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Subject File

PSF: OSS: Donovan Folder

Box 167
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
22 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to give the enclosed to the President? I am sure he will be interested in this most recent report from our Bern office.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching a copy of radio telephone communication just received from our Bern office concerning conditions in Germany.

This is an excellent job of reporting, and I believe that it will be of interest to you.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

18 September 1944

#211

FROM: Berne (via radiotelephones)

TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

GS 1  

PRIORITY

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RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

Good source reports SS contact; leftist elements here regarding underground movements being organized in Germany. Large stocks of food and munitions are already stored and partisan campaigns against armies of occupation will be waged constantly until the war ends. Public opinion gets tired of it and demands recall of the Allies. Eventually the road will be clear for the return of Hitler. From now on the Nazis in the SS and all young children will be given instruction along Nazi and Communist lines to prepare them for infiltration into leftist movements in all European countries and the spreading of dissension. Camouflage printing offices will supply all SS threatened with persecution by the Allies with false identity documents which are not difficult in view of tens of thousands of bombed out Germans who have no papers at all. The Germans have the following plan for using their officers after the war: They will be given courses in civil engineering specializing in branches with which they are most familiar at present and then sent abroad to seek employment as technicians. In this way they would escape unemployment, could engage in industrial espionage and spread propaganda in favor of defeated Germany.

Neue Zürcher Zeitung telegrammed Berlin correspondents September 15. The grave danger threatening the Homeland has shaken up the journalists in the Rhineland. Their articles have a new and stirring tone, stronger and more prophetic language. No attempt is made to gloss over the deadly seriousness of the situation. The Kölnischer Zeitung of Wednesday strikes a note of almost inconceivable a short while ago. "A year after Dunkirk the British and Americans started their drive from the Channel to the provinces of the Reich. This has taken them 100 days to occupy in organizing the territory as far as the German frontier. They have thrown us back with the steamroller of their planes and tanks. With 3 more air fleets and 10 more Panzer Divisions on our side, no one would doubt that the backs of the invaders would be more frequently seen than the tips of their noses. Alas, it was not to be. A bishop has been borne up by these defeats. The inhabitants have not yet realized that the German Army is no longer on the offensive but on the defensive. Every effort is made and no work is spared to bring home to the Rhinelanders that they must give all they have to hold the territory. Noteworthy that the
press sharply attacks people who capitulate. Allied occupation is painted in the blackest terms. The distress that the British and Americans would bring into the country would be incomparable to the suffering of 1918. The Deutsche Beobachter publishes a special warning to the people who think in the bottom of their hearts it would be best to hoist a white flag. It is pointed out that capitulation would not mean an end of their trial as the Allies would immediately start fighting for the spoils and the 3rd World War would be fought on Germany's back. This is the argument: "What would have happened had the July 20th block been successful? The war for Germany's freedom an our conquest would have stopped. But the new bloody battles for the spoils would be raging. The British an Americans would have marched in from the West and the Russians would be in Berlin. A line of demarcation across the heart of the Reich would mark the limits of the disputed zone. On this side of the line the British could recruit their auxillary army and on the other side the Russians would do the same. Just as in Rumania today the soldiers are fighting on their own soil with the Bolshevists against the friends of their country- so would Germans be fighting Germans on either side of the Reich. We ask you people who want to get out of the war whether you prefer to fight as English legionnaires or members of Stalin's Foreign Legion to standing firm for your Fatherland. The victors have no peace to give us-they have no peace themselves. They are united solely by hatred of Germany. The inimical laws of nature will force them to come to blows with each other as soon as the German barriers which separate them fall. The enemy proclaims that if we capitulate that the field German soldier will be permitted to go home. Our entire divisions are to go over to the enemy and be fed into forced labor. That is what German defeat would mean. German soldiers under Soviet Commissars against brothers under English Commanders. Our men would not have any longer to fight on the West Wall for the security of the Reich but German women would be digging trenches on German soil where their husbands would bleed to death. There is no choice but to fight. The outlook is black indeed but it has this consolation that none can abandon our ship. That is our strength-a nation of 100 million with their backs to the wall is a fountain of greater strength than any of us believe."

Nationalzeitung Berlin correspondent September 17: Goebbels interview in Mainichi Shinbun on total mobilization: The German High Command is firmly resolved to resume offensive operations with its newly organized divisions as soon as the time comes. By no means will it content itself indefinitely with slaying defense tactics. It was toward this end that the country has been completely combed for manpower so as to get the number of divisions Germany needs for new offensive movements. The German armament potential is fully adequate for the equipment of these divisions with modern arms-certainly not inferior and in most cases superior to the enemies' equipment. The divisions demanded by Field Marshall & were actually formed in August. The September quota will be 50% higher than the August quota. The October quota will be no less than that of September. With regard to new weapons
Dr. Goebbels declared on the basis of intimate knowledge of what was being done that they would have a very sensational effect and that the enemy would be kept busy with them for the next few months. There is no shortage of raw materials with which Germany is covered for an indefinite period. Germany cannot be starved out in this field.

*Name of Marshall failed to record.*
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dearest Grace:

Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following intelligence has just been relayed to us from Caserta:

"2 C-47's, with stars on the rudders, landed on Vis Monday evening with Russian Yak fighter escort. Tito left in one of them near midnight for parts unknown, according to information we have received here. Source of information is U.S. Air Command Vis. Major Alston and Colonel Maxwell, British Army, have checked and verified Tito's departure."

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
22 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be kind enough to see that the attached memorandum for the President is called to his attention.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007622
By MAR 8 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 007628
By AB Date MAR 8 1944

I have just received the following message from our Bari Office and I hasten to relay it to you:

"Mihailovich and the National Committee ask to have the following message communicated to the Supreme Allied Command. They propose as follows: (1) The civil war in Yugoslavia should cease at once. (2) All reprisals will end. (3) To enforce these two points, Allied officers should enter immediately. (4) There should be a union of Partisans and Nationals under the Allied command to fight the Germans. (5) Any additional arms and supplies furnished will be for use against the Germans alone.

"Our information is that the military position of Mihailovich in Serbia is now hopeless and that if an armistice cannot be made with the Partisans, the Nationalists will go ahead with guerrilla warfare in Serbia and engage in other and more widespread operations for many months. The Nationalist leaders state that the Partisans are terrorizing Nationalist civilians in territory occupied by the Partisans."

SECRET
You are aware that Reuben Markham, OWI representative for a time in Bari, has written claiming that American arms delivered to Tito are being used by the Partisans against the Nationalists.

Under date of 8 September, this Office sent to you my statement of facts and of policy concerning this matter (Appendix D to Memo: "OSS Activities in Mihailovich-Controlled Areas").

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan  
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received the following report from our intelligence team in Rumania:

"By order Russian Command, all Roumanian planes grounded as of 21st. Following villages taken by the German troops: Bozovici, Anina and Oravita."

William J. Donovan
Director
22 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan
Director
Georgescu, Roumanian Under-Secretary of State for National Economy, and Buzesti, Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, recently related the following concerning Roumanian compliance with armistice terms to our intelligence representatives in Bucharest:

"The Roumanian Government now intends to comply with the armistice terms even though the conditions were not properly discussed with the representatives of the Roumanian people. The Roumanians now intend to carry out all their obligations in a cooperative and willing manner.

"Some of the demands which the Russians have made are unreasonable and are beyond Roumania's ability to fulfill. They are now waiting for the Russian representatives to administer the terms of the armistice. They have been encouraged by discussions with Marshal Malinovski and they have proof that the Soviet Union does not intend to sovietize the country."
“According to Georgescu and Buzesti, 85-95% of the peasants are opposed to communism although there is a fair sprinkling of communists among industrial laborers. They quoted a Russian colonel as having said, 'There are few bona fide Roumanian communists but many opportunists'. This statement was made soon after he dropped into Roumania several months ago.

"The ruble is fixed, by Government order, at 100 lei. The Russians will not give an estimate of the rubles involved and they state simply that the order will continue to be effective until the end of this month at least. Wild speculation goes on, in the meantime, since the ruble goes for as little as 6 lei in the countryside. The government may lose billions of lei at this rate, especially if the order remains in effect for any great length of time.

