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THE WAR THIS WEEK

Handicapped by heavy casualties and a supply problem of exceptional difficulty, the Germans continue to inch their way painfully into Stalingrad, while the Russians are reported to have thrown 10 fresh divisions into the battle. Meanwhile, the Nazis are making preparations for a possible attack on Leningrad. In Russia's hour of difficulty, Stalin's blunt statement on the second front has emphasized once again Soviet disappointment with Allied cooperation.

With a uniquely concentrated blast of oratory, German leaders have greeted the approach of winter with confident boasts that the "Fortress of Europe" is impregnable. But the remarks of Hitler and his associates are singularly free of the predictions of victory which were characteristic of their efforts in 1941. German difficulties in the occupied countries are steadily in evidence—in Norway, in Denmark, and in France, where Laval has in essence yielded on the labor conscription issue. In Egypt reports picture the Axis forces as holding resolutely to the defensive.

Compromise moves are the order of the day in India, with Rajagopalachariar urging that the British give the administration into the hands of a broadly representative Indian government for the duration, while leaving military control to Britain and the solution of controversial questions for the peace.

With the announcement that notable American forces have taken up positions in the Andean Islands, further Japanese moves in the Aleutians have been rendered hazard-

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ous, and their sole remaining outpost at Kiska may soon be imperilled. In the southwest Pacific the Australians continue to advance behind the retreating Japanese along the Port Moresby-Buna trail, but reports from the Tulagi area indicate the landing of additional Japanese and suggest that a fresh crisis is approaching in the Solomons.

Stalingrad's Resistance Continues

With the capture of the suburb of Orlovka, northwest of Stalingrad, the Germans have improved their position in the center of the city and have thus far stemmed the Russian counterattacks from the south of Stalingrad and from the north in the Kletskaya-Kachalino area. American military observers believe that the Nazis are still making slow progress in encircling the Soviet defenders and in cutting off their escape. The attackers, however, may be suffering losses of about 15,000 killed a week, with many more wounded.

One can perhaps ascribe Stalingrad's prolonged resistance to three main factors. First, the Germans have to contend with a monumental supply problem. In place of the large net of railroads which they could use when they were still operating in the Donets basin, they have only the single track Don bend line; the railroad to the south from Tikhoretsk to Stalingrad is doubtless unusable, since the Germans have not yet had time to repair or retrack it along its whole length. Second, the Russians have brought up 10 fresh divisions previously in training in western Siberia; it is unclear just where the Soviets have thrown in these reinforcements, but they may well have added weight to the counterattack in the Kletskaya-Kachalino area. Finally, there is the intangible factor of Russian morale. The Soviet leaders, convinced that every day of Stalingrad's resistance is another day lost to the Germans for preparing a further offensive this autumn, have apparently imbued their troops with their own determination to hold the city at all costs.

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Apparently awaiting the fall of Stalingrad to increase the tempo of their drives to the south, the German columns in the North Caucasus have made insubstantial progress. Along the shore of the Black Sea, Nazi units are meeting stubborn resistance before the ports of Gelendzhik and Tuapse. To the west of Groznyi, the southern arm of the German pincers has taken Elkhotovo, seven miles from Darg-Kokh at the northern end of the Ossetian Military Highway, while Nazi units in the central part of this sector have captured the oil town of Malgobek, south of Mozdok.

Preparations Before Leningrad

On the central and northern fronts, the current German attacks seemingly represent an effort to restore defensive positions impaired by the recent Russian advances. For example, south of Lake Ilmen, the Nazis appear to be making a considerable effort to shorten their line in the swampy area between Rzhev and Staraya Russa, where a deep Soviet salient has long existed. Similarly, around Leningrad, the Germans may be trying to clear the south shore of Lake Ladoga prior to an attack on the city. Reports of preparations for such an assault have become increasingly frequent.

According to a Finnish officer, the Nazis will probably force the Finns to participate in an assault on the city—that is, unless the Russian defenders attack first. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the latter have now added four or five divisions to their line between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland. An Estonian informant adds further details. The Germans, he asserts, are shipping substantial quantities of food and matériel to Estonian ports in preparation for an attack on Leningrad. This attack, he suggests, may first be directed against the Soviet salient near Kronstadt. With the elimination of this wedge the Germans could direct their heavy artillery upon the fortifications and warships of the

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naval base, which will be icebound in a few weeks. Our informant concludes that an attack on Leningrad from the south can not come for almost another month, when the ice of the swamps will be frozen hard enough to bear artillery and armored vehicles.

Finnish Apprehension

Meantime, Russian submarine activities in the Gulf of Bothnia are proving a considerable source of worry to Finnish naval authorities, according to reports from Helsinki. Although the submarines have thus far sunk no ships in convoy, they have destroyed three freighters outward bound from the port of Bjorneborg during the past month. Evidently, Finnish ship owners prefer to make a quick dash to Swedish territorial waters across the Gulf rather than to waste time and fuel in going to a convoy rendezvous. The Russian submarines apparently make a similar effort to save fuel by charging their batteries at night and lying on the bottom during the day.

With a renewal of active hostilities between Finland and Russia possibly in the offing, the Finnish Foreign Minister has nevertheless asserted that tension between Finland and the United States has somewhat abated. Reports from Helsinki suggest, however, that the Finnish public is increasingly fearful of a declaration of war by the United States—particularly in view of the fact that many Finns are beginning to doubt the possibility of a complete German victory over the Russians. Nor has the Finnish press as yet published the statement of "an important Washington official" (as reported via Stockholm) that relations between Finland and the United States do not necessarily need to be broken off, providing the Finns do not renew the offensive against the Soviet Union. But if Finland should collaborate with Germany in a further attack on Russia, then, the

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reported statement concludes, a rupture in Finnish-American relations would be quite probable.

Stalin and the Second Front

Stalin's blunt statement in his letter to the Associated Press representative in Moscow that Allied aid to Russia "has so far been little effective" in comparison with Russia's contribution and that the possibility of a second front occupies "a place of first-rate importance" in Soviet estimates of the current situation, has underlined once again Russia's disappointment with her Allies. According to one report, the Soviet Government for several days last month forbade the printing of news stories about a second front—possibly fearing that the British and American delay in opening such a front might depress the morale of the Russian army and civilian population. Now, however, the press is freely publishing stories about the public demand in the western democracies for a second front, along with speculation as to when such a front may be expected. Relations with Britain and the United States, nevertheless, have remained publicly cordial, and Stalin has intimated that most of the diplomats now in Kuibyshev will soon be able to move to Moscow.

Composite Report to the German Nation

A spate of public statements by five German leaders within eight days—a performance unparalleled since the war began—has revealed a new German propaganda line of "defensive confidence", according to data gathered by the Psychology Division of the Office of Strategic Services. On September 27 Ribbentrop spoke at the second anniversary of the Tripartite Pact; on the 30th, Hitler and Goebbels launched the Winter Relief Program, and while in Berlin for this occasion, Rommel gave one of his rare interviews to the press; four days

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later Goering spoke to the nation for two hours from the Sportpalast—his first appearance of this sort in three years.

While some parts of these speeches echo the "pep-talks" of last autumn—a general morale-boosting effort to offset the depressing prospect of another winter of war—the tone is more confident, but at the same time less aggressive, than a year ago. The German leaders are apparently concerned about the capacity of their people to "take" an indefinite continuation of hostilities and are therefore striving to build up a new and more reassuring picture of Germany's role in the war.

For the first time a limited objective is set for the *Wehrmacht* by the Party's "big four": Russia is to be neutralized on the east; the Continent is to be defended on the north, west, and south; Rommel is to handle the situation in the Middle East. These limited objectives accomplished, Germany can rest on her oars. The blackest moment of the war, the winter of 1941-42, has been survived. Already the conquered territories are beginning to pay dividends. By next year the Ukraine will be feeding German mouths and factories. Germany will then be able to attain a new measure of strength, which will make her invincible. The war may go on for a long time, but Germany can never be beaten, and she can outlast her enemies.

Whether realistic estimate or desperate rationalization, Germany's new emphasis on the "Fortress of Europe" propaganda line is not likely to strengthen morale on the home front over any considerable period of time as long as shortages, casualties, air-raids, and the threat of a second front continue. For the moment, however, the Nazi leaders have put on an impressive show, and have probably boosted the popularity of their regime.

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Scandinavia Faces a Second Nazi Winter

The thud of British bombs dropping near Gestapo headquarters in Oslo on September 25 announced with some emphasis the opening of a new season of anxieties for the Nazis and their puppets in Scandinavia. Quisling's plan to set up a corporative parliament called the *Riksting* seems to have been vetoed decisively by his German overlords, who wish no more trouble on their hands than they already have; and mass resignations from Quisling-controlled labor unions are rapidly stripping Quisling of even the semblance of working-class support. The increasing nervousness of the German occupation forces is sharply reflected, moreover, in the order of October 6, proclaiming a state of emergency from Trondheim to the Swedish border, with an all-night curfew and complete coastal alert.

In Denmark, where the rate of sabotage has shown an upward spurt since midsummer, the Germans confront the embarrassing necessity of dismantling the "show-window of North Europe," their prized model of an occupied but "non-coordinated" protectorate. The Danish government has been forced to a choice of either resignation, with its consequences of Gestapo invasion, or virtual collaboration, which implies doing the Gestapo's work for it. Either course can be counted upon to increase Danish attempts at sabotage and resistance.

Sweden's recent gesture of defiance at the polls forecasts additional trouble for Berlin on the northern ideological front. Following up August's press-instigated purge of Nazis in the army, the Swedes used their September provincial and municipal elections to oust from office five members of Nils Flyg's Nazi party and to give the Communists 16 additional seats.

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Vichy Drafts French Labor

After several weeks of hedging, the Laval government has begun the virtual conscription of French labor for Germany. The heads of designated plants have had to submit lists of their employees, and the latter are being graded for priority of enrollment. Those with least family responsibility are to be taken first. The worker receives a letter which states that, "In order to ensure the relief of prisoners, you are designated to work in Germany." If an individual does not sign his employment certificate within 24 hours, his name "will be included in a list which will be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of State for Labor, who will make a decision." A reliable informant believes that no actual force will be used before mid-October, but economic threats and intimidation may be employed in varying degrees.

The Government is justifying itself by the assertion that only by such action could direct German conscription of French workers be avoided. Laval is stressing the duty of designated workers to serve their country in this way. Nevertheless, Hubert Lagardelle, Secretary of State for Labor, and 10 other officials of the Labor Ministry have resigned in protest against the forced-labor policies, according to the press.

In response to German pressure it is reported that Vichy will also shortly decree that no male between 18 and 50 who is a citizen of a country fighting the Axis can leave France or its dependencies.

The Benoist-Méchin Affair

Further reports indicate that Benoist-Méchin and the *Parti Populaire Français* had developed a plan to displace the present Vichy regime prior to the time that Laval took action. Benoist-Méchin had apparently prepared a slate of ministers, to be headed by the ambitious Admiral Platon, a man

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believed to be more acceptable to Pétain and the country than Doriot. Prominent posts were also to go to Benoist-Méchin himself and to Paul Marion, whom Laval may also soon try to oust from the Government.

In Morocco the conspirators may have planned a coup in the absence of Noguès and the head of the Secret Police. They were also working up a violent demonstration against Allied representatives. Some PPF leaders there have since been jailed, and French authorities are reported to have prepared drastic plans for maintaining control.

Apprehension Regarding Dakar

Apprehension—real or simulated—about an Allied attack on Dakar appears to have mounted in both German and French circles. While Vichy has indicated increasing concern, authorities at Dakar are rigorously enforcing black-out regulations and have registered European families in preparation for possible evacuation. Public tension at Dakar has been acute since September, and the German Armistice Commission is showing apprehension. An increase in French submarine strength at Dakar is also reported. Meanwhile, Berlin broadcasts are continuing to emphasize the importance to France of accepting German military aid in the defense of the French Empire.

French military and naval intelligence officers in North Africa are circulating for propaganda purposes the now notorious article by Professor Renner that appeared in the June 6th issue of *Colliers*. In this article Renner proposes that small parts of France and larger areas in North Africa be ceded to Spain and Italy in the future peace settlement.

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Axis Defensive in Egypt

Against heavy opposition, a British infantry force made a minor advance in the Deir El Munassib area on September 29-30, taking high ground and straightening the line. The force was able to consolidate and hold its position, despite an Axis counterattack. Axis air patrolling is now more active, and the use of dive bombers has increased. Apparently to stiffen and control their defensive dispositions, the Germans have paired German and Italian armored divisions in the rear, and have mingled German units with the Italian infantry in the forward area.

Other reports also indicate that the enemy is, for the time at least, holding to the defensive in Egypt. The Axis radio has recently treated the North African theater in defensive terms, making no promises of an attack, and suggesting that the British army, which "has been uninterruptedly strengthening itself," is preparing an offensive. Rommel himself, in his remarks in Berlin, stated that fighting in Africa was increasingly difficult, admitted the stiffer opposition of American tanks, and apparently did not go beyond saying that "we propose to hold what we have in Egypt."

The Axis supply situation continues to be tight, in large measure due to Allied air and submarine attacks on enemy shipping, ports, and supply lines. Sinkings during August may have amounted to over half the tonnage dispatched from southern Europe. The United States Air Force alone dropped almost a million pounds of bombs in this theater in the month of September. The port of Tobruk has been pounded almost nightly, and reports indicate that its efficiency may have been reduced to a fraction.

Consolidation in Madagascar

The British this week continued to consolidate their hold on Madagascar. Despite obstructions and the advent of

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heavy rains, the British column that had advanced from Majunga to Tananarive has now occupied Antsirabe, communications center to the south. This places the British in substantial control of Madagascar's railways. Some French and native troops have apparently withdrawn farther south. The civil population has been friendly, and local French officials have nearly everywhere been helpful. The French Council at Tananarive passed a resolution in favor of cooperation with the British.

India: Further Compromise Moves

As new demonstrations flared up in New Delhi and Bombay, and observers anticipated large-scale Congress agitation during the week of Gandhi's birthday (October 2-9), non-Congress leaders started at least three lines of negotiation to resolve the current impasse. In New Delhi, the directing committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met to review the party's compromise efforts in the past and to work out further proposals for the future. Almost at the same time, Fazlul Huq, Prime Minister of Bengal, issued invitations to a varied group of party leaders to discuss the possibilities of compromise at the Indian capital during the first week of October.

The most clear-cut proposals, however, came from Rajagopalachariar, moderate leader from Madras. Taking issue with the *Manchester Guardian*, Rajagopalachariar asserted that the British could very well start negotiations with Indian nationalist leaders now in jail as well as with those still at liberty. Such leaders, Congress and non-Congress, who are actually representative of Indian public opinion, he suggests, should be called on by the Viceroy to form a national government as a substitute for the present Executive Council. This government, he concludes, could carry on the Indian administration for the duration of the war—

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leaving military control to the British, and postponing the settlement of controversial issues until the return of peace.

Intensified Air Attacks on Kiska

In the Aleutians, the only active Japanese base, Kiska, is now under fairly regular and heavy attack from the air, and the enemy position there is less secure than at any time since the first landings last June. Japanese air power in the area has dwindled, and, at one time in the past ten days, was thought to consist of no more than two or three serviceable planes. However, a later report indicated the Japanese were renewing construction of semi-permanent buildings and underground storage facilities, apparently with the expectation that the base can be held, and additional aircraft therefore are likely to be brought in. An enemy attack on our new position in the Andreanof Islands on October 4, coupled with some fighter interception encountered by our own aircraft at Kiska, suggests that this may already have occurred.

Geography of the Andreanof Islands

The establishment of our new base in the Andreanof Islands, announced after an interim period of several weeks during which the base had been secretly prepared and occupied, brings Kiska within range of our fighter-planes. The westernmost island of the group, West Unalga, is only 125 nautical miles distant from Kiska. The group as a whole, from Amchitka Pass on the west to Seguam Pass on the east, extends for 235 miles in the center of the Aleutian chain. Amlia, the easternmost island, is 245 nautical miles from Dutch Harbor. The islands vary in size from mere rocks upward to 600 square miles—the area of Atka.

The islands were built up from the floor of the Pacific by volcanic action, and many of them have rugged volcanic

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peaks. Some of the volcanoes have erupted as late as 1930-33 (Kanaga, Gareloi). The four largest islands are Atka, Adak, Tanaga, and Kanaga. Kanaga has extensive plains, fairly large and level, and all of the larger islands have some level or gently rolling land in the interior. There are several good harbors, but approaches to the islands by sea are strewn with numerous rocks and reefs.

Originally inhabited by the Aleuts, most of the Andreanof Islands are now unoccupied except for occasional trappers. Until recent months, the only real settlement of the group was the town of Atka, a settlement of about 90 natives on well-protected Nazan Bay on the east side of Atka Island.

Favorable Weather: September to November

In spite of their high latitude, the Andreanof Islands have a mild climate, temperatures ranging from 32 to about 52 degrees above zero Fahrenheit. The best period for sea and air activities is the present one—September to November, when fogs, cloudiness, ceilings, and visibility all are the most favorable of the year. This is not to say, however, that weather in the Andreanofs is any different from the general run of Aleutian weather. It is rainy, cloudy, and misty most of the time, with dense fogs sometimes 4,000 feet thick. Often the fogs are only a few hundred feet thick, however, and frequently they occur on the southern side of the islands and not on the north, so that north side ports may have clear or broken weather when other places are shrouded in fog.

Losses and Gains in the Southwest Pacific

In New Guinea, after losing their Ioribaiwa Ridge positions above Port Moresby September 28, the Japanese unexpectedly chose to avoid further battle. Australian forces as a result have advanced without serious opposition to the

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Gap in the Owen Stanley Range. A small Japanese convoy northeast of Buna has been bombed, but whether it had landed or withdrawn troops at Buna—a clue perhaps to further Japanese intentions in this area—is not yet known. Prime Minister John Curtin, however, views the present Australian advance essentially as a "holding operation", according to press dispatches. A large-scale offensive could not be undertaken for at least six months, he adds, due to the demands of other fronts for men and matériel.

Allied forces in New Guinea are in complete control of the air and have strafed and bombed Japanese bases and communication lines without let-up. In addition, Allied ground patrols are active north of the mountain range, where they have raided a Japanese concentration at Mubo, near Salamaua.

On Guadalcanal, the Japanese are continuing to land reinforcements, and the situation there may again be approaching a crisis. New landings also have been made to the northwest at Viru and Rendova Harbors in the New Georgia group. On Guadalcanal itself, the main enemy concentrations now are at Kokumbona, on the north coast about eight miles west of our airfield near Lunga Point, and still farther west, at Cape Esperance. United Nations' aircraft have bombed these positions and others on nearby islands, and our forces continue to take a relatively heavy toll of attacking Japanese planes. At Japanese airdromes on Buka and Bougainville Islands in the northern Solomons, enemy air activity nevertheless has been considerably intensified, and some reinforcements evidently continue to arrive.

Unusually large Japanese naval concentrations are still being maintained in the Japanese mandated islands north of Rabaul, presumably awaiting the outcome of Japanese efforts to establish air supremacy in the Solomons. While waiting, Japanese naval forces have completed the occupation

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of the Gilbert Islands, which provide a screen for operations in the empty ocean spaces between the Solomons and the Japanese-held Marshalls.

Chungking En Fête for Willkie

Wei Erh-chi First-born, usually known as Wendell Willkie, has been holding considerably more than the center of the stage since his arrival in Chungking. The Chinese, who dearly love a to-do, and who are past masters at making one, welcomed Willkie with firecrackers and the ceremonial hot towel and proceeded to participate enthusiastically in the process of being taken by storm. Willkie's gusto and energy have made a wide appeal, and his visits to factories, munition plants, and universities have been cheerfully accompanied by complimentary speeches of welcome and frequent requests for autographs. The Chungking press has devoted its news columns to full accounts of Willkie's activities, while its editorial writers have vied with each other in enlightening their American guest on such matters as the necessity for increased aid for China, and the desirability of creating an active Pacific front and abolishing extraterritoriality.

Meanwhile, Willkie has interviewed a number of Chinese leaders (including H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, and Chou En-lai, Communist representative in Chungking) and has had several lengthy conferences with the Generalissimo. It is improbable that any of Willkie's hosts disagreed with the editorial writers above.

Chinese Troops Training in India

General Stilwell's headquarters has revealed the fact that several thousand of the Chinese forces which fought in Burma are being re-equipped with American arms at a camp in India, and are receiving training from American Army

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officers. Correspondents who visited the camp have been impressed with the evident effects which good food and a healthful life have had on these troops, and report that the American instructors are pleased by the keenness with which the Chinese take to their various tasks. The Chinese themselves are thoroughly enjoying the unaccustomed luxury of training with real ammunition.

In northern Burma the Japanese are evidently stepping up their own preparations for future events. A sharp increase in enemy air activity in this region has been noted by United Nations' reconnaissance planes. Construction is in progress at various Burmese airdromes, and there has been some evidence as well of heightened shipping activity. On September 28, eight large river craft and more than 400 rail cars were observed at Mandalay.

Castillo Versus Justo in Argentina

Taking advantage of his constitutional prerogatives, President Castillo has appointed a Federal Interventor for the province of Corrientes, thereby setting aside the duly elected provincial governor and legislature. As explanation, he made the traditional statement that he was acting in order to protect the political rights of the citizens of the province. The move, however, was widely and properly interpreted as aimed against General Justo, leader of the conservative opposition to Castillo and candidate for the presidency in 1943. Justo's political influence has long been dominant in this province.

The Corrientes affair is symptomatic of the deepening conflict between the isolationist and interventionist branches of conservative opinion, and may soon touch off events of greater significance.

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Lombardo Toledano's Odyssey

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, foremost Mexican labor leader and President of the Federation of Latin American Workers (C. T. A. L.), has flown from Cuba to Colombia on his swing through Latin America. On reaching Barranquilla he was greeted by a telegram from President Lopez, welcoming him to Colombia as "a gallant representative of American intellectuals."

This message suggests that he will be as well received by government and labor circles of Colombia as those of Cuba, where he had an interview with President Batista and addressed thousands of workers in speeches stressing the need for more intense Latin American participation in the war effort and the crucial role of labor in this effort. In this connection, he emphasized the need for Pan-American labor unity and declared that both the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. had in principle approved holding an inter-American labor congress in Havana, but that failure by the A. F. of L. thus far to approve final plans had delayed the project.

Lombardo Toledano's trip has not been without its domestic and peculiarly Mexican repercussions. Shortly before Lombardo left Cuba, *Novedades*, leading Mexico City daily with strong Catholic leanings, printed an exclusive dispatch from Havana quoting Lombardo as having declared in a public address that "the Pope is the leader of the world fifth column." Soon after, *El Popular*, daily newspaper of the Federation of Mexican Workers (C. T. M.), published affidavits by the editors of the leading dailies of Havana and by a number of important Cuban journalists to the effect that they were not aware of any such statement by Lombardo Toledano.

This was the second attempt within six months by the rightist Mexican Press to attribute a forged and highly provocative statement to Lombardo Toledano. In each case

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it has raised domestic storms which have done little if any injury to Lombardo but have served to distract attention from the more vital problems of the war.

Anti-Nazi Measures in Santa Catarina

The Brazilian authorities are taking vigorous steps to control the activities of the Nazis in the southern states. At present about 500 Germans have been arrested in Santa Catarina alone, and these will eventually be placed in three special prisons in the state. About 400 persons, mostly Germans, have also been forced to move from the coastal area and from the Argentine frontier to specified interior towns more than 100 kilometers inland. The only restriction placed on their activities is that of reporting daily to the police authorities.

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APPENDIX I

GERMAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES

1. *Unity in Diversity*

Since 1933, some 250,000 German emigrés have entered this country, at least 48,000 of them having been exiled for political rather than racial reasons. Not unnaturally, members of this latter group have formed cliques and coalitions and have sought to influence not merely the German-American populace here, but more especially the attitude of the United Nations toward the homeland. A current memorandum on these refugee organizations by the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services indicates significantly that, beneath all their differences, there now flows a strong and common current of German nationalism, revived in the most mutually antagonistic groups by fears of the dismemberment or abasement the Fatherland may suffer at the hands of the Allies.

2. *Titles.*

The chief organized groups of German refugees in this country are the following: The Association of Free Germans, Inc., German Labor Delegation, the Goldsmith Group, German Study Group, American Friends of German Freedom, *Neu Beginnen*, the Strasser Group, the German-American Congress for Democracy, the Loyal Americans of German Descent, the German-American League for Culture, the German-American Emergency Conference, the German-American Anti-Axis League, and the Steuben Society.

Of these, the four most important are: the American Friends of German Freedom; *Neu Beginnen* (sponsored by the Association of Free Germans); the Strasser Group; and the Steuben Society.

3. *The Association of Free Germans, Inc.*

Probably the most active and powerful of them all, the Association reproduces in miniature the Weimar Coalition of Social Democrats, Catholic Centrists, and moderate Nationalists. It has as president, Albert C. Grzesinski, former Prussian Minister of Interior; as secretary, Rudolph Katz, former Aldermanic President of Altona; and as Director, Gerhart H. Seger, former member of the Reichstag.

Though in its published aims the Association follows closely the program of the United Nations, supporting the Atlantic Charter and dedicating itself to the destruction of Nazism and German imperialism, there is reason to believe that there is nothing approaching unanimity of opinion within the group. According to reliable reports, members of the Association have disagreed violently over the issue of unilateral disarmament for post-war Germany, many of them holding the opinion that such a move would invite territorial aggression on the part of

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Russia or Poland. The fear of Russian power is, in fact, one of the chief determinants of the members' real, as distinguished from their publicly expressed, opinions. Rudolf Katz, the Association's executive secretary, has privately expressed the view that post-war Germany will fall into two camps: those who will fight with the Allies against Russia and those who will fight with Russia against the Allies.

4. American Friends of German Freedom:

This organization is the chief supporter in the United States of the activities of Paul Hagen and *Neu Beginnen*, a small band of extreme leftist intellectual refugees with headquarters in New York and London. Founded sometime in the middle thirties by the late B. Charney Vlodeck and Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, the American Friends of German Freedom had as its original aim the financial support of underground work supposed to be carried on in Germany by the *Neu Beginnen* group. Since the outbreak of war in 1939 and the consequent almost complete rupture of underground contacts with Germany, it has continued to function as a publicity bureau for Hagen and to publish two periodicals: *Inside Germany Reports*, a digest of material supposedly collected through underground channels, and *In Re: Germany*, a bibliography of works dealing with the German problem.

5. *Neu Beginnen*:

Formed in 1931 by a small group of Marxist intellectuals, many of them supposedly former Communists, *Neu Beginnen* was dedicated to the task of combatting Nazism by healing the German labor split created by Communist-Socialist dissension.

According to its present platform, however, *Neu Beginnen* appears to have abandoned any ideological compromise with Moscow and stands for: (1) rejection of all forms of Communism; (2) rejection of the principle of a one-party, Socialist dictatorship; (3) support of an independent and democratic Socialist movement in Germany. Its chief spokesman, Paul Hagen, envisions European reconstruction as taking the form of a supra-national federation based on working class cooperation within a Socialist economy, and subject to some form of world control.

As a native Austrian and a Socialist, Hagen is a strong supporter of Austrian inclusion in the Reich, and an advocate of free and equal participation for Germany in a European federation. Correspondingly, he opposes unilateral disarmament, occupation of Germany, and all proposals for quarantining Germany by "political and military safety-belts".

Thus, it is clear that the program of *Neu Beginnen*, though bitterly opposed to Prussian militarism and imperialism, is nonetheless *Grossdeutsch* in its essential aims. Its numerical strength is negligible, its potential strength as a propaganda agency considerable.

6. The Strasser Group:

According to reliable reports, the British consider this by far the most dangerous of the refugee groups. In Canada and Latin America, where it is most active, it is called the Free German Movement. In this country, where its activities

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are restricted by the inability of Otto Strasser to enter the country, the Group is not allowed to use the designation "Free German", which has been preempted by the Association of Free Germans. However, Strasser has received until recently ample publicity in this country by the publication of his pamphlets and articles, the latter having had a wide circulation through such magazines as *Liberty* and the *American Mercury*, as well as through the *Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and other papers. He has now turned to the German-American press for a major outlet for his views.

