Russia. After June 22, 1941, the Red Army became a priceless ally. Now, British thought is divided. The British people are warmly grateful to the Soviet Union. Churchill and many military leaders, on the other hand, feel mistrust and premonitions, while the influential Eden-Foreign Office line on Russia pursues the cautious way, that of realism. This realism is reminiscent of pre-Munich appeasement.

The United States --

The United States, attacked, seeks to win the war on the battlefield, in the air and on the seas. This policy has been compromised by new elements in the equation. The war has become more and more political; and in wars of coalitions the strains and stresses appear, either as defeat approaches --
this is already the case with the Axis, or when victory is in sight, which is now the case with Russia and her allies.

The Soviet Union --

Soviet policy is a continuation of traditional Russian policy but with new slogans, both quieting and alarming. Russian policy is, at the same time, isolationist and expansionist.

The Kremlin suspects the Western democracies of desiring a mutual "bleeding white" of Germany and Russia and wishing to impose an Anglo-American peace in terms of a cordon sanitaire. Wrangel, Deniken and Kolchak remain as near to the Russian memory as Wilson and Pershing stand to us.

Also, Bolshevik ideology enters the picture, as the bitter coating of the Russian pill. The Thirteenth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the VII Congress of the Comintern (1934 and 1935) gave the last official manifestations of the pattern of the proletarian revolution. These manifestations are, in adequate part, a matter of public record. They have never been repudiated. Comintern leaders, active in 1934 and 1935, are now leading the aggressive moves of Russian intervention into Europe. If it is argued that Russia has abandoned idealism and world revolution for nationalism, it is disquieting to have the Comintern mechanism adroitly employed for Russian expansion, an expansion to which visible limits have not been placed, is not
Hitler in MEIN KAMPF and with threatening speeches warned the world of danger for years. Great Britain and France did not heed the warning. Soviet doctrine, too, is available to the student as a warning. So is Russian history. We know Germany now as the result of two costly wars. This is our second war as an ally of Russia. But we continue to be either emotional or confused when we consider the U.S.S.R.

To recapitulate:

The manifesto and Soviet complaints about the lack of a second front require analysis.

Although the Soviet Union is suffering grievously from a war unparalleled in casualties and destruction, the Soviet military situation is at this moment peculiarly favorable. Soviet complaints over the second front, therefore, do not stem from the same dire need for military succor that existed a year ago.

The manifesto and its timing are, of course, primarily political. It is the opening gambit for a peace move. Our "failure" to open a second front could provide the alibi. The peace proposition conveyed to the Germans by the manifesto is an alternative to "unconditional surrender" that might be more seductive to many Germans. We, with "unconditional surrender", do not even give Germany an assurance of protection from the vengeance of the conquered peoples, an assurance
that is implicit in the Soviet proposal.

Field Marshal Kutuzov, who was commander-in-chief against Napoleon, is once again a national hero in Russia; a new Soviet decoration is named after him. He discovered in October, 1812, that it was better not to crush Napoleon since Russia's ally, England, would, he thought, be the only one to gain. His idea was simple, that Napoleon had learned his lesson; he would never again be a danger to Russia, and if he could reform his legions in France, he might then be able to cope with the British from whose iniquities Russia so long had suffered.

Marshal Stalin, like Marshal Kutuzov, may now think that Hitler will never again be a danger to Russia; that the Germans might be useful in curbing the iniquities of the English (and of the Americans, too), and that a MOSCOW-Berlin Axis might be the answer to the Kremlin's prayer (with, of course, the center of balance heavily in the East).

If Germany makes a deal with Moscow and withdraws to her frontiers, it must be noted that the Reich would be deprived of Rumanian oil, Balkan minerals and foodstuffs and would be completely encircled. Germany would then be subject to the full force of Soviet pressure. In other words, from the moment that such an agreement was carried out, Moscow could always exact anything desired of Berlin unless we and the British rushed to the aid of the Reich, which is unthinkable at this time.
A Moscow-Berlin Axis, notwithstanding war-weariness, would be more formidable than the Berlin-Rome alignment ever was. As a counter-poise, the British Isles would be inadequate. Our position would become unfavorable.

Soviet political planning is both daring and prudent. The Kremlin is as yet committed to nothing. The Free German trial balloon could be quietly abandoned, or the Free German Committee, and other committees, too, could become the spearhead of the new Europe.

American Policy --

American policy in this war is difficult to formulate. This is largely because it is so very simple. It is not adhesive to popular appeal or even understanding. This derives from the negative fact that the United States was in grave danger and was attacked. We did not go to war; war came to us. The United States desires only a relatively decent world without constant recurrence of military aggression, oppression and conquest. Each of these simple concepts may go askew if, in the process of defeating Germany, we are maneuvered into aiding and abetting the rape of large parts of Europe by another and singularly similar European power.

Conclusions:

The situation is still fluid. The present war has long been foreseen by the Communist Party. The methods of exploiting it have been carefully studied (vide State Department
archives). At present, we face the dangerous paradox of having our political authority on the Continent of Europe diminish while our military strength is notably ascendant. Attack from the air and the destruction of great German cities are wounding Germany. Now, only Russia has land armies to retrieve the fallen game.

Our position, namely, concentration on the military task of winning the war, must be re-interpreted politically. The Russians are not yet irrevocably committed to a line of policy; neither are the Germans. The British can be influenced if we adopt a strong and positive line. We have vast strength. If exerted politically, it can still save the United States from fighting a great and costly war merely to have achieved the intolerable end of permanent mobilization.

In this war both Germany and Russia have produced great military surprises. We must be fully prepared against political surprises equally enormous. If such a surprise should be a union of Russian imperialism with Comintern revolutionary technique, joined with German military and economic competence, the result would be difficult to handle. Russian-German collaboration is not as fantastic as it sounds. Its roots go back to Bismarck, even to Frederick the Great. After Rapallo and again after the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, there was effective German-Russian collaboration. Each country now has a military elite, each a great bureaucracy, industry
is managerial, and proletarianization is no stranger to the Reich; moreover, Western democracy is more incompatible with the Soviet system than that of another totalitarian state. Thus, elements of affinity already exist between them. The hatreds of war in Europe pass quickly into history. Rapallo came soon after Brest Litovsk.

Suggested Lines of Action:

1. Formulate a clear-cut, long-term policy, comprising maximum and minimum peace aims.
2. Press the British into alignment.
3. Avert a situation where we might be impelled to "outbid" the Russians, or where Germany could play one ally off against the other.
4. Limit the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" to "Hitlerite Germany". No matter how undesirable, it is made necessary by the fact that Mr. Stalin has already done this.
5. Expedite the setting up of a second front in as great force as possible - but in the Balkans, where it could best influence both the course of the war, diplomatic relations with the Kremlin, and the peace to come. True, a Balkan front is difficult; perhaps it is impossible. If so, we must, of course, give up the project, but if it is merely very difficult but not impossible, we must by all means set up the Balkan front. An invasion of France and the Lowlands
would give us no political authority in central and eastern Europe. Only a successful Anglo-American invasion of southeastern Europe can give us a real voice in the eventual peace settlement. To err on the side of supposed caution in reaching the historic decision on what to do now might store up the gravest dangers for the future.

(6) Keep Germany oriented to the West and prevent her turning East.

(7) Leave nothing undone to reassure the Kremlin of continuing Anglo-American support, political and economic, in a peace without conquest.

Such lines of action, if promptly, skillfully, and resolutely pursued, will save a situation which is rapidly turning bad. It is wrong to underestimate our strength or to overestimate that of our enemies and allies. We can and must win both the war and the peace.
October 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

I want to see Bill Donovan on Tuesday or Wednesday for lunch.

F.D.R.
I have just returned from Italy as well as the Middle East. Separately I am sending you a memorandum on certain aspects of the Italian situation with which we are concerned.

In relation to the Balkans, you might be interested in knowing that -

(a) We now are being assigned aircraft for the sending in of our men, which enables us to overcome the handicap under which we have worked for two years.

(b) We have our representatives with the British in Greece and also with Mikhailovitch and Tito.

(c) We are providing 150 younger officers each for the leadership in guerrilla operations in both Greece and in Yugoslavia.
(d) We have worked out a program for special operations in that area which have the approval not only of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but of General Wilson of the British, General Royce, and Mr. Casey and Mr. Kirk.

(e) As soon as we can relieve certain of our units that went to Corsica with the French, I am going to send them to work with the underground groups in Albania.

(f) We are ready to send in additional concentrated foods and medicines.

(g) Because of the necessity of bombing operations to support our operations in that area, I have arranged to have certain of these operations carried on by the young Yugoslavia air officers who have been trained by us. I don't need to stress to you what a heartening effect that would have on the fighting units there.
(h) We have, on our own radio system through a joint code with the British and in certain instances through our own code, direct communication between our representatives in Yugoslavia and our base station in Cairo.

William J. Donovan
Director
5 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show this to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please bring this to the attention of the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached paper, I think, is worth reading. It was prepared at my request by a German who lived in Russia for ten years, was editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, and who knows the leading figures of Germany and Russia. His point of view you may find of interest.

William J. Donovan
Director
IS IT IN THE INTEREST OF POST WAR WORLD PEACE TO HAVE THE PRE WAR GERMANY DIVIDED INTO ABSOLUTELY SEPARATE COUNTRIES? AND THE REICH NO LONGER EXIST?