"The Roumanian armistice delegates are certain that Hungary will be most severely treated by the Russians. They think there is still a loophole, however, permitting a portion of Transylvania to go to the Hungarians for purposes of Bargaining."
"Arrests of the war guilty are going on apace and men of cabinet rank are included. Two were at one time prime ministers of the country. The law, which is called 'The law regarding purification of public departments', has the signature of King Michael. Malinovski indicated his approval when it was discussed with him. The Roumanians are hoping these stern measures will impress the Russians."

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached report of a talk with Neubacher's agent will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622
By MAR 8 1974
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
22 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
By authority of CIA

We have received the following report of a recent
discussion had by a representative of this agency with an
agent of Neubacher, Ribbentrop's Political and Diplomatic
Representative in the Balkans. The agent was not informed
as to the size of the group which Neubacher represents.

The report of the talk with Neubacher's agent
follows:

"A. Neubacher wants to discuss total German sur-
render, but states the difficulty of finding a competent
group of liberals within Germany to discuss the matter
with the Allies and to carry on administrative functions
with the Allies would assign.

"B. He desires Allied troops to be in readiness
for occupation immediately upon surrender.

"C. He claims that Hungary is in danger of an internal
explosion with anarchy seriously threatening.

"D. Northern Jugoslavia is being held only to postpone this explosion which would start trouble within Germany.

"E. There is great interest in preventing anarchy in a region from where it might spread to Germany.

"F. In an effort to hold the Sava line from the east to the west and the Hungarian lines formed by rivers running south to the Danube, the Germans are bringing troops from Greece by highway at night through Smederovo and Nis.

"G. All NorthernJugoslavia being evacuated by the Gestapo."

It is the belief of our representative that if non-Soviet troops held Trieste or Fiume to the Belgrade line, the Germans would allow Allied entry, and that the only impediment to total surrender is the fear of the Germans that the Allies will permit a state of chaos to exist in Germany over an extended period of time.

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Grace:  

I think the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you please see that it reaches desk.  

Thank you.  

Sincerely,  

Bill  

William J. Donovan  
Director  

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of CIA  
007422  
By Date MAR 8 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As indicated by the following message from our Bar office we now have teams in Czechoslovakia:

"OSS Secret Intelligence and Special Operations personnel were landed by plane in Czechoslovakia on September 17. We have already had word from both teams by radio and everything is all right. The operation included as well the landing of 120 Marins and 84,000 rounds of ammunition, 12 Bazookas with 16 rounds each. The 15th Air Force flew the teams in B-17's during the day, escorted by fighters. Czech forces of the interior prepared the reception and arrangements were made through OSS Secret Intelligence, London in collaboration with the Czech intelligence service. On the return trip, the planes brought out 2 British ex-prisoners and 13 Americans."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Miss Tully:

Would you be good enough to place the attached before the President. I am sure he will find it of interest.

Thank you.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
8 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OSS Activities in Mihailovich-Controlled Areas

We relayed to General Donovan your instructions of September 3. He asks that you be informed that word has been dispatched to the field to carry out your orders.

Your instruction to withdraw our "mission" to Mihailovich has been interpreted to include not only the four OSS individuals in that area whose function it has been to obtain strategic and technical intelligence and to infiltrate teams into Central Europe, but also to include the four OSS men who, at the request of the 15th Air Force, were assigned to the command and operational control of the Air Force's Air Crew Rescue Unit in Mihailovich territory.

The British objection to our activities comes at a time when they themselves feel free to drop personnel into Chetnik areas. There have just come to our attention two State Department dispatches, dated 31 August and 2 September from Caserta (Appendix A), which show that Brigadier MacLean, head of the British Mission
to Tito, went into the Mihailovich area a few days ago and is sending out intelligence reports.* In the case of Rumania also, the British sent in teams at a time when they had delayed our presence there by diplomatic representations. While such inconsistent action by the British is undoubtedly the result of bad coordination, it demonstrates the advisability of independence in the field of intelligence where a change of mind on the part of the objecting party alone may give that party a monopoly of first-hand information.

The personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit were requested by the Air Force because of their peculiar knowledge of the country, the language and secret signal equipment. They had already succeeded in evacuating over 200 airmen from Chetnik country and were maintaining a continuous search for others who had been downed. In Greece and Rumania we are doing similar work and have been instrumental in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 airmen from the latter country within the last few weeks.

* Brigadier MacLean was formerly a Foreign Office representative
We believe that if General Donovan were here he would desire to stress that nothing has been done without agreement of the British, and to give you the facts concerning his talk with Marshall Tito about this matter.

At a meeting on August 11 with Tito, General Donovan informed him through Brigadier MacLean (who was present) of the dispatch of an OSS rescue and intelligence team to Mihailovich. At that time Tito nodded his head and voiced no objection, although he said that the men might not have such a good time with Mihailovich and suggested that their names be given to him so that he could advise his troops to protect them in the event of trouble.

General Donovan had earlier discussed with Sir Alexander Cadogan the right of every sovereign nation to have completely independent secret intelligence operations. Sir Alexander agreed with this principle and raised no objection when informed that OSS contemplated dispatch of intelligence units to various parts of the Balkans.

Last June, General Wilson told General Donovan that no intelligence was being received from the Chetnik...
area and that it was urgently needed by the Allies. He not only agreed with the basic principle of independent American secret intelligence operations and approved General Donovan's proposal to dispatch an intelligence team to the Chetniks but urged that this be done. General Donovan wrote you of this talk on July fourth and on the sixth of July discussed the matter with you in person. On that same day, he cabled the field of your approval to send an OSS intelligence unit into the Mihailovich area.

Shortly thereafter, efforts were made to parachute OSS personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit. On the night of 2 August, one officer and two enlisted men were successfully dropped to make arrangements for the evacuation of the airmen with Mihailovich.

On 3 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of General Donovan's talks with General Wilson and of OSS plans to send teams into the Balkans (an earlier memorandum to the JCS on this subject had been returned by its secretariat to be revised and expanded). The 3 August memorandum recited your oral approval and General Donovan's directions to the field for the dispatch of
teams into Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries (Appendix B).

On the fifth of August (three days after the air rescue personnel had been dropped under the directions issued at the time of your earlier oral approval) a White House memorandum was received containing written withdrawal of your April objection with the request that the matter be cleared with the State Department and the JCS. The State Department was called immediately and informed us that their previous clearance still stood. The memorandum from the White House was shown to a member of the JCS secretariat, who was also told of the prior dispatch of the rescue team.*

Meanwhile, the rescue team had completed its arrangements and on the tenth and eleventh of August more than 200 airmen were flown out. The last reports we have indicate that a considerable number of wounded airmen still remained.

Indications of increasing Allied ground and air activity in Yugoslavia underline the necessity for independent American intelligence of all kinds from this

* At this time it was thought in Washington that the air crew rescue personnel were under direct OSS control, and it was not until later that copies of the official orders were forwarded to Washington informing us that this personnel had been transferred to the command and operational control of the 15th Air Force Air Crew Rescue Unit.
area, which is still the only accurate source of information on the highly equivocal question of alleged Chetnik collaboration with the Germans. This territory is also of real importance at this particular time because of its strategic situation as a jumping-off place for projecting intelligence teams into Germany, Austria and other parts of Central Europe, and for counter subversive action against German underground movements. In fact, an intelligence team had already been dispatched into Austria from there; others had been planned.

Attention is respectfully directed to Ambassador Murphy's letter of July 1, 1944 to the Secretary of State with enclosures (Appendix C). The Ambassador's letter indicates his hope that American personnel to be used in Chetnik areas for air rescue purposes might also provide intelligence of a military or general character. The enclosed memorandum to Ambassador Murphy from his Special Assistant, Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, on this subject, contains two paragraphs we believe to be worth quoting:

"Our policy is to give support to anyone willing to kill Germans - a corollary might be - or forward the war effort. The expeditious recovery of these airmen is certainly forwarding..."
the war effort. Moreover, although we will to some extent be "recognizing" Mihailovich by the necessity of having to ask his cooperation, we will not be aiding him in any material way."

"I conclude - and Norden concurs - the lives of American airmen and the military advantage gained by their recovery overrides any objection the British might have on political grounds."