The chief activities of Strasser's group are carried on in South America, where the movement is headed by Bruno Fricke in Buenos Aires. Fricke is a former member of the "Organization Consul" which executed the notorious Feme murders in the early days of the Weimar Republic. It should be added that Strasser's Free German Movement in South America has been repeatedly split by violent dissensions arising from charges of anti-Semitism and Fascism leveled at Fricke and Strasser. However, the split in the South American movement must be viewed not so much as a conflict between a Fascist and a democratic bloc as a quarrel between the revolutionary, National Socialist elements, including Fricke and Strasser himself, and the conservative German nationalists.

The fact that these two views could be reconciled even temporarily in a common organization again demonstrates the great cohesiveness of German nationalism and points to the chief potential danger of Strasser's activities. On the basis of the record, there can be no doubt that despite his protestations of democratic sentiment, he is strongly chauvinistic and stands for a form of National Socialism that would differ from Hitler's only in certain details. British authorities and German Social Democrats call Strasser the Trotsky of National Socialism.

7. The Steuben Society:

Evidence supplied by reliable sources indicates that the Steuben Society, which is made up entirely of German-American citizens, has maintained close relations with the Steuben *Gesellschaft* in Nazi Germany, which on several occasions before the war played host to the American leaders of the Society. This connection, doubtless, goes far to explain the strong pro-German and only slightly disguised pro-Nazi policies of the Society, examples of which may be seen in the following items: (1) the virulent, defeatist, and anti-Administration column called the "Steuben Ecke" which appeared regularly in the pro-Nazi *Philadelphia Herald* until the recent suppression of that paper; (2) the part played by the Society in instigating and supporting the isolationist congressional investigation of the motion picture industry; (3) the continuing anti-British and anti-Administration propaganda being carried on even now in the *Steuben News*, the official house organ of the Society.

8. The British View:

The above analysis of the political attitudes and activities of German refugees in this country can be corroborated by Britain's experience with the individuals and groups concerned. Through confidential sources it has been learned that the official British view of the German problem may be summarized as follows:

Before the outbreak of war in 1939 German political refugees in their attacks on the appeasement policy at Munich were largely responsible for the propaganda

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directed in this country against Anglo-French policy, which had the effect of buttressing the arguments of American isolationists. After 1939, however, they saw in the possibility of an Anglo-French victory their sole hope of returning to Germany, and consequently they did everything in their power to aid the British cause and curry their favor. This attitude held good, however, only until the fall of 1941, when it became apparent that Russia, far from collapsing under the Nazi attack, was able to assume the offensive and threaten Germany. At once, according to the British view, the majority of the German political refugee leaders, regardless of class or party, developed an acute attack of nationalism and began to show signs of desiring a negotiated peace with the German Army subsequent to an overthrow of the Nazi regime. To this end certain leaders among the refugees have been engaging in subtle pro-German Army propaganda while at the same time fostering anti-Soviet sentiment in this country.

Among the outstanding offenders in this connection the British count Dr. Hermann Rauschning, the former Nazi President of the Danzig Senate; Dr. Karl Specker, former press chief of the German Chancery under Bruening; Dr. Heinrich Bruening himself; and Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein. The British also believe, it is understood, that such self-proclaimed champions of democracy as Dr. Albert Grzesinski and certain of his associates in the Association of Free Germans share the hope that the Generals will bring peace to Germany.

As for Strasser, the British believe that the machine which he is creating in both the United States and Latin America will be used ultimately for ultranationalist German propaganda, which will inevitably be prejudicial to British interests, and which may even prove to be a cause of friction with the United States Government. The British have been especially concerned over the impression which Strasser has managed to convey in this country that he has the blessing of their Government, an impression which has gained credence from the fact that Strasser was allowed to proceed from custody in Bermuda to freedom in Canada. Although the British Foreign Office has officially expressed its strong disapproval of Strasser, they do not feel that there are at present sufficient grounds for asking the Canadian Government to intern him. Consequently, their present position is that Strasser's movement, like other "free" German groups, should be tolerated without being encouraged.

In short, excepting a few individuals like Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the anti-German publicist and author, and Dr. Eugen Guenster, a supporter of Bavarian separatism, the British believe that the German political refugees in this country are not to be trusted, and fear that should the refugees once achieve unity among themselves, they might exercise in Washington an influence adverse to Britain's national interests.

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APPENDIX II

THE ELITE GUARD AND THE STORM-TROOPERS

Many close observers of the Nazi Reich anticipated that Germany's entry into the war would lead to the gradual eclipse of the Party formations and the ascendancy of the *Wehrmacht*. This prediction has been amply fulfilled so far as *Sturmabteilungen*, or storm-troopers, is concerned: the SA has been relegated to the position of maid-of-all-work in the war-time economy. But the more important SS has much more than held its own in its rivalry with the Army, according to a memorandum prepared by the Central European Section of the Office of Strategic Services. In prestige, in numbers, in interpenetration of the whole governmental fabric, the *Schutz-Staffel* has not diminished but grown, and the Party's dominance over dissident elements must, in consequence, still be regarded as virtually unshaken.

1. Fate of the SA

The rise of the SS only throws into bolder relief the humble position of the SA. From being the swaggering "conquerors of the streets" of Ernst Roehm's day, the brownshirts have sunk to the status of bridge-guards, factory watchers, and air-raid wardens.

For a time, five years after the June purge had nearly liquidated their organization, the SA appeared to be on the road back to power. Goering needed a counterweight to the mounting influence of Himmler, who had, in the SS, a private army of increasingly dangerous proportions. The *Wehrmacht*, on its side, was restive after its political isolation following the Blomberg affair of 1938, and hoped to use the SA as a provisional ally. Accordingly, Victor Lutze, a "Goering man", became the SA's new leader, and the brownshirts were given the relatively important task of training the preconscripts and reservists of the nation in military matters. This enabled them, in the course of their labors, to indoctrinate millions of Germans with "the SA idea", to tout themselves as "a bridge between the Party and the Army", and to expand with a legitimate air their own forces.

The war, however, dealt the SA's comeback a nearly fatal blow: 989,000 of their 1,400,000 followers were drafted into the *Wehrmacht*, and, with the exception of one SA unit, they gave up their identity entirely and were lost in the anonymity of field-gray. Worse, the SA's responsibility for military training on the home front was seriously encroached upon by the Hitler Youth and the Army, and in return the shrunken organization was charged with sundry other chores of some difficulty but little distinction: target practice for middle-aged civilians, guarding Army property and buildings, distributing ration cards, operating blood banks, harvesting crops, etc.

The SA is by no means "finished": its numbers are still large and its hold over the Labor Front is an important advantage. But in current jockeying for power among the Army, the SS, and itself, the SA is now a not too promising third.

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2. Function of the SS

The history of the SS, on the other hand, has been one of almost unchecked aggrandisement. It has grown with the growth of the Party, and for an obvious reason: just as the National Socialist Party is a "State within a State", so the SS is a Party within a Party. As such, it is the indispensable instrument of Hitler in maintaining his grip upon both Party and State.

The SS was created by Hitler in 1925 as a squad of eight men to protect the Fuehrer and Party supporters from physical violence. Its "choicest" task still is the safeguarding of the Fuehrer. To this mission have been added the protection of the German nation, its blood and unity; maintenance of internal security; guarding and strengthening Party control in Germany; and finally the exposition and enforcement of National Socialist doctrines of the World Movement. To fulfill these missions the SS has successively developed an intelligence service, a police force, and a closed community for the practice of Nationalist Socialist eugenics. It is now rapidly creating an army.

3. Effect of the War

The coming of the war has caused the separation of the SS into two groups: the General SS which has remained on "civilian" duty, and the Military SS which is on active service at the front. The General SS is not to be regarded as a residue of office-workers: all its members have had at least the rudiments of military training and, of course, are subject to the very exacting discipline of the Elite Guard. The strength of the General SS has been estimated at anywhere from 750,000 down; the most probable figure lies between 100,000 and 200,000.

The Military SS, in the early part of 1942, was believed to consist of at least 12 SS regular divisions and 5 SS police divisions, all of them at the front. In addition, regiments and smaller units were stationed in various sections of Germany and German-occupied Europe. It can be said safely that the size of the Military SS is decidedly on the increase, even if rumors of its attaining 40 divisions are discounted.

The strength of the SS is not to be measured, however, solely in numbers. Quite as important is the way it makes its numbers count. The SS controls the police, Gestapo, and Party intelligence services. It dominates the colonization and Germanization of conquered territories. Even the foreign service is taking on an SS tint; both Ribbentrop and Abetz, for example, are high in its ranks. SS men are found in top jobs in the press, the Propaganda Ministry, education, the Labor Front—indeed, all branches of the Government. Only the top-most brackets of the Wehrmacht have resisted penetration.

4. SS Versus Wehrmacht

There can be no question but that the coming of the war threatened the relative position of the SS. The vast enlargement of the Wehrmacht, its prestige and power, might well have caused a gravitational shift of influence toward the Generals, leaving the SS stranded.

The key to the success of the SS in surviving this menace was (unlike the unfortunate SA) its refusal to yield its identity within the Army. It kept its

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members in special SS regiments and divisions. Some SS men, of course, were judiciously placed in regular branches of the Wehrmacht, where they constitute valuable listening posts for the Security Service of the SS Reich Leader. The bulk of the membership, however, was and is concentrated in formations of the Military SS so that, in case of need, they can be withdrawn as fighting units and employed at the discretion of the Fuehrer. It may be not without significance that SS divisions are distributed about equally among the several sectors of the Russian Front—a convenient allotment in case of mutiny.

An official statement of the German General Staff, September 17, 1941, declared that, while the Military SS is in principle under the command of the SS Reich Leader, in the present war several units of the Military SS are under temporary command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army for performance of military missions. Members of these formations are soldiers in regard to rights and duties. Nevertheless, the SS Reich Leader directs the indoctrination of SS soldiers and retains the right of substitution. In the early part of 1942, indeed, it was reported that the Military SS had achieved independent status as a sort of fourth arm, and certainly, there is considerable evidence that some, if not all, SS divisions operate on more or less independent missions, being shifted from one corps to another after completion of a particular task.

That friction would develop between the SS and the Army was, of course, inevitable. Jealousy started right at the top: Himmler, chief of the SS, had been only an officer-candidate in World War I and had, following the Armistice, attempted to "crash" circles in Berlin frequented by the General Staff. He was rebuffed sharply and consistently, and salt was added to his wounds by the fact that Huhnlein, Leader of the Nazi Mounted Corps, and Hiel, Leader of the Reich Labor Service, both succeeded where he had failed. His present relations with the Generals, consequently, are characterized by a certain stiffness.

Himmler's own feelings seem to be reflected in the ranks. The SS men criticize the Wehrmacht as reactionary, and the Army, on its side, considers the SS soldiers publicity-seekers. Saluting between the two forces is done either reluctantly or not at all. Unconfirmed reports, indeed, speak of brisk exchanges between Hitler himself and the Generals, Hitler charging the Army with wanton sacrifice of his SS troops, and the Generals retorting that the losses of the SS result from the men's own recklessness and incompetence.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these bickerings have led or will lead in any discernible future to an open rupture. As long as the SS remains an ill-absorbed lump in the Wehrmacht, there is bound to be a certain amount of mutual uneasiness. But the very presence of the SS at the front, constantly on the watch and still fanatically devoted to the Fuehrer, is Hitler's strongest guarantee of safety from a Putsch by the generals.

5. Estimate

As an organization, the SS contains elements of both strength and weakness. In evaluating its power, one should not allow the indisputable cruelty of its concentration camps or other agencies to emotionalize one's judgment. For the SS contains a definite component of idealism which has attracted some of the best elements of German youth: an emphasis on self-denying discipline and loyalty and a sense of dedication to the country. To those insensitive to this appeal, the SS can offer a place in the Nazi aristocracy, an assurance of economic

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security, and a rather interesting system of eugenics—which encourages selective but extensive breeding and provides maternity care not only for SS wives but SS mistresses as well.

As a result, the SS has been able to pick and choose among its applicants, accepting only those with the highest qualifications. In addition to a hand-picked personnel in the ranks, the SS has been blessed by clever, consistent leadership, unmarred by any dangerous brilliance. It has known how to curry and retain the favor of the Fuehrer. And when to these elements of real political strength is added its possession of a powerful, centralized organization, an efficient intelligence service, thorough control of the police, and a self-contained army, the SS looms up as one of the most durable forces in the German picture.

Potentially, its weaknesses are these: (1) the difficulty of proper indoctrination and assimilation of the greatly expanded Military SS; and (2) the professionalization of SS members serving in the police, Security Service, and Military Service. Both of these threats to the SS's homogeneity are being actively combated, however. Altogether, the danger that the War would push the SS into comparative obscurity, weakening the Party it represents and exalting the *Wehrmacht* unduly, seems definitely past. The SS is not apt to atrophy. It can be destroyed only by the destruction of German power itself.

APPENDIX III

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IN SOUTHEASTERN SIBERIA¹

The Map: Reliable information on Southeastern Siberia is more difficult to obtain than for any other part of Russia. The accompanying map, which is provisional only, is based on the most detailed information available. However, it was not in each case possible to differentiate between industrial plants in full operation and those believed to be still under construction. Only the major airfields and seaplane bases are shown. Roads are not differentiated as to quality, and it is possible that there are railways under construction in addition to those shown.

Despite Soviet efforts to develop the economic potential of Southeastern Siberia, industrial and agricultural production is not sufficient to sustain effective resistance to a prolonged Japanese attack, according to a current report of the East-European Section of the Office of Strategic Services. Russian resistance in the long run would depend upon stock-piles and the flow of supplies from other areas. Large stocks of food probably are available, and there may have been considerable stock-piling of industrial raw materials and semi-manufactured

¹ The area described in this report as "Southeastern Siberia" covers the territory bounded as follows: Lake Baikal on the west, the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk on the east, the Yakut A. S. R. and the projection of its southern boundary to the Sea of Okhotsk on the north, and Outer Mongolia and Manchuria on the south.

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products, although the extent of these accumulations is unknown. In view of the unsatisfactory prospects for maintaining a flow of supplies from outside in case of war, this least known element—the extent of stock-piles—may prove to be the most decisive factor in the economic situation.

Industrial and Agricultural Manpower

During the twelve-year period, 1926-1939, the population of Southeastern Siberia increased 77 percent, chiefly through immigration from European Russia (largely military personnel and urban workers and their families). In 1941 the total population of the area (represented on the accompanying map) is estimated at approximately 4,500,000. At the last census in January 1939, 45 percent of the population was urban, compared with 22 percent in 1926.

But despite the influx of industrial workers, a labor shortage was reported in 1940, when it was estimated that at least 200,000 persons would have to be brought in from other regions of the U. S. S. R. The principal shortages at that time—the latest season for which information is available—were in the critical coal, lumber, metallurgical, machine building, and building materials industries, and in rail and water transport. As of 1941, there was no evidence of manpower deficiency in agriculture.

The Food Situation

Southeastern Siberia as a unit is an area of food deficit. The very fact that progress has been made in industrialization and urbanization has contributed to the deficit. In the two administrative areas which lie farthest east and are most exposed to attack (the Maritime Krai and Khabarovsk Krai), the excess of consumption over production is especially serious.

However, there is reasonably good evidence that substantial stocks of food have been built up for local use in time of war, and particularly in the event that hostilities should put a stop to the flow of imports by way of the Trans-Siberian Railway. For the two easternmost Krai, imports of bread-grains in 1937, for example, when the local deficit was only about 320,000 metric tons, are shown by an analysis of statistics on freight movements to have been between 500,000 and 600,000 metric tons. The latest available statistics for freight movements indicate net grain imports greatly in excess of the local deficit.

There is a very serious current deficit in livestock in the two easternmost Krai. A large proportion of the cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats in Southeastern Siberia (which had as a whole in 1938 about the same number of livestock per hundred of human population as the rest of Russia) are concentrated in the western half of the area—that is, in Chita Oblast and the Buriat-Mongolian Republic. The herds in the two easternmost Krai have been increased since 1938, but the deficit must still be very serious.

Only in fish does Southeastern Siberia produce more than it consumes, and here the Khabarovsk and Maritime Krai have a virtual monopoly. But the salt-water fishing industry constitutes the one form of food production that a Japanese attack would immediately reduce very notably, if not destroy.

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The Industrial Situation

The status of industrial development in Southeastern Siberia is shrouded in Soviet mystery, and data are most inadequate precisely where the production of war matériel is concerned. It is not possible, therefore, to verify Stalin's statement to British Foreign Secretary Eden that Russian military forces in this area can be fully supplied from the "many" plants there.

However, several large new plants are known to exist, in addition to various old railway repair shops and shipyards. These former include the large locomotive plant at Ulan Ude, the reconstructed Dalzard shipbuilding plant at Vladivostok, a similar plant at Khabarovsk, an automobile assembly plant, and others. Airplane fuselage plants are reported at Komsomolsk and Vladivostok and an engine plant at Khabarovsk. Three fuselage plants which lie outside the immediate area under consideration also contribute to plane production for the Russian Far East, estimated altogether to consist of at least 200 planes per month. Tank factories are reported at Chita and Voroshilov, and at Voroshilov there is also said to be an "ammunition" plant, but no data on production are available.

Raw Materials and Power

The industrial capacity of the region depends in any case as much on the supply of power and of raw and semifinished materials as on the fabricating plants themselves. Here somewhat more is known, and the situation which the facts disclose is—like the food situation—relatively insecure. It may be summarized as follows:

1. *Coal.*—It is probable that an increased production of coal has been wholly balanced, if not more than balanced, by a similar increase in consumption. In 1937, when 6,300,000 metric tons were produced locally, the region imported about 1,500,000 tons, and it is believed all this was consumed currently. If this is true, the annual deficit is at least this large. And of the 10 producing coal fields in 1937, the four which produced about two-thirds of the local supply lie within 100 kilometers of the frontier and consequently are strategically the most insecure.

2. *Electric Power.*—The coal situation vitally affects the electric power supply, since most of the power stations are coal-burning. A few use oil, and the remainder wood. There are no known hydro-electric plants. There is a wide range in estimates of the power produced by these stations (even if only those rated at 100 kilowatts or over are considered): if stations which were under construction in 1937 are now in operation, the probable total capacity lies somewhere between 93,000 and 307,000 kilowatts. The maximum figure is less than the amount of power currently supplied daily to consumers in Washington, D. C.

3. *Iron and Steel.*—Up to 1940 there was no steel production in Southeastern Siberia, and the output of pig iron did not exceed 5,000 metric tons annually. In 1937 the region imported about 200,000 metric tons, some of which may have been stock-piled, although the lack of data on consumption prohibits any estimates as to quantities. Since 1940 two full-cycle iron and steel plants have come into partial operation. One, at Petirovsk, is supposed to have, when completed, an annual capacity of 95,000 metric tons of pig iron and 125,000 tons of steel; the other, at Komsomolsk, 150,000 and 250,000 tons, respectively. It is not known

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whether either plant is producing pig iron as yet, but, pending full operation, the region must depend largely on imports.

4. *Petroleum.*—Northern Sakhalin oil wells (including both Soviet and Japanese-concession wells) produce an estimated total of approximately 600,000 metric tons of crude oil annually, of which the Soviet share in 1939 was 469,000 tons. Despite this substantial production, imports from other parts of the U. S. S. R. totalled 400,000 metric tons in 1937, and it is very likely that a portion both of imports and of local production was stored. In the event of attack, the Sakhalin fields would be notably insecure.

5. *Non-ferrous Metals.*—Important zinc-lead mines are located in the Tetiukhe district on the Sea of Japan, but they are immediately vulnerable to Japanese attack. Larger deposits are located in the Trans-Baikal district, but development of them has been retarded. Tin ores also occur in the latter area and there are several concentrators and smelters, but while Trans-Baikal is reported to be Soviet Russia's chief domestic source of tin, there is a complete dearth of statistics on production and consumption.

6. *Cement.*—If all the cement plants projected in the Third Five-Year Plan (1937-1942) have been completed, Southeastern Siberia is self-sufficient in this product. One plant existed in 1937, at Spassk, producing in that year 164,000 tons. In the same year, 400,000 tons were brought in from the outside. Six additional plants, with a total capacity of 525,000-630,000 tons per year, were planned, but only one had been completed by 1939.

Transport

It is evident from the above analysis that the ability of the Russians to sustain a long war against the Japanese in Southeastern Siberia depends in large measure not only on rail transportation within the region but on transportation from the rest of the country to this region. In neither case can the present-day situation be considered satisfactory.

The railway pattern which, with the Chinese-Eastern, perhaps provided adequate logistical support before the Japanese advanced to the Amur, can no longer be considered secure in the event of a Japanese attack. The double-tracked Trans-Siberian (the main line) runs roughly parallel to the frontier for 2,400 kilometers west of Vladivostok, never more than 120 kilometers from Japanese-held territory. Several long bridges (notably the Amur bridge at Khabarovsk, only 37 kilometers from the frontier) and numerous tunnels (in the Baikal section of the line) increase the vulnerability of the railway. The several branch lines from the Trans-Siberian to the frontier, while facilitating the deployment and supply of Russian forces along the frontier, also offer convenient lines of advance for Japanese thrusts against the main line.

The Trans-Siberian Railway obviously is of the greatest strategic importance. Perhaps 75 percent of the population in this region lives within five miles of the railway. All of the seven cities of 50,000 or more, with the exception of Komsomolsk, are on this line. Five-sixths of the agricultural population which resides along the upper Amur and Ussuri valleys and in adjacent areas is likewise concentrated near this railway. It is the only adequate supply line from regions west of Lake Baikal. So long as it remains intact and in Russian hands, it has ample

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capacity (6½ million tons yearly, one way) to accommodate peacetime imports of supplies from the west, as well as local movement within the region.

Without this rail line, the communications network virtually ceases to exist. Aside from air transport, traffic from areas to the west of Lake Baikal would then be limited to the river-road route which makes use of the Lena from Kirensk and the road connection from the Lena south to Bolshoi Never on the Trans-Siberian. Motor transport is a very recent development in the region. Most of the roads are unsurfaced, and some are passable for motor transport only when frozen.

The most notable addition to the transport network, the Baikal-Amur Railway, is not yet completed, and probably will not be for some time. Begun in 1932, this line will provide an east-west transport artery at a safe distance north of the frontier and will greatly strengthen the Russian logistical position. Some portions of this new line are in operation.

The Amur River—the principal means of inland water transport—would be of little use above Khabarovsk in case of war, since it forms the boundary with Japanese-occupied territory. Maritime transport to Vladivostok and other Soviet ports on the Sea of Japan from overseas points likewise would be cut off. Overseas transport to Nikolaevsk at the mouth of the Amur would depend on the degree of control exercised by Japan over the Kurile Strait, separating the Kurile Islands from Kamchatka (not shown on the map). Overseas supplies would probably be limited to the amount that could be brought in (a) by tractor-sled trains in winter from ports on the Bering Sea accessible to Alaska, (b) by sea in summer to the mouth of the Lena and thence upstream, and (c) by sea routes to European Russia and thence to Siberia by rail, in so far as the Trans-Siberian Railway remained in Russian hands.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

October 8-15, 1942

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For the President

October 8-15, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

In the largest Allied daylight bombing raid to date, Flying Fortresses and Liberators operating against Lille this week took a heavy toll of German fighters. This raid was only the most ambitious of a series of daylight operations which have instituted a process of accelerated attrition of Nazi fighter strength. If this process were maintained at the current level over a period of months, its implications for the United Nations war effort in Europe would be very far-reaching. It is to be noted that during this same period the RAF has exacted heavy losses of German bombers over Malta, and British and American air forces have destroyed a considerable number of planes in the Egyptian theater.

Before Stalingrad the Germans have altered their tactics—resorting to heavier air and artillery bombardment and decreasing the force of their ground operations—but there is no indication that they have abandoned their intention to reduce the city this fall. The indomitable Russian resistance continues, and the struggle within the city is apparently settling into the grooves of trench warfare.

While the collaborators continue to talk of an Anglo-American invasion of Africa, the Germans apparently intend to play along with the Laval regime, despite the slim returns of the latter's labor campaign.

The bitter see-saw battle in the Guadalcanal area continues, with the enemy now apparently intent upon a show-down. The enemy's disproportionate losses in the air here weigh heavily against him in a war of attrition. In the

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Aleutians, American air power can now concentrate on Kiska, the sole remaining Japanese base, and even there the enemy's resistance has notably declined.

The continuing crisis in India is now threatening constitutional government in two of the Indian provinces. Meanwhile, the Hindu Mahasabha is seeking national unity in support of a program to oblige the British to compromise, and to this end it is considering proposals for an interim solution of the thorny Moslem problem. On the Far Eastern diplomatic front, British and American announcements of willingness to negotiate treaties ending extraterritorial rights have heartened the Chinese.

Mr. Welles' public castigation of Chile's overtly anemic policy toward the Axis has occasioned comprehensibly sharp repercussions in official Chilean circles but has apparently also stirred some patriotic sensibilities among the public, a situation upon which the Axis radio has been quick to capitalize.

American Raid Over Lille

The United States Army Air Force raid against Lille, involving 115 B-17 and B-24 four-engine bombers and an escort of more than 400 RAF and American fighters, was the largest daylight bombing attack ever launched by United Nations forces against enemy-held objectives. Particular interest attaches to the operation because of the success of the Flying Fortresses and Liberators: they not only were able to defend themselves against concerted attacks by F. W. 190's and Me. 109's, but they destroyed an unusual number of their assailants (enemy losses probably amounted to more than 10 percent of first-line fighter strength in the West).

The raid served two general purposes. In the first place, it engaged the German fighter screen, which has demonstrated some reluctance to defend French territory against Allied

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sweeps by pursuit planes alone. United Nations forces have apparently been willing to exchange plane losses with the Luftwaffe in an attempt to reduce enemy fighter strength in the West, and have used bombers flying with a large fighter escort to draw German planes into combat. Secondly, it aided in the acclimatization of American bomber pilots and crews to the flying and fighting conditions which they will encounter in precision bombing missions conducted in daylight against objectives in the European theater. The Lille raid climaxed—at least temporarily—the use of United States bombing planes for these two purposes. The United States Army Air Force has been steadily increasing the size of its attacking bomber force from 12 on August 17 to 66 on September 6 and 74 on October 2.

Allied Objectives and German Losses

The raid on October 9 was directed primarily against steel and locomotive works in Lille, on which 65 of the planes dropped 142 tons of high explosives and 9 tons of incendiaries. The attacking force, encountering strong fighter opposition as well as heavy anti-aircraft fire, was singularly successful in destroying enemy fighter strength at a low cost in bombers lost. Apparently, the Allied fighter escort served primarily a tactical function as a protective covering to the bombers, since little direct combat appears to have taken place between Luftwaffe and British and American fighter planes.

The official reports estimate that the Fortresses and Liberators, flying in tight formations to achieve the maximum concentration of fire power, destroyed 48 German planes, probably destroyed 38 more, and damaged 19. American bomber losses were only four planes. Five enemy aircraft were also destroyed, one probably destroyed, and three damaged by United Nations fighters, at a loss of only one plane. German losses may be compared with air operations

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during the Dieppe raid of August 19, when an estimated 93 enemy planes were destroyed, 39 probably destroyed, and 140 damaged. While enemy losses at Dieppe were considerably higher than at Lille, they were obtained at a sacrifice of 110 British fighter planes destroyed.

Following the general practice of considering as actually destroyed 50 percent of the probables and 30 percent of the damaged, one can estimate total German aircraft losses during the Lille engagement as 79. Although there are varying reports on the number of German fighter planes stationed in the West (Occupied France, Belgium and Holland, Germany, and parts of Norway), one can probably consider these losses as equal to between 10 and 15 percent of first line fighter strength in this area. Furthermore, the replacement of German fighter losses in the West may well have required the diversion to this theater of newly-produced planes which might otherwise have been sent to Russia or the Mediterranean.

Air Activity in the Egyptian Theater

While General Montgomery, commander of the Eighth Army in Egypt, announced that the British were "preparing for the next round", ground operations were limited to a few sharp actions and the usual patrols. There are indications that some defensive positions are being established by the Axis about 10 miles behind their forward positions.