The writer would answer the question in the negative. One reason is that he cannot conceive of any except political arguments for dismembering the Reich.

To be sure, the institution without which the two German wars of this century would be unthinkable would be destroyed. Theoretically, if the Germans were permitted to remain in one Reich they would have more chance to go to war once more. If they are not, they would have to reunite before taking action and could easily be caught at it.

Yet, the possibility of German contingents fighting again cannot be measured solely on the premise that the German states would try to reunite. If that were the only danger in sight, there would be little to worry about. Any conspiracies aiming at reassembling a German army would soon find that success depended on the readiness of foreign states to join up with them for their own reasons. The ultimate goal of such conspiracies as far as the Germans are concerned would always be to reassemble the Reich.

The international situation can so change that some power might be willing to pay the price in full or demand that Germany
link up with it more closely than has ever been done between Sovereign States. Such a demand would be in line with Mr. Churchill's suggestion concerning Anglo-American citizenship. Lasting peace would not be served by fomenting desperado policies in a dissected Germany, with sad results for the collaboration of the Great Powers. Also, dismemberment of the Reich would invite infringements on the sovereign rights of the succession states including outright occupation. If, for instance a power in the East eventually saw fit to take over a part of eastern Germany -- and this is not a mere hypothesis -- very important interests of some western powers would inevitably be affected. To settle the matter they would have to rely, politically, morally and perhaps militarily on the other German states, which might not yet feel any direct effect from the loss of a sister state. The next step would be the serious discussion of reunion, if not actual reintegration, in order to forestall the absorption of all, one by one.

Even if things did not get to the point of annexation or absorption, it is not at all out of the question that the effects of the mere weakness of the various German units would increasingly prove so onerous for the victors that they would be glad to relinquish to those primarily interested, the
German themselves, part or all of the burden they undertook when the peace was made.

On the other hand, a situation could arise in which Germany's potential of military self-protection would constitute a welcome, if not indispensable complement to the strength of the Western democracies in preventing a dangerous shift in the military and economic balance of Europe.

Apart from these considerations, it is, for argument's sake, not denied that centrifugal forces could get the better of centripetal, once Germany became nothing more than a geographical, linguistic, and traditional complex. The history of the former Baltic States or Czecho-Slovakia, created in 1919, not to mention others, shows what a rank weed national consciousness is in newly founded states.

Such growths would largely counteract 'conspiracies'. Yet as long as the Reich is merely a dream, conspiracies would go on just the same, in different forms, and come to the surface in all kinds of turbulent movements and diplomatic maneuvers. An intact Germany would not be free from furtive attempts to throw Europe into chaos by breaking the peace treaty, but the right policy could keep such things under control. A Germany in search of "a body for her soul", as she was said to be in
1848, would again become the powder box of Europe. Nothing could prevent it.

Nevertheless, the international implications of several practically helpless, autonomous, small states on the territory of the former Reich would not be much different from those of an intact Reich; for the menace of Germany had other than psychological causes. For example, the geographical location, the number of inhabitants, will be the same whether the Reich is dismembered or not.

From quite a different angle, the following observation is submitted: A Germany taken apart would lead to such an artificial condition that criticisms would arise almost instantly. To them would be added the complaint of those who would experience difficulties in trading with the various new states. It may also well be that the next generation would not be able to appreciate the motives that guided those who made the peace. To let a preventive peace lapse, once it has been imposed by force, is beset with traps as the fate of the Versailles Treaty shows. The old slogan of politics, that anything not really necessary is harmful might apply to the dismemberment of Germany.
To cut Germany apart and keep the several states separate indefinitely, regardless whether the population puts up with or resists such a solution is in itself possible. Consequently whether the Germans are for or against 'regionalism' does not matter so much as many believe. But if a sample poll were taken in Germany on the subject, the results would be overwhelmingly against dismemberment.

It is natural that the voices of separatism are heard in the Allied countries more often than those content with a united Reich. Movements of that kind are news. The opposition sees no object in shouting from the rooftops or in organizing under a slogan of unity. They feel sure of themselves. Moreover, in the enemy countries, few think of trying to influence public opinion as do the separatists, who of course see their opportunity.

Numerically the strongest party after defeat will be the Social Democrats. At least, the writer knows nothing that indicates that another equally important political party is forming. Since its beginning, this labor-white collar party has invariably been pro-Reich. Being a mass movement, it has always feared that 'forces of reaction' would become all too
powerful in smaller units; quite logically, it favored the transfer of rights and privileges appertaining to the Bundesstaaten, or later, the Laender, to the central government. It is considered the Reich relatively progressive, the Laender relatively stagnant.

The two convictions that grew up naturally among the rank and file were the Einheit des Reiches, unity of the Reich, and a federal system for Europe. These ideals were stronger than any Marxist doctrine. This holds true for the entire laboring class, including the communists. It has been indoctrinated with the principle of the absolute unity of the Reich, which Nazism has largely realized. The writer happens to know that Stalin is almost passionate in his conviction that "frontiers between those tiny 'provinces' are ridiculous".

Certain antagonisms exist between the North and South, but the tone is more or less amiable. The relatively apolitical Rhinelanders are neutral listeners. The South is undoubtedly the first to criticise. The North's contribution is denunciation, especially of the Bavarians, for their Schlamperei (slipshodiness). The South dislikes Prussian or Hanseatic rigidity, their sharp voices, etc. It's chiefly a
matter of temperament, as it is in other countries, between North and South or West and East.

In tense periods such differences can accentuate political antagonism to the verge of separatism. The movement might gain some strength if a sauve qui peut mood seized the Germans under the impact of defeat and the demands of the United Nations, or if after the eastern part of Germany had come under the sway of the Red Army the sole refuge were with the Western Allies. Then the western and southern laender would probably hasten to declare themselves autonomous in order to be able to appeal to the Western Allies with a semblance of sovereignty. It might well happen that the Reich will fall asunder in this manner.

The great majority of the bourgeoisie would also be against dismemberment. Only two groups are distinctly in favor of it; part of the clergy in the South, especially in Bavaria, and certain big industrial and financial interests on the lower Rhine, in Cologne (mostly Catholic) and in the Ruhrbasin with its fringes.

If we can judge by events during the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, the later circles will argue chiefly on
economic grounds. They would try to get the enormous wealth of these regions (Das Rheingold) out of the bankrupt's estate, i.e., the Reich's and found a state of their own, which would have, as they hope, only assets. The considerable propaganda launched on behalf of this program under French protection fell flat.

Undoubtedly in Bavaria and adjacent regions to the West and South there is agitation for a separatist party, originating chiefly with the lower clergy and some families of the high aristocracy. It will find a response with the peasants, especially in Upper Bavaria, but little in the towns.

The motives for loyalty to the Reich are the same as everywhere else in Germany, patriotic and economic. As far as the economic situation is concerned, a small group of entrepreneurs would profit from a division of Germany, but most of the inhabitants in the small states would live precariously, in a condition of synthetic economic depression. Separatism would lead to a renaissance of 19th century capitalism. The Rhineland might prosper. Other parts would fall into poverty, especially the East-Elbian provinces, old Prussia. This may be at the bottom of the plans for dividing Germany. Germans
living under economic circumstances that go against the grain of today's economy would not only impoverish Europe, their political reactions would make Europe restless and fearful, the very condition that brews wars.

A Germany severely punished and deprived of means of aggression might be pacified in the true constructive sense of the word, but not a conglomeration of impotent states whose citizens would long to be united in a new Reich and feel justified in their demand. The scattered states would be united in the role of the new Sick Man of Europe, and the consequences would be even worse than in the case of Turkey. It is not possible to gauge them now but about their character there is no doubt.

To make security the sole guide in formulating terms for Germany would defeat its own ends. It may be, as mentioned in a previous memorandum, that in the traditional sense the Germany at which the peace is directed will not exist after unqualified defeat. Even were she permitted to keep her military strength in all its splendor, she would be second to the USSR. Since Napoleon's days the distance between the first and second military power in Europe, or even a coalition,
has not been so great as it will be after this war. This is bound to react strongly on Germany; and the men who habitually and by training think about politics in terms of armed strength will be the first to recognize the new relation. They will concentrate on defense first and last.

There is no greater peril for lasting peace than a settlement that does not take into account the actual fundamentals of the situation it is intended to fit.
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please bring this to the attention of the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Interrogation of German Prisoners of War

1. The following information you may find of value:

2. From D-day until the 24th of September, the Psychological Warfare Branch of FHQ (which is made up of representatives of PWE, OWI and OSS) has interrogated more than 170 German prisoners of war. They included seven officers, a major among them, and represented all ages and all regions of Germany.

3. **ATTITUDE OF DEFEAT**

   Only 8 out of this number believed in German victory, and of these 4 were officers. The reasons given for the probable defeat of Germany were:

   (a) War weariness of Germany and present vigor of the United States;

   (b) Overwhelming production in the United States, and, what they considered more decisive, its transport to the battle fronts;
(c) Systematic destruction of German cities in a bombing effort they admired even more than they resented;

(d) The disappearance of the Luftwaffe from battle fronts as well as the industrial regions of Germany;

(e) Germany's predicament in a two-front war;

(f) Admiration for Allied artillery.

4. Over and above these reasons, it was plain that in the minds of all these prisoners of war, the Russian front was decisive.

5. About 80% believed that the war will be over by Christmas; the others believed in German defeat within twelve months. The eight who believed in German victory thought it would take two years more.

