P.S. F. O.S.S.  "The War This Week  3/26/42 - 1/1/43
THE WAR THIS WEEK

As strictly military events receded somewhat into the background during the past week, India emerged to occupy the center of the international scene. Sir Stafford Cripps is seeking to harmonize that country's deep antagonisms in Britain's most recent compromise, but this plan is now seriously threatened by the resistance of Mahatma Gandhi and the All-India Congress.

In the Battle of Burma the Japanese are being stoutly resisted south of Prome and north of Toungoo, but their advance toward the critical areas of upper Burma has not been arrested. At the other extremity of the Japanese "line" (in New Guinea) torrential rains have impeded their activity, but recent Japanese air reconnaissance reveals their renewed interest in the islands of Melanesia even as far south as New Caledonia.

The continuing lull in the Mediterranean and a fresh analysis of the Axis position there now strongly inclines military observers to the view that no large scale offensive is to be anticipated in that region. The Axis, it is believed, has insufficient strength for concurrent offensives in the Mediterranean and in Russia, and will perforce elect the latter theater of operations. On the Eastern Front itself no important changes can be verified, but as Allied shipments to Russia increase in volume, the Germans have launched the "Battle of the Arctic" with heavy initial attacks on the critical Murmansk-Archangel supply route.
**Failure of Indian Conciliation?**

While the counter-proposals of the Working Committee of the All-India Congress are not yet known, it is already apparent that Sir Stafford Cripps' plan is being seriously questioned by the most powerful political element in India. Earlier reports that Gandhi and Nehru were in disagreement may very likely be unfounded. In an article published in the *Hindustan Times*, Devadas Gandhi, son of the Mahatma, has indicated the probable basis of Congress reservations. Young Gandhi objects to the plan because it gives Britain complete control of India's war effort.

Despite Sir Stafford's earlier statement that he was in no position to negotiate, observers in New Delhi suggest that he has postponed his return to England and may very well refer the counter-proposals of the Congress party to London for further discussion. And the report of a coming meeting between Nehru and Wavell perhaps foreshadows a compromise on the crucial issue of control over Indian defense.

**Character of the British Plan**

Another possible objection to the British scheme is its major premise that India, far from being "one and indivisible," is potentially a group of autonomous states. The British proposals envisage (1) an Indian Union which would be a Dominion, (2) any number of other "Dominions" consisting of provinces not electing to adhere to the Union. Since a Dominion would apparently be subject to no higher authority and would have the right to secede from the Empire, and since each Dominion would be independent of every other, India would no longer necessarily remain a political unit under the British plan.

This implied division of India was the ground on which the Hindu Mahasabha rejected the plan. The Liberal Sapru group and the Azad Moslem Conference, also pledged to Indian unity, may very well take the same stand. On somewhat similar grounds, the warrior Sikhs of the Punjab, alleging that the British proposals put them at the mercy of the Moslem majority in that province, has likewise returned a negative answer. Paradoxically enough, even the Moslem League, long the advocate of Indian partition and the only major group whose program the British plan seems to satisfy, is apparently reconsidering its earlier attitude of acceptance.

As the outlook for India grew darker, some observers blamed India's leaders and found them lacking in political realism. Others, however, maintained that the British proposals had not gone far enough, that they did not satisfy the Congress demands for "full government now," and that by concessions to the Moslem League, they had alienated the party of Gandhi and Nehru. The latter is the only Indian group that other members of the United Nations—notably China and Russia—would be likely to welcome for the leadership of India's war effort. In any case, it was apparent that only Japan could profit by further doubts and delays in settling India's political future.

**Retreat and Terrorism in Burma.**

In Burma, where the Japanese have concentrated heavy air power and where they have recently landed a fresh division, the situation is becoming steadily more critical. The Chinese defenders of Toungoo, following fierce fighting in the town itself, have withdrawn their principal forces to the north where a Chinese communiqué states the main battle will be fought.

On the Irrawaddy front, advance British units have narrowly escaped encirclement south of Prome. Meantime Japanese naval units have arrived off the Andaman Islands.
The Japanese also have landed in force at the port of Akyab in western Burma. And reports of native unrest and almost open revolt bring into focus the tremendous difficulties faced by the defenders of Burma.

These conditions, the reports state, are especially characteristic of the right bank of the Irrawaddy as far north as the Chin Hills. North of Pakokku, native snipers have been shooting from huts and trees at refugees passing by in autos. Even in the plains to the south of Mandalay, the government apparently fears the outbreak of terrorism in areas not effectively occupied by the Allied armies. In the mountainous regions to the north and east, however, the natives are not yet aroused and seem inclined to resist the intrigues of the Japanese invaders. Meanwhile, as the Japanese approach the border of India, authorities in Calcutta have urged civilians to evacuate that city as soon as possible.

**Accelerated Action on the India-China Highway**

As British and Chinese troops in Burma fought a gallant rear-guard action, Chinese authorities were reported to be marshalling their full resources to rush to completion China's new lifeline from India. The building of two one-way "jeep roads"—which light trucks going in one direction could use, even when the roads were only semi-finished—is the latest proposal. Such roads would make possible the inauguration of traffic before the beginning of the heavy rains late in May.

Meanwhile, on the principal new India-China road, Chinese and British are speeding construction from both ends of the northern Assam-Burma section (Ledo to Myitkyina), as well as on the section from Myitkyina via Tengchung to Lungling, in Yunnan province. Materials and equipment originally intended for the Burma-Yunnan railway or for the improvement of the Burma Road proper are being directed to this new emergency effort.

In China itself, the government is apparently elaborating a program for organizing resistance in areas under Japanese control. Already a conference of the Formosan Revolutionary League at Chungking has requested that Formosa become a province of China. About Korea, whose revolutionary movement is not yet widespread or completely unified, the Chinese authorities appear to be more hesitant. Aside from a statement by Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan (see The War This Week, March 19-26, p. 9), the government of China has issued no specific promises of Korean independence.

**Lull in the Southwest Pacific**

While air reconnaissance recently has revealed the presence of several cruisers and destroyers and about 15 transports and supply vessels at Rabaul, evidence of the increasing importance of this base for Japanese operations, there has been no notable increase in Japanese troop concentrations in the Rabaul-New Guinea-Solomon Islands area. At present it is estimated that in the whole region from Timor to the Japanese Mandates there are not more than three divisions—a negligible force where major operations are envisaged. The disposition of Japanese ground forces in the South Pacific has not in fact changed to any marked extent since the conquest of Java.

In the air, Japanese attacks on Port Moresby and Port Darwin continue, but Australian Air Minister Drakeford announces that American and Australian planes now have local air supremacy over New Guinea and New Britain.

Northeast New Guinea, which last fall and early winter suffered a record drought, now appears to have been visited by torrential rains. According to newspaper reports, the Markham Valley area has been flooded and the Japanese have been forced to withdraw toward Lae, where they had made one of their original landings.
Floods in the area between Lae and Salamaua will prove an immediate obstacle to the Japanese, whose objective in this region apparently was the occupation and development of a number of commercial air fields already located there. From these bases it was believed that enlarged air operations against the continent and the Torres Strait would be attempted. The land in this area lies only a few hundred feet above sea level and is readily transformed into swamp by heavy rains.

Recapitulation on Java

A first-hand report on the situation in Java during the Japanese assault has now been received. The speed and scope of the attack caught the Dutch unawares, according to this account. The Dutch had anticipated a landing at Semarang, for example, but not the coordinate landings to the east and west.

The rapidity of the assault also prevented really adequate demolitions. In general, public utilities, telephones, power plants, railroads, and automobiles, as well as stocks of raw materials, fell intact to the Japanese. The American refinery and wells at Palembang in Sumatra were totally demolished, but destruction of the Shell refinery and wells was interrupted by a surprise parachute attack, and Dutch air forces were obliged to try later to finish the job by bombing.

Official Netherlands sources state, however, that oil installations on Java, as well as oil in storage, were completely destroyed. The naval base at Soerabaja also was wrecked and cannot be made suitable for the use of any warships, it is estimated, in less than two months. Actual rebuilding will require a much longer time.

Most British and American technicians escaped, but it proved impossible to effect the escape of many Dutch. Netherlands sources declare there were a thousand trained pilots in the Netherlands East Indies before the war, and about 500 planes. Between 400 and 450 pilots were killed and the planes almost all destroyed. Some pilots escaped, as did some naval vessels and their crews.

Japan Wins Representation at the Vatican

The most recent diplomatic success of the Japanese is witnessed in a press report that Ken Harada, Acting Ambassador to Vichy, has been appointed to serve concurrently as Special Minister to the Vatican “with a view to rendering still closer existing relations between Japan and the Holy See.” This is the culmination of a diplomatic offensive going back as early as the first week in February when Japan informally requested permission to appoint an emissary to the Holy See, to the astonishment, it was said, of even the German Counselor of Embassy to the Vatican.

This appointment is undoubtedly intended primarily to facilitate Japanese relations with the predominantly Catholic population of the Philippines and to allay possible fears that the Japanese would interfere with freedom of worship in the islands. Japan may hope in time to secure the substitution of Italian, German, or Japanese personnel for the important American element among the clergy of the Philippines, introduced following our annexation of the islands. Official relations with the Holy See might also be helpful to Japan on a minor scale in connection with Catholic missions in China and other occupied territory and with the Catholic community in Japan which, while small, includes a few influential persons, notably Admiral Yamamoto, Commander of the Japanese fleet.

Ken Harada, now 50 years of age, comes from a prominent Protestant Christian family of Kyoto. His father was at one time president of Doshisha University, the leading pri-
The Soviet Navy in the Far East

As the ice begins to break up in Russian harbors in the Far East, the Soviet navy attracts fresh attention as a factor in a possible Russo-Japanese War. It is well known that the Soviets have a large fleet of submarines and torpedo boats in the Orient. This force might act as a substantial deterrent to a Japanese attack in that area.

The Soviet navy is based primarily on Vladivostok. The latter is, because of its proximity to Japanese-occupied Manchuria, the most vulnerable to attack of all Russian Far Eastern ports. With the help of icebreakers, Vladivostok can be used as a base the year round. Even if Vladivostok were lost, the Soviets possess bases further north at Sovetskaya Gavan and Nikolaevsk. Finally, they have a naval base at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. The last named is ice-free by early May, Nikolaevsk late in May and Sovetskaya Gavan like Vladivostok could be kept open by icebreakers. The last named may soon be connected by rail with the Trans-Siberian railroad and is to be the terminus of the new northern Trans-Siberian road which has been under active construction for some time.

Arctic Sea Battle

On the Russian front, interest has shifted from the continental battle ground—where action is already in considerable measure immobilized by the spring thaw—to the Soviet supply lines in the far north. First, a surprise air and naval attack by Russian forces behind the Nazi lines near Murmansk somewhat relieved the pressure on this vital seaport. To this the Germans replied with an attack on a convoy somewhere near the North Cape. Here the Nazis claim to have sunk two or possibly three merchant ships (one of 10,000 tons) and to have torpedoed a British cruiser—with the loss to themselves of one destroyer. The British admit—without specifying the time or place—the sinking of the light cruiser Naiad. But British and Soviet naval units, engaged for the first time in joint operations, have apparently saved the major part of the convoy, after damaging three submarines and a destroyer, besides the one whose loss the Germans have admitted.

The crucial importance of keeping open the shipping lanes to Murmansk is apparent in the fact that the value of lease-lend exports to Russia—a large proportion of which is aircraft—increased notably during the last week of January and has since risen sharply. Such shipments will play their part in Russian resistance to a probable Nazi offensive this spring. Perhaps symptomatic of preparations for such an offensive were the renewed bombing of Moscow by the Germans and a reported Nazi attack in the Kalinin area.

Typhus on the Eastern Front

There is increasing evidence that throughout eastern Europe the spread of typhus has now assumed at least mild epidemic proportions, although these reports should be accepted with some reserve, pending confirmation (see The War This Week, January 15-22, pp. 10-11). Although native populations appear to be hardest hit, the German invaders themselves have suffered and are known to have brought the infection back into Germany.
SECRET

In French North Africa and Spain also the number of cases is considerably above the usual endemic level. In the former area, 2,500 cases are now reported weekly.

Except for hospital attendants and others whose duties bring them regularly into contact with typhus victims, the German Army is unvaccinated. Reliable observers believe that the Germans do not possess sufficient anti-typhus vaccine to combat the disease through mass inoculation. The epidemic is expected to continue through April and, according to one source, will reach a seasonal peak in May.

German Air Strength for the Spring

Clues to probable German air strength for the expected spring offensive are given in a study just completed in the Economics Division of the Coordinator's office. At the beginning of the Russian campaign the Nazi production of planes of all types was about 2,200 a month. First line strength was 5,700, reserves increased the figure for operational types to 12,600 planes. The total number of planes in the German air force, including transports and trainers, was 23,300.

The estimated monthly production of aircraft in Germany increased steadily during 1941 from about 2,000 a month in January to 2,400 a month in December. Standardization of models and the importation of foreign labor contributed to this expansion. There is no evidence that bombing by the RAF has had any appreciable effect on production.

Despite this expansion, since June, 1941, however, first line air strength has not increased. Heavy losses in the Russian offensive—estimated by the British as 1,800 planes up to September 1—may have accounted for as many as 4,300 aircraft. Owing to unfavorable operating conditions, casualties were inordinately high. As a result, the loss of many of their best trained pilots and crews has undoubtedly impaired German first line efficiency.

There is, however, some difference of opinion as to present first line German strength. The British place it at 4,200 planes (roughly 75 per cent of the June, 1941, high), with seriously depleted reserves. American sources believe that first line strength has remained unchanged, and that the Nazis have maintained reserves of 4,200–5,000 planes.

The Future Course of German Aircraft Production

Nevertheless there seems to be fairly general agreement that present German production is between 2,400 and 2,700 planes a month. But while the British believe that this figure represents a virtual maximum of production capacity, competent American opinion predicts an increased output—in view of German plant expansion now in progress. According to the latter, the continued importation of foreign skilled labor will permit the Germans to maintain the 1941 rate of expansion, culminating at the end of 1942 in a figure of 2,900 planes a month.

Such an expansion, however, will be possible only if the Nazis make no extensive changes in models, and if the British do not succeed in effectively bombing Axis aircraft factories. Moreover, greater production need not result in an enlargement of first line strength.

Increased combat losses consequent on a renewal of the offensive, a high rate of pilot casualties (necessitating a greater allotment of planes for training new pilots), or developments which would make existing types of aircraft obsolete—any or all of these factors might fully offset increased over-all production.
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The Axis and the Mediterranean

As winter turns to spring and the Axis forces in the Mediterranean still make no move, a reexamination of the strategic situation in that area has become essential. Highly placed Allied observers now tend to the conclusion that the Axis will seek only limited objectives in the Mediterranean this spring and summer. Russia, they believe, will be the main front, and the Axis probably has insufficient forces for a simultaneous attack there and in the Mediterranean.

Certain indications still point to offensive plans—the heavy bombing of Malta, the relative strength of the Italian navy, the concentration of forces in the Aegean area (even including invasion barges), the reinforcement of Rommel in Libya. But these considerations appear to be outweighed by grave difficulties which would be involved in alternative offensives in the Mediterranean.

First, in Libya, there is not much time to lose. In less than a month the summer heat begins. Thus far, despite reinforcement, Rommel apparently has insufficient armored forces to resume a full-scale offensive. And the monumental question of supply still looms as the crucial issue on the desert front.

Second, an attack on Syria must necessarily be preceded by the capture of Cyprus. This would be a much more difficult task than the conquest of Crete. From bases in Syria, British planes would be far better placed to defend Cyprus than would Axis aircraft to attack it from Rhodes, 300 miles away. The whole operation would probably take more than a month (the capture of Crete took 27 days), plus perhaps another month to overrun Syria. It would be only in the full heat of summer, then, that Axis forces would be in a position to advance overland toward Iraq.

Third, an attack through Asia Minor would be still more difficult. Owing to unfavorable weather, terrain, and communications, an Axis army might take four months to reach the Russian frontier south of the Caucasus, even with the cooperation of the Turks.

A fourth possibility—a limited offensive against Turkey to occupy the Thracy, Aegean, and Black Sea coasts—seems the only one that the strength of Axis forces at present renders probable. By opening the Straits to Italian warships, such an attack might aid the main offensive against Southern Russia. It is perhaps toward this that the Axis is directing its preparations in the Aegean area.

Detente in Turkey

Reports from diplomatic sources confirm the foregoing analysis. The Swedish General Staff apparently anticipates no Nazi move against Turkey and believes that the spring heat will gradually bring on a stalemate on the Libyan front. In the Aegean area, according to the Swedish observers, the Germans are simply aiming at mastery of the air so that they will be able to deny these waters to the British Mediterranean fleet. Even the 100-odd transport planes recently arrived in Crete are apparently to be used rather for the supply and reinforcement of Benghazi than for any aggressive moves.

As King Boris of Bulgaria, after his conference with Hitler in Berlin, adjourned his Parliament until fall, rumor had it that the Fuehrer was pressing for a Turko-Bulgarian pact—an indirect way of aligning Turkey with the Axis. In any event, reports from Ankara indicated that the present location of Bulgarian army units implied no particular threat to Turkey. A maximum of 250,000 men was distributed about as follows: one division in Greece, six in Serbia, seven in northern and western Bulgaria, and four near the Turkish frontier. And a careful air reconnaissance by Turkish
planes found no evidence of aggressive concentrations in the Aegean islands or on the Bulgarian border.

**Liquidation of Hungary?**

The tension between Hungary and Rumania—while unabated—has not yet resulted in any major border clashes. A report from Bern gives a possible explanation of what Hitler may be seeking. In a couple of weeks, the report states, the Fuehrer will “help” Imredy—who, along with most of the officer corps, favors full military aid to Germany—to seize the Hungarian government. The result, however, will be the liquidation of the Magyar state and its transformation into a part of the German Reich with a status similar to that originally granted the Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate. Rumania, the report concludes, will recover northern Transylvania—that is, if she sends the required number of troops to the Eastern Front.

**Fresh Threats of Vichy Collaboration**

As Germany prepares for the much-heralded offensive in the east, so in the west she is taking precautions of a political nature in order to insure herself against possible French disturbances. Germany seeks a solution of the French problem which would meet the requirements of her security and supply. It is now believed that the Rio trial may be cut short. Prominent members of the Vichy government have been forbidden to travel between the two zones. And Pétain may have to bow to Nazi pressure and permit the creation of a collaborationist regime, in which Laval is endeavoring to find an important part. At the same time it is authoritatively reported that the Germans will pick their time and force the issue whenever they believe it expedient to do so.

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Cooperation between Spain and France in Morocco and Rio de Oro in matters pertaining to aviation, and specifically to the Iberia Company, have been the subject of recent negotiations. Refueling facilities would be offered to French planes traversing the Spanish territory of Rio de Oro to and from Dakar, and similar facilities offered to Spanish planes traversing Moroccan territory. Such a plan would aid civil transport and communication for the French, on the one hand, with Dakar, and the Spanish on the other, with the Canary Islands. There are also reliable reports that high Spanish authorities have shown interest in coming to a similar agreement for French Guinea.

**A Critical Election in Colombia**

Since Colombia occupies a highly strategic position, facing both the eastern and western approaches to the Panama Canal, the Colombian presidential election of May 3, which will determine whether or not Colombia is to have a democratically-disposed regime for the next four years, is of critical importance. Beneath the oratory about domestic questions in the current presidential campaign, the issue of foreign policy is basic, and is clearly drawn between the candidates.

Under the present incumbent, Eduardo Santos, Colombia supported the United States at the Rio Conference, severed diplomatic relations with the Axis, and deported Axis diplomats more promptly than any other South American government. Santos, a rather weak President, has nevertheless tolerated both Nazi and Falangist activities, and bequeathes to his successor a situation of great potential danger to the united defense of the hemisphere.

Both candidates for election, ex-President Alfonso López and Dr. Carlos Arango Vélez, are of the Liberal Party, domi-
Nazi activity continues in Colombia

The election is projected against a sinister background of Nazi and Falangist activity. Despite the departure of the Axis diplomatic staff, the Nazi organization in Colombia appears intact. The present Nazi leader is K. A. von Wahlert, who is associated with the Pfaff Sewing Machine Company in Bogotá. He has recently succeeded Emil Pruefert, formerly Landesgruppenleiter of the Nazi Party for Colombia. Pruefert is still active in Barranquilla, and remains the propelling genius of the Party. Strong Nazi groups exist in Cali and Medellín, led respectively by Carl Stumpf, manager of the Banco Alemán Antioqueño, and by Walter Springer, alleged chief of the Nazi Party in Medellín. Another important Nazi leader is Gustavo Gebhardt of Barranquilla, who publishes the Karibischer Beobachter. The United States has been obliged to blacklist more Axis companies in Colombia than in any other Latin American country except Mexico.

Nazi activities are effectively supplemented by the work of the Spanish Falange, and the Spanish legation now organizes Nazi propaganda. The Falange holds public meetings in Colombia, and circulates the stock arguments of Hispanidad. The recent celebration of the four-hundredth anniversary of the discovery of the Amazon, in which President Santos participated, was a Falangist project. The Conservative newspaper, El Siglo (owned by Laureano Gómez), gave ten columns, February 14, to the text of a speech by José María Penán, extolling Hispanidad, and following the usual Falangist line. There is evidence that many public officials are Falangists, and that Catholic schools and priests are disseminating Falangist material.

Although López at the moment seems to be the stronger candidate, his defeat of these Conservative and totalitarian forces is by no means certain. President Santos, who controls the official election machinery, appears, from his newspaper El Tiempo, to be leaning toward Arango Vélez. The dangerous possibility exists, furthermore, that Gómez, supported by the Conservative upper land-owning class and the Church, and subsidized by the Reich, may try a coup aiming to reinstate the conservatives in power after an interim of twelve years.

Toward the Control of Axis Activities in Brazil

Information broadcast from pro-Axis radio stations in Brazil has for some time constituted a serious menace to the movements of ships and planes in that region, particularly to the planes along the bomber ferry route to Africa. While the Condor and Lati airlines remained in operation, and while the embassies and consulates of the Axis remained open, radio
communication with Berlin was difficult to control. After Brazil broke relations with the Axis, certain stations (four were definitely located in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) continued to send messages. Raids on these stations, between about March 19 and 23, have now apparently closed the principal ones and blocked this channel of Axis communication.

The campaign against hostile espionage in Brazil, meanwhile, continues. Plans for a Japanese occupation of strategic points around the key industrial city of São Paulo were uncovered recently, and surveillance of Axis minorities has been intensified.

The German minorities in southern Brazil are in a particularly unhappy position. Undoubtedly the majority of the people of German descent, whose ancestors came to Brazil many decades ago, are not actively involved in subversive activity, nor are they wholly inclined to accept Nazi ideology. Nazi agents, however, are able to bring severe pressure upon them. As a result, the older people, in particular, who have lived in Brazil for thirty or forty years, have suffered from a war of nerves. Lacking information on political questions, they have been shocked by Nazi propaganda warning them of the intention of the Brazilians to confiscate their property, and to drive them into concentration camps. It is reported that fatal heart attacks have increased, and that the increase in the suicide rate is alarming. The real Nazis and the even more dangerous Quislings, meanwhile, use lurid reports of secret military organizations among the minorities to camouflage their own purposes.

APPENDIX

NATIVE STATES AND POLITICAL COMMUNALISM IN THE CRIPPS' PROPOSALS

The Cripps announcement has left somewhat vague the proposed constitutional position of the Indian States (Native States), ruled by the princes. Apparently these States would have the right to accede to the Union or to remain outside it—whether with Dominion status is as yet unclear. The announcement simply states that “whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements as far as this may be required in the new situation.” It is reported from New Delhi, moreover, that Sir Stafford in a press conference suggested that he would see representatives of the people of the States. Such a step would be a reversal of the previous British practice of dealing only with the princes themselves, and might imply a revision of treaties leading to more modern and liberal institutions in the States at large.

The new principle of regarding India as susceptible of political division is obviously a result of pressure from Mr. Jinnah’s Moslem League. Such pressure represents a logical extension of the phenomenon of “political communalism.” According to this principle, representation in legislative bodies has been based on constituencies delimited according to religious or other interests rather than determined on a purely geographical basis; that is to say, in the provincial assemblies there are reserved for the Moslem and other minorities a certain number of seats which are separate from those of the Hindu majority, the so-called “general constituency” (see accompanying map).
First imposed in 1909 in the Councils established under the Morley-Minto reforms, "Communal representation" did not succeed in settling the differences between Hindus and Moslems. Rather it increased them, and since then, communal tension has been growing steadily worse. The result has been further communal concessions in the constitutions of 1919 and still more in the constitution of 1935.

The acceptance of a plan similar to the one Britain has offered might change India from a single political entity with merely internal conflicting groups, into a number of separate states. Neither geographic, strategic, nor economic factors would govern the change, but simply the social incompatibility of India's population. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible that the Moslem League, with its program of a partition of India, would not be able to prevent even one of the four provinces with Moslem majorities (Bengal, North-West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sind) from joining the proposed Union (see map, also *The War This Week*, February 26–March 5, p. 9; March 5–12, p. 10).
INDIA

STATES AND RELIGIONS

PERCENTAGES OF STATE POPULATIONS
PROFESSING HINDU AND MOHAMMEDAN FAITHS

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MAP NO. 421 APRIL 1942
DRAWN IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION, COI.
THE WAR THIS WEEK
April 2–9, 1942

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Copy No. 8

For the President
THE WAR THIS WEEK

The Battle of the Bay of Bengal has begun. The British admit the loss of two cruisers; the Japanese claim the sinking of 21 merchantmen. The Japanese have struck at both the principal British naval bases—Colombo and Trincomalee. It seems clear that the Japanese navy is operating in force in the Indian Ocean and that a major effort against India is under way.

This orientation of the Japanese effort runs counter to certain earlier predictions, and it is believed that it may reflect a decision by the Japanese that a conquest of Australia has become too difficult and that a campaign in Siberia should await a clarification of the military situation in European Russia. Meanwhile the political situation in India, probably reflecting the gravity of the Japanese military menace, has improved, and a press despatch of Thursday notes that a general understanding on the main issues has been as good as reached, with an early agreement between Sir Stafford Cripps and the leaders of the All-India Congress predicted.

Elsewhere the Allied cause is suffering serious reverses. The epic American defense of Bataan has finally succumbed to overwhelmingly superior Japanese forces. Marshal Rommel has synchronized a new drive in Libya with the Japanese attack on India, but there is reason to believe that this may be a reconnaissance in force rather than a serious effort to invade Egypt. The gathering intensity of the drive in Burma and the devastating attack on Mandalay seemed clear indications that
the Japanese are determined to cut the last of the potential “Burma roads” to China. And heavy plane concentration and a further forward movement in the Solomons suggest a south-eastward extension of Japanese control over the Melanesian shield.

Despite the spectacular newspaper reports of Russian success, it is now clear that there has been no change of importance on the Eastern Front during the past month. Meanwhile the Germans have nearly completed their preparations in the south, and apparently the initial Nazi offensive will be launched in that area—possibly as early as the second half of April, when weather and ground conditions are first suitable. At the same time German military and naval concentrations in the north suggest both interest in the interruption of the Archangel supply line and preoccupation with the defense of Norway.

**India’s Eleventh Hour**

With the foe literally at the gates of India, negotiations over the political status of the peninsula had reached a deadlock when the last-minute intervention of President Roosevelt apparently saved the day. Reports from New Delhi suggested that leaders of the Congress, in consultation with Louis Johnson, the President’s personal representative, had worked out a new formula on the critical issue of defense. Observers confidently predicted that this latest compromise proposal, drawing on Australian experience, would provide for a British commander-in-chief and a native defense minister, with clearly demarcated functions.

In a week of alternating optimism and gloom, control of Indian defense was apparently the hard kernel of the whole dispute. Second in importance as an objection to the scheme brought by Sir Stafford Cripps was the question of Indian partition that it foreshadowed. A third point of conflict was the proposed postponement of the whole constitutional scheme until the end of the war—the “post-dated check,” as Gandhi termed it. Finally—although the press scarcely mentioned this last objection—reports from New Delhi implied that Congress leaders were dissatisfied with a constitutional convention to which the Indian princes would apparently send personal representatives rather than delegates elected by the peoples of their states.

Two of the groups that flatly rejected the Cripps proposals—the Sikhs and the Hindu Mahasabha—based their arguments on the partition issue. With the two most important Indian political elements, however, the Congress and the Moslem League, the defense question was paramount. As representatives of the Working Committee of the Congress, Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad, president of the Congress, offered counter-proposals—calling, apparently, for a native Indian defense minister. This proposition they discussed with Cripps and General Wavell, commander-in-chief for India. At one point it appeared as though the British might offer the post of defense minister to Nehru himself. But the final British compromise proposal—evidently worked out by Cripps and Wavell after telephone conversations with members of the War Cabinet in London—seems to have been somewhat less conciliatory. The result was again a virtual “no” from the Congress—plus the last minute appeal to President Roosevelt.

“Stubbornness” and Panic

In a magisterial address in New York Tuesday evening, Lord Halifax—a former Viceroy of India—defended the British proposals on defense and partition, and solemnly warned that if the current negotiations broke down, the
friends of India “would not find it difficult to decide where the responsibility lay.” This, indeed, was the note struck with surprising unanimity by the press of Great Britain, the United States, and even of China. There seemed to be little appreciation of the Nationalist contention that historical experience has shown military control in India to be practically equivalent to total overlordship.

Lord Halifax also stated that if reconciliation failed, the British government would nevertheless “do its own duty” to defend India against the Japanese. Nehru likewise was said to have pledged himself in the event of invasion to “fight . . . unto the death.” Despite these brave words, despatches from New Delhi reported that panic was gaining the upper hand in India. Bengal was seething with unrest and pro-Japanese activities. And many British were evacuating the Calcutta area, apparently against the wishes of General Wavell.

The Battle of the Bay of Bengal

In the beginnings of the battle for the Bay of Bengal the British have admitted the loss of the cruisers Dorsetshire and Corneall, while the German radio has even announced a Japanese landing on the Indian coast. On the basis of these fragmentary reports, however, it is impossible to form a clear picture of the whole battle.

Intense air activity on both sides formed the prelude to the main action. As British headquarters denied that the Japanese had landed at Akyab on the west Burma coast, United States bombers, in a daring raid on the Andaman islands, set fire to a Japanese cruiser and damaged a transport. Meantime, according to Tokyo, Japanese planes and submarines accounted for 21 Allied merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal. Then on Easter Sunday the invaders' carrier-based aircraft struck at Ceylon.