The week's main activity was in the air. Apparently taking advantage of unusually wet conditions in enemy landing grounds, the RAF made six attacks on El Daba, destroying about 20 planes on the ground or in the air, with more than that number listed as either probably destroyed or damaged. At the same time United States B-24's, assigned to long range missions, attacked shipping and ports in Crete, Greece, and Cyrenaica.

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After a virtual cessation of air attacks on Malta, the Axis this week abruptly resumed large-scale raids. Such attacks have been interpreted in the past either as preparatory steps to storming the island or as an effort to neutralize it for purposes of Mediterranean shipping. The Axis may be planning to increase the flow of supplies to Rommel in anticipation of more active fighting; or shipments may be going to Tripolitania, where unofficial reports have indicated a concentration of Italian troops for defense in the event of an Allied landing to the west. Meanwhile, Malta's fighters are taking a heavy toll of the raiders—66 planes destroyed and a larger number damaged, according to dispatches from Malta.

Change of Tactics at Stalingrad

Although the Germans have not abandoned the attack on Stalingrad, as some newspapers have asserted, they have significantly altered their tactics. They have decreased the scope of their ground assaults, while employing their available air and artillery strength in an intensive bombardment. Under cover of this lull, the Soviet defenders have regained some ground formerly held by the enemy north and south of the city, and have improved the fortification of their own positions. The Germans, however, have similarly been able to repulse continued Soviet counterattacks from the north. There is no convincing indication as yet that the Nazis have renounced their intention of taking Stalingrad this autumn; if only for reasons of prestige, it would seem necessary for them to continue the assault. But there is evidence that the Russians have fought them to a standstill, and that the struggle in the city is beginning to take on the character of trench warfare.

Military observers believe that the Germans control the greater part of Stalingrad's central section inside the railroad loop—including part of the river bank and the two railroad stations, as well as the Mamayev Hill to the north, and the

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western edge of the Rykov Workers' Settlement, the first suburb to the north. The Soviet forces apparently hold the eastern part of Rykov, including the Red October Metallurgical Plant, the Barricades State Machine-Building Plant, and the Dzerzhinski State Tractor and Tank Plant, and the surrounding workers' settlements. To the south of the city, the situation is confused, with Russian units resisting in the suburbs.

A certain increase in the intensity of the German attack around Groznyi has paralleled the change of tactics in Stalingrad, and the Nazis have stepped up their bombing of the oil refineries in that area. From this development some observers have concluded that an all-out drive toward the Caucasus would replace the attack on Stalingrad. In the last few days, however, the Germans have made only slight gains, and the Russians have succeeded in counter attacking with some success. It is as yet too early to predict the scope of coming Nazi operations in the North Caucasus.

To the west, on the Black Sea coast, while Soviet units have successfully defended the ports of Gelendzhik and Tuapse against German attacks from the north, an enemy column approaching from the east threatens to encircle the latter port. But north of Gelendzhik Russian naval units have attacked successfully behind the Nazi lines.

Meantime, on the central and northern fronts German efforts to eliminate Soviet salients have achieved minor successes. Here the autumn rains—with occasional snow and freezing—have already begun. American military observers anticipate little activity in these sectors during the next few weeks.

Laval and the Labor Problem

Labor for Germany continues to be the central problem at Vichy. Although there is apparently some division in German circles, the demand persists for 150,000 skilled

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workers, of whom only about 17,000 have been enrolled to date. Observers are highly skeptical, but Laval presumably hopes to get one-third of the balance through his present campaign and one-third by future economic threats. He is reported to realize that only force can get the remainder. Laval will make every effort to avoid recourse to such measures, and the best opinion at Vichy is that the Germans are themselves not yet ready to use force. The fact that the deadline has again been extended to the end of November and that Laval is able to delay and still retain control of the program indicates that for the present at least the Nazis are disposed to maintain his regime at Vichy.

Nevertheless, the pressure of rival and more extreme collaborators persists. Three Cabinet members, Platon, Marion, and Abel Bonnard, are reported to be causing Laval concern by appointing to office Doriot's followers. For example, Marion is choosing as censors and personal observers in every prefecture the heads of the local Doriot Party.

German Interest in the Defense of French Africa

German officials in Paris have again expressed the hope that an agreement can be reached for the proper defense of Morocco, presumably giving the Germans certain privileges of military importance in French Africa. In this connection Déat is reported in the Paris press to have recommended a pact with the Nazis similar to the agreement with the Japanese in French Indo-China. Paul Marion, Laval's Minister of Information, has taken the opportunity to state publicly that the United Nations will probably attack the French Empire instead of the Axis, and that consequently France must cooperate with "Europe" in her own defense. The Paris press publishes daily stories anticipating invasion, and refers to large assemblages of Anglo-American troops in Freetown, Bathurst, Liberia, and Gibraltar, and naval concentrations off Brazil.

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A report from Bern suggests that the Germans are allowing the French to send a certain number of tanks for the defense of Dakar. General Noguès, however, is reported by our informant to be hostile to any agreement which would allow the Germans to move into Morocco.

Negotiations Over Syria and Madagascar

Arriving in London, De Gaulle was at first indignant over the Syrian issue, but he has since entered into negotiations, apparently feeling that continued resistance would hurt his cause elsewhere—particularly in Madagascar. In his proposals to the British, De Gaulle is reported to have given up any demand for military command in the Levant, and to have yielded in the matter of the elections, proposing that they be called for April, 1943.

The British have indicated that settlement of the Syrian issue is a condition for possible extension to the Fighting French of control of Madagascar's civil administration. In any event the British intend to retain military control on the island. This week the British column moving slowly south from Tananarive occupied Ambositra and pushed on to the south. Concentrated some 50 miles ahead are French and native forces numbering about 3,000 men, most of whom were withdrawn from the region around the capital. Observers express doubt, however, as to whether these forces plan to fight any more than a delaying action.

Reports from the Near East

President Roosevelt's reception of the Turkish journalists now in this country was featured in the Turkish press as a special favor indicating American interest in that country's problems. The Turkish papers carried lengthy dispatches from these journalists dealing with the United States war

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program and America's determination to fight the war to the finish.

In Iran the currency shortage caused by the needs of Allied forces is again acute. The recent currency issue of 300 million rials has been absorbed, and a new and larger issue is needed. The Irani are concerned about the inflationary effect of this situation, which is one factor in the friction that continues in British-Persian relations.

The Russians are making an obvious effort to smooth their relations with Iran, presumably because of Russia's increasing need of a friendly power on the southern supply routes to the Caucasus. Stalin personally received the Persian envoy, and the latter returned from Moscow with guarantees of the integrity and independence of Iran, together with an official Russian declaration of friendship.

In Iraq the reshuffling of the Cabinet was due simply to internal differences. The Finance Minister was dropped on suspicion of racketeering in handling supplies.

Goering and the German Bread-Basket

Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering last week told his people that the present food picture on the home front was none too satisfactory. Deliveries from occupied Europe have proved disappointingly small, he said—barely enough to sustain the German armies, with little or nothing left over for civilians. The people of the Reich, and the prisoners and foreign workers now within its boundaries, will have to subsist on what Germany can produce on its own soil; and Germany, it will be remembered, has never been agriculturally self-sufficient.

For the future, however, the Marshal promised a heart-warming flow of Russian agricultural products. The Reds, he noted sadly, "have burned everything." But, he added, "We shall build more. Slaughter houses, canning factories,

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marmalade factories, basket factories, noodle factories; eggs, butter, flour—yes, they are there, in such abundance as you can't imagine. All we have to worry about now is to take proper hold on the spot."

Taking a "proper hold" may, indeed, give Goering's men something to worry about, according to observers here. If the Germans intend to harvest crops and put up factories in this conquered area, they will have to feed and clothe those who do the harvesting, the building, and the machine-tending. Whether, after they have provided for these helots, there will remain any substantial surplus of farm products to be shipped home to the Reich this year is certainly dubious.

Failure to import sizeable quantities of agricultural products from Russia in the near future will not, of course, cause Germany to starve: her present food production and stocks are sufficient to give her people a more or less adequate diet. But any significant improvements in German nutrition within the next year or two must wait upon further exploitation of the occupied portions of Russia.

Showdown on Guadalcanal?

At Guadalcanal, the Japanese apparently have come to the conclusion that a war of attrition in the Solomons is not to their benefit, and are pushing for a showdown. Despite losses suffered at the hands of an Allied naval task group brought into action in the waters off Guadalcanal to counter Japanese night landings, the enemy has been able to shell our airfield and to put fresh troops ashore.

The intensity both of our own and the enemy's operations has steadily increased throughout the past 10 days. On the night of October 5-6, in the face of our air attacks, a force of six Japanese destroyers succeeded in covering the landing of additional troops on the northwest coast of Guadalcanal—losing one destroyer sunk and one damaged. Elsewhere in

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the lower Solomon Islands adjacent to our positions, Japanese infiltration also continued, although here too we had inflicted some damage on enemy ships.

The ability of the Japanese to reinforce their positions at night despite our air attacks was then countered on our side by the use of a naval task force for night patrol. In its first encounter with the enemy on the night of October 10-11, this force sunk one heavy cruiser, four destroyers, and a transport. One American destroyer was lost, and some other warships were damaged, none seriously.

On the morning following the engagement, Navy and Marine torpedo planes and dive bombers, in pursuit of the Japanese, obtained a torpedo hit on another cruiser, which was left burning. That afternoon, a cruiser believed already to have been damaged in one or the other of the above actions, was hit again and the crew was seen abandoning ship. During the night, however (October 11-12), a Japanese naval force returned to Guadalcanal and shelled our positions. On October 12 and 13, our air reconnaissance disclosed the presence of at least 51 Japanese naval units in the Solomons area—9 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 31 destroyers, 2 cargo ships, and 3 unidentified vessels. During the early morning of October 15, Japanese troop ships—covered apparently by heavy naval units—began unloading reinforcements, again on the shore westward of the American positions.

Japanese Air Losses

Air attacks have continued to batter enemy positions in this area, from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, and it is our tactical superiority in the air which may have influenced the Japanese to attempt to force to a conclusion the developing war of attrition.

Guadalcanal is the only good site for an airfield in the lower Solomons, and defensive operations here have been very much to our advantage. Japanese air losses over Guadalcanal alone from August 27 to September 17 are reported by

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the new chief of the Navy Department's Bureau of Aeronautics at 133 planes shot down, compared with a loss of 25 of our own aircraft. Some estimates of total Japanese losses in the New Guinea-Solomons theater since the offensive began in early August range as high as 600-700 planes (including accidental and other operational losses as well as planes shot down).

New Guinea Lull

In New Guinea, Allied patrols on October 8 caught up with small Japanese rear parties just south of the Gap in the Owen Stanley Range, but there has been little activity since then, due apparently to inclement weather. Advance troops have occupied the Gap, and some skirmishes are reported on the north side of the range, but Kokoda remains in the enemy's hands. The track thence to the Japanese base at Buna continues under air attack. The Japanese have improved their air raid warning system at Lae, but apparently are not making much use of the airdrome itself.

Bombs on Rabaul and Kiska

At Rabaul, Army bombers have attacked steadily and in force, dropping the largest weight of bombs yet used in the Southwest Pacific—40 tons in one raid on the night of October 8-9. After a similar attack the next night, fires were visible for 90 miles, and the bombings have continued. No night fighter interception has been reported, although 71 fighters and 6 bombers were observed at nearby Lakunai airdrome the day following the first attack.

Far to the northwest, in the Aleutians, Japanese inactivity in the air is striking. Here, where our air forces can now concentrate their assaults on the sole remaining Japanese base at Kiska, there has been no reported fighter interception since the first heavy attack on October 6. Enemy shipping like-

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wise appears to be scarce, although some submarine activity has been noted. On October 12, our bomber pilots reported two beached ships, two medium freighters, one small camouflaged ship, and one AA ship in the Kiska area.

Decay of Constitutional Government in the Indian Provinces

The dismissal of Allah Baksh, Premier of Sind, has brought into clear relief one of the paradoxes of the current Indian political scene. In five provinces constitutional ministries, responsible to elected assemblies, are trying to carry on a policy of conciliation—in opposition to the repressive policy of the Central Government, which is responsible only to the Viceroy. Prior to his dismissal Baksh had renounced all the honors and titles bestowed on him by the British and had issued a statement strongly condemning their current policy of repression—a statement quashed by the official censor after only one paper had carried it. The Central Government—at whose direction, apparently, the Governor of Sind (a Crown appointee) dismissed Baksh—evidently regarded his actions as a sign of "disloyalty." Observers now predict that the resignation of the rest of the Baksh coalition ministry will soon follow.

In Bengal, the coalition ministry of Fazlul Huq is approaching a similar crisis. The Governor of Bengal apparently accuses one member of Huq's ministry of running a sort of civil disobedience movement of his own in his department of the administration. Huq, on the other hand, feels that he is not receiving adequate support from the Governor, and that the European and Moslem League members of the Bengal Legislature are working together against him. After a talk with the Viceroy, Huq has now professed himself as satisfied with the former's assurance that he would urge the Governor to work in harmony with the ministry. In the opinion of local observers, however, relations between the

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Governor and the ministry are moving rapidly toward an open break.

Such an event, our informants continue, would be a calamity for the province. Huq has urged that the United States mediate the Indian issue, and has been particularly successful in maintaining Hindu-Moslem cooperation in Bengal—the most populous province of India, and one with a scant Moslem majority. His dismissal, they conclude, would result in the Governor's rule by ordinance, with intensified civil disturbances, and perhaps communal riots.

The Position of the Mahasabha

Six provinces in which Congress ministries resigned in 1939 are already ruled by ordinance. A parliamentary debate on a bill to continue this temporary government has given Lieutenant Colonel Amery, Secretary of State for India, an opportunity to reject once again any attempt "to appease the unappeasable opponent." In India, however, compromise negotiations between Indian party leaders have continued. Leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha are now considering a proposal emanating from certain Moslem League members to concede to the Moslems 40 percent of the membership of a provisional Indian Central Legislature, provided the League agree to renounce for the duration of the war its agitation for a separate Moslem state. Another proposal envisages the concession of *Pakistan* in principle to areas with a 65 percent Moslem population—an international court to work out the details at the end of the war.

In an official resolution of its Working Committee, the Mahasabha has accused the British of exploiting the current disturbances in India by a "policy of blind repression," designed to crush the forces of Indian nationalism. The resolution calls on all Mahasabha members to join in a mass campaign behind the "national demand" and appeals to all

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other Indian parties to cooperate in forcing the British to seek a compromise. In another statement for the press, the Mahasabha refers to the stand of the United Nations on India as the "acid test" of their idealistic professions. A prominent member of the Mahasabha has stated in confidence that only coordinated pressure by the United States and China can bring the British to terms, while the Indian Agent-General to China, just back from Chungking, reports great bitterness among the Chinese over the current policy of repression.

Although the week following Gandhi's birthday passed a good deal more quietly than local observers had anticipated, violence has flared up in Karachi, hitherto relatively calm, and in southwestern Bengal, where food riots are agitating the rural areas. In Orissa and Bangalore the police have again fired on nationalist demonstrators. In Bombay many Congress sympathizers last week shut down their businesses for the duration of the week, and a general strike is now threatening.

Toward Relinquishment of Extraterritoriality

The announcements by the United States and Great Britain that they are prepared to negotiate treaties providing for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China added much cheer to Chungking's celebration of the Chinese National holiday, the "Double-tenth." Newspapers had extras on the streets of the city shortly after the news arrived, and big posters soon appeared in public places. The Generalissimo told a responsive crowd that Chinese must henceforth redouble their efforts to make China a truly free and independent country, one worthy of being a member of the United Nations.

The extraterritorial rights in question stem from the treaties of the nineteenth century, but the practice of letting foreign traders administer themselves was customary in

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China as early as the T'ang dynasty (618-907). Arab traders on the China coast dealt with Chinese authorities through their own leaders or headmen, while the headmen settled all inter-Arab disputes and difficulties. Much the same practice flourished after the East India Company began trading at Canton. Chinese officials concerned themselves with disciplining the English "barbarians" only in the rare cases of homicide against Chinese, and were otherwise well content to let the English keep themselves in order.

Specific legalization of the accepted practice was achieved by Caleb Cushing, American Minister to China, in the Treaty of Wang-hsia (1844). The treaty of Nanking (1842), which terminated the first Anglo-Chinese war, contained no provision for extraterritoriality, although regulations issued by the British in 1843 did provide for the application of English consular jurisdiction over English criminals in China. Articles XXI and XXV of Cushing's Treaty, however, explicitly provided for extraterritoriality in both civil and criminal cases.

The Chinese negotiators of the Cushing Treaty made no protest against the clauses dealing with extraterritoriality, nor were Chinese authorities particularly concerned over the later developments of the principle in the Treaties of Tientsin (1858). With the growth of Chinese nationalism, however, the existence of extraterritoriality became increasingly irksome to Chinese leaders, particularly since it presented a severe obstacle to effective national administration in such important areas as Shanghai. In recent years, the abolition of consular jurisdiction has been a constant objective of the Chinese Government, and the Kuomintang has laid particular stress on the issue.

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The Columbus Day Announcements

For months every Italian-language newspaper in the United States, regardless of political affiliation, has argued for the removal of enemy-alien restrictions on Italians in the United States. Beyond a doubt the two alleviative measures announced by Attorney General Biddle on Columbus Day will receive enthusiastic and unanimous approval from Italo-Americans. The elimination of the literacy test for citizenship in the case of about 200,000 elderly Italian immigrants may in the long run exercise more practical effect than the decision to take Italians out of the enemy-alien category, according to analysts in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the office of Strategic Services. As a war measure, however, the latter is more vital and more immediately significant.

Although at this writing the statements of only a few Italian journals can be cited, it can be safely said that unanimous approval of these measures will not imply unanimity of opinion as to what measures should now be carried out. For some time past, the organized anti-Fascist Italians—the Mazzini Society group which is identified with Count Sforza, the Communists, the Socialists, and the trade unionists led by August Bellanca and Luigi Antonini of the Italo-American Labor Council—have been clamoring for a crack-down on pre-Pearl Harbor Fascists, citizens as well as aliens. Countless "exposures" have been published against "converted Fascists": Ettore Patrizi, publisher of the San Francisco *L'Italia* and *La Voce del Popolo*; Generoso Pope, publisher of the New York City *Il Progresso Italo-Americano* and *Corriere d'America*; and those associated with *L'Araldo* of Cleveland, *La Notizia* of Boston and *L'Italia* of Chicago. It now appears probable that the anti-Fascists will demand that the generosity of the Columbus Day measures be balanced by firm measures against men of this type and their associates. The Army's

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action in ordering Mr. Patrizi and four associates to move inland from the Pacific Coast, announced on October 10, will no doubt be held up as an example to be followed elsewhere.

Mr. Welles Forces the Issue

Months of patient and tactful diplomacy having failed to induce Chile to "stand up and be counted" with the Allied democracies, the State Department in the person of Mr. Sumner Welles has now virtually called for a show-down. Speaking at Boston, Mr. Welles roundly condemned both Chile and Argentina for permitting their territories to be used as bases for Axis operations against American shipping. In the case of Argentina, the remonstrance has merely emphasized the already obvious coolness that characterizes our relations with the Castillo Government. But the rebuke to Chile represents a new departure in policy.

Until very recently, it had been hopefully forecast in many quarters that the Ríos Government in Chile would soon break off relations with the Axis. Few illusions were held concerning the anti-fascist sentiments of either Ríos or his Foreign Minister, Barros Jarpa. But the pressure of the pro-Allied leftist bloc which elected Ríos was counted upon to swing the government into line with the rest of the Americas; and Ríos' acceptance of President Roosevelt's invitation to visit the United States was widely regarded as an encouraging sign.

However, no definite move by Chile against the Axis was forthcoming, even after the belated discovery by Chilean authorities that an Axis spy ring actually did exist there. Apparently convinced that soft words would no longer avail, the State Department decided on sterner ones.

The repercussions of Mr. Welles' speech have thus far followed a fairly predictable pattern. President Ríos has cancelled his trip to Washington. Barros Jarpa has denied

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with much eloquence that subversive activities by the Axis have taken place on Chilean soil (even though these activities have been fully publicized by his own country's press). He has, further, castigated Mr. Welles' remarks as a gross affront to Chilean national honor.

Unfortunately, despite the pro-democratic sympathies of the majority of Chileans, Barros' resentment has found some reflection in the public at large. The manner and timing of the Under-secretary's rebuke appear to have stirred the public's patriotic sensibilities, and the Axis radio has been quick to exacerbate the wound. It remains to be seen what lasting tactical advantage Barros and the pro-neutrality forces of the right have gained, and whether or not they can consolidate their influence over Ríos.

Espionage Trials in Brazil

The Brazilian police campaign against Axis espionage, hitherto limited to detaining suspects, has reached a harsher phase with the trial of five civilians before a military court on charges of espionage. Under the national defense laws of Brazil, espionage is punishable as high treason by imprisonment or death. One of the defendants, Ernst Holek, vice president of Condor Airlines before its forced reorganization, has long been suspected by United States authorities of feeding military information to the German counter-blockade. Other defendants are Affonso Aboim, employee of Condor; Aulete Albuquerque, the only woman implicated; and Plauto Carneiro Mesquita, government employee.

An unexpected feature of the case is inclusion as a defendant of Dr. Cauby Araujo, President of Pan American Airways' Brazilian subsidiary. Reputed to be a staunch upholder of United States interests, he was suddenly arrested a short time ago. Details of the charges against him have not been made public.

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APPENDIX

ISLAND STRATEGY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Two days after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese dispatched a naval task force to the northern Gilbert Islands. Now, provoked by the Marines' attack upon the Solomons, they have occupied the southern Gilberts as well, and are apparently in process of occupying Funafuti in the Ellice Islands. Various reasons for Japanese interest in these remote Pacific atolls are explored in the following survey¹ by the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

Strategic Considerations

The attractions which the Gilbert and Ellice group present to Tokyo are clearly strategic rather than economic. Even a people with a standard of living such as the Japanese enjoy are unlikely to covet the Islanders' menu of coconuts, pandanus fruit, undersized pigs, and muscular chickens; nor is their output of copra any great prize. Fresh water is scanty on these barren atolls and islets; indeed, the Japanese occupying force would have to bring the bulk of its supplies with it, whether or not confiscation of food from the natives were resorted to.

Japanese activity in the Gilberts area, in short, must be viewed in the context of the whole South Pacific naval struggle, for the move here appears to be but one of several the enemy has been making to counteract, if possible, the advantages we gained in occupying the southern Solomons. Others include the now abortive drive upon Port Moresby via Buna, the reinforcement of positions still held in the Solomons and New Guinea, the attempt to seize control of the China Strait through the capture of Milne Bay, and, finally, the occupation of the phosphate islands of Nauru and Ocean, west of the Gilberts.

The objectives of the infiltration through the Gilberts are, presumably, four: (1) to enable the Japanese to outflank the Solomons on the northeast side; (2) to provide stepping-stones down from the Japanese bases in the Marshalls; (3) to extend the range of Japanese reconnaissance and Japanese attacks upon our supply routes from the United States; and (4) ultimately, perhaps, to support an investment of United Nations bases in Samoa and Fiji.

Do the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, however, offer sufficient shelter for planes and ships to make all or any of the above objectives feasible? It would appear that the most they can contribute to the Japanese naval and air effort are docking facilities for very light ships, and anchorages for seaplanes under favorable weather conditions. A few small airfields might be hacked out of the coconut and pandanus groves, but there appear to be no level or cleared spaces immediately available.

Facilities

Historically, the reason why the Gilberts and Ellices have remained so isolated and undeveloped has been their lack not merely of resources but of good harbor and

¹ See accompanying map.

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anchorage facilities. The atolls have been so unpromising, their lagoons so treacherously choked with coral, that few of them have been adequately charted. There are fair channels and anchorages at Makin (recently raided by our Marines), Apalang, Tarawa, Apemama, Nonuti, and Tapeteoes. But none of these could accommodate any large number of vessels, and only at Makin and Tarawa could ships of respectable draft enter the lagoon. Even there, the anchorages lie several hundred yards offshore, and landings could only be made across the fringing coral at high tide. The rest of the atolls and islets have, at most, a passage for small boats, and ships must lie outside on the lee side.

Seaplane facilities are somewhat better. As far as can be deduced from existing surveys, most of the lagoon islands among the Gilberts contain suitable landing space, and one at Funafuti in the Ellice chain is adequate. In fine weather, moreover, emergency landings could usually be made on the lee sides of the other islands.

What the Japanese Have Gained

Nature has placed definite limits upon the scope of operations the Japanese could undertake from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands area. It is, for example, extremely doubtful if they could mount an invasion force on these atolls of a size to threaten seriously the main United Nations bases of the South Seas. Nor would they be able to use the Islands in any true sense as an advance base for their heavier forces.

On the other hand, it would be dangerous to discount the value of the Islands as bases for light naval vessels and seaplanes. These minor forces can play a major role in the logistic battle of the South Pacific merely by forcing our lines of supply back from the Canton Island route as far south as Samoa, or further. Moreover, whatever light forces the enemy can base on the Gilberts or Ellices will be available to join such battleships and aircraft carriers as may come down from stations nearer Japan, making the whole task force that much less dependent on a supply train. Whether the Japanese can continue to hold the Gilberts and to menace the Ellices is something else again; but as long as they do, their forces, big or small, flank our supply route from Hawaii to the Solomons. The importance of that one strategic fact is very considerable.

The Gilbert Islands

The Gilberts are part of the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands (Crown) Colony. They comprise 16 small island units with a total land area of approximately 150 square miles. Ten are of atoll formation. Of irregular shape, they vary from 5 to 40 miles across, and have a ribbon-like succession of islets mainly on the east or weather side of their lagoons, and usually reefs, spits, and coral patches on the west side. The remaining six are either coral islands ringed with reefs, or else islets built up on reefs.

None of the Gilberts is over 8 to 12 feet above sea level, and the average is only about 4 feet. They are exceedingly barren, with at most a meager deposit of humus over bare coral rock or sand. The natural growth is limited to coconut palms, pandanus, and a few shrubs. There are no running streams, and the local inhabitants were obliged to use brackish water until modern cisterns were installed to catch rainwater.

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In this inhospitable setting, the Micronesian-Gilbertese people manage to sustain a population among the densest for its area in the world. The natives total about 28,000, or an average of nearly 200 to the square mile. In some places, the population is reported to exceed 1,000 to the square mile. With the progress of medicine the death rate has fallen away below the birth rate; overpopulation has become a grim reality, and a factor to be taken into account in assessing the implications of Japanese occupation. In the two years immediately preceding the war, some 2,000 land-hungry Gilbertese were moved by the British authorities to new colonies on the uninhabited Phoenix Islands in an attempt to alleviate the problem. The white population at the opening of the war totalled about 60, and there were some 25 Chinese, a handful of Japanese, and nearly 200 recognized "half-castes."

The Ellice Islands

The Ellice Islands comprise nine coral islets and atolls, with a combined land area of only about 16 square miles. Funafuti, the most important unit in the group, is of atoll formation, as is Nukufetau; the others are of island type. The Ellices are low, like the Gilberts, but in general are more fertile. The natives are Polynesians who are known to have moved there from Samoa some four centuries back. They number today about 4,500 and are increasing rapidly. By 1937 the white population had fallen to two. The islands, in fact, were recently closed by government order to white visitors.

Adjacent Islands

Ocean Island stands out in contrast to both the Gilberts and Ellices in having had a considerably larger non-native population. Being the administrative capital of the Gilbert and Ellice Colony, it had, consequently, a bigger official staff. But the great majority of non-natives were employed by the British Phosphate Commission. The island is nothing more than a barren, sunbaked hump, about two and a half square miles in area, possessing rich deposits of natural phosphate rock. The native Micronesian population are relatives of the Gilbertese, and number today about 1,800. At the end of 1938 there were also 140 whites, close to 700 Chinese indentured laborers, and about 150 Gilbertese laborers.

Cantilever arms reaching out across the reef from the phosphate workings once loaded close to 400,000 tons of phosphate annually into the special vessels of the British Phosphate Commission, which took it to New Zealand for use as fertilizer.

