To show the President on his file return
7 April 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

General Donovan asked me to forward the attached report to the President, and I would appreciate it if you would bring it to his attention.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.
7 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a copy of a report by Captain Walter R. Mansfield, USMCR, on his mission to the headquarters of Mihailovich, which may be of interest to you.

Respectfully

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director
REPORT OF CAPTAIN W.R. MANSFIELD, USMCR, on OSS MISSION TO GENERAL MIHAILOVIC.
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SUMMARY

1. I was in Yugoslavia for six months, i.e. from 18 August 1943 to 15 February 1944 with Mihailovic’s forces. The first three months were spent with General Mihailovic at his General Staff Headquarters; the last three months on a tour of inspection of his troops. I travelled through the entire area of West and North Central Serbia on the inspection tour, going north from the Drina and Lim Rivers to a point just south of the Sava River at Sabac, west to a point 40 miles south of Belgrade, and south almost to Raska, in the Ibar Valley. (See Exhibit A for route taken.) I got out of Yugoslavia by going overland with small Cetnik bands through Herzegovina and Southern Dalmatia to a point on the Adriatic Sea a few miles south of Dubrovnik.

I had many talks with General Mihailovic and various members of his Staff and gathered information about him, his policies, his staff, army, communications system, operations and relations with the British Mission attached to him.

On the inspection tour, I personally inspected at least 6,000 Cetnik troops with arms, and 10,000 without arms. I gathered statistics and information in each area inspected on the number of men mobilized, number mobilizable, number and types of arms and ammunition on hand, communications, personal histories of commanders and their officers, number and disposition of the enemy in the area, operations executed and planned, reprisals, hostages, propaganda (both Cetnik and enemy), morale of troops and people, attitude of troops and people toward the Partisans, living conditions and food situation, potential airdromes, etc. However, all of my pencilled notes and most propaganda collected were turned over to my superior, Lieutenant Colonel Seitz, whom it was thought would get out first, but who is still there. But I took out complete statistics furnished by Mihailovic on his army, letters from Mihailovic to President Roosevelt and General Donovan. I also have a substantial number of photographs.

In this report I have tried to limit myself to facts personally witnessed, and have accepted statements from
Mihailovic's officers with qualification. I was allowed freedom of route in the areas inspected.

2. Mihailovic has a fairly well organized army mobilized in Serbia. It is composed mostly of former Yugoslav army officers and men who had two years military training before the war. It is organized on a geographical basis with separate commanders and brigades in each "Srez" or political subdivision and a chain of command from the Minister himself down to the smallest platoon. Mihailovic claims he has 57,440 men mobilized and could mobilize over 400,000 if he had arms. Based on numbers of men seen, I estimate he has 35,000 men mobilized with arms but can give a better estimate when Lieutenant Colonel Seitz returns with our figures which can be spot-checked against Mihailovic's figures.

3. Mihailovic is now doing very little fighting against the Germans, although he did have a month of considerable activity after the Italian capitulation in September 1943, when he cut the Belgrade-Sarajevo Railroad by destroying two important bridges, took many towns in battles against the Germans, including Visegrad, Priepolje, Priboj, Rogatica, Gacko, Pecka, and obtained personal surrender of the Italian "Venetzia" Division at Berane.

Mihailovic's policy is to hold up operations until "D-Day" (or "Justanek" as the Serbs call it) when he expects an Allied invasion and states that he will throw all he has into one all-out effort. He refuses to start operations now, stating (1) he wants to avoid heavy reprisals on the people, and (2) that he does not have enough arms and ammunition. He is determined to preserve the Serb population ethically and numerically against the Croats. He also claims that he has only a "one-shot" army which will be wiped out by German reinforcements if he undertakes operations before "D-Day". He claims willingness to undertake continuous operations against the Germans if he is given a steady stream of supplies which would enable him to do it and thus counteract attempted reprisals. On the other hand, his record shows that while he promised to cut the main Belgrade-Nis-Skopljé Railroad lines in the Ibar or Vardar valleys (which are most valuable to the Germans as supply lines and avenues of retreat from Greece), he failed to keep his promise after his commander for this area received substantial arms by plane from the British. He also has failed to destroy the Bor and Trepsa Mines, important sources of copper and lead
Mihailovic complains that the British have failed to assure him that requested operations have been coordinated with general Allied strategy elsewhere.

Most Cetnik commanders and troops seen in Serbia would like to fight, but ask for more arms and ammunition which they claim they need in order to carry the fight to the Germans and prevent heavy reprisals.

4. There is complete distrust of the British by Mihailovic and his leaders, who feel the British have now sold them down the river to Stalin. They are particularly irritated at the British because of the BBC London Yugoslav news, which is their main Allied news source. Station WRUL, Boston, is too weak to be heard regularly. They point out that since September 1943, BBC has devoted its time almost exclusively to Partisan news and ignored Mihailovic despite the fact that he carried out substantial anti-German operations, especially in September and October, 1943, after the Italian capitulation. Mihailovic also complains bitterly that in many instances in the fall of 1943, BBC falsely credited the Partisans with many anti-German activities in fact carried out by his forces. I personally saw some evidence supporting this contention.

5. Mihailovic's forces appear to have complete control of the mountains and small towns in the area inspected, including most of Serbia. The only Partisans seen here were a band of about 800 near Ivanica, which had been pushed into Serbia from the Sanjak and was fighting Mihailovic's forces there. I also saw small bands of Partisans through north Herzegovina.

6. There is bitter civil war raging between Mihailovic's forces and the Partisans in Herzegovina, Sanjak and Bosnia, where the Cetniks are devoting virtually all of their efforts to fighting the Partisans. The Cetnik attitude is that the civil war against the Partisans is now primarily racial, secondarily ideological. Cetniks claim that over 75% of the Partisans are Croats, many of whom are former German Quislings Ustachi who deserted the Yugoslav Army in 1941 to join with the Germans when German victory appeared inevitable, and who now have joined the Partisans when it appears that the Allies may win after all; and that these Croats, carrying over their earlier racial and religious discontent, first decimated the Serb population in their blood purge of 1941-2, and are now...
determined to build up Croat control at all costs.

7. I saw no collaboration between Cetniks and Germans in Serbia, other than a liaison with the Nedici at Belanovica, east of Valjevo and at Aranjelovac, south of Belgrade, allegedly for the purpose of getting information on German movements. I saw one instance near Stragari where this enabled the Area Commander to make a successful attack on a German column and capture arms.

Cetniks in Southern Herzegovina and Southern Dalmatia are in some places collaborating with the Germans to the extent that the Germans are not fighting them there and are allowing them to travel unmolested so that they can fight Partisans. In one instance a local village commander admitted knowing the Germans there and assisting to billet 640 German troops. One Cetnik soldier showed me a legitimacia issued to him by the German Army at Dubrovnik, which described him as a "Cetnik" entitled to go into Dubrovnik to visit the hospital. I saw no evidence, however, that the Germans were giving arms to the Cetniks, or that Mihailovic knew about this collaboration.

8. I gathered there is a feeling on the part of both Cetnik troops and people that, while they are all for the King, they would not favor the government in exile.

9. The people in that part of Serbia inspected are 100% for King Peter II and very strong for Mihailovic, whom they revere because he led the resistance in 1941 when all other nations were losing, and because he stands for King and democracy. They do not seem to want communism or Partisans. In Herzegovina I was unable to get such a strong impression.

10. Most arms seen with Mihailovic's forces were in very poor condition and area commanders claimed they desperately needed arms and ammunition. Most rifles were old Yugoslav army type, pitted and worn. There are substantial numbers of German machine pistols and Barettas. Light machine guns were Zorkas or Holland type. There were very few mortars or heavy machine guns, and practically no artillery pieces. I would estimate each soldier has an average of about 25 to 40 rounds per rifle, and 150 to 200 rounds per machine gun. About every other soldier carries a hand
11. Mihailovic states he has 90,739 rifles, 321 HMG’s, 1149 LMG’s, 65 mortars, and 294 machine pistols. The excess of arms over number of men mobilized does not exist in that part of Serbia inspected, however, but in such areas as Herzegovina and Southern Dalmatia, where it should be noted most fighting has been against the Partisans.

12. Most troop commanders impress me as capable soldiers. Mihailovic himself, while in good health and obviously having considerable ability as a leader, has surrounded himself with a second rate General Staff, with a political adviser, Dr. Moljevic, who is an extreme Pan-Serb. Mihailovic lacks ability to delegate.

13. The average Cetnik soldier is extremely poorly clothed and has been living a hard, rugged, and miserable life for three years in the woods, suffering many hardships, living in dirty peasant huts and eating what the peasant will give him. Many troops have not seen their families for nearly three years, or have lost them through German reprisals. Considering these factors, the morale and discipline of the troops in Serbia is very good; in Herzegovina rather poor.

14. The Army has a poor communications system, with a sprinkling of home-made, weak radio transmitters and relies mainly on couriers who take hours or days to deliver messages which should be received at once.

15. Military Intelligence generally is very poor.

16. The Serbian people are tremendously enthusiastic for Americans. They refer to America as the only nation which has no ultimate designs on them.

17. Morale of Serbian troops and people would be tremendously increased by even a token Allied invasion. They would then probably want to rise up in revolt at once.

18. There is no famine in parts of Serbia visited. Germans are collecting only a portion of the requisitions demanded, and then only in the plains regions where they can come and get it.

19. I cannot state what “line” Cetnik propaganda to the people is taking because it was too voluminous to be
translated. A large batch of Cetnik pamphlets, newspapers and mimeographed material collected in the various areas inspected has been sent to Washington for translation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The Allies should maintain some liaison with Mihailovic rather than cut off relations entirely, for the following reasons:

(a) He serves as a source of intelligence.

(b) His army is too strong to be conquered or absorbed by the Partisans, at least while they are occupied with Germans. If there is a "D-Day", or Allied invasion of the Balkans he would probably fight Germans and destroy some targets.

(c) In the meantime, Mihailovic keeps a certain number of German and Bulgar troops immobilized. Withdrawal of all Allied liaison or labeling him as a traitor would undoubtedly free some of these troops for use on some other front.

(d) Politically the Allies still recognize the government of which Mihailovic is the Minister of War.

(e) Complete severance of relations may adversely affect Allied influence over Tito's operations.

(f) If the door is kept open with Mihailovic, it is always possible that he will change his position and start operations against the Germans, in which event the Allies might wish to send in more representatives to him, or at least to coordinate his operations with general Allied strategy.

If liaison is to be maintained with Mihailovic solely for intelligence, it is recommended that:

(a) There be an American representative with him because of the distrust of the British, which might cause refusal of intelligence on the ground
that it would be given to Tito.

(b) A complete understanding be reached with the Royal Yugoslav Government and Mihailovic regarding the scope and functions of the liaison officers.

(2) Whether the Allies should go further and give positive aid to Mihailovic depends on answers to many questions which I am not in a position to give. Some of these problems are:

(a) Whether additional aid would be worth the investment.

(b) The extent to which the Allies could insure control of Mihailovic, so that the aid would be used in operations desired by them instead of using it against Partisans or saving it up so that he can increase his own strength against the Partisans after the war against the Germans is finished.

(c) How additional aid would affect relations with Russia, and Allied relations with Tito.

(d) Whether the Allies trust Mihailovic to carry out operations, in view of his past record.

(e) Whether the Allies plan any "D-Day" or invasion of the Balkans, and are willing to gamble that Mihailovic will use aid on "D-Day" operations.