6. The most profound defeatism was noted among the prisoners from Westphalia and other heavily bombed areas. The lowest morale was found among men 17-20 years of age, and 35-45. It was remarked that for the first time the opinion of professional soldiers, including non-commissioned officers, was not different from that of draftees.
7. REASONS FOR CONTINUING TO FIGHT

As asked why they continued to fight on for what they considered a lost cause, they offered the following reasons:

(a) Brutal treatment expected after the war by Germans who have seen what was done to Poles and Russians (90% had heard this propaganda; 70% believed it completely and volunteered certainty of inflation again, hard labor in enforced exile, the breaking up of families and the sterilization by the Jews of 20% of all German males;

(b) Splendid discipline of German army only slightly altered (90% of the prisoners described the relations between officers and enlisted men as excellent);

(c) Hope for a negotiated peace, reflecting the propaganda that the plutocracies will join in the end the German "crusade" against Bolshevism;

(d) Belief that stubborn German resistance, threatening a million Allied casualties, would bring better peace terms;

(e) Six out of seven officers volunteered the information that the Allies would join with Germany in fighting the "Yellow Peril."

8. ATTITUDE ON DEMOCRACY

No single prisoner pretended or seemed to believe this is an ideological war. Of all prisoners, 85% (and all prisoners younger than 22 years old, 99%) had no
conception of democracy but "freedom", i.e. a "state of anarchy", some said. In lengthy discussion many came to admit that "Democracy is a wonderful thing but impossible for Germany ", (they still need a leader - "If Hitler is a bad leader, then we must find a better leader"). There is complete cynicism toward Hitler and other Nazi leaders. Asked why they don't do away with these leaders, they all suggested that this would being no better peace terms -- a further indication that they think of the war from the point of view of geopolitics. The possibility of internal revolution was denied by 90%, but 25% believed that Hitler might step aside as had Mussolini. All express fear and hatred of Russia. Incidentally, this is true of Serbs, Alsatians and others serving in the German army. All expressed the hope that if Germany is defeated British and American troops will occupy ahead of Russian. Asked whether the Anglo-Saxons would "control" the Russians, the prisoners were equally divided.
9. CENSORSHIP AND RADIO CONTROL

It appears that the censorship of mail has broken down. Of six hundred letters, only two were censored and all painted horrendous pictures of the bombings. Although there is a death penalty, 80% of the prisoners had at one time or another listened to foreign broadcasts. Some 60% have seen Allied leaflets and 100%, who had been on the Russian front, had seen Russian leaflets.

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you show this to the President please.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. On the 23rd of September, while with the 5th Army, it was made very clear that little help could be obtained from the disorganized units of the Italian Army. Thereupon I wrote the attached letter to General Clark, suggesting the organization of "operational groups" (such as OSS has) from volunteers of the Italian forces.

2. We have received a cable from Colonel Huntington, who is in charge of our unit with the 5th Army, stating that the plan has been approved upon the following conditions:

   (a) The groups must be non-political.
   (b) Opposition to the King and Badoglio must be carefully avoided.
   (c) The groups must be military organizations headed by Italians.
   (d) Operations will be carried out only if so ordered by the Commander of the 5th Army.

William J. Donovan
Director
SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Operational Groups for Employment with Allied Forces.

TO : Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark
(Thru: Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther)

FROM : William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services.

1. Yesterday, together with Lt. Col. John Whitaker, I talked at Capri with Benedetto Croce--well known Italian philosopher and writer.

2. Mr. Croce, since 1924, has been the most courageous, aggressive and effective opponent of Fascism. By published articles and open statements he has denounced totalitarianism and attacked Fascist rule in Italy. The regime feared to arrest him. He has taken refuge in Capri only at the insistence of the Allies in order to avoid capture by the Germans.

3. In the course of our talk, Mr. Croce analyzed the present psychological state of the Italian people, including their political thinking and their present attitude towards the war. We asked him what he considered the one most important means of fusing his people and restoring their self respect.

4. His reply was instant and unequivocal. It is to give them the opportunity to enlist voluntarily in a fighting force under their own flag to fight by the side of the Allies.

5. I respectfully endorse these views and suggest that this would be a means of establishing a focal point for resolving the present difficulties and uncertainties of the various political elements of Italy; would bring to one place the residue of the fighting spirit; would serve to bind the people to the Allies; would give some assurance of earning
the right to a free election in the selection of their own government, and would symbolize their consolidated active resistance to Germany and the German army.

6. In principle, I recommend the following manner of organization:

(a) To select a well-known Italian of military background as the titular head, such a man as Maj. Gen. Pavone, a pronounced anti-Fascist with an excellent record in the last world war.

(b) To provide for the assimilation of those volunteers as a fighting force under the rules of the Geneva Convention.

(c) To give these volunteers the right to carry the flag of their own country--Italy.

(d) Provide originally for their recruitment in small detachments of "operational groups," such as already exist under directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the case of American citizen of Italian origin in OSS.

(e) That instructors from SOE and OSS be attached to these groups for training in modern methods of demolition and in the tactics of irregular warfare.

(f) That for the purpose of obtaining immediate organization and employment of these groups, the Office of Strategic Services is prepared to make available such funds as may be necessary, and although I have not had the opportunity of seeing our British colleagues, I believe they would also contribute.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ William J. Donovan
Brigadier General, USA
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

15 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace -

I hope this is what you wanted.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
19 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show this to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From a well informed traveler, we have just received, as of September 24, 1943, the following information from direct observation in Austria:

"There is little food, except bread, no fruit. On the black market, however, there is obtainable coffee at 300 marks per kilo and tea at 200 marks per kilo. All German officials admit openly that they are short of coffee, and also cigarettes.

"Considerable numbers of Greek and French foreign labor were observed in Vienna.

"People are gloomy; morale is low. Numerous cripples and blind people are seen on the streets. The old discipline and order is no longer noticeable. People
brood over their future."

William J. Donovan
Director
Dear:  

Gen. Donovan's office is delivering this relief map at 11:30 this morning. Where does it go?

Dot
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have had made for you by our map group a relief model of Italy and adjacent areas (Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Tunis area), scale 1:500,000 (one inch to eight miles), colored.

This is similar to the maps we have made for the study of our special operations and I really think you will be pleased with it. You might even want to have it in your office to follow the operations as they move.

If it does please you and you would be interested in other theaters, I will see that the maps are made for you. This is a special job done by our own people and requires great care and skill.

I will get in touch with Grace Tully and see how best it can be delivered.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 October 1943

SECRET

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show this to the President? Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622
By SEP 10 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Italian Admiral

You will recall that in our recent conversation I informed you that OSS had located and secured the services of an Italian admiral. He and his wife arrived in Washington by plane yesterday. OSS has obtained living quarters for the couple in Washington and is taking care of their well-being.

The individual, Vice Admiral Eugene Minisini, Retired, is reputed to have exceedingly valuable technical knowledge on Axis ordnance. OSS brought him to this country to place him at the disposal of the Navy and also the Army.

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Do you think it advisable
that I should see Dr. Subasic?

F. D. R.

Enclosures: Copy of the
attached memorandum, together
with a letter from Dr. Subasis
addressed to the President, dated
Oct. 19, 1943.
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show this to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

During my last conversation with you, you showed a great deal of interest in the Balkan Theater of Operations. Since that time I had a very interesting talk with the Ban of Croatia, whose letter to you I am enclosing herewith.

The Ban is willing to go for OSS first to Italy and later to make an appearance in Yugoslavia proper in order to establish direct contact with the political and military leaders of Croatia. He understands that he will go merely as a soldier and patriot to assist us in our fight against the enemy.

The Ban believes that now is the propitious time to contact not only the resistance groups in that country, but the General Staff of Croat Puppet Government army, 150,000 strong. The Ban knows the officers and the Chief of the General Staff, and is ready to embark upon winning them over to our side.

During my talk with the Ban no political commitments of any kind were made by me to him, and he understands that he can go only as a soldier on behalf of our common cause to assist us -

1. In eliciting all possible information regarding conditions in Yugoslavia;

2. In persuading the military leaders of the Croatian Puppet Army to join us; and

3. To establish liaison with TITO, with whom he hopes to work very closely.
The Ban told me that it would aid him tremendously in carrying out his duties, and would greatly facilitate his future tasks, if he could have an interview with you, not in his diplomatic capacity, but merely as a patriot who is working for the common cause. I told him that I could give him no such assurance that you will see him, but that I would be glad to present his request to you.

During his stay in this country for the last eighteen months, the Ban steadfastly refrained from contacting any officials in the State Department because he thought it might embarrass Ambassador Fotich. The Ban disapproves of the present Yugoslav Government for he feels that it merely is occupied with the perpetuation in power of the Pan-Serbian groups, who think in terms of Serbs only, and not in terms of a federated Yugoslavia in which all groups - Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - are equally represented.

The Ban, who fought in the last war as a Serbian officer, is very popular among the 5,000,000 Croats. They regard him as their champion and leader.

I believe that the Ban can be of great value to us in paving the way for our forces.

I do not wish to urge you to grant the Ban an interview, yet if you feel inclined to do so, I am sure that it will imbue him with great enthusiasm to carry out the responsible tasks assigned by me to him.

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

25 October 1943

In accordance with your wish, I have had made an evaluation of the causes for the deterioration of the Greek situation. I am assured by my people that the British in that area confirm this evaluation:

"1. Food: A famine of the proportions of the one of 1941-42 menaces Greece if she is not freed prior to the arrival of winter.