Nauru, to the west of Ocean, is an even richer phosphate island. Somewhat larger (about 8.5 square miles in area), it was at one time a German colony. After the last war, it was taken over by Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand as a mandated territory, the responsibility for administration being delegated to Australia. The population comprised in 1940 about 1,800 Micronesian-Nauruans, together with 190 whites, 1,500 Chinese laborers, and 30 Gilbertese laborers. The British Phosphate Commission controlled the phosphates here, too; exports in 1938 totalled about 841,000 tons.

The Phoenix Islands

The Phoenix Islands, farther east, are eight in number, four being atolls and the others coral islets. Of the Phoenixes, Canton and Enderbury are held jointly

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by the United States and Great Britain, and the others are included within the Gilbert and Ellice Colony. Most of them are practically devoid of vegetation, and until recently they have been uninhabited except for temporary camps of guano workers.

Canton Island was developed about 1938 by Pan-American Airways as one of its stop-over points on the Clipper route to the South Pacific. Howland and Baker, American islands further to the northwest, are low and flat, of coral formation, and uninhabited until recently.

Eastward, a thousand miles or more beyond the Phoenix group, is another north-south chain of islands, not shown on the map. These, the Line and northern Cook Islands, are especially vital links in the line of supply between Hawaii and the South Pacific, now that the Japanese hold the Gilberts. Fanning, one of the Line group, is one of the way-stations on the cable from North America to the South Pacific.

Evacuation

The Gilberts, together with other British Pacific Islands, had been on a war footing from September, 1939. Most of the women and children from white families had already been evacuated when Japan launched the war. According to eye-witness accounts, the Japanese struck at the northern Gilberts on December 10, 1941, shortly before dawn. They occupied Makin and Apaiang, and captured several whites there, especially Roman Catholic mission workers. At Tarawa, two Japanese destroyers appeared off the lagoon entrance and after the settlement had been machine-gunned, a landing party was put ashore. The local officials had already dismantled the masts of the local radio station, having heard of the bombing of Ocean Island the previous day, and the Japanese immediately completed its destruction. When they departed, they carried away all available goods and foodstuffs.

At first, the Japanese tied up the whites, but later after questioning, released them. These people were, of course, stranded on the island and had to subsist on native foods. Nearly three months later a motor launch and lifeboat from a torpedoed Danish vessel put in at Tarawa after a long voyage during which most of its passengers had died. The survivors, together with 25 white residents, escaped in these boats, only a small group, largely Catholic missionaries, electing to remain. Meantime, resident whites in the rest of the Gilbert Islands had been evacuated, either to Fiji or to Australia.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

October 15-22, 1942

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For the President

OCTOBER 15-22, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

In the face of notable air and naval losses, the Japanese continue their steady encroachment on the American position at Guadalcanal, and events are now shaping a final decision in the struggle for the southern Solomons. The recent concentration of Japanese effort in Middle Melanesia has been accompanied by withdrawals in New Guinea and the Aleutians and by quiet elsewhere in the Far East. The intensity and concentration of the current Japanese offensive is a measure of the store they set by conquest of this area—at once the base for harassment of the American lines of supply to Australia and an essential protective shield for the Japanese flank in the event of future offensive action against Siberia, China, or India. With the end of the monsoon, indeed, observers are canvassing the possibilities of a limited Japanese offensive into Assam which would seriously embarrass the already slender program of Allied air supply to China.

In the northern suburbs of Stalingrad the Germans have improved their position by driving a wedge through a factory district to anchor their lines on the west bank of the Volga. At the same time, northern Africa is prey to uneasiness: Axis defensive preparations in Egypt suggest expectation of a British attack, Nazi propaganda expresses "alarm" over an Allied invasion of Northwest Africa, and French authorities appear worried lest Mussolini exploit possible Tunisian disorders to invade that colony.

Suspense at Guadalcanal

The tempo of Japanese activity in the southern Solomons has declined momentarily, but the battle for Guadalcanal is

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apparently moving slowly toward a dramatic climax. The Japanese so far appear to have been unable to render our airfield untenable for any length of time, and for the present they have confined their efforts to occasional bombardment of our positions. This they have been able to accomplish with a certain amount of freedom, apparently, but not without suffering damage themselves.

Little ground activity has been reported since October 15, when Japanese troops on the island were reinforced with men and artillery put ashore under the protecting guns of a naval force, which included at least one battleship.

Despite these reinforcements, the Japanese may still be slightly outnumbered on the ground, and it is likely that some additional troops will be landed before a full scale attack is launched. The Japanese may also wish to develop their artillery positions further, since they appear to hold some tactical advantages for the use of artillery fire. Heavy and continued ground bombardment of our positions might well accomplish what Japanese bombers and Zeros have been unable to do. The Japanese positions, however, have themselves been under fire, both from our aircraft and our surface vessels, and it is unlikely that the situation on the ground will long remain static.

Air and Sea Action

Air and naval forces meantime have borne the main burden of the action. Our air forces at Guadalcanal continue to shoot down a disproportionate number of Japanese planes—19 out of 40 in one raid intercepted by Grumman Wildcats, with a loss of but 2 of our planes, and an entire flight of 14 bombers on another occasion, when anti-aircraft fire also contributed to the destruction.

Since October 15, our air attacks in the northern Solomons have resulted in reported damage to one heavy cruiser, and

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possible damage to two cruisers and an undetermined number of cargo ships or transports. In the southern Solomons, torpedo boats, planes, and shore batteries since the night of October 13-14 have reported damage to a battleship, two cruisers, some destroyers (not specified), and perhaps five transports, of which at least two were beached and destroyed. But no warships have been sunk, and the Japanese still have large forces available in this area for action, including both battleships and aircraft carriers.

No fleet engagements have been reported, although we have lost two destroyers. The Japanese shelled our Guadalcanal positions on the night of October 15-16 and again, October 17-18, after our vessels had shelled Japanese positions the previous night.

The Coming Decision

The seriousness of the situation on Guadalcanal is self-evident. In view of our present widely publicized handicap in fighting "a two-ocean war with a one-ocean navy," a decision in our favor would weigh heavily in psychological as well as in military results.

Since their defeat in the Coral Sea battle in early May, the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific theater have revealed a certain mental stasis. Their inability to proceed successfully toward the occupation of Port Moresby and the consolidation of their positions in the Solomons apparently surprised them. They have for some time underestimated their foe. When they were surprised and set back in the lower Solomons and at Milne Bay, the Port Moresby venture by sea became next to impossible, but the Japanese still attempted to accomplish all results at once—the overland capture of Port Moresby and the recapture of the Solomons. In the latter project, they have wasted much air strength and have given our forces more time to prepare against a

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serious counterattack than they had presumably anticipated.

The Japanese now apparently have decided to put all their Southwest Pacific eggs in one basket, regain Guadalcanal and perhaps start again where they were six months ago—before they lost the naval battle for Port Moresby. Meantime they are showing indications of strain both in air power and in shipping. On New Guinea, where they have been pushed back to within six air-line miles of their main forward base at Kokoda, no Japanese air forces have attempted seriously to challenge our air supremacy. At Kiska in the Aleutians, air interception of our continued bombing attacks has been virtually non-existent. The appearance near Kiska this week of two destroyers carrying crated cargo may indicate, not an attempt to “disguise” the destroyers, as press dispatches suggested, but a possible shipping stringency.

Limited Campaign in India?

In India, where the end of the monsoon season again brings the threat of Japanese action, observers believe the enemy is still capable of a limited offensive. With the probabilities of a major new campaign in Siberia steadily dwindling, and with an all-out campaign against India also unlikely, the Japanese might find their most favorable opportunity in a limited land campaign against Assam and Bengal. Such a campaign would be designed to impede still further our aid to China and possibly to gain a foothold for a later concerted sea-and-land attack against India, should Allied defenses be disrupted by internal disorder.

While there were evidences of some troop movements into Thailand during September, no large concentrations have been reported in Burma. Some reports have suggested small-scale Japanese movements northward from Akyab, but an overland offensive of any size in India is not yet in sight. The Japanese in Burma recently have been active in the con-

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struction and improvement of airfields, but these activities might be interpreted as indicating defensive rather than offensive intentions, since Japanese installations in Burma have been under increasing Allied air attack. The possibility of offensive action against India can not be ruled out, however. While a limited offensive toward Assam would meet severe obstacles of terrain and transport, it is believed that these difficulties are not insurmountable (see Appendix III). By occupying northern Assam, the enemy would double the length of our air route between India and China. Payloads would be reduced, and the chances of successful air interception would increase to such an extent that even our present “token” aid might end.

Mounting Economic Hardships in China

Such a reemphasis of Chinese isolation would come at a difficult time for China. This would be notably true with respect to the Chinese economic position. Drought, spring frosts, and locust plague have contributed to the development of a severe famine in the province of Honan. Chekiang and Kiangsi are suffering keenly from the looting and destruction of foodstuffs which accompanied the recent Japanese campaign in those provinces, and difficulties of transportation have reduced the beneficial results of the good harvests elsewhere in China.

Prices continue to spiral upwards. Heavy government war expenditures, only partially covered by taxation, have been met by the sale of bonds to official banks, which in turn use the bonds as cover for the issue of paper currency. Difficulties of production have led to increasing scarcity of consumer goods. The index of prices has registered the results. Wholesale prices, on the basis of an index of 100 for the first six months of 1937, rose to 1400 in June 1931; 2400 in December 1941; 4300 in April 1942; and 5930 by the beginning of September.

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The cost of living is the chief topic of conversation in Chungking. A bus ride of any distance in the city costs \$3 Chinese national currency (CNC\$20 equals US\$1) while a 20-minute rickshaw ride costs from CNC\$15 to CNC\$20. Rice costs about CNC\$300 a picul (110 pounds). Matches of local manufacture are CNC\$1 a box, cheap paper is CNC\$.10 a sheet, and local sugar CNC\$25 a pound. During the past summer, which was one of the hottest in Chungking's history, ice sold at CNC\$40 a 50-pound cake.

Imported goods are almost prohibitive in price. Coffee and cocoa are CNC\$150 a pound; baking powder CNC\$110 a pound. A pack of American cigarettes, if it can be found, costs CNC\$100. Chewing gum is CNC\$15 a pack, while ice cream (illegal by government decree) is bootlegged at CNC\$10 a dish. Such luxuries can be dispensed with, but to low salaried American missionaries and relief workers it is a grim fact that evaporated milk is CNC\$75 a can, and that a second-hand suit of Western-style clothes, in reasonably good condition, costs CNC\$2,000.

The Mahasabha Turns to the United States

In India the official policy of repression, while producing a measure of outward calm, has as yet failed to eliminate popular discontent. Fabrication of bombs in the home is apparently becoming a popular indoor sport, and reports tell of the establishment of special classes in bomb-making at Bombay, and the planting of more than 20 bombs in one day in that city. Faced with this situation, the Hindu Mahasabha has appealed to President Roosevelt to intervene in the interests of Indian independence and the formation of a national government. The use of India as an Allied military base, the Mahasabha warns, is no longer merely a domestic problem, and unless decisive action comes quickly, it may soon be too late for a friendly settlement between India and Britain.

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On the British side there is still no hint of compromise. But the arrival of General Auchinleck in India has aroused speculation to the effect that his appointment as either Viceroy or Governor of Bombay is in the offing. The terms of the incumbents of both these offices expire in April. Such an appointment might be meant as a friendly gesture toward India on the part of the London government, which considers that Auchinleck had a liberal record when he was Commander-in-Chief in India. New Delhi observers suggest, however, that General Wavell would object to the appointment as Viceroy of an officer junior to himself, and that hence the Governorship of Bombay is a more likely possibility. Meantime, one Indian member of the Viceroy's Council has predicted in confidence the further Indianization of that body in the very near future.

Encirclement in the Stalingrad Suburbs

The crushing German attack on the Dzerzhinski Tractor Plant in the northern suburbs of Stalingrad has apparently outflanked the Soviet defenders of the Rykov factories just to the south, and has given the Nazi attackers a northern anchor on the west bank of the Volga. In these newly-won positions the Germans will probably emplace artillery for counter-battery against the Russian artillery across the river. Meanwhile, the attackers have captured the Barricades Munitions Factory in the Rykov district. The defenders still control the Red October Metallurgical Plant and the nearby petroleum plant. But with the Germans again pressing the attack in the streets of the city proper, Stalingrad's chances of continued resistance are apparently diminishing.

In the Groznyi area, the German advance toward Darg-Kokh has evidently reached the Russian main line of resistance. On the shore of the Black Sea the threat against Tuapse from the east has grown, as the Germans have

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advanced to a point almost within artillery range of the port. The classic Soviet tactic of defense in depth, however, is apparently proving effective in the wooded hills around Tuapse, which afford the Germans little scope for extended maneuver. North of Tuapse the Nazi column advancing toward the port of Gelendzhik has taken two villages.

Elsewhere on the front, rain and mud have paralyzed the opposing armies. And with the continued resistance of Stalingrad, Helsinki observers are becoming less confident about predicting an attack on Leningrad this autumn. The reported construction of fortified lines to the east of Narva, Estonia, and along the Luga River across the Russian border may indicate that the Germans have abandoned the idea of an assault and are making preparations for another winter of siege. Reports further suggest that the number of Nazi troops garrisoned in Estonia is still very low.

The End of the Military Commissars

The decree of October 9 abolishing the institution of military commissars is not so sweeping a change as one might at first suppose. A supplementary order of the Commissariat of Defense, coupled with editorials in the official press, have made it clear that political influence in the Army is not a thing of the past, but will now be in the hands of line officers (probably former military commissars), who will serve as second-in-command of the various Army units.

The chief objection to the previous system was apparently the division of command that it entailed. For this reason, during the Winter War with Finland, Stalin deprived the commissars of their military authority (subsequently, after the defeats of 1941, he revived this authority—apparently doubting the loyalty of some of the Army officers to himself

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and to the military system established after the purge of 1937). In the view of an American observer, the insuring of unity of command was not the sole motive behind the present change. Stalin had apparently become convinced that officers of all ranks were loyal to him, and he had developed personal ties with the principal generals. Moreover, the line officers themselves objected to the system—evidently feeling that they had proved their loyalty on the field of battle. Lack of confidence between officers and commissars was, moreover, impairing morale at the very time that the government was seeking to build it up in preparation for a winter of difficulties. Finally, there was a lack of officer material to replenish the ranks of both line officers and commissars; under the new system, many of the military commissars, after a short period of training, can become effective line officers.

The Second Front Again

Agitation by the Soviet press and populace for a second front has not diminished during the past few weeks. The chief notes still seem to be, first, that a second front is perfectly feasible, in view of current German troop dispositions; second, that if Britain and the United States do not open a second front this year they will be ignoring an implied promise. New themes have been added by one major-general, who has attempted to explode the theory of victory through air-power alone, and by the historian Eugene Tarlé, who has analyzed the miscalculations of British diplomacy in past wars. At least one speaker has made capital out of Mr. Willkie's statement that some people in Allied countries might need to be "prodded" on the second front issue—pointing out that Mr. Willkie was the personal representative of President Roosevelt and the political representative of 22 million voters.

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In analyzing the reasons behind this Government-sponsored agitation, one observer has suggested that it represents both an effort to put all possible pressure on Britain and the United States, and an attempt to deal with the disappointment of the Russian people, whom the Government had led to expect a second front this year. By placing the blame on the Anglo-Saxon countries, and by indicating that Russia is doing all in its power to induce them to open a new front, the Soviet Government may hope to deflect popular irritation from itself. Furthermore, the Government is apparently making an effort to acclimate the Red Army to the idea that it can expect no substantial relief from the West until next spring at the earliest.

Preparations in Egypt

Events in Egypt continue to indicate Axis defensive preparations in anticipation of a possible British attack. If such an attack should develop, observers suggest that in its early stages it will probably be far less a war of movement than previous desert battles, because both ends of the battle line are for the first time anchored to natural barriers. Moreover, both sides have organized defenses in some depth. Infantry and artillery would play a major role in this period of trench warfare, and the superior Allied supply situation in ammunition would be a favorable factor. Axis strength in medium tanks is now estimated at more than 500.

The continuing raids on Malta presumably have covered shipments to Rommel and perhaps to Tripolitania. During the first 6-day period of attack, small groups of JU-88's, escorted by about 50 fighters, conducted a continuous offensive against Malta that is estimated to have cost the Axis 92 planes destroyed, 35 probably destroyed, and 109 damaged. Planes from Crete and North Africa were brought to Sicily to participate in these raids.

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Axis Alarms Regarding Northwest Africa

Axis-controlled propaganda organs continue to voice their alarm over a coming Anglo-Saxon descent on Northwest Africa, an attack which, it is alleged, will be coupled with a British offensive in Egypt in a grand effort to drive the Axis out of Africa. The collaborationists in Paris are reported to be urging the Germans to take over the defense of North Africa to forestall the Allies, and German officers on the scene have frequently advised this step. Vichy, however, has as yet shown no sign of adopting such a program.

French shipments to Dakar have increased markedly during October, but this may be only to compensate for previous lags in supply. Meanwhile, Vichy has been developing airfields in the Dakar area. Rumors are circulating that Darlan and units of the Toulon fleet may shortly move to North Africa; but recent weeks have seen only very minor changes in the disposition of the French Navy. Press reports of major fleet movements are without foundation.

Problems in Tunisia

The Bey of Tunis is becoming increasingly restive under French control, according to several reports from Tunisia. His immediate efforts are directed at the removal of Admiral Esteva and at greater Arab participation in the government of the Protectorate. An American observer believes the Bey, who came to power only in June, is well liked by the populace. He and his entourage are reported to be willing to cooperate with Vichy, but they may be driven toward the Axis by the persistence of French authorities in their traditional colonial policy. For his own reasons, Laval would also apparently like to see Esteva displaced, though feeling that the latter's removal at this time might have the appearance of a concession to the Bey that would be detrimental to French prestige in the area.

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At the same time French officials in Tunis have once again expressed the fear that Mussolini is watching for any internal disorders in Tunisia which would favor his alleged invasion plans.

Laval Cautious as the Labor Program Meets Resistance

Laval's efforts to get French workers for the Nazis continue to meet serious obstacles, and it is quite evident that German demands will not be met, according to reliable advices from Vichy. Strong methods are producing minor results in the Occupied Zone, where the French Government is also resorting to heavy pressure to induce interned Spanish refugees to work for the Reich. In Unoccupied France Laval has encountered a wave of slowdowns and strikes, spreading from Lyon to almost a dozen other centers. Most of the strikers have returned to work, but slowdowns persist.

An example of Laval's difficulties is the report of a plant in the Lyon area in which 700 workers out of 4,000 were designated to go to Germany. Only 30 actually agreed to go. The rest were deprived of their jobs (the only sanction used to date in support of the September 4 decree). Unemployment is a serious threat, and the workers are now prohibited from enlisting in the French armed services as an escape. The Communists, however, promptly pledge up many of those thrown out of work, and seem to have enough money to support them. This development worries conservatives, already irritated by the Communist "monopoly" on patriotism. Some industrialists are, therefore, themselves reported to be supporting their patriotic unemployed.

Sensing (with characteristic accuracy) the depth of feeling aroused by this issue, Laval is acting with great caution. He is using police power to maintain order and minimize sabotage; but he has taken no judicial action against the strikers, despite the "illegality" of strikes in Vichy France.

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Indeed, Laval has shown no inclination to use force, and has apparently convinced the Nazis that the prestige of the police would be shattered if they should enter workers' homes to send the latter to the Reich. The Nazis are apparently not anxious to take upon themselves the onus of labor conscription, even in the Occupied Zone. They seem willing to secure what workers Laval can get, and in the meantime keep him in power under continual pressure, according to advices from Vichy. Pétain has expressed the pious hope that the world will sympathize with the difficulties of his Government's position.

Economic Aspects of the Occupation of Madagascar

British forces this week pushed slowly south of Ambositra into southern Madagascar, enveloping a minor French stronghold. Still ahead of them are understood to lie about 3,000 French and native troops; the British, nevertheless, have for some time enjoyed control of the important parts of the island.

Allied occupation brings to an end the two-year blockade of Madagascar. The simple native economy has not greatly suffered during this period, but normal exportable surpluses have decreased. Now the United Nations will have the opportunity to replenish their low stocks of high-grade graphite and mica, as well as to get small quantities of sisal, beeswax, and hides; and substantial quantities of foodstuffs should be obtainable for the use of our armies in Africa and the Near and Middle East. Increased production of these strategic materials for the United Nations can be obtained if fuel, vehicles, machinery, and consumer goods are sent to Madagascar.

Cabinet Crisis in Iran

The wheat problem has precipitated an acute internal situation in Iran, with the Cabinet reported as likely to resign.

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Increasing discontent over financial issues and the treatment of Iran by the United Nations has been brought to a head by the present failure of the British to meet Iranian demands for wheat, in the face of a shortage to which Allied consumption has largely contributed. The British apparently feel that supplies can be secured from the provinces and that wheat should be offered only on an exchange basis—to which the Irani object that "exchange" thus far has proved highly one-sided.

Chile Changes a Cabinet and Perhaps a Policy

Following arduous and skillful maneuvering by Chilean prodemocratic elements and an exchange of cordial messages between the Presidents of the United States and Chile, the political struggle set in motion by Sumner Welles' Boston speech has now developed its own momentum. As a result, former Foreign Minister Barros Jarpa has lost not only the initial psychological advantage which he gained by exploiting wounded Chilean pride, but his position in the cabinet as well. Without openly endorsing Mr. Welles' remarks and indeed explicitly rejecting their implied reflection on Chilean honor, anti-Axis forces adopted the tactic of supporting President Ríos and his decision to postpone his trip, but at the same time attacked Barros Jarpa as the chief obstacle to better relations with the United States. This pressure on Barros appears to be the immediate cause of the cabinet crisis which has now given Ríos his opportunity of changing foreign ministers and thereby taking a long step toward fulfilling Chile's hemispheric obligations.

Central American Contretemps

A spat between Presidents Ubico of Guatemala and Somoza of Nicaragua brought their respective countries this

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week to the verge of a diplomatic rupture, as both Costa Rica and the United States made last-minute efforts to mediate the dispute. The publication of an attack on Somoza in the government-controlled press of Guatemala City had brought an energetic protest from the victim. As the altercation developed, Somoza indicated his willingness to accept a token gesture of reproof against the author of the article; but Ubico remains adamant. Thus far, there is nothing to indicate that the controversy involves anything more than a personal and quite irresponsible feud between the two presidents. However, it has provided Axis agents and sympathizers in Central America with a first-class opportunity to increase hemispherical disunity.

Góes Monteiro Departs

On October 20, the Brazilian Government announced that General Pedro Aurelio de Góes Monteiro, Chief of Staff, has been granted an indefinite leave of absence "because of poor health". Since Góes has actually been ill for some time, observers are inclined to accept the official explanation. But this scarcely lessens the significance of his departure: the General had been until recently leader of the pro-Nazi bloc in the Vargas administration. His retirement from the scene should give no little encouragement to democratic forces within Brazil.

Cuba Establishes Relations With Russia

Cuba and Russia, hitherto estranged, have now established diplomatic and commercial relations. Soviet assistance to the Loyalists in the Spanish civil war, and, more recently, the gallant defense of Russian armies against Hitler, developed widespread Latin American sympathy for the U. S. S. R., especially in countries with well-organized anti-fascist move-

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ments. Recent statements by responsible political leaders in Uruguay and Mexico indicate that these countries may soon follow Cuba's example, and Colombia, according to its new Foreign Minister, Turbay, will shortly exchange diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union, implementing its 1935 agreement.

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APPENDIX I

THE SOUTHERN RUSSIAN FRONT: SEPTEMBER 1-
OCTOBER 21, 1942¹

The close of August 1942 brought with it a significant change on the Russian front. The Soviets abandoned their tactics of withdrawal, which had permitted the Germans to advance at an average rate of 15 miles a day throughout July and (in the Caucasus) through mid-August. Since the beginning of September the Nazis have made no important territorial gains on the Eastern Front (see map).

Soviet strategy has been consistent since the beginning of the war, and the campaign of 1942 has shown marked similarities to that of 1941. In 1941, the Russians made decisive stands, first to the east of Smolensk, and then at Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov. This summer the Red Army broke off its retreat at Voronezh, Stalingrad, Grozny, and Tuapse. For two months the Germans have been unable to capture any of these points, and the front is tending to become as "positional" as modern mechanized warfare will permit. In 1941, the Soviets required five months' "withdrawal time" before they could contain the German blitz. In 1942 they needed only two months.

Prelude to the Struggle for Stalingrad

On July 29, 1942, mobile German forces arrived in the vicinity of Kletskaya, 80 miles northwest of Stalingrad, after driving eastward for almost a month. About the same time, German troops reached the west bank of the Don near Kalach, 50 miles due west of Stalingrad. One week earlier, the Wehrmacht had driven to Tsimlyanskaya, on the Don River midway between Rostov and Stalingrad, established a bridgehead in the face of stiff opposition, and struck south into the Caucasus. Despite continued Soviet air and ground attacks on the hastily constructed German pontoon bridges, the Nazis widened their bridgehead near Tsimlyanskaya. Fresh reserves turned toward the east and managed by August 5 to reach Kotelnikovo, 95 miles southwest of Stalingrad on the Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk Railroad. The stage appeared set for a conventional pioneer movement with the points at Kletskaya and Kotelnikovo, perhaps buttressed by a German drive due east from Kalach.

At this point, however, although heavy front-line clashes continued, the German forward advance stalled. The necessity of converting the Likhaya-Stalingrad Railroad as far as it had been captured, of amassing supply reserves, and of bringing up fresh forces probably all played a part in the delay. The Stalingrad front did not change appreciably until August 21. Then the Russians acknowledged that German tanks had forced a break in their lines at Kotelnikovo, and by August 25 the Germans were 25 miles southwest of Stalingrad. Northwest of the city, German tank and troop crossings of the Don near Kletskaya began on August 20, and on August 25 the Russians admitted German successes in the Don-Volga corridor. August 25 is generally accepted as the date the direct push on Stalingrad began. By the end of August the

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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pincers had closed to Kachalino and Abganerovo at least. Then came another lull while the Germans gathered strength for what they had probably planned as the final blow.

The Battle of Stalingrad.

This blow came on September 7 when, abandoning their attempts to encircle the Soviet defenders, the Germans struck in a frontal attack from the neighborhood of Kalach. German attacks from three sides followed in rapid succession through September 15. Then began the unparalleled house-by-house resistance of the Russians, as German forces finally drove into the city's outlying streets.

The tactical details of the Stalingrad struggle since mid-September do not merit extended discussion. Gains and losses of either side were measured literally in streets and even in houses. During the first few days in October, however, increased Russian pressure began to make itself felt north of the city. Ten Russian divisions from Western Siberia joined the defenders, perhaps striking from the neighborhood of Kletskaya and Kachalino, in an effort to drive in the Germans' exposed left flank and trap the Axis forces fighting within Stalingrad itself.

On October 9 the Berlin radio announced that the German High Command had changed its tactics. The doggedness of Russian resistance and mounting German casualties (Moscow claimed the latter had reached 200,000 killed) compelled the utilization of heavy artillery and dive-bomber barrages to reduce the city before German infantry could take possession. The threat on Stalingrad's north flank remained strong, and may well have been one reason for this German move. October 11 marked the first lull at Stalingrad in 48 days. Four days later, however, the Germans resumed the attack, with two infantry divisions and 100 tanks driving at the northern suburbs of the city.

Meantime, at Voronezh, the Russians maintained the initiative against the northern anchor of the German offensive. This threat of a major action may have prevented the Germans from shifting forces of significant size to the Stalingrad area.

The Caucasus

By September 1 the German forces which had passed through Rostov on July 24 had captured Temruk and Krasnodar in the western portion of the North Caucasus, had occupied most of the oil fields of Maikop, and were advancing toward Novorossiisk and Tuapse. To the east, fighting had reached the vicinity of Mosdok. In this sector the Russians had halted their withdrawal about the middle of August, and German progress became slower and costlier. The battle for Stalingrad, at the same time, did not permit the invaders to strengthen their Caucasian armies.

On September 1, the Germans captured the small Black Sea port of Anapa. Mopping up the Taman Peninsula, opposite Kerch, the Nazis entered Tamanskaya on September 5. By September 6 the Germans had reached Novorossiisk, but were unable to capture this important Black Sea port and naval base until the twelfth. Fighting in this area has continued on a moderate level since mid-September, but the Germans have made no further substantial progress.