The air attack on Colombo, if it was an effort to repeat the surprise success of Pearl Harbor by knocking out Britain’s chief naval base in the Indian area, was clearly a failure. Twenty-five planes shot down and perhaps as many more damaged, out of a reported total of 75 enemy aircraft, constitute an impressive record for the defenders. Next day, Vizagapatam and Cocosada on the Indian east coast were the targets. Three days later the Japanese returned to the attack on Ceylon, this time striking against the east coast naval base at Trincomalee. The outcome of the air and naval battle for the waters between the Malay and Indian peninsulas—essentially a battle for supply lines—can have a decisive influence on the struggle in Burma. Last week, American bombers started fires in the dock area of Rangoon. But this success was scarcely comparable to the Japanese raid on Mandalay—temporary capital of Burma and the link between the old and new roads to China—which, according to a report from London, destroyed two-thirds of the city, killing 2,000 to 3,000 and injuring 5,000 more. On the fighting front, while the Chinese counter-attacked north of Toungoo, the British fell back from Prome and established a new line for the protection of the Burmese oil fields, about 70 miles farther north.

Japanese Expansion Continues in Melanesia

Despite recent Allied air successes, the Japanese are still expanding southeastward in the Melanesian Islands. Buka Passage, the strait between Buka and Bougainville Islands in the Solomons, has now been seized and about 500 troops have been landed in this area. Air reconnaissance there recently revealed the presence of three Japanese heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, a destroyer, and a transport, indicating that further expansion may be anticipated. Faisi Island, southwest of Bougainville, also is reported to have been occupied.
Disposition of Japanese Air Forces

Further evidence of the continued interest of the Japanese in the Australasian area is presented by the estimated disposition of their air forces. Including some planes still stationed in Java, there are believed to be in the area which extends through the Sunda Islands, Timor, Amboina, New Guinea and New Britain more than 700 "operational" planes—first-line planes available for operations. This number is estimated to include nearly one-fourth of Japan's operational fleet. Some 225 or more planes are thought to be in the New Guinea area alone (compared with only about 325 in Burma). Available in Manchuria for possible operations against Soviet Siberian forces there may be fewer than 300 planes—a force which is considerably inferior to the known strength of the Russians in that area.

End of the Battle of Bataan

In the face of a Japanese offense in great force, American resistance apparently has finally collapsed. The east flank of the Bataan lines was enveloped, according to a special communiqué of the War Department, and a counter-attack with physically exhausted troops failed. Earlier it was reported that the Japanese, using tanks as well as artillery fire and aerial bombardment, had thrown fresh reserves into the fighting, and that both sides were suffering heavy losses.

The heroic defense of Bataan has won the unstinted admiration of enemy and friend alike. But its loss will be severely felt. At least four divisions of Japanese troops have been contained there by a much smaller group of defenders. As a base for counter-attack against Japan, the Philippines would have offered invaluable advantages. And the psychological importance, particularly among Asiatic peoples, of the successful joint resistance of American and Filipinos against the Japanese invader already had been outstanding.

China's Diplomatic Offensive

One of the most striking developments of the post-Singapore world has been China's coming of age as a great power, according to one close observer of the Chinese scene. This was implicit in China's becoming an ally of the Anglo-Saxon nations on December 8. But at that time Singapore still remained the tangible symbol of British sea-power in Asia and of the "unequal" treaties in China, which they had endured for exactly a century (1842–1942). Hence the fall of Singapore has had repercussions in diplomacy which are hardly less profound than those in military strategy. As never before in modern history, Nationalist China is now on her own, our observer continues. In this exposed and dangerous position the Chungking Government has been stimulated to take the diplomatic offensive on a world scale.

Chinese Representation in Washington

The inauguration of the Pacific War Council at Washington on April 1 was a victory for China quite as much as for the British Dominions, according to the same source. The inclusion of Dr. T. V. Soong (although seated farthest from the President) appears to vindicate the unusual and inventive move last December by which he was made Foreign Minister of China resident in Washington.
Meanwhile China's representation in this city, though still not comparable to the British, has steadily increased. Admiral Liu Tien-fu recently arrived as a naval liaison officer, four generals of the Chinese Army are now here (Chu Shih-ming, military attaché; P. Kiang, ordnance expert; and T. H. Shen and Huang Ping-heng, air experts), and three more generals will soon arrive with the military mission from Chungking.

China in India

The delivery of a private message by special messenger from Chiang Kai-shek to Pandit Nehru on April 3 witnessed China's continued interest in the Indian political crisis. It is appropriate that the new Chinese commissioner to India, Shen Shih-hua, whose appointment was announced on March 31, should be a transportation expert of long experience in the Ministry of Communications. According to a Chinese press despatch of April 3 from Chungking, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang has decided to send a delegation to India in the near future.

China and Islam

Equally important, though less publicized, has been China's activity in the Moslem world. A treaty with Iraq, negotiations with Iran, and the sending of a Turkish chargé d'affaires to Chungking, have been followed by the recent announcement that China and Egypt are exchanging ministers.

The importance of Islam to China is hardly recognized in the west. Just as the Arab world for centuries intervened between China and Europe, so today the Mohammedans of Malaysia, India, and Sinkiang hold strategic positions in Chinese foreign relations. In the case of Sinkiang the religion of the prophet, with its extra-Chinese orientation, has in the past impeded strict Chinese control of the area and might in the future be of use in any effort to shake off Soviet domination. In India and the Indies, whence thousands of pilgrims visit Mecca yearly, the Moslems form a powerful minority. And it should be noted that Free China includes most of the Chinese Mohammedans; there are 50 million Mohammedans in Kansu and Yunnan provinces.

A national Moslem conference of representatives from 16 provinces convened in Chungking on March 30. Pai Chung-hsi, a leading Mohammedan as well as outstanding military commander, was made chairman and in a rousing speech called upon the "60 million" Moslems of China to band together in the cause of "resistance and reconstruction" (K'ang-chan chien-kuo).

German Preparations for an Offensive in Russia

For approximately a month there have been no real changes on the Russian front. Competent American observers, who have consistently stressed the fact that the Soviet counteroffensive this winter succeeded in wresting no vital strong points from German control, now believe that there is little likelihood of any further Russian gains. Recent newspaper stories—such as the accounts of "fierce fighting" in the Donets and Kalinin sectors—printed with banner headlines and then a day or two later quietly dropped without sequel or confirmation, seem to be frequently the joint product of journalistic bull-sessions, working on the filmiest evidence.

The initiative on the Russian front will apparently soon be in German hands. It seems unlikely that there will be further movement of any magnitude until the Nazis choose to launch a spring offensive. Already in the south their preparations are reported to be nearly complete. Since the
first week in February, heavily loaded trains have been carrying back to Russia, rested and reequipped, the German divisions that have been spending the winter in occupied France, central Germany, or central Poland. Many of them are apparently already in their concentration areas. Others are traveling by rail, unimpeded by the spring thaw, to within perhaps 100 to 150 miles of their destination. From there on to the concentration areas the distance is short enough so that the mud of the Ukraine presents no insurmountable barrier.

To a large extent, then, the Nazi armies are already poised, ready to strike when the ground dries and other conditions are favorable—perhaps as early as the second half of April in the south, and possibly a month thereafter in the Moscow area. It is impossible, of course, to predict just what the German strategy may be. Observers concur, however, in forecasting a main attack to the south. Moreover, in the region about Moscow, which the Russians will evidently spare nothing to hold, and whose entrenchments to the west they have been strengthening, it is highly probable that the Nazis will launch a holding attack, in an effort to immobilize the substantial reserves concentrated there. And it is not impossible that, after a break through to the south, the German army will strike suddenly north to take the defenders of Moscow in the rear.

**Limitations to German Strategy**

Supply lines in southern Russia would, however, limit the initial force to about 100 divisions. The railway net behind the present German positions could continuously maintain about 60 divisions, plus perhaps 40 more to be supplied (for a maximum of two months) from stores held in reserve this winter. But as the German army entered the Caucasus area, the number of divisions that their greatly extended lines of supply could actively maintain might fall to as low as 20–30.

Under these conditions, the strategy envisaged above—turning north against the rear of the defenders of Moscow—might prove extraordinarily difficult. Meantime the Russians would have an opportunity to disrupt Nazi plans by a simultaneous attack from the north. Despite all these difficulties, the destruction of the Red Army this year would appear to be an essential part of German strategy. And it is difficult to see how the Nazis could accomplish this without extensive operations on the central and northern fronts.

**Civilian Conditions in Russia**

Reports from Kuibyshev are at length beginning to reveal the extent of civilian suffering in Russia this winter. According to what purports to be an official tabulation, 650,000 people starved to death during two winter months in Leningrad alone. And in Moscow bread, herring, and pickles issued on civilian ration cards have apparently given a bare minimum of subsistence.

The result seems to have been a slight slump in the morale of the capital. The renewal of German air attacks, limitations on the use of fuel gas, and the frequent interruption of electricity have also contributed to the difficulties of life in Moscow. And shortages of coal for heating and of soap in Moscow and in Kuibyshev have contributed to dangerously insanitary conditions.

**Ordeal in Malta**

On Malta, whose air-raid shelters, dug out of the rock, are said to be able to withstand a direct hit and to give refuge to the entire civilian population, air attacks continued with un-
abated intensity. During the week ending April 4, there were 53 air raid warnings, more than 100 civilian casualties, and more than 65 enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged.

In Libya, Axis columns were apparently advancing from Martuba, Bomba, and Mekili. Press reports jumped to the conclusion that this was Rommel’s long-awaited spring offensive. But a report from Cairo pointing out that the Axis would hesitate to launch a full-scale attack in the face of existing British strength, suggested that the present movement might be no more than a reconnaissance in force. Meantime, in the Levant area, an increase in Axis U-boat activity and the threat of surface raiding added to tension in Syria.

More British Bombs for Nazi War Production in France

Contrary to somewhat sensational reports in the press regarding internal changes in France, there is reason to believe that Marshal Petain finds Laval no more a solution for the French problem than does Hitler himself, but at the same time there are repeated reports that changes may still occur in the Vichy cabinet. The Germans have apparently also been impressed with the difficulties of any radical solution of the political situation, such as total occupation of the country, just on the eve of the opening of the spring campaign in Russia.

The inability of the press and radio in Vichy and Paris to arouse the anger of the French people at repeated British bombings is a disappointment to the Vichy Minister of Propaganda as well as to Goebbels, it is reported. And it is to be noted that the press of unoccupied France has shown considerably more restraint in treating the current bombings than when—in violent invective—it dealt with the raid on the Renault factories near Paris March 3.

At the same time the intense aerial activity resulting in serious damage to the Matford Plant at Poissy, and the British raid on Saint Nazaire appear to have indicated to the Germans the desirability of maintaining larger troop concentrations in France. The Matford plant, a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company, is reported in despatches from London to have been producing twenty trucks a day for the use of the German army. Before the war it manufactured light automobiles. Ford officials are reported to have had no contact with the Matford plant since the fall of France in June, 1940.

Current French Industrial Contribution to Germany

Fresh Nazi attempts to recruit French labor for work in German industry are reported. Proposals have been made to Pétain in this connection, and inducements of higher wages and better living conditions are being made to workers, some of which, according to reliable reports, have been meeting lately with greater success. At the same time, there are reports of increased production in France to meet the needs of the German war economy. The manufacture of tools and other machinery has been increased, the construction of freight cars for the German Army is “sufficient and regular,” and in the textile industries a very large percentage is supplied to Germany. Leather, wood, and food stuffs, to mention a few, continue to be commande for German use in large amounts.

Japanese Pressure on Vichy

Japan is now attempting to take over in one form or another 100,000 tons of Vichy French shipping now in Indo-China. It is a suggestion that a “local agreement” between the French in Indo-China and the Japanese, might be reached as an alternative to immediate Japanese
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seizure. This agreement would provide that these ships continue to fly the French flag and be manned by French officers and crews, but that they operate nevertheless between ports under Japanese control, with the exception of a line between Indo-China and the island of Madagascar, now controlled by the Vichy French.

Following the announcement by the State Department regarding the status of the Free French in the Pacific, a similar announcement has now provided for the establishment of a United States Consulate General in Free French Africa.

Japan Becomes “Protector” of the Catholics

The recent diplomatic accord between Japan and the Vatican has already been put to extensive use by the Axis in radio propaganda beamed to Latin America. The new agreement is obviously being used, particularly by Catholic Italy, in an effort to make Japan more “palatable” from a religious point of view to Catholic Latin America, and to increase distrust of “Protestant” Great Britain and the United States. This Axis propaganda now claims the Papal blessing for its cause in general, and especially for Japan, which is alleged to have assumed the role of “protector” of the Catholics in the Far East.

Meantime on the diplomatic front, there were indications that the Vatican was doing its best to counteract the impression created by the establishment of relations with Japan. The Papal government has apparently not only accepted but even urged on China the sending of a similar representative. There is in China an organized group of more than two and a half million Catholic converts.

Reservations on Padilla

The United-States-Mexican agreement, negotiated in Washington on Tuesday by Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexican foreign minister, to stimulate Mexican war industry and rehabilitate her railways, is an important step forward in hemisphere economic development and defense. Padilla is continuing in the role which he established for himself at the Rio Conference, where he spoke with a decisive pro-democratic accent.

One observer points out, nevertheless, that the efforts of the daily and weekly press in the United States to “build up” Padilla as the “symbol of the coming of age of the American republics” and as the future president of Mexico are unfortunate. Padilla is an able civil servant but has no popular following in Mexico. Mexicans might well receive the impression, therefore, that the United States was attempting to foist a president on them. Such an impression, embroidered by Axis propaganda, could intensify normal Mexican resentment at alien interference in their politics and thus jeopardize the current cordiality between Mexico and the United States, our observer concludes.
APPENDIX I

BRITISH OPINION IN TRANSITION

Various reports of well-placed observers picture a significant change in public sentiment in Britain over the past few weeks. The episodes at Singapore and in the Channel apparently contributed to a public depression which appears to some observers to be verging almost on apathy. The average man's belief in the impregnability of the Empire has rested upon the assumption that these two naval strongholds were under secure British control, but the fall of Singapore and the Scharnhorst-Gneisenau dash through the Channel profoundly altered this view, according to these reports.

One observer who had talked widely with all classes of people, and particularly with those concerned in gauging public opinion, declares that the post-Dunkirk spirit can be revived only if an immediate threat of danger returns or if a tangible "cause" appears. According to this view, the man in the street—no longer fired by the old slogans—sees no real prospect of a changed world worth fighting for, and he regards the status quo as an insufficient incentive to victory.

Another observer, who notes a "certain brightening" in the public attitude as a result chiefly of MacArthur's appointment in the Far East, nevertheless declares that there are some quarters in which there is open discussion of the "possibility of defeat." On the whole, however, the public wants a more active policy and, in its eagerness to contribute through sacrifice, it greeted the recent restrictions on clothing and fuel with an almost "pathological gratitude." If, however, popular sacrifices are not capped by vigorous action on the part of the Government, a swing toward defeatism or communism might follow, the same observer believes.

Students of public opinion to whom this evidence has been submitted warn against overemphasizing the decline in British morale as evidenced in the two attitudes characterizing this wave of depression—bewilderment and irritation. The sacrifices, tension, and effort of the British people during the Battle of Britain were tremendous, tending to obscure mistakes and inefficiency, which now loom large. The psychological effect of the inevitable let-down is now simply manifesting itself in a harvest of complaints. Bewilderment over the blows sustained in areas long thought to be invulnerable adds to these complaints.

These commentators point out that there is as yet little evidence suggesting a deep-seated downward turn in British morale. The search for more active and successful leadership, already manifest in the appointment of Cripps and Lyttleton; the demand for greater self-sacrifice; for an immediate "second front"—all are indicative rather of a basic morale which has not undergone serious deterioration.

British Attitude Toward the United States and Russia

British sentiment toward the United States has undergone many changes since the beginning of the war. According to observers in Britain, the initial reaction of gratitude in 1939 changed gradually to irritation over our tardiness in taking an active, armed part in the struggle. Russia then began to replace America in the esteem of the average Britisher. Admiration for the Russians continues, particularly for Russian "austerity." The Russians are hailed as the "chaps who don't talk but kill Huns." And it is declared that Britain would win the war in half the time if she had some of Russia's generals and some of that country's spirit.

There is some implication that America, which is not "austere," is not pulling its weight. However, the general
view toward American war production is reported to be more optimistic than formerly. Criticism of the United States now comes usually from a small but vocal group on the extreme right, who dread our post-war trade competition; or from the group on the extreme left, which contrasts our war effort unfavorably with that of Russia. The British generally are said to be welcoming Anglo-American cooperation as a basis of post-war stability—cooperation in which they feel Russia also must have a part.

As to Australia, that Dominion is now thought to be as good as lost to the United States already. But there is apparently little alarm, and the British in general are said to favor even closer ties between these two “nations.”

Food Situation in Britain

Although food consumption early in 1941 was at a level dangerously low for morale, it was still above the absolute minimum required for the maintenance of health, according to data assembled by the Economics Division of the Coordinator's Office. Since last spring the situation has been steadily improving. Lend-lease shipments of evaporated and dried milk, cheese, bacon and lard, eggs, canned meat and fish, and dried fish have made possible also a welcome variation in the diet. The home production program has been expanding, with considerable increases in potato, carrot, and cereal acreages; and milk supplies have been maintained practically at pre-war levels.

In a period when the German U-boat campaign is being greatly intensified, however, there is a real question as to how long the present standard of consumption can be maintained. Before the war the United Kingdom normally imported more than half her total food supply. Of these imports, more than one-fourth came from Australasia, Africa, India, and the Far East—sources which have either been cut off or rendered precarious. While government policy has tried to minimize dependence on imported foodstuffs by reserving shipping space for foods of the highest nutritional value (on a weight basis) and by encouraging home production, the United Kingdom is still heavily dependent upon these imports.
APPENDIX II

THE ARCHANGEL-MURMANSK SUPPLY ROUTE AND GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH

With serious German naval attacks on the Arctic route to Russia already under way, attention is once again focused on the principal Soviet supply line. The Murmansk-Archangel route is by far the shortest available from democratic arsenals, and it leads all others in capacity. Murmansk is ice-free all winter and can handle about 100,000 tons of imports per month, barring military interference. The present front cuts the Murman railroad to Leningrad a considerable distance south of the White Sea, but a cross line, recently completed, skirts the southern shore of that sea and connects with the Archangel road (see map inside back cover).

When ice-free, the Archangel route has a substantially larger capacity, and its railroad link is not nearly so vulnerable as that from Murmansk, which is longer, nearer to the enemy, has many bridges (along the White Sea), and is electrified in the Kola Peninsula sector. The Archangel railroad, currently serving both Murmansk and Archangel, can reasonably be expected to handle at least 200,000 tons per month one way. This railroad is being double-tracked, and it is possible that this project may soon be completed, leading to a substantial increase in capacity.

There is likewise a second route from Archangel—the Northern Dvina River to Kotlas, thence by the Kirov railroad to the main Russian railroad net. During the American occupation of this region, following the first World War, 50,000 tons per month were forwarded over this route during the ice-free season, which lasts from mid-May through Septem-ber. It is estimated that this route could handle from 50,000 to 100,000 tons per month at the present time.

During the winter the capacity of Archangel is undependable, but the ice is expected to break up about May 10 this spring. During the first World War ships came in under icebreaker convoy from Cape Svyatoi Nos but penetrated only as far as the outlying ports of Molotovsk and Ekonoma (on an island north of Archangel). Despite noteworthy attempts this route proved unusable this past winter, which was very severe.

German Military Concentrations in the North

Military concentrations reflect the interest of the Germans in cutting this vital northern route. The most effective method would be the seizure of Murmansk and the Russian naval base nearby at Polyanoe (also eliminating to a great extent the Russian defenses of the ocean route to the White Sea). An alternative cutting of the Murman road at Belomorsk (Sorokka) would still leave 200 miles of difficult country to traverse before the Archangel line was reached.

As the map indicates, the Germans now have in northern Finland five divisions in the line (assisted by three Finnish battalions), a division in reserve, two divisions of reinforcements recently arrived (and at present located at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia), one division at Kirkenes, and probably most of six Todt battalions of railroad engineers (exact position unknown). Most or all of another German division stationed at Kirkenes, where barracks were constructed for 30,000 men, was recently sent to strengthen the garrisons in southern Norway. A German air fleet in northern Finland (based on the triangle Petsamo-Rovaniemi-Paljoensuu) is reported to consist of 1,000 planes, but perhaps only 300 are available for operations.
German Attacks on the Northern Supply Route

To date, German attempts to cut the Arctic route have met with little success. An incipient offensive against Murmansk was recently checked by a daring Russian landing in its rear and there has been no sign of a follow through by the Germans. The 16th German army, whose mission the Russians think was to cut the Archangel-Moscow railroad south of Vologda, is cooped up in Staraya Russa, far from its goal. And the RAF has staged a devastating raid on Lübeck, an important shipping center for supplies to Scandinavia and the Russian front.

German Defenses in Norway

Meanwhile important preparations in Norway appear to reflect German concern for that country's defense. The Tirpitz, the Admiral Scheer, the Prinz Eugen and other German naval units are at Trondheim. For the protection of the Norwegian panhandle, the Germans have rushed to completion the lateral highway from Trondheim to Kirkenes, and have established mosquito boat bases at Tromsø and Trondheim. Coast defenses are being rapidly completed, but, like the air force, are concentrated chiefly on the southern coast around Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger. To man these coast defenses, the personnel for 150 new batteries and 36 coast-defense infantry battalions have been or are being sent to Norway chiefly from the coasts of Western Europe.

The southern part of Norway is now held by six divisions, while there are only three in the panhandle north of Trondheim, excluding always the division at Kirkenes. To facilitate reinforcement of Norway the Germans have erected barracks for four divisions in Denmark, where their total garrison does not exceed 7,000 troops, and have collected 50 tanks there for an armored division being organized for Norway, where none exists at present. A submarine base at Horten, near Oslo, and strong air bases in Denmark and the southern lobe of Norway protect the crossing.
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For the President
THE WAR THIS WEEK

The Japanese have now deserted more cautious alternatives and have opened a wide attack in the Bay of Bengal, possible prelude to a more extended action in India itself, where British efforts at political conciliation have failed. At the same time German intervention has produced a collaborationist victory at Vichy under the leadership of Pierre Laval. These moves are interrelated, although by no means necessarily the product of coordinated effort by the two Axis partners, notoriously given to the close pursuit of their own immediate objects.

If their offensive eventuates in the occupation of such bases as those in Ceylon, the Japanese could then harass vital communication lines with the Middle East, notably the oil supply lines for the Allied effort in India. Such a campaign could be of significant benefit to Germany as well as to Japan. If the Nazis, in turn, can now wrest from Vichy the effective cooperation of the French fleet, then the naval responsibilities of Britain in the west will be substantially increased and her position in the Indian Ocean area potentially weakened. That situation would serve the immediate interests of the Japanese.

Meanwhile events continue to emphasize the central importance of the Indian and Russian theatres of war. Preparations are going rapidly forward for a Nazi spring drive against the Russians. The Japanese offensive in Burma is pushing the British and Chinese steadily northward. And
on the "negative" side Rommel's offensive in Libya has now proved to be essentially a reconnaissance in force. Japanese activities in the Solomons suggest a cautious and tentative "feeling out" process and not a clear-cut and determined offensive. And in Siberia the Japanese have allowed the initial favorable period for an offensive to pass: the ice will soon be going out of the rivers, and mechanized operations then become difficult for some weeks to come.

Sir Stafford Goes Home

It was in an atmosphere of disillusionment that the political discussions between Sir Stafford Cripps and Indian Nationalist leaders broke up. Earlier press optimism proved unfounded, as both of the two leading Indian parties rejected the British compromise proposals, and Sir Stafford himself departed for London.

The Moslem League, despite its gratification over the fact that the Cripps plan implicitly recognized its pet doctrine of Pakistan or Indian partition, seemed unwilling to leave the question of membership in the proposed Indian Union to popular sentiment, even in the provinces with Moslem majorities, but suggested instead that provincial boundaries be redrawn. The objections of the All-India Congress went still further to the heart of the matter. In trenchant form, the party of Nehru and Gandhi laid down the already anticipated bases of its definitive refusal.

First of all, in the interim period before the end of the war, when the British constitutional plan would go into effect, the Congress found that British control over defense would make of Indian self-government "a farce and nullity," since defense would cover "almost every sphere of life and administration." Second, under the Cripps plan, the native states would remain as an "enclave" where "foreign authority" would still prevail.

Finally, the recognition of Moslem separatism would prove an "apple of discord" in the new India.

Cripps' Counterblast

Cripps himself countered with a blast against the "critical and unconstructive attitude" with which Nationalist leaders had met his plan. A real Indian ministry, as proposed by the Congress, would, he maintained, "constitute an absolute dictatorship" of the Hindu majority, answerable only to party chiefs. A weary Sir Stafford was apparently laying the blame for the failure of conciliation squarely on the shoulders of Indian Nationalist leaders. In this he seems to have represented the feelings of the average Britisher, whom a despatch from London has pictured as skeptical of the success of Cripps' mission from the start and uninformed as to the basis of Indian intransigence.

Somewhat later, Cripps denied that the United States had played any significant part in the negotiations. On this one point, he was apparently in agreement with Indian leaders. A press report from New Delhi suggests that the latter have been profoundly irritated by impatient and uninformed American newspaper comment, and by the predominant role assigned to Louis Johnson, the President's personal representative in India, as the deus ex machina of the whole transaction.

Fundamentally, India still seemed unconvincing of Britain's magnanimous intentions. After the collapse of the negotiations with Cripps, Pandit Nehru summarized Indian public opinion with ominous candor: "The fundamental factor today is dislike of the British Government." Pledging that his country would not "embarrass" Britain's war effort, Nehru called on all Indians to rise in defense of their land—implying, apparently, that the new situation made India rather than Britain primarily responsible for its own salvation.
Japanese Alternatives

In the opinion of a close observer of the Indian scene, however, the failure of the Cripps mission will make little difference in the conduct of India's defense. That is largely a professional matter, in which the chief factors are the apathy of a great part of the population, an acute shortage of equipment, and practically no time for improvising new divisions. Last week the Japanese were keeping the Allies guessing as to where they would strike next on India's long and vulnerable coast.

The sinking of two British heavy cruisers and the aircraft carrier Hermes apparently indicated fairly complete air supremacy over the Bay of Bengal—and the formidable strength of the Japanese fleet in Indian waters (including, on Mr. Churchill's estimate, at least three battleships and five aircraft carriers) suggested some sort of major offensive. Apparently the inhabitants of Madras, about a fifth of whom are reported to have fled to the interior, feared that their city might be the next Japanese objective. Strategic considerations pointed to Ceylon and Bengal, however, as more likely to be attacked.

The air assaults on Trincomalee and Colombo have already indicated Japanese interest in Ceylon, British fleet headquarters and pivot of Indian Ocean defense. Prime Minister Churchill has suggested its limitations as a naval base—at least in comparison with Singapore. Nevertheless, a Japanese attack here—probably in the form of naval action followed up by troop landings—would constitute a major assault against a main center of British resistance. Hence some observers think it more likely that such an assault would be preceded by an attack on the rich and vulnerable province of Bengal, precipitating panic and economic disorder in that area.

The Calcutta Area

Bengal would appear to be an almost ideal objective for a raid or a troop landing. The British have anticipated an attack on Calcutta from the east just as little as they previously reckoned on a land offensive against Singapore. As a result, they have left the coast defenses of this area weak, and in the past they have never garrisoned or trained any considerable number of troops in Bengal (see The War This Week, February 19-26, pp. 6-7).

Despite its extensive docks and repair facilities, Calcutta's position, far up the winding Hooghly river, makes it a poor naval base. British fleet units defending Bengal would probably operate from Ceylon, while the Japanese would have an excellent anchorage in the Andaman islands. If the latter seized the Burmese port of Akyab (as an erroneous press report announced about a week ago), they would have an air base only a little more than 300 miles from Calcutta.

The port of Calcutta is completely exposed to air attack. Its principal wharves are located in enclosed basins, access to which is through narrow channels. The destruction of a ship or bridge in one or all of the channels would seriously impair Calcutta's usefulness as a port of entry. As a major railway junction for shipments to China, Calcutta would be the logical place for the Japanese to interfere with supplies going in that direction. Furthermore, the industry of the Calcutta area would be extremely vulnerable to bombing attack. The jute mills lining the Hooghly river, the mines and iron works of western Bengal and eastern Bihar, are near enough to the sea to be vulnerable to carrier-borne aircraft. An attack on these latter establishments would go far to paralyze the railways, railway workshops, ordnance factories, shipyards, and engineering shops of Calcutta, which are almost completely dependent on them (see The War This Week, February 19-26, pp. 16-17).
The Population Factor

In Bengal, 60 million people crowd into an area about the size of Kansas. Undernourished and sickly, about 60 per cent are said to suffer from malaria annually. Bitter religious disputes characterize the relations between Moslems and Hindus; the former have a slight numerical preponderance.

Living just at the subsistence level, the inhabitants of the Calcutta area would starve in large numbers if military operations should interfere with their normal production of food, especially rice (1938-39 crop: 7.5 million tons in Bengal alone). Bengal has a huge livestock surplus, but the religious scruples of the Hindu population would prevent the killing of any cattle.

Such considerations indicate that the war morale of the people of Bengal would probably be extremely low. The 563,000 factory workers (80 per cent concentrated in metropolitan Calcutta) would, moreover, form a potentially dangerous element. Observers agree that these workers would be extremely subject to panic in the event of air attack.

The intrigues of the Bose brothers (see The War This Week, March 12-19, pp. 9-10) have, moreover, created in India an embryo fifth column. According to a report from London, the grand strategy of their pro-Axis movement is in the hands of Subhas Chandra Bose, who recently broadcast two messages to Sir Stafford Cripps from Berlin. But the actual liaison with the lunatic fringe of Indian leaders, and the tactical execution of the plans formulated in Germany, seem to be in the hands of Ras Behari Bose, now resident in Japan. The technique of the Bose brothers is apparently a clever mixture of sensationalism and confusion, as revealed in the recent contradictory reports of Subhas' death in an airplane crash in Japan, just on the eve of his second broadcast from Berlin.