(3) The United States, Great Britain and Russia should bring pressure to bear upon Tito and Mihailovic to make peace, or at least an armistice, and devote all their attention to fighting the Germans. A geographical division of their forces still seems possible for the reason that Mihailovic's forces seem to be disposed almost entirely in areas of Serbia where they are exclusive. The Royal Yugoslav Government in Exile could make Mihailovic agree to a truce. It is up to the Great Powers to make Tito do the same by exercising sanctions they obviously possess.
1 March 1944

REPORT OF CAPTAIN W. F. MANSFIELD, USMCR ON
MISSION TO GENERAL DRAGA MIHAJLOVIC

I. CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF PERSONAL ACTIVITIES

On the night of 18 August 1943 I was dropped by parachute from a Halifax bomber to the General Staff of General Mihailovic on a mountain near Ivanica, Serbia, after a five hour trip from Derna, Africa. We spotted the signal fires almost immediately and made a pass at the field, during which I could see the fires from the hole through which I jumped. As soon as we checked our flash signal with the one seen on the ground, we did a circle of about ten miles, and came back. Then I shook hands with the RAF dispatcher, gave our "thumbs up" signal, and when the light went green, shoved off. When the chute blossomed I immediately saw the fires, realized I was a way off to one side, and landed in a pile of rocks, hurting my hip slightly. I found myself on a cool mountainside and in a few minutes was surrounded by a group of big bearded Cetniks who tried to smother me with kisses, yelling "Zdravo, Purvi Amerikanec!" (Greetings, first American) I lit my Very Light, signalling the pilot all was okay and was led to the dropping ground where I met many more Cetniks, Colonel William Bailey, Chief of the British Mission, and Major Greenlees, his Chief of Staff. In a little while the plane returned and nearly beamed us with about 15 containers, dipping its wings as it disappeared in the night. They were immediately taken away in oxen carts.

I learned that Mihailovic's "Starb" was less than one hour away and that he was waiting to see me. We walked over the mountain, noticing Cetnik guards posted on all surrounding hills as we passed them in the darkness. The "Starb" (or General Staff
Headquarters) proved to be a few makeshift parachute tents grouped together and camouflaged in a copse near a few "kolibars" (mountain huts used by shepherds). There was nothing but the roughest equipment lying about, and a fire burning with logs around as benches.

A few minutes later the Minister appeared out of the darkness with some members of his Staff and personal bodyguard. We met and were able to converse in French. I found him to be a man of about 50 years, medium build, heavy gray beard, glasses, a friendly smile, and a sharp sense of humor. He introduced me at once to General Trifunovic, his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Laladevic, his Operations Officer, and others. We then sat around the fire, drinking "rakia" (prune whiskey, similar to vodka) and discussing people we knew. Most men present were bearded and showed the effects of nearly three years "in the woods". They were dressed in all kinds of oddments, some wearing remnants of their old Yugoslav uniforms. Colonel Bailey broke the ice for me in getting to know them.

After an hour I went to the British Camp, about a half mile away, which I found to be a crude peasant hut and two parachute tents. Here I met Lieutenant Colonel Duane Hudson, the first British officer sent in, who landed blind by submarine on the Montenegrin coast in September 1941, and two Royal Marine sergeants who had been captured on Crete in 1941 and jumped a prison train in Yugoslavia. We had a little more "rakia", then went to bed on some hay in one of the tents. In the meantime the oxen teams arrived and were being unloaded by the Cetniks.

I spent the next few days getting used to a new life, which was fairly rugged, and learning something about the current situation. We paid an official visit to the Minister and his Staff on the following day. Thereafter I had dinner several times with the Minister around his campfire, and engaged in long talks with Colonel Bailey, Colonel Hudson, Mihailovic and his Staff members. Only "faux-pas" committed to my knowledge was toasting to the Minister with the phrase "Tvrd, za mnoge godine", the meaning of which I will not explain here. Much of what I learned was sent home over Bailey's radio. Before leaving Cairo I was told by Major Huot that I should use the British cipher because there was an understanding that all of our messages would be seen.
by the British. I was also given a poem cipher for emergency use only. When I arrived in Yugoslavia, Colonel Bailey advised me Cairo had sent a signal stating that I should use my own private code, showing all messages to him before sending them. Both he and I understood this to mean that my wires would be seen only by him. He advised me that I should feel free to send anything I liked. I therefore used my poem cipher until Lieutenant Colonel Seitz later arrived.

Life here was fairly rugged. We were located on the plateau of Cermernina Planina, with Germans about three hours away by foot. I immediately bought pack and riding horses and several quick-packing drills were held so that we could be up and away in a hurry if necessary. We slept on the ground and ate out of a common pot. Each day I spent some time with a Cetnik officer learning the language. Our Cetnik guard of about 30 men were raggedly clothed, dirty, and very curious but rugged looking and willing to help us in every way. They mostly carried old Yugoslav rifles, pitted and worn.

We were not starved, however. There was plenty of black bread, Kimak (a kind of butter made from the top of the milk), pig, lamb, potatoes, plums and a little tea and sugar which came with me.

Colonel Bailey was most helpful to me upon my arrival. He impressed me as a capable, broad minded, intelligent, and patient officer who was far more familiar with the problems faced in dealing with Mihailovic than officers with whom I had talked in Cairo. He speaks the language like a native and knows all of the personalities involved, having been in Yugoslavia for many years before the war. He advised me that while I was part of the British Mission I should feel free to visit Mihailovic and his Staff whenever I liked, without reservation. He stated that he was very glad American representatives were coming, and hoped that there would be more.

Both Colonels Bailey and Hudson outlined to me their activities as British Liaison Officers, and the history of their relations with Mihailovic. At this time Bailey was engrossed in trying to get Mihailovic to undertake more extensive operations against the Germans. Mihailovic was balking, on the ground that he had insufficient arms, and that the reprisals would be
too heavy. A few days after my arrival, Bailey sent Mihailovic a written ultimatum, pointing out how Mihailovic had failed on certain operations, and requesting that orders be given for execution of these operations. Bailey's one strong point was the failure of Mihailovic to carry out sabotage on the north-south communication lines in the Ibar and Vardar valleys where the area commandant, Djuric, had received a substantial number of planes. Mihailovic replied by letter, agreeing to issue orders for more action, and specifically agreeing to order Djuric to start operations in his area.

I found a situation on arrival where there was some friction between Colonel Bailey and Cairo, because of alleged lack of cooperation by Cairo in not sending planes with arms for operations, which Cairo was insisting that Mihailovic carry out immediately. When planes did arrive they contained a great deal of defective or wrong equipment. I, myself, saw containers filled with nothing but undersize shoes and overcoats which would fit people only five feet, two inches high. Despite repeated wires to Cairo giving exact pin points, times, requests, etc., wires from Cairo indicated that they were paying no attention to Bailey's requests. For example, quite aside from the question of arms and equipment, the personal needs and necessities of the Mission were being neglected, and some members lacked proper clothes, boots, etc.

In my daily talks with Mihailovic and his Staff, I received considerable information about his army, organization, and communications. I also studied living conditions for the purpose of giving my prospective commanding officer some idea of what he would face, and what he should bring in with him in the way of supplies.

Everyone, both in the British Mission, and in Mihailovic's Staff were interested in knowing what was to be the status and functions of the American Officers, whether more Americans were coming; whether the Americans would send in arms and supplies; what was our attitude toward the Partisans; whether we would have our own private radio to Cairo; and similar questions. Mihailovic was, of course particularly interested in knowing whether the Americans would be under the British, or would set up separate
missions with him. Before leaving Cairo I had repeatedly asked
for instructions on our functions, and had been told that I was
going in simply to prepare the way for a senior officer who would
be fully briefed; that I should acquaint myself with the personalities and general situation, and send home over the British radio
such information and intelligence as might be of use to my senior
officer coming in, particularly on the question of what supplies
he should personally bring in. Answers on the question of our functions were always very general and to the effect that my senior
officer would be able to instruct me upon arrival. I had one brief-
ing conference with Major Inman, head of the Yugoslav desk at M.O.4,
Cairo, in which he advised that the Partisans were doing much more
fighting against the Germans than Mihailovic; that Bailey was hav­
ing great difficulty getting Mihailovic to undertake operations,
and was, in fact, not seen by Mihailovic; that it would be necessary
to send in a new man with a firm hand, Brigadier Armstrong, who
would bring pressure to bear on Mihailovic to carry out these
operations; and that the most important operations were destruction
of lines of communication in the Ibar and Vardar Valleys, i.e. the
main railroad lines into Greece and Bulgaria.

I, therefore, answered the many queries by stating that I was
merely sent in to prepare the way for my superior, who would be in
a better position to answer; that I did not know how many more
Americans would come in, but I hoped many; that we were working in
full cooperation with the British in all respects; and that for the
present I would be simply an American military observer.

Without knowing exactly what our functions would be, it
seemed to me that we might possibly serve in any of the following capacities:

(1) Military Observers, reporting home military
intelligence. But for this function, we would need at least 30
or 40 representatives throughout areas occupied by Mihailovic's
troops, with radios, in order to report first-hand intelligence.
No fighting is done by Mihailovic's G.H.Q., except when it is
attacked. American representatives there could only serve as
a conduit, transmitting home such day-to-day unconfirmed reports
as Mihailovic's Chief of Intelligence might offer. One officer
could easily handle this job for both British and Americans.

(2) Military Liaison to advise Mihailovic on strategy,
and coordinate his operations with general Allied strategy in Europe. This function would require that the officer have some knowledge from Cairo as to what advice could be given regarding general strategy.

(3) Supply Liaison, checking on Mihailovic's needs and requirements for operation, handling negotiations with Cairo for supplies, administering the distribution of supplies to Mihailovic's forces, and checking on their use in the field. This would depend on whether the U.S.A. was going to send in any supplies.

(4) Operations. American representatives could furnish American technical operational personnel such as demolition experts, radio operators, etc.

The last three of the above would depend, of course, on whether Mihailovic's operations were going to be extensive enough to warrant them.

For the first two weeks life was relatively calm. Two Musselmen spies were captured and I had the unpleasant experience of seeing them get their throats slit. An average of about two German transports, and one light bomber flew over every day, but we were well camouflaged. The local Korpus commander gave us a tremendous dinner out in the open under the trees (about four miles away) at which I stuffed myself, drank "rakia", and even gave a speech of thanks with what little Serbian I knew. Cetniks and peasants came and gaped at me while I ate. I was initiated into the "kola" (national dance) to the music of a harmonica, and had to neave the snot put a bit. At this point it seemed like a damn good war with no bang and plenty of pleasant people who were obviously lionizing me right and left.

On 4 September we heard of the Allied invasion of Italy and immediately hoped we would be in Belgrade by Christmas. So did the Serbs. There was much celebrating, and on 5 September fires were lit in honor of King Peter's birthday.

On the following morning, 6 September, the Germans let us have it and I had my first taste of combat. In the early morning mist a force of about 200 Germans came up the mountain side on our side of the General Staff, while we were asleep. All of
a sudden heavy machine fire started close by in all directions. Bailey and I threw on our pants and shoes, grabbed our rifles and "quick-packs", slit a hole through the back of our tent and jumped into the woods. The Germans were coming up over the hills at about 400 yards in their blue-green uniforms with rifles and opened up fire on us. But there did not seem to be any front. Machine guns, Sten guns were being fired from all directions, both in front and in back of us, and were cutting branches in the trees overhead. Bailey suggested we back further into the woods, which we did. Finally we did a semi-circle about a half-mile back and were near the Starb. The firing continued another hour and a half. We learned that the Germans had been driven back down the mountain. We then went back, got our horses and things and returned to Mihailovic.

Several were killed on both sides and some prisoners taken. I saw one prisoner being alternately questioned and then kicked and beaten. Later I was told that he had had his throat cut.

We immediately left on a long day and night march in the rain over the steep mountains for two days to Zlatibor, with Mihailovic, his Staff and a guard of about 150 soldiers. Here we pitched camp near the Uvac River. Mihailovic and Staff were located about two miles from us, spread out in different koli-bars. His radio stations were located about one mile from us on the other side. It was the usual custom for us to spread out in this fashion, for security reasons, and to have some privacy. On the march we always traveled in single column, with about 250 people, and 40 to 50 horses.

We were now in the area of bushy-haired Captain Radovic, local commander, who became a close friend when I gave him some film. He gave me a considerable amount of intelligence on German disposition in his area, which I wired to Cairo. That week four of his soldiers created a mild sensation by dressing up in the uniforms of some Germans they had killed, going into Vzice (where there was a large German garrison) and machine gunning a notorious Quisling leader in his home.