The eastern prong of the Caucasus drive has likewise made little headway,

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probably owing both to a lack of reserves and to stronger Russian resistance. During September the Germans made no concrete gains. With the beginning of October, however, they began to exert stronger pressure along the railroad loop east and south from Prokhladnaya. The Germans claimed to have stormed Elkhovtovo on October 3, and Malgobek, about 20 miles south of Mosdok, on October 7. The Malgobek claim has been specifically denied by the Russians. The indecisive nature of the fighting in this area suggests that any concrete German gains probably must await a decision at Stalingrad.

Air Losses

The following tables summarize the official communiqué figures on air losses of both sides from late August to the present:

A. RUSSIAN REPORTS

Week ended	German losses claimed	Russian losses admitted
Sept. 6.....	450	250
Sept. 13.....	415	281
Sept. 20.....	310	205
Sept. 27.....	206	156
Oct. 4.....	257	137
Oct. 11.....	123	78
Oct. 18.....	130	49

B. GERMAN REPORTS¹

Period	German losses admitted	Russian losses claimed
Aug. 25-Sept. 4.....	49	1,062
Sept. 6-7.....	5	168
Sept. 9.....	4	137
Sept. 10.....	8	128
Sept. 12-14.....	23	227
Sept. 15-28.....	77	990
Sept. 29-Oct. 9.....	36	459

C. AIRPLANE LOSSES FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER¹

Russian		German	
German claims	Russians' admissions	Russian claims	German admissions
2,134	915	1,435	141

¹ Occasional German reports furnish no data for September 5, 8, 11.
² Where necessary, linear interpolation was used.

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Both sides agree that this summer's air conflict reached its peak of intensity during the first two weeks of September—including the first week of the assault on Stalingrad. Press reports of 1,000 German planes attacking Stalingrad check with available information on Nazi air dispositions and with the Russian estimate of 1,500 sorties on certain days. The Germans sustained activity at a high level for a period of three weeks, after which they reduced their scale of air combat; the Russian figures for the past week are, in fact, the lowest since mid-April. It is possible that this reduction stemmed from a decision to shift planes held in reserve near Stalingrad to other parts of the front, as, for example, Leningrad. Yet in view of the Germans' apparent resolve to take Stalingrad at all costs, such a supposition seems unlikely. One can reasonably conclude that heavy losses and a lack of adequate replacements on the part of the Germans have been the chief reason for the recent decline in air activity.

APPENDIX II


GREEK FOOD OUTLOOK FOR 1942-43¹

Last winter the Greek food situation was the most critical in all Europe. Today, conditions are slightly less ghastly—not because there has been any basic improvement, but because since last April the Greeks have been receiving monthly shipments of wheat from Canada. Although the goal is 15,000 tons monthly, shipments have probably not been up to that level. However, the fate of the Greek people during the coming winter seems almost wholly dependent on the continuance of such shipments, which, although meager, spell the difference between life and death for the million inhabitants of the Athens-Piraeus region. It is in this urban area that suffering has been most intense. The self-suppliers in the provinces have fared badly, but in general have managed to ward off actual starvation.

Conditions, 1941-42

In the Athens-Piraeus region last winter, death from starvation became very common. The toll was heaviest among the homeless war refugees, many of whom, weakened by undernourishment, succumbed to the cold. After a bitter night, garbage trucks would gather up the stiff bodies from doorways and the recesses of buildings, along with the refuse, for burial in mass graves. Among the regular inhabitants the suffering was less spectacular, but little easier to bear. In the popular quarters, about half the families had one or more of their members in bed, suffering from physical weakness and sometimes mental deterioration, due to undernourishment. Among all classes were (and doubtless still are) found oedematous swellings, which begin at the extremities and gradually consume the entire body. The simplest cure for these swellings is a small quantity of olive oil and lemon juice; but olive oil, like all other fatty food, is unavailable in the urban areas.

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared by the Economics Division of the Office of Strategic Services.



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Rations

When one considers the meager rations on which the Greeks in this area have been largely dependent, the record of mass starvation is not surprising. The only food which the Greek Government has even attempted to distribute regularly is bread. Normally, average bread consumption amounted to 160 kilograms a year (about 438 grams daily), supplemented by 90-100 kilograms of other foods—chiefly potatoes, meat, olive oil, and dried vegetables. Until May, 1941, the Government managed to distribute a daily ration of 320 grams of bread. From that time on, until December, the ration steadily decreased, and at times ceased altogether. In mid-December the ration was 150 grams daily—about one-third of pre-war consumption. Moreover, the quality of the bread had deteriorated seriously, and consisted of 60 percent corn flour to 40 percent wheat flour. In January, rations were reduced to 128 grams, and were made entirely from corn flour. After that, distribution ceased altogether for several weeks.

During the summer and early fall of 1941 there were a few small distributions of other foods, such as meat, rice, sugar, and olives. In November, 300 grams of dried vegetables per person, from the International Red Cross Committee, were disbursed. In December, 80 grams of olive oil—the first in eight months—and 600 grams of sugar—the first in six months—were distributed.

Food from Other Sources

Besides the government's distributions, some non-rationed foods were available and some rationed foods could be obtained on the black market during the summer of 1941. There were enough of these in the Athens-Piraeus area to enable the average person to eat fairly well—at prices five times higher than before the war. Since last autumn, however, difficulties of communication and exhaustion of reserves have about dried up these sources of supply.

Communal Feeding

During the winter months, communal feeding became increasingly important. Soup kitchens for the people were operated in most urban areas, both before and during the war. After the war, when famished and homeless refugees began to flood the cities, an effort was made to extend these facilities. Most of the food-stuffs which it was possible to centralize were set aside for these canteens. But they by no means met the need. By the summer of 1942, some half a million persons were being served—not always a meal each day, but in some cases a meal every second day. The rations were small, of poor quality, and without any trace of fat. But even operations on such a scale would have been impossible without the shipments from the International Red Cross Committee, which sent in dried vegetables, chiefly from Turkey.

Reasons for Food Crisis

In order to judge whether, in the coming winter, the food situation will show any improvement, one must understand the reasons for the current shortages. The very grave situation in 1941-42 resulted chiefly from:

1. complete cessation of commercial imports after the armistice;
2. greatly reduced domestic supplies;
3. the breakdown of the distributive system within Greece itself.

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Even in peacetime the Greek people were less well nourished than those of many other nations. Only 15 percent of the land was cultivated, and the nation depended on imports for nearly half its food supply. Greece was self-sufficient only in fruits, fresh vegetables, wine, and olive oil.

Cessation of imports, then, had very serious results for the Greek people. Before the Red Cross arranged regular shipments from Canada in the late winter, no systematic provision was made for any food to be received from overseas. Germany and Italy apparently each sent small quantities. Serbia also may have sent some. But total Axis shipments very probably were not more than just sufficient to furnish 4 to 4½ ounces of bread daily to the million inhabitants of the Athens-Piraeus region.

Such Axis shipments as were made cannot be considered net additions to Greece's food supplies. Although the Italian army of occupation has been supplied from Italy, the German forces are living off the country. Moreover, the relief to the food situation expected in the summer of 1942 as a result of seasonal vegetable and fruit crops was lessened by the presence in Greece of a large number of German civilians, and by shipments to Rommel's army in Africa.

At the same time, domestic production in 1941 was curtailed by as much as one-third to one-half of the pre-war period. Perhaps the greatest blow to Greece was the cession to Bulgaria of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, areas of highest yields. These lands, in fact, had constituted Greece's granaries. They had also accounted for over one-fourth of Greece's livestock. Even on the Greek territories remaining, crop yields fell very low, due to shortages of labor, draft animals, power, and fertilizer.

Even if domestic production had been considerably greater, the food situation in the Athens-Piraeus area would not have been markedly different, because the distributive system broke down almost completely. This breakdown was due partly to lack of transportation facilities, which had been drastically reduced by army requisitioning of vehicles and by the fuel shortage.

After the armistice, the Government was left with very low reserves; and all its measures to procure foodstuffs from producers—particularly cereals, oil, dried vegetables, potatoes, and fruit—have failed completely. It is believed that the Athens Government acquired virtually none of the 1941 harvest, and there appears to be small prospect of its faring any better with the 1942 crop. Of the breadgrain harvest, now estimated to be about 300,000 tons, the government has requisitioned barely 35,000 tons. Such a quantity would be sufficient for only 4 ounces of bread per person daily if the distribution were confined to the million inhabitants of the Athens-Piraeus region. Spread over all the non-producers in Greece, the daily ration would be infinitesimal.

It seems doubtful, however, whether the Government will be able to collect even this small requisition from the Greek peasants. The Government has also requisitioned the entire 1942 olive crop, estimated at about 100,000 tons. But lack of transportation, as well as peasant resistance, is reported to be hampering its movement, and the Germans seem to have made no attempt to remedy this situation.

Outlook for 1943-45

The fate of the people in the Athens-Piraeus region during the coming winter, therefore, seems to depend chiefly on what can be acquired from overseas. At

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present, the only agreement in operation appears to be the one made through the International Red Cross Committee, for Canadian wheat; but Argentina has also promised to send some. If 15,000 tons were distributed monthly in the Athens-Piraeus area, it would provide a bread ration of 450-500 grams daily—or about the pre-war average bread consumption. It would, however, constitute virtually the entire diet of these people, with the exception of the meals served in soup kitchens.

The continuance of these soup kitchen meals is at present not assured. Where the peas and beans to provide them are to come from is still unsettled. Last winter, most of them came from Turkey; but available stocks there are now exhausted, and blockade authorities refuse to admit them from other Middle-Eastern countries. Recently, the Greeks proposed substituting 2,000 tons of dried vegetables for 2,000 tons of the wheat from Canada. In September the Greek Legation asked for 2,000 tons of dried vegetables and beans a month from Lend-Lease. But, so far as is known, no definite arrangement has yet been made.

If Greece received regularly the supplies asked for, the 1942-43 winter would be somewhat better than 1941-42, especially if the Germans made some provision for the Greeks to obtain control of olive oil supplies. With bread, dried vegetables, and olive oil, most of the population should be able to survive. At present, however, there is no certainty that even the Canadian wheat shipments will be continued—chiefly because their continuance depends on transportation in neutral Swedish vessels. If Sweden enters the war, the program will collapse—at least temporarily—until some other arrangement can be made. There is, in any event, no cause for optimism concerning the coming winter in Greece.

APPENDIX III

ROUTES AND TERRAIN ON THE BURMA-INDIA BORDER¹

At a time when the Japanese may be very reluctant to undertake a full-scale attack on India, they might well soon envisage a campaign of limited liability, calling for the occupation of the upper Brahmaputra Valley, with the objectives of cutting the India-China air route, capturing India's main domestic source of oil, and establishing a "jumping-off place" for a possible wider drive to the west and south. Japanese occupation of northern Assam would almost double the length of the air route between India and China and would so reduce pay-loads and increase vulnerability as practically to eliminate even the token value of the route.

Analysis of the terrain of the India-Burma borderland indicates not only that such a limited attack would be feasible from the viewpoint of supply routes, but that once having seized this sector the Japanese would be hard to dislodge (see accompanying map).

The most probable route for such a "limited offensive" runs from Ye-U in Burma to Manipur Road in Assam. This line, supplemented by the use of

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared by the Geography Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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water routes for the first 100 miles is the only one in this region which possesses real military utility, and would apparently suffice to carry the volume of matériel necessary for an expedition of this scope.

Possibilities of Attack and Defense

Once at Manipur Road, the Japanese would encounter no significant natural obstacles to seizing the oil fields and refineries at Digboi. To take Sadiya—the key landing area on the India-China air route—they would have to cross the Brahmaputra by ferry or pontoon bridge, not a particularly difficult feat, since the river here is relatively narrow and is reported to have comparatively little swampy land along its margins. Furthermore, in their advance into Assam, the Japanese would have greatly weakened the defenders in the upper Valley by capturing their supply routes: the Brahmaputra, the all-weather road south of it, and the Assam-Bengal Railway. Since Allied communications along the northern side of the river would be extremely tenuous, due to the dense tropical forest, the turbulent Himalayan streams, and the virtual absence of trails, the Japanese invaders would have a strong strategical advantage.

Attempts by United Nations forces to oust the Japanese from the valley would encounter tremendous natural obstacles if the enemy should succeed in pushing our covering forces from the Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia hills. On the south face of these Assam hills is a steep, rugged escarpment, 4,000 feet high in places and covered with an extremely dense tropical forest. The rainfall here is very heavy (424 inches annually at Cherrapunji compared, say, to approximately 40 inches at Washington). Only two routes traverse the hills from south to north—the road from Gauhati to Sylhet and the railway from Luding to Silchar. Both these routes could be effectively blocked at the southern escarpment where the railroad passes through six vulnerable tunnels. Once established in this range, the Japanese should feel relatively secure in their grip on northern Assam.

Barriers of Weather and Terrain

One reason why Japan has not pushed this overland assault before now has been the weather over the Bengal-Assam area. During the rainy season all land approaches to the Brahmaputra region from Burma are impassable to wheeled traffic; only pack animals and troops on foot can negotiate the roads, and these only with difficulty. In the mountains torrential rains destroy the light bamboo bridges, make crossing by raft or boat exceedingly dangerous, and cause landslides along the trails. Moreover, clothes tend to rot from constant wetting; weapons rust quickly; tropical diseases take their seasonal toll.

The monsoon, however, is now lifting, and the roads and trails of this district, such as they are, will soon be usable. If the Japanese push is to occur, it can begin at any time now.

The area which the attack would traverse is sparsely populated. The valley of the Chindwin River makes up the eastern section. In the west an unbroken line of mountains extends southward from the Himalayas. These ranges are narrow and at several places may be crossed at an altitude of about 6,000 feet. However, their steep slopes, constricted valleys, heavy rainfall, and inadequate roads have previously proved a formidable block to invaders.

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The Main Route

Starting from the Burma State Railway, the Ye-U-Manipur Road route is passable in fair weather as far as Palel, across the border, and at all seasons from Palel to Manipur Road—which is on the Bengal-Assam Railway. Its total length is 356 miles.

The auxiliary water route, using the Chindwin River to Kalewa and Sittaung, is of great significance, since it would enable the Japanese to transport heavy equipment to the base of the main mountain range without overcrowding the roads. In fact, if the Japanese do plan an attack here this fall, they will undoubtedly already have shipped this matériel as far as Kalewa, since, during the dry season just beginning, the freight capacity of the river dwindles from 20,000 tons a month to 3,000.

A rough estimate of the volume of traffic which the road from Ye-U to Manipur Road can handle was obtained in the civilian evacuation of Burma last spring, when a capacity of 160 motor buses a day was reached. Subsequently, the section of the road still held by the United Nations was improved, and it can be assumed that the Japanese have worked on the parts which they control. The road, therefore, should be capable of accommodating moderate troop movements. Whether the section from Ye-U to Kalewa could carry the heavy equipment and the supplies required for a more ambitious invasion of India proper is very dubious.

Section by Section

As of June, 1942, the condition of this road was reported to be as follows:

1. From Ye-U on the Burma State Railway to Kaduna, about 20 miles north, the road was passable by motortruck all year.

2. From Kaduna 67 miles west to Kalewa on the Chindwin River the route was a rough track under construction but passable during the dry season.

3. From Kalewa to Tamu, 101 miles north, the road was under construction through level to rolling country with dense jungle. Most rivers were fordable during the dry weather, but ferries were needed at some points, and bamboo bridges required reinforcement. The last 18 miles were metalled but so narrow and winding that speeds in excess of 10 miles per hour were impracticable.

4. From Tamu to Palel (35 miles northwest) the road climbs 4,500 feet to the crest of a mountain range, then descends 2,500 feet to Palel at the edge of the valley in which Imphal is located. This section was dangerous at all times and became impassable during the rains. Where the road cut through shale and rubble, serious landslides were expected during the wet weather. At the north end of this section, the road descends steeply to Palel.

5. From Palel to Manipur Road, 163 miles north, the route is metalled and open in all weather. Relatively level to a point about 20 miles north of Imphal, the road then enters the Naga Hills, becoming narrow and winding. One-way traffic operates on schedule to permit passing at a point 67 miles south of Manipur Road. The highest elevation is 6,000 feet.

Good defensive positions on the route are located in the section between Tamu and Palel and along the narrow mountain road between Imphal and Manipur Road. There is some possibility that either defenders or invaders might utilize a route leading from Imphal approximately 85 miles west to Silchar, which is on the railroad and the navigable part of the Surma River. This route, which

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includes 55 miles of pack trail, climbs 2,500 feet over the mountains, and then descends 4,000 feet to the Surma Valley. It affords excellent defensive positions but introduces serious transportation problems for all but light troops.

Alternative Routes

In general, routes from Burma to India lying north and east of the Ye-U-Manipur Road decrease in military significance as one goes northward.

(a) The southernmost route, which starts from Kawlin on the Burma State Railway, has been generally used by pack animals and pedestrians, and the 36-mile section from Sittaung to Tamu (described as a graded elephant path) might be improved as a supply route from the Chindwin River.


(b) Part of the next route north might be used as a link between the Chindwin at Homalin and the town of Imphal. As the distance in this case is 75 miles over foot trail, it appears probable that this route would be used only by light troops seeking to cut off defenders fighting farther south.

(c) Another trail from Tamanthi, head of wet-season navigation on the Chindwin, to Kchima north of Imphal, joins the road at a critical point but is too long and difficult to be important (157 miles, half pack-trail, half foot-path).

(d) The next trail to the north leads from Mogaung 280 miles to Ledo. In the dry season, motor trucks and bicycles use this route for about 75 miles to Maingkwan, and carts can travel to Shingbwiang, 30 miles farther. North of this point the route becomes an extremely precipitous trail through the mountains to an improved stretch of about 25 miles near Ledo. This route might be made passable for vehicle traffic and one "jeep" is said to have traversed the entire length during the dry season. However, unless improved since June, 1942, it should be considered only a potential route for light troops attempting a diverting attack on the defenders' rear.

(e) The northernmost route from Myitkyina through Monyak to Ledo is long (393 miles) and is too difficult for any extensive military use. Large parts are passable only on foot and a preliminary survey indicated that improvement for military traffic was impracticable.

CONFIDENTIAL



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

October 22-29, 1942

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For the President

OCTOBER 22-29, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

As the sanguinary struggle for Stalingrad continues without decision, observers point out that the Russians have already achieved two important objectives: they have prevented the Germans from reaching Astrakhan and striking at Russian sea-borne supplies on the northern Caspian before the ice sets in; they have forced the Nazis to continue the struggle into November when snows and gales of great severity are normal in this whole area.

Meanwhile in Egypt the British have struck a heavy blow against the Axis in what appears to be the beginning of a large scale drive. Although the British have won some initial advantages, observers predict that another week may pass before a significant break-through can be expected. With heavy attacks on his rear bases in north Italy and on his Mediterranean shipping, Rommel's supply position is critical.

In the course of a continuing battle in the Solomons, in which losses have been heavy on both sides, the Japanese have succeeded in landing additional troops on Guadalcanal Island and apparently have hemmed in our forces on three sides. Although details of the battle are comprehensibly scarce, the enemy obviously occupies a position in that area which offers notable advantages.

Stalingrad: The Defense of the Northern Suburbs

In the northern suburbs of Stalingrad the Germans have been unable to repeat this week their successes of mid-October. Fanning out from their wedge driven to the Volga in the Rykov suburb last week, the attackers have captured part

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of the Red October Metallurgical Factory to the south, and the Spartanka suburb to the north. In these two areas fierce fighting has been raging at close quarters, and the defenders appear to be clinging tenaciously to several of the extensive Red October buildings, and to be successfully resisting from street to street in the Spartanka area. The Germans have capitalized on their new positions by shelling Soviet batteries on the Volga islands opposite Stalingrad itself. For their part, the Russians have partially relieved the defenders of the suburbs by counterattacking from the northwest. Admiral Standley, American Ambassador to Russia and now in this country for consultation, has expressed his conviction that Stalingrad will be held.

The accompanying map represents an effort to bring some order out of the confused and conflicting reports on the situation in Stalingrad. Much of the material is admittedly based on inference. In the southern suburbs, about which official communiqués of both sides have been most vague, the defenders probably hold large areas and, according to press reports, have driven the Germans back north of the Tsaritsa River. In the center, the attackers apparently control much of the area inside the railroad loop, including the two main stations and a corridor to the Volga. To the north, the possession of the Tractor Plant and a large part of the Rykov suburb has enabled the Germans to split the Russian defenders. In general, the Soviet forces in Stalingrad appear to be divided into at least three main groups, with communication between them possible only by way of the Volga River and the large islands opposite the northern suburbs.

Fruits of Stalingrad's Resistance

The fate of Stalingrad is still in doubt. But it is very probable that its defenders have already accomplished one major part of their mission. According to Russian observers

BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES


- MARKET
- RAILROAD
- RAILROAD STATION
- DOCK AND EMBANKMENT
- LOADING PLATFORM

INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

- TRACTOR FACTORY
- MACHINE CONSTRUCTION SHOP
- "RED HAMMER" METALLURGICAL FACTORY
- STRUCTURAL STEEL WORKS
- RUBBER FACTORY
- PETROLEUM TANKS
- BRICK FACTORY
- LUMBER MILL
- FACTORY FOR MILITARY CLOTHING
- LEATHER FACTORY
- CANNERY
- DIESEL ENGINE POWER UNIT

OTHERS

- WORKERS' SETTLEMENT
- HOSPITAL
- POLYTECHNICAL SCHOOL
- AIR BARRACKS
- AIRPORT



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in this country, the Soviet command expected that the invaders, after capturing Stalingrad, would almost immediately start a new drive along the Volga toward Astrakhan. It was the Russians' objective to prevent the Germans' reaching the Caspian before November. That objective they have already attained.

Between about the tenth and the twenty-fifth of November the Volga and the northern Caspian Sea freeze over. In other words, the Russian resistance at Stalingrad has held back the invaders from Astrakhan during the season when water transport below Stalingrad is still possible. Should the Germans reach the Caspian next month, they would not be able to interfere with Soviet water-borne transport until next spring. Furthermore, the Caspian shore railroad from Kizlyar to Astrakhan is for all practical purposes closed to traffic, according to advices from Tabriz. For the rest of the winter, then, transport between the Caucasus, Iran, and the bulk of the Soviet Union will go over the Caspian and the Central Asian railways, substantially free from the menace of German attack.

Moreover, around Stalingrad itself, the coming months will probably be unfavorable for offensive operations. The current spell of "Indian summer," described as favoring the attackers, can not last long. Normally the months of November and December are characterized by terrific winds and snow storms that sweep across the open steppes of the lower Volga. The average temperature is lower than that on the Gulf of Finland. During the civil war in 1918-1920 the storms of this area seriously hampered the conduct of military operations in winter.

If the Germans should take Stalingrad next month, it seems unlikely that they would drive immediately for the Caspian. More probably they would try to establish a firm winter line. According to Czech informants, however, a third possibility

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would be an offensive from the Orel-Voronezh area toward Tambov and Morshansk. Such a drive would aim to cut the direct rail communications between Moscow and the Middle Volga industrial centers of Kuibyshev and Saratov.

Lull to the North and South

Outside of Stalingrad, activity on the Russian front has been indecisive. For the past week, the Russians report the destruction of 114 German planes, to 51 of their own admitted as lost. These figures indicate about the same level of air activity as during the previous week—and fully as low a level as during the 1942 winter lull. East of the Volga, however, the Germans have continued their air attacks on Russian communications.

In the north and center, rain and snow have again limited the operations of both armies. On the Black Sea coast, where the Germans have again made no substantial progress, the attackers have blamed their lack of success on torrential rains, strong Soviet defenses, and the difficulty of fighting in dense woods. In the Groznyi sector, the arrival of the SS Viking Division apparently enabled the Germans to drive a wedge into the Russian lines about a week ago. The defenders, however, seemed to have restored the situation, and a lull ensued. Late press reports now suggest that the Germans have resumed the attack in the direction of Nalchik.

Allied Offensive in Egypt

The Allies this week fired the opening gun of what may be a major offensive directed at driving the Axis out of North Africa. The British attacked all along the line to which the battered Eighth Army retreated last June, concentrating their major effort in the northern sector. Here strong British infantry units supported by artillery and tanks pushed

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through enemy minefields to establish themselves six miles to the west. Armored units and infantry followed through the gaps, despite stiff resistance. A small gain was also made in the central sector, but to the south heavy Axis fire prevented a penetration. The British are obviously trying to keep Rommel's armored strength divided between north and south. Casualties have been heavy, and the situation remains fluid. Neither side has yet employed the full weight of its armored forces. Observers expect perhaps a fortnight of intense fighting with movement strictly limited by the narrow desert front, before any break-through is achieved.

The general superiority which the Allies are believed to enjoy is especially marked in the air. United States and RAF planes have actively supported ground units and steadily attacked gun emplacements, motor transport, and tanks. Enemy air operations were largely limited to the defensive, although reports indicate that reinforcements may be available in Crete, Greece, and Sicily.

For this period of positional warfare the Allies enjoy advantages of supply, especially in fuel, that may be of the first importance. With planes and submarines taking a high percentage of his cargo ships, Rommel's supply position is critical. The British raids on Genoa, Turin, and Milan were also apparently intended to disrupt rear bases from which supplies flow both to Rommel and to Tripolitania.

If Rommel is forced back from his present positions, military observers expect that he will take up a defensive line running from Matruh to the Qattara depression, and, if driven from that, a line based on Halfaya Pass.

Uneasiness in Northwest Africa

Reports from Northwest Africa continue to reflect apprehension. Darlan has just made an inspection tour of Dakar, Casablanca, Rabat, and Fez. Except for the demonstrations

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of a few youth organizations, the public reaction in Morocco was generally apathetic. At the same time the shipment of military supplies to Dakar persists.

In Spain there have been some renewed expressions of Spanish annexationist designs in Morocco. The combination of a press article, comments made by Foreign Minister Jordana to American representatives, and a speech by Garcia Figueras, a minor official, suggested to one well-placed observer that Berlin might again be encouraging Spanish claims to force France to a defensive agreement with Germany covering French Africa.

French Shipping

The question of the transfer of Vichy-controlled merchant tonnage has again been opened. British sources report that Vichy is about to deliver to the Germans 140,000 tons of shipping, which it is believed the Nazis intend to use as naval auxiliaries in the Black Sea.

Food and Finance in Iran

The wheat problem continues to be the center of a highly unstable internal situation in Iran. Obsessed by fears of famine and inflation, the legislature is reluctant to allow any currency increases. Although the Premier, Qavam, understands the problems facing the Allies, he apparently shares the cumulative resentment over the treatment of Iran by the United Nations. He may shortly be forced either to dissolve the legislature or to resign with his Cabinet. Unchecked profiteering and hoarding, and inadequate control over the provinces have added to the Government's difficulties; but efforts are now being made to establish joint boards of control for food, transport, and finance.

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Battle Throes on Guadalcanal

The Japanese on October 25 launched a combined and long-awaited air, sea, and land offensive in the lower Solomons. Using both tanks and heavy artillery fire, the Japanese attacked our ground forces on Guadalcanal from the west on the night of October 24-25, and again during the morning. These attacks were repulsed. On the following night, an attack from the south succeeded in penetrating our lines defending the airfield, but this assault also was thrown back. The Japanese are known to hold positions east of the airfield; hence our forces appear to be hemmed in on three sides along a narrow strip extending no more than 30 to 35 miles along the northern coast.

Fresh landings preceded the Japanese attack. Prior to the arrival of these additional troops, Japanese forces on the island numbered about 15,000. The Japanese may now have superiority both in men and weapons. In the air, the Japanese appear also to have been able to concentrate enough land- and carrier-based aircraft to obtain quantitative superiority in the immediate Solomons battle area, but our qualitative superiority persists. Grumman Wildcats based on the island continue to out-fight the enemy, and on October 26 our bombers were still able to use the air-field.

The Battle at Sea

On the sea, where the ultimate fate of our forces on Guadalcanal must be decided, the situation necessarily remains obscure. The Japanese apparently have fairly free naval access to Guadalcanal itself, and have supported their ground forces there with naval artillery fire.