"2. King: There is no doubt that an overwhelming democratic sentiment exists among the Greeks. Insisting that the King return prior to the holding of elections will only provoke incidents and consolidate the opposition.

"3. Dodecanese: Guarantees are wanted that the Greeks will get the Dodecanese Islands. The current British policy of keeping the Greeks out of participation in military operations and in future civil administration in the Dodecanese alienating both Dodecanese and Greek sentiment.

"4. The whole of Greece is united in a trend against the British due to the refusal by the Middle East Command to employ Greek troops in the Greek islands.

"5. The Greeks are afraid that their national interests are placed in jeopardy by the establishment of Italy as a co-belligerent."
All Greeks hate and deplore this arrangement. Based on several episodes that have taken place in the islands and in Greece itself, the Greeks keenly distrust the Italians as fighting allies.

"6. The communist-led EAM is the largest organization in Greece. Fighting is taking place between the Nationalist bands and the EAM during the current partial evacuation toward the north by the Nazis. It is claimed that the communist leaders of EAM with a view to taking over after Greece is freed are attempting to monopolize resistance organizations."
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Grace:  

Attached is a memorandum for the President which contains information he asked me to obtain. Would you please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

I am attaching a memorandum reporting a conversation which I thought might be of interest to the President.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
The following was obtained from a conversation with certain of our people with Andre Philip in London:

"As at former times, Philip again gave the impression that he was more interested in action than in intelligence. The political aspects of resistance are under his control and the military side under Giraud. He made it plain, however, that he regarded resistance as being primarily political in character and seemed to feel confident that the remnants of Giraud’s secret army were being absorbed into the resistance groups. The much-talked-of secret army at present forming in France is an attempt to amalgamate various resistance groups for concerted para-military action on X-day. The method of organisation is the following: Officers of the armistice army go into hiding for a period, after which they return with a new identity and by entering into contact with various resistance groups in the locality, set up a chain of command and lay plans for mobilisation at the strategic moment. Hence the secret army cuts across the lines of individual resistance groups. It is impossible to say how many men the army includes, but it is likely that there are about 100,000.

"Philip feels that there may very well be no fighting in France, since the German army may very well withdraw to northern France in an attempt to defend a line from the Jura to the Somme, with the possibility of falling back on the Maginot Line. He thinks that this may happen even before an Allied landing takes place."
"Philip spoke of the resistance movements and general tendency to unify all pro-allied sentiment in France. He said that the University was the best source of resistance leaders, since it had proved to be about 95% anti-collaborationist and active in resistance.

"Philip talked at some length about the new Consultative Assembly which is in the process of being set up in Algiers and which will hold its first session in November. He looked upon it as forming the nucleus of a structure which would develop into a parliamentary regime. Already four distinct political groups are being formed, - largely as a result of this framework having been imposed by Philip. Of the twenty former members of the Parliament, three are Communists, five are Socialists, five belong to the left center (from the radical Socialists to the popular Democrats) and the seven right-wing and center Conservatives form a fourth group. Ten of the representatives coming out of France have also aligned themselves with these political groupings. Three are Communists and I believe he said four are Socialists. The other three or four are divided between the left center and the Conservative groups. Members of the French Committee of Liberation may be questioned by the Consultative Assembly following special invitations issued to them for their attendance at the Assembly sessions. Philip thought that there might be a general reconstitution of the Committee of Liberation to conform more closely to the balance of political forces within the Consultative Assembly. The Committee still contains some civil servants who lack decision and, in fact, are terrified by the necessity of deciding anything. He referred quite frankly to de Gaulle as being the Premier, with Giraud as Commander-in-Chief, and stated that de Gaulle and Giraud jointly occupied the post of what would correspond to the Presidency.

"Philip thought that the great majority of the French police (perhaps ninety per cent) could be retained. This was somewhat surprising to me in view of the charges which I have recently heard that the new French police
have proved more dangerous to the French underground than the Nazis. Philip, however, denied this vehemently, pointing out several examples which definitely proved that the French police were for the most part more than friendly to the resistance movement.

"The most important changes in the administrative structure, Philip said, would have to take place in the Judiciary. He thought that as many as eighty per cent of the present judges would have to be changed.

"We questioned Philip at some length on the lines of thought which were developing within the French Committee of Liberation with regard to the post-war constitutional structure of France. He stated that while no final formula had been drawn up there was fairly general support for the retention of a substantial portion of the Third Republic constitution with certain modifications. It is difficult to tell whether these views represent Philip's own convictions or whether they are a consensus of French Committeeemen and resistance leaders. At any rate, the following constitutional system is outlined:

"There would be one parliamentary house with plenary powers, elected by a 'scrutin de liste' in the departments without proportional representation. In addition, there would be a Consultative Assembly, half of the membership of which is to be composed on the lines of the former French Senate and the other half to represent industries and other functional groups. The Assembly would elect the President for a long period, possibly ten or fifteen years. He would be non-political and would no longer have the right of changing the Premier. However, he would serve as chairman of the committee which would control the Judiciary. The Assembly would elect the Premier by a majority vote and the Premier would select his Cabinet members as formerly. During the first two years of a parliament, no Ministry could be ousted by an ordinary interpellation unless after such an interpellation two weeks were allowed to elapse and a formal interpellation were directed against the Premier himself. No
Assembly could be dissolved by the Premier, but if after the Assembly had been in power for two years, it should oust the Premier by a formal interpellation, the Assembly would be automatically dissolved and a new election held. The French Committee system of the Chamber would remain somewhat as under the Third Republic, but an effort would be made to strengthen both the powers of the Executive and of the Committees themselves in the drawing up of legislation. When a bill would be presented finally to the Assembly, the latter would be deprived of the right of amendment and must either accept or reject it as a whole. Philip regarded this proposal as of extreme importance in curbing the irresponsibility of a legislative assembly.

"We asked M. Philip about Russia and the problem of the Eastern frontiers. He thought that the Soviets would definitely retain the Baltic States and that nothing could be done about it. He also was convinced that the Soviets would keep the Eastern half of Poland. Poland, he indicated, would certainly be compensated by the annexation of East Prussia and part of Silesia. The balance of Polish power would thus shift westward and this circumstance might help to improve relations with Czechoslovakia, which are at present so strained. He said that the present conservative Polish Government was naturally opposed to the loss of what was formerly the conservative district of Eastern Poland and was likewise disturbed at the prospect of the forces of industrial and social democracy being strengthened as a result of the shifting of power to the industrial districts of Silesia and East Prussia."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following comes from one of our men in Stockholm:

"According to evidence which is considered reliable, there is now in the process of being organized in Stockholm a Free German Committee which is patterned after the Committee that was organized in Moscow. (Please refer to the Legation's Telegram No. 2622 August 20th of this year). Communists, Social Democrats and the leading Refugee Trade Unionists from Germany have been holding conferences during the past fortnight. An invitation was tendered to the Social Democrats to join the Committee which the Communists in Stockholm are undertaking to organize, but this invitation was declined by the representatives of the Social Democrats.

"The Social Democratic Representatives have been informed by the Communists that a Committee such as the one mentioned above is being organized, and that representation has been obtained from refugee Germans at the University of Uppsala. According to reports, there have been persons with Communist sympathies among the German refugees at Uppsala.

"It is further claimed by the Communists that the Community of the German Church in Stockholm has provided representation. These persons are understood to have conservative leanings and have not been politically inclined but have demonstrated their feeling against the Nazis by declining to respond to notices to perform service in the armies of Germany."
"An active part in the organization of the Committee is being taken by the Swedish Communist party. The person from whom the legation obtained this information is of the belief that the Communists among the German refugees have been in communication with the Committee at Moscow and that the Swedish Communists were the medium through which such communication was established. There is no concrete evidence to support this, however.

"When a meeting takes place this week, the refugee group of the Social Democrats will delegate some person to attend it in the capacity of an observer.

"It is indicated in a report of the meetings which took place between the refugee Social Democrats and the refugee German Communists that the following argument is being used for the association of the Moscow Committee with the German military representatives.

"The object of this association is to endeavor to penetrate the military groups of the Germans. That is to say: That the Communists expect to expedite the collapse of Nazi Germany by means of appeals from territory which has been captured from Germany."

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 October 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a memorandum on the Balkan situation which I wish you would see gets to the President. Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Referring to my previous letters of October 25 and October 28, here is additional information on the Balkan situation. The following refers to the Albanian political situation:

"1. Among both Republicans and Royalists, there abound confidence in the statements made in December, 1942, by Premier Molotov and Secretary of State Hull. However, Foreign Secretary Eden's reservations about boundaries have caused disquiet.

"2. Concerning boundary problems, it is thought that the British, because of their interests in the Balkans, have secretly recognized the persistent claims of Greek representatives in London and Cairo. Albanian claims on Kossova in the North are still made, since the Patriots do not recognize Italian seizure of this region.

"3. Distrust is created by the fact that Albania has not been allowed to join the United Nations. They argue that their acceptance among the United Nations is justified by their guerilla operations which prevented actual Italian occupation. They are irritated by the granting of cobelligerency status to Italy.