The State Department has never objected to having an intelligence unit with Mihailovich and, indeed, is anxious for information from that area. In a parallel case, that of Greece, where the British had ordered withdrawal of our personnel without previous notice to us, the State Department's only concern was that we have personnel with Zervas as well as EAM/ELAS in order to avoid political implications which might arise from the presence of personnel with one group and not with the other.

In accordance with the mandate imposed upon us by the JCS, every effort has been made by OSS in its activities in the Balkans to avoid political involvement. The attached message from General Donovan, reviewing our position vis-a-vis both Tito and Mihailovich
demonstrates that scrupulous care has been taken to avoid commitments that may in any way be misinterpreted (Appendix D).

In conclusion, we have been asked by General Donovan to state that if you wish to have us continue the assignment of our personnel to the 15th Air Force for the rescue of American airmen in Mihailovich territory, he would appreciate word to that effect.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
UTTH
September 5, 1944

(Yugoslavia: Chetnik's are aiding enemy)

Caserta
August 31, 1944

MacLean went into the Mihailovic area a few days ago and he now reports to AFHQ that the Chetniks are aiding the Germans actively and are keeping the Partisans from making the most just now out of the German confusion. It is entirely possible that the military gain which the Allies should make from the fall of Bulgaria will be lost. The civilians do not understand very clearly what is involved and some of them are hindering operations, under the impression that the Chetniks have Allied support.

Brigadier MacLean is of the opinion that an Allied source should say something official on this subject. He suggests that General Wilson make the statement. MacLean has wired a proposed text of this to AFHQ which he asserts is harmless, saying to more than other official declarations have said. It makes clear that some of the Chetnik groups have been aiding actively the Nedic and German units who are seeking to disarm the Bulgarians. The Chetniks have even aided the enemy in their assaults on the JANL. The Nazis receive benefit from this. The JANL is the only force in Yugoslavia which is supported by the Allied and those troops or guerrillas who aid the enemy will receive no Allied aid in any shape or form.

The Brigadier wants this statement published at once. He
thinks it should be put on the air in Serbo-Croatian by certain radio stations and that it should be dropped in leaflet form. The same leaflets can be distributed also through the cooperation of the Partisans and the British Liaison group. At the close of his report MacLean says that Tito is winning over more and more of the Chetnik rank and file.

MURPHY
Brigadier MacLean has sent word to SAC that in Mihailovic's area where he was dropped a few days ago Bulgarian forces are providing the Germans with valuable assistance by maintaining themselves along the chief communication lines and resisting actively the efforts of the Partisans to reach and cut these lines. The motive of the Bulgarians doubtless is to protect their own avenues of retreat to their frontiers, but by this action the Germans are securing precious time for stabilizing their positions.

MacLean's message then proposes that prior to the making of any agreement with the Armistice Mission from Bulgaria, which at present is in Cairo, that Mission should agree to see that instructions are sent at once to the Bulgarian forces in Serbia and Macedonia, pending their withdrawal, either to begin to cooperate with the Partisans or in any case to offer no hindrance to the latter's operations, as these are regarded by the Allies as highly important and forming part of the current concerted plan. The message ends by stating that while it is obviously not in the Partisans' interests to have the Bulgarians remain on Yugoslav soil, the Partisans are obliged to regard them as outright enemies as long as they behave as such.

It may be noted that MacLean has wired to General Gammell of AFHQ word that he has been in touch with General Popovic and that Popovic has undertaken to destroy the Kraljevo-Skopljec.
Nish-Sofia, and Nish-Skeplje railroads in connection with the forthcoming offensives.
MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Dispatch of intelligence and air search teams into Balkan countries

REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum to JCS from OSS dated 12 July 1944 relating to OSS dispatch of intelligence team into Rumania

(b) JCS 714

(c) Memorandum from Secretary, JCS to OSS dated 8 April 1944, relating to representative with Mihailovich

1. By Reference (a) information was given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning conversation with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson on 23 June 1944. General Wilson stated that the Office of Strategic Services was right in its position with reference to dispatch of clandestine agents for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. He said we were entitled (as were the British) to undertake to dispatch such teams to Balkan areas without consultation with anyone. The British had not only sent a team into Rumania (from which we had been temporarily barred by diplomatic action of the British) but intended to send an intelligence team into the Mihailovich area. General Wilson also thought we should aid him in search for American pilots known to be in that area.

2. While control of this organization's intelligence and morale subversion operations rests only in the United States

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 21 1975
Commanding General (JCS 714), the statements of General Wilson are pertinent because it was through British representations that our earlier efforts to send teams into these areas were delayed or prevented.

3. Upon my return to this country I informed the President of these conversations. The President orally withdrew his earlier directive against sending teams to the Mihailovich area, Reference (c), and gave me his oral approval to send intelligence and air search teams into this area.

4. The United States Commanding General in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Jacob L. Devers, has approved the dispatch of intelligence teams into the Balkan countries. I have therefore directed that teams be sent into Rumania, Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries for clandestine intelligence and air rescue purposes. This does not, of course, apply to our operations activities, or communications concerning them; we shall, as in the past, continue to coordinate these activities with the British under control of the Theater Commander.

William J. Donovan
Director
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a secret memorandum
dated June 19, 1944, from Major General H. F. Sinclair, Commanding
General, 15th AAF, to the Commanding General, AEF/AAF, regarding
the evacuation of USAF personnel from Serbia which is referred to
in my SITG, June 20, 4 p.m. In that connection I also enclose
a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Frederick W. Herrick, dated June 20,
1944, on the same subject.

I have discussed this matter with Generals Eaker and Eisenhower
and I understand that there is every intention to implement the
plan to put an American mission into Mihailovic territory for the
purpose stated. It would be hoped, of course, that such American
officers as might be designated for this purpose would, as an incident
to their purpose of rescuing American airmen, provide whatever
information of a military or general character that might come to
the attention in the course of their regular routines.

Respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy,
American Ambassador.
Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum dated June 19, 1944, from Major General H. F. Twining, Commanding General, 15th AAF, to the Commanding General, AAF/MTO.

2. Copy of memorandum dated June 20, 1944, from Mr. Frederick T. Merrill to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.

Go to Ambassador MacVoy's, Cairo.

In triplicate.
APPENDIX C (PAGE 3)

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 560, dated July 1, 1944, from the United States Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters.

19 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Evacuation of USAF Personnel from Serbia.

Commanding General, AAF/MTO, APO 660, U. S. Army.

1. A conference was held at this Headquarters 13 June with Majors Greenwood and Greenlee, who were among the last officers of the British mission to be evacuated 30 May from the Mihailovich territory. These two officers had been in Serbia for over a year and were well-informed on conditions there; the following facts were brought out in the conference:

a. The entire area of Serbia that is under Chetnik control is relatively safe for Allied airmen (particularly Americans) who are forced to bail out or crash-land.

b. Mihailovich is extremely friendly to the United States and his people are most hospitable to American airmen.

c. The Chetniks offer little military resistance to the Germans; their first enemies are the Partisans, and after them come the Germans. However, if American airmen fall into German hands in Chetnik territory, it is the policy of Mihailovich's men to fight to rescue them.

d. Mihailovich is now receiving no support from the Allies in the form of missions and supplies. As a result, he is handicapped in essential distressing decisions to his people and indicating to them that some USAF personnel are representatives of the Allies to the Mihailovich government.

e. Although air crews are relatively safe from capture in Serbia, there is no method at this time to evacuate them, since Mihailovich would be unwilling to pass them over to Partisans for air evacuation from Partisan territory or best evacuation at the Adriatic coast.

f. It is believed that Mihailovich would welcome a representative of his headquarters for the sole purpose of collecting aiding, and arranging evacuation of Allied airmen.

g. Since all Force 866 missions have been withdrawn from Chetnik territory, there is no organized radio communication with Mihailovich's headquarters at this time. However, he does have a radio station, and on 12 June a message from him was interpreted, indicating that ten Fifteenth Air Force crew members were at his headquarters and missions for us to arrange evacuation. 12 June interception indicates members for forty airmen.

h. During April, May and up to date in June, about five hundred Fifteenth Air Force crew members have been reported by German and German-backed authorities in Serbia. Since communications have been disrupted among the Chetnik provinces for the last couple of weeks, it may be assumed that a large percentage of these men are still held and unreported in various parts of Serbia.
3. On 28 May twenty-nine Fifteenth Air Force crew members were evacuated by air from Mihailovich's headquarters, along with the British mission officers (including Brigadier Armstrong) who were stationed 28 to 29 May, inclusive. Almost all of these airmen were in good physical condition and they reported excellent treatment by the Cretans.