One hundred miles northeast of Guadalcanal, a Pacific task force on October 26 exchanged air blows with a "strong" Japanese naval force. We damaged one enemy carrier badly and received severe damage to one of our own. A second

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Japanese carrier was hit in this action, and during the night of October 26-27, a Navy Catalina loosed a torpedo at a carrier 400 miles northeast of Guadalcanal, but results were not observed. The Japanese may have as many as three regular and two converted carriers available in the South Pacific for current operations. We on the other hand announced this week the loss of the *Wasp*, one of the newest of our carriers (but also one of the smallest).

In the week's fighting—including air action against the enemy's main base at Rabaul—we are believed to have sunk two cruisers, three destroyers, a seaplane tender, two gunboats and four merchant vessels. We have announced the loss of one destroyer and a tugboat.

The Issue Remains in Doubt

The Japanese admittedly have large naval forces at their disposal, and may, despite their highly disproportionate air losses, turn to a naval war of attrition. They would then seek to make our airfield untenable for transports and bombers, at the same time gradually strangling our supply line (which must provide the Grumman Wildcats with fuel). Under these conditions, they would have little to fear from our land-based air strength in the Solomons.

Such a picture, however, assumes that the benefits of a naval war of attrition reside with the enemy. If not, the Japanese may try as rapidly as possible to smother our air and coastal defenses and set up their own air base. In either case, the troops on Guadalcanal—their backs to the sea—are clearly our first-offered pawns in a type of war which is new to Americans. The psychological repercussions of defeat, if defeat comes, are likely therefore to be relatively more severe than they would be after the loss of an equal number of troops in continental warfare.

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War Begins Again on the Burma-India Front

In India and Burma, where the water-logged ground left by the monsoon now is becoming dry enough to support operations, the Japanese have struck at our airfields near Chittagong and Sadiya, and their troops have begun to move. A small force of Japanese has advanced northward from Myitkyina, evidently aiming at Fort Hertz, from whence enemy planes might more successfully interrupt our air transport route to China. In the first raid on our bases in northeastern Assam, with about 60 bombers and fighters, the Japanese destroyed several transport planes grounded for repair. It is evident that the enemy, even in this long-awaited attack, achieved some measure of surprise.

Japanese troops also have advanced northward 50 miles from Akyab (at the southern extremity of the Burma-India line), occupying the towns of Buthidaung and Maungdaw. While no more than a battalion of Japanese troops may actually have carried out the movement, it is aimed at a tense sector of the United Nations' front—Bengal and Assam.

The Foundations of a Settlement in India

"What about India?" is the question which has become almost a symbol all through Asia," Mr. Willkie has declared, in reporting on his recent trip to Russia, the Middle East, and China. As if in answer to this question, Rajagopalachariar, formerly Congress Premier of Madras, and now, after his resignation from the Congress, a leader in negotiations for a settlement, has outlined the conditions which he feels must precede any satisfactory compromise. The present policy of repression, he declares, may succeed—but only if the Japanese refrain from invading India. In the event of such invasion, however, sabotage and interference with communications would seriously hamper Allied operations. Nor

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would India cooperate in a reconquest of Burma, he continues, unless the British made it clear that they were not intending to reestablish imperial rule over India's neighbor to the east.

Furthermore, Rajagopalachariar, like Mr. Willkie, urges the United States to intervene with the British on the Indian issue. But he has no illusions that our country will do anything that might threaten the unity of the Anglo-Saxon powers. Moreover, he realizes that negotiations with the British would be futile, unless the Indian leaders themselves could compromise their differences. He is convinced, however, that the Congress chiefs will make concessions to the Moslem League, if they know that a national government will result from such a compromise. Unless some such settlement emerges from the present crisis, he concludes, hatred of the British will continue to increase, especially in Bengal and southern Assam, where many are coming to regard the Japanese as no greater an evil than the British.

An important British official agrees with many of these statements. On the surface, he declares, disaffection is under control. The threatened longshoremen's strike at Calcutta, for example, has not materialized, and labor at the Tata Steel Plant is now working normally. At Ahmedabad, however, both the textile mill owners and their employees, after more than two months of a combination strike and lock-out, still refuse to return to work; here the Government has apparently decided to refrain from decisive action until November 9, the last day of an important Hindu festival. And in certain areas like the Midnapore district of Bengal, popular discontent remains serious. Our informant concludes that the undercurrent of tension in the civilian population of Bengal and Assam might be released at any time by a Japanese air attack on India's industrial centers.

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American Bombers Range Over China

Bombers of the United States Army Air Force in China carried the air war to within a few miles of the Great Wall and Manchuria when they raided the Lin-hsi (Hopei) installations of the Kailan Mining Administration on October 21. According to General Stilwell's communique, the raid was most successful; many direct hits were observed in the target area, and all American planes returned to their bases.

The Kailan coal mines are an important objective. Operated since 1912 by British interests, the mines escaped damage on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, and since Pearl Harbor they have continued, without noticeable dislocation, to produce coal under Japanese supervision. With an average annual output of four to five million tons the Kailan fields make a considerable contribution to the Japanese war economy, particularly since Kailan coal is of excellent coking quality and thus of high value for the production of steel.

A few days after the Kailan raid, the American air force struck at Hongkong and Canton. On October 25, American bombers attacked docks and shipping in the Hongkong-Kowloon area, destroyed 10 of the Japanese fighters which tried to intercept, and probably destroyed 5 more. The next day, October 26, American planes again raided Hongkong, scoring hits on the important North Point power station. And later that day the American air force attacked the Japanese-held White Cloud airdrome at Canton.

People's Political Council Meets in Chungking

Meanwhile, the third People's Political Council has begun its sessions in Chungking. Established by order of the Kuomintang Party Congress in 1938, the People's Political Council has power to deliberate on all measures of domestic

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and foreign policy, and to submit recommendations to the Government on the basis of its deliberations. It has the right to request reports from the various Ministries and to interpellate the officers of state. Members of the Council are appointed, rather than elected, and the Kuomintang has the final decision upon all nominations. Nevertheless, the membership of the Council has consistently been both representative and distinguished, and the Council has served as an effective sounding board for the expression of public opinion.

Rumors of New Political Appointments in China

The possibility of a new position for T. V. Soong, Chinese Foreign Minister, who arrived in Chungking from Washington on October 25, has been the subject of political speculation in the Chinese capital for the past few days, according to an authoritative observer. There are rumors, as yet unconfirmed, that Soong will take over the posts of Finance Minister and Vice-President of the Executive Yuan now held by H. H. Kung, with Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to London who is also in Chungking, becoming Foreign Minister. H. H. Kung, according to these rumors, will make a good-will tour of England and the United States and eventually will become the Generalissimo's representative in Washington.

Such changes would constitute an important political development. The man who holds the combined posts of Finance Minister and Vice-President of the Executive Yuan is, under the Chinese system, the chief civil administrator, second in power only to the Generalissimo. H. H. Kung is respected for his political views and his personal integrity, and he has been invaluable as an effective peacemaker between factions and personalities. He has not, however, been noted for rigorous administration or for an eagerness to eliminate in-

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competent assistants and hangers-on. Soong has served as Finance Minister before, and is regarded as an able financier and conscientious administrator. He is conspicuous for his failure to build up a clique and his penchant for the use of able men. His appointment might well bring some improvement in the handling of the pressing financial and economic problems with which China is faced.

Aftermath of a Raid

Six months after Brigadier General Doolittle's flight of bombers peppered the Tokyo area, the Japanese have renewed their attempts to make propaganda capital of the raid. Announcing that American fliers forced down on that April 18 raid have now been tried before a military court, convicted, and punished, the enemy has wrung from our War Department the admission that eight of our airmen are, indeed, missing.

General Doolittle's statement at the War Department on May 19 had led American journalists to believe that "Not one American plane was lost in the raid,"¹ and this view was passed on to the world. The American admission, according to FCC radio analysts, has furnished Tokyo propagandists with excellent grist for their efforts to undermine world confidence in American news sources.

Aware of this danger, the Office of War Information has endeavored to explain the discrepancy. In a special statement last week, the OWI declared that "secrecy surrounding certain planes which participated in the Tokyo raid was highly desirable in the hope of saving the lives and securing the freedom of certain crew members who crash-landed in areas controlled by the enemy." Whether that policy has been successful or not, there seems little question that its cost

¹ *New York Times*, May 20, 1942.

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in terms of public trust of our news releases will be appreciable. The Doolittle raid itself, however, was a military success, as a confidential account recently compiled by our air forces makes plain (see Appendix I).

Chile Moves Toward a Decision

Mass meetings and great crowds demonstrating in the streets put dramatic emphasis this week on a widening split between the Chilean cabinet and the Chilean people over the country's foreign policy. With the pro-democratic majority clamoring for a break with the Axis, a reconstruction of the Cabinet followed, and the notorious Barros Jarpa was dismissed from his post as Foreign Minister. At the same time President Ríos was given a free hand to form a new and presumably anti-fascist Government. The men whom Ríos has appointed as replacements, however, have been anything but reassuring to the public.

Barros Jarpa's successor, for example, turned out to be Joaquín Fernández, who did his best to sabotage hemispheric solidarity in Montevideo when he served there as Chilean Ambassador. Fernández' ambiguous remarks following his new appointment, and his cordial greeting in Buenos Aires of Ruiz Guiñazú, Argentinian opponent of the United States, give little hope, moreover, that he has changed his politics. Whether the Chilean Congress will stomach this kind of "reform" of the Cabinet remains to be seen when it assembles in extraordinary session on November 15.

If Ríos fails to secure parliamentary support, he can either surrender to Congress or resort to dictatorship. His unusual appointment of General Froilán Arriagada as Minister of Economy and Commerce suggests that he may be seeking the support of the Army, whose attitude has not yet been determined. One thing at least has become clear: by his open assumption of personal responsibility for Chile's foreign

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policy, Ríos has lost the buffer which Barros Jarpa represented. The Chilean President now stands face to face with the demands of the Chilean people.

Peru's Communists Emerge

President Prado of Peru, harassed by Congressional attacks upon grafting cabinet members, by a national rice-shortage, and by the machinations of his popular rival, General Ureta, is now involved in a desperate search for mass support. His latest maneuver is directed toward winning over the urban labor movement through virtual legalization of the Communist Party, which, from "underground," has maintained important contacts with the workers. The suppressed Communist weekly *Democracia y Trabajo* has been allowed to reappear, and the Party itself has been permitted to hold a National Congress.

Prado undoubtedly hopes that the Communists in turn can win over a substantial portion of the liberal *Apra* movement from its present anti-Prado leadership. If he should succeed in these imaginative tactics, the new alignment of political forces will have significance far beyond Prado's personal fortunes, for it will mean a definite coalescing of Peru's pro-United Nations forces.

Dollar Diplomacy

The alleged refusal of three foreign-owned meat-packing plants in Brazil to cooperate in relieving Rio de Janeiro's growing shortage of fresh meat has led the Minister of Justice to cite them before the new State's Tribunal of National Security. The companies—Armour's subsidiary in Brazil, the Wilson Company, and Frigorífico Anglo—had apparently rejected urgent demands that they supply freshly-slaughtered meat to the Municipal Food Commission.

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The attitude of these firms, unfortunately, seems to have strengthened the belief of many Latin Americans that British and American corporations operating in their countries have heard of neither the "Good Neighbor" policy, nor even of the United Nations. In Argentina, they recall, a reputable British trade journal published an editorial only last spring urging support of the Castillo policy of "neutrality." In Uruguay, moreover, the Swift & Company subsidiary is reported to have vetoed a plan of the Federation of Meat Workers to have employees donate a day's pay for Allied war relief. The company official, when interviewed by union representatives, was quoted as saying that his company had never helped the United States and England, and did not care to begin now.

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APPENDIX I THE TOKYO RAID¹

The raid of April 18, 1942, which saw 16 American Army bombers strike at the industrial heart of Japan, had multiple objectives: aside from such specific material damage as was planned, it was hoped that the foray would (a) induce the Japanese to recall for home defense combat equipment then in areas under pressure; (b) instill an "anxiety complex" among the Japanese people themselves; (c) encourage our Allies; and (d) favorably impress our own public.

Preparation

That these objectives should have the optimum chance of attainment, long and arduous preparation was made for the flight. A minimum range of 2,400 miles and a bomb-load of 2,000 pounds were considered essential; the plane chosen as best adapted to these and other requirements was the B-25. Two types of bombs, with fuses that could be set for extreme low-level release, were selected to obtain the proper effect: a 500-pound demolition bomb and a 500-pound cluster of incendiaries.

Targets in the Tokyo region were designated according to a plan of spreading the flight over a 50-mile front in order not merely to provide the greatest coverage, but also to create an impression of a larger force than existed and to dilute the ground fire. Non-military targets—particularly the Emperor's palace—were to be strictly avoided.

For nearly three months, the crews (ground maintenance men and armorers as well as the actual flyers) were trained together to achieve as nearly perfect coordination as possible. Pilots and navigators were subjected to intensive practice in cross-country flying, night flying, and flying over the water to accustom them to operation without radio references or landmarks. Particular attention was placed on low altitude approaches, rapid bombing, and evasive action.

Mechanical changes in the B-25's were many and ingenious, with every effort being made to conserve weight and space. Two wooden 50-caliber guns were installed in the plane's tail, obviating the need for carrying an extra gunner and his heavy armament but retaining the appearance of protection (as it turned out, no ship in the flight was attacked from the rear). Liaison radio sets were removed, and because of the fire hazard rather than of the weight, no pyrotechnics other than a couple of landing-flares were carried.

A desire to increase the plane's range, however, led to the installation of two metal leakproof tanks and one collapsible rubber tank. Since low-level bombing was planned, the Norden sight was replaced by a simplified sight which, at 1,500 feet, showed a greater degree of accuracy.

Reports From the Flyers

Brigadier General James H. Doolittle: On its approach to Japan, General Doolittle's craft passed over a camouflaged naval vessel and saw a multi-motored

¹ Based on a report issued by the Director of Intelligence Service, Headquarters, Army Air Force.

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land plane; but, as was the case with the other planes in the flight, there were no later indications that these outlying enemy boats or aircraft raised the alarm. Arriving north of Tokyo, the General's plane turned south, flying over airfields from which many small biplanes—apparently trainers—had arisen. But both these craft and nine fighters which Doolittle encountered nearer Tokyo failed to close in. Over the target area, the American bomber dropped four incendiary clusters, then lowered to the house-tops and slid over the western outskirts of the city into a low haze. Anti-aircraft fire was reported as heavy and of correct elevation, but of the wrong deflection.

Lieutenant E. E. McElroy: Encountering heavy but not too accurate ground-fire, Lieutenant McElroy's plane arrived over its target, the Hokusuka Navy Yard, and released one incendiary and three demolition bombs from 1,300 feet, destroying everything on the main dock, enveloping a partially completed boat in flames, and blowing up a large crane. Thirty miles away, huge billows of black smoke could still be seen rising from the target.

Captain C. R. Greening: Unable to reach its primary target of Yokohama, Captain Greening's ship made its bombing run over a large oil refinery near Sakura, east of Tokyo. On the approach, four enemy fighters appeared and gave combat; two were shot down. Four incendiaries, dropped "in train" from 600 feet, caused successive explosions that were clearly felt by the crew. Fifty miles away from the target, a large column of smoke was still visible.

Lieutenant R. O. Joyce: Lieutenant Joyce's crew ran into strong anti-aircraft fire and nine Zero fighters, which they evaded by stepping up the plane's speed to 330 mph, in a dive. Over Tokyo, they dropped two demolition bombs on the Japanese Steel Company, one of them falling in the center of the plant and one between two buildings. A third bomb was released over a thick industrial area in Shiba Ward, and an incendiary fell in the residential section near the steel plant.

Lieutenant T. Lawson: Six Japanese pursuits came in sight of the Lawson plane, but failed to attack. Anti-aircraft fire, which was intense over the target, appeared to be light flak, with black bursts about the size of weather balloons. Three demolition bombs were dropped on factories in the Tokyo area, one hit producing smoke and flying debris. The plane's incendiary bomb was released over the densely populated sector near the Palace.

Lieutenant D. G. Smith: While still far from the Japanese coast, Lieutenant Smith's crew picked up an enemy radio program. It continued its normal musical offerings for over an hour, and then suddenly ceased. An alarm rang for forty-five seconds, followed by a voice which shouted three words. This occurred about ten times before the station finally went off the air. Lieutenant Smith's plane proceeded to Kobe, where four incendiary clusters were dropped along the water-front, straddling the principal targets. Anti-aircraft fire was light, and the only two planes encountered—97's—were soon outdistanced.

Lieutenant R. M. Gray: This plane not only bombed Tokyo but strafed it as well, machine-gunning a military barracks and its men. Lieutenant Gray's bombs struck a gas works and a chemical plant.

Lieutenant W. N. Bower: Several enemy pursuits tailed Lieutenant Bower's plane but made no attempt to close. Anti-aircraft fire was intense but a bit late. Since a balloon barrage protected the primary target of the Yokohama Dock Yards, Lieutenant Bower's bomber released its explosives on the Ogura Refinery

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and nearby factories and warehouses, dropped incendiaries on another factory area, and shot up a power-house with machine-gun fire.

Lieutenant E. W. Holstrom: Several Japanese pursuits approached Lieutenant Holstrom's plane when his guns were not operating. Two of these enemy fighters attacked while Holstrom was still off the coast, and tracer bullets streaked over the pilot's compartment. Later, two more pursuits cut across the bow and appeared ready to "peel off" for an attack. At this point, Holstrom's plane salvaged its bombs from 75 feet, and turned down the coast.

Captain D. M. Jones: Primary targets were not attacked by this plane, since the approach had not been made as expected. However, flying up Tokyo Bay, Captain Jones' craft dropped one demolition bomb on an oil tank south of the Palace, another on a power-plant or foundry, and a third on a large factory about two blocks long, with a saw-toothed roof. Intense anti-aircraft fire followed the release of the first bomb.

Lieutenant T. Hoover: Trailing Doolittle's plane into Tokyo, Lieutenant Hoover's ship dropped three demolition bombs and one incendiary from a height of only 900 feet on the Japanese Army Arsenal, debris flying higher than the plane.

Major J. A. Hilger: Flying not toward Tokyo but toward Nagoya, Major Hilger's plane scored hits on all targets, spreading incendiary clusters over the barracks adjacent to Nagoya Castle, the Matsuhigecho Oil Storage Depot, the Atsuta Factory (reported capable of producing 500 planes a year), and the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works (which builds the "Zero" fighter). A column of smoke was seen by the retreating plane when a good 20 miles away. Anti-aircraft fire was quite heavy, but its aim was poor. Only one hostile plane was sighted.

Lieutenant H. F. Watson: On the way in, Lieutenant Watson's crew observed about 20 two-engined bombers dispersed on an airfield, and 15 to 20 pursuits warming up on a ramp. One pursuit attacked from below, but made only one pass. Despite intensive ground-fire, Lieutenant Watson's plane delivered its cargo of demolition and incendiary bombs upon the Tokyo Gas and Electric Company.

The Missing

From three planes which took part in the flight, no reliable "action" reports have come. Captain E. J. York's plane is known to have been forced to proceed to Siberia, due to unexpectedly high fuel consumption; the crew were interned. Lieutenant D. E. Hallmark's bomber was last seen by one of the other crews over Tokyo Bay. No report has ever been obtained from Lieutenant W. D. Farrow's crew, nor were they, apparently, seen over the target area by the rest of the flight.

Enemy Resistance

Nearly every plane, on its approach to Japan, has reported the sighting of naval and merchant vessels, innumerable small fishing craft, and a number of patrol planes. Yet the Japanese apparently were entirely unprepared for the attack. Either their dissemination of information was faulty, or the communication system had broken down completely.

As our planes passed over the countryside, farmers in the field looked up and went back to work, undisturbed; villagers waved from the streets; a baseball game continued its play; and in the distance, training planes took off and landed, apparently unaware of any danger present.

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About 20 two-engined bombers and an equal number of fighters were seen on a field, but few planes attempted interception, and those that did were not inclined to press home the attack. The pilots appeared inexperienced and their gun fire inaccurate.

The anti-aircraft defense has been reported as consisting of either 37 mm. or 40 mm., although the description of the bursts and the absence of tracers would indicate that larger caliber guns were in action. This supposition is supported by the fact that no A. A. fire was reported below 1,500 feet. The altitude was accurate but the bursts were generally behind—possibly because the gunners did not realize the speed of the B-25's. There were a few barrage balloons in the Tokyo area in clusters of five or six, and in one case they diverted an attacking plane to its secondary target. Ineffective camouflage was observed.

The over-all picture is one of inadequate defense. The warning system did not appear to function; interception by fighters was definitely cautious; and anti-aircraft fire, responding slowly, did not reach the intensity one would expect for so important a city as Tokyo.

Conclusions

Sixteen B-25's made the flight to Japan. From the pilots or crew members of thirteen of these planes have come reports from which a reasonable estimation of the execution and success of the mission may be made.

The preparation was thorough. The flight was well executed and, in most cases, primary targets were reached; hits were made at low altitudes; and explosions, followed by smoke and fires, were observed by several ships as they passed over the area. Had it been known beforehand how complete was going to be the surprise and how weak the resistance, it would have been possible to concentrate all planes on such a target as the Mitsubishi Aircraft Factory.

The magnitude of the destruction and the effect on Japanese morale can not be evaluated from the few rumors that have come out of the enemy's country. The reaction on our Allies and the American public was essentially favorable. Any encouragement, however, accruing to the Chinese must have been tempered by the fact that immediately following the raid the Japanese initiated a severe attack on those areas in China which they suspected had been used in the project.

APPENDIX II

THE NEW ORDER IN THE PHILIPPINES¹

The most detailed information we possess on the actual functioning of the Japanese government of the Philippines has just been made available to us—by the Japanese themselves. Sparing us even the inconvenience of translation, the enemy has published his *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration* in clumsy but intelligible English. The *Journal* covers the period from January 2 through May 31, 1942.

¹ Based on a report by the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

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Administration

Interest in the administrative arrangements set up by the enemy in the Islands centers not so much on any original features as on the faithfulness with which earlier precedents are followed. Martial law was, of course, announced by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Homma, as soon as Manila and surrounding districts were occupied. Four days later, on January 7, 1942, the first steps were taken for the installation of a Japanese-controlled government.

The local candidate, in this case, was Mr. Jorge B. Vargas, former secretary to President Manuel Queson.

Some two weeks later, Mr. Vargas, following an outline laid down by General Homma, announced the "Articles of Organization of the Philippine Council of State". Lest any notions of independence disturb the minds of the Councillors, the Commander-in-Chief dispatched an order to Mr. Vargas "concerning basic principles in exercising legislative, executive, and judicial powers". This order stated that two rules should be observed:

(a) "Activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances, and customs until further orders—provided that they are not inconsistent with the present circumstances under the Japanese Military Administration."¹

(b) "The Executive Commission of the Philippines may enact new statutes and ordinances subject to the approval of the Commander-in-Chief."

Education

From a study of the *Journal*, it becomes clear that the Japanese have been, particularly keen on what they describe as "the renovation of education" in the Philippines. In the course of this program they intend, in the language of Major General Hayashi, "to make the people understand the position of the Philippines as a member of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; to eradicate the old idea of the reliance upon the Western nations, especially upon the U. S. A. and Great Britain; and to foster a New Filipino culture based on the self-consciousness of the people as Orientals."

A somewhat more sombre note is struck by Major General Hayashi's further declaration that the program will endeavor "to elevate the morals of the people, giving up overemphasis on materialism;" and will "inspire the people with the spirit to love labor." Naturally, the Japanese will also "strive for the diffusion of the Japanese language in the Philippines and to terminate the use of English."

Agriculture

The *Journal* furnishes additional indication of what the Japanese intend for Philippine agriculture. According, again, to Major General Hayashi, "too much importance has been attached to the production of crops for export to the United States." Instead, Hayashi intimates, more importance must be attached by the Filipinos to producing for Japan. "It is my conviction," he told the assembled native provincial governors, city mayors, and treasurers, "that in order to eradicate the dependence upon the American market and to make an adjustment of the excess agricultural products, it is the wisest way to divert the existing major agricultural industries into the planting of cotton crops."

¹ All quoted passages remain in the enemy's version of English, though the italics are our own.

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Hayashi apparently foresees some difficulties in store for this policy. "It seems," he declared, "that the majority of the Filipino farmers are ignorant of the potentialities of this country for cotton growing, and, therefore, it will be up to your future efforts that the planting of their (sic) product will be appreciated and encouraged among the farmers."

Propaganda

The propaganda technique of the Japanese in the Philippines has followed essentially the same line as in other areas they have conquered. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is proclaimed, and the natives are instructed as to the part they are expected to play. "Self-seeking materialism" is excoriated, and the moral beauties of hard labor are extolled. However, in the Philippines, specific effort is being made to destroy all bonds of loyalty to the United States, and the theme of "Yankee imperialism" is constantly hammered in one speech and proclamation after another.

Typical were the remarks of the Japanese Chief of Staff on February 2, 1942: "As to the Philippine Islands, the war was meant to establish the Philippines for Filipinos as a member in the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, making a clean sweep of all the exploitations, outrages, insults, and degenerations caused by the Americans during the last forty years."

Later on in the same speech, he said: "The course which the Philippines should follow in the future will be the course to escape from her former position as a captive of the capitalism and imperialism of the United States, to liquidate the unnatural culture borrowed from a faraway country and the industrial organization as a colony of a foreign power, to return to the original features of an oriental people, shaking off vanity and the dependent mentality, to reform the national life into simplicity, and to reorganize industries which will make possible the cooperation of this country with its neighbors. We believe that a nation which indulges in pretty dresses, nice food, physical enjoyment, and expensive fashions can never succeed in establishing a strong nation."

Resistance

The New Order in the Philippines is not apparently enjoying entirely smooth sailing. On February 2, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Forces complained:

"We know that there are still some people who spread malicious and entirely groundless rumors in this country, and there are still some people who act as spies or intend to cause disturbance; and, furthermore, communists still indulge in subversive activities in some regions. These people are doing more harm to the Filipinos and to the future of the Philippines than to the Japanese forces; and they should be described as traitors or enemies of mankind.

"Particularly, the rumor of the resurrection of the American forces in this country is too absurd to be denied, so we shall laughingly disregard it."

A laughing disregard of actual Filipino resistance, however, does not seem to be Japanese policy. Executions and sentences are noted four times in the *Journal*. On February 11, Domingo Diesta and two others are reported as executed for inflicting injuries upon a Japanese soldier, and another, Manuel Ninianga, was shot for setting fires. Twenty-seven others are announced as having received severe punishment for stealing from buildings sealed by the Japanese Army. On

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February 15 the *Journal* records that three Britishers were executed for disrupting the peace of the internment camp and trying to escape. Nearly three months later the execution of 13 Filipinos for cutting down communication lines is noted, and the Commander-in-Chief is quoted as saying that "twenty of about 50 Chinese leaders were executed in accordance with the sentence of a military court martial, which found them guilty of anti-Japanism."

ERRATUM: In the legend of the map on the "India-Burma Borderland," published in *The War This Week*, October 15-22, the words "pack trail" and "foot path" were transposed. The dashed red line should have indicated "foot path" and the dotted red line, "pack trail." In the text, p. 26, under "Alternative Routes, (b)," "foot trail" should read "pack trail."

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THE WAR THIS WEEK

The past week has been lacking in conclusive developments, but events in one theater—Egypt—are moving toward a decisive stage. Here, in two tank battles, the British have broken through the basic Axis defenses south of El Alamein. In the northern sector they have driven about 20 miles west, and a major battle is apparently now in the making.

The campaign in the Southwest Pacific has developed into a war of "accelerated attrition," with heavy naval losses on both sides but with particularly severe losses for the Japanese in the air, where they are least strong. The military contest on Guadalcanal is still in the balance, with American forces holding a tenuous initiative and the Japanese continuing to land infantry reinforcements. Meanwhile, United Nations forces have moved forward in New Guinea to take the advanced Japanese base at Kokoda.

Although there are fresh signs of Soviet strength in Stalingrad, in the Caucasus area the Germans have reached the northern end of the Georgian Military Highway. With the approach of winter, however, observers are inclined to believe that the chances of new German advances of importance anywhere on the Eastern Front are slight. A possible exception is the Leningrad area where perhaps the most favorable season for an attack is now beginning.