"4. Every party agrees that it is extremely essential for a government to be established. The Republicans desire a National Committee, similar to that of France, under the leadership of Fannoli, in the United States; Mirach Ivanaj at Istanbul; Mithad Frasheri or Mehdi Frasheri, Albania. The Royalists desire only King Zog. Some Republicans feel that as a final expedient a government which included King Zog would be better than no government at all, but this only with misgivings and as an utter emergency. The popular feeling is certainly not monarchist but democratic.
"5. Concerning the creation of an Albanian Legion, as in the first World War. Failure of Otto of Austria regarded irrelevant as Albania is not a satellite of the Axis but rather a victim."

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You will be pleased to know that on October 10th we sent one of our planes to a landing field in Greece and delivered certain supplies there. There were a number of American airmen in hiding and we were able to bring out fourteen of them.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 November 1943

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show this to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum for the President on the Balkan situation. Would you please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to my memorandum of October 25th, here is additional information on the Balkan situation:

1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces, are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are composed of two parts - the Cetniks, lead by Mihailovitch, and the Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily exaggerated. Their greatest strength is given as 15,000 by the Deputy Commander for Mihailovitch in South Dalmatia, Colonel Zujozich, who came here a short time ago. These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances among the population are created by Mihailovitch's title as Yugoslav commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed to fact.

2. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz. Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They are made up of men from every region of the country and they are engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovitch's relative lack of activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing. Two Italian divisions, the Garibaldi and the Venezian, joined his forces following the fall of Italy, and added considerably to Tito's supplies. The chief fields of Partisan activities against the Nazi are West Crotia, Bosnia, Dalmatia and Slovenia.
3. Included in the political goals of the Partisans is the establishment of a federated Jugoslavia with a government selected by democratic elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual foundation for the allegation of communism made against the Partisans. Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and file or the leaders.

4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the present cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. This is stated in confidence by General Givkovith, Deputy of the King as Commander in Chief, and by Prime Minister Purich. The Government is not representative of the population, and causes controversy between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the Government-in-Exile. With most of the Slovenes, Croatians and Serbians the prestige of Britain has seriously suffered. These people are also firmly against General Givkovith, who, under King Alexander, was Dictator.

5. Nedich's puppet government in Serbia is extremely disliked and Pavelich in Croatia is spiritedly scorned and hated. Pavelich is backed by his Ustashi militia, a small number of the people and by Nazi military forces.

6. The United States is considered as reactionary by the Serbians. We are more amicably regarded than are the British, by other Jugoslavs. They expect us to give material support, both during and subsequent to the war, particularly medicines and food, which they vitally require. Tito made a recent complaint
about the shortage of supplies and has asked that supplies receive priority over the sending of more Allied personnel.

"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged, during the war, to Alexandra.

"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-Exile and the Soviet Union. The principal barrier to such an understanding is Mihailovitch. Although it is frequently stated in rumors, there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord between the Partisans and the Soviet Union.

"9. Generally stated, most of the Jugoslavs desire a democratic Government and a federated Jugoslavia, covering Slovene areas taken by Germany and Italy after the first World War. They are not definite on the means of accomplishing the former aim."

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I enclose a memorandum from William J. Donovan for your information, and please return for my files.

Just what is the present status of the war criminals' trials?
What is Pell and his group doing?

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a memorandum for the President. Will you please see that he receives it? Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You will recall that you asked me certain questions about the possibility for the trial of war criminals. I enclose a proposal, prepared by our Planning Group, which I sent to the State Department some months ago, which would have the United Nations conclude a convention for the extradition of Axis war criminals.

You might think it advisable to consider the possibility of having as a term of your unconditional surrender a refusal to conclude an Armistice unless and until there should be turned over to the United Nations war criminals in areas held by the German armies.

I have prepared a partial list of present German officials in that class of criminals, and will see whether other names might be included.

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a digest of one of our reports "Reconnaissance of Dalmatian Coast":

"1. Between October 12 and 18, 1943, Major Louis Huot*, a representative of British SIS and a representative of the Partisan Forces made two reconnaissance trips from the port of Bari to the Dalmatian Coast to establish a maritime supply line to the Partisan Forces in Yugoslavia. These trips were the first by Allied vessels to this area during the present war.

"2. The first trip constituted a reconnaissance of the island of Vis (Lissa). Vis was free of enemy forces and was guarded by approximately one thousand soldiers of whom at least 5% are women. Arms included captured Italian light weapons. No cannons or mortars were seen. Rigid discipline governs the relation of men and women soldiers on field duty. Morale is high despite near starvation diet, lack of proper arms and clothing and atrocities by the Italian forces until Italy's capitulation. There is no evidence of enemy intelligence activities on Vis.

"3. The second reconnaissance touched at Vis where the party was warmly received and proceeded to Hvar Island which is held by approximately eight hundred Partisan soldiers. The party proceeded thence to Podgora on the Mainland where it was received by Colonel Pavle Illic, formerly Vice Chief of Staff to General Tito and presently Commander, with headquarters at Bari.

*our chief representative,
8th Army Corps. The journey from Hvar Island to Podgora was made down the channel between Hvar and Brac islands. The channel had been mined by Partisans with captured Italian mines and was watched by sentinels spaced at intervals of approximately two miles on each shore.

"4. The intelligence obtained by the reconnaissance party included the following:

a. Geographical boundaries of General Tito's 8th Army Corps;

b. Position of Axis forces in the area;

c. German air power in the area which included 77 Stukas and 20 observation planes. The main German air strength is centered at Zagreg to be shifted where needed;

d. Dalmatian island including defenses, hiding places for ships and inter-island communication."

[Signature]
William J. Donovan
Director
2 November 1943

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

Dear Grace:

Will you please show the enclosed to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

One of our men sent me the following:

"Word has come that a few days ago, the German court martial in Norway condemned ten Norwegian counter-espionage agents to die for their activities on behalf of Great Britain and the Norwegian Government. They were accused of sabotage, illegal weapons, munitions' traffic, wireless activities, murder and travel between England and Norway.

"The executions have taken place. Six were from Oslo, one from Bergen, one from Aalesund, one from Toensberg and one from Televaag. All names are known to British, Norwegian and American counter-espionage offices.

"The majority of these men had received their counter-espionage training in England and were sent to Norway to fulfill their special missions. Norwegian quisling informers are suspected."
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 November 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I am leaving Tuesday or Wednesday to meet Stilwell and Mountbatten in New Delhi, and then to the Middle East, returning by way of Australia.

William J. Donovan
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you speak to me about
this?

F.D.R.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I beg you to read this carefully. It contains an idea that your skill and imagination could develop.

I don't pretend to suggest what price should be paid by our government for the hoped-for result.

If the plan went through, and if the culprits were delivered and fittingly tried and executed, and if unconditional surrender resulted, it would strengthen your position morally at the peace table.

Russian propaganda is evidently directed to this very purpose.

This paper is presented by Theodore A. Morde, representative of the Readers' Digest in Cairo. He worked originally for the COI and then for OWI. He subsequently became assistant to Alex Kirk in Cairo. He resigned to take the Readers'
The President - 2 - 29 October 1943

Digest job and meet the person concerned.

This agent presented his plan to only two persons: Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, when he was in Cairo as personal representative of the President, and Colonel Guenther, in charge of OSS in the Middle East. Both were sworn to secrecy, and neither knows the outcome of the plan or meetings. Both considered the plan feasible. General Hurley expressed a desire to go to Turkey with this agent to assist in the plan, but did not do so, apparently because his orders did not permit him to participate. Colonel Guenther, while neither he nor OSS officially sponsored the action or plan of this agent, gave every assistance to this agent in matters of transportation and contacts.

This agent traveled to Turkey as a war correspondent and at no time displayed any credentials other than his passport.

This agent finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with von Papen after gaining the confidence of one Alexander Rustow, an anti-Hitler German, now a university professor in Turkey. Rustow in turn contacted von Papen's closest friend, a Herr Poath,
head of the Deutsche Orient Bank in Istanbul, who arranged the actual meetings with von Papen.

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I return herewith secret memoranda to the President from Mr. Robert Sherwood and from General William Donovan relative to Theodore Morde.

I discussed these memoranda with the President this afternoon in the car going to the airport and he approves the denial of a passport to Mr. Morde. In view of this discussion, I am not sending any formal reply other than this.

Encs.
From Robert Sherwood, October 26, 1943;
From General Donovan, October 29, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. TULLY

November 10, 1943

I return herewith secret memoranda to the President from Mr. Robert Sherwood and from General William Donovan relative to Theodore Morde.

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E. R. STETHNIUS, JR.

Encls.
From Robert Sherwood,
October 26, 1943;
From General Donovan,
October 29, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

October 26, 1943

Last week a young man named Theodore Morde came to see me. Pa Watson had referred him to me. Morde had previously been with my outfit, first under the Coordinator of Information and then with OWI, and had been in our Cairo office. Several months ago he decided he wanted to resign from OWI and join the Cairo office of the Reader's Digest. We agreed to let him go as he had been making a certain amount of trouble.

The story he brought back last week was an amazing one: He said that under the sponsorship of General Pat Hurley he had been to Istanbul and had had two interviews with Von Papen, in which he discussed a possible deal for the overthrow of Hitler and the Nazi party.

Knowing Morde, I was a bit leery of this -- and subsequently I have heard from our Cairo office that General Hurley disclaims all responsibility for it and, in effect, denounces Morde.

I am going to make a full report of this to the Acting Secretary of State with the suggestion that Morde should not again be given a passport to leave this country.