On the night of 8 September we heard over the BBC the announcement that Italy had signed a capitulation on 3 September.
were at the time, not far from a garrison of about 2,000 Italians at Priboj, and were surprised that we had not received some advance notice from Cairo, which would have enabled us to place Mihailovic's troops near the Italian garrison and obtain their personal surrender, as well as their arms, before the Germans stepped in. On the following day, Colonel Bailey received a wire from Cairo, instructing him to do everything possible to obtain surrender of the Italians in the area, but not to take their arms and ammunition away from them if they would agree to fight with the Cetniks against the Germans. At Berane, was located the Italian "Venetzia" Division, command post for Italian troops there and at Priboj. The "Tauranese" and "Emilia" Divisions were reported to be in the area from Podgorica and Bokor Kotor north to Dubrovnik. Bailey immediately set out with Major Lukasevic and a band of Cetniks for Berane to try to obtain surrender of the "Venetzia" division. I repeatedly wired Cairo for orders to go with him, thinking that it would be helpful to have an American representative at any talk with the Italian commandant, but received no reply for over a week.

On 11 September, Colonel Hudson and I went to Priboj to try to obtain personal capitulation of the Italians there, whom we could hear all night fighting the Cetniks who were attacking their garrison. We arrived that night close to the Italian garrison, but when our peasant courier tried to make contact with the Italians inside, they opened heavy fire on us, which lasted three hours. We retreated up the mountain, and received word on the following day from the Italian commandant that he was under orders from his command post at Berane, and that he would not surrender until he received instructions to do so from his General. Two days later the garrison surrendered to us and we spent some time in Priboj talking with the Italian officers and placing the town under Cetnik control. It remained under Cetnik control for almost two months. Later Major Lukasevic disarmed the Italians when the town was threatened by Germans.

In the meantime, Mihailovic had sent out a general order to his troops throughout Yugoslavia to attack lines of communication, and German troops. I had a copy of this order translated and sent home a signal about it. Thereafter, for several days, Mihailovic was showing me radio reports from all of his Korpus commanders reporting extensive sabotage and attacks on small German columns throughout Serbia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Dalmatia; that several trains were derailed in south Servia; that a large number of German lorries were destroyed and several
villages and towns taken. Commanders in Bosnia and Dalmatia were complaining bitterly about being attacked in the rear by Partisans while Cetniks were fighting Germans. For example, they stated that after taking Gacko and driving the Germans toward Bileca, Partisans walked into Gacko and claimed that they had taken it from the Germans.

While this was all going on, BBC London, on its Yugoslav news program, began an extensive program of Partisan news, devoting its attention almost exclusively to reports that the Partisans were fighting the Germans everywhere, and taking numerous cities and towns from the Germans throughout the region of Bosnia, North Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. Mihailovic was never mentioned, despite the fact that his intelligence reports were to the effect that he had taken many towns, such as Berane, Priepolje, and Gacko; and had carried out the above mentioned operations. The American station WRUL was reporting both Cetnik and Partisan operations at this time, but it was so weak that it could be heard only infrequently.

At this time Mihailovic asked me to see him at a conference with his staff. He was furious at the British because of the BBC news, and showed me intelligence reports from his own commanders indicating that some of the BBC news was false. He asked me whether it would be possible to have a group of American observers come in solely for the purpose of going out with his troops to see for themselves the operations which he was conducting and report back intelligence to my government. He stated that he felt further talk with the British on the subject would be useless because it was quite apparent to him that the British had sold him down the river to Stalin. I told him that I would report the matter home for consideration by my chief. I immediately revealed our entire conversation to the British Mission and sent home a signal.

From this point on there was complete distrust of the British by Mihailovic, his staff, and his area commanders. The feeling toward the Americans, on the other hand, was one of intense friendship. Time and again, both Mihailovic and his officers stated that they felt that America was the only democracy left which would take a fair and unbiased view of what was going on in the country.

I had now been in the country one month, sent home over 96 signals, and received four replies. One congratulated me on my
safe arrival. The second was not decipherable. The third advised me to keep each message under 300 letters, rather than 350 letters, the British limit, and to stay with Mihailovic rather than join Bailey on the trip to Priboj. I received no replies to several questions submitted to Cairo during the month. A fourth had to do with the Theater Command.

On 20 September, Colonel Bailey returned from Berane. He and the British enlisted personnel with him reported that on the way down to Berane, Lukasevic and his troops had taken Priepolje from the Germans in an all day attack, driving the Germans toward Plevlje and killing, I believe, over 100; that he had obtained complete personal capitulation from the Italian commanders at Berane and Priboj and entering into an agreement for joint coordinated action against the Germans; that in view of this agreement he had not disarmed the Italians, but had left a skeleton Cetnik force in each town. About two weeks later, Mihailovic reported that the Partisans had attacked Berane, and disarmed the Italians. This only increased his ire.

On 23 September Colonel Seitz and Brigadier Armstrong were dropped to us on Zlatibor. Armstrong brought with him Major Flood, Intelligence Officer; Major Jacks, Operations Officer; Lieutenant Colonel Howard, Chief of Staff; two enlisted wireless operators; and one batman. Both Seitz and Armstrong lost a great deal of their equipment upon landing, either through theft or dropping too far from the landing ground.

Colonel Seitz was unable to answer many of the above questions regarding our functions, which I had faced the first month because there was a strong difference between him and Brigadier Armstrong on these matters. At the first meeting with the Minister and his Staff, Brigadier Armstrong presented letters to Mihailovic from King Peter II, General Wilson, and Colonel Putnik, head of the Yugoslav legation at Cairo. Seitz stated that he had not been advised of these letters. After the initial greetings the Brigadier obtained a private audience with the Minister for himself and Colonel Bailey, to which Seitz was not invited, and on the following day, at the first official staff conference with Mihailovic and his staff, the Brigadier excluded us in front of all personnel present, including the Yugoslavs. The Brigadier also took the position that while we must show him all of our wires, he need not show us all of his wires to Cairo. Shortly thereafter, he also forbade Colonel Seitz's going to Priboj to purchase a horse, and to see the Italians who had surrendered, although his own Intelligence Officer, Major Flood,
was allowed to go there.

The American members of the mission were now relegated to the position of doing practically nothing. We submitted a signal to Cairo on the above, and received a reply that we were under the Brigadier's command; that the only persons allowed to see the Minister would be Brigadier Armstrong, or, in his absence, his next in command, and Colonel Seitz or, in his absence, his next in command, in the presence of an interpreter selected by Brigadier Armstrong; and that the Brigadier's messages would be subject to scrutiny in his discretion.

Soon after his arrival, the Brigadier stated that we could expect very few planes all winter, because the PAF was allowing only a very small number for these operations; that Mihailovic would only get supplies by plane for specific operations, which he hoped to persuade Mihailovic to undertake, such as the blowing up of bridges on the Ibar and Varda valley railroad lines.

During his first week, the Brigadier went with Colonel Hudson to blow up a bridge on the Belgrade-Sarajevo narrow gauge railroad line near Vardiste. This job was a success, and they returned six days later. During this period there had been a complete mix-up with Cairo on whether arms would be sent in for the job. Cairo had refused a plane load to Zlatibor, on the ground that it was located too near Partisans in the Sanjak but eventually agreed to send arms to Gremena. Lieutenant Kolarovic sent a large group of men two days travel time to this latter spot which was now dangerous because it had been compromised when we were attacked by the Germans there on 6 September. They waited several nights in the cold but no plane came. This only served to increase the strain between Mihailovic and the British, especially since Mihailovic had already sanctioned this rather important job which would cut the supply lines by railroad from Belgrade to Dubrovnik. Despite repeated clear wires from the British Mission on air points for landing grounds on Zlatibor, signals received from Cairo indicated either a complete misunderstanding or ignorance of our signals.

On 2 October, Brigadier Armstrong, Colonel Seitz, Colonel Hudson, and Major Jacks went with a large number of Cetniks to attack Visegrad and destroy the large railroad bridge on the
Belgrade-Sarajevo near Rogatica. The operation was a success. The Germans were driven out of Visegrad and the Cetniks gained control of the railroad line. The bridge was blown up a couple of days later. During this period, I was attending intelligence meetings daily with Major Flood and Lieutenant Colonel Novarkovic, the Minister's Chief of Intelligence. Daily Intelligence bulletins were sent home by Flood and myself, in the American cipher, for the reason that the British deciphering branch at Cairo reported that they had such a back-log of undeciphered messages that we could expect quicker transmittal if we used our own cipher which was jointly held by the British.

The Brigadier, upon his return from the Visegrad job, would have daily conferences with the Minister, to some of which Colonel Seitz was now being invited. At these conferences, the Brigadier would try to get the Minister to undertake new operations, but Mihailovic would continue to stall action, raising such questions as whether the British would give him arms for the jobs, whether the cost in reprisals was too high, and how the job fitted into General Allied strategy. Many conferences were held, for instance, on a plan for Djuric in the south to attack the main railroad lines north of Skoplje with a mobile striking force which would then move south toward Macedonia and cut the Salonika line. After much haggling Mihailovic agreed to authorize the job, provided certain special weapons were sent in to Djuric by the British. Not much hope was held out for completion of the operation, however, because Mihailovic had already reneged on a previous order to Djuric, who had stated that he had received no previous orders to carry out an attack on the railroad lines.

Relations were becoming more and more strained, however, and the Brigadier's position was getting more and more difficult because we were receiving virtually no supplies, and each day BBC London was devoting its time entirely to the Partisans.

In October, we received one plane at the General Staff containing two bodies and some explosives. Thereafter I believe that no planes were sent in to Mihailovic anywhere. Mihailovic at the same time was incensed because after his troops had taken Rogatica from the Germans in early October, and had assembled a large number of his forces for an attack on Sarajevo, he was attacked in the rear by Partisans.
Simultaneously, HBC announced that the Partisans had taken Rogatica from the Germans, although the Cetniks had control of the town at the time.

In view of these circumstances, I suggested to Colonel Seitz that we make an appreciation of the situation to determine how the American members might be of use in this theater. Colonel Seitz and I then prepared a basic estimate which reached the conclusion that Allied control of Mihailovic operations was necessary; that such control could be obtained only if the Allies were in a position to feed him with supplies; and that we should make a general inspection of Mihailovic's army in Central Serbia and report our findings to Cairo and Washington. Colonel Seitz took the report up with the Brigadier, who sanctioned the inspection tour. The substance of the report was sent in signals to Cairo. The Brigadier then took up the proposed inspection tour with Mihailovic, who agreed with our plan and assigned Captain B. Tovorovic, Yugoslav officer with the General Staff, as our liaison officer. Colonel Hudson was assigned as interpreter from the British Mission. It was anticipated that we would try to get out of the country at the conclusion of the tour after we had obtained all of the statistics on Mihailovic's army.

In the meantime, we were attacked by Germans and strafed by German planes near Rudo, on the Lim River, and moved north for several days close to Ljubovija, which is on the Drina River, southwest from Valjevo, North Serbia.

Our itinerary was selected to enable us to see the largest number of areas and troops in Central Serbia that could be inspected in about one month and a half. These areas included those under the following commanders: Major Racic, Major Vukanovic, Captain Ninkovic, Captain Kalabic, Major Smiljanic, Major Vuckovic, Major Cvetic, and Major Lukavsevic. Maps showing the routes followed, places where we stopped and the troops and people viewed are attached hereto as Exhibit "A". This itinerary would also permit us to see troops both in the plains in North Serbia and the mountains in the south.

On 7 November 1943, we left on the tour with Major Racic, went north toward Sabac, going east through Vladimir, south to a point below Valjevo, east to a point near Topola, then south near Gornja Milanovac, Cacak, Guca, ending up in Cvetic's area near Niska.
The procedure followed in each area was about the same. We first had a long conference with each Area Commander, in which we obtained general information about his staff, troops, arms on hand, men mobilized, men mobilizable, communications, enemy disposition, operations executed and planned, reprisals, medical supplies, potential airports, enemy movements, and other information. Such information was tabulated we obtained on a form of questionnaire for each Srez from the commander interviewed. The balance was recorded in pencilled notes. At the same time, Captain Todorovic had requested the Minister to obtain the same information from all Area Commanders whom we would be unable to visit and to forward the same to us in Cvetic's area where we expected to be in the middle of December.