British Drive in Egypt

Following the first two major tank battles of the current campaign, British forces have pushed through the enemy's

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fixed positions in the northern sector of the Egyptian front, and have caused his withdrawal from the commanding points of the southern sector. The basic Axis defenses south of El Alamein have thus been broken, and Axis forces, having suffered heavy losses, are now in retreat. Military observers believe, however, that Rommel's retreat was at least partly a withdrawal to avoid encirclement, and that he is now reforming his units, with the intention of fighting all the way. He is expected to make a determined stand either before El Daba or at the fortified positions around Matruh. A battle of decisive importance appears to be shaping up.

The present British drive apparently developed as follows: After British forces had slowly hacked their way through Axis minefields and strong points in the northern sector (with infantry, artillery, and engineers, supported by tank units, carrying the burden of the attack), Australian units established a salient that trapped two Italian battalions and the remnants of a German regiment against the coast. The enemy vigorously counterattacked, but was repulsed after getting about 20 tanks through to the trapped forces. Moving two divisions rapidly northward, the British apparently struck just south of the enemy's counterattacking forces. Two major tank battles developed on November 2, which resulted in the withdrawal of German units, fearing encirclement. Following a diversionary British attack in the southern sector, enemy forces in that area also retreated from their fixed positions. Axis supply columns were seen withdrawing along the coast road toward El Daba and Matruh, where they were bombed and subjected to raids by British armored car regiments.

The Battle Opens Up

The cracking of the strong defenses south of El Alamein reopens the possibility of maneuver, though within an

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area still limited by the sea and the Qattara depression. Rommel has previously demonstrated his genius for such tactics, but this time he is facing a British command that has shown itself at once cautious and yet quick to exploit its opportunities. The Axis will also be severely handicapped by its inferiority in all departments, and its shortage of gasoline. An Allied communiqué places Axis losses for the first twelve days of this campaign at 270 guns and 260 tanks captured or destroyed, 600 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 9,000 prisoners taken, and 50,000 tons of shipping sunk. In an effort to relieve the critical supply situation, German planes are reported lately to have made 200 round trips daily from Crete to Egypt, carrying perhaps 300 tons of fuel daily.

Superior Allied air forces have kept enemy planes on the defensive, and deprived Axis ground forces of air support. Stuka squadrons have been limited by lack of fighter support to attacking under cover of darkness for the most part. In addition to raids on objectives in the forward area, Allied air forces have continually bombed and strafed the retreating enemy. Military observers also credit the Allied air arm with the breaking up of earlier enemy counterattacks.

The Axis air offensive against Malta has apparently declined in intensity, with a reported transfer of 30 fighters to Crete and Egypt. A Malta despatch totals enemy losses during October at 131 planes destroyed, with an additional 200 damaged, of which 50 were probably destroyed.

Uneasiness in Northwest Africa

Indications of Axis and Vichy uneasiness regarding Northwest Africa persist. The distribution of German submarines reveals a concentration in this area. At one time during this week, about 15 U-boats were reported in the Azores—Cape Verde Islands region, and more than half of the submarines in the Atlantic are now believed to be operating in the Eastern Atlantic.

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At the same time French shipments of war materials to Dakar continue to be on a larger scale than in recent months. General Barrau, commander of the armed forces of French West Africa, has stated that as a military commander he is obliged to get sufficient material for his units, but that French forces will never precipitate an incident. The evacuation measures at Dakar, which call for the eventual departure of more than 7,000 women and children, may have been undertaken not merely to facilitate the defense of Dakar, observers suggest, but also with the idea that the removal of these families to France would insure the "reliability" of the defenders of Dakar.

Farther to the north, French officials in Morocco have expressed fears, brought to a head by current maneuvers in Spanish Morocco, that the Spaniards would move into the French Zone as far as the Sebou line in the event of any possible Allied action against French Africa.

Reinforcement of Stalingrad's Defenders

While the Germans have made slight gains this week in Stalingrad's northern suburbs, the Russians have sent reserves across the Volga to the south of the city and have counter-attacked from that direction in some force. A similar effort to reinforce Stalingrad's defenders from the north has apparently been less successful. But in the central part of the city the Russians are evidently using the embankment along the main railroad loop as an effective line of defense. These signs of Soviet strength, coupled with the lateness of the season, have prompted an increasing number of optimistic pronouncements from United Nations sources. One military observer has pointed out that even if Stalingrad does fall, its position in the German winter line will be that of a "hedgehog" outpost like Rzhev or Staraya Russa—an outpost which may very well be retaken by the Russians.

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On every sector of the front, in fact, observers are beginning to predict that the Germans will make little further progress this year. On the Black Sea littoral, attacking in the teeth of an early blizzard, the Nazis have made only slight headway against the strongly fortified coastal defense area of Novorossiisk Bay. Here, the fight may well be reaching a turning point, with the Russian defenders holding strong points against German forces attacking from the coast range and the peninsula south of the city. East of Tuapse strongly entrenched Soviet troops have forced the Nazis to extend still further their circling movement against the city. Northeast of Tuapse the Russians have counter-attacked successfully.

The German Advance and the Caucasus Passes

The weakest point of the Soviet defense would appear to be the Grozny area, where the capture of Nalchik and Alagir has brought the Germans to the northern end of the Ossetian Military Highway and to within about 30 miles of Ordzhonikidze and the Georgian Military Highway. In this sector some of the defending units may now be separated from their base of supplies. Furthermore, the Georgian Highway is the one road across the Caucasus that remains open a considerable part of the winter, and as such its defense is vital to the preservation of the Trans-Caucasus. Military observers point out, however, that between the Germans' present position and Ordzhonikidze there are many rivers and canyons to impede the Nazi advance. One can reasonably conclude that the central passes of the Caucasus are not yet in grave danger, and that the invaders may very well make few further gains in this area before next summer.

Other sectors of the front have again been quiet. The German air force has concentrated on supply routes to the north and south—bombing Murmansk and the Astrakhan

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area and shipping in the Caspian Sea. Around Leningrad, ground forces on both sides have likewise been inactive, and there have been no further signs of an impending German attack. Yet November and December are perhaps the most favorable months for such an assault (see Appendix IV). If the Germans let slip this opportunity, it would seem to indicate that they have abandoned for the present any plans to capture a city no doubt weakened by a summer of intense privation, or to smoke the Russian Baltic Fleet out of Kronstadt, its only remaining base.

The Second Front and a Russian Counteroffensive

The Soviets may hold approximately their present line for the coming winter, but a Russian counteroffensive similar to that of last winter is not a foregone conclusion. In the view of a civilian observer recently returned from the Soviet Union, the Red Army has reserves available for such an offensive and has been training its leaders for attack on secondary fronts like the Rzhev sector. But the Soviet Union, our observer continues, does not intend to throw in its reserves until it is sure of the attitude of its Allies. The Russians, he declares, are not convinced that Britain is committed to an all-out struggle, and suspect that appeasement forces in the United States are still active. Moreover, Soviet official statements reveal a suspicion that British conservatives may eventually employ Rudolf Hess as a peace intermediary. A second front the Russians would regard as a pledge on the part of their Allies to fight to the finish. Until the Anglo-Saxon powers open such a front, a large-scale Russian counteroffensive would appear to be unlikely, our observer concludes.

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The French Labor Campaign and German Policy

Efforts to secure French labor for Germany continue to meet with little success. A substantial number of skilled workers are reported to have signed contracts to go to the Reich, but they are not presenting themselves for departure, and it seems apparent that many signed the contracts only to gain time for settling their personal affairs, before quietly disappearing. In an effort to halt this practice, German authorities have announced a new departure deadline, after which they threaten to impose "sanctions."

Laval has again gone to Paris to treat with the Germans. Observers at Vichy believe that, despite the failure of the labor drive, the Nazis in all probability will not upset the present regime at Vichy, though constantly "needling" Laval. For the present, the Germans do not desire to undertake the military occupation of France, our observers believe, and they wish to avoid creating in France any internal situation that might cause dissidence in French Northwest Africa.

The labor draft is also a factor in the generally mild but persistent opposition of elements of the French clergy to the Pétain regime. The Marshal recently had Cardinals Suhard and Gerlier, Archbishops of Paris and Lyon respectively, come to Vichy, where he appealed to them for a change of attitude. The Archbishops were reported to have been conciliatory but firm in their opposition to the labor draft, the collaborationist policy, and the Jewish persecution. They maintained that the clergy's first allegiance is to the French people, and only thereafter to the Government. Certain Catholic groups—following elements of the higher clergy—have supported the regime. But the Catholic left wing, which has been consistently hostile, has grown considerably in strength since the Armistice, and such men as the Archbishop of Toulouse have vigorously opposed the Vichy program.

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Naval Attrition in the Southwest Pacific

While the Japanese have not lost their strategic initiative in the Southwest Pacific, they have suffered notable naval and air damage in the Solomons area and once again have apparently chosen not to force the issue. Whether this is due to the damage sustained by enemy warships—and in particular, carriers—or whether to a Japanese desire to prolong the naval war of attrition in the Solomons, is far from clear.

The size of the Japanese naval forces engaged in the campaign in the Solomons is indicated by the fact that on October 27, the day following our main attack in the Santa Cruz area, some five battleships, three aircraft carriers, fifteen cruisers, and eight destroyers were sighted. Our own naval forces, apparently utilizing "hit-and-run" tactics (and handicapped by the previous day's loss of a carrier) appear to have withdrawn after exchanging blows on October 26; but Navy patrol bombers continued to assault the Japanese forces. It is not clear when the Japanese themselves withdrew.

The Results of Attrition to Date

An unofficial tabulation, based on Navy Department communiqués for the period since the battle began in August, shows the present score in the Solomons to be not unfavorable to the Japanese in ships actually sunk: one heavy cruiser, eight destroyers, and three transports known to have been lost by the Japanese, compared to our own admitted loss of two carriers, three heavy cruisers (not counting the Australian *Canberra*), six destroyers, one transport, and four auxiliaries.

In ships possibly sunk or damaged, however, we claim a heavy toll, with at least 61 ships damaged and three possibly sunk. This compilation does not include damage inflicted by General MacArthur's bombers in raids on Rabaul and on

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Japanese bases in the northern Solomons, where one cruiser, two destroyers, and an aircraft tender are believed to have been destroyed. Nearly a score of other vessels are reported from MacArthur's headquarters to have been damaged in varying degrees, although this might include some duplications of damage announced by the Navy Department. We have specified damage to only two American destroyers, although others of our warships of unspecified types have sustained injuries.

The Meaning of Damage

In the naval-air battle of October 26-27, we claimed damage to two large Japanese carriers, one battleship, four heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser. One of the carriers received four to six "heavy" bomb hits (including some bombs of 1,000 pounds). Since a direct hit with only a 300-pound delayed action bomb should ordinarily destroy about half the flight deck, this carrier is not likely to see service again for a long time. Another carrier was hit with two "medium" bombs (500-pounders) and might be out of action temporarily. One heavy cruiser was hit both by bombs and torpedoes—and the latter is generally recognized as the most damaging missile in naval warfare. A second heavy cruiser received three torpedo hits; a third, four heavy bomb hits; and the fourth—a cruiser of the *Tikuma* class—was hit five times by medium bombs. One battleship was hit with two heavy bombs.

The degree of damage a warship sustains naturally depends on where the hit is made, as well as upon the missile itself, and no generalizations are possible. Aircraft carriers, though the most vulnerable of the large vessels, can nevertheless take considerable damage. At Midway, the *Kaga*, *Akagi*, and *Soryu* survived several fairly heavy air attacks before finally succumbing to Navy torpedo planes, dive bombers, and sub-

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marine torpedoes (one of the three is reported to have been shelled and finished off by a Japanese cruiser). The *Hiryu* was hit one evening by six 1,000-pound bombs and possibly a 500-pounder and did not sink until the next morning. In the Coral Sea action the *Shoho*, which sank in a matter of minutes, was hit in rapid succession by twelve 1,000-pound bombs and 10 torpedoes. The U. S. S. *Lexington* took four or five torpedo hits and still was described as in "pretty good shape." But she was downed by internal fires and explosions after one of three bombs which also hit her had penetrated five decks and exploded. In the Mediterranean in January 1941, H. M. S. *Illustrious* took seven direct bomb hits and four near misses, but survived them all.

Until American production becomes a telling factor, our ability to sustain a naval war of attrition will depend, of course, on our ability to make repairs quickly. Since Truk is only half as far from the lower Solomons as Pearl Harbor, the Japanese have the advantage.

Air Strength: The Limiting Factor?

The Japanese in the third week of October were reported to have some 400-odd carrier- and land-based planes available for action in the Southwest Pacific. Of these, more than 100 were reported certainly destroyed in the naval action of October 26, and another 50 were probably destroyed. During the week ending October 28, some 70 more were destroyed over Guadalcanal. Altogether, at least half of the available Japanese aircraft was destroyed—an estimate which probably does not take into account all accidental, non-combat losses.

Since it is believed by military observers that the Japanese have withdrawn all available naval aircraft from adjacent areas (Japanese operations in the Pacific have been under the command of the Navy), lack of aircraft may now limit

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the enemy's operations in the Solomons, as it has done already in the Aleutians and in New Guinea. Military observers believe, however, that the Japanese Navy will probably draw on the Army for planes—a view which may be substantiated by reports of sizeable Army air units in Malaya, from whence they might be flown to the Solomons area as reinforcements.

Despite this shortage of aircraft, the enemy still appears to have ample naval forces available to prosecute the attack in the Solomons. While Japanese carrier strength is limited by the loss, temporarily at least, of two large carriers, her weakness here, obviously, is no greater than our own. Relatively large Japanese ship concentrations still are reported in the Buin-Faisi area (northern Solomons), where these vessels have been refueling. From their base here, Japanese ships can leave in the late afternoon and arrive at Guadalcanal in time to furnish support for ground operations the next morning.

Guadalcanal Troops Cling to the Initiative

While awaiting the outcome of the struggle for supremacy at sea, our troops on Guadalcanal are clinging tenuously to the initiative. Enemy attacks late last week were repulsed with relatively heavy losses to the Japanese, and on November 1 some elements of our ground forces penetrated Japanese-held territory as far as two miles to the west of our Matanikau River defense line. The Americans were supported by aircraft, which not only has continued to defend Henderson Field and attack Japanese shipping, but apparently has been notably effective in silencing Japanese artillery, now known to include calibers up to 6 inches.

Communications with our forces on the island have not been interrupted, and on the morning of October 30 a small American naval force bombarded Japanese positions for two hours.

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There are no indications as yet, however, that the Japanese themselves might be in imminent danger of isolation or destruction. On October 27, Japanese troops available for operations in Middle Melanesia were estimated to number 53,000 at a minimum, and possibly as many as 70,000—18,000 to 20,000 on Guadalcanal, 10,000 in the remainder of the Solomons, and 25,000 to 40,000 in the Rabaul area (for possible use as reinforcements). Some reinforcements were landed the night of November 2-3 to the east of our positions on Guadalcanal, and others can be anticipated.

Kokoda Reconquered

In New Guinea, United Nations troops, traversing the difficult Owen Stanley Range, have finally reached and retaken the Japanese advance base at Kokoda, and are pursuing the Japanese toward Oivi, a few miles to the north. Both Oivi and Kokoda are the sites of small airfields which might be used by light planes to bring in some supplies and equipment—heretofore one of the chief limiting factors in the advance over the mountains (four native bearers have been required to supply one soldier).

In recognition of the mounting danger to their north coast base at Buna, the Japanese have been increasing their air strength on New Guinea, which previously had been virtually non-existent. Despite enemy fighter interception, however, our aircraft have been successful in turning back a convoy apparently transporting reinforcements to Buna. The quality of Japanese intercepting planes again has been reported as inferior to aircraft used in earlier operations.

China Begins to Plan for the Peace

Chinese leaders in Chungking are now engaged in drafting the clauses which China will seek to have embodied in the peace treaty, according to an authoritative observer. Such

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diplomatic leaders as T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister, and Wellington Koo, Ambassador to Britain, are already aiding in the deliberations at Chungking, and it is rumored that the Chinese envoy to Russia will soon be recalled to take part in the discussions. When the Chinese peace terms have been drawn up, it is probable that a special mission will be sent abroad in an effort to obtain adherence from China's allies in advance of the peace conference.

The Chinese terms are expected to include the return to China of Manchuria and Formosa; freedom for Korea; some form of international mandatory status for Malaya, Burma, and possibly Indo-China; and guarantees to China as regards use of the Burma Road and the Haiphong (Indo-China) Railroad. Our observer believes that the Chinese will not insist on harsh treatment of Japan, since he feels that they realize the necessity of post-war cooperation with the Japanese.

Some Chinese, however, are evidently thinking in terms of a drastic settlement with Japan. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, who frequently voices indiscreet but widely held opinions, has published his own draft of a peace treaty. He calls for restoration of all lost territories and goes on to state that the remains of the Japanese Navy should be turned over to China; all naval bases, military installations, airplane factories, and arsenals should be dismantled; all naval and military schools should be closed for 50 years; and Japan should be prevented from creating navy, army or air forces for the same period of time. By Sun Fo's terms, half of Japan's remaining merchant fleet would be given to China; and half of all Japanese industrial plants would be dismantled and transported to China.

Sun Fo would demand that half of all the books, journals, maps, and laboratory equipment in Japanese universities be turned over to China, and that every Chinese object seized

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by the Japanese since 1894, whether cannon, book, or painting, be restored to the Chinese. He insists that "all books, magazines, and newspapers published within Japan must be prohibited absolutely from printing any material that is anti-Chinese or derogatory to China", and that material of this nature which may have been published prior to the peace should be "searched out and burned". To enforce the fulfillment of his peace terms (particularly those which would forbid the Japanese to build a military establishment for 50 years), Sun Fo would have "China, the United States, and other United Nations" send troops to garrison "Tokyo, Yokohama, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, etc., etc."

Japan Inaugurates the Greater East Asia Ministry

In Tokyo, the formal inauguration on November 1 of the Greater East Asia Ministry (Daitoasho) in a ceremony at the Imperial Palace marks an important development in Japan's efforts to consolidate her present position. The new Ministry will have jurisdiction over all parts of the "Co-prosperity Sphere" outside of the Japanese Empire proper (Japan, Korea, Karafuto, and Taiwan). It supersedes the Overseas Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Board, the Manchurian Affairs Board, the China Affairs Board, and the East Asiatic and South Seas Bureaus of the Foreign Office. The Ministry will be composed of four bureaus: General Affairs, Manchukuo Affairs, Southern District Affairs, and China Affairs.

The Greater East Asia Ministry is to supervise, direct and control all affairs within the "Co-prosperity Sphere," with the exception of actual military operations, and it is expected that it will eventually take over the military governments which have been set up in the various occupied areas. The functions of the Foreign Office are greatly curtailed, since the new Ministry will direct and supervise all diplomats in the

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occupied areas and will take charge of all administrative work necessary for cooperation with the Army and Navy. The Foreign Office will retain merely nominal authority, limited to "purely diplomatic matters," although it will still appoint Ambassadors. The new Ministry has already named a Minister Plenipotentiary to the Nanking Government (together with a chief secretary and twelve other counselors). A similar appointment has been made in French Indo-China.

The head of the Greater East Asia Ministry, Kazuo Aoki, is a career bureaucrat who held a variety of positions in the Ministry of Finance during the 20 years following his graduation from the law department of the Imperial University in 1916. In 1936-1937 he was Vice-President of the Manchurian Affairs Board; and in 1939, as Minister of Finance and President of the important Cabinet Planning Board, he was considered the most powerful man in the Abe Cabinet. Over a period of years he has been in agreement with the military's plans for expansion. In 1941 he became Economic Advisor to the Nanking Government, and shortly before his appointment to his present post he was made a member without portfolio of the Tojo Cabinet.

Mr. Willkie, Britain, and India

The British press has reacted in fairly predictable fashion to Mr. Willkie's statements about India in his report to the American people. Comment on this address, as on previous similar occasions, has divided broadly into three main categories—which one might characterize as governmental, moderately governmental, and frankly critical. Typical of the first category was the editorial in the *Daily Telegraph*, which, after regretting "that Mr. Willkie did not include India in his tour", concluded that "We prefer . . . his views on what he has seen to his views on what he has not. . . . Had he seen India for himself he would have been less inclined to take what others said to him about it."

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The *Times* likewise expressed a wish that Mr. Willkie had seen India for himself. But it emphasized chiefly the moderate position that the Empire was evolving "in pursuance of settled British policy, to transform dependencies into free partnerships Public opinion in this country can be relied upon to insist upon faithful adherence to [this] . . . policy. But the consummation of that process depends now primarily upon facts, parties, and persons within India itself." Representative of the third category in its outspokenly critical vein was the comment of the *Manchester Guardian*: "Let us hope the British Government will read between the lines and see in Mr. Willkie's careful and generous phrases how badly our failure in India reacts on the common cause."

The Indian Reaction

Even the Indian press has not expressed unqualified approval of Mr. Willkie's statements. Both Moslem League and Congress organs have maintained that words are not enough and that definite actions are required to substantiate good intentions. Such is the viewpoint expressed by Jinnah's *Dawn*—which, however, commends Mr. Willkie's stand on the second front. The *Tribune* of New Delhi (Congress) is more specific in its criticism. While approving the speaker's assertion that the United States has already drawn heavily on the good will it formerly enjoyed among Asiatic peoples, the *Tribune* maintains that Mr. Willkie did not display any love for India or for freedom but simply a recognition that India was a war problem of the United Nations. President Roosevelt, the editorial continues, missed a great opportunity to declare for Indian freedom at the time of the signature of the Atlantic Charter, nor has he subsequently corrected the British official interpretation of the Charter. Yet it is still possible, the *Tribune* concludes, for the United States to put

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pressure on Britain to bring India's millions effectively into the war.

Mr. Hepburn and the Canadian Opposition

The unexpected recent resignation of Mitchell Hepburn from the premiership of Ontario is being interpreted by some observers as only the latest in a series of moves organized by Prime Minister King's opponents. Conservative party leaders, such as ex-Prime Minister Meighen and those Ontario business interests who abhor Mr. King's "appeasement" of the French Canadians, apparently anticipate that Mr. Hepburn will now abandon his Liberal affiliations and try to take by storm the forthcoming Conservative convention at Winnipeg, hoping to emerge as the head of a "coalition government" ticket. Should this plan not materialize, it is expected that Mr. Hepburn will at least attempt to enter the House of Commons at Ottawa, where his vehement advocacy of a policy of total war might well prove embarrassing to the present cabinet.

Chile in the Balance

Chilean political blocs, split sharply on the "neutrality" issue, worked overtime last week in feverish attempts to build up strength for the special session of Congress on November 15. Clashes between pro- and anti-Axis students have already occurred, and more may be expected, since the Confederation of Chilean Workers (claiming over 100,000 members) and other democratic groups are planning a special "Anti-Fascist Week", to culminate with a monster parade through the heart of Santiago to the government palace.

Meantime, President Ríos and his hand-picked "non-political cabinet" have apparently determined not to commit themselves publicly until Congress meets. However, Ríos

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has given indirectly some indication of his Government's character by addressing an anti-United Nations student demonstration, and by having his Minister of the Interior despatch troops to suppress a general strike in the province of Magallanes. It remains a distinct possibility that serious Congressional discord, provoked by "pro-neutrality" deputies, with or without the connivance of the Government, may yet provide Ríos with an opportunity to dismiss the legislature, clamp down a national "state of siege" in the Castillo manner, and rule by decree.

Schism in Colombia

The Concordat recently negotiated between Colombia and the Holy See has already come under the fire of Laureano Gómez, openly pro-Axis publisher of Bogotá's *El Siglo* and reputed head of the local Spanish *Falange*. Ostensibly based on dissatisfaction with certain minor provisos of the Concordat, Gómez's attack has broadened into a general assault upon the entire domestic and foreign policy of the present liberal, pro-Allied government. The result has been to provoke a highly significant schism within the local Catholic hierarchy—a schism which apparently reflects a similar split in the Spanish Church itself, between the opponents and the supporters of the Axis-dominated *Falange*.

Several Colombian bishops, through the columns of Gómez's *El Siglo*, have seemingly lined up with the Falangists, declaring that reading of the pro-government paper, *El Tiempo*, is a mortal sin. On the other hand, United Nations circles have been cheered by the action of an opposing wing of the hierarchy which, with the Apostolic Nuncio's support, has come vigorously to the defense of the Concordat and the Government. Moreover, a new church-sponsored journal, *El Catolicismo*, has now appeared with the

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announced and specific purpose of combatting the influence of Gómez, his paper, and his followers.

Toledano Leaves His Card

The recent visit to Ecuador of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Mexican labor leader, appears to have touched off long-smoldering sentiment among all classes for effective unification of the Andean republic. Toledano, who is president of the Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL), received an enthusiastic welcome not only from workers but from leaders of the urban middle classes and members of the government. Seizing the opportunity to attract labor support for his shaky administration, President Arroyo del Ríos granted a personal interview to Lombardo and declared October 9 a national holiday, so that Quito workers might attend a rally in honor of the distinguished visitor.

With official approval thus unmistakable, the Ecuadorean workers, who have long been split by factional disputes and kept unorganized by Government repression of union activity, established a united national trade union organization, the Confederation of Ecuadorean Workers (CTE), which promptly voted affiliation with the CTAL. The CTE is certain to press for full cooperation with the United Nations. Proof of how deeply the public's desire for unity in time of war has cut across class lines is furnished by an unprecedented editorial in Quito's leading newspaper, *El Comercio*, which hails the new labor organization as a long step forward in stabilizing Ecuadorean politics and society.

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APPENDIX I

THE JAPANESE SHIPPING POSITION¹

The amount of merchant tonnage available to the Japanese is being steadily whittled down by United Nations action, not so rapidly as to imperil the enemy's present transport operations, but rapidly enough to make fresh long-range ventures on a major scale improbable. Currently, the Japanese are losing about 90,000 tons more each month than they are able to send down their shipways. Losses during August and September appear to have averaged about 117,000 tons, while the enemy's output is believed to be running at scarcely 25,000 tons each month.

As of October 15, the Japanese had at their disposal some 5,990,000 tons. Of this total, only a fraction would be free for additional military operations. The following table indicates roughly how the Japanese must allocate their tonnage, and how much excess capacity remains to them for additional expeditions:

Total tonnage available.....	5,990,000
Economic Supply of Japan:	
(a) Coastwise, China, Korea, and Manchuria.....	3,100,000
(b) Indo-China and Siam.....	150,000
Naval Auxiliaries.....	500,000
Lay-ups and Repairs.....	700,000
Captured vessels already in essential trade.....	100,000
Unusable types.....	50,000
Supply of troops now committed in Southern areas.....	600,000
	5,200,000
Tonnage available for additional operations.....	790,000

This figure of excess tonnage must be scaled down by another 100,000 tons, which represent the number of tankers in the total: the expedition's immediate oil supplies would be carried by the naval auxiliaries and by the transports themselves. What the remaining 690,000 tons mean in terms of the transport of troops and their supplies would depend, naturally, upon the length of the voyage assumed, the type of equipment to be carried, the time necessary for unloading, etc. But an indication can be given if we consider a hypothetical invasion of Australia from the home base of Japan—a round-trip distance of, roughly, 6,000 miles.

In the first place, because of the turn-around factor, not all of the usable surplus of 690,000 tons could be allocated to the initial invasion fleet. Some vessels would have to be kept in reserve to bring in additional supplies to the landed invaders during the time that the original convoy vessels were returning to Japan, reloading, and starting out again. Again, the enemy would doubtless hesitate to assign its entire excess tonnage to such a venture: some safety margin would probably have to be withheld to cover essential "normal" traffic.

¹ Based on data compiled largely from naval sources by the Economics Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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It is unlikely, then, that the Japanese would be able to allocate more than about 500,000 tons of merchant marine for the Japan-Australia hop. The best estimates of the amount of tonnage required to transport a Japanese infantry division (18,000 combat troops and 7,000 GHQ men) with its equipment and sufficient supplies for one month, vary between 122,000 and 125,000 gross tons. This would indicate that the enemy could embark from its home bases only about four divisions.