But, in my opinion, the really important part of the whole story lies in the activities abroad of the Reader's Digest. They are now printing a large edition in Africa in English for distribution among our troops. Morde told me that this edition is going to be greatly expanded and extended for our troops all through North Africa, Sicily and Italy.

As you know, the Reader's Digest has become more and more bitter and partisan in its attacks on this Administration. In its world-wide circulation it is, in effect, undoing the work that my outfit is constantly trying to do overseas. They seem to be able to get plenty of paper for their expanded editions in places where we are hard-put-to-it to get paper for such essentials as airplane leaflets.

It is my suggestion that, in view of Morde's dangerous activities, there might be some way to prevent the
issuance of any more passports to men who are going overseas in war-time solely for the purpose of increasing the circulation of the Reader's Digest, particularly among our own American troops.

Robert Sherwood
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

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Robert Sherwood
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  

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The President

- 3 -

29 October 1943

head of the Deutsche Orient Bank in Istanbul, who arranged the actual meetings with von Papen.

William J. Donovan
Director
MEETING NO. 1 - October 5, 1943
Place: Germany Embassy, Istanbul, Turkey

THE FOLLOWING NOTES WERE WRITTEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING:

I opened the meeting by addressing von Papen as 'Mr. Ambassador.' I explained that I had come on a highly secret and important mission from the United States for the sole purpose of seeing him. I mentioned that last week I had been in Algiers for whatever inference he might derive from that fact; that I had traveled thousands of miles by plane and that my presence in Istanbul was an absolute secret; that I had not yet registered with the Turks nor had I reported to the American Embassy. This pleased him very much. "Good," he said.

I then said bluntly that I was not an intelligence agent, that this interview was no trick, and that I came to him in complete good faith. I said that I wanted to speak openly, honestly and frankly and I wanted him to trust me implicitly. He then asked me if I would tell him just who I was, and I replied that I wished to do so. I told him that because of the delicate nature of this mission I carried no credentials other than my passport, which I showed him. He noted the page which states "the bearer is Assistant to the American Minister, etc. to Egypt and asked if I had spent much time in the Middle East. I replied yes, approximately a year and a half, and explained that I had served in that capacity in my job as Ass't, later Chief, of the OWI there. He read my name aloud and pronounced it with a heavy German accent as "Mord-a," and he referred to me throughout the interview from then on as "Mr. Morda." I told him that I was now traveling under the disguise of a correspondent and showed him my pass; he exclaimed with satisfaction when he saw my fingerprints on the pass, and said he was completely satisfied that I was who I represented myself
to be, and that he was pleased with my frankness and apparent honesty and open-and-above board manner. He said that he was very glad I had come and that he, frankly, too, wanted to meet me; that the very fact that he had told Rustow and Posth that he would grant the interview proved how interested he was in what I might have to say. He then relaxed completely, smiled, offered me another cigarette, lighted it, and gave every evidence that he no longer entertained any suspicions about me. Knowing that he had expressed to Rustow a fear that I might be an intelligence agent, I repeated again that I definitely was not one, that I knew nothing about intelligence and that I was there solely to talk with him and present a plan for his consideration; that I came as a trusted messenger for persons I could not identify to him. I even pointed out to him that obviously the fact I was not a person of renown, and was a young man in appearance, aided me to come to him inconspicuously and without risk of suspicion and he agreed emphatically, seemingly with renewed confidence in me. It was plain to see he now looked on me as a typical American, the out-and-out type with nothing to hide and willing to place his cards on the table.

I then explained to him that I had with me a highly confidential paper which outlined something in which he might be very interested; I warned him beforehand that what he read on that paper in no way represented the official views of the U.S. government; that the actual paper itself had been a plain piece of paper with no letterhead or any type of official marking.
I said that the message on that paper had merely been typed and that there was nothing on it to prove it came from any official U.S. gov't source or any other source; that if its contents were divulged no proof could ever be offered as to its source, and that he had only my word to vouch for whether it represented anyone's true opinions or not. I said that I had not written it, but that I was here to find out if he might be interested if the aims and details expressed in that document could be worked out.

I then gave him a magnifying glass and a tiny film - an actual photograph of the paper - and after much difficulty he was able to read it by holding the lens some four inches away from the film. He was tremendously affected. It seemed to me that tears were very close to his eyes. He sat back and closed his eyes for a minute and then whatever reserve he had felt up to that moment broke.

He began to talk. He asked me if there could be any hope that what he had read might be true. He said the time had come when the war must stop. He said he prayed that a just peace would come soon, and that all this horrible bloodshed would stop. He said hundreds of thousands of Germans were homeless, with no place to go, because of Allied bombings. He said all Europe was threatened with Communism. He seemed then to catch himself, and immediately I began to talk myself.

I told him that I and every American, like him, wanted this war to stop. But, I said, the war will never stop and the bombings will never stop and the suffering will never end until Hitler and Nazi Totalitarianism have been expelled from Germany. As I said that, he
nodded, as in confirmation. Watching his face closely, I said that
the average American had no hatred for the German people, but that
they did hate Hitler. That I hated Hitler. I hated what he had
done to Germany, to its culture, its art, its very life. As I said
this, I tried to say it with every ounce of sincerity I could. I
said it again, and I could feel him respond; several times he nodded
in agreement, and his eyes never left mine.

I said that there was a chance of peace for Germany, a just
peace, a peace that would not again be based on terms like those in
the Versailles treaty, but I said Americans felt, and America felt,
that it was now up to the Germans to clean their own house, to GET
RID of Hitler, and Goebbels, and Goering and Himmler and the rest of
the criminals who had brought Germany to the state she was now in.
Not once did he interrupt while I impressed on him our hatred for
Hitler.

I then told him in a quiet tone that I knew Germany and loved
Germany; that many Americans knew and loved his country and some day
hoped to live in peace with Germany; that our aim was peace not for
just another twenty or thirty years, but a hundred, even two hundred
years. He said he, too, knew America, that he had many friends in
America and had never wanted to feel any hatred towards America. But
he said, our bombs are instilling in the Germans a hatred toward
Americans that had never been there before; that he hoped they could
be stopped before this hatred got deep, that up to the present the
Germans mainly blamed the British.

DECLASSIFIED
He then said our propaganda was wrong, that Americans seem to think all Germans are Nazis. That, he said, was not true. He said that if Americans only hated the Nazis, they should offer some hope to the Germans who were NOT Nazis; that now the Germans are afraid that they will all be included in the revenge that had been promised to them by us and the British.

I told him we knew very well that not all Germans were Nazis, and that was why I had come to him. I said that it was commonly believed in America that he hated Hitler and the Nazis; that it was believed that he was one of the few great statesmen left in Germany and that if anyone could lead the Germans out of the mess they were in, he alone was the man. He was pleased at this. Then he said in an apologetic tone that books and the cinema and rumor had painted him in colors that were not true, always stressing mainly what he did as a captain in World War I. He asked me if I could possibly believe he, as a captain, could really have done all the things he was accused of doing.

He said people gave him credit for too many black deeds that in the first place, he had never been in a position of authority to perform, as a mere captain. He said such wild things had been written and said about him that he had not even taken the trouble to issue a denial, that he felt it was beneath him to try to refute irresponsible journalists. He said in the last war his position had been different and after all, whatever he did, he did in behalf of his country, as any American would do in behalf of the U.S.A. He said if he had been able to remain in power as Chancellor that this war would never have
come about. He said that surely anyone who knew his career as a leader in Germany did not need to be told how he objected to Hitler's rise to power. "Unfortunately," he said, "Hindenburg was too old and he was not able to take the strong measures needed. "And then," he continued, "came Scheichler. As a result, I found it necessary to continue to serve Germany as best as I was permitted.

I said: "But, sir, you are the one man who can reform a new Germany. You are respected, not only in your own country but throughout the world, as one who has Germany's interests foremost in your heart." While he made no comment to this, it was obviously what he wanted to hear. I told him that he, with the possibility of again becoming the leader of a postwar Germany, now had the opportunity to hasten that day; that what America wanted was the immediate elimination of Hitler, either his capture or death. I said I wanted to make myself perfectly clear; that if some way could be found whereby he could help achieve that objective, America was prepared to help in many different ways. I told him that if Hitler should suddenly be flown by plane out of Germany to a spot under American control, like Iceland, or No. Africa, or even No. Ireland, a reaction might set in in the U.S. such as was occasioned when Mussolini was suddenly removed from the Italian scene. I hammered this home. I said "You have seen how America welcomed Italy as a new ally and how just her treatment of Italy has been since she surrendered." I said Italy will again be a great nation in the world. I pointed out how hatred for the Italians largely dissipated in the U.S. and England once the balloon had been pricked and the main object of their hatred, Mussolini, no longer figured in the picture.
I told him that the same thing not only might but probably would happen in the U.S. once Hitler were out. He asked me what would happen to Hitler, if such a thing should happen as, for instance, Hitler should be delivered into the hands of the Americans. I said I had no idea, but that I thought, as in the case of Hess, he would probably be treated as a prisoner of war in accordance with his former rank as head of a state, and confined in a safe place away from mob violence until such time as he could be accorded justice and tried by a court to be established after the war. He then made a strange remark: he said there was a great fear in Germany over the prospect of the many leading figures being unjustly tried by a postwar court comprised of representatives of the United Nations; that it was only just that these leaders be tried by German courts, that German justice formerly had always been correct and fair. I asked him if he thought the Nazis would have permitted American or British courts to try Roosevelt or Churchill if they had won the war. He did not reply.