Following is a list of troops and people actually seen by us on the entire tour:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Commander</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>No. of men with arms</th>
<th>No. of people without arms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Racic</td>
<td>Dornja Oravica</td>
<td></td>
<td>Azhukovaska Brigade</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Stave</td>
<td></td>
<td>Radjevska Brigade</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Gornje Sipula</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cerska and Jaduska Brigades</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Sinocovic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pocerki Brigade</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Svilenova</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Milovan-Tulariović</td>
<td>Dupljaj and vicinity</td>
<td>1st Tamnavsha Brigade</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,000 including women and children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Struganik</td>
<td></td>
<td>Valjevska Brigade</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Nickovic</td>
<td>Ivanovci</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Kalabic</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kreiljeva Gardia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Vlackca</td>
<td></td>
<td>Orasacka Brigade</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Stragari</td>
<td>24 Nov</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Simljanc</td>
<td>Kamenica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above does not include many hundreds of troops seen by us before and after the formal inspection tour. Nor does it include all of Mihailovic's troops in the areas visited because we often would hit an area by surprise and stay too short a time for troops to be brought in from surrounding districts.

We arrived in Cvetic's area in the first part of December near Raska. At this time the Brigadier was still up north in Racic's area. The information requested from the Minister had not arrived and we had no radio contact with the General Staff because Cvetic's radio was not working. When the radio was repaired we sent some messages to the Brigadier through Mihailovic's General Staff, but had no replies.

After waiting several more days we decided to try to make for the Adriatic Coast as soon as we had obtained the balance of the information from the Minister, in order to present this information which we thought would be of some importance to our Government in deciding its policy toward Mihailovic.

On December 23rd, while we were hiding away in the little village of Krijani in Cvetic's area, we received a pencilled note via Caljak courier from Captain John Wade, British Liaison Officer attached to Kesserovic. He stated that he was with a group of six enlisted men located about three hours from us, and that pursuant to orders received from Cairo, he was on his way to cross over to the Partisans in order to leave the country.

-15-
We immediately went over and found him. He stated that relations between the Allies and Mihailovic were almost broken off because Mihailovic was refusing to fight the Germans, and that Mihailovic was accused of collaborating with Germans in his fight against the Partisans; and that he was ordered to join the Partisans if he felt that he could make his way over with a reasonable degree of safety. He had been given a pin point near Berane, but since the intervening territory was heavily populated with Germans and Cetniks, he decided to try to make his way through Zlatibor, then cross the Drina, and work his way down south until he could make contact with the Partisans. He was told to ask for the commander of the 2nd Partisan Korpus and was advised that safe passage to Italy had been guaranteed by the Partisans.

Colonels Hudson and Seitz decided that we would join Vade at once. Colonel Seitz felt that if we waited any longer the information which we had collected would become stale and that it was better to get out with part of the information rather than lose all. Hudson stayed with Vade, who went to Srednja Reka, where we joined him the next day. That night Colonel Seitz and I talked the matter over further, and decided that it would be better if he went on with the information already collected while I waited, obtained the balance of the information, and followed him as soon as possible. I gave him all of my pencilled notes and statistical data collected from various area Commanders on our tour of inspection. Early on the morning of 24 December, the entire party left in a westerly direction toward Stitkovo, while I remained at Srednja Reka.

On the afternoon of 24 December, Major Cvetic and Captain Todorovic arrived at Srednja Reka, and I explained to them what had happened. On Christmas day we received a message from the Minister to the effect that Major Lukasevic was leaving in a few days with all information, and would escort us to the coast through Lukasevic's area where a canal was now open. On 1 January having been nothing of Lukasevic, I decided to push on toward Novo Varos, in Lukasevic's area, in the hope that I could establish liaison with him and save time. On 2 January I arrived in Stitkovo and found that we were surrounded on three sides by Germans and Partisans who had come over from the Banjak, and that it would be impossible to hide away in a small village, for the reason that small groups of Partisans had been infiltrating into the area for several days. I also found that Lukasevic and Kalatozic were both near Novo Varos but separated from us.
by German and Partisan troops. We therefore left Stitkovo as the firing started and made a hasty fifteen hour retreat back to the area of the Srednja Reka. Enroute we bumped into Captains More and Stock, British Army, who said they were following Wade. I advised them of the situation, and they decided to wait while I went back to try to establish liaison with Mihailovic. We were then separated by very heavy two day snow fall, after which I found that they had pushed on.

After eight days I went forward again as far as Bratlijevo and found that about 800 Partisans had been pushed from the Sanjak into the Stitkovo area, and were now between us and Novo Varos, our objective. On the night of 13 January we attempted to sneak through their lines but were unsuccessful when our two guides were captured by the Partisans. On the following day we circumvented the Partisans by going over Javor Mountain, and arrived safely in Stitkovo, where we saw Kalaitovic, who told us that the canal to the sea was now open, and that we should proceed in the direction of Priboj to meet Lukasevic.

From then on we continued our march to the sea, in the course of which we had a few brushes with Partisans and Germans. Briefly, our route was from Stitkovo to Novo Varos, Priboj, Fudo, Gorazde, Kalinovik, Ulog, Kifino Selo, Lubinje, Star Slano, and the region south of Dubrovnik. We crossed the Lim River at Priboj, the Drina River at Gorazde, and the Trebišnjica River at Star Slano. Not one day passed without gunfire somewhere near us.

During all this period, I wore GI pants and leather jacket with insignia, except when we crossed the Drina River at Gorazde, where there were about 200 German troops. Here I donned complete peasant garb, put my equipment in a peasant sack, which was placed on a horse, and walked across the bridge, and thru Gorazde. we walked right in front of the German guards, but were not stopped.

At Priboj we met Lieutenant Colonel Ostojic, who advised Lukasevic had left with a party of 16 Yugoslavs naval officers for the coast. He gave us letters from Mihailovic to Roosevelt, Donovan, and Eisenhower, which I sewed inside of my jacket. At Priboj the route of the canal was outlined to us, and we followed it with some variations depending upon whether we met Partisans or Germans enroute. We traveled with armed escorts ranging from five to sixty men, depending upon how many we could obtain from the local Cetnik commander in each area. We made several forced marches, one for twenty-two hours, without stopping, and several during the night time to avoid conflict with the Partisans. when we arrived south of Kifino Selo we found ourselves blocked by bands of Partisans in the surrounding mountains and after traveling six hours to try to make a path through, our guard of 50 men broke, and were forced to retreat back near Kifino Selo. On the following morning we learned that Colonel William Bailey and Major Lukasevic were not far.
away, and we joined their party.

I learned immediately from Colonel Bailey that he was doing the same thing as myself and hoped to get out of the country by giving a pin point by radio to the British, and having a naval craft pick him up. He invited me to join him, and I did so.

Previously my plans were to try to capture or buy a small boat on the coast and see if I could make my way across the Adriatic. I heard that two parties had done this successfully.

Our party now numbered about 180 men. We succeeded in pushing through the Partisan area to a spot near Lubinje, where we found ourselves blocked by several hundred Germans on one side, and a brigade of Partisans on the other. After almost bumping into the Germans, we decided to change our route and go between the Partisans and the Germans. We had proceeded only one half hour when I, at the head of one of the columns, bumped into a German patrol at about fifty yards. Here it was Lukasevic's quick thinking which saved us. He advanced with some men as if he were looking for the Germans, and told us to go back. I later learned that he demanded to see their commandant, stating that he was the Commandant of the Cetnik Nevisinje Brigade, and that he had important information to give the Germans; that he was escorted into the village, met the German commandant and advised him that he was out scouting for Partisans and that a large band of Partisans were intending to attack the Germans that night, and that he, Lukasevic, hoped that the Germans would be on the alert. The Germans allowed him to go for the purpose of fighting the Partisans. In a little while the local Cetnik Srez commander arrived. He stated that he was acquainted with the German commandant, that he had found living accommodations for 640 of the German troops in the area and was expecting another 640 the next day. That night we went in the dark through the area, not far from where the Germans were billeted. On the following day we crossed the Trebesnjica, and made contact with Lieutenant Colonel Bacevic's Headquarters. Thereafter, we remained in the vicinity of Dubrovnik, while Colonel Bailey made contact by radio with Cairo.

We were then about five hours from the coast. Bacevic had advance notice of our coming, and a young Yugoslav navy lieutenant in his area who knew the coast very well had made a survey for
the purpose of trying to find a pin point. He finally selected a point about five kilometers south of Cavtat where the rocks descended abruptly into the Adriatic Sea and there was a deep water cove from which we could flash a signal without its being seen by Germans. The only difficulty was that there were several villages between us and the point which harbored a number of Ustachi. Between us and these villages was a large range of mountains descending to a plateau which in turn descended to the sea.

Another difficulty was that Bailey's batteries needed to be charged. We had been told that Bacevic would do this at his headquarters which were about eight hours inland, but when we arrived we found he had no gasoline. We therefore sent a courier into Trebinje, where the batteries were charged by a local concern. We finally made contact with Cairo and received word a day or so later to stand by for three days at the pin point, the coordinates of which we had signaled to Cairo, and to signal certain letters by Morse code with our flashlight each night for three hours.

Up to this point the weather had been excellent. On the night we started down to the coast, a big storm blew up. After sneaking down the mountainside through several villages, in rubber-soled shoes, made out of pieces of rubber tires, and dodging Ustachi patrols we arrived at the pin point without much difficulty. There was an angry sea and we knew that we could not embark, but we kept flashing the signal for three hours. When no boat showed up, our Celjak guide, who lived about three quarters of an hour on the pin point, agreed that we could hide out up in his bedroom the next day, so we returned and stayed there all that night and the next day. The village was full of Ustachi whom we could see through a crack in the window. There were now ten of us, and we stayed in this room without moving out, the landlord bringing us food during the day. Again we tried the next night, but without success, because the weather was still unsettled, and we stayed one more night and day in the same house. When the boat did not show up the third night, we made a long hard retreat up over the mountains for five hours back to the Knezevic family, who hid us for the following day. On the following night we returned to the little safe village from which we had originally started.

By this time we were pretty discouraged because we found out that the Gestapo knew that we were in the general vicinity, through spies in Dubrovnik, but did not know exactly where we were. We received this word through one of Bacevic's spies in the local Gestapo a
Dubrovnik. Furthermore, our batteries had run out, and we had no way of getting them charged except at Trebinje. When we sent a peasant there with the batteries to be charged, he found that the Germans were getting their batteries charged, and had left a soldier to watch their batteries. The soldier became interested in our batteries which were of a different type, so that we had to get the batteries out of there that night. Finally we managed to get another battery, by stealing it out of a railroad car.

The weather continued to be bad and we had a heavy snowstorm. We finally established contact with Cairo and tried to arrange that we would not proceed again to the pin point until Cairo gave us a signal that the ship had already left Bari. This we did because we felt the canal was good for only two more days and we did not want to compromise it. The signal finally came through from Cairo and we again proceeded on the night of 14 February over a slightly different route to the pin point. The trip down the mountainside was extremely difficult because of the snow which made our boots slip on rocks and roused several dogs in the neighborhood. We were only twenty minutes at the pin point flashing the letters R N when we heard the low hum of the motor. About fifteen minutes later the ship slowly pulled up and slung a dingy overboard. In 26 minutes we had embarked all nine of our party. The ship was a British Navy type ML, about 75 tons, bristling with nine machine guns. We arrived in Bari at 0900 the following morning.

While in southern Dalmatia I was advised by everyone, both Yugoslav officers and peasants, that there were no Partisans south of Dubrovnik. I did not run into any on our trip to the coast through this area.

II. MIHAJLOVIC AND HIS POLICY

Mihailovic's general policy is the same as that of any other guerrilla force in an occupied country, i.e., resistance based on ultimate Allied victory. His order of battle, however, as expressed both by himself and many of his leaders, is based upon saving up his offensive for "D-Day" or Gustavik, as it is called by the Yugoslavs. This policy is based upon the assumption that the Allies will invade the Balkans, or if they do not, that he will be called upon to make one grand effort to throw the Germans out of Yugoslavia without Allied help. Mihailovic's position is that he does not have enough arms to
engage in extensive operations before this great "D-Day" and still have enough left for the great day. He bases this on the tremendous reprisals and German counter offensive which followed his "justanek" in the fall of 1941. He also wishes to avoid any further extensive reprisals which he believes will only serve to further reduce the numbers of the Serb population which he states has already been decimated by the Croats, Ustachis and Germans. He is determined to preserve the Serb population ethnically and numerically to avoid Croat domination after the occupator is thrown out.