The Japanese Press Forward in Burma

The Japanese drive in Central Burma has been gathering intensity, and both Chinese and British defenders have again been pushed northward toward Mandalay. Chungking news despatches report strong Japanese reinforcements en route to Burma and the opening of a new front on the Shan plateau designed to cut the Mandalay-Lashio railway far above the present battle areas. The situation in Burma is admittedly most critical, and the outcome of the campaign there will probably depend above all on the rapidity with which Allied air reinforcements can be sent, in the view of close observers of the scene. One London commentary is reported to have gone so far as to characterize the campaign now as little more than a stubborn rear guard action designed to give India time to prepare for invasion.

In the Irrawaddy Valley sector, held by the British, the Japanese were reported to be within a few miles of Magwe, gateway to the oil region (see map on inside of back cover). In this area also, a heavy attack southwest of Taungwinyi apparently was aimed at disrupting British and Chinese communications across the low-lying Pegu hills and at separating the two Allied forces. After having been attacked from three sides at Yedashe, the Chinese were reported to have fallen back 22 miles along the Mandalay road. One reason for this retirement, according to reports from the Chinese front, was the necessity of maintaining a line generally east of the British. The map makes clear the difficult tactical problem which faces both Chinese and British forces in maintaining secure communication lines across the Pegu hills.

The new drive across the Shan plateau, reported in news despatches from Chungking, may constitute a formidable threat to the whole Allied position in Burma. Originating
Shelled on the Indian frontier by the canton, anticipated no large-scale clin. cs r e g a r d i n g a n "corridor," advancing troops. In Bunna and the Bay of Bengal area, Chinese occupied this on carriers, is now placed by generally, the air strength of the Japanese continued intensive planes—a considerable increase over former estimates.

Operations on the Salween River near Mawchi remained on a small scale, although Japanese troops were said to have occupied this tin and tungsten center. Military observers anticipated no large-scale offensives in this area, either by the Chinese or their opponents. Meanwhile, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has visited the Burmese front, where he is reliably reported to have conferred with Allied military officials regarding a united command in Burma.

Topography and Strategy in Burma

The peculiar topographic features of Burma are significant conditioning factors in the strategy of the Japanese. Shielded on the Indian frontier by the great Arakan Yoma range, whose peaks rise in some places to 10,000 feet, and on the east by the Shan plateau, the rich central basin provides a compact but deceptive battleground. The two "corridors," separated by the Pegu hills, offer natural advantages for defense by separate forces. But the Pegu hills are not impassable—a fact which might readily lead to a Napoleonic strategy of mountain fighting, aiming to subdue the defenders in detail.

A glance at the map will show, however, the improbability of such a venture as that predicted by some newspaper accounts—a landing at Akyab designed to "outflank" the British from the west. While a landing at Akyab to seize the airfield located there is not at all improbable, an attempt to outflank the British by a movement of troops across the formidable Arakan Yoma range is thought by observers to be highly unlikely.

The Coming Rainy Season in Burma

Weather also is an important factor in the Burma fighting, but perhaps not so important as is popularly supposed. The Southwest Monsoon movement of humid air from the Indian Ocean to the land normally begins to develop in May and early June, but heavy rains generally do not break until about the end of May, according to data supplied by the Geographic Division of the Coordinator's office. The exposed Arakan district, around Akyab, is subject to very heavy rains. The central basin area around Mandalay, however, lying in the lee of the Arakan Yoma range, receives considerably less rain and in fact is characterized as a "dry" belt. The highlands of the Shan plateau also are relatively dry. The fighting in central Burma already is moving beyond the southern delta region where floods would be a more serious handicap to military movement.

Nevertheless, the rivers in central Burma are considerably extended during the rainy season, owing to drainage from the mountains. One observer has noted that at Bhamo the
Irrawaddy river changes from a shallow stream strewn with sandbanks to a river two miles wide. But he also notes that it is during the rainy season that the Irrawaddy becomes most navigable. The number of rainy days increases in May and June, averaging from five to ten per month in the Mandalay basin, but this is hardly more than the normal number of rainy days during the same months in areas with comparatively dry climates. The evidence available in fact indicates that at no time during the rainy season, which lasts into October, would weather alone bring about any considerable cessation of military operations in central Burma.

The Isolation of China
The establishment of a defensive line running from the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, through Akyab, Kalewa, and Bhamo, is thought by some observers to be the present objective of the Japanese in the Burma campaign. With alternative routes from India to China in their present incipient stage, it would hardly be necessary to extend the line farther north than Bhamo to intercept traffic for the Burma Road. Myitkyina (north of Bhamo and not shown on the map) might become an objective, if construction on a proposed northern route from Ledo were to be completed (see The War This Week, February 12–19, pp. 5–6). At present, however, if the Japanese succeed in capturing the rail center at Mandalay, land routes to China via Burma will for all practical purposes cease to exist.

The proposed Ledo-Myitkyina route in the north appears to have been traversed by jeep trucks and might be useful as a fair-weather road if it could be treated with crude oil from the Burma oil fields. Even so, its chief utility would be as a supply route to the defenders of northern Burma, if only because of the gasoline factor. The oil fields and refinery at Digboi in Assam probably could supply a service of 400–500 jeeps running into Upper Burma, but the loss of Burmese oil fields and refineries will seriously handicap traffic from northern Burma to China.

The Oil of Burma
The advance of the Japanese in the Irrawaddy valley has put them within reach of the two most important oil fields between the Netherlands East Indies and the Middle East—Singu and Yenangyuang (see map). The oil fields of Burma altogether have an annual average production totaling slightly over 1,000,000 metric tons, of which nearly 90 per cent is produced by these two fields. By capturing the refineries at Syiam, near Rangoon, to which oil had been piped and transported by barge from the fields in central Burma, the Japanese already have virtually nullified the effectiveness of Burmese oil production for the Allies, although a few diminutive refineries are located near the producing areas and might conceivably still be in use.

Russian Route to China
Faced with the possible loss of supply routes from India, the Chinese have begun more intensive diplomatic exploration of the possibilities of a new route through Iran and Turkistan. Last summer, however, the former Russian supply route to China was delivering only some 50 tons a day in Chungking, roughly one-tenth the amount which has since been reaching Kunming over the Burma Road, according to an American observer. Even on the assumption that the Russian authorities could and would cooperate, routes through Central Asia are very long and very costly. The exploration of supply possibilities via these back-door routes to China
is interpreted by one observer to be more of a gesture of Chinese determination than anything else—coming as it does after the successive closures of more practicable routes.

**Civilian Exhaustion in Free China**

Three Americans who have recently returned after considerable first-hand observation in Free China are unanimous in pointing out that, although the farming population is no worse off than usual, the professional classes are suffering seriously from poverty and malnutrition.

In addition, it is said that after five years, Free China as a whole is definitely incapable of taking the offensive. Our chief objective, according to these observers, should therefore be to keep China in the war, rather than to aim at obtaining her vigorous assistance. Concentrated pharmaceutical products might thus be just as important in the maintenance of Free China as artillery and munitions.

**Resistance in Manila Bay**

The defense of Corregidor and its auxiliary forts at the entrance of Manila Bay will continue, according to a message by General Wainwright to his troops, “with all the resources at our command.” From bases in Australia, a 4,000-mile bombing attack on Japanese positions in the Philippines has given Wainwright’s statement sensational punctuation.

After the fall of Bataan, the Navy had announced that “most” of an estimated 3,500 sailors and marines had escaped to Corregidor. Under continuous air and artillery attack, with as many as 22 raids in two days, Corregidor appeared still to be able to return the enemy’s fire, although the Japanese have claimed that the guns on the north side of the island have been silenced.

Resistance also appears to be continuing on Cebu, where early in the week the Japanese landed an estimated 12,000 troops at six beachheads on the island. Some observers anticipated that further attempts to extend control over the southern and central islands of the Philippines would be made by the Japanese with troops freed after the fall of Bataan.

**Reaction to the Fall of Bataan**

Axis propagandists, including the Japanese, have made almost no capital out of the fall of Bataan. Tokyo radio beamed an alibi to India: the Japanese did not wish to inflict heavy slaughter on the Filipinos. Berlin radio sympathized with the “poor doughboys,” taking it as another occasion to attack American leaders, but making no disparaging references to the fighting.

The British press joined in tribute to the defenders, ranking the defense of Bataan with the long-drawn-out resistance of Malta, Tobruk, and Sevastopol. Pro-Ally journalists in neutral Turkey blamed the defeat upon the exhaustion of men and supplies only, and found in the ardent fighting of the Filipinos the fruits of an enlightened colonial policy. In Tangier, too, the press pointed particularly to the Filipinos who “fought violently” alongside the Americans.

**Resumption of Activity on New Guinea**

Japanese land forces, operating from their base at Lae on the Huon Gulf, appear again to have begun an advance up the Markham Valley, after having been driven back to their coastal bases some weeks ago by torrential rains. No contacts between ground troops of the United Nations and the Japanese have been reported on New Guinea since the initial Japanese landings at Lae and Salamaua on March 8.
The air duel between Allied fliers and the Japanese in Australasia continues daily, with heavy and successful attacks particularly on the important Japanese bases at Rabaul, New Britain, Koepang in Dutch Timor, and Lae. A direct hit on an aircraft carrier at Rabaul has been officially confirmed. Two Japanese carriers are believed to be operating in this vicinity.

The Japanese have again bombed Tulagi and Gavutu islands in the Solomons. It is reported also that they are building a small base for submarines at the mouth of the Warongai River in New Britain. Japanese raids on Port Moresby and Port Darwin are less frequent, although the most recent figures on Japanese air strength in this area indicate that it has been maintained at about 650 operational planes.

Quiet in Eastern Siberia

With the virtual end of the spring period of favorable weather for a Siberian blitzkrieg, quiet continued to reign in that theatre. As the ice breaks up on the frontier rivers (usually beginning about April 20), the latter again become barriers with gunboat patrols, and the bordering alluvial areas become so swampy as to prevent military operations on any large scale. There are a few places devoid of alluvium, which should dry up early in May, but Russian defense of these small sectors should be relatively easy (see The War This Week, March 12–19, pp. 21–22).

Complimentary statements by General Tatekawa, the retiring Japanese ambassador to Russia, are being broadcast currently from Tokyo concerning Russian efficiency and amicable relations with Japan. But the Hsinking radio in Manchuria, which has often (as before the outbreak of the Pacific War) foreshadowed Japanese policy, warned that Japan and Russia may clash as a result of Anglo-American intrigues. Various important Japanese have recently been recalled to Japan for conferences, including General Akamato, an expert on the border defenses of Manchuria, and the military attaché to Russia with all his staff. And it is just reported that Tatekawa has secretly been appointed advisor on Russian military strategy to the Manchukuo Army. It may also be significant that Japanese broadcasts are beginning to contain opprobrious allusions to communist activities in several strategic Asiatic countries.

Collaboration Wins the Day at Vichy

With the return of Laval as Vice President of the Council at Vichy, the Germans have apparently won a clear-cut victory, although its precise character will not be known until Laval returns from his negotiations with the Nazis in Paris. It is expected that he will then form his government and clarify the important issue as to what the future position of the Marshal is to be.

Meanwhile Pétain has agreed that Laval shall not only be Vice President of the Council but that he shall hold the four key portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Propaganda and Information, and National Economy. Darlan, it is announced, is to continue in the post of Minister of National Defense. Although Otto Abetz, German Ambassador to Paris, was reported at one time to have expressed Berlin’s displeasure at having Laval as the French champion of “collaboration,” the latter has obviously been chosen again by the Germans to force the issue at Vichy and to remove American influence and sympathy with the Allies from places of importance around Marshal Pétain.

Probably taking his cue from Laval himself, the collabora-
Nouveaux Temps in Paris, declared on April 7 that French “neutralities” are not neutrality at all but in reality a tacit alliance between Vichy and Washington. Luchaire also pointed out that the “new government will conduct the affairs of France in such a way that she may take her rightful place in the new European order and derive appropriate benefits from this European collaboration.” As an indication of what changes this “new conduct of the affairs of France” may bring in the French domestic scene is the announcement that the Riom trial has been suspended: its scope may be broadened so that future proceedings may include “political and military mistakes which led to war and defeat.”

The full significance of Laval’s advent to power must await the commentary of events. Speculation at once suggested the dangerous possibility of fleet cooperation and the surrender of French base facilities. Certain observers believe that the Germans are seeking to protect their rear against the danger of invasion at a moment when they are about to renew the eastern offensive, and one report declares that Laval will function as “civil supervisor of all France,” perhaps even leaving strictly “military supervision” to the Germans. In this connection it is to be noted, however, that the Germans already control the north and west French littoral, and that only German troops could be relied upon to repel an Allied invasion attempt on this area. The Nazis must also face the danger that a violent swing to collaborationism may alienate large numbers of the French people and increase the probability of sabotage and active aid to a possible invading force.

From North Africa comes a report that Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français has received 80,000,000 francs from the Nazis which it is to use in propagandizing North Africa in favor of Nazism. At the same time there is a report to the effect that Laval has recently announced that, should he be returned to power, he would fight to get back for Vichy the Free French colonies, presumably in Africa and the Pacific. There are also reliable reports of increasing tension in Morocco with certain military precautions being taken by the French—in apprehension, it is reported, of what the British may do. Simultaneously highly placed French officials in North Africa continue to urge that America make economic aid available to that region at a time when economic stringency is reported to be grave.

An Axis Squeeze Play?

As Vichy gravitated toward the Axis, the fast battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, now reunited at Toulon, were the chief stakes in the risky game of Mediterranean naval balance. If these and other units of the French navy were suddenly to pass under Axis control, the British would face a significantly strengthened naval force in that area just at the time when the defense of India may demand naval reinforcement in the East.

The sinking of the Italian heavy cruiser Trento by a British submarine, plus the report that both of the two new Italian battleships were under repair at Taranto, indicated that the naval balance in the Mediterranean had improved somewhat, and that the Italians might not be able to contribute very significantly to any contemplated squeeze play. A recently compiled list of Italian sinkings reveals that since the start of the war Italy has lost perhaps 44 per cent of her merchant shipping, about half her submarines, more than one-third of her destroyers, and about a third of her light cruisers. Although the British have sunk none of the six Italian battleships, only the three old vessels Giulio Cesare, Caio Duilio, and Andrea Doria are apparently now fit for service. Of the seven heavy cruisers with which Italy
entered the war, the *Zara*, *Polo*, and *Fiume* were lost at Cape Matapan, and the *Gorizia* went down at Messina. With the recent loss of the *Trento*, then, the Italians have left only the *Bolzano* and the *Trieste*, at least one of which is now under repair.

*Action in Malta and Libya*

Last week Malta withstood its worst bombing thus far. Evidently the Axis was meeting with some success in neutralizing the fortress lying athwart its supply lines to Libya. But it was at heavy cost: somewhere between five and ten per cent of the 100 to 200 planes that flew over the island daily were reported lost. Airmen generally consider ten per cent losses as an uneconomic wastage of air strength. And at a time when the RAF has launched a major offensive against industrial centers in northern France and Germany, and when the Nazis are apparently preparing for a spring push in Russia, the losses over Malta may make themselves felt in other theaters of the war.

*The Flow of Lend-lease Goods to Russia*

On all except the northern sector of the Russian front the spring thaw had apparently stalled both Soviet and Nazi armies last week. There was marked activity in the Lake Ilmen area alone, where the Germans admitted a Russian break-through. But they added that they had cut the supply lines of the Soviet advance detachment, leaving them isolated and without reinforcements.

As the zero hour of the anticipated German spring offensive drew near, the lend-lease shipping lane to Murmansk was again the focus of Allied interest. The Germans claimed that they had set fire to two merchant ships and damaged a third on this run. Press reports from Stockholm, however, announced that another Allied convoy had reached Murmansk in safety. S. A. Lozovsky, Soviet vice-commissar for foreign affairs, declared that "all sorts" of war materials were now reaching Russia from the United States. And Admiral Standley, on his arrival at Kuibyshev to assume his functions as American Ambassador, predicted that the current month would see the flow of goods from the United States at last equaling American commitments.
THE WAR THIS WEEK

With Pétain's acceptance of Laval and the creation of a frankly collaborationist government in France, the Germans have won a diplomatic victory of far-reaching implications. In the end it may involve the transfer to Axis control—in effect at least—of the French fleet and bases. Present indications, however, suggest that Laval will move slowly at first, attempting above all to consolidate his domestic position.

In the Far East, there is an enigmatic pause in the Battle of Bengal, and the Japanese are withdrawing from that area important elements of their fleet, including heavy units. This may reflect a decision that the costs of an assault on India would be too high, as suggested by the Japanese air losses over Ceylon. Or it may mean merely the withdrawal of carriers to obtain fresh complements of planes. Meanwhile the recent doubling of Japanese air strength in Manchuria and Japan suggests an increasing interest in the Siberian area. At the same time the Japanese have again been feeling out the North Australian defense zone, but here their heavy air losses—as compared with those of the Allies—would scarcely encourage a significant forward movement.

On the Russian front, the Soviets continue to claim gains, but the best evidence indicates that Russian attacks are aimed primarily at seriously hampering German preparations for the expected spring offensive. Military observers credit the Russians with no advances of importance for several weeks past.
SECRET

Pétain Yields to the Collaborationist Tide

On Sunday last Marshal Pétain asked the French people to follow him as it had on the occasion of the armistice of June 1940. With full knowledge that the assumption of power by Laval would be considered as nothing less than an unfriendly act by the United States, the Marshal declared: “Pierre Laval will exercise under my authority the internal and external policy of our country. It was with him at the most tragic moment of our disaster that I founded the new order which must assure the resurrection of France.

“Today is a moment as decisive as that of June, 1940; I again find myself with him to resume the national task, and that of European organization for which we together have laid the bases.”

The somewhat enigmatic nature of Pétain, and the vacillating character of his policy have given rise to justifiable differences of opinion as to his willingness and ability to resist the collaborationist demands of the Germans in the past. Now, however, his frank acceptance of Laval, who has promptly embarked on a candid program of cooperation with the Germans, has destroyed faith in the sincerity and usefulness of Pétain. The most striking index to this new attitude is quite obviously the recall for consultation of Admiral Leahy. In future the Marshal is apparently to be viewed as a political front for the Laval regime, of value merely in winning for that regime political adhesion among parts at least of the French public.

One close observer of the French scene points out that Pétain’s present action accords with much in his past. When France in the summer of 1940 was faced with the decision whether she should surrender to the Germans or continue resistance in the colonies, the character and personality of Pétain played a decisive role. His great prestige in the first

World War was enough to convince large numbers of people that his advice should be taken and that France should lay down her arms. His popularity and prestige, together with a fundamentally egotistic belief in his own political importance, permitted such traitors as Laval to gather about him and to support his political pretensions while seeking to foster their own personal ambitions. Pétain’s lack of faith in the cause of French democracy and his defeatist tendencies, as recorded by Clémenceau and Foch from the last war, made it only too appropriate that he take advantage of France’s prostrate condition in order to force upon her in 1940 his ideas of what a French government should be. This cast of mind has now made it perfectly possible for Pétain, despite his notorious personal enmity for Laval, to accept a regime pledged to full cooperation with the Germans.

Laval Maps a Collaborationist Course for France

Laval’s formation of the new government obviously fulfills hopes which he has long cherished. It is even reported on high authority that some years ago (and long before the collapse of the French republic) Laval conceived an anti-democratic regime, to which Pétain had declared himself sympathetic, and of which he, Laval, would be the effective leader, covered by the cloak of the Marshal’s popularity. Without the popularity of Pétain, Laval obviously realizes that in the present juncture he could do little, unless he were prepared to seek the full support of the German Army.

In his Monday broadcast to the French people Laval declared: “I have always affirmed that rapprochement between France and Germany was a condition of peace in Europe . . . Today no menace will prevent me from seeking entente and reconciliation with Germany.”
Only the future can reveal the precise form to be taken by the policy here described by Laval in unvarnished terms. He has reserved for himself the key posts of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Information (propaganda). He has chosen as colleagues notorious collaborationists or men who are in any event fully expected to do his will in realizing the new policy.

It is true that Darlan has been named successor to Pétain and commander in chief of all the armed forces, responsible only to the Marshal. But observers point out that the extent of Laval’s power, notably over the Ministries of War and the Navy, will enable him to exert significant control over the armed forces of France, and probably as a result to undermine rapidly the position of Darlan.

Laval’s Apparent Intentions

It is believed that Laval will make no spectacular changes at once. According to Anthony Eden, he will lie low for a time to quiet apprehensions in America as well as in France. Laval probably hopes to mediate between Washington and Berlin and to acquire enough prestige in the New Order to feather his own nest and that of France. He will do nothing about Vichy warships for a time, Eden indicates, and neither contemplates nor desires allowing Berlin to have them. He might, however, use them to protect the trade of France with her dependencies. Laval would no doubt permit Nazi penetration in these areas, so that a naval clash with Allied forces might well result. He will foster the transfer to Germany of French workers, but is unlikely to embark on so ambitious a project as the conquest of territories held by the Free French. Eden concludes.

Certain changes are already in evidence, however. In French West Africa Rear Admiral Paul Collinet, who commanded the Strasbourg in the British attack on Oran, has been given the naval command. In Tangier the Germans are planning to establish diplomatic or consular representation, and are attempting to establish a regime of extraterritoriality. A very recent report tells of the arrival in Tangier and North Africa of “an extraordinary number of Germans” who, it is claimed, are coming for espionage and counter-espionage purposes.

While Allied suspicions have been aroused over plans regarding the movement of French warships from North African ports, it is reported that the French are calling for more arms from the Germans to “protect” themselves against the British. In Dakar, the press and the radio, through directed propaganda efforts, are vehemently stressing loyalty to Pétain, while from Martinique Admiral Robert claims that his relationship with Pétain and Darlan has not changed.

Axis Naval Dispositions and the French Fleet

This week’s map presents in diagrammatic form the locations of the naval units in Europe that the United Nations must watch—their ships being heavily engaged in Atlantic, Pacific, and Far Eastern waters. Notable are the badly battered but still powerful Italian battle fleet at Taranto; the German naval concentration at Trondheim—threatening both the British Home Fleet and the Allied supply line to Russia, while guarding against an assault on Norway; and the scattering of the remaining Nazi fleet units among numerous ports of the North and Baltic Seas, cleverly guarding against a repetition of the British of surprise torpedo-plane successes such as those at Taranto and Pearl Harbor. Here the central question is, of course, what the future will bring when the damaged Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (perhaps along with the pocket battleship Lützfow and the aircraft carrier
Graf Zeppelin) are ready to join the Tirpitz and Scheer to form a formidable battle line.

With Laval again in power at Vichy, the immediate issue, however, is the French fleet. Here, one can distinguish four separate elements of the French navy, in ascending order of importance. First, there are the units already in Allied hands—or as good as in Allied hands—including the old battleships Paris and Courbet in British ports, the battleship Lorraine and three heavy cruisers demilitarized at Alexandria, and the aircraft carrier Bearn at Martinique.

Second are the ships at Dakar and Casablanca on the Atlantic Coast of Africa. Here are France’s newest battleships, the Jean Bart and the Richelieu. The former, however, is incomplete (nor does Casablanca appear to offer adequate facilities for its completion); the latter, damaged by the British and with its bottom fouled, is probably of use only as a sort of floating shore battery. Furthermore, to join the main body of the French fleet naval units from Africa would be obliged to run the gauntlet of Gibraltar. Such a venture, hazardous at best, probably would have to be attempted without the formidable air protection that was in large measure responsible for the successful passage of the Straits of Dover by the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

Third in importance are the vessels in Mediterranean ports in North Africa. Lacking heavy naval strength, these units would be of real significance only if they joined the main French fleet at Toulon. It is barely possible that the resistance of local authorities might prevent their junction with the bulk of the Vichy navy in any frankly collaborationist gesture.

Fundamentally, however, it is the fourth group, the fleet at Toulon, including four heavy cruisers and perhaps three battleships fit for service—the old Provence, and the new, fast Dunkerque and Strasbourg—to which commentators refer when they speak of the “menace” of the French navy. Meantime, press reports of the presence of two British battleships, one of the new King George V class, in waters near Toulon, suggest that the United Nations will not be caught napping by any surprise move of the new Vichy regime.

French Alternatives

The present danger, however, is more complex than a mere “surrender” of the fleet would suggest. There is also the question of bases, notably Bizerte, in Tunisia. The use of Bizerte as a base for supplying Axis armies in Libya last winter caused a grave crisis in Franco-American relations. And if the new Vichy government were to turn over all its facilities to the Germans and Italians, the Axis naval and supply problem in the Mediterranean would be considerably simplified.

Yet the change would not be so great as some press commentators have suggested. There is considerable evidence that the British are no longer attempting to control the Western Mediterranean. The recent convoy to Malta, for instance, came not from Gibraltar, but from Alexandria. Gibraltar apparently remains as a sort of naval outpost. But to neutralize Gibraltar, as Malta has already been largely neutralized, would be of clear advantage to the Axis. For this purpose, the use of the French base at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), less than 300 miles from Gibraltar, would be an almost indispensable prerequisite.

Laval’s announced intention is eventually to reconquer the French colonies that have passed to De Gaulle. One observer suggests that an ultimate Vichy attack on Syria would not only be in line with this policy, but would also give Laval a splendid pretext for what would amount to a surrender of his Mediterranean fleet to the Axis. For an effort to reunite the
French Empire, even though it meant joint action by the French and Italian navies against the British, would no doubt fire the imagination of at least one wing of patriotic Frenchmen. Certain naval officers in particular, outraged by the British attack at Oran, and their fomenting of "civil war" in Syria, are reported to be thirsting for vengeance on their traditional enemies.

_Mediterranean Danger Spots_

In Syria itself, a personal struggle between General Catroux, the chief of the Free French authorities, and General Spears, the British commander, is embittering relations between the two occupying forces. A report from Beirut suggests that Catroux, alarmed at the fact that the British are more popular with the natives than the French, is about to reorganize the government of the Lebanon in cooperation with the Maronite Patriarch, spiritual director of about a third of the Lebanese.

In Libya, sandstorms during the early part of the week completely stalled military operations. Although Malta, Britain’s much-bombed island fortress, last week suffered somewhat less damage and fewer casualties than in the preceding period, its situation apparently remained as critical as before. In an unprecedented gesture, the King awarded the George Cross to Malta’s entire civilian population.

_Pause in the Bay of Bengal_

It is difficult to interpret the present lull in Japanese operations against India. On the one hand, the report that the Japanese have withdrawn all the battleships and all but two of the aircraft carriers previously concentrated in the Bay of Bengal, might suggest that for the present at least they are content with the practical mastery of these waters which they have already obtained. On the other hand, the advice issued by the government of Madras for all non-essential civilians to leave the city, and the news of increased enemy merchant ship movements in the Bay of Bengal, would point to a continuing Japanese menace.

With the Indian peninsula on the alert, post-mortem statements on the failure of the Cripps mission were not lacking. The Chinese press reaction has in general been one of great disappointment, tempered by the feeling that the Indian problem is of such urgency that British and native leaders will persevere continue negotiations and reach a satisfactory settlement. British newspapers see a certain gain from the breakdown of negotiations: now the responsibility for India’s future rests squarely with the Indians themselves. Furthermore, the British have won understanding and support from an initially hostile public opinion in the United States.

_The Japanese Shift Fresh Strength to the North_

While an unconfirmed report from Finland pictures German disappointment at Japanese failure to attack Siberia "as expected," a reallocation of plane strength indicates increasing Japanese interest in that area. The number of military planes in Manchuria and Korea was increased in the first half of this month from about 300 to 700, and in Northern China (including Chahar) from 60 to 200. In Japan the number was nearly doubled, rising from about 400 to more than 750.

At the same time seven divisions, which were supposed to have been in Japan proper, have dropped out of sight. Some of them are thought to be now in Manchuria, where there have recently been 18 divisions (12 on the border facing the Maritime Province). In addition, a convoy bearing a large
number of Japanese troops recently left Singapore, bound northwards. It is believed that its destination may be Dairen.

Renewed Activity in Australasia

With General MacArthur’s sphere of authority delimited at last, and with United Nations aviators taking the offensive against Japanese air bases at Kupang, Salamaua, and Rabaul, Allied optimism about Australia was on the increase. According to Lieutenant General Brett, United Nations Air Commander, his fliers are destroying six Japanese planes to every one of their own lost in action. At Rabaul, for instance, Allied airmen destroyed 40 Japanese planes on the ground. More recently, however, Japanese heavy bombers returned to the attack on Port Moresby (New Guinea). Coupled with reports of decreased activity in the Bay of Bengal, this new attack suggests that the Japanese for the moment at least have abandoned aggressive intentions against India, and are again feeling out the defenses of the north Australian zone.

Toward an Allied Initiative?

Thus far in the war, the Axis has held the initiative. Operating on interior lines, and able to concentrate its strength with speed and a reasonable degree of secrecy, it has forced the United Nations to scatter their own troops and naval units over the whole globe—to defend all points at once and none of them adequately. The result has been defeats, withdrawals, and defensive actions.

Last week there were signs that in some theaters at least the initiative was passing to the Allies. Apparently taking advantage of the fact that Japanese carrier strength was heavily engaged in the Bay of Bengal, American bombers were reported by Japanese sources to have struck at Tokyo. And on the European continent there was increasing evidence that the Germans were speculating with some anxiety as to just where Britain and the United States might conceivably be planning to open up a second European front.

Reichsmarshal Goering and his staff since April 4 have been at Serqueux near Forges-les-Eaux (Seine-Inférieure) in Occupied France, according to a report from Vichy. The Belgian government in exile has stated that the Germans are evacuating civilians and laying land mines in the Sambre and Meuse region. And a Swiss report suggests that German press quotations of American and English newspaper predictions of a coming offensive represent a real endeavor to determine where such an attack might come. Here frank curiosity is a more convincing explanation than a claim, ostensibly from Berlin, of complete information on “Roosevelt’s plan.”

Wednesday’s commando raid on Boulogne has revealed once again the vulnerability of the channel shores of Occupied France—presumably one of the areas which the Nazis are protecting most heavily. With an estimated 900,000 men to guard the whole European coast from Bordeaux to Trondheim, German forces for once are themselves spread dangerously thin.