4. During the coming months, if we continue our bombing offensive in the Balkans, and along the Allied-Rусsian bomb line, it may be assumed that several hundred Allied airmen will bail out or crash-land in Serbia.

5. In view of the above facts, it is recommended that steps be taken to immediately establish a non-political AAF representation at Mihailovich's headquarters for the sole purpose of collecting, aiding, and arranging air evacuation of distressed Allied airmen. A party of seven would be required. Two officers, three radio operators (also trained in cipher), and two landing ground non-coms. The representation should be entirely non-political.

6. The party with all necessary equipment and supplies for initial operation could be delivered to Mihailovich's headquarters with one C-47. In addition to personal equipment, first aid kits, bedding, arms and ammunition, the following equipment would be required:

2 radio sets - Gates 1 Finch Radio Corp. (available at S2S).  
2 spare sets of tubes.  
1 "Tiny Tim" generator (available at S2S).  
1 PR 75 Generator (available at S2S).  
3 6-V batteries (available at S2S).  
1 drum of gasoline for generators.  
3 SCR-536 short-range RT sets.

7. Majors Greenwood and Greenlee can supply a complete list of valuable contacts in the area.

8. This plan has received complete concurrence of S2S, particularly as a result of corroborating information brought back by Lt. Colonel Farish with whom a conference was held 17 June.

9. This plan also has received concurrence of EAF, Air Ops, S2S, Force 266 and "A" Force.

10. It is believed that such a plan, promptly put into action by the Fifteenth Air Force would permit evacuation of practically all Fifteenth Air Force personnel forced down in East Serbia and adjacent territory.

N. F. TWINING,  
Major General, USA,  
Commanding.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MURPHY

SUBJECT: Evacuation of Stranded Airmen from Milosevich Territory.

In addition to the points elaborated in General TWA's letter to General Baker, the following considerations were developed in conversations with officers of the Fifteenth and with the British majors - Greenwood and Greenlee.

1. The estimated cost of training personnel per bomber crew is a quarter of a million dollars. In crude dollars and cents tactics, the recovery of forty bomber crews - the estimated loss over England at the present rate of operations continues to August 1 in time two million dollars. More important, however, is the availability of replacements - a factor which might conceivably affect future operations.

2. The knowledge that there exists a way back greatly raises morale of bombing crews. It also tends to influence pilots from sharing their crews in their efforts to bring home wounded bombers.

3. The British, of course, may object that the sending of a technical mission implies political support and that Milosevich will not interpret it and make use of such a mission for his own purposes. This is partly offset, however, by the fact that Milosevich is already showing off American aircraft and giving the impression of the people that he has American support.

4. Plans are now in a tentative stage to set up a separate plant on the island of Cyprus, sole function of which will be the evacuation of personnel with the cooperation of Milosevich. Establishment of such a plant (Santorini?) is not thought practicable, partly because it will be at a point where the evacuation of personnel is not yet politically feasible. Since it is known that fully armed personnel is needed by Milosevich's forces, a technical mission is highly desirable.

5. It is not believed that Milosevich will demand a gold piece at all stages of this stage, since he will probably find it of greater American sympathy and hence the British will talk all material costs.
9. Our policy is to give support to anyone willing to kill Germans—a corollary might be— or forward the war effort. The vicious recovery of those airmen is certainly furrowing the brow, Moreover, although we will to some extent be “coordinating” his actions by the necessity of having to ask his cooperation, we will not be asking him in any material way.

8. If the press have to be informed, the technical aspects of the mission should be stressed.

9. I conclude—and Morden concurs—the lives of American airmen and the military advantage gained by their recovery override any objection the British might have on political grounds.

(Signed): FREDICK T. MERRILL.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

APPENDIX D

MESSAGE FROM GENERAL DONOVAN, DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1944:

"It is very difficult to reduce the situation in Yugoslavia to simple terms but, in general, the situation remains the same as between Tito and Mihailovich as it has always been."

"To both Tito and Mihailovich we have made clear our position: (1) that we have established mission with Tito with no promise of any kind as to arms, equipment or supplies; (2) We have made clear that we will not support either side in internal political strife although the fact of delivery of supplies by British in which our supplies to British were included may be construed as reputation of this and that in fact such action constitutes material and political support; (3) That we have no political favors to seek and no political commitments to make; (4) That we have established mission with Tito in order more effectively to collaborate with our allies; (5) That our purpose in being in this area is to use it as a base from which we may better project our intelligence teams into Central Europe and more particularly into Germany; (6) That we have established no mission with Mihailovich but that we have placed there joint search parties and intelligence teams for purpose of seeking, assembling and effecting rescue of American pilots and crewmen. This in conjunction with American Air Command. It should be stated that Mihailovich has been most helpful in this respect; (7) That insofar as supplies are concerned the British have had (except for two or three months immediately following fall of Sicily) and continue to have control of supplies and transport; (8) That for first year beginning with deliveries of about 50 tons a month by progressive increase they have now reached in last two months delivery of about two thousand tons a month; (9) That military arms and equipment have been of British type although certain percentage of them which British themselves do not know are made in U. S. (10) That food and clothing supplies have been about 60 percent of American origin mostly delivered to British on lend lease; (11) That in addition between December and early May we delivered to the British from our stores in Cairo between seven and eight thousand tons consisting of plastic, shoes, clothing, trucks which were co-mingled with British supplies. In such allotment were about fifteen hundred Marlin guns which have either been delivered to or are set aside for use of OSS patrols in that area who have encounters with German patrols."

"Consideration should also be given to the fact that as I have already advised you, Subasich is convinced that best opinion

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
APR 21 1975
in Serbia is for elimination of this political warfare between two groups and for organized attack against Germans."

"To summarize: our conduct here has been most punctilious in keeping out of any of this political controversy, no playing any part in whatever conflicting purposes there may be between British and Russians and in avoiding any entanglement in rivalry between Mihailovich and Tito. In any case it must be remembered that we are making use of Yugoslavia as jump-off for work that must be done in coming to grips with Germany in Central Europe. Wisdom of that course is now being demonstrated as appears from intelligence teams that we have already placed or are placing, and by means of which we will be able to carry on our operations. We have done this so far without incurring hostility of either Tito or Mihailovich although each one feels that we should not in any way be working with the other. However within Yugoslavia itself an American soldier can still move without fear of harm in Partisan or Chetnik territory."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested to see the attached summary of a report on Greek political affairs, dated 18 September 1944. The report was prepared by an OSS representative who has been in Cairo for the last four or five months and has recently returned to this country.

William J. Donovan
Director
Among the Greeks in Cairo there is resentment toward the British for their interference in Greek political affairs. This feeling is shared by liberal and conservative elements alike, and it is said to have been caused by British action in arresting individuals in Cairo and Alexandria for security reasons without preferring charges, by severe censorship and distortion of news, and by British control over the Greek Government.

The trials which followed the mutinies of last April resulted in the internment of from six to ten thousand men of the Greek armed forces. After the trials, the British exercised a political screening over the personnel of the Greek forces and discriminated in favor of suitable individuals in facilitating their escape from Greece. This has resulted in the formation of a body of Greek officers with conservative political opinions.

As examples of British censorship, press dispatches have been altered to omit comments against Premier Papandreou and remarks in favor of EAM. Deletions have been made of statements implying excessive interference by the British in Greek affairs and there have been distortions in the published accounts of the courts martial of the mutineers.
The British have also aroused antagonism by their treatment of resistance groups, for it is charged that they have consistently supported weak parties against strong ones and set Greeks to fighting one another. The author of the report suggests the explanation that the British supported EAM until the latter became preoccupied with political ideas rather than with fighting the Germans. Thereafter the British gave their help to anti-German groups; these were also anti-EAM. The British have maintained an ambiguous attitude toward the Security Battalions, which were equipped by the Germans ostensibly to fight Communists, but were used for other German purposes, such as making arrests and searching houses for the Gestapo. It is stated that the British failed to denounce these battalions openly until September, 1944.