For the above reasons his policy as expressed personally and in operational orders to his area commanders is to cut down operations against the Germans and Bulgars before "D-Day" to a minimum, unless he receives sufficient arms from the Allies to wage a continuous war against them. His present orders allow each commander to engage in small attacks against the German forces where his own forces are numerically superior in the particular instance to those of the enemy and gain from the operation (either in arms captured or damage done) will more than offset the subsequent cost in reprisals.

The only major departure from the above policy during the past year came immediately after the Italian capitulation, in September 1943, when for a period of one month Mihailovic issued general orders to his leaders to attack communications and enemy forces wherever possible.

At the same time, Mihailovic continues extensive fighting against the Partisans, insisting, however, that his orders are that commanders will fight Partisans only when attacked. In January I was advised by Captain Todorovic, who had sat in on secret meetings of Mihailovic's Staff, that Mihailovic allocates percentages of arms to be used in certain areas against the Germans and Partisans; and that everywhere he is allocating a greater percentage (estimated at about 65%) to the Partisan War. This is borne out by Mihailovic's own figures which show he has an excess of arms over men in certain areas, such as Herzegovina, where he is fighting the Partisans.

The above policy reduces the Cetnik army in Serbia (where there is little or no conflict with Partisans, because there are very few Partisans in Serbia) to a static condition where everybody is waiting for "D-Day". Many of the leaders and men would
probably like to do more fighting because they are sick of being in the woods for three years. Mihailovic thus only serves the purpose of keeping immobilized a certain number of German troops who must be on hand to check the threat of a general uprising by his troops.

The following is Mihailovic's history as related to me by Colonels Bailey, Hudson, and others: Mihailovic personally is a regular career officer in the Yugoslav army, born near Ivanica, Central Serbia, of Serbian parents. Before the war he had served in several different capacities in the Yugoslav army. For a time he was Military Attache at Prague, Czechoslovakia, and Military Attache at Sofia, Bulgaria. He speaks good French. When the war with Germany broke out he was a General Staff Colonel on the extreme left wing in Bosnia, near Sarajevo. When the army began collapsing in his area he immediately retired to the hills with several of his officers and men. Gradually he was joined by others and found himself to be the highest ranking officer. At that time his immediate policy was not to fight the Axis until he was supported by the Allies, thereby precluding heavy reprisals upon the Serbs. He planned to wait until "D-Day", when he would make a great effort to throw out the Germans. He soon found that the Musselmen in Bosnia were being appealed to by the Croat anti-Serb population to join with the Ustachi in the purge of the Serbs, so he went from Bosnia in May 1941 to Ravne Gora, north of Cacak. At this time the country was in a virtual state of anarchy because the Germans had not yet organized their control. It was being run by Belgrade commissars and gendarmes who were too weak and demoralized to keep order for the Germans. Mihailovic got considerable backing from the local people around Ravne Gora by putting local bandits in the hills. He was also joined by large numbers of Yugoslav officers and men who had escaped the Germans and did not want to go into the cities where they would be taken prisoner and sent to prison camp.

In June 1941 Russia entered the war against Germany. Prior to this the Communists had been outlawed in Yugoslavia. Now a small group who call themselves Partisans and who were strongest in the vicinity of Montenegro (where the poverty of the land has always caused the population to take more to Communism and to produce more artisans who showed Communist feelings) began organizing. Their chief appeal was that now the people, and not the army and politicians who had let them down, would do the fighting. The Partisans were therefore fairly popular because they promised everything, didn't go against the King, and were all for getting rid of the old politicians.
Mihailovic's position at this time was not strong, because he came from an army which had been compromised. The Serb peasant who formed over 80% of the population of Serbia, was extremely disappointed at the showing made by his country's army of 1,500,000 men, which he had supported by the sweat of his brow for many years. The Serb felt that he had paid for a fight and that he hadn't received a fight.

In the fall of 1941 the Germans left a very small force to occupy Serbia, mainly because they had drawn most of their forces to the Russian front. The Partisans, finding the Germans weak, began making successful attacks on communications, railroads, and small German columns.

Mihailovic was now forced to take a different position, because he found himself with a competitor appealing to the Serbian people who were getting excited over the successes of the Partisans. In August 1941 he therefore issued a general statement that he realized the temper of the people, that he had been appealed to as a responsible leader, and that he was now going to come down and lead a general revolt against the occupator. This he did, with considerable success for two months, working with the Partisans jointly part of the time. Uzici, Pozega, Cacak, and many other towns in Central Serbia were taken, and Valjevo was besieged.

The joint offensive did not last very long, however, because of the many differences between the Partisans and the Cetniks. Peace was made for a while, but did not last long. Then the Germans mustered their strength, made a drive south into Serbia and crushed both the Partisans and Mihailovic with a full scale offensive with tanks and infantry. Mihailovic went into Montenegro. The Partisans first went into Herzegovina and were pushed from there into Bosnia. This spelled the end of the Partisan appeal to the Serb people because the Partisans were defeated and now Medic and the collaborators became popular. The general feeling was that a German victory was inevitable and that the people might as well follow the Medic slogan, "Work, and order. Let the big nations fight out the issues which the Serbs cannot settle, and from which the Serbs can only get futile bloodshed". Now the people wanted peace and no reprisals—particularly those who would lose the most.
Mihailovic now sat in Montenegro where he reorganized his army with orders that it should stay under cover until it could be strengthened. He was able to stay in Montenegro from September 1942 until May 1943 because of collaboration between his local leaders there and the Italian occupators to whom control of Montenegro had been given by the Axis after the defeat of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic justified the receipt of Italian arms which he used against the Partisans on the ground that he would subsequently use them against the Italians themselves.

Today Mihailovic still has a great grip on the Serbian peasant. Everywhere Colonel Seitz and I traveled on our tour through north-central Serbia the people in villages who turned out to see us cheered him madly. In private conversations they talk of him as one would of the Messiah. Cetnik troops and peasants alike sing romantic songs about him, and Ravne Gora, his original hideout, has become very sacred to the Serbian people. To them, Mihailovic still stands as a symbol of their spirit of resistance against the occupator. He also stands for the things they want, King and democracy. They feel that he did not desert them in their greatest hour of need, immediately after capitulation, but stayed to organize their resistance and fought against the Germans in 1941 when the big nations were losing the war everywhere else. One must remember that the Serb peasant is a simple man, uneducated, and bound to grasp firmly to simple ideas.

As far as qualities of leadership are concerned, Mihailovic seems to lack the ability to delegate authority. For example, he personally sees and answers every telegram and letter from his various commanders and other representatives throughout the country. This wastes valuable time which could be used for important matters, and delays answers which must be sent off immediately. Even on minor matters such as arrangements for movement of his GHQ to another location he personally supervises everything.

Colonel Bailey has also reported that Mihailovic fancies himself as a very clever politician and diplomat who has attempted in relations with the British to get help without making commitments binding upon himself, with the result that
he hurts his own position because he only encourages hard dealing and lack of complete frankness on both sides. For example, he refused to accept as a condition to the receipt of British aid, that he would permit British Liaison officers to witness the operations which he said he would carry out if the aid were forthcoming, and he isolated himself from Colonel Bailey, after Bailey had made this request. Bailey's position was that if Mihailovic was actually going to carry out the operations as requested, he would lose nothing by allowing British officers to witness them and would in fact probably help himself because the British could render first-hand reports to Cairo. Later, Mihailovic withdrew from this position and reestablished relations with Bailey.

In his dealings with the British missions sent in to him, Mihailovic, (according to Bailey) has unfortunately adopted an attitude that they are only glorified quartermasters. He has limited his discussions primarily to making requests for arms and ammunition, and that the British broadcast certain propaganda submitted by him. No attempt was made at the outset to enter into complete and frank joint discussions or agreements on proposed operations, and whether they would tie it with Allied policy. This may partly be due to early action of the British. At the outset of their relations with Mihailovic, in the fall of 1941, they sent Mihailovic a plane load of arms over the objection of their own British liaison officer, Colonel Hudson, who pointed out that the aid would be used in the civil war which was beginning to brew with the Partisans. When Mihailovic learned of this he adopted the attitude that the British mission was relatively unimportant because he could get aid in spite of it. During this same period BBC London, regardless of messages from Hudson, was making a world wide figure of Mihailovic. This only tended to inflate Mihailovic's superiority complex in his early dealings with Hudson, and in his later dealings with Bailey. Mihailovic also showed evidence of smallness in his treatment of Colonel Hudson. When he found that Hudson had tried to stop Cairo from sending aid, he kept Hudson virtually incommunicado for almost six months. More recently Bailey reports that Mihailovic tried in several ways to keep him from getting out of the country.

Toward Colonel Seitz and myself, Mihailovic has always been
most affable, but we have never had dealings with him involving American supplies or requested operations.

Mihailovic has a very second rate general staff, probably in part due to his inability to delegate authority. His next highest ranking officer is General Trifunivic, who appears to be his Chief of Staff. Actually he seemed to me to be nothing but a rubber stamp. Rumor has it that Mihailovic kept Trifunivic constantly at his side to prevent potential rivalry for control of the Yugoslav army. Before leaving, however, I heard that Trifunivic has been placed in charge of a group of Korpuses. Mihailovic's Chief Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Laladevic is reported by the British to be rather narrow minded and inefficient. Mihailovic's political advisor, Dr. Moljevic, is an extreme pan-Serb, anti-Croat, a former lawyer who lived and practiced in Banja Luka, which was purged mercilessly by Ustachi in 1941 and 1942. Major Tersic and Captain Slepcovic, other assistants to the Minister, are pleasant and friendly but seem to lack ability and force. The only staff officer who appears to have ability suited to his position is Lieutenant Colonel Novarkovic, Chief of Intelligence, who is a hard worker, but he is hampered by poor communications system and lack of operational orders regarding intelligence.

As distinguished from the General Staff officers, Mihailovic's Area and Korpus commanders are on the whole fairly capable leaders, when one takes into consideration the paucity of officer material available after capitulation, and that the cream of the officers, numbering about 12,000 are in German prison camps. The Cetnik commanders are, with few exceptions, former regular Yugoslav Army officers, averaging about 35 years of age. Nearly all of them have been with Mihailovic since his early days in Ravne Gora, and are used to many hardships after three years in the woods. These commanders must almost of necessity be fairly capable men, because they must lead groups of volunteers serving without pay, without adequate equipment or arms, and under most rugged living conditions.

Ideallogically Mihailovic stands for King, and democratic principles of representative government. As Minister of War of the only Yugoslav Government politically recognized by the Allies, Mihailovic takes the position that he is the legal head of all men of legal fighting age throughout Yugoslavia, and that upon receipt of orders from him they should mobilize under his banner. This may color his thinking on the number of men he can actually mobilize because he may be under the impression that they will mobilize merely because they are legally mobilizable.
III. MIHAILOVIC'S ARMY

The information which follows is based upon a personal inspection made by Colonel Seitz and myself of Mihailovic's troops in North Central Serbia, the areas of which have already been listed above. While each area commander suggested a route through his area which would permit us to see the greatest number of his troops, we were given free choice to choose our own routes if we so desired. Maps showing our exact route are attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Scarcely a day was passed without an inspection and review of some unit of Mihailovic's forces. Photographs were taken of nearly all Brigades inspected and are attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

In nearly all areas large numbers of villagers and townspeople collected to greet us. In fact, our daily receptions by the people in some areas were almost overwhelming. For instance, in Milovanovic's area, north of Valjevo, people lined the roads for miles, showering us with flowers and fruit, and stopping us for brief visits. It was possible to make this trip without running into the enemy because we always kept on the move.

Under the above conditions we had an excellent opportunity to study the condition of the men, their arms, morale, age, etc. We also had a chance to gain some impression of the type and ability of their leaders and the morale and attitude of the people.