The Japanese Radio Reacts to the “Bombing”

The still mysterious American “air attack” on Japanese cities elicited copious comment from the Japanese radio. Various broadcasts declared that the planes escaped in the direction of the China continent. A characteristic propaganda note was sounded in the story of the machine-gunning of a school and the death of a student. And finally a somber chord was struck by Major General Takao Hiraguchi,
member of the Imperial Headquarters Information Board, who warned that such raids may be repeated on a large scale and that as for paratroopists: "Such soldiers are different from ordinary prisoners of war. If I am to state my personal opinion very frankly, they should have their arms, legs, and heads lopped off."

The Chinese Take Over in Burma

After rescuing a large number of British encircled at Yenangyaung, Chinese forces in Burma, according to reports from Chungking, recaptured this oil center and took over the greater part of the Burma front. This development followed the destruction of the Yenangyaung oil wells, successfully executed by the British in the face of strong Japanese efforts to save the wells. Meanwhile, the former British defenders of the Irrawaddy sector have apparently retired to the north for a much-needed rest.

Despite the successful Chinese counter-attack, and Allied bombing of Rangoon and Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, observers pointed out that there was little reason for optimism about the Burma front. Chinese withdrawals in the Sittang area have paralleled those of the British on the Irrawaddy, where the invaders have now returned to the assault at Yenangyaung. And the Japanese are evidently adding to their attacks in these two sectors, as third offensive northwest from Thailand in the Rawlake area. Press reports suggest that the recent Japanese naval concentration in the Bay of Bengal may have been for the protection of troop convoys going to Rangoon. When these reinforcements reach the fighting front, the Chinese defenders of Burma may well be seriously outnumbered, and may also find themselves in a still more disadvantageous position with respect to heavy war equipment.

The Burma Road in Review

American observers recently returned from China and realistic Chinese army officers in Washington for some time have objected to the term "life-line" as descriptive of the Burma Road. They point out that the Road can provide certain priceless materials for Chinese arsenals and industries, but not the heavy supplies for an army in the field. Even with the loss of Rangoon and Southern Burma, however, the road will continue for some time to be a source of supply for China.

According to an American transport expert who inspected the Road last summer, it will require from a year to 18 months to move into China the materials collected at Lashio and in dumps along the lower part of the highway. Other reports confirm this estimate. An official survey conducted between November 30 and December 29, 1941, showed roughly 150,000 tons of goods of all categories in Burma on route to China. Of this total, almost half was already at Lashio or points north. A month later, 22,000 tons of specifically lend-lease goods were on hand at Rangoon, of which 10,000 to 12,000 tons were trucks able to move out under their own power. Officers engaged in the evacuation of Rangoon have reported that it was possible during February to move up-country the great bulk of the lend-lease goods which had accumulated there.

It is somewhat difficult to determine how much of this material has already arrived in China. Perhaps 15,000 tons a month would be a safe estimate. But of this total, three-fifths may be gasoline. Fundamentally, then, logistic difficulties on the Road remain as crucial as ever. In a China where every gallon of gasoline is precious, and where the current revival of stage transport indicates a supreme effort to utilize every available conveyance, however primitive, the
shipment of lend-lease materials to their final destination must necessarily be slow.

The reverse side of the coin is the difficulty encountered in getting strategic materials out of China to the United States. As of mid-March, there were on hand for shipment from China more than 300 tons of bristles, 50,000 tons of tung oil, 200 tons of silk, 1,430 tons of tungsten, 1,850 tons of tin, and 5 tons of mercury. Air transport, for the present at least, would scarcely be adequate to move such large cargoes out of China.

**German Spring Strategy**

As the period draws near when climatic conditions will permit a German spring offensive, newspaper speculation on the direction and character of such a drive has become increasingly plentiful. Press commentators, apparently obsessed with Germany's supposed need of oil, have largely restricted themselves to predicting an attack in the extreme south directed at Rostov and the oil fields of the Caucasus area.

Informed military observers point out, however, that a drive for oil will doubtless be secondary to an effort to destroy the Russian southern armies. If the latter objective were attained, the former would naturally follow. Such an offensive of annihilation might very well come in the form of a pincer movement on Stalingrad—the southern attack from the direction of Rostov, the northern from Kharkov or even from Kursk. The eventual objective would most likely be the port of Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea, whose capture would isolate the Caucasus from the rest of Russia, except for somewhat roundabout routes using the Caspian Sea itself.

Although by now the ground is dry in the Crimea, such an attack as that envisaged above is perhaps not to be anticipated until the first or second week in May. Furthermore, some military commentators believe that a war of nerves may go on until June, and that then the Germans may launch their main effort on Moscow, with only a holding attack to the south. Such a “northern” school of thought draws attention to Soroka and Murmansk as possible points of German interest in the very near future—as lend-lease shipments over the Arctic Sea route steadily increase in volume.

**Germany Reduces Her Rations**

The new German food rations effective April 6 involved average reductions of about seven per cent in bread and cereals, 19 per cent in meats, and 17 per cent in fats and oils. For normal consumers, heavy workers, and long or night workers, the cuts were proportionately greater than average. For very heavy workers, however, the reduction was below the general average, with the result that their favored position became still more marked. Apparently these new rations will continue to provide an adequate diet for those in special working categories, but for normal consumers a diet only on the margin of adequacy.

Although these reductions are actually of a magnitude previously unparalleled for any of the commodities affected, they scarcely justify overoptimistic hopes. On the basis of a study prepared in the Economics Division of the Coordinator's Office, it appears that the changes do not reflect a critical situation in the food balance for the current crop year (ending July 31). This is true even for fats and oils, in which the German position is particularly tight. Rather, we must look elsewhere for the reasons that have dictated so drastic a step.
Estimates of probable consumption requirements under the new conditions suggest that bread grain supplies in the future should more than meet requirements, here the Germans may even accumulate some surpluses as emergency reserves. Adequate quantities of meats are in all probability also assured for the crop year 1924-5. Even fats and oils should be able to fill present ration requirements through the same period. The new requirements apparently represent an effort to adjust consumption to the long-run supply outlook. Consonant with the agricultural potentials of the conquered lands cannot be realized, the rulers of Germany are probably anticipating a less favorable supply situation, particularly after the end of 1925. Essentially the ration reductions reflect, therefore, some preparation for the possibility that the war will not be won this year or even next year following.

In addition to the importance of these reductions in adjusting the food balance, they may also act as a positive demand factor: the new rations are more closely compatible with the prevailing rations in countries actively co-operating with Germany—Finland, Hungary, Roumania, and Italy. Moreover, the obvious Allied interpretation that the step reveals German weakness today may lead again to disappointed hopes. An item of no small value in the Nazi war of nerves.

Rumania-Turkish Trade

The Turks are still keeping everyone guessing. Although Governmental British statements have recently exposed itself, this condition, as pretty well satisfied with the state of Anglo-Turkish relations, strong indications last week appeared to point in a different direction. The trial of the "Communists" ordered in the recent assassination attempt on German Ambassador Franz von Papen has evidently raised the wrath of the British government and press, convinced that the defendants are not being given a fair hearing. According to one story, the Turks have advised a direct demand of the Russian ambassador that the defendants be allowed territory to the Soviet Union. In fact, Rumania-Turkish relations have become so strained that the Turkish ambassador in Moscow has felt obliged to leave for Yalta.

Thus far, the Rumanian government has remained its pace. But according to a report from Ankara, the Turkish premier recently told a conference of editors that he would use 'his' arm if the Soviets commanded their participation. After the meeting, the report continues, the chief of the Turkish Press Bureau stated that if the dispute were to continue, Turkey would not hesitate to go to war with Russia. Moreover, diplomatic relations in Ankara appear to mean the present Soviet pro-co-operative policies will be closely examined and the Turks will not fail to make a definite commitment regarding Turkey's present position.

Furthermore, on his return to Berlin, the Rumanian ambassador to Germany declared that after all, in the recent, the situation between Romania and Turkey will be resolved as a "real" one. The report also added that he was returning to Germany with new, broader development of the traditional friendship and quickening desire between Turkey and the Reich.

Placards in Canada

Voters in Canada on Monday will decide whether to relieve the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King of any pledge regarding conscription for overseas service. Opponents of the plan charge that, in the process of repressing both the Canadian national movement, both for conscription, as well as for their own election.
SECRET

Coordinator's Office, legal food rations in unoccupied France, even when augmented by the non-rationed foods which may be available, are sufficient to provide French adults with only about 50 per cent of their calorie requirements.

Breadgrains are rationed at 60 percent of the pre-war level, fats and oils at 40 percent, and meats at 22 percent. Diets are deficient in calories, proteins, calcium, and iron, and vitamin intake correspondsingly low. Such a diet, according to nutrition experts in the Bureau of Home Economics (Department of Agriculture), produces serious physical and mental results. Following prolonged deficiency of certain vitamins and minerals, one may expect to find loss in weight, lowered resistance to disease, increasing incidence of digestive disturbances, fracturing of bones, dental decay, and delayed healing of wounds. Weakness, listlessness, and a loss of initiative and interest in life occur under such conditions.

Artificial "Surpluses"

The facility with which the Germans have been able to requisition local food "surpluses" has greatly aggravated the food situation. The armistice agreement, which divided the country, created these "surpluses" in both occupied and unoccupied areas by cutting off markets from their former supply sources. Further "surpluses" were created within the unoccupied zone because of the incompetence of the Vichy-appointed bureaucracy which controlled food distribution. Attempting to stifle illegal trade, they merely succeeded in restricting trade between departments. Additional "surpluses" resulted which invited further German requisitions.

The unoccupied zone, which in normal years was dependent upon the rest of France for a large share of its foodstuffs, suffered most from such activities. Nonetheless, analysis by the Economics Division reveals that food supplies remaining in that zone should have been sufficient to balance requirements of the legal ration levels effective during the past year.

The Black Market

The significant "leak" in this rationing system has come through the Black Market. That leak is made possible by the cooperation of incompetent and corrupt administrators, and by the participation of the farmers themselves in illegal marketing activities. Wealthy consumers and the rural producers fare reasonably well, but at the expense of the rest of the population—in particular, the large majority of urban consumers.

The extent of dealings outside of the rationing system may be judged in part from the statement by one French food official who estimated that in France as a whole 1.4 million tons of wheat had been diverted from "proper" use by the Black Market, fraud, the feeding of animals, and the use of counterfeit ration cards. More revealing is the fact that rations in unoccupied France were severely cut in April 1942, even though analysis indicates clearly that supplies would have been adequate if consumption had been rationed at the levels in effect at the beginning of the crop year.

For those whose need for foodstuffs is most acute, there is likely to be little benefit even from increased production, at least until such time as German requisitioning declines and the rationing system is made effective. In the opinion of a competent observer, these reasons, particularly the last, would prevent improvement in the food position of low-income urban consumer groups, even were new food import sources made available to Vichy France.

Growing Axis Strength in the Mediterranean

In the eastern Mediterranean Axis submarines have virtually eliminated British convoys, according to various enemy sources, and Nazi submarine production is declared adequate to equal their admittedly important losses in that area. Malta continues to suffer from the almost unremitting bombardment from Sicily. And the forecasts of neutral
observers in Berlin tend to confirm earlier impressions that there will be no offensives against Egypt and Syria this spring by reason of the heat and Hitler's involvement in Russia. The Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, it is understood, has reported to his government that Rommel will not have enough equipment for active campaigning before autumn, and that Laval and the Nazis definitely plan to reconquer Syria, although there is no indication as to when this might take place.

Meanwhile, however, Anglo-Egyptian relations appear to be improving. Nahaat Pasha, the Egyptian envoy to London, who was under some suspicion, is reported to have exerted strongly with the King in favor of the British and the Wafd; and, according to the Frankfurter Zeitung, the new Wafd premier, Nahaat Pasha, recently had a long and apparently satisfactory conversation with Sir Stafford Cripps on Egyptian post-war aspirations. After a two-day debate, the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies approved an overwhelming majority Nahas' arrest of Aly Maher, the pro-Axis leader. At that time Nahas said that, although he wanted to spare Egypt the horrors of war and to prevent Egyptian manpower from becoming cannon fodder, he would remain loyal to engagements with Britain and tolerate nothing harmful to the democracies in the world struggle for freedom.

Syrian imbroglio

In Syria and the Lebanon, the three-cornered political controversy continues between the British General Spears, the Free French General Catroux, and the natives. In general, the British desire to strengthen military defense, the Free French to maintain French control and prestige unimpaired, and the natives to further Arab nationalism. The French and the natives are in direct opposition, a situation tending to weaken the whole Allied defense position.

The British Foreign Office had disapproved of Spears' proposal for a new election in the Lebanon and had approved Catroux' cooperation with generally pro-Vichy Maronites, even though the outcome might be a Lebanese government not as friendly to the British as the present one. But in the meantime, Catroux, who had telegraphed de Gaulle he would no longer allow Spears to intervene, made a hurried trip from Beirut to Damascus and set up a new Syrian ministry without the knowledge of his British colleague.

Thrills and Counter-Thrills in the Far North

In the northern sector of the Russian front, where snow is still on the ground and the thaw has not yet bogged down the movements of armies, a series of confused attacks and counterattacks have been going on for the past two weeks. Apparently the Germans are still sniping at Allied supply lines south from Murmansk, while the Russians are evidently trying to disorganize the Finnish army—which may well prove to be the weakest link in any German plans for a renewed offensive.

Last week at least, the Germans and Finns were more vocal than the Russians in their reports of successful action. Marshal Manstein claimed the repulse of Soviet attacks along the Syr River, while Berlin reported that, in the Arctic theater, German planes had bombed Murmansk and Nazi mountain troops had shattered Russian advance units. Stockholm even went so far as to say that part of the long-encircled German 16th Army had fought its way to safety from Staraya Russa. Far to the south, the Germans told of an air attack on Novorossisk on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea—Russia's chief naval base east of the Crimea. Neutralization of Novorossisk would be a logical prelude to an offensive in the Caucasian area.

Meantime, S. A. Lozovsky, Russian Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, overflowed with optimistic predictions for the coming campaign. But with American lend-lease aid to Russia just beginning to hit its stride, competent observers in this country were little inclined to prophecy. And a report
that between 1500 and 3000 people were starving to death daily in Leningrad gives, if correct, some indication of the extent of civilian suffering in Russia's beleaguered cities. Furthermore, according to Soviet sources, Leningrad has recently undergone a three-day air attack by the Luftwaffe.

Conciliation on the Diplomatic Front

Diplomatic dispatches last week suggested that the Soviet foreign office was beginning to abandon its characteristic attitude of reserve toward neutral and even Allied powers. From Ankara came the report that the advance guard of the 30,000 Polish soldiers whom Russia is sending to the Middle East for training, had arrived at Jerusalem. Furthermore, Russo-Turkish tension over the trial of those accused in the bombing attempt on German Ambassador Von Papen appears to have abated. Soviet officials have evidently been somewhat surprised at the furor that certain tactless remarks on their part have aroused in the Turkish capital. And it now appears that the Turkish foreign minister himself has admitted in private that the judges in the case were not being entirely fair to the defendants.

Russia, Bulgaria, and Poland

The Soviets also appear to be making efforts to undermine whatever aid Bulgaria has promised to give the Nazis on the Eastern Front. A Tass dispatch from Geneva suggests that despite the "Hitlerization" of the country and the suppression of all opposition by the new Bulgarian cabinet, there is still danger of a popular uprising against active Bulgarian participation in the war. The Bulgarian people, the dispatch concludes, are determined to resist the attempt to convert them into cannon fodder for Hitler. Nothing has diminished their hatred for "Bulgarian traitors and their Berlin masters."

The remaining thorny issue in Russian foreign policy— that of the post-war status of the three small Baltic States—

is also being currently discussed with the British, and may be nearing a solution.

Modest Victory for the Left in Argentina

In Argentina the Radical and Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies, whose combined vote gives them a slim majority, succeeded in uniting their forces to reelect Dr. José Luis Cantilo, a Radical, to the presidency of the Chamber. This was the first test of the use the Socialists would make in the new Parliament of their balance of power position, and indicates that Acting President Castillo may have strong Chamber opposition. Some observers predict that in such a case Castillo may find some pretext to dissolve Parliament and make the semi-dictatorship of the conservative National Democratic Party complete. In the Senate, where the conservatives have unchallenged control, Dr. Robustiano Patrón Costas was reelected president.

Paraguay's Liberal Party Dissolved

The dissolution of Paraguay's once-dominant Liberal Party, announced by the government on April 25, makes legal a situation which has existed in fact for some time. Since assuming office in September 1940, President Morinigo has systematically ousted Liberal officials and has exiled or imprisoned the party's leaders, thereby effectively eliminating it from the political scene. There have been recent indications that political exiles have been active (The War This Week, March 19-26, p. 19). The dissolution decree, which probably reflects that renewed activity, makes no essential change in the military dictatorship, which has methodically suppressed all opposition.

Nazi Propaganda of Confusion in Latin America

The Nazis continue to spread the propaganda of confusion in Latin America, aiming to paralyze the opposition through conflicting and disturbing rumors and reports. When, for
instance, ten advanced training planes destined for Brazil made a forced landing on the Orinoco Delta, the newspapers in Rio de Janeiro the next day carried the story that three of the B-25’s then being sent from the United States to Brazil had cracked up also—a story which had no foundation in fact but which was widely believed.

Another blow was struck at hemisphere solidarity by an apparent agreement on the part of the Axis to respect Argentine shipping if Argentina remains neutral. The existence of such an agreement is reflected in secret instructions issued by the Argentine government to ship owners on how to mark and light their vessels and what routes to follow.

During the past week the Nazis have been making strenuous efforts to reestablish radio communications with Latin America. When certain Brazilian stations were raided (The War This Week, March 26–April 2, 1942, pp. 17–18), the Germans lost the channel through which connection was maintained between Berlin and the espionage system of the Western Hemisphere. Now messages from several stations in Chile indicate that a new connection is in the process of being set up from the latter country. The Germans are calling for the plans of “our invasion” of northwest Africa.

Quebec Votes “No”

Canada’s voters, by a two to one majority, have signified their willingness to release Prime Minister MacKenzie King’s government from its previous promises never to introduce conscription for overseas service. This result had been anticipated, but it had been hoped that the negative vote in Quebec would be considerably less than the actual 72 per cent which the returns show. In effect, French Canada as a whole voted against releasing the government from its anti-conscription pledges. The 28 per cent of the Quebec population who voted “Yes” were probably confined largely to the English speaking groups who constitute 20 percent of the whole and to the small number of French Canadians in urban centers like Montreal whose constant contact with English speaking Canadians makes them more tolerant of other points of view.

As a result of the vote, Quebec is now pitted against the rest of the Dominion. Instead of unifying the country, the plebiscite reveals more clearly than before that many of its sons will be forced unwillingly to serve overseas, and that an ultra loyalist Ontario is convinced that French Canada is trying to sabotage the war effort.

The position of Prime Minister King has been made very difficult by the plebiscite result. The main objective of his political career has been the maintenance of national unity, and according to one informed observer, it is not expected that he would further confuse the political situation at the present time by resigning. Nevertheless, by the vote of April 27, the Quebec members of the Federal Parliament, who by a great majority supported the government, have been repudiated by their own constituents. Mr. King, a master of political maneuver, must find his way out of this predicament, possibly by means of a general election, in which his talent for persuading French Canadians might be more fully exercised than it was in the plebiscite campaign.
THE WAR THIS WEEK
April 30–May 7, 1942

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For the President
The Coordinator of Information

THE WAR THIS WEEK

Following the recent accession of Laval, the British seized the initiative and struck Tuesday at Vichy-held Madagascar. With parachutists and commandos reported in the van of the attack, the British have captured the principal base at Diego Suarez and threaten the early conquest of the island, aiming above all to safeguard it against potential future use by the Axis. At the other end of the Indian Ocean the Japanese were fully capitalizing the successes of their newest offensive in Burma. With Lashio and Mandalay in their hands, they drove fresh spearheads northeast along the Burma Road, north toward Bhamo, and northwest toward India, and had virtually isolated China from all but air supply. To the southeast, developments in Melanesia clearly indicated the imminence of some further advance in the Solomon Islands and suggested that an even wider offensive in the Coral Sea area may be in the making.

In the west, German precautions in France and the Low Countries appeared to reflect no substantial anxiety concerning a “second front,” despite the widespread publicity given the latter possibility in the press of the democracies. On the eastern front the Soviets continued to win victories by communiqué, but American military observers were inclined to discount these successes and to believe that the Germans are actually in the process of ironing out salients created by earlier Russian drives.
The British Seize the Initiative in Madagascar

The British expedition against Diego Suarez, following President Roosevelt’s prediction of measures to prevent further Axis use of French territory in any part of the world, emphasized again the determination of the United Nations to seize the initiative from their opponents. Threats of a Japanese move on Madagascar have been in the air since the fall of Singapore, and measures to forestall it were undertaken even before the Vichy visit of Admirals Abe and Nomura accentuated the danger, according to press reports.

The attacking forces struck directly for Madagascar’s strongest fortified point—a naval base and military area, with a considerable garrison even in normal times. Geographically this northern tip of the island is practically isolated, save for a single none-too-adequate road down to Majunga, and thence inland to Tananarive, the capital. But capitulation of Diego Suarez would probably entail the collapse of resistance elsewhere and open the way for rapid penetration of the whole colony. The few thousand ill-equipped native and French troops can hardly resist long, and the possibilities of Japanese aid appear remote. Fifth column activities present no serious threat. The natives are unarmed, and disinclined to guerrilla fighting; the bulk of the 25,000 French residents are friendly; no serious interference will be offered by seventy Italians, five Germans, and two “problematical” Japanese—a hotel keeper and his wife.

Advantages of Holding Madagascar

The United Nations would gain decided advantages from a conquered and strongly held Madagascar. Most important, the danger of hostile use of the island would be removed; a critical threat to troops and supplies routed via the Cape of Good Hope to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, India and Australia would be neutralized.

Furthermore, the United Nations would possess a new strategic springboard, well situated in relation to the Middle and Far Eastern theatres of combat as a point of support for convoys, a base for submarines and destroyer patrols (the dry-dock at Diego Suarez can accommodate 10,000-ton cruisers), and a vantage point for aerial surveillance of the southern Indian Ocean and southeast Africa. Madagascar normally exports large quantities of agricultural and mineral products, particularly beef, coffee, graphite and mica. It is understood that she now has substantial accumulations of these products which will be available for the common effort as fast as ships can be found to carry them.

Difficulties of Occupation

Considerable local difficulties face a power which assumes responsibility for Madagascar by military occupation. These are not lessened by the publicly expressed determination to respect the status of the colony as French territory, ultimately to be restored to France. The chiefs of the administration are strongly collaborationist, and probably cannot be left in office. The economic situation is very bad, owing to shipping losses and the effects of eighteen months of British blockade. Trade has practically ceased, and there are acute shortages of all kinds of manufactured goods, construction materials, petroleum products, medicines, wheat flour, and condensed milk. Health conditions present a third major problem for an occupying force. Malaria is prevalent over the whole island, tuberculosis and syphilis are very widespread, and the microscopic jigger flea, which burrows under the toenail to lay its eggs, could by itself cripple an incautious army.
Potential Danger of a Break With Vichy

A larger peril is that the Vichy government might be drawn into full Axis belligerency, especially in the event of protracted fighting. If the occupation is completed by landing troops on Madagascar’s insular dependencies in the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel, not to mention the nearby independent colony of Reunion, the number of possible grievances will be multiplied. It is clear, however, that the United Nations face the chances of a break with open eyes. The United States has declared that it will not hesitate to send troops or ships to Madagascar, should such action be desirable in the common cause, and that it will regard any warlike act against either Great Britain or the United States as an attack upon the United Nations as a whole. War with one power means war with all. Laval has chosen to place a minimal interpretation on this formula, and to regard local resistance in Madagascar as falling outside the category of “warlike acts.” Meanwhile it is reported that the British did not consult the Free French in advance and that General de Gaulle’s headquarters have evinced notable chagrin and disappointment in this connection.

Defeat in Burma

The Japanese are moving swiftly to rout the last Allied resistance in Burma. Chinese and British forces, defeated and separated, are retreating on three fronts—toward India, toward northern Burma, and into China itself. Imperial Headquarters at Tokyo claims also the capture of the airfield at Akyab on the western Burmese coast, only 300 air-line miles from Calcutta, but the British have offered no confirmation. This denouement of the Burmese campaign, which has now developed new threats to both China and India, has led Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek once again to warn his people of the difficulties which lie ahead and of the possibility of further prolongation of the war.

In the Burmese campaign the Japanese appear to have taken brilliant advantage not only of superior forces and equipment, but also of native aid. Fifth columnists captured Lashio some hours prior to the actual occupation of the town by Japanese forces, according to reliable advices received here. Four Thai divisions are said to have participated with the Japanese in the attack, and native Burmese were active against the Allies throughout the campaign. In addition to the Thai divisions, eight Japanese divisions and two motorized regiments are estimated to be in action on the Burmese front, supported by some 400 planes. Upwards of 250 light and medium tanks also are said to be in use.

The Advance on China

The strongest Japanese drive appears to be along the Burma road, where the invaders are reported to have reached and passed Wanting, which lies beyond the Chinese border in Yunnan Province. The nature of this threat to China is difficult to evaluate, but it hardly seems likely that the Japanese can extend their operations far into China at present. Beyond Wanting, the terrain becomes very difficult, and the Burma road climbs over rugged country to elevations as high as 8,430 feet. Various Chinese in Washington seem to be convinced that southwest China is not the danger spot for a Japanese offensive. The real threat, they say, still lies in the Yangtze valley area of central China, and particularly in the region of Changsha, which the Japanese have already three times assaulted.

The Japanese may intend, however, to proceed as far as Lungling. Their objectives here would be two: the substantial isolation of China and destruction of lend-lease sup-
plies cached along the Burma road. Although depot facilities between Lashio and Kunming are poor, the Chinese apparently have transferred some supplies from Lashio to this region.

**The Isolation of China**

At Lungling, about 20 miles southwest of the point where the Burma road crosses the Salween River, there is a junction with a route northward to Myitkyina, thence to Fort Hertz, from which a road is now being built over the mountains to Ledo in Assam. Japanese capture of Lungling would put an end even to the faint hope of supplying China over this new route to the Burma road.

Another supply route, known as the India road, is said to be under construction. Starting at Ledo, it uses the route to Fort Hertz, then runs due east to Sichang in China and from there another 600 miles to Chungking. News despatches from Chungking say that “350,000 laborers” are now working on this road. But it crosses very difficult terrain and several high passes, including one of more than 13,000 feet. It is estimated that at best this road could not be completed for at least two years.

The most effective method of implementing President Roosevelt’s recent promise to maintain aid to China appears, therefore, to depend upon the further development of a traffic in airborne goods. Japanese air bases in northern Burma might also make this difficult. But the fact that, before the fall of Hongkong, a regular air freight service was maintained over Japanese occupied territory between Hongkong and Chungking indicates that freight service of this kind is at least possible.

**Withdrawal to India**

A third Japanese drive is directed against British and Indian troops retreating along the Chindwin River toward Kalewa. From Kalewa there is a trail across the great Arakan Yoma range to Chittagong in India. The Japanese are reported to be moving up the Chindwin River in barges. Whether they would attempt to follow the retreating Allied forces across the Arakan Yoma range is again open to question. But these mountains, formerly thought to be impassable for armies, are probably no more so than those which lie between eastern Burma and Thailand, and over which the Japanese have moved their tanks to capture Lashio. Refugees from Burma, of whom there are reported to be some 80,000, have been filtering into India over the mountains at the rate of a thousand or more a day for the past several weeks. It is difficult to believe that Japanese troops could not do the same.

It must also be borne in mind, however, that the region on the windward side of these mountains is one of the rainiest in the world during the monsoon season now approaching. At Cherra Punji in India, some 200-odd miles north of Chittagong, the rainfall sometimes reaches 425 inches a year—with one exception, the heaviest in the world.

**The Japanese Move Forward in Melanesia**

Current Japanese naval and air activity in the Carolines and Melanesia now suggests the beginning of a forward movement in the Solomon Islands, with an offensive on a large scale in the Coral Sea area not to be excluded. Since the withdrawal of their naval concentration from the Bay of Bengal in mid-April, the Japanese have shifted the focus of their naval activities to the Southern Mandates—New Britain area. It is believed that most of the heavy units returning from the Indian Ocean proceeded to home waters for overhaul and
Reconnaissance in New Guinea

In the Markham Valley of Northeast New Guinea, where their troops were flooded out several weeks ago by heavy rains, the Japanese have again penetrated inland. Observers on the scene, however, apparently do not anticipate an immediate attack on Port Moresby overland via the Markham Valley, but suggest rather that the Japanese are seeking to disperse their airfields. Numerous commercial fields exist inland, which in peacetime were used for air transport to the New Guinea gold fields.

The anxiety of the Japanese, reflected in their search for dispersal fields, is well grounded. On two successive days, April 29 and 30, Allied fliers were able to bomb and machine gun Japanese aircraft lined up on the ground at Lae, destroying or damaging some 50 planes.

Russo-Japanese Relations Improve?

Japanese relations with Russia are improving, while those with Germany are getting worse, in the opinion of the French ambassador in Tokyo, whose views are to be received with some reserve since in mid-March he regarded a Japanese attack on Siberia as imminent (The War This Week, March 19-26, pp. 6-7). Although the extreme militarists still favor war and the betterment in relations may even be a Japanese ruse to deceive the Russians, the ambassador thinks that cooler heads in Japan will restrain the others until the results of the expected German offensive against Russia become apparent.

The following may be straws in the wind: General Tatekawa, ex-ambassador to Russia, has made remarks implying praise of Russia’s war effort, and the Japanese government again permits and even encourages its officials to travel by the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Moreover, there were no indications of military movements on either side of the Manchurian frontier during the past week. A Japanese warning to the Soviets that additional landings of American bombers in Siberia would endanger Russo-Japanese relations was to be expected in the circumstances.

Non-violence in India

On May 2 the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress, by a vote of 176 to 4, adopted a measure calling for non-violent non-cooperation as the means of resisting a possible Japanese invasion. The motion precludes any support of the British program of military resistance, although the Congress states that it will put no hindrance in the way of that program. It was at the instance of Mahatma Gandhi that the Congress acted—Gandhi, who less than two weeks before had protested against the growing American military
strength in India. The motion represents, for the present at least, the return of Gandhi to leadership, and the temporary eclipse of Nehru.