The Greeks realize that they must cooperate with the British, and they account for the British course of action on the ground that the British are exerting control in order to maintain a Greek government that is not only stable, but favorable to them. The Greeks feel, however, that the British would do better to retain the good will of the Greek people by giving them greater freedom to change their own government, rather than to control the situation by supporting an unpopular Greek government.
It is stated in the report that British and American officials both deplore the British policy, with the exception of the British Embassy to the Greek government.

The Russians are popular with EAM, but many Greeks are concerned at the prospect of a Pan-Slavic confederation dominated by Russia. In spite of this fear, Russia's conduct toward the Greeks has involved less interference in Greek internal affairs than has been exercised by the British.
Miss Grace Tully
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand this attached memorandum to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe that you will find of interest the following report describing the second and largest in a series of three daylight air operations whereby supplies were dropped to French resistance groups.

1. On 14 July 1944, the 3rd Bombardment Division 8th USAAF delivered 320 aircraft loads of arms and other supplies to seven Maquis groups in central and southeastern France.

2. Designated "Operation Cadillac", the undertaking was initiated by a request of SHAEF to the Commanding General USSTAF and Special Force Headquarters (the Special Operations Branch of OSS combined with British SOE). This request was based upon current intelligence and an estimate of the potentialities of French resistance, furnished by SFHQ.

3. SFHQ agents in the field were instructed to have a radio operator permanently on hand at each dropping point to give immediate and continuous contact. The Maquis were told over clandestine wireless channels that a large daylight
operation would be taking place. However, in the interest of security, they were not told the date, the time, or the number of aircraft. Each Maquis was given a pre-arranged message to be broadcast by the BBC on the evening of the day before the operation. Within an hour of the broadcast on 13 June, all reception grounds but one had replied that they were fully prepared. The other replied in the early hours of the 14th that all was in order.

4. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on 14 July, 349 Flying Fortresses, loaded with 4320 containers of supplies, took off in bad weather with fighter escort from nine airfields in England. After crossing the French coast between Caen and Le Havre, the formation proceeded to a point near Blois in France, where it broke up to cover the seven targets.

5. The weather was clear and the visibility excellent over the targets, which were identified by three bonfires forming an equilateral triangle 200 yards to a side. The supplies were dropped by parachute at 145 miles per hour at heights varying between 500 and 1,250 feet, not an easy task for Fortresses in formation. Despite this difficulty, the dropping was described as extremely accurate.
6. After the drop and while the Fortresses were starting to climb and assume formation, two groups were attacked by German fighter aircraft. Two damaged Fortresses landed in the Normandy beach-head. One crewman was injured. In all, 320 aircraft dropped 3791 containers or 417 short tons of supplies, 93.7 percent of the projected delivery. (The 29 planes which did not participate in the drop were "spares" which were sent back after the formations reached the English Channel) The following total of supplies was delivered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosive</td>
<td>18,379 (lbs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sten Sub-Machine Guns</td>
<td>2,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 mm Ammunition</td>
<td>5,069,100 (rounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades #36</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades #82</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols (50 R.P.G.)</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bren Light Machine Guns</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.303 Ammunition</td>
<td>6,852,368 (rounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>4,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIAT</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIAT Bombs</td>
<td>2,180 (rounds)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Enthusiastic reports were transmitted by the recipients of the supplies:

"Operation unbelievable success hope rest of this month's operations as well".

"Operation yesterday very successful stop over 500 containers already recovered grouped and dispersed stop
"congratulations from us both to you and Air Force for a faultless display which has augmented morale of all".

"Parachutages de jour pleinement reussis. Containers recus avec joie sans nom."

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure: Four photographs of Operation "Cadillac"
THE APPROACH. NOTE SIGNALFIRES
THE DROP
TRAINER (CRAYON)

CONTAINERS ON GROUND
TRAIN (CRAYON)

THE DEPARTURE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just received from our representative in Bucharest the following report which I believe will be of interest to you:

"My staff and I are working daily on the reporting of military intelligence and the exchange of such intelligence between the Russian Command and 15th Air Force in Italy. Our communications are the means through which this military information is transmitted and therefore has the explicit approval of the Russians. Our HQ are used for the coordination of all American military activities here including the Ploesti study group and the air personnel evacuation group. This further strengthens our position and our cover as the Russians have recognized these operations as legitimate and necessary.

"Re the proposed purge from the Romanian Government and Army, and the arrest and trial of Romanian war guilty
persons, this matter is proceeding very slowly. The Romanians have not yet been able to bring themselves to take decisive action in this regard, and it appears probable that the Russians may soon take a hand. Despite the pressure brought to bear by the younger and more vindictive elements in the Government, the Old Guard has succeeded to date in delaying Romanian action, and few important removals from office and arrests of important persons have taken place. Younger elements recognize that unless the Romanians do the job themselves the Russians will do it for them and that the entire Government will suffer. The Old Guard 'does not wish to see bloodshed'. Mr. Maniu recognizes the necessity for removing collaborationists from office but wishes to include collaborators with former King Carol.

"This so broadens the base and raises so many collateral issues that the entire proposal has been stalled. Another difficulty results from the presence in the Government of certain individuals who would presumably be included in any list of war guilty."

[DECLASSIFIED]

William J. Donovan
Director
30 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you kindly hand the attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007422

By MAR 8 1974
October 9, 1944.

Dear Bill:

Ever so many thanks for those interesting stamps which were issued by the Chetniks. I am delighted to have them for my collection.

Always sincerely,

"T.O.R."

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

(The President kept stamps and original of attached memo)
5 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the enclosed stamps will make an unusual item for the President's collection. Will you please give them to him with the enclosed memorandum?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The enclosed stamps were printed in the mountains of Yugoslavia by the Chetniks under General Mihailovic and were sent out by Master Sergeant Michael Rajachich of the Office of Strategic Services with a request that they be forwarded to you for your collection.

Sergeant Rajachich was a member of the three-man air rescue team which we mentioned in our memorandum to you of 8 September 1944. He and his two associates made a night jump into Chetnik territory without reception and were responsible for the evacuation of approximately 200 American airmen, many of whom were wounded and several of whom had been in Yugoslavia since the first Ploesti raid about a year before.

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007622
By Date SEP 10 1974

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Colonel William J. Donovan

sent the attached memorandum to the Secretary, with an expression of his belief that you might be interested in seeing it.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I believe that the following report which we have just received from our representative in Bucharest will be of interest to you:

"Starcea advises that the situation is more critical now than at any other time since the coup. The different political factions in the government are bickering while the country is falling apart. He said that in spite of the fact that the King wants to stay out of politics, it may be necessary for him to interfere and take decisive action to form a strong government. Two more observers agree that this government impasse will not stop until King or the Russians act decisively. It is believed that Starcea may be influencing King to act.

"An American Air Force Colonel motored from Bucharest to Craiova and back on October 1-2. He reports that peasants in the villages and the city inhabitants seem to have enough food.

"Two American Officers who went to Brasov from Bucharest on October 3-4 reported the Brasov stores to be well-stocked and the city prosperous. Russian mounted military police and troops were in the town, but not in the stores. Everybody seemed to behave well, and the general impression was of quiet and order."

DONOVAN

William J. Donovan
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL DONOVAN:

I am sending the enclosed to you for your eyes only. Will you be thinking about this in connection with the post-war period?

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

JUN 1 1972
Dear Mr. President:

It was a kind and gentle thing you did, to send a telegram to Hamilton Bryan, as he lay dying. His wife was able to read it to him before he lost consciousness, and his eyes filled with tears as he understood it. Then he passed into a coma, with occasional moments of delirium in which he was commanding a warship in battle against the Japs at Cavite. He died without pain, swiftly, being spared months of possible agony from cancer.

Yours very sincerely,

John Franklin Carter
REPORT ON BILL DONOVAN'S PLAN FOR POST-WAR SPY INTELLIGENCE.

Bill Donovan's comprehensive plan for a post-war secret intelligence service is, I understand, being forwarded to you for your consideration.

In my opinion, consideration should be given to the probability that the British Intelligence has already penetrated the Donovan organization and is thoroughly familiar with its methods, plans and personnel. If it is continued after the war, its greatest usefulness might be as a means of letting the British think they know what information is reaching us. Since they will be pursuing their own ends, which are not necessarily either hostile to or synonymous with our own ends, reliance should be placed on the alternative method which this Unit, as your suggestion, employed throughout 1941.