We first obtained from each Area Commander, detailed information from his area on each of the following topics: (1) names and short personal history sketches of his officers; (2) Disposition of enemy in his area, with reasons why they are so disposed; (3) Disposition of his own troops; (4) Description of targets in area; (5) Communications System; (6) Supply; (7) Reprisals; (8) Hostages; (9) Potential Airrobes; (10) List of operations to date; (11) Plan of Operations; (12) Relations with Medici; (13) Propaganda, including enemy, Cetnik, Partisan, and Allied; (14) Economic Intelligence. Pencilled notes taken by me on the above were turned over to Colonel Seitz.

Each Area Commander also gave us a schedule prepared by him showing for each Srez in his area, the following: (1) Population; (2) Number of men already mobilized and under arms; (3) Men mobilizable in all three branches; (4) Arms and ammunition on hand; (5) Arms and ammunition requested. In addition
to the above, Mihailovic gave me his own schedule giving the same information for all Areas, including those visited by us. This schedule is attached as Exhibit "C". A glance will show the painstaking work to which Mihailovic has gone in order to set forth the numbers for each Srez, or political district.

It was our plan to check the figures personally collected by us, and spot-checked in the field, against those received from Mihailovic. This will be impossible, however, until Colonel Seitz returns, for the reason that I turned over all schedules to him except the one received from Major Cvetic. The latter checks very closely against Mihailovic's figures.

Since Colonel Seitz has all of the notes, schedules, and propaganda collected in the figures, the information set forth below is reconstructed entirely from memory, and hence is very incomplete.

(a) Organization of the Army

Mihailovic states that he has 57,440 men mobilized, and that he could mobilize 472,900 for the first group (active mobile combat troops, 13 to 40 years); 169,600 for the second group (saboteurs, men between 40 and 55 years of age); and 58,520 for the third group (home guard, over 55 years of age).

I believe that Mihailovic now has mobilized about 35,000 men with arms. This figure, which must of necessity be a pure guess, is based upon the fact that in the very, very limited area of Serbia inspected by us we saw at least 4,000 men with arms. In many areas we are unable to see all of the Brigades, for many different reasons. Some were doing guard duty. Others were stationed too far from us to appear. In some areas we showed up as a total surprise to the Korpus commander, so that he was unable to muster all men from the different parts of his area during the very short period when we were with him.

The army is organized geographically. Each Srez in Serbia (political division of area comprising a small section of Yugoslavia) has at least one Brigade depending upon its population, of which an average of about 250 men are constantly mobilized in the woods. There are also many more recruits without arms in each area who are called together frequently for a period of training. If completely mobilized, each brigade would number between 2,500 and 5,000 men, depending upon the population of the area.
The army is organized as follows:

(1) Vod (Troop or platoon)
(2) Ceta (company - 2 or more vods
(3) Brigade - 2 or more cetas
(4) Korpus - 2 or more brigades
(5) Area or Call - 2 or more korpuses

The commander of each unit is responsible to the commander of the next highest unit, and each Area Commander is responsible directly to General Mihailovic. Korpuses and Srezes are shown in a map attached hereto as Exhibit D and D-1.

Until very recently Mihailovic made no promotions of officers in the army, who continued to hold the rank which they had at the time of capitulation. While korpus commanders tried as much as possible, for the sake of discipline, to have junior officers who were subordinate in rank, it was not uncommon to find a Lieutenant in command of a Brigade, with a Captain under him, the Lieutenant having proven himself a more capable leader of troops during the past two years. Of late, however, Mihailovic has promoted some officers, and there now appears to be a hierarchy of command. Of course, all troops serve without pay, and are told not to expect pay in the future.

Korpus commanders are responsible for all operations within their areas and enter the areas of other Korpus commanders only upon orders of their Area Commander or Mihailovic.

Guerilla warfare (requiring men to organize where cover is best and to live mostly in the woods) requires that any organization of forces be flexible and adaptable to changed circumstances. In general, however, each Area and Korpus Commander has a Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer, Intendant, Adjutant, Propaganda Officer, and a Staff Company or Personal Guard. Each officer and soldier is issued a personal Cetnik legitemacia, and a roll is kept of membership in each area.

Each Korpus Commander advised that figures showing the
number of men whom he could mobilize in his area were based upon secret rolls kept by the Cetnik Mayors of the villages in the areas; that they could rely upon the loyalty of the people in these villages, and that periodically, organizational meetings were held for the purpose of testing the morale and willingness of the people to serve. In some areas troops mobilized for active duty are constantly kept in rotation so that large numbers of the population eventually see service at some time or another in the Cetnik ranks.

In most areas visited there was always a large number of men without arms, who turned out for inspection. For instance, in Vuckovic's area at one inspection we saw over 600 such men.

(b) State of Army, Morale, and Fighting Ability

When the troops originally rallied around Mihailovic on Ravne Gora in 1941, many had their uniforms, rifles, and ammunition; a great deal of which was depleted by the unsuccessful revolt in the fall of 1941. During the past 2-1/2 years their uniforms have worn out and there has been very little replacement of clothing, with the result that the troops are now in an extremely ragged condition. While the peasants can supply food and shelter, clothes and shoes are almost impossible to obtain. They must be purchased on the black market at sky high prices, and without funds this is impossible. The only source of clothing is an attack on enemy troops, and I have heard troops planning such an attack to get themselves some clothes. At present Mihailovic's troops wear all kinds of oddments, including peasant garb, and Italian, German, Bulgar, and British uniforms. The great majority wear native Opankas for shoes, and these afford little protection against rain, rocks and snow. Perhaps the most extreme example of raggedness was in Vuckovic's area, where we saw 25 soldiers of the Second Takovska Brigade, who had walked without shoes eight hours in the snow to appear for inspection. Yet one rarely hears them or their commanders complain about lack of proper clothes. All they ask is arms and ammunition.

About half the Cetniks are heavily bearded, carry their ammunition on their persons, with one or two hand grenades hooked into their belts, and look like "tough hombres."
The average Cetnik soldier in Serbia has a Yugoslav rifle which is pitted and worn, and shows the marks of having been buried for some time after capitulation. The leather sling has been worn out completely, and is now replaced with rope or rag. There are no supplies, soap or oil for cleaning these rifles, so that it is impossible to keep them in first class condition. In short, the average rifle often looks more like a museum piece, than an instrument ready for use on the battlefield.

Mihailovic's figures show that for 57,440 men mobilized, he has on hand the following arms and ammunition:

- 90,739 Rifles
- 321 Heavy Machine Guns
- 1,149 Light Machine Guns
- 65 Mortars
- 294 Machine Pistols

Some of these figures seem out of all proportion to what we found on inspection. For instance, Mihailovic's report states that he has over one and one-half times as many rifles as men mobilized. Upon inspection, we found everywhere in North Serbia, that there were insufficient arms. Each Commander advised that if he had more arms he would mobilize more troops.

Mihailovic's own figures show that the excess of arms over men mobilized does not exist in the part of Serbia inspected by us, but in areas like Herzegovina where he is fighting the Partisans. This ties in with my own observation. Lieutenant Colonel Bacevic did state, for instance, that in his area (Herzegovina and South Dalmatia) he had plenty of arms taken from the Italians, and did not want anything except shoes and clothing for his men.

As for ammunition, the amount varies in different areas in Serbia. An individual soldier may have from 10 to 100 rounds for his particular rifle, or at best, enough for about one day's fighting. There is a small sprinkling of automatic weapons and light machine guns in every korpus, and each korpus usually has two or three mortars with sufficient bombs to last not more
than an hour in battle. There are practically no heavier weapons such as light mountain artillery pieces (seventy-five millimeters), Howitzers, or the like.

There are, of course, exceptions to the above. For instance, Kalabic's area, where the King's guard is located, has a substantial number of light machine guns captured from the Germans in August 1943.

The best way to test all of Mihailovic's figures will be to check them against those personally obtained by us when Colonel Seitz returns.

When one considers that for two and a half years these men have been serving without pay, living in the woods under most difficult conditions, suffering reprisals upon their families, and that they are poorly equipped, poorly clothed, and poorly housed and fed, their morale is excellent. Their clothes are often so ragged that they look more like tramps than soldiers. In the bitter Serbian winter, without any clothes, other than thin jackets and pants, without gloves, and without shoes other than thin "opancies" they live under conditions which I would have considered it impossible for them to stand if I had not seen it with my own eyes, often marching many hours with heavy equipment through deep snows.

The discipline in the Serbian Cetnik is also amazingly good. I have seen men ordered by their commanders to carry out long marches under most difficult conditions without a murmur. In fact, on the road they keep up spirits by singing peasant songs. Breaches of orders are, however, dealt with rather drastically. Men may be shot by their commanders for violations which incur a lesser penalty in our army. Minor infractions are punished by 25 blows on the back with a stick in front of the platoon.

It is difficult to gage the fighting ability of the Cetnik soldiers. The majority, i.e. all men over 25 years of age, went through two years of compulsory training required by the Yugoslav government before the war, and hence have a basic knowledge of infantry weapons. There seems to be a noticeable
lack, however, of capable junior tactical officers.

Brigade commanders and junior tactical officers do not go in for any extensive training before making an attack on the enemy or carrying out a sabotage operation. Their combat intelligence before attack is very poor. They rely mainly upon the element of surprise for success, but they are apt to be surprised themselves by factors which were not properly briefed before the attack, such as the length and construction of a bridge, the housing of the enemy forces, the number of the enemy in the neighborhood, the length of time to get to and from the point of attack, and the deployment of their own forces. Usually, however, the Cetnik has an advantage over superior numbers of the enemy because he knows the terrain better, and gets information from natives concerning the enemy. Hence, the German sticks mostly to the towns and main roads, and rarely ventures up into the hills.

The tactics used by Cetniks in attacks on the enemy are crude. The forces usually assemble in the woods close to their target. If the target is a moving column, they strike heavily by surprise from the woods, and the attack is either a success or failure within the first hour. In attacking towns they tried to strike by surprise during the night or at dawn, stealing up within striking distance. If they have success they invade the town, kill as many of the enemy as possible, destroy targets, and take off what food and equipment they can lug. If the general area is held by Cetniks they stay in the town until they are ousted by the enemy.

Mihailovic's army obtains its food from the Serbian peasants who seem to give both food and lodging willingly to the Cetniks. Most commanders advised that it was rarely if ever necessary to requisition food from the peasants, and that the peasants were only too glad to give it. When a commander finds it necessary to ask for large amounts for a concentrated group of his soldiers, he sometimes gives a receipt to the peasant, which it is hoped will entitle the peasant to payment after the war. The problem remains as to how the army would be supported if it were fully mobilized, since nearly all the peasants would then be taken off the farms and put in
the army. Most commanders feel that women and children could work the farms during this period.

The above information applies only to that part of Serbia inspected by us. In Southern Herzegovina and Dalmatia, through which I went on my trip out of the country, the situation differed considerably from Serbia. The troops in these areas seemed to have more arms and ammunition, which Lieutenant Colonel Bacevic, commander for the area, stated that he had taken from the Italians after they capitulated. But the morale, fighting spirit, and discipline of these forces does not compare with that of the Cetniks in Serbia. For example, one band of 60 Cetniks refused to continue with us through one area south of Nevisinje because they were afraid of running into Partisans who blocked off the area. On the retreat back to our starting point, about 50 of these men disappeared. There was a great lack of junior officers with the result that 100 men would often be under a sergeant only. In one instance, a soldier sent off on a most urgent mission as a courier was found two hours later still waiting around for a rest, and something to eat before he left. Major Lukasevic nearly ordered him to be shot. This lack of morale may in part be due to the collaboration with Germans in this area, and in part to the fact that the people are war weary.

(c) Communications

Mihailovic's army has a very poor and inadequate communication system, with the result that it depends almost entirely upon couriers, who take days to deliver a message which should be delivered at once. At the General Staff there are five central radio transmitters, each one of which maintains daily liaison with about seven Korpus commanders. Each of these commanders in turn has a small home-made, low-powered primitive radio transmitter which is usually only capable of operation during the day time, and is often out of commission. Some of the Korpus commanders have a few similar transmitters within their areas for the purpose of keeping liaison with distance Brigade Commanders.