The Cripps mission had left the Congress a prey to internal dissension. Nehru and Azad, president of the Congress, favored full resistance to Japan. Rajagopalachari, right-wing leader from Madras, while also favoring active resistance, differed from the other Congress leaders in wishing to collaborate with the Moslem League by establishing separate Hindu and Moslem states. His resignation from the Congress preceded by a few days the vote in favor of non-violence.

The Philosophy of Non-Violence

Non-violent non-cooperation is a technique of revolt developed by Gandhi in South Africa before the First World War. He took it to India in 1919 to use against the British, and it was the weapon of his widespread campaign during 1919-1922. Its philosophy is epitomized in the word satyagraha—somewhat loosely translated by Gandhi as "soul force." Literally it means "stubborn insistence (agraha) upon the truth (satya)." Truth, in Gandhi’s view, as in that of traditional Hinduism, is a metaphysical force, with absolute value, which can operate to produce concrete results in the physical world. A true cause, promoted by sincere advocates, themselves strictly devoted to truth in every respect, cannot fail. Ethically, truth abhors the injury of living creatures: it is the antithesis of violence.

In the case of modern India, Britain as its sovereign has appeared to Gandhi to represent untruth, to be "satanic": Britain took and enslaved the country; it holds India by violence. For this reason, Gandhi has felt himself called on to lead a movement to drive out the British by non-violence. For the same reason, he opposed active cooperation in the present war, and withdrew from the leadership of the Congress when the latter offered in the summer of 1940 to support the British war effort. Convinced that the Japanese, as military aggressors, are the agents of evil, Gandhi now has induced the Congress to oppose them also with satyagraha.

Non-Violence in Action

The action of the Working Committee is not pro-Japanese. Neither does it imply merely passive resistance. It may mean such active forms of opposition as refusal to man the railways, abandonment of city services, mass demonstrations against taxes—all efforts to wear down the endurance of the aggressors. Its success is far from certain, but the only other way of mobilizing the civilian population seems to be guerrilla warfare, and for this the people have no training.

Fresh Speculation on Laval

An element of mystery continues to surround the intentions of Pierre Laval. General de Gaulle believes that he may for the present lull the French people into a false sense of security (apathetic reactions to Laval’s return to power have been reported in various French circles). The General also believes that later Laval will perhaps place the French fleet indirectly at the service of the Axis in operations against Syria.

In this same connection, another observer points out that the cabinet is filled with second rate men (see Appendix I) and is really to be viewed as a half-way house on the road to full collaboration. These second raters, some of them friends of Pétain, have been chosen as a transitional cloak under which Laval can act while he is establishing full control in France. Meanwhile the Germans will make concessions to
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Laval only as he demonstrates that he is their man, according to this argument, and they may then drop him in turn when he has served their purpose.

Various sources now picture Laval’s appointment as a grudging *pis aller* on the part of Pétain: if the Marshal had refused to yield, Hitler threatened to install a *Gauleiter* in France and to institute military control (and perhaps total occupation) of the unoccupied zone. In any event the Marshal recently defended the appointment by declaring that, although Laval was somewhat more favorable to the Germans than he (Pétain), the new premier would give no military aid to the Nazis.

**German Anxiety in the West?**

On the eve of Hitler’s expected offensive in the east, various developments and reports reveal German anxiety concerning the military position in the west, according to some observers. It is widely believed that the Nazis sought in the creation of the Laval regime security in their rear. The popular demand in Britain for a “second front” and the recent conversations of high Allied strategists are believed in some quarters to be the source of uneasiness in German councils. An unconfirned report has Field Marshal von Rundstedt appointed commander of the German Army of Occupation in the west, and it is insisted that Hitler would scarcely waste Von Rundstedt’s talents on an inactive front.

On the other hand, the present German military position in the west, as indicated by the accompanying map, suggests no great anxiety, either in terms of number or disposition of ground troops or of aircraft. Some ten divisions hold the coastal defense zone from the Gulf of St. Malo to Lille. Three further divisions are stationed in the Low Countries. Altogether in occupied France and the Low Countries there are some 30 divisions (one armored). The strength of each division is estimated to be considerably less than that of divisions operating on the Eastern Front, where more overhead troops are required, so that the total of the 30 divisions may not be more than 375,000 men. Some observers, moreover, believe that the total number of divisions may be 27 rather than 30, but with an additional armored division in training in the vicinity of Paris.

**The Factor of Rapid Reinforcement**

The current situation could change almost overnight, however, since it is estimated that ground reinforcements leaving central Germany could be set down on the French coast within 72 hours. With adequate bases and facilities (which they are believed to possess), and assuming the availability of operational units in central Germany and elsewhere, the Germans could probably double their air force in 24 hours, according to military observers.

Troops stationed near Cherbourg have been observed recently undergoing intensive training to resist possible landings, and preparations for defense along the entire French coast continue. But there is no evidence of new Nazi invasion plans against the British Isles, and certain American observers believe that Germany will be content for the present to maintain a strong defensive position. This view is perhaps confirmed by a report that Rhine barges, previously requisitioned and adapted for use in an invasion, are being returned to their Dutch owners.

However confident the Germans may be about the situation in the west, it is not true that they are using only third rate troops to garrison their defenses in that area. It is a fact that the troops include older men and that they are not the best in the German Army. But they are veteran fighters...
with battle experience gained in the present war, and the divisions include a considerable leavening of younger men. Reports that these troops are of a distinctly inferior quality may arise in some instances from contacts not with regular units but with Landeschützen. These troops are veterans of the First World War, and the Germans are using about 20 battalions of them in France, primarily for guard duty in the interior.

**Libyan Alternatives**

In the Western Desert observers point out that a shortage of artillery and anti-tank equipment may force Marshal Rommel to postpone until autumn any planned offensive. As the hot summer months approach, the problem of water and of reasonably comfortable bivouacs may well be the chief consideration in the Libyan theater. Apparently Rommel's present positions at Jebel el Achdar are hilly, comparatively well watered, and much cooler than those of the British.

Yet an Axis attack is not entirely out of the question. The virtual neutralization of Malta has permitted far more Axis convoys to get through to Tripoli than was the case last autumn and winter. Considerable reinforcement of Marshal Rommel's army is, then, theoretically possible. The extent of this reinforcement will largely depend on how much armored equipment the Nazis think they can spare from the Russian front.

Were Rommel to receive such additional strength, he could probably take the offensive at any time this summer. Highly competent observers suggest that even in the most intense heat mechanized warfare is possible on the Libyan front. The windy season, which lasts for a two-month period sometime between April and June, even offers certain advantages: dust storms lasting five or six days are useful for concealing secret maneuvers from the enemy.

**The Germans Straighten Their Line**

A Nazi effort to wipe out the chief salients established by the Soviets last winter—thereby straightening the German lines in preparation for concerted offensive action—has characterized recent operations on the Russian front, according to well-informed American military opinion. Of the three great Soviet salients, the Nazis have doubtless already eliminated the one farthest south, toward Dneprapetrovsk. After two weeks of German claims, the Russians have finally admitted fighting around Izum, far to the east of their extreme penetration last winter.

The middle salient, below Smolensk, where Soviet parties last February pushed as far as Dorogobuzh, may also have disappeared. Here the Nazis claim to be in Sukhinichi, effectually pinching off the area of Russian advance, but this claim still awaits Soviet confirmation. The final salient, the northern one around Staraya Russia, may still be intact. It is of some significance, however, that the Russians have now admitted for the first time that the Germans are occupying a number of towns south and east of Leningrad.

As the Nazi lines straightened, the German armies were apparently attempting to clear the areas behind their forward positions—in order to obtain increased mobility for a coming offensive. Where such an attack might come was still anybody's guess. So far as weather was concerned, the ground was dry in the south, in the center it was still muddy, while in the north the ice was breaking up.
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Stalin’s Ultimate Aims

Despite its present position of extreme peril, the Soviet Government is apparently unshaken in its desire to regain and permanently hold the territory included in its boundaries of June, 1941. In his May Day order, Stalin eschewed any desire for “foreign” conquests. But his specific enumeration of the peoples that the Soviets intend to liberate gives some notion of his ultimate aims: “We want to free our brother Ukrainians, Moldavians, White Russians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Karelians from the insults to which they have been subjected by the German Fascist beasts.”

Hitler’s Speech Again

Optimistic reports interpreting Hitler’s recent speech continue to arrive. Gothenburg editors dub it privately as the rehearsal of a swan song. The Swedish ambassador at Ankara mentions military tangles and sagging morale. “Hitler’s uneasiness” is another phrase which occurs, and a Swiss Consul mentions the speech along with other factors foreshadowing a “threatened crisis.”

On the other hand, certain observers here continue to regard the speech as one of Hitler’s shrewdest and most carefully considered utterances. They point out that the speech aims at opposite effects at home and abroad, and is to be understood in terms of the two intellectual climates—authoritarian and democratic—to which it was addressed.

At home, it was a precautionary warning to all Germans, aiming not to weaken but to strengthen morale in the face of the arduous spring and summer ahead. The promise of further hardships and the threat of harsh treatment for recalcitrants need not have a demoralizing effect on the Germans. The Nazi state normally acts by spreading terror, and if Hitler sought to warn the widest possible German audience against any derelictions of duty or half-hearted support of the war in Russia, he could reasonably assume a new and severe “power”—even though he already possessed it.

Abroad Hitler must have known his remarks would be interpreted as a sign of weakening morale, according to these observers. Presumably he aimed at this effect, both in America, where his objective is to retard the war effort and to create confusion, and in England, where he also wishes to awaken doubts as to the wisdom of British policy in carrying on the war. This he did by assuring the British that they are bound to lose the war, even if they lose it only to Russia and the United States.

Axis Air Strategy: The Value of Interior Lines

Recent air developments have emphasized the Axis advantage of speedy concentration offered by interior lines, in the opinion of an American air expert. In the case of the Germans, who have not yet revealed their full reserves, this factor is still of great importance. The Japanese, on the other hand, as a result of their far extended lines, may now be in a considerably less favorable position than they were a few weeks ago.

Plane production figures running to many thousands have often given a misleading impression as to the number of aircraft needed to carry out a given mission: a relatively small number, if well organized and well supported, can accomplish seemingly disproportionate results. For instance, in their southward drive on the Indies, the Japanese used in all about 2,500 planes, 1,500 of which were operational at any given time. Despite their reckless expenditure of aircraft in specific actions, they exercised considerable economy in their dispositions of strength. For example, by establishing
landing stages about 200 miles apart, they probably cut down operational losses, as compared with combat losses, to the surprisingly low ratio of 1:1.

From a central air base at Bangkok, the Japanese were able to despatch planes quickly where they were needed. Against them, the Allies, desperately outnumbered, lost the greater part of their own aircraft on the ground. Eighteen American B-17’s in Java, for instance, after sinking 45 transports and 11 naval vessels in the battle of Macassar Straits, finally succumbed to a Japanese attack on their landing fields. And even when the Allies were able to ship in new planes over long and dangerous transport routes, the necessity of guarding both Australia and India kept their air strength dispersed and divided.

Significance of the Attack on Ceylon

Then came the Japanese air attack on Ceylon. It seems likely that, owing to faulty intelligence, the attackers were surprised at the resistance they met. After losing around 70 planes shot down or damaged (the decks of three carriers were shot clean), they broke off the attack, and withdrew their heavy naval units from the Bay of Bengal.

This engagement proved what the B-17’s in Java and the AVG in Burma had already shown—that the Japanese have never yet won an air-battle against properly equipped and properly organized opposition. The AVG has outscored its enemies by more than 20 to 1. American raids on Japan’s bases at Rhabaul, Salamaua, and Lae have been almost uniformly successful—and virtually without losses for the attackers. At the present time the American naval air arm is successfully contesting Japanese aerial and naval expansion southward through the Solomons. Faced with this new Allied strength, the Japanese may well hesitate to launch an all-out air offensive against India, Australia, or even New Caledonia.

There remains the possibility that Japan may swing on her western pivot in Burma and go into China. But this again might cost Japan more planes than she can afford to spend. And in Siberia the undetermined strength of potential Russian resistance presents a threat which the Japanese might very well hesitate to encounter.

The Factor of Reserves

Our observer concludes that Japan has no substantial air reserves of her own. Nor is it likely that by any gigantic pincers movement the German and Japanese air fleets would be able to join forces in the Middle East. Formidable physical barriers would doubtless prevent any such long-distance replenishment of Japan’s reserves.

Turning toward Europe, we find that German handling of the problem of reserves has been extremely effective. When, for example, Marshal Rommel found himself hard-pressed by the British in Libya, he obtained an impressive number of additional planes within about two days. But the German air force in North Africa is merely an outpost. The Luftwaffe as a whole is organized in depth to a distance of roughly 1500 miles from circumference to center, and the central air reserve is well under cover.

Dispositions in Europe

In Russia we can distinguish three main areas of German air concentration. To the south, in the Crimea, our observer reports increasing Nazi strength. Such a concentration, he adds, does not necessarily presage an offensive toward the Caucasus. A second area of strength is in the center, facing
the considerable Russian air mass in the Moscow region. Here the immediate purpose of the Nazis is apparently to attack the Russian railroads and blast the Soviet troops out of their trains into the mud. To the north, in Finland, the growing Nazi air concentration threatens the periodic interception of American supplies to Russia. The lines of communication from Murmansk—running laterally to the disposition of the German air force—are particularly vulnerable to attack, the lines from Archangel less so.

In general, however, the Germans—favored by interior lines—have not yet revealed their full strength in Europe. The day-time fighter sweeps of the British, for example, have not forced the Nazis to show their hand. Fundamentally, our observer concludes, Hitler must regard the building of American air strength in the British Isles, and not the Russian land mass before Moscow, as the main threat to his system. The dispersal of American air strength suits his purposes well, and he may be expected to encourage it and to keep the United Nations guessing as long as he can:

**Norwegian Resistance Grows**

With the Quisling regime in conflict with practically all the clergy, teachers, and lawyers in Norway, current Swedish newspaper reports picture a spread of the spirit of revolt in that country. Many teachers have been arrested, thrown into concentration camps, subjected to forced labor. On the whole, opposition has forced the Quisling regime to desist from its attempts to indoctrinate these groups, and persecutions have served only to unite the people against National Socialism. National Socialist agitators declare that the Norwegian professional classes are attempting to create chaos to facilitate eventual military invasion by the Allies.

In the last two years about 20 percent of the fishing fleet, including the biggest and best boats, has disappeared, taking refugees to the British Isles. Quisling has attempted to stop this exodus with regulations of great severity: recently 18 such refugees were caught and then selected for execution in reprisal for the assassination of two Gestapo agents.

Meanwhile, the Germans have been rapidly strengthening their system of communications along the Norwegian coast. They have completed the coastal highway all the way to Kirkenes, near Murmansk. Reports from Stockholm indicate that they have already extended the coastal railway from Namsos to Mo on the Rana fjord, that they expect to complete the previously projected stretch to Bodø by the autumn of 1943, and that they are using Russian prisoners of war to construct the final link from Bodø through Narvik to Kirkenes, which will not be finished for at least two years.

**A Democratic Victory in Colombia**

Democratic forces won a fresh victory when Alfonso López was chosen president of Colombia in the elections of May 3 by a majority of 200,000 votes out of a total of about 1,100,000. His opponent, Carlos Arango Vélez, is, like López, a member of the Liberal Party. But, whereas the former drew his support from the right wing of that party and from the Conservative Party (headed by pro-Falangist, pro-Nazi Laureano Gómez), López found his constituents among the middle and working classes. He also had the support of President Eduardo Santos. The election, which was almost entirely free from violence, reflected the pro-democratic convictions of the Colombian people, it is said. In foreign policy López favors an aggressive "international democracy" and American solidarity against the Axis forces.
**The Navy Takes Jurisdiction of Venezuelan Tankers**

To facilitate protection against further submarine depredations, it is reported that the United States Navy has just taken jurisdiction of the tanker fleet serving Venezuelan oil fields. Practically all the crude oil produced in the Maracaibo fields is transported by shallow-draught tankers to the Dutch islands of Curacao and Aruba for refining. Between February 16 and March 15 of this year Axis submarine activities in these waters had reduced the daily average shipments out of Lake Maracaibo and other Venezuelan ports by a large percentage.

The Navy has now ordered that the tanker fleet operate at less than 50 percent of normal. This rate of operation signifies an annual loss of revenue for Venezuela of nearly two million dollars, and will also necessitate a substantial curtailment in the personnel of the oil companies. Both the Standard and Gulf Oil Companies, however, have recently agreed to bridge this loss in revenue, which should be only temporary, by non-interest bearing loans to the Venezuelan treasury, but they have not yet made provision for their own unemployed workers.

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**APPENDIX I**

**The Character of Laval’s Cabinet**

With the final constitution of the Laval ministry, it has become possible to make certain generalizations about its composition. Noteworthy are the small number of holdovers from the previous régime—only five—and the fact that only four departments of the government besides those directed by Laval himself carry full ministerial rank—an obvious effort to leave a maximum of authority in the hands of the Chief of the Government. Furthermore, French reactionary and fascist groups are well represented, and the powerful Wormes et Cie, banking and industrial trust controlling a large share of the French economy, while less important numerically than in the previous cabinet, still retains a considerable representation. Finally the ministry is full of men of relative youth and inexperience—men who have recently come up through the ranks, and who now for the first time attain cabinet rank.

Brief biographical details follow:

Lucien Romier: minister of state without portfolio attached to Marshal Pétain. Editor of the conservative daily Le Figaro and something of an authority on sixteenth century France, Romier is a man of considerable intellectual distinction, an intimate friend of Pétain, and probably less collaborationist than the majority of the cabinet.

Joseph Barthélemy: minister of justice. A former deputy and one-time French delegate to the League of Nations, Barthélemy is a large landed proprietor, with views which may be described as feudal agrarian. He is a noted jurist, and like Romier, a friend of Pétain and not an outright collaborationist.

Pierre Cathala: minister of finance—one of Laval’s oldest political associates, having served with him in his ministry of 1931, and in the Tardeau ministries of 1930 and 1932.

Jacques Leroy-Lodurie: minister of agriculture and supply—a large conservative landowner, who wields the preponderant influence in the National Federation of Agriculture. His brother, Gabriel, is a guiding figure in the Banque Wormes.

Abel Bonnard: minister of national education—a poet and member of the Academy, for some time an ardent exponent of collaboration. He has supported Bonapartists claims to the French throne, and has ridiculed Anglo-Saxon civilization.

General Eugène Briend: minister of war. As Pétain’s military delegate at Paris on the commission discussing armistice problems with the Germans, General Briend has assisted Fernand de Brinon, a notorious collaborationist.

Admiral Paul Aspland: secretary of state for the navy—one of the youngest admirals in the navy, a Darlan man, whose political opinions have been variously reported as “pro-Allies” and definitely “anti-American.”

General Jean Jenessi: secretary of state for air—a daring air leader in 1940, and subsequently commander of the French air force in Syria at the time of the British and Free French attack.

Hubert Lagardelle: secretary of state for labor—a personal friend of Mussolini, who helped draft Pétain’s labor charter.
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Jean Bidelme: secretary of state for industrial production—a mining engineer with connections in the French steel industry and the Dutch coal industry. He is a collaborationist and a great admirer of German efficiency.

Robert Gibert: secretary of state for communications—a young man, previously director of the electricity and communications secretariat.

Max Bonnafous: secretary of state for agriculture and supplies. Graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, a socialist and editor of the works of Jaurès. Bonnafous has been prefect of Bouche-de-Rhône and is said to admire autarchy and authoritarian government.

Jules Brete: secretary of state for colonies—formerly resident-general in Indochina, and an expert on French West African problems. He has instructed all French colonial governors to organize a steadfast defense of the empire.

Dr. Raymond Grasset: secretary of state for family and health—departmental leader for Pétain’s National Veterans Legion and a long-time neighbor of Laval.

Paul Marin: secretary of state for information—an amateur economist who has been associated with a number of the new political parties in France, notably Driot’s fascist Parti Populaire Français.

The following are secretaries of state attached to Laval:

Count Fernand de Brinon: The scion of a wealthy family with an entree into high German circles, de Brinon was effective head of the Comité France-Allemagne, the most active of the pro-German groups of the pre-war period. The author of several articles for official Nazi organs expressing admiration for the policies of Hitler, he was one of the principal engineers of the French-German trade agreement signed after Munich, and in the spring of 1939 served as Bonnet’s personal agent to Göring. Since the fall of France he has been Pétain’s ambassador to the Germans at Paris, at which post he now remains.

Admiral René Pilot: A follower of Darian, under whom he served as under-secretary for the colonies.

Jacques Benoist-Méchin: An outstanding pro-German and the author of the leading French book on the Reichswehr. Benoist-Méchin was confined to a prison camp by the French government for a time during the present war. On the fall of France, Abetz, German representative in Paris, obtained his release. An ardent collaborationist, he became secretary of state under Pétain, serving as intermediary between Vichy and the Germans in Paris. It was he who first conceived the idea of transferring to the Invalides the ashes of Napoleon’s son.

Jacques Guitard: secretary-general attached to Laval—formerly confidential secretary to Paul Baudouin, well known defeatist of the Armistice period, during the latter’s tenure of the ministry of foreign affairs.

Robert Dousset: secretary-general of police—a young man, previously prefect of the Department of the Marne, in occupied France.

Georges Hilaire: secretary-general of administration in the ministry of the interior—another young man, also a prefect in occupied France (Department of the Aube).

Jacques Barnaud: delegate-general for Franco-German economic relations—an able, cultured man, formerly one of the economic advisers to the Blum government. Deeply interested in Catholic theology, he apparently believes it possible to establish a Catholic totalitarian Europe. He is a partner and leading figure in the Banque Worms.

Joseph Pascual: general commissioner for sports. No information available.

APPENDIX II

THE ZONES OF OCCUPIED FRANCE

Since the Armistice the portion of metropolitan France occupied by the Germans has been divided into at least seven different zones, each with special regulations of its own controlling the movement of Frenchmen and foreigners. At present, however, there appear to be only three zones which have any political or military importance: the forbidden zone on the north and east, the coastal zone, and the maritime zone (see accompanying map).

The coastal zone includes the Atlantic and Channel coast of France from the Spanish frontier to the forbidden zone in the northeast. Over most of its length it is a strip of territory about nineteen miles (thirty kilometers) wide, but the boundary line cuts much farther inland behind the larger peninsulas. This zone is obviously a region of possible conflict, and the German military authorities aim to control all movement and residence there. Since October 20, 1941, entrance into the zone has been forbidden to all persons except those whose principal residence is there, and even residents must have permits from the commander of the local military district in order to enter or remain in the zone. No newcomers are allowed to establish residence there.

The forbidden zone includes the departments along the northeastern frontier contiguous with Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, and parts of the second row of departments farther from the border. The return of refugees to this zone is absolutely forbidden, except to the Departments of the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and Haut-Rhin, which compose Alsace-Lorraine and have been annexed outright to Germany. All traffic between this zone and the rest of France is closely restricted. The forbidden zone is served by important railroads leading from the coast to Germany, and it includes some of the most highly developed industrial districts of the country and has the principal French deposits of iron ore, coal, and potash, which, with the sole exception of bauxite, are France’s only important mineral resources.

The Germans originally explained their special control over this region as necessitated by heavy war damage, the difficulty of provisioning the area, the danger of British air-raids, and strategic considerations. There is evidence now, however, which indicates that they intend to annex this zone, or at least a large part of it, to Germany. French control has been almost obliterated by barring entrance into the zone to officials appointed to posts there by the German Government. The refusal to allow former residents who left the region during hostilities to return to their homes, and the intensive recruiting of French laborers for work in Germany suggests an attempt to depopulate the area of Frenchmen.

A German agricultural and colonizing society has taken over the cultivation of land owned by refugees and is apparently preparing eventually to settle Germans on that land. After the Armistice there appeared in Germany several books and articles in National Socialist publications seeking to justify the extension of the
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German frontier westward to include much of eastern France, which, it was maintained, is geographically and culturally part of Germany.

The maritime zone is a continuation of the coastal zone into the forbidden zone. It is an especially restricted combat area, but the particular regulations applying there are not known.

In unoccupied France the only zone to be distinguished is that composed of the few narrow strips of territory along the Franco-Italian frontier which are occupied by the Italians, and which were held by their troops at the time the Armistice went into effect.
Coordinating Information

THE WAR THIS WEEK

American sea and air forces lashed out at the Japanese this week in the northern reaches of the Coral Sea to win a victory in which they sank or damaged 21 naval vessels. Although Japanese naval units finally retired from the scene of the battle, the enemy has apparently continued the occupation of the Solomon Islands. Moreover, the availability of naval reinforcements makes it perfectly possible that the Japanese will shortly attempt to renew their forward movement in this area, possible prelude to an assault on Australia.

In Burma continuing Japanese successes carried them northward to Bhamo and Myitkyina and effectively closed the last of the practicable alternative land routes from India to China. At the same time they drove up the Burma road into China and struck northwestward toward India, bombing Imphal and Chittagong. This simultaneous interest in three primary sectors of the war—Australia, China, and India—left some confusion in the minds of observers as to where the Japanese would strike the next serious blow.

In the west the Germans launched an offensive action in the Crimea and claim to be moving rapidly on Kerch. Despite the impressive nature of this thrust, observers were inclined to believe it was still part of the process of "cleaning up" preliminary to the main offensive, rather than actually a part of that more ambitious drive. A recapitulation of this process during the past few weeks reveals that the Nazis have pretty well eliminated existing Russian salients and
now find themselves less than a hundred miles from Moscow. A current situation map prepared for this issue focuses attention on the somewhat limited accomplishments of the Russian winter offensive, and suggests the extent to which even reliable organs of the American press have distorted this picture.

Meanwhile, the declining intensity of the attacks on Malta may mean that the Germans are husbanding air strength for the offensive in Russia and that during the period of that drive the control of the sea lanes to Tripoli will be of less importance to them. At the same time, as the ice goes out of the White Sea and an increasingly larger flow of lend-lease supplies can be directed to the port of Archangel, the Nazis have intensified their attacks on the Arctic sea route.

The Battle of the Coral Sea

In the Battle of the Coral Sea the Japanese suffered a serious naval setback, sustaining heavy losses while the American forces appear to have won the battle at relatively light cost. The two Japanese aircraft carriers put out of action—one sunk and another probably a total loss—may have been among Japan's newest and largest, carrying upwards of 60 planes, although there is as yet no official word on this. In addition, the loss of two heavy cruisers—one sunk and one damaged—is a serious blow. As for light cruisers, the recent action apparently leaves the Japanese with only seven which are afloat, and a number of these—including one in the Coral Sea—probably have been put out of action temporarily.

The Mission of the Japanese Task Force

The action in the Coral Sea was precipitated when a naval task force was sighted on May 4 moving toward Tulagi Harbor in the Solomon Islands. This may have been an operation aimed ultimately at the invasion of Australia itself, but the immediate purpose appears to have been the establishment of a secure base on the Japanese east flank, designed to protect an attack on Port Moresby. The occupation of this port on the Papuan coast of New Guinea would protect the rear of any attempted invasion of northeastern Australia. Moreover, it would eliminate an advanced Allied air base which is close enough to Japanese bases in Northeast New Guinea to supply fighter support for bombers.

The Action and the Results

While light Japanese forces were concentrated in Tulagi Harbor, the initial Allied air attack was made, resulting in the sinking of a light cruiser, two destroyers, four gunboats, and a supply ship, and damage to other ships. On May 5 and 6 aerial reconnaissance in the Coral Sea located two aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, 17 destroyers, 16 unidentified warships, two submarines, one submarine tender, and 21 transport or supply ships.

On May 8 American units made contact with this Japanese force near the small Louisiade Islands, southeast of New Guinea. In the resulting engagement the American forces sank or damaged both carriers and four of the seven cruisers. On Monday, May 11, it was announced that two Japanese submarines had been sunk in the Coral Sea area, raising the total of Japanese ships sunk or damaged in this action to 21.

Meanwhile the Japanese probably have succeeded in setting down light occupation forces on Tulagi, Gavutu and Makambo Islands in the Solomon group, although this has not been confirmed. Control of these islands, which command Tulagi and Gavutu Harbors in the southeastern Solomons, would allow the Japanese virtually to dominate these islands. Harbors at the opposite end of the chain
have been under Japanese control for several weeks. Newspaper dispatches report that seaplane tenders have landed some stores and equipment also in the Louisiada Archipelago.

Since the Japanese appear to have stepped up air operations against both Port Moresby and Horn Island, off northeastern Australia, further naval action at an early date is perfectly possible. The Japanese can always move naval units rapidly southward to the New Britain region from the Truk area in the Carolines, where reports indicate that they have assembled notable naval strength.

Imbroglio in New Caledonia

Concomitant with these serious Japanese threats in the Coral Sea area, political difficulties have arisen to plague the Free French rulers of New Caledonia, and the High Commissioner there has been suspected even of playing deliberately into the enemy's hands. The trouble arose apparently as a result of popular distrust of D'Argenlieu, the High Commissioner. Governor Sautot had been recalled to Free French headquarters in London in what General de Gaulle later termed a purely routine administrative move, but he refused to leave, apparently at popular behest. He was then arrested by the High Commissioner, along with four prominent members of his administrative council. The upshot was a general strike of all workers, and some mob violence.

Somewhat enigmatically, the High Commissioner himself has now been arrested and will soon leave the island, according to a reliable report, but the status of Governor Sautot remains in doubt. With American troops now bolstering the defenses of New Caledonia, which occupies a position of great current strategic importance, the situation is one of unusual delicacy.

The Japanese Advance in Burma

In northern Burma the Japanese drive has swept on to envelop strategic Bhamo and Myitkyina, thus cutting the last of the practicable alternative land routes from India to Yunnan and leaving only air transport as a means of travel and supply. In the northwest the Japanese continue to push the British back on Kalewa along the route to India. On the Burma road, however, the Chinese caught an overextended Japanese mechanized column which had advanced as far as Chefang, some 25 miles inside China. Subjecting the column to annihilating artillery fire, the Chinese forced the Japanese to withdraw, lifting the immediate threat to Paoshan, important station on the India-Burma air route. Press reports indicate, however, that the Japanese have already recovered, and with reinforcements they now seem to be moving forward once more in Yunnan.

Meanwhile Chinese units, previously isolated at Taunggyi and virtually given up for lost, have fought their way north and captured Maymyo. Using tactics reminiscent of the fighting in China, they threatened the Japanese rear as the latter were drawn into the artillery trap at Chefang. It is reported that the Japanese, now reinforced, are attempting to retake Maymyo.