This is much less expensive and involves a small and informal central office, adequately camouflaged, utilizing chiefly foreign contacts of American business, with the despatch of occasional "look-see" agents in special circumstances, and with the evaluation of reports entrusted to the State Department working in liaison with the F.B.I., Military and Navy Intelligence Services.

Since post-war trends will discourage expenditure of Federal funds for foreign espionage, I recommend that this other system be given serious consideration. If you should wish, I would like to organize and direct it. In any case, I should like to give any advice and assistance desired by whomsoever you select.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. JUN 1 1972
By N. J. Stewart Date 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

TO TAKE UP WITH THE GENERAL
BOARD FOR THEIR RECOMMENDATION.

F. D. R.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I am attaching a memorandum for the President dealing with the organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

007622
By SEP 10 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your note of 31 October 1944 I have given consideration to the organization of an intelligence service for the post-war period.

In the early days of the war, when the demands upon intelligence services were mainly in and for military operations, the OSS was placed under the direction of the JCS.

Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace.

This will require two things:

1. That intelligence control be returned to the supervision of the President.

2. The establishment of a central authority reporting directly to you, with responsibility to frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy.

I attach in the form of a draft directive (Tab A) the means by which I think this could be realized without difficulty or loss of time. You will note that coordination and centralization are placed at the policy level but operational intelligence (that pertaining primarily to Department action) remains within the existing agencies concerned. The creation of a central authority
thus would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State and other agencies.

In accordance with your wish, this is set up as a permanent long-range plan. But you may want to consider whether this (or part of it) should be done now, by executive or legislative action. There are common-sense reasons why you may desire to lay the keel of the ship at once.

The immediate revision and coordination of our present intelligence system would effect substantial economies and aid in the more efficient and speedy termination of the war.

Information important to the national defense, being gathered now by certain Departments and agencies, is not being used to full advantage in the war. Coordination at the strategy level would prevent waste, and avoid the present confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication.

Though in the midst of war, we are also in a period of transition which, before we are aware, will take us into the tumult of rehabilitation. An adequate and orderly intelligence system will contribute to informed decisions.

We have now in the Government the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed.

William J. Donovan
Director
SUBSTANTIVE AUTHORITY NECESSARY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

In order to coordinate and centralize the policies and actions of the Government relating to intelligence:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a central intelligence service, to be known as the ____________, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his functions and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. Subject to the approval of the President, the Director may exercise his powers, authorities and duties through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.

2. There is established in the ____________ an Advisory Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and such other members as the President may subsequently appoint. The Board shall advise and assist the Director with respect to the formulation of basic policies and plans of the ____________.
3. Subject to the direction and control of the President, and with any necessary advice and assistance from the other Departments and agencies of the Government, the _______ shall perform the following functions and duties:

(a) Coordination of the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government, and the establishment of such policies and objectives as will assure the integration of national intelligence efforts;

(b) Collection either directly or through existing Government Departments and agencies, of pertinent information, including military, economic, political and scientific, concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign nations, with particular reference to the effect such matters may have upon the national security, policies and interests of the United States;

(c) Final evaluation, synthesis and dissemination within the Government of the intelligence required to enable the Government to determine policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and war, and the advancement of broad national policy;
(d) Procurement, training and supervision of its intelligence personnel;

(e) Subversive operations abroad;

(f) Determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the collection of information under subparagraph "(b)" hereof; and

(g) Such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the President from time to time may direct.

4. The __________ shall have no police or law-enforcement functions, either at home or abroad.

5. Subject to Paragraph 3 hereof, existing intelligence agencies within the Government shall collect, evaluate, synthesize and disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as intelligence required by such agencies in the actual performance of their functions and duties.

6. The Director shall be authorized to call upon Departments and agencies of the Government to furnish appropriate specialists for such supervisory and functional positions within the __________ as may be required.

7. All Government Departments and agencies shall
make available to the Director such intelligence material as the Director, with the approval of the President, from time to time may request.

8. The __________ shall operate under an independent budget.

9. In time of war or unlimited national emergency, all programs of the __________ in areas of actual or projected military operations shall be coordinated with military plans and shall be subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Parts of such programs which are to be executed in a theater of military operations shall be subject to the control of the Theater Commander.

10. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the __________, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities and services. The Director shall be assigned, upon the approval of the President, such military and naval personnel as may be required in the performance of the functions and duties of the __________. The Director may provide for the internal organization and management of the __________ in such manner as he may determine.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will find of interest the enclosed photographs of port facilities at Antwerp and Bordeaux.

These photographs are samples of the work which we are now undertaking as part of a program of strategic photography in liberated countries. The program is being carried out with the approval of SHAEF and in conjunction with the Ninth Air Force. To provide full intelligence coverage of selected areas the work has been coordinated with both research and field intelligence. It is believed that the completion of this program will furnish a valuable fund of basic information for future use.

William J. Donovan
Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA

Enc.

007622
By SEP 10 1974
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I think the enclosed memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enc.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On 24 January, after seeing Subasich and Ambassador Patterson, King Peter sent the following letter to Prime Minister Churchill:

"I had a long talk with Dr. Subasich this afternoon. We discussed the next steps. I told Dr. Subasich that if he submitted his resignation and that of his Cabinet, I would entrust him with the forming of the new Government and with the task of concluding the agreement, taking into consideration my proposals. I also suggested that I would then use my best efforts to bring into the Royal Yugoslav Government other democratic political elements.

"I have since talked with him by telephone and he has informed me that he has already held a Cabinet meeting and is giving the Ministers until tomorrow, when he will bring me the definite answer."
"I will not give my consent to the Royal Yugoslav Government to leave London before this situation is cleared up."

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:

On 24 January, King Peter summoned Premier Subasich for new consultations. He again proposed that the Subasich government resign, and suggested that Subasich form a new government to include Yuray Krnjevich and Milan Grol, after which steps would be taken to resolve the King's objections to the Tito-Subasich draft agreement. Subasich consulted with his cabinet and the King's proposals were accepted. A few hours later, however, Subasich informed the King that General Velebit, Partisan military liaison officer in London, had strongly advised Subasich to make no decision pending a reply from Tito, who had been informed of the situation. Although Subasich and his cabinet appear definitely to have been frightened by Velebit's request, they are still inclined to accept the King's proposal. In this connection the State Department communique delivered to King Peter on the evening of 24 January by Patterson has carried considerable weight.

[Signature]
Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
The attached chart illustrates the importance of the Upper Silesia industrial area, the most important cities of which have been captured by the Soviets.
MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

As you probably know, the idea of having a centralized intelligence service, as proposed by General Donovan, has stalled in one of the subdivisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Personally, I think that this is the time to have a definite plan formulated. The difficulty seems to lie in the fear of certain agencies of the government that they will not be permitted to play their part in the proposed setup.

I think that the situation can be clarified if the various agencies are brought together in one room and given an opportunity to make suggestions for or objections to the proposed plan. I really believe that a frank, across-the-table discussion would eliminate some of the difficulties. Among the agencies that should be invited are, of course, the War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice (including the FBI), the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture and other departments that are engaged in collecting vital information concerning political, economic and social conditions abroad. Indeed, it appears that all of the ten executive departments, including even the Post Office, have a part to play in this venture.

If you think that something ought to be done along these lines, the attached memorandum might be sent to Bill Donovan.

RECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 1 1972

CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

April 5, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: MAJOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Apropos of your memorandum of November 8, 1944, relative to the establishment of a central intelligence service, I should appreciate your calling together the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various executive agencies, so that a consensus of opinion can be secured.

It appears to me that all of the ten executive departments, as well as the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission have a direct interest in the proposed venture. They should all be asked to contribute their suggestions to the proposed centralized intelligence service.

"F.D.R." F.D.R.

Original sent to Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services, 4/6/45,
elb

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date 1972
6 April 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the attached memorandum concerning Colonel de Wavrin. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On my return from China I learned of the FBI and Attorney General memoranda concerning Colonel Andre de Wavrin. I immediately consulted studies which we had already prepared on this matter, and I attach appropriate excerpts from a report of our Research and Analysis Branch, dated 11 January 1945. This indicates that the charges against Colonel Passy were made because of political dissension within resistance organizations. In addition I investigated the facts and sent the following cable to our representative in London:

"Can you obtain from British full and complete appraisement of charges that Passy [de Wavrin] was guilty of participation in alleged tortures of French refugees in his inquisitional offices in London and also reason British decorated Passy?"