When Colonel Seitz and I were on our tour of inspection we saw how frustrating it can be to try to operate an army with such an inadequate system. For instance, when I was in the southern part of Cvetic's area I made a two day trip over
mountains through heavy snow to Stikovo to try to find Lukasevic or Kalitovic, who had radio transmitters, so that I might establish liaison with GHQ by means of their radio. I arrived to find that both commanders had left the vicinity two days before and that we were surrounded on three sides by Germans and Partisans. All of this would have been avoided if Cvetic's Korpus commander had had radio liaison with GHQ or with Lukasevic. The result was that we did not know whether to take a chance and go on from Stikovo, or to retreat. The approach of German forces finally led us to make a thirteen hour retreat back to the point from which we started.

Mihailovic's army would be tremendously improved with just a moderate amount of radio transmitters properly placed. With his present inadequate system, important combat intelligence often fails to arrive on time. It also means that when a certain brigade is ordered to action in an area, action cannot be commenced until it is too late, because word is not received on time. It further results in divorcement of Brigade Commanders from their Korpus commanders, with the result that there cannot be coordination of activities in different areas, and forces are trapped by the enemy because word cannot be gotten to them in time.

Mihailovic presently works his primitive radio system to the extreme, and accomplishes the most he can, but he is tremendously handicapped by lack of equipment.

(d) Intelligence

Mihailovic has the facilities for an excellent intelligence system in Serbia, because in every village and town there are Cetniks who want to help him. The results obtained, however, are very poor. Each Korpus commander seemed to us to know the enemy disposition in his area pretty well, and most operations are reported in to the Korpus commander, but most Korpus commanders showed an appalling lack of knowledge about targets in their areas or about other strategic information of interest to the Allies. For instance, they could give only rough estimates on lengths and construction of railroad bridges and tunnels, the nature and extent of enemy protection of targets, the times of movements of trains, the daily movements and habits of enemy garrisons, the locations and sizes of potential air-
fields, the equipment and operation of strategic factories and mines, etc. This ignorance is in part due to probably a lack of appreciation, and in part to sheer laziness. It is mostly due, however, to lack of proper organization and orders from the Minister and his Chief of Intelligence. It was only recently, and after much hammering that we were able to get Mihailovich to direct commanders to collect details on railroad traffic, enemy aviation activities, etc.

Good target intelligence is still lacking. For example, before our attack on Visegrad and the destruction of the Rogatica bridge, we received three different estimates on the size and structure of this bridge, all of which varied greatly, and all of which were wrong. It would have been a simple task for the Area Commander to make an accurate and complete reconnaissance of the bridge. We likewise received only the roughest information from Vuckovic and Cvetic on bridges and factories in their areas.

No plausible excuse was offered by Area Commanders for not providing excellent intelligence on all matters within their areas. The men who are now standing by in the woods waiting for arms and "D-Day" could easily be put to work to provide the Allies with top-notch intelligence. Such activity might also improve their morale. I feel that good results will not be obtained unless Mihailovich issues a forceful directive making it clear to everybody that he considers the matter to be of vital importance. At the same time, each commander should be given the categories into which such intelligence must be divided, such as (1) Target intelligence, (2) Enemy movements and disposition, (3) Disposition of Mihailovich's forces, (4) Operations, (5) Enemy propaganda, (6) Miscellaneous matters, such as word received concerning enemy plans or enemy letters intercepted. Each commander should also be impressed with the fact that this is a continuous job and that details are important.

(e) Operations to Date

On the subject of operations generally, my impression is that prior to the Italian capitulation in September 1943, Mihailovich was conducting nothing but minor operations against the Germans. In September and October, a substantial amount of operations against the Germans were reported from all areas, some of which were witnessed by Allied personnel. Several
trains were wrecked. A large amount of railroad track was torn up. The Belgrade-Sarajevo Railroad line was broken by destruction of the Vardiste and Rogatica bridges (the latter a very long one). Many towns were taken after attacks on Germans, such as Priepolje, Bielo Polje, Berane, Priboj, Visegrad, Rogatica, Gacko, Bileca, etc. The Italian "venetzia" Division surrendered. A large number of German camions were destroyed, and a substantial number of Germans killed. Since October, activity seems to have gone down almost to its former level.

The fact remains, however, that Mihailovic (despite promises) has failed to cut the main railroad lines north and south through the Ibar and Varda valleys. These are most important both as present supply lines and as the principal means by which Germans would retreat from Greece and Macedonia. Mihailovic has also failed to destroy the Bor and Trepca Mines, important sources of metal to the Germans.

From each Area Commander visited, Colonel Seitz and I obtained a statement of his operations to date against the enemy, showing the time and place of the operation, the numbers involved on both sides, with the results. Colonel Seitz now has the pencilled notes on all of this data, so that it is impossible for me to list the details. My only recollection is that most of the Area Commanders claim to have carried out several small operations a month during the past year, a small operation being one in which a band of 100-200 Cetniks attacked a larger number of Germans, Lotishevci, Nedici, Bulgars, or Arnauts. In some areas much larger operations are reported. Two typical lists of operations received from Area Commanders, which I happened to retain, are attached as Exhibits E and F.

Since there were no Partisans in the areas visited by us on our inspection tour, the question of operations against the Partisans did not come up.

(f) Operations Planned

Each Area Commander expects that there will be a "D-Day" when he will receive an order to conduct all-out operations against the enemy within his area. His plan of attack is to deploy his available manpower in such a way that he can wipe
out enemy garrisons within the area and cut enemy lines of communication. For instance, Kalabic showed us in some detail how he would deploy his troops to attack the enemy if the enemy disposition is the same on "D-Day" as it is now. Colonel Seitz has our pencilled notes on these plans.

For operations prior to "D-Day" each commander operates under an order from the Minister, directing that he may in his discretion carry out minor operations where the number of his forces is greater than the enemy, and the results gained will be worth the cost in reprisals.

(g) Medical Attendance and Supplies

Mihailovic's army is woefully lacking in medical officers and supplies. Each area has one or two medical officers at best, and no supplies other than a few bandages and battle dressings. In some regions, such as Cvetic's area, there are no military doctors, but the Commandant has an arrangement with certain doctors in the towns that they will render assistance when called. This, of course, would prove most unsatisfactory during any large scale operations, because the assistance would come too little and too late.

One of the most pitiful instances of lack of medical attendance and equipment was reported by two British enlisted men who were present when Major Lukasevic attacked Priepolje in September 1943. They stated that several men with bullets in the chest or stomach, finding no medical assistance in the rear lines, returned to the front line and continued firing until they died.

(h) Training and Recruitment

Mihailovic's commanders have no difficulty in finding recruits in Serbia. We have witnessed many Cetnik recruitment ceremonies, in which thousands of Serbian peasant youths showed up to be sworn in to the Cetnik Army. In Zlatibor I saw 1600 recruits at one ceremony in October, and in Cvetic's I saw about 1500 at another in late December. The only difficulty is in finding arms and ammunition for these men.
Serbian youths who wish to join the Cetnik ranks are accepted by the local commanders if found physically fit. They do not, however, become Cetniks until they take the oath. This is administered by a local Orthodox pope, at an impressive ceremony usually held in the woods under the supervision of the commandant and his officers. All youths assemble, and prayers are first read by the pope. Under the guidance of the pope recruits then raise their right hand, swear allegiance to the King, country, and Cetnik army. Then there are many speeches by the local commander and members of his staff, and many cheers for King Peter, Yugoslavia and Draga Mihailovic. Thereafter, the men go into a period of training which varies according to their areas. The next step is to provide them with arms. If there are no arms, they may be returned to their homes until called to active duty or placed on active duty without arms, such as courier duty.

The Training in most areas consists of the Yugoslav manual of arms and infantry tactics. There is very little close order drill, because guerrilla warfare does not call for it. There is, however, a large amount of deployed infantry tactics which are used most of the time in the woods. We have seen recruits going through this training.

In nearly all districts there is a "youth movement". Youths from 12 to 18 years of age are recruited and trained in infantry tactics, using wooden rifles and machine guns which they make themselves.

The living conditions of the recruits and active soldiers are most rugged. The recruit enters without pay or equipment (other than his rifle) and carries his own food with him to the recruitment ceremony, Thereafter, he must live as best he can on the generosity of the peasants.

In some areas soldiers are considered to own the rifles which they bring with them into the service, so that it is impossible to have a rotating army. In other areas, however, (such as Kalabic's area) all arms are treated as community property. Soldiers are then kept on active duty for a period of several months, and are then permitted to return to their farms, being replaced by new recruits who are given their arms.
This system seems to work out better and permits the area commander to have a larger number of mobilizable combat troops available in his area.

(i) **Propaganda**

By far the chief source of Allied news to the people of Yugoslavia is the radio, and the only Allied station which most radios can always get without interference is BBC London. The Boston station, WRUL, is too weak to be heard regularly.

In the country areas where we lived there are very few radios, mainly because these people could afford a radio and would have difficulty getting an accumulator periodically charged for its operation. Each Srez probably has not more than three radios, one of which is usually owned by the Brigade Commander for the area.

The peasant receives his news, therefore, by word of mouth from those who hear the radio, or through mimeographed news sheets and propaganda issued by the Cetnik Commander in his area, who has a radio. The only other source of news are the German controlled newspapers, such as "Novo Vreme" or magazines, such as "Signal" which is published in the Serbian language.

Each Korpus has its Propaganda Officer, who is responsible to the Chief of Propaganda with Mihailovic. There is no uniform type of propaganda leaflet issued for all Serbia. In some areas, newspapers are printed, such as "Ravne Gora" and "Gardist", (published in Kalabic's area). Elsewhere, there are mimeographed pamphlets issued daily in some areas, weekly in others.

I am not prepared here to answer questions on the "line" taken by Mihailovic's propaganda. Colonel Seitz and I collected a great volume of material, but we were unable to get it translated for us because there was not enough time. When this is all translated here, we will be in a better position to see what the general trend, appeal, and arguments are. My present impression is that, even though there are few Partisans in North Central Serbia, Mihailovic still issued a great deal of anti-Partisan propaganda there.

The BBC which, since September 1943, has devoted most of its time to Partisan news, has caused a tremendous anti-British sentiment in all Cetnik ranks. This is shared to a lesser extent by the peasants who are more perplexed than antagonistic.
They cannot understand how this radio station, which praised Mihailovic so highly in 1941 and 1942, is now backing their civil enemy so strongly. At first the local propaganda officers tried to explain the BBC news to the people by stating that BBC did not reflect the views of the British people. Since December, however, when Law, in the House of Commons, stated that the British Government was giving far more aid to the Partisans, because they are doing more fighting against the Germans, the have ceased this explanation.

The Germans, in addition to controlling the newspapers, issue propaganda pamphlets and place placards in most of the cities and towns. I turned many of these over to Colonel Seitz, and upon his return they can be studied.

The only Allied pamphlet I saw was one dropped by plane in Herzegovina in January. It showed a picture of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Teheran, and gave a Serbian text of the statement issued by them there.

On the whole, the Serbian peasant seems to learn important news events quickly. Of course, the fact that both Mihailovic and the German controlled newspapers attack the Partisans, may class them together in the eyes of the peasant.

The Cetniks like the Boston radio station, WHUL, very much, stating they believe it tries to give an impartial statement of the news, but are disappointed because it is very weak and cannot be heard regularly. As for discussions on the radio from the United States, however, whether over WHUL or rebroadcast over BBC, the criticism generally was that they did not go enough into the deeper problems. The Serbs, while glad to hear broadcasts from friends of their own race in America, are not very impressed when sister Divna from Pittsburgh gets on the radio and sends best wishes to everybody in some town in Ivancica where she used to live. They want something more serious.

(j) **Food Situation**

There is no famine in Serbia. The peasant still east and lives almost as well as he did before the war, except that he
lacks white flour, sugar, and such delicacies, which are so expensive that they are in most cases entirely beyond his reach. There is plenty of black bread, corn, "kizmak", pig, lamb, "rachia", chicken, and the like. The only scarcity is found in those mountainous areas which always were poor.

The Germans requisition from each village a certain percentage of its crops and livestock, and require that the food be delivered to a receiving station periodically in some central town. If it is not delivered as ordered, the Germans go on punitive campaigns, burning houses, etc. In the northern plains the peasant delivers on the average about 50% of his requisitions, because the flat country enables the Germans to go out and collect easily. But in the mountainous regions, the peasant delivers only about 10% of his requisitions (if this much) because the Germans do not have the forces or inclination to go up into the mountains and collect.