I again made it very clear to him that if he knew of any possible way to hasten the fall of Hitler, he could count on every assistance from America. He asked him if he fully understood what I was implying, and he replied he did, but that obviously at that moment he was not able to give me any sort of answer.

At least three times he brought up the matter of our demand for unconditional surrender, and nothing less than that. He said that this was being pounded into the minds of the Germans and that
perhaps even those who might care to hasten the peace were afraid to do so in the face of that prospect. I told him that from my knowledge of America and its leaders, he could count on hearing our demand for unconditional surrender to the very day our army marched into Germany; that this did not mean there was no hope for Germany, far from it. That America and our great President, Mr. Roosevelt, knew that a lasting peace could not be achieved without Germany once again assuming her place in the lineup of the United Nations and the democracies. But that it would have to be a new type of Germany, and one with which we could enter into economical negotiations honorably and with complete trust.

He asked me if I thought America planned to keep a standing army in Germany after the war, if America planned to police Europe. I told him again I had no idea, that that it was believed, and I believed, that definitely, yes, America would maintain an army in Germany for a long period, long enough surely to insure that a lasting peace was hastened and to guard against any anarchy that might break out. It is my definite impression that this was exactly what he hoped and wanted to hear.

He asked me if I thought Mr. Roosevelt would care to deal with him, personally. I said that was something I naturally could not answer, that it was conceivable everything in the future, as far as the President was concerned, and insofar as he himself was concerned, depended on what he did in our favor to help bring the war to a quick conclusion by ridding Germany of its present government. I said, "Mr. Roosevelt is a great statesman, the leading
statesman in the world today." He replied: "Yes, he is a great man.” He then said he doubted if Churchill would ever want to deal with him. "I got along very well with Chamberlain," he said, but Churchill and Chamberlain are two different types of men.

He then referred again to the bombing of Germany, which he characterized as "horrible". He said we could not hope to gain by this means. He said that only 10 per cent of Germany's war production has been affected by the bombing. He said "it was the innocent people who are suffering today."

He said he would like to talk for a minute about Italy. "Why," he asked, "did you insist on unconditional surrender from Italy?" I said I thought that should be apparent. He said it was a great mistake. He said if we had been content merely to make Italy a non-belligerent neutral, Germany would have withdrawn her forces from Italy and not attempted to defend it. He said, as it was, Germany was compelled to resist in Italy. I told him that any choice other than demanding unconditional surrender would have been ridiculous, from a military standpoint; that we needed Italy's airbases from which to bomb both Germany and Occupied Europe; and further, that we knew we would soon have all of Italy and that Germany had never tasted an onslaught of bombing such as she would soon have to face once we had all of Italy in our possession. I said it seemed so needless to continue this terrible waste of Germany's and our own men, when the conclusion of this war could be speeded if only he could aid in bringing about the collapse of the Nazis.
He said that the people of Germany believed, and perhaps rightly (1) that the war was forced on them, and yet they alone stood in the way of Communism from sweeping Europe. He said that the Germans could not understand why the democracies were not awake to that danger. I said that he knew America well enough to know that Americans had no sympathy for Communism, as such. He said our bombings of cities like Hamburg was doing more to spread Communism in Europe that anything else, not only in Europe, but in Germany itself.

He asked what I thought the coming Moscow conference was for. I told him I had not the slightest idea but that it presumably was to reaffirm our friendship with Russia, to plan further military moves that would lead to the defeat of Germany, and possibly even to sign documents attesting to that fact. He said he thought we and the British were blind, and that any documents signed would be worth just what the Russian-German treaty was worth. And then he threw in a warning that some day we in America and England may wake up to find that the Nazis have signed a separate peace with Russia, and then where will we be? He said he had just finished reading Davies' book about Russia, that Davies had become a Russo-phil and that he was dangerous to America for that reason.

He concluded the interview by asking me if he could meet me again after having a chance to think over what we had been discussing, and suggested a meeting in two days. I told him I must leave in two days and requested that he arrange a meeting for to­mor­row. He agreed and said he would arrange that we meet on an
island in the Marmara, Krinkipe, where our mutual contact, Pesth, had a house. He said that he would sail to the island in his own boat to avoid being followed.

As we rose to leave, he took me by the arm and said: "You cannot realize how seriously affected I am by this talk with you. A man in my position has a great weight to carry and many troubles. I will think of what you have said to me and will try to give you an answer to take back with you to America."

He said there had been several attempts on his life and that it was very dangerous for both of us to meet. He asked me to be careful, and never permit a word of our conference to reach anyone except President Roosevelt, whom he trusted.

I asked him about the car which was stationed near the front gate of the embassy. He said the car had men in it whose job was to protect him, and that if I had made an attempt against his life, they had orders to shoot me. But he told me I had nothing to worry about.

As we were about to shake hands and part, he again took my arm and pulled me over to a large map on the wall. "Look at that great space," he said, indicating Russia, "think what industrial havoc they can do, and what they can do to all Europe."

With that, he grasped my hand very firmly, smiled and said he would look forward to our meeting tomorrow, at which time he would return my magnifying glass and try to give me a message to take back to America.
He then opened the door, and I stepped into the hall, again trying to appear very German. He said a few words in German to Rustow, who joined me in stiff bows to him, as we made our exit.

Our return to the same waiting taxi, and subsequent ride back to Istanbul was without comment on my part or Rustow's, and without incident. The interview with Von Papen lasted an hour and five minutes.
THE FOLLOWING NOTES WERE WRITTEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING:

My second meeting with Von Papen lasted an hour and a half and differed from the first in that Von Papen was eager to talk and spoke freely, without hesitation, and apparently with complete confidence in me.

He opened the conversation by telling me that he had devoted many hours of thought to what we had discussed yesterday and had prepared some notes, which he showed me, consisting of three pages in his own handwriting. He said he would not give these to me, since I likewise had not given him anything in writing attesting to our meeting, but that I was free to take any notes myself on what he had to say, with one reservation: that I was to show them to no one other than the President. He said his message to me this afternoon was for the President, that he wanted me to see him, and explain to him just what he, Von Papen, felt and what he proposed.

He dealt first with the points brought up in the film which I gave him yesterday. He also asked if he might retain the film and I told him, certainly. He returned my magnifying glass which he borrowed yesterday.
He said he wanted to stress that he was "first and foremost, a German patriot." That his life had been devoted to his country and that his country, not its government, came first.

Re paragraph 1 of the outline I gave him, he said the word "dominate" was wrong—that the real Germany that represented the German people did not want to "dominate" Europe; that tradition and history showed that Germany had never wanted to "dominate" Europe, politically.

He said he thoroughly approved of a Federation of the European states in the post war world, and as a German, he felt Germany should be permitted a role of leadership in the economics of Europe. But, he said, there should also exist a fair economical understanding between all the states, which should be considered as more important than anything political; that a Federated government of Europe should have time to give proof that a mutual understanding existed economically, and that later should come any discussion of political disputes or treaties.

He said he felt Austria was and is German and must remain German, that the people of Austria would so choose if given a chance to decide by themselves. That Austria never again should be placed in the hands of the Hapsburgs. He made a gesture as if dismissing the Hapsburgs as not worth considering.

He said that the Sudetenland part of Chech territory should have autonomy, as after Munich.
Regarding Poland, he said he believed the frontiers of 1914 should be restored, that the "hated" corridor should be eliminated; that Poland should be given an outlet to the sea near Liebaw; but that the province of Posen should be given back to Germany to which it had belonged.

He said he felt there should be no trouble arranging a peace with France, which should be restored to the French intact. As for Alsace-Lorraine, he felt that some arrangement could easily be effected with France whereby perhaps a division could be made, possibly based on a just plebiscite.

He said he felt the Ukraine was needed by the new Europe as a "food larder", that the Ukraine should perhaps be made an independent state, allied by common treaty with Europe, but definitely with Europe and not with Russia, or under any Asiatic influence. That the Ukraine should be independent and merely serve the purpose of a granary to feed Europe's populations, all countries on a fair and equal basis.

He said that in the postwar Europe, there should be no fight for markets. He said that there should also be no fight between Germany and America, or Germany and Britain for markets.... that Germany needed our products (citing automobiles) and we needed hers, as chemical products, photographic apparatus, etc.

Re the paragraph in the outline dealing with Japan, he dismissed Japan with an expressive wave of his hand, saying
Germany had no interest whatever in Japan.

He said the postwar oil situation was important to Germany; that he hoped it might be possible for Germany to get a concession in the Pacific area now under Japanese control, and perhaps also a concession in the Pacific that would serve Germany as a source of supply for at least a minimum quantity of rubber; but he said that the question of colonies should not stand in the way of peace, and that Germany, under a new government, would be prepared to let a just peace conference decide her need in that respect.

He said his interest and that of other leaders of Germany, who were not Nazis and did not approve of the Nazis, was to safeguard the economical, and to whatever extent possible, the political existence of the German people, certainly not the present government of the German people, for the German people could not be included in that government.

He then turned to a general discussion of other subjects, on which he made the following remarks:

Again referring to a Federation of European states, Von Papen said he sincerely believed this was not only possible, but, from Germany's standpoint, desirable. That he would like to see
the capital in Berlin, of course, but this was not essential; that representation in the Federation should be according to population, on some such lines as our House of Representatives. He repeated again that Germany, the pre-Hitler Germany and the post-war Germany, had no wish to "dominate".