I received in reply a message stating that the newspaper accounts on which the memoranda of the FBI and Attorney General seem to have been principally based resulted from maneuvering within the French political elements in England. The text of this answer stated:
"Question charges against subject discussed with D. C. of MI-5* personally and with officer in charge investigation. Received categorical denials subject himself had any connection with any Black interrogations. These were conducted by another Branch. Latter concerned with local security while subject with intelligence in occupied France. Linking of subject personally with affair was political maneuvering. Incidents did occur and interrogation centre was closed. Other Allied nations similarly involved in methods normal to continental practice but uncongenial here.

"Discussed reasons for British decoration of subject with C of MI-6* personally who instigated award. Given D.S.O. for valor in field where risked life by going ahead as known to you. Preferred decorate him for military valor rather than give O.B.E. for domestic service as higher award and more fitting soldier."

*MI-5 is responsible for domestic security in the United Kingdom and British possessions. MI-6 is responsible for gathering secret intelligence outside the United Kingdom and British possessions.
From my own knowledge the services of this man have been of value to this country and to our allies. Great Britain has already decorated him twice. I understand that the award to de Wavrin of the Distinguished Service Cross, although recommended by the Theater Commander, General Eisenhower, was not presented because of a State Department objection. In January of this year General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff for SHAEF, discussed this matter with me and told me that General Eisenhower had decided on the award only after the most careful examination under the close supervision of General Smith. Because of the debt we owe to de Wavrin and in the interest of fairness, I should like to place in proper focus the memoranda submitted to you by the Department of Justice. I believe I can do this by giving you the facts which we have ascertained by a careful check.

Colonel de Wavrin is a career officer. At present he is Head of the Direction des Services de Renseignements et Securite Militaire, which has under its cognizance secret intelligence, research and analysis and counter-espionage activities. He was formerly executive head of the Services Speciaux, the French intelligence services. In 1940 he had organized its predecessor, the BCRA (bureau Centrale des Renseignements et
d'Action), and as its executive head directed for four years the FFI's intelligence and sabotage activities in occupied France. Under de Wavrin the BCRA contributed greatly to the success of French resistance, and in April 1944 he was named Chief of Staff to General Koenig, Commander of the FFI. In addition, it is estimated that the BCRA provided to the British and American armies, through OSS and British channels, 80% of the intelligence on which the Normandy invasion was based. It will be remembered American strategic intelligence had been barred for the greater part of the period. (These figures did not hold true in the invasion of Southern France, where the theater G-2 stated: "A rough estimate of the proportion of accepted ground Intelligence supplied by the three Allied agencies shows that 50% was provided by O.S.S., (30% by the S.R. [French] and 20% by I.S.L.D. [British])."

In August 1944 (when General Patton through the O.S.S. Detachment asked the FFI to serve as infantry to protect the flank of his armored divisions) Colonel de Wavrin parachuted into an area almost entirely held by Germans in order to assume personal leadership of eighteen FFI companies. These companies provided protection for the communications
lines of the Fourth and Sixth Armored Divisions.

After central Brittany had been secured, de Wavrin preceded task force "A" of the Third Army into the Treguir and Lezardiuix areas, incited and stimulated a general uprising of the resistance forces and returned with intelligence on which the successful reduction of these towns was based. At the request of the task force commander he then assumed personal command of an FFI force of 1500 which successfully attacked the city of Paimpol, defended by 2500 Germans.

De Wavrin received the British Military Cross for gallantry in Norway. He was awarded the British Distinguished Service Order for a mission behind enemy lines in occupied France in February 1943. This mission was for an extended period. Its purpose was the organization of French resistance. De Wavrin's capture would have meant torture and death, yet during this period he rescued a wounded American aviator at great risk of capture. These British awards furnish sufficient refutation of the statement that the British do not trust de Wavrin.

In nearly two years' actual experience with de Wavrin I have found him always ready to cooperate with Americans
and always of great assistance to us. I invited Colonel de Wavrin to come to this country to meet selected members of my staff for the purpose of carrying through plans for the penetration of Germany. These plans involve the reintroduction into Germany of French workmen, formerly there, who had escaped to France. Clearance for the trip was obtained from the Department of State and G-2.

I do not know on what the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI base their charge that Colonel de Wavrin came to this country to organize a French intelligence service. An open visit by a man clearly identified with French secret intelligence is an unlikely means to establish a clandestine intelligence service, particularly since there are many French officers in this country who, because less conspicuous, could accomplish the purpose better.

In view of de Wavrin's record of service to the Allies, it hardly seems necessary to reply to the other charges made by the FBI. I nevertheless feel I should comment on some of the apparent deficiencies in the memorandum in order to point out the character of the evidence on which the charges are based.
The charge that de Gaulle appointed de Wavrin head of the French Secret Police in 1940 is inaccurate. Colonel de Wavrin is an intelligence officer and organizer of resistance operations. He has never headed the French secret police. The BCRA did have a counter-espionage branch, which was responsible for the safety of French intelligence agents operating in France and cooperated with the British intelligence services in the detection and investigation of Frenchmen suspected of working for Germany in England.

The accusations as to the methods used by de Wavrin as head of the BCRA are based on three incidents: the Dufour court action reported in the New York Times on 10 September 1943, the Pucheu trial and the trial of Lt. Carre.

The Dufour action named General de Gaulle and six other officers as defendants in addition to de Wavrin. The statements quoted from the complaint are unproved allegations. Even if true, there seems to have been reason to suspect Dufour of being an enemy agent.

The Pucheu trial was not, as alleged, a purge "within the de Gaulle regime". Pucheu was never connected with de Gaulle. His arrest was ordered by Giraud. We have been able
to find no evidence to show that de Wavrin played any important role in his trial.

There is also no evidence presented with respect to the trial of Lt. Carre. He was tried and convicted in absentia early in 1943 for his activities with the Vichy Tri-Color Legion. The Department of Justice memorandum presents no evidence to show this was through efforts of Colonel de Wavrin's organization. Lt. Carre's demobilization and internment were ordered not by de Wavrin but by Andre de Troquer, Commissioner for war of the French. Lt. Carre's death at Salerno is cited by the memorandum as "indicative of the probable nature of the trial accorded this Frenchman", but there is no showing as to how the proceedings were illegal under French law. The FBI memorandum also states that Lt. Carre's death in the fighting at Salerno was sufficient to wipe out his previous collaborationist record, but, on the other hand, fails to recognize that on the same basis Colonel de Wavrin's indisputable services to the Allied cause since 1940 should erase the stigma of his alleged (and unproved) connection with the Cagoule.

The statements about de Wavrin's disclosures of military information are hard to credit. No facts are given.
He enjoys the confidence of de Gaulle and has recently been appointed to a new position. The British (despite the statement credited to them that they "informed de Gaulle that they had refrained from seizing de Wavrin only because of the scandal that would follow") have continued to show full confidence in him and to cooperate closely with him in French operations. In view of the awards already made and the continuing intimate and professional relationship between de Wavrin and the heads of the British Intelligence Service, it would be interesting to know to whom the term "the British" is meant to refer.

I am also making available to the Department of State information as to the value of de Wavrin's services to the American military effort. On the basis of this information it may be that the Department of State will wish to review its action in bringing about the refusal of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to him. We are doing grave injustice to Colonel de Wavrin by withholding merited recognition for his services, especially since several of his subordinates have received the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for achievements less outstanding than his.

William J. Donovan
Director
EXCERPTS FROM OSS R&A REPORT NO. 2553 *

From the known appointments to the higher administrative offices in the new intelligence agency, it appears that the Services de Recherche et Contre-Espionnage will be directed chiefly by the former BCRA element. The return of Colonel Passy to the intelligence services especially, has caused some misgivings in the more leftist political circles of France where the intelligence services have recently been charged with fomenting civil war and preparing the way for dictatorship. It is of interest, therefore, to determine the possibilities of political action afforded by the organization and personnel of the intelligence services.