Reaction in Chungking

Although the Generalissimo has lost some prestige as a result of the collapse in Burma, and some defeatism has appeared in Chungking, no faction is strong enough to oust Chiang, and it is generally believed that he will continue the fight against Japan, according to a very reliable and highly placed source. The Chinese still do not believe that the Japanese can conduct a major invasion of Yunnan at this time, in view of the weather and terrain, and there is no
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indication of a major Japanese move from Indochina, our source concludes.

Chiang is reported to have told his Army Council that he blamed the Burmese debacle in part on lack of cooperation from British military leaders. But the Generalissimo insisted that Japan has now reached the high-water mark of her effort and cannot maintain her present drive much longer. The coming months will be hard he added, but China will come through. Meanwhile, if Russo-Japanese hostilities break out, he expects a renewal of fighting on the Hunan or Chekiang sectors.

Indian Defense Again

With the Japanese in control of Burma and with the bombing of Chittagong and “a small country town in Eastern Assam” (identified by the Japanese as Imphal), the defense of India has become something more than an academic question. General Wavell has already announced the reorganization of the Army into three mobile commands, and General Brereton has suggested that American air forces will play a significant part in the defense of the peninsula.

Apparently the British and American commanders are experiencing few hindrances arising from the Congress party’s objections to foreign control of Indian defense. One well placed British observer recently returned from India suggests that the defense of the peninsula is primarily a professional matter and that the failure of the Cripps’ mission has actually made little difference. If the Congress had accepted Cripps’ proposals, it would have helped chiefly in securing better air-raid precautions throughout India, and perhaps in limiting the number of strikes in industrial plants, and in stiffening public morale.

Stressing the friendly note on which the conferences between Cripps and the Congress leaders closed, our observer suggests that back of all the issues on which the negotiations broke down was the solid fact that Britain was already committed to India’s defense. The Indian leaders knew that if Britain should win, her offer would in effect still be open. On the other hand, if Japan should win, the Indians could explain that they had not cooperated with the British. What was really at stake in the negotiations over the defense issue was, then, the implicit issue of whether or not India should be given a position in which she could, if she so desired, make a separate peace.

Our observer concludes that when the opportunity arises, some Indian leaders—besides those like Rajagopalachari already pledged to cooperation in the war effort—may take a stand for armed defense. Nehru certainly has no illusions about the effectiveness of non-violent non-cooperation as a weapon against Japan, and he is definitely anti-Japanese. Moreover, Gandhi’s lieutenant, Ghouse, has already advocated cooperation with the British. Communist elements, many of whose leaders are still in jail, favor vigorous prosecution of the war. And many younger men, sons of wealthy parents and university graduates, show strong sympathy toward Russia.

For the present, at least, apathy rather than enthusiasm or hostility to the British seems to characterize the Indian defense effort. Latest reports on India’s morale indicate general pessimism, among both official and native groups. Nor is there any apparent readiness to adopt a scorched-earth policy in the event of a Japanese invasion.

Attack in the Crimea

While it is as yet too early to draw conclusions about the current Nazi attack in the Kerch peninsula, it is probable
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that this movement, far from being the long-awaited “spring offensive,” is simply a continuation of local efforts to straighten the German lines in preparation for a concerted attack later on (The War This Week, April 30–May 7, p. 15). Here, and in the parallel attacks in the Donets area, the Nazi ground troops have apparently had the aid of strong air concentrations. According to a Soviet press source, they have even used gas.

The accompanying map suggests the success of German local attacks during the past few weeks. Although the lines and shaded areas are based simply on competent estimates rather than on specific reports, they do indicate that the Nazi attacks have already gone far to wipe out the more advanced Soviet salients established last winter. To the north, the Germans have apparently drawn their lines tighter around Leningrad, and may even have relieved the beleaguered 16th Army at Staraya Russa. In the center, the Soviet pioneers north and south of Smolensk have largely disappeared, and the Nazis still stand less than 100 miles from Moscow. To the south, the Germans have apparently succeeded in relieving the almost-encircled city of Kharkov (where the Russians claim to have launched an offensive of their own), and their line remains anchored at Taganrog on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

In sum, then, the significant net gains of the Russians after a winter of ostensibly unremitting counter-offensives, are first, the reconquest of Rostov and large areas of the Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine; second, the relief of Moscow, including the capture of Mozhaisk; and third, a large scale infiltration in the Valdai Hills area, apparently lightly held by scattered German units.

The distribution of Nazi strength on the map is likewise an estimate. Some of the figures may already be out of date. For instance, there may be by now a greater concentration on the southern front than the map shows (most of the “allied” units are apparently operating in this area; German communiqués point out that Rumanian troops are participating in the attack on the Kerev peninsula). Nevertheless, it is probable that the Nazis, even if they do decide to throw their main weight into a southern offensive, cannot leave merely a small holding force against Moscow. The length of the Russian front is so great, and the Soviet army so large, that a stripping of one sector to permit the concentration of overwhelming force in another area—as envisaged in the original Von Schlieffen plan for attacking France—would here appear to be out of the question.

Ordeal in Leningrad

In the Leningrad sector, it is the Russians who will probably suffer most from the spring thaw. Here a series of Soviet attacks have apparently failed to relieve the city. And soon the ice will be out of Lake Ladoga—thus eliminating Leningrad’s chief supply line, the railroad laid this winter across the lake itself.

A report from Kuibyshev suggests that before the completion of this line, the food shortage in Leningrad had reached critical proportions. And even after the new link went into service, while workers had enough to eat, babies and non-essential people in general starved in large numbers. A report from Helsinki, ostensibly based on the testimony of deserters and prisoners-of-war, adds further details: evacuation and death have lowered the population of Leningrad from about 3.2 million to an estimated 2.5 million this spring.

Of approximately 150 large factories in the city, the report continues, the Russians have transferred from a third to a half inland, many to the Ural area. Those remaining have endeavored to maintain their output by lengthening the
working day to even as much as 18 hours. But bombardment and a shortage of raw materials, electricity and fuel, coupled with the poor physical condition of the workers, have greatly reduced production.

A lack of adequate bomb shelters, the report concludes, has been responsible for many civilian casualties. Nevertheless, a service of 70 airplanes has maintained the city’s hospitals. Now, with the ice going out of Lake Ladoga, Leningrad is girding itself for the coming summer ordeal, although apparently the Russians are confident that they can continue to supply the city by establishing a boat service across the lake.

Will the Germans Use Gas?

Prime Minister Churchill’s speech, with its clear warning to the Germans about the use of chemical warfare, corroborates suspicions expressed by several neutral sources. The Turkish ambassador to Berlin, for example, is evidently of the opinion that Hitler will not scruple to employ gas—and bacteria also—on the Russian front. But the German army leaders are hesitant and would consent to the use of these methods only as a last resort.

Other observers believe that the recent Nazi propaganda line—including Hitler’s reference to British use of “new means” of warfare—indicates a readiness to employ gas. In Russia, they point out, weather and terrain are favorable, and the German army and chemical industry are well prepared; the latter has been working at high pressure in anticipation of the coming summer.

It may be that Nazi preparations for using gas are responsible in part for the current delay in launching an eastern offensive. A more plausible reason for that delay, however, is the spring flooding of the rivers in Central and Southern Russia. One report maintains that the Don, in one area where it is normally a mile across, now forms a lake 30 miles wide.

Spring Comes to the Arctic Ocean

The battle for the supply routes to Russia continues with redoubled intensity. In a recent engagement, the Germans had one destroyer sunk, and another damaged, while the British lost the light cruiser Edinburgh and five supply ships from two convoys—of which, according to Allied reports, 90 percent of the supplies reached Russia in safety. Such losses suggest that both sides regard the northern supply route as a most critical theater, in which they are willing to suffer inordinately heavy damage.

The months of early summer are the least unfavorable of the year for naval or air action, according to a study recently prepared in the Geographic Division of the Coordinator’s Office. While weather conditions are relatively adverse all year round, both for convoys and for their attackers, in winter northerly gales and long hours of darkness make naval operations unusually difficult and air activity often impossible. In summer, the dense fogs characteristic of the season would apparently favor the escape of Allied convoys from air reconnaissance. On the other hand, the long hours of daylight would be of considerable aid to attacking planes.

The Opening of Archangel

About the middle of this month, the White Sea port of Archangel will be substantially free of ice. A study prepared in the East-European Section of the Coordinator’s Office suggests some of the implications of the opening of Archangel as a terminus for American and British convoys.
Since late December, convoys bound for Russia have used the port of Murmansk, open all through the winter with the occasional assistance of an icebreaker. Besides its freedom from ice, Murmansk has at least two advantages over Archangel: first, it is nearer to Britain and the United States; second, its port facilities may be adapted to more varied shipments, since in years before the outbreak of war, Archangel was important chiefly as an export point for lumber.

On the other hand, Murmansk is far more exposed to enemy attack. Already the Finns have cut the Murmansk-Leningrad railroad south of Soroka. Shipments this winter have had to go over the new railroad from Soroka along the southern shore of the White Sea to Obozerskaya, the junction with the railway from Archangel south to Vologda and Moscow. Furthermore, the capacity of Murmansk is considerably smaller than that of Archangel—about 90,000 to 120,000 tons per month for the former, and possibly 290,000 tons for the latter.

In short, it seems likely that from now on, the Soviets will use both ports. Despite German bombing of the railway south from Murmansk, its capacity is probably still adequate to keep the port clear—that is, barring further damage from the air. Even in that event, the Russians are used to making rapid repairs on this railroad, having at least once rebuilt a ruined bridge in as little as a day and a half.

The railroad south from Archangel, coupled with the river facilities of the Northern Dvina, can probably keep clear the port of Archangel and the neighboring ports of Bakaritsa and Ekonomia. Furthermore, south of the junction with the Murmansk railway system at Obozerskaya, the Russians have very nearly completed the double-tracking of the line, making a bottleneck at this point unlikely. In fact, the chief limiting factor in the whole Russian supply problem may be not so much the capacity of the Soviet ports and railways, as the amount of shipping which Britain and the United States make available for this route.

The Intentions of the Finns

A further argument in favor of the continuing use of Murmansk is the comparative quiescence of the Finnish army. A report from Helsinki suggests that the Germans, fearing a Finnish collapse, will not ask the Finns to take Soroka this summer. (Once in possession of Soroka, the Finns would control the railroad connecting Soroka with the Archangel-Vologda-Moscow line, thus making Murmansk useless as a port of entry.) The Nazis feel, according to the report, that if they are victorious over the main Soviet army, the Russian forces in the north will be obliged to withdraw of their own accord.

Meantime, in the Kiestinki sector, the spring thaw is apparently working considerable hardship on the Finnish and German troops. Adequately supplied with food and ammunition, they are, however, unable to evacuate their wounded over the soggy roads to their rear, and must rely on airplanes to bring in medical supplies. The Russians, on the other hand, have adequate all-weather roads in this area, the report concludes.

French Reactions to the Descent on Madagascar

The British descent on Madagascar appears to have provoked two rather different reactions in metropolitan France. The official attitude of Laval's government was hostile, and both Pétain and Darlan sent messages of encouragement to the resisting French troops. On the other hand, reports suggest that the popular reaction in France was one of understanding tinged with a feeling that the act was inevitable.

The De Gaullists are a case apart. The relatively calm attitude of the French public fully justified the exclusion of
the Free French from the attack, it is felt in British government circles. But in the De Gaullist camp, reports picture great disappointment and distinct resentment, a sentiment not mollified by current negotiations at Martinique. In any event, observers are contrasting the notably different French popular reaction in the case of Madagascar and in that of the earlier joint British-Free French invasion of Syria. A more recent British announcement that the Free French are to assist in the administration of Madagascar may allay to some extent initial De Gaullist resentment.

Laval’s Difficulties

The Germans are already contriving difficulties for Laval and are now once again tacitly supporting renewed Italian claims to the cession of Nice and Corsica, according to reports which lend some color to the continuing rumors that one of the Parisian collaborationists may presently replace the new Vichy premier.

Meanwhile it is said that the Germans are offering Laval the repatriation of a sizeable number of French prisoners for the return of General Giraud, who is still at Vichy and not, as some newspapers have reported, in the hands of the Germans or the Swiss. The Nazis appear to be considerably disturbed about the plans of the General, who is reported to be as anti-German as ever and as being “happy to work with the United States.”

In North Africa recent reports picture certain high French officials as still hopeful that Pétain may hold out against Axis pressure and that North Africa may yet reenter the war on the Allied side (with the help of the United States), whatever may happen in metropolitan France. To accomplish this end, however, continued American economic assistance is essential, these officials insist. The seriousness of North

Africa’s economic plight is reflected in a recent statement by General Nogues that the Moroccan government is seeking an exchange with metropolitan France of food products for certain commodities needed in Moroccan industry. The General emphasized the importance of haste and declared that “minutes are precious.”

Respite for Malta

In one 72-hour period this week the defenders of Malta shot down 101 attacking planes, according to Allied press reports. Coupled with a continuing let-up in air raids over the island, perhaps indicating a shift of Axis strength to the Eastern Front, the current success of Malta’s defenders may presage a respite for the coming months. That such a respite would be more than welcome to the island was apparent in an official British announcement that three-quarters of the buildings in Valetta are now uninhabitable.

Yet if the Axis is to continue the neutralization of Malta, steady bombing attacks will still be necessary. Of course if the Nazis had decided to attempt the capture of the island, they might have ended this drain on their resources once for all. Now, with the sinking of three British destroyers by German bombing, it is apparent that the Axis still has a powerful air fleet in the Mediterranean, and that Malta may be enjoying only a temporary respite after all.
APPENDIX I

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MALNUTRITION

A case study of the effects of inadequate diet, strictly enforced by effective rationing, has just been received from Belgium, and it will hardly encourage those who look forward to the day when the United States will be able to work through internal revolt of peoples under Nazi control. Rather this study suggests that the rationing of conquered Europe might serve the German effort to maintain order more effectively in the long run than will Nazi firing squads. Moreover, it is particularly among the urban middle and lower classes that the spirit of revolt is likely to become progressively weaker, as food conditions demand that more and more commodities become subject to rationing.

Today there is no country in which all consumption is rationed. Rationing is generally introduced for specific commodities as shortages develop. The percentage of total calories provided by rations varies from virtually none in Portugal to some 90 percent in Germany. Hence, legal rations can nowhere be used as the sole measure of consumption.

Nor does the existence of a rationing system mean that the system works. Certain groups may fare better than others—notably the rural producers who can withhold their product, and the well-to-do who can purchase in the black market. This frequently means that adequate quantities are not available for the urban consumer in the lower income brackets. Indeed, many such people receive even less than the rationed amounts of particular foods.

From the beginning of the war, there has been a gradual extension of the number of countries with some degree of rationing. More important is the ever-lengthening list of commodities to which control is applied. There is reason to believe that for most countries the extent of control will become more severe, and the opportunities to obtain free supplies will become more and more limited. Rations will therefore comprise progressively larger percentages of the total consumption of citizens in any country.

Belgian rations are on a scale similar to those in force elsewhere in Europe. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the nutrient values supplied by these rations will be markedly increased in the future. Hence it is worthwhile to examine the effects—physical and mental—of consumption at the level prescribed. The particular observations reported are from a Belgian prison, where for many months the inmates are known to have been fed nothing more than the legal rations. Such a stark view of rationing enforced in its complete rigor suggests some of the results which prolongation of the war may bring for an ever-widening element of the population of Europe.

The legal Belgian rations provided the prisoners with diets of 1,500-1,800 calories, less than three-quarters the number of calories needed to sustain life when no physical activity is undertaken. The diet was unbalanced: it was markedly deficient in protein, mineral salts, and vitamins.

The first effect was hunger, so severe that the prisoners frequently became disoriented, subject to fainting spells, and temporarily blinded. The sensation of hunger was so acute that sleep was often impossible. In many cases these effects were intensified by an inability to eat even the meager food allotments because of inordinate swelling of the submaxillary glands, and of the tongue, gums, and indeed the whole mouth. In such circumstances, dysphagia is almost always present: the feet drag; climbing stairs is most painful; all processes which necessitate keeping the arms extended even for brief periods are performed with difficulty. Soon the nervous system is affected, so that motor control becomes yet more difficult. There is a numbness of the limbs which hinders all activity. The patients, already debilitated by the dietary conditions, are now more rapidly ill. There are severe cases of constipation, and even more commonly diarrea sets in and will not respond to treatment. This soon brings increased weakness and the loss of weight.

Indeed, loss of weight is general and progressive, from about one month after the rationed diet is instituted. The organism exhausts its store of fats; then the muscular tissues deteriorate. All bones become more prominent. Losses of 50 and more pounds during one year are common; and there are cases of weight reduction to the extent of 50 percent.

Actually, this weight loss is concealed to some degree by "famine edema," which occurred among some 90 percent of the inmates receiving no food other than rations. This is a condition in which liquid which cannot be eliminated accumulates in the body. Though it is usually localised in the lower limbs, it sometimes spreads and thus hinders breathing and circulation (the edema disappears quickly if sufficient quantities of Vitamin B, are administered).

Despite the suffering accompanying these dietary deficiencies, death by starvation appeared to be painless. Without additional symptoms, many of the prisoners passed away during their sleep.

Cases of such malnutrition are undoubtedly to be found throughout Europe today. There are as yet, however, few areas where the bulk of the inhabitants must live on such curtailed diets. From all the evidence, it appears that such conditions prevail most nearly in Greece. Recent accounts (coming from Ankara) reveal a situation in many other countries not very different from that described above. These accounts tell the same story of weakness, sleeplessness, weight loss and edematous conditions, alimentary and urinary disorders—and peaceful death.

Published reports of a survey among normal consumers in Belgium, from September 1910 to April 1911, again show conditions differing only in degree from those of the prisoners living solely on legal rations. Other studies give similar evidence of the results of malnutrition brought about by the First World War, according to an analysis now in progress in the Bureau of Home Economics of the United States Department of Agriculture.

All these studies put considerable stress upon other than the physical effects of malnutrition. Investigators of the early "twenties pointed out that there was a complete lack of mental aggressiveness among the hungry. During the present war, a state of apathy is regularly reported as characterizing the inhabitants of Greece. In the Belgian prison, the inmates were subject to states of acute depression: listlessness, lassitude, and lack of interest in life itself were common. The evidence clearly indicates that persons suffering from malnutrition are not desperate men readily moved to rash activity. Rather, they are apathetic and indifferent people who accept their lot without marked protest. Such men can scarcely be relied upon to assist the United Nations by fomenting internal revolt.
APPENDIX II

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC GAINS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The economic resources which the Japanese have gained in the Philippines, while not vital to her war economy, are nevertheless of considerable strategic importance. In the case of iron, chrome, and manganese ores—commodities which Japan needs—the comparatively short haul from the Philippines will doubtless influence the Japanese to exploit these resources immediately. Although information on the demolition accomplished in the islands is by no means complete, it is not believed that "scorched earth" tactics have been very successful.

The Philippines offer Japan considerable resources in iron ore, which in the past has been one of her most critical needs. Annual production, averaging 60 percent iron content, has run about 1,250,000 tons in the islands. Some of the iron mines were reported to have been flooded and at least one was dynamited. But in the open pit mines of Mindanao, the area of greatest production, destruction is not practicable. A very large unexploited reserve will allow for considerable expansion in mining. The fact that the Philippine mines are nearer than those in Malaya, and that the Philippine ore is of high quality, may lead to intensified exploitation of these resources.

Philippine chrome is believed to be sufficient to fill the gap in Japanese requirements. Approximately 150,000 tons of medium grade ore (40 to 48 percent) were mined there annually prior to the Japanese occupation. The known reserves in Zamboanges Province, on Luzon, are estimated at more than 10,000,000 tons, and they are easily accessible. In this area there was some destruction: at Santa Cruz, trucks were removed and the loading pier burned, and at Matinloc the pier was demolished and all equipment was removed.

With respect to manganese, an annual Philippine production of 60,000 tons of ore considerably improves Japan's position. The average content is 50 percent. Again the supply is nearer than that in Malaya. The largest and best deposits are on Busuanga, a small island about midway between Palawan and Mindoro. Smaller quantities of high-grade ore also are located on the island of Masbate. No information is available on demolition.

Japanese dependence on stockpiles to meet current requirements for copper will be to some extent relieved by requisition of the small Philippine output—about 9,000 tons of metal annually. Japan will also gain a monopoly control of hemp, more than 50,000 tons of which were ready for movement when the attack began last December. It is not known how much of this was destroyed, but in any case an annual production of 200,000 tons will become available to her.

Japan is nearly self-sufficient in sugar, but about 200,000 tons were milled, bagged, and awaiting shipment when the Japanese arrived, and annual production is about 1,000,000 tons. The Philippines' 280,000 tons of molasses per year will be useful to Japan for alcohol distillation, as a supplement for fodder, and also as a source for potash. Timber resources will augment the Japanese supply of this important product, and her requirements of copra and coconut oil will be assured.

Some reports indicate that trucks and passenger cars obtained in the Philippines already are being shipped to Japan for scrap. In the Paracale mining area in

Southern Luzon the Japanese are said to have found 1,000 tons of drill steel, 500 tons of structural steel, and 1,000 tons of manganese balls ready to ship. And although a considerable amount of petroleum was set afire or used in military operations, there were on hand in the Philippines at the end of November 1941 about 1,100,000 barrels of stocks. A complete estimate of the amount of this which fell into Japanese hands is not yet available.
Russo-German Front

Present Front
Line of furthest German Advance
Front as of March 9, 1942
Area retaken by Russians
Area taken in recent German advances

Northern Sector
25 Div.
4 Div.
5 Div.
2 Div.

Central Sector
64 Div.
13 Div.
13 Div.
2 Div.

Southern Sector
46 Divisions
4 Div.
1 Div.
4 Div.
2 Div.

Other Forces Allied with the Germans
7 Rumanian Div.
3 Hungarian Div.
2 Slovak Div.
4 Italian Div.
1 Spanish 'Blue'

MAP NO. 517, MAY 14, 1942
DRAWN IN THE GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, C.O.I.
THE WAR THIS WEEK
May 14–21, 1942

Printed for the Board of Analysts
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THE WAR THIS WEEK

In Burma—as in Malaya—the Japanese have loosed an offensive of unexpected power. They have rapidly driven the British to the borders of India, where the threat would be even more serious but for the imminence of the monsoon. They have moved northward to occupy Fort Hertz and close the last of the alternative land supply routes to China. Finally, they have invaded the western reaches of Chinese Yunnan, and cautious military observers are speculating on the possibilities of a widening Japanese offensive in this area, perhaps even coordinated with a renewed drive in Central China and aiming at final liquidation of the "China incident."

In the west the situation—both political and military—is in a state of flux. The occupation of Crimean Kerch gives the Germans a position of some strategic importance if they plan a subsequent drive on the Caucasus. But farther north in the Kharkov sector, neither Russian nor German claims give any precise clues as to the nature and timing of the anticipated Nazi offensive. At Vichy Laval is treading a cautious course, and his failure to espouse a more openly collaborationist policy is now said to be irritating his German masters. And in the Mediterranean outward evidence continues to suggest a lightening of Axis pressure, but an area where air power is of such primary importance is also one where the element of surprise must enter all calculations.
Burmese Offensive.

With the conquest of Burma substantially complete, the Japanese have already invaded China on the east and have thrust toward India on the west. Although these drives have been momentarily halted by the barriers of the Salween River and the Arakan Mountains, military observers point out that the Japanese air and troop concentrations in Burma are larger than required for the mere consolidation of gains already made. Hence they anticipate further moves in the direction of China or possibly of India.

The Chinese appear to have recuperated from the first shock of the rapid Japanese advance up the Burma road. They have thrown back the invaders from the west bank of the Salween and have stifled the immediate threat to the strategic air center at Paoshan. In the face of this check, Japanese columns have branched out both to the north and south, with the apparent intention of preparing other crossings at Teng- Yueh and Kunlung (see map). They have already occupied Teng-yueh, through which the only other road in this area leads across the Salween, to join the Burma road at Paoshan. At Kunlung, where a projected railroad from Burma to Kunming was to bridge the Salween, the terrain also might facilitate a crossing.

The most considerable Japanese concentrations are believed to be in this vicinity, but farther south, near Kengtung, the Chinese have reported heavy fighting. Estimates of Japanese strength in this region have ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 troops, with one report that both heavy tanks and artillery were being brought into action, but with actual developments still remaining somewhat obscure. This action may have been precipitated by Chinese efforts to regain contact with troops by-passed by the Japanese in their mechanized thrust up the Burma road. It may also foreshadow a Japanese attack up the Mekong River valley designed to flank the Salween River defenses.

Japanese Intentions

In the past Chinese leaders at Chungking—including Chiang Kai-shek—and certain Chinese in Washington have tended to discount the possibility of a major offensive against Free China from Burma. News dispatches, however, now quote a Chungking government spokesman as warning the United States that Japan is on the verge of an “all-out” offensive against China and that the latter needs help with the utmost urgency. The Chungking radio also reflects the belief that China will be next on the Japanese list, according to both FCC analysts and BBC broadcasters. American observers in China have not been unimpressed with the possibilities of attack from Burma, and in fact have advised all Americans to leave the Tali area. At Kunming, Chinese army headquarters have issued a proclamation suggesting that civilians leave and citing the precedent at Paoshan, recently raided by a small Japanese force.

Test for War Lords and Appeasers

Whatever their military intentions, the Japanese will doubtless attempt to capitalize to the utmost the crisis which has been created for the Chinese. Thus the threat of imminent danger, following close on the heels of failure in Burma, will not only furnish Chinese appeasers with new arguments but may place a severe strain on Chiang Kai-shek’s rather tenuous arrangements with local war lords.

After the fall of Hankow and Chiang’s retreat to the western provinces, the central government established a modus vivendi with the former war lords, largely without resort to
actual military showdowns. By judicious concentration of his forces and much compromise, Chiang has been able to obtain substantial administrative authority over their areas while leaving them considerable local power—political, economic, and military.

In Yunnan (where there have been strong concentrations of Central Government troops) the testing period has opened auspiciously. Governor Lung Yun has announced that the Japanese would be met with "several hundred thousand troops." News dispatches have even reported him dramatically rallying a weary Chinese formation to counterattack after their own general had committed suicide, following an unsuccessful attempt to stem the Japanese at the Salween. The pressure, however, is not yet serious, and there are other regions—notably Sikang and the Chengtu plain—where local war lords still have considerable military power.

There are no signs as yet of a strongly organized peace faction in China, according to reliable observers, although Tokyo is making claims to the contrary. But in the complex mosaic of the Kuomintang there are several cliques which have been long and widely suspected of leaning toward an arrangement with Japan. Every military reverse, moreover, adds to the strength and boldness of Chungking appeasers, whose numbers have been augmented recently by wealthy refugees from Hongkong, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies, who are now cut off from their property.

**Terrain in Yunnan**

If the Japanese launch an offensive in southwest China, they will face both lengthening supply lines and a difficult terrain. Hitherto they have succeeded not only in overcoming obstacles offered by terrain, but they have actually turned them to advantage. In Yunnan, however, they face a situation different from that in Malaya or the valley of the Irrawaddy. Here there are no jungles through which to infiltrate, and the country is so broken by precipitous mountains that mechanized equipment will be largely restricted to the few existing roads.

Although the Japanese have already driven to the very edge of the Salween, they are now only at the beginning of the difficult terrain (see map). At the Burma Road crossing, there is a drop of 4,500 feet from the top of the mountain pass to the bank of the Salween. With the bridge destroyed, tanks and trucks must find a means to cross a river which is only 150 yards wide but which is swift and deep. Once across, they must again use the road, the only possible means of travel, even for tanks, in the Salween gorge. Off the road, fighting must be done on foot or in the air, and this is true of much of the country through which the Burma Road passes. The latter will be the key to any fighting in Yunnan. Strong air support which could harass the opponent's movements along this road—and destroy his artillery emplacements—might thus be decisive, either for the Japanese or the Chinese.

**Invasion Routes from Southern Yunnan**

If the Japanese should elect to drive on Kunming, they would probably coordinate an attack along the Burma Road with flanking movements through southern Yunnan, tactics suggested by the current fighting in the Kengtung area. Farther to the east, there are at least four other possible invasion routes—from Indochina. From Lookay, whose importance was emphasized this week by an AVG bombing, the Yunnan-Indochina Railway might be followed. The chief difficulty offered by this route is the precipitous nature of the mountains through which the railway passes, and the
fact that there are no roads until Kaiyuan is reached—a distance of 124 miles. Moreover, the Chinese have long since blown up the bridges, and are also reported to have torn up the tracks.

A second and easier route leads from Indochinese Hanoi by highway to Ha Giang, thence by trail to Wenshan, and finally by motor highway to Kunming (see map). Two further routes lead from Lai Chau by trail—one to Kaiyuan and the motor highway there, another through broad valleys to Oshan and by highway to Kunming.

Japanese Interest in Central China

Military observers are closely watching Japanese movements in other parts of China. In Chekiang Province reports indicate that Japanese troops are seeking out air bases potentially useful in bombing Japan. More important still, a fresh drive on Changsha in Hunan Province appears to be developing. Chinese leaders themselves view the Japanese campaign in Hupeh Province as the greatest current danger to Free China. The Japanese have long held Ichang in this province, but between Ichang and Chungking lie the gorges of the Yangtze, serious handicaps to military operations.

An alternative route to Chungking extends along the Han River valley to Nan-cheng, thence through a break in the Tapa range, where the Kialing River valley stretches down to Chungking and the Chengtu plain. The Chinese recently reported they had stopped a Japanese drive up the Han River valley, although comparatively small forces appear to have been involved.

There is as yet little indication that the Japanese will now attempt such a grand-scale pincers movement on Chungking as might here be implied. Such an offensive, if successful, would be a serious blow to the United Nations, depriving them of access to a valuable base of operations against Japan. Some observers believe, however, that Free China's own continuance in the war depends more upon the effect of the Japanese offensive upon her morale, since no particular area is of sufficient strategic importance to her to make its loss a decisive factor.

Aid to China by Air

The conquest of Burma has cut the land routes from India and left the air as the sole avenue of supply. But transport planes, flying from Assam to Yunnan, face the handicap of long hops and heavy gasoline loads (which must in general be sufficient for the round trip).