The situation in Southern Herzegovina is quite different. Here there are areas where food is very difficult to obtain.

Colonel Seitz and I collected extensive data on prevailing prices of food and commodities in Belgrade and other cities and towns of Serbia, which I turned over to him.

(k) Reprisals - hostages - potential airdromes - targets - personal histories of Cetnik officers - German disposition.

Colonel Seitz has our pencilled notes on each of the above topics, showing for each area the number of reprisals and hostages, location and description of potential airdromes, location and description of military targets in each area, and personal histories of Cetnik officers. Since without these notes I could furnish only a hazy general recollection of the facts, I suggest we wait until he arrives with the data.
IV THE PARTISAN-CETNIK WAR - ATTITUDE OF CETNIKS

In North Central Serbia we saw no Partisans, and were advised everywhere that there were no Partisans in the area, with the exception of a small band of two or three hundred who had crossed the Sava River between Sabac and Obrenovac and had penetrated a short distance southward. It was also reported that there was a small group of Partisans in the Kakanik Mountains and in the south near Pristina. When I arrived near Raksa in late December I found that a band of 800 to 1,000 Partisans had been pushed over from the Sanjak, through Stitkovo. On 10 January they had penetrated almost so far as Ivanica, but were being surrounded on all sides by Cetniks. Later I heard that there were also Partisans in the Zlatibor region.

My impression is that the people in Serbia do not favor the Partisans, and that they are against communism. Every peasant wants only his King and a democratic form of government. We heard this expressed thousands of times. The peasants fear and hate the Partisans, whom they represent as an enemy which will burn down their houses and take away all of their food.

The general feeling on the part of Cetnik commanders in the area of Serbia inspected seemed to be that they were not worried about Partisans trying to establish a foothold. The chief enemy in Central Serbia still seems to be the Germans.

On the march to the sea through the Sanjak and Herzegovina, I found an entirely different situation. Here the chief interest of the Cetnik commanders, their men, and the Serb peasants were the Partisans. By far the greatest part of the military effort here is devoted against the Partisans, and there is a bitter civil war raging everywhere. For instance, I have personally seen many houses alleged to have been burned down by Partisans in Herzegovina, and have listened to many local pro-Cetnik Serb peasants describe bitterly how badly they have been treated by the Partisans. For instance, when I have asked to buy food from peasants, they have replied that they would only be too glad to give me something if they had it, but that the Partisans had been in the village and had taken everything. I have personally,
from a hill near Kalinovik, seen the Partisans, through my field glasses, burning down the houses of the local Cetnik commandant and his leaders.

Both the attitude of Mihailovic, as expressed in his letters to Generals Donovan and Eisenhower, and that of his Area Commanders, shows that they consider the war against the Partisans to have primarily a racial basis, and only secondarily a ideological basis. Several Yugoslav officers explained the situation to me as follows:

"In 1941 the Partisans under Tito comprised mostly poor Serbs from Montenegro and the Sanjak, to whom communism appealed, because it gave these people a chance to share the wealth. At the same time, the Partisans appealed strongly to those Serbs who felt that rich politicians and bureaucrats were responsible for the sudden defeat of their large army. The Serbs feel, however, that the real reason for the army's fiasco was the treachery of a large percentage of Croat officers and men who, being strongly Germanophil, and believing that Nazi domination of Continental Europe was inevitable, were willing to surrender without resistance. After the capitulation, the Germans brought in Pavelic, and the Ustachi and these traitorous Croats joined the Ustachi. At this time both Tito and Mihailovic had the same objective, i.e. to defeat the occupier, and the only difference between them was that Tito stood for communism. Meanwhile, the Ustachi and treacherous Croats began their blood purge of Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, believing firmly that permanent German domination of Yugoslavia was inevitable, since the Allies were losing heavily on every front.

"After the Germans crushed both Tito and Mihailovic in the fall of 1941, Tito was eventually forced up into the region of west Bosnia, his main stronghold. During the year 1942 it became apparent that the Allies might possibly win the war after all."
Rommel was pushed back out of Egypt. The Allies landed in North Africa. Russia continued to have success on the Eastern Front. The Ustachi then realized that if the Allies were successful, they would be shot as war criminals. Mihailovic had vowed that for every Serb life taken by the Ustachi and Croats, a Croat life would be taken in reprisal, and BBC London was broadcasting this announcement. The Ustachi could not, therefore, make peace with Mihailovic, and their only hope of saving themselves was to go over to the Allied side by joining the Partisans.

"Inspection of Partisan bodies and prisoners taken in battle shows that the Partisan army is now comprised of more than seventy-five percent Croats and former Ustachi. The Cetniks claim that they are fighting the Serbs to preserve themselves ethnically and numerically, and to insure for themselves post-war control of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the war there were about 4,800,000 Croats in Yugoslavia, 6,000,000 Serbs, 1,000,000 Slovenians, 750,000 Muslims, and 1,000,000 of other minorities.

"Before the war, the Croats both feared and resented any Serb domination of Yugoslavia. They felt, on the contrary, that since their population, together with that of the Slovenians, was almost equal to that of the Serbs, the capital of Yugoslavia should be at Zagreb, especially since they were closer to the centers of European culture. While willing to accept the benefits of a Yugoslav state, the Croats, under Dr. Macek, were constantly agitating for an independent state, and an independent king, not a Kara-George. Dr. Macek had aspirations for the throne.

"The Serb-Croat antagonism was further increased by the fact that the Croats are overwhelmingly Catholic, and the Serbs, Orthodox. In 1927 there was nearly a religious war between the Serbs and Croats, when the Yugoslav Government's Concordat gave more rights to Catholics.

"The Serb officers feel that the Croats are the politicians, whereas the Serbs have, in the course of history, done all the fighting. They point to the
country's history in the last world war, when the Serbs on the Salonika front were the spearhead which eventually liberated their country with a tremendous loss of life.

"The Cetnik officers maintain that Tito is now devoting by far the greater amount of his forces, arms, and ammunition against the Cetniks in the civil war."

The above expression of attitude shows how bitterly the Cetniks feel against the Partisans, whom they consider as comprising the overwhelming percentage of Croats and former Ustachis. They cannot forgive the Croats for their purge of the Serb population in 1941 and 1942, which they claim took 700,000 lives. They cannot understand why Britain, which formerly backed Mihailovic against the Ustachis, in the days when the Allies were losing the war on all fronts, is now sponsoring an army alleged to consist mainly of these Ustachis.

My impression was that most Cetnik officers favor an independent Serbia after the war. Some want a greater Serbia which will be the predominating influence in all Yugoslavia. Some definitely believe there should be a federation of independent states (including independent Croat and Serb states) with a federal government, having delegated powers, under King Peter.

Some Cetnik officers favor a truce with the Partisans until the war against Germany is finished. A notable example is Major Lukasevic, who states that much as he hates the Partisans he would be willing to have a truce, provided a geographical line could be established dividing Yugoslavia into two areas, on the understanding that the Partisans would fight the Germans in the north, and the Cetniks would fight the Germans in the south. Other Cetnik officers believe that peace is impossible.

V. COLLABORATION BETWEEN CETNIKS AND GERMANS

In North-Central Serbia I saw no evidence of collaboration between Cetniks and Germans, with two small exceptions. One instance was at the town of Belanovica, east of Valjevo, in the area of Captain Ninkovic, a Cetnik Korpus commander. Here there were about 50 Nedici gendarmes under one lieutenant whose function is to keep order in the town. Ninkovic advised that the lieutenant
and most of the men were loyal to the Cetniks, and stated that if they were called upon, they would immediately join the Cetniks in the woods; that he could disarm them at any time, but that they were more useful to him in their present capacity because they gave him valuable information on German movements in the area. After we had passed near the town, Colonel Seitz and I met the Nedici Lieutenant, who had followed us for the purpose of meeting us in the woods. He professed to be loyal to the Cetniks, and willing to help them in any way that he could, but surprised us all and infuriated Ninkovic and the other Cetniks present when, in answer to my question as to how the people in the town felt toward the Nedici, he stated that he thought that they were sympathetic, because the Nedici saved them from heavy reprisals which the Germans would otherwise have taken.

Likewise, Kalabic admitted that he maintained friendly contact with about 50 Nedici gendarmes in Aranjelovac, about 50 kilometers south of Belgrade, who were assigned there by the Germans to guard the railroad station. He stated that he maintained this relation for the same reason as Ninkovic, and also for the reason that they were a source of arms. He pointed out, for example, that they had tipped him off in August, 1943, that some German lorries were traveling south through Stragari with a lot of machine guns and ammunition. As a result of this information he was able to attack the column, kill 80 Germans, and capture 40 Zorka light machine guns with a considerable amount of ammunition. I saw Stragari. The entire village, including over 150 houses, was destroyed by the Germans in reprisal for this attack.

In southern Herzegovina and southern Dalmatia I saw collaboration between the Cetniks and the Germans for the purpose of fighting the Partisans. On one afternoon while I was at the head of a column I bumped into a German patrol and made a hasty retreat. Major Lukasevic went forward with some of his troops while we retreated to a nearby village. I later learned that Lukasevic, upon being brought down to the local German commandant, stated that he was the commander of the Cetnik Nevisinje Brigade; that he had come down purposely to make contact with the Germans, in order to advise them that there was a large band of Partisans advancing toward their position, and that he, Lukasevic and his men, were taking up positions in the woods to fight these Partisans. The German commandant thanked him very much for this information and allowed him and his men to escape in order to fight the Partisans. We later met Lukasevic about six hours south of this point.
While we were waiting for Lukasevic, the local Cetnik Srez commander advised us that he was friendly with the German commandant for the Lubinje area; that on the previous day he had found living accommodations for 640 of the newly arrived German troops, and that he was expecting another 640 shortly. We could see many of these German troops from the mountainside.

While we were hiding out near Dubrovik, south of Trebinje, one of Bacevic's soldiers showed me a German legitimacia issued to him by the German authorities at Dubrovik. The paper had on it the printed letterhead of the German Army headquarters at Dubrovik. In the Serbian language it described him as a "Cetnik" fighting the Partisans, and allowed him the right to go to the hospital at Dubrovik. He advised me that it had been issued to him by the German authorities at Dubrovik.

When faced with such evidence of collaboration, Lieutenant Colonel Bacevic tried to justify it on the grounds that it was necessary to know what the Germans were knowing in his area. I expressed the opinion that such activities would constitute espionage against the Germans, but that this was not espionage because the Germans knew that these men were Cetniks. He replied that all persons of Orthodox religion in the area are described as "Cetniks" by the Germans.

My own impression is that there is very little collaboration in Serbia, where the German is still the primary enemy, but that there is collaboration in Herzegovina, because Mihailovic's leaders, much as they hate the Germans, feel that they must collaborate against the Partisans in order to save themselves from losing the civil war against the Partisans. This collaboration does not seem to bother their conscience any. They point out that they are, in fact, fighting former Croat Ustachi, many of whom are presently collaborating with Pavelic; and that the British are feeding arms to the Partisans, which are being used by the Partisans against the Cetniks. This all plays into the hands of the Germans, who are taking advantage of the fact that the civil war is foremost in the minds of the Cetniks.

The above collaboration in the area of southern Herzegovina seems to be just a continuation of the collaboration which existed earlier in 1942 and 1943 between the Cetniks and the Italians against the Partisans.

VI. Mihailovic's Communications with His Government

When I arrived in Yugoslavia, the British Mission advised
that Mihailovic's only method of communication with his government in Cairo was by radio to Malta, in a cipher known to the British. In January 1944, Colonel Bailey advised he thought Mihailovic probably had established direct radio liaison with his government, but that his messages were undoubtedly monitored.

As far back as October, Mihailovic advised me that he had direct liaison with America through a radio he kept in the woods; that he could send messages via this method to Potich, Yugoslav Ambassador at Washington; and asked if I wanted to send a message direct to anyone in Washington. I politely declined and reported the matter to Bailey, who took it up with Cairo and London. I later learned he had a young Serb-American, Robert Marjanovic, working at this secret station.

Mihailovic advised that the radio station was in the woods not far from Aranjelovac, and offered to let me see it, but I never went there.