He said he himself knew, and that it was known by the German people, that they had no hope of winning the war; further, that even the Nazis knew it. He warned that the Nazis were still capable of tricks, and suggested it was even possible that when Russia reached the point of invading German territory, some "Red" general might try to pull a 'coup d'etat and, salvaging what he could of the German army, make a deal with the Russians and go over to their side in order to share in the Communist sweep of Europe. He said this 'could' happen one day! That that was why we must have an immediate peace, as soon as it could be arranged, to forestall such a catastrophe, that would not only cause ruin to the German people and Europe, but also to America's and England's aims and desires for a lasting peace.
He said 'success breeds success,' and that already some Nazi leaders are gazing admiringly on what Communism had been able to do for Russia, and that they even admired Communism in many respects and felt that it might even be a better system than their own, and worth imitating. He said Germany was now in the position that Russia was when the war between Russia and Germany began.

Von Papen again said our bombings of Germany were doing more to spread Communism inside Germany than anything else ... that hundreds of thousands of people are homeless; that in their condition of despair, they were already turning to communism as their "hope;" that they were saying to each other: "it works." When I mentioned that Hamburg had been a communistic center in Germany before the war, he agreed and said "Look at Hamburg, as an example of that." He said Hamburg is completely ruined and the destruction is 'terrible,' as is the suffering. He begged that we stop this horrible bombing, that it was not necessary for us to win the war, that our leaders should realize that they were doing more harm than good. He then went on, temporarily losing control of his feelings, and said the German people were not behind the Nazis, that they were beginning to feel that the Allies must be even worse than the Nazis, if they continued this ruthless bombing. That we had a real chance to do good propaganda by showing that our hatred of the Nazis was not directed at the German people themselves. That our radio and our press should not include the German people and the Nazis as one, that they should refrain from so doing in order to inspire a hope in the German people when they so badly need it.
Von Papen said with every show of sincerity that the war must stop; pounding the table hard, he said that homeless people who were without hope and who were suffering deeply, could only mean inevitable anarchy in Europe; that the working classes who were hit most were a people who could easily follow the communistic banner later.

Again referring to the future peace, he said he hoped America and Britain would keep an armed force in Europe for a long enough period to guard against anarchy and to preserve law and order, but that he personally doubted if the democracies could ever be convinced of the necessity for doing this. He said also that he hoped peace terms would permit Germany to maintain some army to keep guard on her east wall against the Russians; that such a guard would have to be maintained to save Europe, and that Germany wanted to do this as her share, and to protect herself.

He said he feared, and most of all, the German people feared another Versailles treaty with its 14 points. He bitterly condemned the Versailles treaty and said it was only because of its unfair terms that the German people had ever been swayed to fall in line behind Hitler. That up to the time that Hitler came to power, Germany had tried to be a model nation, under his leadership and that of von Hindenburg. That they had tried, but failed, because the German people were deprived of what they considered their rights and were easily won over by Hitler when he promised to regain them for them.

Once when von Papen was talking about the Nazis, he smiled broadly and said there were many people in Germany who called them
'animals,' including his family! (His family were with him, waiting for him on their boat while he talked to me). He told me he had told them he had to "discuss some business matters."

He said the German people were NOT behind the Nazis, as we in America seemed to feel; that they would gladly expel them if given the chance, and would welcome a new government, if this new government could give them any hope of releasing them from the stress to which they were now submitted.

Von Papen said another mistake Americans made was to put Nazis and Prussians in the same category. That a Prussian officer learns to be a gentleman, to love his family, learns honor and discipline, and learns to live as a 'poor man,' and not try to get rich, like the Nazis! He said we were making a 'grave mistake' to class them together.

Once our conversation touched on Turkey, and he said Turkey would never enter the war on the German side, that that fact was recognized even by the Nazis, and that Turkey had never been on the German side.

He said that Germany, even though she was led by misguided leaders, had succeeded in staving off Communism, and that he had heard that the British referred to Germany's eastern army as a British Expeditionary Force. I said that I had heard it said in America it was a question of "dog eat dog," and said "if you'll excuse me" and he laughed heartily.

He said the chief fear of the German people was that
Germany would be carved into little states; he admitted, when I pointed it out, that the Italian people had fared well at the hands of the Allies, but said it would have been better from a propaganda standpoint if we had told them before that their fate would not be severe, as then they could have weakened Mussolini easily from within; that Bagdolio’s coup d’etat was easier than the Italian people had ever expected it would be.

I then told him again that my visit would be a complete failure if he could not give me a message to take back to America that would show some way whereby he and Germany were anxious to end this war by an act of their own from within. I said only one thing would ever satisfy the American people, and that was for Hitler to be forcibly ejected from Germany, along with his cohorts, and if possible delivered into the hands of the American people. I told him that the whole war psychology of the American people would be greatly affected if some day a plane landed in Iceland or No. Africa with Hitler, and perhaps Goering, Himmler and Goebbels on it, signifying the removal from the German scene of the top Nazis. That only by their removal could America ever consider discussing a peace with Germany. I told him bluntly that I was there to ask that he bring this about.

He replied very gravely that this was asking a great deal of him. That he realized it was a job that had to be done by the German people themselves. That it had to be done from within and could not be done from without. He said, too, not to forget that
there were many Hitler supporters, especially among the youth, and that his death or removal would have a great and questionable effect on them. That "changing horses in mid-stream" was not easy, and was especially delicate in time of war.

Finally he said that to overthrow Hitler would be difficult, but he thought it could be done. He said this most thoughtfully, and seriously.

BUT, he said, for him to stir revolt in Germany and for him to convince "his friends" that the time had come to throw out Hitler and the Nazis, he must have something to "offer" to those friends, something definite and "solid" and based on a sacred understanding. He asked me directly: "If there were to be a new government in Germany, would America and Britain be willing to make peace?" I said I couldn't say, but I thought it all depended on the government formed, and more that that, depended on the Nazi leaders, including Hitler, being delivered into actual Allied hands. That unless this were done, there would always be a suspicion in America and England that Hitler and the others were in hiding somewhere, and that they might be living, even if they were reported dead ... that their physical persons must be in the hands of the Allies before any such story would be believed.

I asked him directly if he personally were ready to aid the Allies in getting rid of Hitler. He said that depended on whether President Roosevelt was prepared to offer him a promise of peace that would be attractive enough to "his friends" to support him in
that effort. He said he MUST be able to give them an incentive, something concrete that promised a future for Germany that would not be as harsh as unconditional surrender with all its harsh implications. I said, suppose that can be arranged, will you THEN do your utmost to get rid of Hitler and the Nazis? He replied very simply, yes.

He said that he had the highest respect for the President, and knew he could trust him to live up to his word. That if I, or some other envoy of the President could supply him with proof that we meant what we said in holding out a hope for Germany's future, he would then take steps to bring about what we desired, i.e. a new government in Germany, and a complete ousting of the Nazis.

He said he wanted me to tell the President that he, von Papen himself, was too old for personal aspirations, but that he would be honored to be in charge of the new government of Germany, and that he was looked up to by the German people and trusted as a leader. That he, however, would be willing to aid whatever new government was chosen, regardless whether he personally led it.

I asked him if he would be willing to meet the President, supposing that that could be arranged, or if he would be willing to meet one of our highest leaders, and he said he would be most willing, if it could be arranged, but that it would be very difficult. That his life was constantly in danger, and three attempts had been made already. He then asked me if I thought it might be possible for him to meet Mr. Hull when he returned from the Moscow conference. Then he seemed to think this over, and said no, he felt Mr. Hull was too conspicuous, but that if he were coming to Turkey, he thought it
might be arranged, if I would help.

I told him we were prepared to help him get rid of Hitler in any way he suggested. He said he recognized that no one could help them inside Germany, that they must do it themselves.

I then proposed that if I were to meet him again in—say—a month or five weeks, with a definite assurance from the President along the lines he wanted, would he fulfill his part and effect this change of government in Germany. He said that he would leave for Germany during my absence in the states, or in any case, would get in touch with his "people" and return to Turkey with a definite plan of action to accomplish what he and we mutually desired. He said: "Tell your President that I will leave to contact my people in Germany. Tell him that I must have something definite to offer them. Tell him that I will do my best and that I believe we will have success."

I told him, if he would do that, I felt my mission had been a success. He smiled and shook hands warmly and said again he must ask my complete confidence as any disclosure of our conversation to anyone other than the President might lead to his death. He said that he trusted me, and that I must be very careful, and that in turn I could trust him without reservation not to disclose to anyone what had taken place between us. He said he hoped to meet me again in four or five weeks.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

My dear Miss Tully:

Enclosed is a memorandum for the President on the subject of OSS Activities in the Far East. We shall very much appreciate your bringing it to his attention.

Very sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton  
Acting Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OSS activities in the Far East.

General Donovan has requested in a cable from New Delhi, dated 14 December 1943, that the following information concerning OSS activities in the Far East be communicated to you.

"OSS has made arrangements with the Chinese to establish a special Joint Intelligence Service aimed at Japan and territory controlled by Japan. Subsequently I discussed the arrangement with the Chinese Minister of War and secured his and the Generalissimo's approval. We have informed General Stilwell in detail.

"To the satisfaction of General Stilwell and Admiral Mountbatten, OSS has established missions with both SEAC and CBI."

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director