In northeastern Assam the best airport for transport planes is Sadiya (see map). Before the Japanese captured Mandalay, plans had been made for flying supplies from Sadiya to Myitkyina, a distance of only 200 miles. With Myitkyina in Japanese hands, freight must be flown from Sadiya to Yunnanyi (about 375 miles) or from Sadiya to Sichang (about 400 miles).

Air experts still maintain that by using about 50 Douglas C47 or Curtiss C53 transports, supplies can be forwarded to Yunnanyi or Sichang at the rate of 4,000 to 6,000 tons per month. But it would be essential for this purpose to maintain sufficient air strength (including anti-aircraft defenses) in northeast India to prevent the Japanese from knocking out Sadiya, and in China to protect the Chinese air terminals.

Sadiya is of critical importance in this scheme, because if it were lost transport planes would be obliged to use the airport at Tezpur, almost 200 miles west-southwest of Sadiya, making the trip from Tezpur to Sichang, for example, nearly 600 miles. Two-motored transports, such as the C47 and the C53, cannot make this trip with a pay load of any size. If
Tezpur is to be used, four-motored transports would be required. Meanwhile, if the Japanese should push on by sea or land into eastern Bengal and Assam, they would effectively upset all these plans.

**Air Raids for India?**

With the British falling back from Burma to the northwest, the Japanese find themselves in a position to threaten India as well as China. Air attacks alone might deal a serious blow to the Calcutta area, containing about four-fifths of India's war industry. Here native morale is low, and some reliable observers expect the workers to take to the hills at the first bombing.

Actual invasion of Assam is another matter. With the summer monsoons imminent, this area is subject to the full force of the rain-laden winds from the Indian Ocean. The advantages of this season are by no means all with the defenders. The Japanese now hold the Mandalay basin in Burma, sheltered from the monsoon by the Arakan Mountains, comparatively dry and available for bombers all during this season. The Japanese also have an all-weather field at Akyab on the Burmese coast, some 300 miles by air from Calcutta. On the other hand, the defenders themselves have several all-weather fields at Calcutta, but no such fields elsewhere in this part of India.

British press dispatches meanwhile report that General Alexander, while discounting the possibility of a Japanese invasion during the monsoon season, is preparing for this eventuality. Fresh troops of the Indian Army guard the frontier, across which the weary survivors of the Burma campaign are beginning to return.

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**The Battle of the Coral Sea in Retrospect**

Further reports now make it possible to clarify certain elements in the Battle of the Coral Sea. Advance Japanese naval units came southward into the Coral Sea area, then diverged eastward, apparently to seize points in the Solomon Islands and thus secure their flank. An American naval force attacked these units in Tulagi Harbor, sinking seven naval vessels.

Presently the main Japanese force entered the Coral Sea by the same route, presumably on its way to attack Port Moresby. An engagement followed on May 7 and 8 between this force and American naval units and naval aviation, near the Louisiade Islands. The Japanese losses were one aircraft carrier sunk and one damaged, and one cruiser sunk and one damaged. American losses have not yet been reported.

During the Battle of the Coral Sea American Army Aircraft were not idle. Based on northeastern Australia, Army Aircraft made a series of heavy raids nearby on Lae and Rabaul, and on Buka, Woodlark and Deboyne Islands, between May 4 and 11. One mission returning from an attack was reported by the press to have stumbled on the battle and to have taken aerial photographs of the action. Another was dispatched on May 8 against a "Japanese convoy" (near the scene of the battle) which was not located. Still another was sent on May 9 to intercept a Japanese carrier, but darkness intervened.

Although the air duel over Australasian bases continues unabated, major Japanese fleet units appear to have moved elsewhere. The battle which has followed the battle has led some observers to anticipate a naval attack in other areas, and the possibility of attack against United States bases is not ruled out.
**Secret**

*Mop-up on the Kerch Peninsula*

Soviet resistance on the Kerch peninsula seems to be flickering out. In the opinion of a well-placed military observer, remaining Russian forces are simply holding beachheads to permit the withdrawal of the bulk of the army. Unless the Soviets reinforce this army from the mainland, it appears unlikely that it can prolong its resistance.

Nor does a German attack across the straits toward the Russian naval base at Novorossiisk seem to be the next logical move. The crossing would be difficult and might expose the Nazis to a Soviet counterattack. Furthermore, with the fall of Kerch, the Germans would presumably be in a better position to attack Novorossiisk from the air. Likewise an assault on Sevastopol at the other end of the Crimean peninsula would be an expensive operation at the present time. It seems far more likely that the Germans will continue to soften up Sevastopol by bombardment until such time as they can attack it with comparatively small losses.

**Attack on Kharkov**

As though to counterbalance the German success on the Kerch Peninsula, the Soviet radio and the Allied press have been playing up the Russian attack toward Kharkov. Despite the fanfare with which it has been launched, American military observers do not regard this drive as an all-out offensive. If it had been such, they point out, it would probably have taken the form of a large enveloping action rather than a head-on attack, and by now it would have achieved a more clear-cut success than press despatches yet reveal. A more likely hypothesis is that it is a local attack which has already brought the Soviet forces within striking distance of the city of Kharkov.

In the opinion of the Russian ambassador to Turkey, the Soviets launched the assault in an effort to disrupt the greatest German concentration of war equipment, including planes and tanks, on the entire Eastern Front. Berlin vigorously denies that it has relieved Nazi pressure in the Crimea or interfered with the German military program. But the ambassador is sure that even if the attack fails in its main purpose of capturing or destroying large quantities of German equipment, it will succeed in seriously disorganizing Nazi plans for a full-scale offensive. Such considerations may account for the apparent vigor of German counter-attacks in the Kharkov sector.

**Laval Continues to Temporize**

Although Pierre Laval has now been head of the Vichy government for a little more than a month, he has taken no step of an overt character leading to full collaboration with Germany. As Minister of the Interior, he is purging the regime of known opponents, and appointing men of his own choice to key positions. Marshal Pétain, in turn, is reported to "look forward to working in his garden," relieved to be spared the burdens of office. Pétain is still a factor in the picture, however, for as supreme chief of the French armed forces overseas, his orders are obeyed by administrative officials and officers who might not stomach Laval alone.

A current report describes what are believed to have been Laval’s intentions respecting collaboration when he came to office. He is said to have been reconciled to German domination of the Continent, but to have revived his earlier idea of forming a Latin bloc to act as a sort of counterweight to the Nazis. He appears to have met checks here, however, in Italy’s territorial demands and in Nazi hostility to his qualified collaboration. The Nazis have evidenced their
displeasure in the Giraud case and in the current executions in occupied France. They are said to be dissatisfied with Laval and to be giving encouragement to men like Doriot.

Laval has been anxious to avoid any decisive step that might sever relations with the United States. He is taking advantage of the apathy of the French people to establish himself, and is carefully cushioning his position with regard to Franco-American affairs. Apparently with Nazi approval, he has plastered Vichy with posters, which declare: “I wish to say again that a final rupture between our two countries will not come from France.”

Reactions in French Africa

Diplomatic sources report that since Laval’s return to power, gasoline and trucks are again reaching Rommel’s armies via French North Africa. French officials in North Africa, however, have hinted their continuing friendliness to us and would like to see us renew our economic assistance to North Africa, thereby avoiding the threat of French dependence on Germany.

The German Armistice Commission is urging that French defenses of Morocco be improved. It is stated that the Germans are now shipping armaments to this area, with further shipments of synthetic gasoline to follow soon. General Juin is ostensibly complying, but has expressed the opinion that he would rather see Moroccan defenses improved under American than under German direction. On the other hand, rumors suggest that certain high French officials have been won over to Laval’s policy, and that Boisson, the Governor-General of strategic Dakar and former political protégé of Laval, has declared himself as highly pleased with the changes in Vichy.

Vichy is exploiting to the full the recent clash off Algiers involving French and British planes and light naval units, an action which resulted in the loss of one plane by each side. Vichy is presenting it as an example of wanton aggression: “Once again the French see what means our former allies are using.”

Negotiations in Martinique

In Martinique Admiral Robert, after the issuance of a virtual ultimatum from the United States, has agreed to the immobilization of French warships. He has also agreed in general that the United States will exercise effective supervision of the islands with continued recognition of the French position of de jure sovereignty and possession. Meanwhile, Laval, obviously irritated by the attempt of the United States to negotiate directly with Admiral Robert, has attempted to suggest that such negotiations can only be carried on with Vichy, thus confusing the issue in the public mind.

Axis Pause in the Mediterranean

Malta continued to enjoy a relative respite as Lord Gort, former head of the B. E. F. in France, arrived from Gibraltar to succeed bomb-worn Sir William Dobbie in command of the island fortress. There were clear signs that German bomber strength in Sicily has been reduced for use elsewhere, but diplomatic sources believe that considerable parts of Kesselring’s staff and air fleet are still in Sicily.

Indications are that Axis forces in Cyrenaica will not launch any major offensive against Egypt this spring. They are, however, prepared for lesser operations, with supplies estimated to be sufficient for one month of active campaigning.
Their forces, including two armored and one motorized divisions, are well-located and in good condition. Skirmishes led by enemy tanks this week, especially in the region southwest of Gazala, broke a quiet period on the desert front.

A Report on the Near East

Turkey continues in her determination to defend herself against any and all invaders, a seasoned observer reports, writing at the end of March from Istanbul. Her army is kept in the field and she wants all the arms she can get. Her great fear is that either Germany or Russia will win a clear-cut victory. To forestall the results of either eventuality the Turks expect to call in Allied help. Diplomatic sources report that the Soviets plan to develop the recent Russo-Turkish détente once the bomb trial is over.

The Turkish government, our observer writes, has the complete confidence of the people in political and military affairs, but in economic matters the situation is acute. Trade interruptions, budget strain, abrupt price rises, shortages, and governmental inefficiency in handling the situation have brought about a general uneasiness as to the economic future.

In Syria the Free French, the majority of whom are apparently suspicious of British designs on Madagascar and Syria, are themselves generally regarded as the old imperialists operating with reduced efficiency. British and American prestige has also declined due to military defeat and association with the Zionist cause, an issue exploited by the Axis radio. In Egypt our observer found public opinion in a bad state, with the British, the Palace and its satellites, and the Wafd all hard at work interfering with one another in a snarl of old methods and lack of coordination.

Drought Comes to Northeastern Brazil

Northeastern Brazil is suffering one of its periodic droughts. This region of “climatic calamities,” which is triangular in shape, reaches the coast between São Luiz and Natal, and extends southwestermost to an apex somewhere in western Baia. Throughout this area rainfall is uncertain; there are places where in one hundred years there have been fifty years of either flood or drought. In this region no rain has now fallen for more than a year. The vegetation is parched, and the sources of water rapidly disappearing. As usual, under these circumstances, the inhabitants are flocking into the coastal cities, and domestic and wild animals are being widely slaughtered.

Coming at this time, the drought may have several consequences. The homeless and starving refugees will constitute a serious burden on the food supply and on coastal shipping. Civil disorders may be expected, including raids on the food stores in the cities, and a fertile field exists for enemy agents bent on spreading confusion and chaos. It is even possible that the airfields in this region may be in danger of attack, either by disorganized groups or by bands under Axis leadership. On the other hand, prompt action might avert disaster through the recruiting of laborers for work in the rubber forests of the Amazon—a repetition of the great migration into the Amazon under similar circumstances which took place during the historic drought of 1877–1879. This would require coastwise shipping to carry the workers from places like Fortaleza in Ceará to the Amazon.

The Dominican Republic “Elects” a President

The Dominican Republic went through the formality of a presidential election on May 16 in which Generalissimo
Rafael L. Trujillo was the unopposed and successful candidate. A former president of the country from 1930 to 1938, he will replace M. de J. Troncoso de la Concha. Since 1930 Trujillo has been the acknowledged dictator of the country, and on January 20 of this year he was appointed by the president to the supreme command of the Army and Navy. Present world conditions were used to justify his return to the presidency.

The election was the first in the history of the country in which women were allowed to vote. Dominican exiles in Cuba and Venezuela carried on a vigorous pre-election campaign against Trujillo’s dictatorship as inconsistent with the democratic principles of the United Nations. They protested particularly against the decision of the University of Pittsburgh to award Trujillo an honorary degree. Nevertheless, the election was not accompanied by any reported disturbances.

Although Trujillo’s term was not scheduled to begin until August he took office immediately. President Troncoso appointed him Secretary of State for War and Navy to succeed his brother, Hector Trujillo, just resigned. Troncoso then submitted his resignation to the National Assembly which unanimously accepted it. Then in accordance with the constitution, Trujillo automatically succeeded to the Presidency.

Reliable evidence indicates that the Nazis are carrying on widespread activity in the Dominican Republic despite the fact that the government has declared war against the Axis. Since 1935 the Dominican government has maintained close diplomatic relations with Germany, and the Trujillo party was reorganized along Nazi lines. The press enjoys no liberty, and no party except Trujillo’s is permitted to exist. Army officers are Nazi sympathizers. Nazi agents are either still at large or have been released as a result of “popular” demonstration fomented by the government. It is alleged that Trujillo gives lip service to the democracies in order to obtain United States support for his regime.

**Chile Moves Toward a Break with the Axis**

Chilean Government leaders are reconsidering the possibility of a break in diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, current indications suggest. The Socialist Party, headed by Oscar Schnake, has recently been adding its influence to that of the Communist Party in favoring such a move. While the United States has avoided any appearance of bringing pressure to bear on Chile for a break with the Axis, it has become apparent to Chile’s leaders that no substantial economic aid will be forthcoming from us until this issue is squarely met. It may be partly for this reason that the proposed visit of a Chilean Commission to the United States to discuss Chile’s critical economic needs has been delayed.
APENDIX I

THE PROBLEM OF RUBBER IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the field of synthetic rubber the Russians probably led the world in June 1941, both in experience and production, according to a current report prepared by the East-European Section of the Coordinator's office. The Russian policy of preparedness, designed to obtain a maximum degree of self-sufficiency in strategic raw materials, had led to a rapid expansion of synthetic rubber production in the Soviet Union. Before the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Russian rubber industry had accomplished an almost complete change-over from natural to synthetic rubber. In recent years it has also given much attention to the development of domestic sources of natural rubber. But the actual production of this type of rubber still remained small in June of last year.

Even with this foresight program, in 1940 Soviet domestic production of raw rubber, plus imports—the total estimated at somewhat more than 103,000 metric tons a year—was probably inadequate to fill Russia's consumption requirements—estimated at 110,000-117,000 tons. Thus, if these estimates are correct, Russia in 1940 was drawing on previously accumulated stocks for a part of her current consumption. Nor is it likely that the war has eased the situation. For increased military demand in all likelihood has offset even the most severe restrictions on civilian consumption.

It is estimated that synthetic rubber (made almost entirely from alcohol) accounted for a production of 82,000 metric tons in 1940. During the first few months of the war synthetic production probably declined to a rate of about 36,000-48,000 metric tons per year. There is some ground for thinking, however, that in recent months the output has increased. Nevertheless, unless both imports and domestic production have recently increased very substantially, it is almost certain that the Soviets face an acute shortage of raw rubber, a shortage which may, unless alleviated, necessitate a very substantial curtailment of the use of this commodity in essential military equipment.

One favorable factor in the situation is that the very large military establishment economizes rubber by the extensive use of tires of steel and hard-rubber on artillery equipment, and by the widespread substitution of caterpillar-tractors for pneumatic-tired trucks as prime movers for artillery.

For the rest—copper, nickel, molybdenum, antimony, and mercury—sources now available to Japan will be insufficient after she exhausts her present stocks. Through the conquest of the Far Eastern area, however, Japan could fill her deficits in nickel and antimony and improve her position in the other three. Japan has productive copper mines and could increase their output adequately by the time stocks run low. Stocks of nickel, mercury, and molybdenum are sufficient for two years or more. But Japan has drawn heavily on her antimony stocks in the last two years and has endeavored, as yet without success, to gain control of the transport system in the Chinese province of Hunan (Changsha), which contains the principal Chinese antimony mines.

APPENDIX II

THE JAPANESE POSITION IN FUELS AND NON-FERROUS METALS

Lack of fuels and non-ferrous metals will not notably handicap the Japanese war effort, according to such estimates as can be made on the basis of available information. Nor do the Japanese lack facilities for mining strategic fuels and metals. Of fourteen of these, Japan is not completely self-sustaining in any. But she can supply her deficits adequately for three—tin, tungsten, and coal—from functioning occupied territories.

For five others—manganese, chromium, aluminum, oil, and lead—she has sufficient stocks with which to service her economy without restriction, until she can restore to former capacity sources in conquered areas which have not been disorganized by recent military operations (the assumption here is that she will not be handicapped by difficulties of organization or by the removal of war in these areas). In the case of lead, invisible stocks, such as pipe in buildings, are large and easily recoverable, so that Japan should suffer no shortage until the captured mines can be reorganized. For another metal, zinc, stocks are insufficient unless the captured mines can start producing very soon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Period stocks will bridge</th>
<th>Adequate sources</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>Philippine Islands, British Malay, and Netherlands Indies combined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromite</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Philippine Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Netherlands Indies and British Malaya combined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Malaysia combined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Netherlands Indies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Burma.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For the rest—copper, nickel, molybdenum, antimony, and mercury—sources now available to Japan will be insufficient after she exhausts her present stocks. Through the conquest of the Far Eastern area, however, Japan could fill her deficits in nickel and antimony and improve her position in the other three. Japan has productive copper mines and could increase their output adequately by the time stocks run low. Stocks of nickel, mercury, and molybdenum are sufficient for two years or more. But Japan has drawn heavily on her antimony stocks in the last two years and has endeavored, as yet without success, to gain control of the transport system in the Chinese province of Hunan (Changsha), which contains the principal Chinese antimony mines.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metal</th>
<th>Proportion of requirements covered by stocks now available (Percent)</th>
<th>Stock Pile Limit</th>
<th>Unconquered Far-Eastern Sources</th>
<th>Chief Countries</th>
<th>Proportion of requirements they could cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2 yr.</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>Entire deficit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antimony</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3 mo.</td>
<td>China (Kweilow)</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercury</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2 1/2 yr.</td>
<td>China (Hunan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molybdenum</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15 yr.</td>
<td>Australia and India</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 percent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16 mo.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Processing these minerals after they are mined may present difficulties, and the effective military use of most minerals which Japan controls in abundance is circumscribed by her steel capacity. This capacity is still only one-tenth that of the United States, and any substantial increase would involve great difficulties for a country of Japan's industrial potential already engaged in a major war (The War This Week, April 16-23, pp. 21-24).

In view of the fact that Japan has not issued pertinent statistics since the inception of the China Incident in mid-1937, one must in general resort to estimates, which may vary substantially, about the present Japanese position. Fairly reliable 1940 data, however, are available for production in Far Eastern areas outside the Japanese empire. These data, which probably reflect potentials today with reasonable accuracy, are shown in the appended table in conjunction with estimates of the present situation in the Japanese empire. The use of other ores besides bauxite for the production of aluminum explains the inclusion of both. The aluminum content of bauxite is between 20 and 25 percent. Ferro-alloys of manganese, chromium, nickel, tungsten, and molybdenum are more or less interchangeable, a fact which probably accounts for tremendous additions to stocks of some—especially molybdenum—when supplies of others were cut off.

JAPAN’S PRESENT POSITION IN IMPORTANT FUELS AND NON-FERROUS METALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Stocks (Jan. 1, 1943)</th>
<th>Occupied areas</th>
<th>Other Far-Eastern countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In thousands of metric tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>(1) 14,600</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>54,000 1,633,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>(1) 15</td>
<td>(1) 25</td>
<td>8,300 2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(1) 20</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>277 1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zine</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>(1) 6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>190 1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(1) 25</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>286 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>(1) 600</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>10,000 4,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>190 1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>866 5,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>107 1,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungsten ore (60% WO3)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>(1) 3.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| In metric tons |
| Molybdenum  | 300         | 125        | 2,500                  | 0              | 55 21,220                    |
| Antimony    | 4,000       | 150        | 1,000                  | 390            | 126 7,372 34,000            |
| Mercury     | 600         | 20         | 1,400                  | 0              | 117 34,000                   |

| In thousands of barrels |
| Petroleum    | 2,639       | 75,000     | 0                      | 77,000 6,300 215,000       |
| Petroleum substitutes | 5,790 | 5,000 | 165 | 0 | 110,000 |

Japanese Empire: Japan, Korea, Formosa, Southern Sakhalin.
Organized occupied areas: Indochina, Thailand, occupied China.
Disorganized occupied areas: British Borneo, Burma, British Malaya, Netherlands Indies, Philippine Islands, Hongkong (lead).
Other Far-Eastern countries: Australia, Free China, India (British and Portuguese), New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua (manganese), Northern Sakhalin (petroleum). Continental Siberia is not included.

Four additional metals—magnesium, vanadium, cobalt, and beryllium—are important in war, but pertinent data concerning them are almost completely lacking. Reports indicate that Japan is producing unprecedented amounts of magnesium, which occurs in large quantities and presents chiefly a problem of extraction. The Japanese have not greatly developed the use of vanadium in alloys and presumably obtain all they need from byproducts in the burning of
fuel oil—especially oil from Venezuela and Colombia, which is rich in vanadium. Little is known about the Japanese positions in cobalt and beryllium. Japan's cobalt production and stocks are low in relation to potential demand, but other metals can take the place of cobalt in ferro-alloys with minor exceptions. Beryllium, a comparative newcomer in the field of alloys, has as yet little application in Japan, although she imported at least ten tons metal content of beryllium ore in 1940 and 1941.

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APPENDIX III

SCANDINAVIA AND THE GERMAN WAR ECONOMY

Ever since Germany overran Denmark and Norway in 1940 as a preliminary to her Western offensive, Scandinavia has had a triple importance to the war. Norwegian air and naval bases have served in operations against Britain and the northern supply lines to Russia; Finland's bases and troops have been employed against Russia and the Murman supply route; finally the strategic resources of the entire region have contributed substantially to German war production.

The accompanying chart shows the relative importance of Scandinavian mineral production to the German economy. Scandinavian mineral and timber resources, manufactured products, and, to some extent, foodstuffs are now being exported to Germany. Although, in return, Germany sends some commodities to the area, notably coal and pig iron to Sweden, and foodstuffs to Finland, the balance is heavily in her favor. It is not, however, the size of Germany's favorable trade balance, but rather the strategic nature of several Scandinavian products that makes the area of importance to the German economy.

Iron ore.—Germany has no shortage of iron ore. In the Ukraine alone Germany holds resources, probably unused, of fully 16 million tons a year. Nevertheless Swedish ores, which are believed to be going to Germany at a rate of 12 million tons per year, are of great importance to the Nazi economy. They are of high metallic content, averaging 60 percent, and their conversion to steel, therefore, involves savings in coke and manganese, both of which are relatively scarce in Germany. Also to change over German furnaces, labor and transport facilities for the use of other ores would involve loss of time and efficiency.

Molybdenum.—German technology has been making increasing use of molybdenum as a substitute in various steel-hardening alloys, of which the Reich is believed to have barely adequate supplies. Scandinavian sources, amounting to at least 22 percent of the total German molybdenum supply, are thus of some importance, and may be enhanced if recent reports of large scale increases in Norwegian output are correct.

Nickel.—Norwegian nickel production (1,250 tons) normally constitutes about one-third of the total continental supply. Reports indicate that an additional 5,000 to 10,000 tons (metal content), not shown on the accompanying chart, will be exported from the Petsamo district of Finland in 1942. This may significantly ease Germany's tight position in steel-hardening alloys.

Copper.—The German position here is barely adequate. Loss of the copper flowing from Scandinavian areas, amounting perhaps to 30 percent of the total current German supply, might have repercussions on the war economy. Recent reports indicate that Scandinavia is expanding its contribution here.
Strategic Minerals in Scandinavia

Aluminum.—Scandinavia is not a major element in the 500,000 tons of virgin aluminum which Germany was estimated to control in 1942. Norway's pre-war production of 30,000 tons was cut in half by the war, and German schemes for its expansion have apparently been abandoned in favor of a Hungarian program.

Pyrites.—Germany has ample sources of pyrites, and thus sulphur, with major deposits in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. The loss of the Scandinavian deposits would probably involve only slight reorganization in the sulphur supply system.

Tungsten.—Swedish tungsten output is small relative to Portugal, Germany's principal source. It is in fact likely that Germany is not receiving directly any Swedish tungsten, though benefitting indirectly from the high grade steel products coming from Sweden.

Timber and its products.—Aside from the strategic minerals Scandinavia's largest contribution to the German war effort consists of its significant exports of timber, paper, and wood pulp. The demand for wood pulp has increased, cellulose being an important element in the manufacture of explosives and substitute textiles and fodder. Should this long-established source of pulp, paper, and cardboard be lost, Germany would have extreme difficulty in finding adequate alternative sources or substitutes.

Foodstuffs.—At present Finland is a deficit food area, drawing some imports, largely sugar and bread grains, from the Reich and from Sweden, itself a slight surplus area except for fodder. Norway is under an enforced food shortage as a result of sending quantities of fish to Germany.

Shipbuilding.—In 1941 Norway and Sweden produced together an estimated 185,000 tons of merchant shipping, amounting to fully 26 percent of the estimated tonnage turned out from shipyards under German control. Despite the probable existence of considerable idle shipyard capacity in Europe, this contribution is important because the Scandinavian yards are well-run and well-named.

Industrial Production.—Sweden is importing coal and coke in quantity from Germany to maintain her economy. In return she exports semi-manufactured metals and finished machinery, tools, motors, etc. These items were 22 percent of Sweden's exports in 1938, and production has probably not declined. This saves Germany much skilled labor of a type notably scarce on the Continent.

Summary.—The net contribution of Scandinavia to the German war effort, though not large in monetary terms, is thus extremely important strategically, most notably so in the cases of steel-hardening alloys, machinery, copper, and to a lesser degree, iron ore, shipbuilding, and wood pulp supplies. Account must be taken, however, of the goods which Germany provides Scandinavia in exchange.
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APPENDIX IV

ESTIMATES OF GERMAN AIR STRENGTH

Estimating the air strength of our enemies is at best a tricky business. Any computation contains so many variables and so many unknowns that current estimates necessarily show wide variations. Yet there is apparently substantial agreement on certain figures; experts currently regard 1,800 to 2,000 as a safe average for German monthly production of combat types, and 4,300 to 5,000 as a fair estimate of first line strength.

It is in the figure for reserves that the real discrepancies occur. Competent estimates range all the way from less than 2,000 to more than 10,000 planes. One source of these variations is the incompleteness of our figures on German air losses. It is obvious that a small percentage variation in the estimates of losses per month will cause a very large percentage variation in the estimate of reserves at a given date. While RAF reports on planes shot down on the Western Front or in the Mediterranean are doubtless reliable, any totals for German aircraft lost in Russia are simply estimates. Furthermore, non-combat losses and the wastage of combat planes in training schools are impossible to gauge with any exactitude; the rule of thumb ratio of 1:1 used in estimating combat as against non-combat losses may be too optimistic.

Variation in the method of computing reserves is a further source of discordant figures. The most obvious method is, of course, to add German production since the start of the war to an estimate of air strength in September 1939, and from this total to subtract combat, other operational, and training losses. A more usual method is, however, to base deductions on the number and activity of planes actually committed in certain critical theaters. Exponents of the first method are likely to arrive at a considerably higher figure than those who follow the second method, and to suggest the existence of a hidden reserve of strength not yet exposed to combat.

Definition of First Line Strength

Two further factors are of prime importance in any estimate of German air power. The first is the definition of first line strength—here considered to include all combat types assigned to operational units, but to exclude transports, trainers and combat types used for training or held in stored reserves.

One is bound to note the smallness of first line-strength in relation to the volume of resources—men, materials, and equipment—necessary to sustain that strength under active conditions of operation and combat. Furthermore, a considerable part of a plane's life is spent undergoing routine maintenance and repair. Consequently the number of planes ready to fly at any one time is considerably smaller than the "first line strength" as defined above. With a given first line strength, the number of planes ready to fly is less during periods of active operations than in periods of inactivity, since increased activity requires increased time spent in servicing.

The Labor Factor

A second factor is the labor supply situation in Germany itself. It is probable that a working force of about a million would be required in German airframe, engine, and equipment factories to produce 2,500 new planes a month (all types), provide spare parts, and repair damaged aircraft. This production figure implies an expansion of 29 percent from an estimate of 1,900 planes a month for the beginning of 1941. Such an expansion would have required an increase of something like 250,000 workers in factories alone—plus those employed in constructing the new plants themselves, in providing raw materials, and in supporting services.

In other words, although the German government assigns a high priority to aircraft production, it is at least questionable whether they have been able to make available a labor supply adequate for contemplated expansion. Prior to the Russian campaign, they followed a practice of releasing men from the armed forces for industrial work in periods of military inactivity—thus relieving the strain on industrial manpower. Since the spring of 1941, however, when the Nazis undertook full mobilization in preparation for the Russian campaign, they have been unable to continue this policy and in recent months have reverted to additional call-ups and comb-outs for military service. Although the government has sought to offset this drain by the employment of women and foreign workers in increased numbers, and by curtailing certain civilian industries, it is doubtful whether such measures have been effective enough to permit further expansion of armament production.
BURMESE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Active Fronts as of May 21

- All Weather Road
- Fair Weather Road
- Proposed Route
- Trail
- Railway (I M. Govt)
- Railway (Signal)
- Railway (Under Construction)

Scale of Miles

MAP NO. 546 - MAY 21, 1942
DRAWN IN THE GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, C.O.I.
THE WAR THIS WEEK
May 21–28, 1942

Printed for the Board of Analysts

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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Arthur B. Alben
THE WAR THIS WEEK

With a continuing lull in the Melanesian area and with a decline in the intensity of operations in the Burmese-Yunnan theater, the Japanese have shifted their attention momentarily to eastern China. Here apparently the immediate object of their operations is to eliminate the Allied air menace in the provinces of Fukien and Chekiang.

Meanwhile in the see-saw struggle about Kharkov it appears that the Germans have once more gained the initiative, although convincing indications of a major Nazi thrust are still lacking. On the propaganda front, it is reported that the Germans are seeking to add momentum to the current surge of war optimism in the United States, which has been stimulated by buoyant American exaggerations of Allied success. In the same connection, persistent American press discussion of the weakening of the German domestic and military position finds little substantiation in careful studies of the situation by experts.

In western Europe the Germans are playing the old game of divide and rule. With Laval still temporizing, the Nazis appear to welcome, if not to abet, the current Italian campaign for French territory. It remains to be seen whether this lever will prove sufficiently strong to force fresh concessions from Laval in the form of closer collaboration with Germany.