In the few weeks preceding the reorganization of the Services Speciaux to form the Services de Recherche et de Contre-Espionnage, the French intelligence services were subjected to a bitter attack by the extreme leftist political circles which demanded their dissolution on the grounds that they were not sufficiently amenable to government authority. In fact, while the reorganization of the intelligence system was necessitated by the changed situation of France, the decision to drop the name of the Services Speciaux probably

*copies of this report have been disseminated to the Department of State and the Department of Justice.
was not unrelated to the hostile attitude exhibited toward the pre-liberation agency. The distrust which surrounds the French intelligence services is nothing new, however, and has always had something of a partisan tone. In the pre-liberation period and until the Allied recognition of the FCNL as the administrative authority for liberated France, the BCRA and its successor, the Services Speciaux, were the object of various charges by generally conservative and anti-Gaullist groups of French refugees located in England and America. Predicated on a professed belief that the Gaullist intelligence services were aiming at the establishment of dictatorship in liberated France, these charges included: (1) the use of Gestapo-like methods in processing French escapees who came to England where the BCRA exercised wide control over French nationals, (2) the manipulation of political Resistance within France in such a way as to ensure the undisputed leadership of de Gaulle, and (3) discrimination in the arming and supplying of military Resistance in a manner calculated to facilitate the foundation of an authoritarian state. While some of these accusations, stripped of their implications of dictatorship, had some basis in fact and were echoed in the Consultative Assembly, they represented, for the most part, gross exaggerations and misrepresentations put forward with the idea of discrediting the
Gaullist regime in Allied circles and of creating favor for a more conservative French authority organized under General Giraud. With the liberation of France and the institution of the new Provisional Government at Paris, the conservative critics of the pre-liberation period either rallied to the new regime or maintained a discreet silence. The Services Spéciaux, however, found themselves attacked from a new direction, this time by the Communists and other elements of Resistance who are apparently dissatisfied with the failure of the Provisional Government to put into immediate operation the political, economic, and social policies of the more extreme left. Because of the pre-liberation background of the charges of dictatorship coming from conservative groups, but more because of the indisputably conservative nature of their personnel, the intelligence services offer to these leftist groups an excellent target for political propaganda designed to arouse public opinion against what is deemed to be the "conservative" attitude of the Provisional Government.

2. Political Consequence of the Intelligence Services

The attacks which have been levelled against the Services Spéciaux by extreme leftist circles and which probably will be revived against the new organization may be attributed
in part to the political complexion of the intelligence personnel. With the exception of Jacques Soustelle, the leading personalities of the intelligence services appear to be of quite conservative background and views. The majority are naturally army and navy officers with the traditional conservative outlook of the French military and not a few, drawn from the former Giraudist services, have a record of former Vichy service. Then, too, the charge that the intelligence services have a liberal sprinkling of ex-Cagoulards is still repeated, with Passy offered as the classic example. While the charge as applied to Passy may be doubted, it is reasonable to believe that the general accusation has an element of truth. At the time of the 1940 Armistice the Cachoul, which had been in the vanguard of Fascist conspiracies in pre-war France, is said to have split into three groups. One section, which gathered at Paris, associated itself with collaborationist elements. The largest group, allegedly anti-Iaval but pro-Petain, went to unoccupied France where it passed under the leadership of Marcel Payrouton, then Minister of Interior. Presumably some members of this group crossed to North Africa after the Allied invasion and associated themselves with the Giraudist regime. The third division, called the "plebius of the Cachoul,"

reportedly went to London to join the de Gaulle movement.

If it is true that these ex-Macoulardes are now associated with the present intelligence service, it can only be assumed that their political sympathies lie with the more conservative political groups in France.

The personnel of the French intelligence services, along with certain conservative members of the Provisional Government have also been identified with synarchism, which may be defined loosely as a political and economic movement aimed at the control of the state by an industrial, financial and technocratic elite. Synarchism has been linked with the intelligence services by virtue of the fact that several past and present members of the latter's administrative staff, including Passy, Manuel, Constans, Palabon, and Guillaumat, are graduates of the military-engineering college, the École Polytechnique, where the movement is said to have started. As graduated from the École Polytechnique is the sole evidence offered in support of synarchist affiliations in the intelligence services, little importance can be attached to this charge. The accusation, base as it is on the flimsiest evidence, serves only to underline the existing distrust of the services as an organization composed of officials whose
political sympathies are such that they may be expected to
give willing support only to a government of moderate left
or distinctly conservative views.

In view of these facts, Communist speakers were able
to condemn the Services Séciaux as composed of "ascouards" and "fifth columnists" who were arming "non-Communist groups
in preparation for the 'civil war'." Even the new Communist
Minister of Air, Tillon, entered the lists, resurrecting the
old charge that the DEFA-dominated intelligence services re-
fused assistance to the Communist-controlled Prance-Tir aur et
Partisans in the pre-liberation days and adding an accusation
that the Services Séciaux wished to overthrow the Provisional
Government and replace its membership with elements drawn from
the Comité des Forces. While such accusations were put forward
with the idea of forcing the Provisional Government into a
more leftist attitude, it is undeniable that there is in the
whole movement an undercurrent of apprehension regarding the
political influence of the intelligence services in the event
that an open break occurs between the de Gaulle Government
and the more extreme elements.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

10 April 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

The attached memorandum, sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy, will probably be of interest to the President.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA
007422
By JUN 11 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to previous memoranda concerning the possible surrender of German forces in North Italy. It is a summary of a more comprehensive report which has been communicated to AFHQ.

Obergruppenfuhrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender formula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.

Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long conferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not questioned provided such surrender be "honorable". All three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his own initia-
tive. Wolff recognizes the futility of further fighting, but reports that von Vietinghoff, an old-line soldier, insists that the surrender be "dressed up" so as to be compatible with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the position of a traitor.

Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the three men have proposed a point on the front lines through which Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the surrender, and they have promised again to do everything possible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state, however, that Admiral Doenitz has ordered marine destruction and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director
May 9, 1945

These papers were found in the President's desk x breefcase after his death on April 12/45.

As far as I know no action was taken on any of these matters. I assume the President was holding them to discuss with various people and take action on them at the proper time.

Grace G. Lilly
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

I believe the attached report will be of interest to the President.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 27 March concerning approaches via Heinz Heintze of the German Foreign Office, from a Bavarian Nazi group headed by Franz Xaver Ritter von Epp, the Reichsstadthalter (Governor) of Bavaria:

A trusted messenger who is working with Heintze returned to Switzerland on 6 April from Munich, where he made contact with the von Epp group. Source confirms that von Epp and several other high-ranking officers are prepared to do everything within their power to cut short warfare in Bavaria, to prevent unnecessary destruction in Bavaria, and, if possible, to prevent establishment of the "redoubt". Among those working with von Epp are General Karl Kriebel, commanding Wehrkreis VII, Munich; Generalleutnant (Lw) Wolfgang Vorwald, commandant of Luftgau VII, Munich, who controls the ground personnel of the large airfields in the Munich area (including Schleissheim and Riehm) and at the Reichenhall airdrome near Salzburg; and Obergruppenfuehrer Benno Martin, Higher SS and Police Leader for
Wehrkreis XIII, Nuremberg. The group also includes several younger officers and government officials.

The messenger reports that the group is prepared immediately to receive a radio operator. Operational details are here omitted.

(The OSS representative comments that while the von Epp group may not be able to take effective action against the SS in Bavaria, the dropping of a radio operator appears worth the gamble and should at least produce useful military information.)

The messenger reports that the "redoubt" is becoming a reality. Large quantities of supplies are accumulating in the Salzburg area, prominent hostages are arriving, and the local population is being evacuated. There are indications that the OKW is being transferred from the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin, to Bad Reichenhall, and that parts of the Foreign Office are being transferred to Badgastein, 75 miles south of Salzburg. Only a small number of troops are at present in the "redoubt", including an estimated 6000 SS troops in the Salzburg-Berchtesgaden area. General Karl Weissenberger, the commandant of Wehrkreis XIII, Nuremberg, is an ardent Nazi and
must be expected to fight to the end. Obergruppenfuehrer Wilhelm Koppe, Higher SS and Police Leader for Wehrkreis VII, Munich, is a Nazi of the worst type, who was guilty of many crimes while he was on the staff of Hans Frank, the former German Governor of Poland. No cooperation can be expected of Koppe.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director