The only Allied success of real importance was the entry of Mexico into the war. Observers emphasize above all the political significance of that step, whose influence will be strongly felt throughout Latin America, it is believed.
The Japanese Drive in Eastern China

While comparative quiet prevails on other Pacific fronts, the fighting in China has spread rapidly over the eastern provinces of Chekiang and Fukien and continues, somewhat abated, in Yunnan. In Chekiang, Japanese columns converging upon Kinhwa have been thrown back with heavy losses, according to Chungking, although Tokyo insists that the town is surrounded and the Chinese are trapped. Another Japanese force has completed the occupation of islands near Foochow (Fukien), after debarking under cover of heavy naval and aerial bombardment. Foochow itself has also been under heavy fire, and newspaper despatches indicate that an expeditionary force is now massing at Formosa, possibly for an attempt to invade Fukien province through Foochow and Amoy.

Since the American air attack of April 18, the Japanese have systematically sought out and bombed airfields not only in Chekiang and Fukien but in Kiangsi, Kwangsi, and Hunan. Japanese planes made 54 flights over these five provinces during the month following April 18, according to one unofficial tabulation. Twenty-two towns were bombed. Kian in central Kiangsi (see map) was raided 13 times by a total of 182 planes, while Chuhsien also suffered heavily.

The present fighting in Chekiang province probably has as its principal objective the elimination of bases from which Japan could be bombed, although air distances even from Chekiang are at the outer limits of the tactical range of four-motored bombers. The maximum range of the heaviest four-motored bombers (allowing a gasoline margin for fighting at full throttle) is about 1000 miles, with a normal tactical radius of 750 to 900 miles. Tokyo is about 1100 miles from bases in Chekiang.
BOMBING RANGES
CHINA TO JAPAN

Figures represent air line distance in statute miles.
Of the eastern air bases in Chinese control, only those in Chekiang lie within practicable range of important targets in Japan (as the accompanying map indicates). Bases in Fukien, such as Kian, are too far distant for comfortable bombing of such targets as Tokyo and Osaka, the obvious industrial objectives on Honshu. Nagasaki, the shipbuilding and manufacturing center on Kyushu, is barely within the maximum range. From Lishui in Chekiang, however, Nagasaki would be comparatively accessible, as would Yawata, site of the very important Imperial Steel Mills. Targets on Formosa, of course, would be within easy range: either Taihoku, the chief city at the northern end of the island, or Takao, an important naval base in southwestern Formosa.

Chinese “Magnetic” Tactics

Operations in the eastern provinces are already settling into the familiar Chinese pattern of “magnetic” tactics, in Chungking parlance. The Japanese have been drawn out, their formations dispersed, and their communication lines over-extended. And now the Chinese are capitalizing on the enemy’s exposure and attacking points in his rear, Chungking reports. One Chinese detachment has recaptured Sintang, cutting off the communications of a Japanese column engaged in the attack on Kinhwa.

Although the Chinese have reported 100,000 or more Japanese troops in action in northern Chekiang alone, observers are inclined to place the figure at possibly 50,000 troops. As a matter of fact, some observers believe that military action in the eastern area—either in Chekiang or Fukien—is not of primary importance in any scheme for concerted action to crush the Chungking regime. They point out that the Japanese at about this time last year occupied Foochow for a short period, later withdrawing voluntarily. The Japanese also staged at that time one of
their routine drives inland from Hangchow and the Chekiang coast.

In addition to destruction of the air bases, the Japanese may also seek to disrupt traffic on the railway west of Kinhwa which carries important freight and connects with truck routes south and west through central Kiangsi. Further objectives may be the disruption of Chinese transport of salt from coastal works inland, where there is a serious shortage, and possibly the seizure of the winter wheat harvest.

**New Threat to Changsha?**

The Japanese have three times assaulted Changsha, a strategic center on the Canton-Hankow railway. There is some evidence that a fresh drive on that city may be imminent. If the Japanese could seize Changsha and make themselves masters of both the Peiping-Hankow and Canton-Hankow railroads, they would possess a continuous rail route from Manchuria to Hongkong. The consequent saving in shipping and sea risks would be a notable gain. In addition, with this line in their hands, they would be in a position to cut off effectively eastern China from Chungking control.

**An Irreparable Japanese Loss.**

The Japanese suffered an irreparable loss of a unique character when they recently lost a 15,000-ton vessel by enemy action, according to a report by the Vichy ambassador in Tokyo. The latter declares that 2,000 expert technicians selected from various industries in Japan were lost from a total passenger list of 2400. The Japanese were sending these technicians to the conquered areas in the southwest Pacific where they were to re-establish and develop captured plants.

**Fresh Soviet-Japanese Détente**

The long-standing border dispute between the Soviet-sponsored Mongolian People's Republic and Japanese-sponsored Manchuko is now settled, according to Tokyo and—with some reservations—Moscow as well. A protocol for demarcation of the mutual frontiers has been ratified by the governments of both of these remote "buffer" states. Following as it does the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Fisheries' agreement on March 20, the ratification of the boundary treaty indicates that on the surface at least Russo-Japanese relations in the post-Pearl Harbor period have not deteriorated.

Tokyo made the announcement by radio May 15. Although a Moscow report has indicated that the protocol refers only to the Bor Nor section, and not the whole frontier, it seems likely that at least temporarily the ratification of the protocol formally solves one of the most troublesome of the border issues between Mongolia and Manchuko. Serious incidents occurred along the border in 1935 and 1937, and those at Nomonhan in early 1939 assumed the proportions of an undeclared war. On September 15, 1939, a fortnight after the outbreak of the European war, Russia and Japan agreed to end hostilities and to form a joint commission to establish a frontier line.

**Warning to India**

Premier Tojo, warning that all British outposts for the protection of India are now in Japanese hands, has suggested to the Indians that they must either take "this golden opportunity" to eject foreign troops or suffer the consequences. Observers are not yet inclined to discount these threats too completely. The comparative lull in fighting on the Burma-Yunnan front may indicate that the relatively
large concentrations of Japanese troops in Burma will be turned against India, rather than China. A recent AVG raid on Japanese positions on the Yunnan front met little resistance, and despatches from Calcutta report that Japanese scouting parties are active in the Chittagong area. However, the British commander in this area still acknowledges no signs of enemy intention to launch a major offensive on India, according to newspaper reports.

A New Basis for Indian Cooperation?
In an address at Lahore in which he advocated a war federation of India, China, Iran, and Afghanistan, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made clear once again his position on the current conflict: "It was my ardent wish that India should have participated in this war." Nor did he question the motives of American aid in Indian defense—in contrast to a statement of Gandhi's a few weeks ago. Furthermore, while reiterating his inalterable opposition to the partition of India, Nehru seemed to offer some basis for compromise with the Moslem League by his statement that if "a majority of a particular territorial unit want separation, it cannot be denied them."

Such a speech may possibly suggest that Nehru is preparing to take a different line from Gandhi, now once again the dominant figure in Indian politics since the adoption by the Congress of his program of non-violent non-co-operation (The War This Week, April 30 - May 7, pp. 9-11). An observer in New Delhi maintains that the only apparent way to counteract Gandhi's program would be for Nehru to combine with Jinnah, head of the Moslem League, and with Rajagopalachariar, moderate leader from Madras (who resigned from the Working Committee of the Congress in protest against its present program), to organize a national government. Other observers question the practicability of cooperation between Jinnah and the other two leaders. They concede, however, that a coalition of Nehru, Rajagopalachariar and those who agree with them in support of full war against Japan might yet prove strong enough to combat Gandhi's present influence.

Turning of the Tide at Kharkov?
As the Russians reported the orderly evacuation of the last of their troops and equipment from the Kerch peninsula, there were indications that their offensive against Kharkov was likewise taking a turn for the worse. The ominous statement in a Soviet communiqué that Russian "troops entrenched themselves in occupied positions" suggested that the initiative had passed to the Germans. In one area the Soviets admitted that the Nazis had driven a "wedge" into their positions, and in the Izyum-Barvenkova sector south of Kharkov, the Red Army announced that its advanced units had "repelled fierce enemy infantry attacks." Meanwhile, the Nazis blandly claimed that the operations south of Kharkov had "developed into a battle of encirclement," threatening "the bulk of three Soviet armies, including strong tank forces."

The Allied press comforted itself with the reflection that the Russian assault on Kharkov might have disorganized the Nazi timetable for a spring offensive. On the other hand, according to despatches from Bern, German military circles predict that the Kharkov defensive will eventually develop into a crushing Nazi offensive—the operations around Kharkov being an interlude between the Soviet winter drive and the coming German offensive.
Ministerial Change in Finland

Despatches from Helsinki announce the resignation of Pekkala, Social Democratic minister of finance and reputedly a friend of the United States. Finland's outstanding Social Democrat, Väinö Tanner, has taken Pekkala's place, while a third member of the same party, Uuno Takki, will fill Tanner's former position as minister of commerce. The Social Democratic party, torn between patriotism and pro-democratic sympathies, in the past months has been an equivocal factor in Finnish foreign policy. In the cabinet, according to reports from Helsinki, Tanner has generally taken a stand midway between Ryti and Witting—pledged to active prosecution of the war to the bitter end—and Pekkala, who on several occasions has expressed disapproval of the German connection. With Pekkala now removed, the Finnish ministry apparently has attained a greater measure of agreement on the war issue.

Despatches from Helsinki continue to suggest, however, that the Finns will take no offensive action this summer. And despite reports of extensive German troop movements to Northern Finland, informed sources apparently believe that the Axis has insufficient land forces in the far north to attempt an offensive against Murmansk.

Dissenting Opinion on Nazi Plans

While Allied military opinion is almost unanimous in predicting a German effort to eliminate Russia from the war this summer, at least one close observer of Nazi air strength sees Britain as the next goal of German aggressive intentions. Taking the position that Russia is too extensive an area for the Nazis to occupy profitably, he believes that Hitler is likely to hold the Soviet forces for the next 12 months by an active defensive, improving particular positions by minor operations against such points as Rostov. With about 150 divisions the Nazis can neutralize Russia, while using 70 to 80 elite divisions for a decisive blow against England.

In predicting this attack, our observer cites an astronomical figure for German air strength—more than double any of the estimates now current in Allied intelligence circles. He further envisages Nazi use of thousands of gliders for troop transport. The invasion might well start, he concludes, with the landing from gliders of innumerable guerrilla detachments, who would avoid large population centers and military camps, and concentrate on capturing airfields and destroying lines of communication.

There can be little argument with our observer's contention that the conquest of Britain would be a more decisive blow to the cause of the United Nations than the destruction of the Russian army. With the rapidly growing threat in the west removed, Hitler could then turn all his forces against the Soviet Union. But it is obvious that the Nazis' most logical military move is not necessarily the most feasible. Most military observers continue to believe that an attack on Britain this summer would be a foolhardy venture, while a full scale offensive against Russia would be a risk well worth taking.

The Nazi Propaganda of False Hopes

Extravagant radio claims of Russian successes—ostensibly from Soviet sources—may be simply a device of the Germans to break down the morale of their enemies, according to a despatch from London. Apparently these Soviet claims, faked by the Nazi radio, are calculated to raise inordinately the hopes of Russia's allies—only to have these replaced by anger and mutual recrimination when they fail to materialize. This technique has the further advantage of later presenting
the Germans with fictitious victories, the report continues. A similar technique of playing up the (very real) sufferings of the Nazi troops in the Russian snows last winter misled many people in Allied countries. The present program of deception is apparently not unconnected with the current rumors of a Nazi “peace offensive” and the loose talk of “victory in 1942” in the United States.

In so far as this American optimism is Axis-inspired, a Swedish correspondent in London of Social Demokraten discerns an Axis effort to stimulate over-confidence, slow down the American industrial effort, and lessen aid to Russia. The German radio, through its clandestine station, “Debunk,” had itself come out only this last week with “action” appeals to Americans which lend credence to the view that this wave of optimism is not unwelcome in Berlin. The tenor of these appeals is simple: work more slowly, produce less, use passive resistance, and insist upon keeping troops, planes and ships at home.

A Wave of War Optimism Comes to America

The past two weeks have witnessed a surge of war optimism in this country. This American “victory panic”, as our Swedish correspondent dubs it, reflects various developments—reports on the Battle of the Coral Sea, optimistic American official statements, the Russian “offensive” before Kharkov, and a vague feeling that the Germans are seriously weakening and that the crack-up may not be far off. This vein of optimism has developed despite the warning of the President that the war will be long and that the press should do its part by reducing individual victories to their proper proportions in the larger pattern of the struggle. A high point was reached when Newsweek carried as the title of its lead article: “Chance for Victory in 1942 Causes Allied Hopes to Soar.”

Close observers of the German scene view such optimism as unsupported by their estimates of the German domestic and military situation or by any reasonable prophecy which can now be made. It would be idle to attempt to present an over-all picture of the German situation, but the Appendix deals with certain aspects of the picture to which the Coordinator’s office has recently devoted careful study.

Laval on the Mat

Once again the Axis appears to be putting pressure on France, and rumors suggest that Laval, checked on every front, may be considering important concessions to the enemy. Laval had hoped to found a Latin bloc, some observers believe, based on his old close association with Italy. Instead Rome has seized the initiative. With new vigor she is demanding Nice, Corsica, and Tunis, “the rightful fruits of victory.” It is stated in the press that Italy has sent Laval a detailed note on territorial demands, and has supported this by sober-rattling reviews of 300,000 troops massed in battle equipment near the French Alpine border. News of increased activity on the part of the Italian Commission in North Africa also comes from diplomatic sources, and there is apparently much talk of the possibility of Italian occupation of Tunis. Nevertheless, despite all these reports, it is still believed in some quarters that Mussolini may be using this issue rather as a way to resist sending men to Russia, alleging the need of troops at home to take over these French areas. Rumors suggest that Laval may be willing to negotiate over Tunis, but it is doubted in some circles if the Italians would be satisfied with less than Corsica and Nice.

Germany has apparently become increasingly dissatisfied with Laval, and it is perfectly possible that she is using these Italian demands as a lever to secure further French
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The Axis Moves in Libya

A large Axis armored column striking south of the British positions around Bir Haheim, a point about forty miles southwest of Tobruk, has broken the relative quiet that has prevailed in Cyrenaica since Marshal Rommel made his exploratory thrusts on April 8. It is too early to judge whether these operations are of major importance, but they follow a period when the aerial neutralization of Malta has made possible reinforcement of Axis forces.

The action of the last few days apparently began with General Walther Nehring leading the African Corps on a sweep from Tengeder, on the southern end of the Derna-Mechili line behind which Axis units have been concentrating. A British communiqué announces that the attack has been met and repulsed.

This Axis advance follows a period of stepped-up RAF bombing, especially in the Martuba and Bengazi regions, reports of which have indicated Axis movements in the north. Although there are rumors of a general Axis drive in the Eastern Mediterranean, for which this attack to the south might be a diversion, it seems quite probable that this
Axial thrust is only a reconnaissance in force similar to those of early April.

**Turkey Pressed but Friendly**

In Turkey the economic and food problems described last week have continued to be so acute that a rumor now suggests that Saracoglu, foreign minister and a respected administrator, may replace the present prime minister. This would be a move to quiet growing criticism of the touchy food problem, which was given a new edge by the recent one-third cut in the bread ration.

Apparent nothing in this situation, however, affects military or political policy. An experienced Turkish diplomat reiterated that the Turkish army, while probably unable to repel the Nazis, would fight and would force the Germans to use 30 divisions. The Turkish semi-official press and radio are cautiously neutral toward the Russo-German conflict, but increasingly cordial and optimistic about the American cause. Even the pro-Axis Cumhuriyet allowed favorable comment on our war effort. Current Turkish (and Egyptian) opinion of the British is apparently mixed—unflattering with respect to British land forces, but showing high regard for the British Navy.

In the area to the south the Axis has stepped up its radio activity. Taking advantage of the presence in Berlin of the exiled Iraq premier, Rashid Al-Gailani, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Axis radio is giving more attention to the coming of the Germans to "liberate" Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon.

**Mexico Enters the War**

The significance of Mexico's entry into the war is above all political, rather than military and economic. Properly capitalized, Mexico's participation might be a powerful stimulus toward solidifying the entire hemisphere in the struggle against the Axis. Axis propaganda, especially in Argentina and Chile, has had considerable success in conjuring up the bogey of "Yankee Imperialism" and minimizing the example of the small Central American republics which have followed the United States into the war by describing them as "banana colonies" with no will of their own. But Mexico is no banana republic. She enjoys great prestige as the champion of Latin American independence. Mexico has proved time and time again that it is not afraid to brave the wrath of the "Colossus of the North". Hence, it will presumably be difficult to persuade Latin Americans that Mexico is merely doing the bidding of the United States.

There is every indication that Mexico itself will assume an active role in the task of promoting hemisphere solidarity. Mexico's entry into the war represents the triumph of the labor and liberal elements within the country over the conservative, clerical groups which have constantly obstructed effective cooperation between Mexico and the United Nations. The spearhead of the anti-Axis drive in Mexico has been Lombardo Toledano, supported by the Confederation of Mexican Workers (C. T. M.). Lombardo has undoubtedly been the most important single factor in determining Mexico's new status as a belligerent, and it is likely that he will press that advantage both abroad and at home.

As head of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (C. T. A. L.), with important affiliates in Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, and with smaller branches in a number of other South American countries, Lombardo can be expected to work through this organization to urge declarations of war against the Axis throughout South America. This campaign may begin with a special congress of the C. T. A. L. in Mexico City in the near future.
At home, Lombardo and the anti-Axis groups can also be expected to increase their pressure for a clean-up of Axis activities and a careful scrutiny of such organizations as the Unión Nacional Sinarquista, Acción Nacional and other smaller parties which are openly hostile or suspiciously cool toward the United States and its allies.

Drought and Rubber in Brazil

The critical drought now afflicting northeastern Brazil (The War This Week, May 14–21, p. 15) may prove to be a disaster not entirely devoid of benefits. As a relief measure for the local population, President Vargas has taken advantage of the situation to send additional laborers in to the Amazon to work in the rubber forests. A Brazilian estimate states there are some 30,000 laborers available for this transfer. A decree has been issued providing transportation by steamer from Fortaleza, capital of Ceará, to Belém at government cost. The Rubber Reserve Corporation of the United States is paying part of the transportation costs by river steamer to Manaus, and is assisting in the construction of barracks in that city to house the newcomers. The Brazilian government has also guaranteed the workers from Ceará a wage of thirty milreis for each daily tour through the rubber forests.

Mounting Crisis in Canada

Following the plebiscite of April 27, Canada may be on the threshold of one of the gravest crises in its history, according to a reliable observer just returned from Ottawa. In the plebiscite of April 27 Quebec alone of the nine provinces failed to release the government from its promises regarding conscription for overseas service. The government, and especially Prime Minister King, are faced with the dilemma either of enforcing conscription against the will of Quebec and risking political disunity (or worse), or of postponing the application of that measure and being turned out of office by the English-speaking majority in Canada.

Dissatisfaction among Quebec's three million French-Canadians—a third of the Dominion's population—is more serious than at first supposed, and appears to be crystallizing into almost unanimous opposition. The resignation on May 12 of the leading French-Canadian member of the Cabinet, Minister of Transport P. J. Cardin, was followed on May 21 by the adoption of a motion, 67–7, in Quebec's provincial legislature urging the maintenance of the voluntary system. Although Mr. Cardin's resignation has been discounted as the action of a disgruntled politician, the solidity of the provincial legislature is imposing, and its opposition might have been even more radically expressed but for the tempering influence of Premier Godbout of Quebec.

English-speaking Canadians appear to have passed the point where compromise is likely. Should Prime Minister King—an adept compromiser—attempt to delay the enforcement of overseas conscription, the more militant members of his Cabinet, Minister of Munitions and Supply Howe, Minister of Defense Ralston, and Minister of Naval Services Macdonald, might now agree to shelve him. The only alternative to enactment and enforcement of a conscription measure in Quebec at all costs, according to the view expressed by some English-speaking Canadians, is the exclusion of Quebec from its provisions, either through non-enforcement or by provisions in the law itself. English-speaking Canadians in general are opposed to this solution, however, as creating an undesirable precedent. All competent authorities seem to agree that there is no immediate need for conscription, as the Canadian armed forces are getting all the men they need by the voluntary system at present. Overseas conscription is more than anything else a symbol of the total
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war that Quebec alone of Canada's nine provinces is unwilling to wage.

Rumors of Violence in Quebec

One alarming symptom of the gathering storm in Quebec is rumors of possible violence. French-Canadians express fear that the armed mobile units of the air raid warden service, composed largely of young English-speaking hotheads, might turn into anti-French-Canadian vigilante groups. On the other hand, the wealthier Anglo-Canadians in Montreal are openly saying that they expect their homes to be attacked by French-Canadian mobs. Such rumors, though probably completely unfounded, are an indication of the high inter-racial tension now existing in Quebec.

Another disturbing factor is the virulent campaign against any implementation of the conscription law now being conducted by the leading newspapers of the French-Canadian nationalist faction, especially Le Devoir of Montreal. The influence of the latter is especially great among the lower clergy of the province, who form the forefront of the anti-conscription movement.

Thoughtful French-Canadians point out that Quebec is in a state of bewilderment. Having put their faith in the Liberal government's promise never to introduce conscription, they cannot understand why that government now appears to be repudiating its anti-conscription pledges just as the Conservatives did in 1917. Public opinion in Quebec has not been sufficiently educated as to the necessities for this volée face. Whether enough time remains for a campaign of enlightenment is open to question. If nothing is done, according to our observer, extremist demagogues—of whom there are many in Quebec—will have an opportunity to disrupt the province and might conceivably even try to bring about secession.

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APPENDIX

SOME ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN MILITARY AND DOMESTIC SITUATION

In recent surveys the Coordinator's office has devoted careful study to certain aspects of the contemporary German situation, both military and domestic. First, on the military side, evidence indicates that the British bombing campaign is distinctly less effective than press comment would suggest. The Coordinator's estimate of German casualties is much lower than those of the British, and the German oil position is shown to be stronger than is generally believed.

Effects of the British Air Offensive

A survey of the evidence by an air expert concludes that, at the present tempo, the British bombardment will have no major effect on the German war effort against Russia between now and the time when operations are curtailed by the winter. It is very easy, however, to exaggerate the amount of damage which would be done even if Anglo-American resources permit a notably heightened tempo of attack. The blits on Coventry, most successful of all, reduced the town's activity index, based on electric power consumption, to 87 percent of its previous level. But electric power consumption had returned to normal in about five or six weeks. The conclusion is simple: the most damaging blits of the war must be repeated every few weeks if the industrial activity of the target area is to be kept down to a damaging level.

German Casualties on the Russian Front

Optimistic estimates of German permanent casualties on the Russian front from British and other sources, run as high as 2,600,000. The estimate of the Coordinator's office, however, is only about 1,400,000. This figure is unquestionably a conservative one. While these higher estimates cannot be summarily dismissed, it is believed that they are based on total casualty figures which are too high and that the breakdowns of these figures utilise percentages of killed, missing, and totally disabled which are too great a proportion of total casualties.

It should be noted that any estimate of permanent losses does not include the important factor of men in hospitals. What may be called the "hospital pool," in a period of large-scale offensive operations such as the campaign of last fall in Russia, probably results in a constant drain of some 600,000-700,000 men on the strength of the German armed forces.

The German Oil Position

During the second half of 1941—at the height of the fighting in Russia—Germany's consumption of petroleum was approximately equal to Nazi production,
according to a study prepared in the Economics Division of the Coordinator's office, while consumption last winter was considerably lower than current output.

From June to December of last year, petroleum consumption of the German ground and air forces on the Eastern Front probably amounted to about 430,000 tons a month—around 300,000 tons of which were for the ground forces alone. Combat vehicles accounted for about 70 percent of this latter figure, supply vehicles for the remainder. Divisions actively engaged in combat were responsible for more than 90 percent of the ground force consumption. Of the 130,000 tons consumed by the air force, almost all was for planes rather than for the supply service.

During this same period, military consumption elsewhere than on the Russian front amounted to about 225,000 tons a month, with civilian consumption 670,000 tons. The consumption total of 1.3 million tons a month was only slightly larger than the estimated production rate. Thus petroleum production and consumption were in approximate balance during that period of the war when Germany's military requirements were at their peak. At most the Nazis made no more than negligible withdrawals from stocks.

Although this report has not studied the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942, as carefully as the preceding period, it seems unlikely that military consumption of petroleum during the winter amounted to more than 420,000 tons a month. If civilian consumption continued at the rate of 670,000 tons a month, total consumption was approximately 1.1 million tons—as compared with a production of 1.3 million tons. The conclusion is inescapable that German petroleum stocks last winter were increasing at a rate of approximately 200,000 tons a month.

Party and Army

On the German home front, the Coordinator has devoted particular attention to the relations of the Nazi Party and the Army, to the German food position, and to German morale.

Certain writers have emphasized what they term a "fundamental opposition" between the Party and the Army. But the old independent Wehrmacht no longer exists. Since February 4, 1938, when Blumberg and Fritsch had to go, the German army has been pretty effectively Naziified from the top downward. For some years now, the entire young manhood of Germany has passed through the pre-military training entrusted on January 19, 1939 to the SA. All the younger classes now in the Army are the products of Nazi training and education. Nothing is more certain than that the expansion of the 4000 commissioned officers of the old Reichswehr into the hundreds of thousands of officers of the present army has resulted in an immense strengthening of the position of the Nazi Party in the Army. Military Attaché reports agree that all the officers in the grades from major downward are solidly National Socialist.

The higher officers from colonel upward are still in the main the officers of the Reichswehr. Promotion in the German army is slow, even in time of war. Very few Nazis have found their way into the higher and highest grades. The officers of these grades are above all professionals with little or no political tradi-

The end of that aloofness on February 4, 1938, and he did it without resorting to one of Stalin's purges. The hostile officers were pensioned or gradually eliminated. It is safe to say that few enemies of Hitler remain among the higher officers. In the opinion of one very close and reliable observer of the German army, the relationship between the Party and the Army is no longer an issue of fundamental importance.

The German Food Position

The April change in German rations gave rise to optimistic comments in the press, even suggesting that Nazi food shortages might soon be serious. A recent analysis of the German food position by the Economics Division of the Coordinator's office, however, suggests a different situation (The War This Week, April 16-22, 1942, pp. 15-16). Germany's food position appears to be cared for through the year 1942-43, on the assumption that the same areas now available to her will continue to be. It is only after the end of the calendar year 1943 that the situation may become serious, and to a considerable extent this too may be avoided by a further reduction in rations, particularly for fats and oils and, in all probability, for meats. Such reductions might still be made without dealing a body blow to the efficiency of the German military and economic machine.

Considerations of German Morale

Intimately allied to such considerations as food rationing and British bombing is the problem of German morale. The view that serious fissures have already appeared in the morale front and that the Allies "can win the war by propaganda" is one of the favorite forms of contemporary wishful thinking.

It is unquestionably true that the German people, imbued with the notion that they were embarking on a short war of brilliant but inexpensive conquest, have been grievously disappointed. The reverses and serious losses suffered by the German Army in Russia must have had deep and disheartening effects on all strata of the German population. The prospect of another winter of war, and perhaps still another, is doubtless a nightmare to the great masses of the German people.

On the other hand, there is no convincing evidence that German morale has been seriously impaired. A recent survey in the Coordinator's office reveals widespread support of the existing regime in word and deed. There is grumbling and some discontent among the aged, women, Americans, South Germans, ardent Lutherans and Catholics, intellectuals, Jews and certain others. But apparently there is no justification for the view that the organizational efficiency of the regime has been impaired by this discontent. The widespread fear that, in the event of defeat the German people will reap a peace of vengeance, has undoubtedly contributed to the creation of an attitude of grim determination to see the war through at all costs.

Resistance in the Occupied Territories

Recent discussions of alleged German weakness lay considerable emphasis on Nazi difficulties in the occupied territories. The implication is that certain of these countries are already developing within them significant instruments of
revolt and that they are, therefore, increasingly ripe for Allied invasion. Three countries are central in this argument: Italy, France, and Norway. In none of them does the controlling authority (hence Nazi influence) seem to be threatened in any serious way.

The three fundamental forces in Italian life, namely, the monarchy (including the army), the fascist regime, and the Catholic Church, appear to be intact and to be united in an effort to preserve the integrity of the kingdom and the power of the present government against foreign and domestic enemies, according to one close student of Italy.

The foreign enemies include the nations with which Italy is at war and may also include Italy’s ally, Germany, whose increasing power in the peninsula is a matter of great concern to Italian ruling circles. At the moment, this concern takes the form of limiting German control in Italy rather than of repudiating the German alliance which, from many points of view, has proved helpful to Italy (as, for example, in the Greek and North African campaigns). Curiously enough, even in non-fascist or mild anti-fascist circles, Mussolini is looked upon as a bulwark against overbearing German control in Italy.

Monarchy and Church in Italy

The Savoy Monarchy, with its deep roots in Italian life, still has considerable prestige among the people and still commands the unquestioned loyalty of the army, our observer continues. The strongest elements in the army appear to be intact and to be in Italy. The monarchy and the fascist regime need each other. To be sure, even if the fascist regime should fall, the monarchy could hope to survive because it might be able to count on the army and wide popular support.

The Catholic Church and the fascist regime have been and are on friendly terms, he notes. The Church, even more than the monarchy, can pursue an independent policy, even if fascism should fall. It must not be forgotten that the clergy in Italy—including the hierarchy—is predominantly Italian and feels a great sense of patriotism towards Italy.

The fear of national humiliation, of chaos or revolution (Communism), is one of the strong bonds which unite the forces of fascism, the monarchy and the Church at the present time. No organized anti-fascist movement, strong enough to seize power, seems to exist in Italy today. There appears to be no immediate prospect that the fascist regime will be overthrown.

All the above is subject to qualification dictated by a constantly changing world and Italian situation, our observer concludes. The most important qualification is this: the return of Laval to power has created an “opening” which affords the best opportunity for a diplomatic anti-Nazi offensive in Italy since that country entered the war.

Confusion and Weakness in France

At least three elements in the current French situation tend to discount optimistic views of the early crystallization of French resistance to the Nazis. First, the political orientation of Laval remains undefined. He has yet to embark on an overt policy of collaboration. The second factor, a logical result of the first,