There is reason to believe, however, that during the past few months the Japanese have been shipping to Indo-China, Malaya, and the Netherland Indies more troops and supplies than operations there would require. If the accumulation of excess men and materials at these forward bases were tapped for an invasion force, the expedition's round-trip distance to, say, Australia, would be appreciably lessened and its size potentially increased. Again, if Japan should secure control of the Southwest Pacific, the sizeable forces now in occupied zones and the ships which serve them could be withdrawn, to augment the "invasion surplus".

APPENDIX II

IRON AND STEEL CAPACITY OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE¹

Japan's steel capacity, both in the homeland and in controlled territories, has increased sufficiently over the past few years to sustain her present war effort. But whether the enemy can raise his output enough to exploit satisfactorily newly-conquered areas, or to expand armament production, remains extremely dubious.

By the close of this year, it is estimated, production of steel in the Empire will have reached about 8.5 million metric tons of ingots and castings—as against 5.6 million in 1936 and only 1.6 million in 1926. Although this 1942 output is less than one-ninth that of the United States, it appears to meet the essential Japanese military requirements. About 4 million tons of ingot steel are earmarked for direct military uses and shipbuilding, while the remaining 4.5 million tons go into indirect military and industrial production. Even with a vastly smaller steel output than ours, the Japanese are able to devote only a slightly larger fraction of it to strictly military employment.

The factors which inhibit Japanese steel expansion are several and serious. To begin with, the Empire's recent rise in output was made possible by two contributions no longer received: imports of scrap iron, and imports of productive and fabricating equipment. It is true that Japan has replaced her need of imported scrap by raising her output of pig iron; but it is questionable if she can continue to increase her steel rolling capacity without the help of foreign manufacturers of heavy machinery: the shortage of domestic skilled technicians is acute.

This bottleneck in rolling capacity nullifies to a great extent Japan's acquisition of raw materials. Aside from the homeland's own resources, nearby Manchuria and Korea can together yield Japan ores containing about 4 million metric tons of iron. Occupied China and French Indo-China can furnish an additional one-half to 1 million tons; and more distant sources in Malaya and the Philippines can

¹ Based on a report by the Economics Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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supply more than 3.5 million tons. But Japan's present rolling mill capacity is only 7 million metric tons, requiring an ingot production of about 8.5 million. Even if that capacity were susceptible of increase, it would call for more open-hearth furnaces after ingot production had topped 9.5 million tons, and more blast furnaces after ingot requirements had passed 13 million tons.

What may be still more significant is the fact that the greater part of Japan's iron ore and coking coal must come to the mills by water—about 8 million metric tons of raw ore and 6 to 7 million tons of coking coal, at the present rate of production. Although most of the coal comes from nearby China or Karafuto, some of the ore must be imported from such faraway points as the Philippines and Malaya. Since the Japanese shipping position is already strained and undergoing steady deterioration (see Appendix I), this overseas supply of raw materials provides a basis for expansion that is far from secure. If, in addition, American bomber raids upon the coal mines at Kailan were as successful as reports indicate the enemy's output of coke, and hence of steel, may be somewhat curtailed.

APPENDIX III

BULGARIA AND THE WAR

Although public opinion is becoming increasingly anti-German, Bulgaria is caught inescapably in the Nazi net, according to a survey of current opinion and conditions in Bulgaria by two very well qualified observers.

The governing class—including high Army officers, large propertied interests, and the Cabinet—collaborates completely with Germany. The peasants, however, because of racial ties, and a majority of the industrial workers, because of Communist sympathies, are pro-Russian and unwilling to fight against the Soviet. A great part of the small tradesmen and middle class also support Russia for either or both of these reasons. Anti-German feeling has spread rapidly during the past year as German occupation and demands have become more severe and sweeping. No Bulgar wishes to die for Hitler, and the belief is waning that Germany will be able to win a real victory. Nevertheless, no countermovement can be expected against Germany until the latter sustains severe military defeats. At present, sabotage is believed to be of no particular significance.

Despite the propaganda against "Jewish, Masonic" America, our observers report that the Bulgarians are generally friendly to the United States and regret being at war with us. Axis propaganda appears to have had effect, however, in increasing anti-British sentiment.

The Bulgarian Government is a tool of the Germans. The King can make no important decisions without German consent, and the Parliament votes as it is told. The Minister of the Interior, Gabrovsky, is the strong man of the Cabinet, and is reportedly responsible for the crushing persecution going on against the Jews. Real power, however, lies in the hands of Beckerle, German Ambassador at Sofia, a determined and ruthless member of the SS. The Germans are also

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blamed for increasing economic distress. Crops were poor this year, and shortages were general, although there will be no actual starvation this winter. The shortage of coal (due primarily to lack of transportation) is serious.

Bulgaria's Own Aspirations

Both the Army and civilians are on a war footing, with probably a total of 400,000 soldiers under arms. The army is well-trained, well-clothed, well-fed, and well-equipped, though lacking in tanks and planes, and not fully motorized. It has plenty of oil and gasoline, of which the civilian population gets none.

Bulgarian soldiers do not want to fight, but our observers agree that, if the Germans take the initiative, the large Bulgarian forces already concentrated on the Turkish border, supported by a skeleton German force, could be persuaded to go to war against the Turks. "Great Bulgaria", a slogan that embraces the newly acquired territories plus Eastern Thrace, is a platform which all classes support. For this program Bulgarians might fight. The ultimate decision, however, would appear to rest not in Sofia, but in Berlin's broader strategy concerning Turkey and the Middle East.

APPENDIX IV

TERRAIN AND CLIMATE IN THE LENINGRAD AREA¹

In September, 1941, the armies of General von Leeb were brought to a halt before Leningrad by a combination of mud, water, and Russian resistance. For more than a year the Germans have been unable substantially to advance the siege line then established. If they intend to resume the assault this winter, they must again cope with serious obstacles of terrain and climate. The coming period from late November to the first of the year is regarded as relatively favorable to the attackers; but it is certainly not ideal.

The German lines below Leningrad today extend from Peterhof on the Gulf of Finland to Schlüsselburg on Lake Ladoga in the form of a semi-circle 20 to 25 miles from the city (see map). Leningrad itself lies in a poorly-drained lowland of old lake deposits, through which the Neva River runs. Southwest of this lowland, the Ishorsk Plateau rises to a height of 300 to 500 feet. Significantly, the Germans have been able to hold this sparsely-settled plateau, which is fairly well drained, but have found it impossible to push out into the more densely-populated lowland to the northeast, or to crack the river defenses which the Russians have thrown up along the Neva.

While the principal natural obstacles to German forward movement have been the ponds, creeks, and bogs which cover most of the lowlands, the soils of even the higher and better-drained areas offer considerable difficulty. The entire Leningrad area is underlain by deep deposits of soft earth laid down by former glaciers. The soil covering these deposits is a gray, rather sandy type known as "podzol". When saturated, podzol (and dirt roads composed of it) become soft, creating difficulties for motor transport.

¹ Based on a report prepared by the Geography Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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The forests around Leningrad have proved another terrain asset for the defenders. Though today the pine and fir forests which used to cover most of the farm land in the immediate neighborhood of the city have been largely removed, the east side of the German-held corridor running down from Schlüsselburg is flanked by heavy woods. These forests were utilized successfully by the Russians in their operations against the Germans from Tikhvin down to the Volkhov River during the winter and early spring of 1941-42.

The Schedule of Attack

The time of year best suited to military operations in the Leningrad area is not easily determined. The Germans scored their main successes during August, 1941, tapering off in September. The Russians, on the other hand, conducted their counter-offensive from early December through February. One fact seems fairly certain: conditions during the fall—when the soil is churned into deep mud and the bogs and water barriers are full and unfrozen—are much less favorable than those obtaining even during the winter period of low temperatures and snow.

Autumnal handicaps to the maneuvering of mechanized equipment do not end simultaneously. By November 1, on the average, the period of mean daily temperatures below freezing has begun on the Izhorsk Plateau; by November 10, it has commenced in the Leningrad lowland. Freezing of the soil starts soon after these dates: on the Izhorsk Plateau, plowed soil and dirt roads would probably support heavy vehicles by November 7; similar surfaces in the lowland would be ready by November 17; and soil in the forest areas by December 1.

While bogs and small lakes will probably freeze about the same time as the soil in these sections, they will not support heavy vehicles until somewhat later. In some years the Neva floods the surrounding lowlands as late as the middle of November. Freezing on the river's quiet lower estuary ordinarily begins about November 15, and the estuary is completely frozen by December 15. At Leningrad the river starts to freeze around November 25, and by the end of December a substantial crust has developed on the whole river. If the ice becomes covered with a deep mantle of snow, however, the rate of thickening will be much slower than if clear weather and strong winds keep the surface clean.

Though attacks upon Kronstadt might be made at any time by air or by artillery fire from the mainland, an assault across the ice would have to wait upon the deep freezing of the five-mile stretch of water that separates the island from the shore. This might not occur until about January 22—the average date for the closing of the port of Leningrad. The ice near the coast forms and thickens a good deal earlier than that farther out in the channel; the Russian fleet, in fact, has access to the open sea from Kronstadt all winter, through the use of ice-breakers.

As for Lake Ladoga, specific data on its freezing are not at hand, but it is probable that between January 1 and January 15 the ice near the shore would become sufficiently strong to support at least trucks and light tanks. Last winter, the Russians operated motor trucks across the lake's ice from a point near the mouth of the Volkhov to Schlüsselburg.

Overland attacks by the Germans upon the Leningrad defenses, then, could get under way during the second and third weeks of November from the west and south, and somewhat later from the Finnish front on both sides of Lake Ladoga—

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though it must be emphasized that an unusually cold or warm season could change these dates by as much as two or three weeks. Attacks across the ice of the Neva, the Gulf of Finland, or Lake Ladoga would not be possible until one and a half to two months later.

Air Support


One additional factor, however, places a serious limitation upon German assaults, either over land or over water: the difficulty of providing troops with air support. From November 15 until early March, visibility and icing conditions permit but few days of effective aerial activity. Two-thirds of the days bring falling snow and a cloud-covered sky, with cloud coverage averaging about 80 percent and only one entirely clear day occurring per month. Fog on an average of about once a week, frequent strong winds that drift the snow, and short winter days still further reduce visibility. Icing is favored during this period by the abundance of cloud, the high relative humidity (averaging above 85), and temperatures that seldom rise above freezing.

Mid-winter Operations

If the Germans should delay their assault until later in the winter, the "air factor" would be no less against them, the cold would be even more intense, and heavy snowfalls would cripple road traffic. On the average, snow in the Leningrad area attains a depth of about 6 inches by Christmas, rises to a foot by February, and reaches its maximum of some 17 inches around the beginning of March. Winter air temperatures, while not as severe as those of the Russian interior, attain at Leningrad mean daily minimums of 22 degrees Fahrenheit in November, 4 in December, 4 in January, 1 in February, and 12 in March. Extreme temperatures as low as -8 in November, -36 in December, -33 in January, and -30 in February have been recorded. What makes the cold a greater hardship than the temperature charts might indicate, however, are the high humidity and strong winds common to the Baltic winter.

These considerations should be tempered somewhat by the recollection that the Russians found the middle of winter not at all impossible for at least limited offensives. The Germans, after that lesson, may yet prove equally adaptable to Leningrad's peculiar conditions of climate and terrain.

THE LENINGRAD FRONT



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
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NOVEMBER 5-12, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

Striking simultaneously at a series of strategic points in French North Africa, American forces this week entered the European theater in force. With British air and naval cooperation, the American troops overcame initial French resistance with finish and despatch and brought the campaign to a close in three days.

With Morocco and Algeria in their possession, Anglo-American units will obviously strike promptly at the next objective—Tunisia—and the third stage of the campaign may well be a collaborative effort with General Montgomery to liquidate the shrinking remnant of Marshal Rommel's Afrika Korps. The latter has been hurled back on the Libyan border and may soon be either surrounded there or harried across Cyrenaica.

The dramatic seizure of the initiative by the Allies during the past two weeks marks the beginning of a new phase in the war. Allied activities have already forced Hitler to occupy Vichy France and hastily to transfer air power to the Mediterranean, undertaking added military responsibilities in the west at a time when German lines are already widely extended in the east. With the recent reduction of Nazi pressure in Russia, the Soviet armies are now everywhere holding the enemy in check.

German activities clearly reveal a deep preoccupation with the defense of the northern Mediterranean littoral. Whether they will themselves attempt shortly to regain the initiative is an open question. But some military observers are in-

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clined to believe that the German military position is sufficiently tight to prohibit any large scale operation this winter.

Allied Occupation of French Northwest Africa

Striking to reopen the Mediterranean and gain control of North Africa as a base for future operations, American land, sea, and air forces made multiple landings at 3:00 a. m. on November 8. Initial landings met with little resistance, and subsequent discharge of assault convoys was accomplished despite strong opposition, offered principally by French naval forces and coastal artillery. Three days later, after immediate Allied objectives had been largely achieved, Admiral Darlan gave the order to French forces in North Africa to cease firing.

The first Allied success occurred in the Mediterranean, where the landings were covered by British naval forces. In the Algiers region a direct assault on the port is reported to have failed, but a landing was made at Sidi Ferruch (see Appendix II and map at back, on which the situation is necessarily incomplete). By the afternoon of November 8 the airdromes of Blida and Maison Blanche south of Algiers had been taken, through the use of United States parachute troops. British fighter planes shortly began to operate from these fields, and in the evening Algiers surrendered unconditionally. The harbor forts were occupied the following day, and Allied shipping entered the port.

Further west, three landings were apparently made in the Oran area. Coastal batteries on Arzew Heights were taken early in the morning, and shortly afterwards tanks were landed. In naval engagements, two French destroyers were sunk and three damaged. By evening, columns advancing from east and west were converging on the city, and at least three airfields to the south of Oran had been captured and

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put into use by Allied aircraft. On November 10, Oran capitulated.

The Moroccan landings in the vicinity of Casablanca met with more determined resistance, but all assault waves were landed. Serious naval opposition was offered, and in the resulting actions American naval forces either sank or seriously damaged all the French naval units in the area. These are believed to have included seven destroyers, a light cruiser, and the new French battleship, *Jean Bart*, now burned out in the port of Casablanca.

Landings in the Casablanca area were at Safi to the south and Fedala and Mehedyia to the north. Coastal batteries at Fedala and Casablanca were silenced, but resistance continued. The landing at Safi was accomplished in the face of bombing by Vichy aircraft. Columns from the Mehedyia-Lyautey assault, including elements of General Patton's armored forces, were advancing on Casablanca when that city finally capitulated.

The Battle for Tunis

With Darlan's order for the cessation of hostilities in French North Africa, the first phase of the campaign comes to an end, and attention focusses on the Allied drive for Tunis and Tripoli. Reportedly reinforced by elements of the British First Army, American forces have now occupied Bougie, coastal city 110 miles east of Algiers, and Bône, nearest large port to Tunisia.

To meet this Allied threat the Axis has occupied the rest of France and Corsica, and has apparently concentrated air strength in the Sicily-Sardinia area. Military observers believed that a maximum of four or five Italian divisions—and probably less—might have been available in western Tripoli. Reports also indicate that about 200 enemy

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aircraft have arrived in Tunisia with about 1,000 air personnel, and that several hundred German air-borne troops have landed at El Aouina airdrome near Tunis. A British raid on this field is reported to have set 19 planes afire. Enemy infiltrations so far appear to be on altogether too small a scale to do more than harass the Allied forces; and time is growing short for Hitler to move any mass of Axis troops across the Mediterranean to the "defense" of Tunis.

The campaign to date has placed the Allies in control of a thousand miles of strategic Atlantic and Mediterranean coastline. Dakar on the flank, if it does not voluntarily enter the Allied fold, remains an isolated fortress. In the Mediterranean, bases have been gained for coming operations aimed at clearing the Mediterranean and making Allied power felt all over southern Europe.

British Drive in Egypt


In the days immediately preceding the American landings to the west, British forces in Egypt turned an Axis retreat into a rout that allowed only reduced elements of the original German Afrika Korps to escape to the Libyan border, where they are now once again threatened with encirclement.

A rough sketch of the advance is given on the accompanying map. On November 2, the British broke through the enemy's fixed positions and forced his withdrawal after three major tank battles. This initial victory was turned into a disaster for the Axis by the speed and power of the pursuit by British air, mobile, and armored units; and by the enemy's tactical errors and acute shortage of motor transport, air support, and armored equipment.

The Details of the Campaign

Fanning out from the gap, and breaking through in the south, the British encircled the mass of the Italian forces and some German elements which lacked the transport necessary

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for retreat. These divisions are now offering little serious resistance. Only the Afrika Korps, using all available trucks, escaped the Alamein battlefield. This force—the 15th and 21st Armored and 90th Light Divisions—successfully eluded British efforts at encirclement, withdrawing along the coastal road to the escarpment southwest of Fuka. Here a stand was made. Heavily attacked by British armor and threatened on the flank, the Axis was forced to resume its retreat. To avoid offering a concentrated target to Allied aircraft, the enemy apparently left the coastal road and went overland as far as Matruh. Then, after minor resistance at Matruh, the harassed troops resumed their retreat with a dash to positions in the Halfaya-Capuzzo-Solum region.

The Germans will probably not be able to make any real stand in the latter area, although they have brought up part or all of the Italian division that had been garrisoning Tobruk. They now are believed to have few more than 20,000 men, and losses in tanks, guns, and planes have also been very severe. With British heavy units approaching the border, and the main force presumably advancing along the escarpment to envelop Halfaya Pass, the Germans may shortly strike out across the desert for Benghazi or El Agheila. Problems of communications and transport in this region have halted British drives before. But this time the ultimate fate of the Afrika Korps would appear to depend on whether decisions in Berlin and the battle for the Mediterranean make possible prompt reinforcement.

The prestige value of this British success has been of the first importance—especially in its influence on the French defenders of Northwest Africa.

The Occupation of Vichy France

The occupation of Vichy France was Hitler's answer to the combined Anglo-American successes in Africa. Whether it

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was true or not that Hitler, Ciano, and Laval had agreed at Munich on a program of complete occupation, the conscription of French workers for the Reich, and the handing over of the French fleet to the Nazis—in any event the Fuehrer apparently felt that Darlan's equivocal course had indicated the unreliability of Vichy's fighting forces. Under the pretext that the next Allied objectives were Corsica and the French Mediterranean coast, the forces of Field Marshal von Runstedt on Wednesday morning crossed the demarcation line at Chalons-sur-Saône and a few hours thereafter reached Lyons, Vichy, and Marseille. Italian troops have also entered long-coverted Nice, Chambéry, and Corsica.

Hitler's statement specified that the new occupation was to be only temporary, and that Pétain's government would continue its functions and would be free to move to Versailles. The Marshal, however, protesting against the German action as a violation of the Armistice terms, showed no signs of complying with the Fuehrer's suggestion. Fighting French sources in Cairo announced a "confirmed report" that Pétain had left Vichy.

The logical conclusion of the present crisis would appear to be the liquidation of the Vichy government except as a *Gauleiter* administration under Laval or Doriot, and the unification of all French resistance in a real government-in-exile in Africa. The Vichy naval chiefs however, have as yet thrown their support to neither side. They have apparently not accepted General Eisenhower's invitation to join the Allied fleet at Gibraltar, and the German-controlled Vichy radio has answered London's appeal to French merchant marine officers to put in at Allied-controlled ports, by ordering them to make for French harbors. As for the navy, the Vichy radio has similarly announced that in view of the fleet's determination to resist any attack, the Germans will

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not occupy Toulon. It would appear that the French navy is continuing its previous policy of strict neutrality.

The French Fleet and the Mediterranean Naval Balance

A decision by the French fleet would upset the Mediterranean naval balance, which may now be fairly even. Vichy's four battleships, seven heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers based at Toulon and Alexandria, would give an overwhelming numerical superiority to whichever side they chose to join. In cooperation with the Italian battle force of six battleships, three of them of the new *Littorio* class, based at Taranto, the French ships could endanger our newly-won positions in North Africa and cover the reinforcement of Tunis. Without French help, the Italian fleet would very likely take no action at the present time—reserving itself for the defense of Italy later on. In cooperation with the United Nations, however, the French fleet could probably permanently neutralize the Italian navy and perhaps even attack it in its own home waters.

Already, scattered naval engagements between Axis and Allied forces have apparently begun. The British have reported the torpedoing of an Italian light cruiser, while the Germans claim damage to two carriers, two cruisers, and two destroyers off the Algerian coast.

The Junior Partner of the Axis

Whatever Hitler's Reich may think of the current developments in the Mediterranean, it is Italy which is most deeply affected. Italy's "destiny" is at stake.

Up to now Italian Fascists have been accustomed to view British successes in the Mediterranean simply as incidents in the fortunes of war, which have not endangered the security

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of the Italian peninsula. The present crisis, however, threatens to give Italy the first taste of a type of defeat which might undermine the whole Fascist regime, in the view of one close observer. Furthermore, the appearance of American forces in the Mediterranean is probably having an incalculable effect on Italian morale. About France, Germany, and Great Britain, Italians generally (and many Fascists) have had grave misgivings; but about our country there still persists the widespread conviction that the "side of the United States is the side that wins." American activities in "Italian" Mediterranean waters have doubtless revived in full force all the sentiments of respect and affection (and perhaps also fear) that Italians have felt toward the United States. And these activities have probably confirmed the doubts of certain Fascists who approved of the German alliance only so long as the United States stayed out of the war or at least away from the shores of Europe, our observer concludes.

German Defensive Strategy

Hitler's latest address, delivered in Munich on November 9, was evidently intended primarily to reassure party members of the wisdom of German strategy in Russia in the summer of 1942. The Fuehrer's remarks on this subject were equivalent to an admission that he had abandoned his strategy of shattering the Red Army in favor of a war on the economic resources of Soviet Russia. Furthermore, he made only one veiled reference to the collapse of Rommel's army in Egypt. And he devoted but a single sentence to the American occupation of North Africa, and concluded his remarks with the promise that he was preparing a "thorough and timely counterblow". At the present time, however, it appears that the Nazis will confine their counter-measures to the reinforcement of Tunis and Tripoli and the defense of the European continent.

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There is no doubt that the Axis knew of the American plan well in advance. For the previous few weeks German submarines had been steadily moving away from the Atlantic Coast of the United States toward Africa. Just prior to the American landings a concentration of 20 U-boats had gathered off Gibraltar. In other words, the surprise of the American operations (if there was a surprise) was tactical rather than strategic.

Yet even with this knowledge, the Axis has restricted itself to the occupation of Vichy France. Reports of steady air reinforcement of Sicily and of special measures to keep the Hungarian railroads clear during the first half of November have given no specific indication of troop movements. American military observers believe that Axis quiescence up to the present, coupled with the strategic disadvantages attendant on almost any possible course of action, strongly suggest that the enemy will not attempt any large-scale retaliation.

An invasion of Turkey would have no immediate bearing on the current Mediterranean campaign. It is, of course, possible that the Germans could crush the under-equipped Turkish Army in short order. In the opinion of a highly-placed civilian observer recently returned from Turkey, however, the invaders could penetrate this winter only as far as Ankara before their progress would be blocked by snow, mountainous terrain, and determined resistance. Moreover, the British have recently sent considerable reinforcements to Iraq. In short, the Allies might have the whole winter in which to build up their position behind the Turks, whose well-drilled and spirited army would need only American equipment to make of it an effective fighting force.

Severe logistic difficulties also discourage any operations through Spain.

Even the reinforcement of Tunis and Tropolli would appear to be a hazardous undertaking. The American forces have

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anticipated the Axis and are so strategically placed that a large-scale enemy landing would be a difficult venture (see Appendix I). Furthermore, even if an Axis army eventually succeeded in establishing itself in Tunis, it would face on two sides Allied armies whose supply problem had been immensely simplified by the control of the Western Mediterranean.

Sicily as a Defensive Bastion

If the Axis restricts itself to a strategy of defense, the reinforcement of Sicily would probably have first priority. Additional German ground troops may join the one or two Nazi divisions now in Italy. Of greater importance, however, is the strengthening of Italy's operational air strength within its own borders, which until recently totaled no more than 300 planes. The success of the recent RAF daylight attack on Genoa has dramatically underlined this weakness.

To send German reinforcements from the central part of the Reich or from the Eastern Front to Sicily should be a matter of a few days for bombers and a week for fighters—provided the weather over the Alps were good—but upon their arrival they would need repairs and maintenance. Aviation gasoline would probably have to come from Germany by rail. Additional ammunition, spare parts, and ground crews would also need to be brought overland before an enlarged Nazi air force could operate out of Sicily. In Sardinia, Sicily, and Pantelleria, German and Italian air strength is at present approximately 500 planes. Roughly three weeks would be needed to double that force.

Air fields in Sicily appear to be adequate to accommodate a greatly enlarged force. There are 15 known airdromes and landing grounds, including three with runways and several others with perimeter and taxi tracks. The GAF has already operated out of airdromes at Catania, Gerbina, Marsala,

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Sciacca, Syracuse, and Trapani. The development of the Sardinian airfields would probably take somewhat longer, since they have not yet been used by the Nazis. Pantelleria, however, may soon become troublesome for the United Nations. Although its airfield probably bases only fighter planes, all types of aircraft have refueled there. It lies less than 100 miles from the best Tunisian airfields at Tunis (El Aouina) and Bizerte (Sidi Ahned).

The Russians Hold on all Fronts

Should the Axis choose to reinforce Italy or to take the offensive elsewhere, it would probably draw the necessary divisions from the Eastern Front. Already the Nazis have greatly reduced their pressure in Russia, and the Red Army has been able to hold its ground at all threatened points. In Stalingrad, activity has dropped to small-scale attacks and counterattacks on both sides, while on the Black Sea littoral northeast of Tuapse the initiative has passed to the Russians. Before Ordzhonikidze, steady German ground and air assaults have failed to drive back the Soviet defenders, and the gateway to the Georgian Military Highway is still secure. Meantime, on the central front, colder and clearer weather has apparently brought a slight increase in military activity. The Russians have maintained their pressure against the German outpost at Rzhev, while the Nazis have bombed the Soviet concentration point of Ostashkov, between Rzhev and Staraya Russia. With German ground forces now on the defensive, Russian guerrillas have apparently begun their winter operations.

Although German heavy artillery has shelled the naval base at Kronstadt, there is still no sign of a forthcoming attack on Leningrad. With Axis attention focussed on the Mediterranean, a Leningrad offensive now appears extremely

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unlikely. From now on, the Germans will probably direct their major efforts against Russian supply lines to Britain and America. Nazi air attacks on Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad, and on the new Astrakhan-Kizlyar Railroad along the Caspian, give some indication of enemy intentions for the winter months.

Stalin Charts a Course

As though in anticipation of events to come in Northwest Africa, Stalin's speech on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution was confident in tone and clear-sighted as to the future. In one sense, the speech was an explanation to the Soviet peoples of Russia's defeats last summer. Repeating the familiar Soviet argumentation on the Second Front, Stalin pointed out that "The Libyan front is diverting, in all, four German divisions and 11 Italian divisions", and that "instead of the 127 divisions in the first World War, we are now facing on our front no less than 240 divisions." Had there been a Second Front this year, the Russian leader asserted, "the Red Army would . . . be . . . somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zitomir, and Odessa." Yet the failure of the Nazis to carry out their alleged timetable was far more significant: "to be in . . . Stalingrad July 25, 1942, in Saratov August 10, 1942, in Kuibyshev August 15, 1942, in Arzamas September 10, 1942, and in Baku September 25, 1942." Such a timetable, Stalin maintained, indicated that "the principal objective of the offensive" was not "to capture the oil districts of Grozny and Baku" but "to outflank Moscow from the east, to cut it off from the Volga and our rear in the Urals, and then to strike at Moscow".

In more positive vein, the Russian leader expressed his confidence that his Allies would open a Second Front in Europe "sooner or later". And he scouted the assertion that

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dissension existed within the "Anglo-Soviet-American coalition". Despite "differences in ideologies and social systems", Stalin proclaimed the unity of the coalition on the following program of action: "Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes, economic aid to nations that have suffered and assistance to them in attaining their material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, the destruction of the Hitlerite regime."

An Effective Second Front?

Four days after the first American landings in Northwest Africa, it was still difficult to gauge the Russian reaction to these events. Soviet newspapers published the African news in small print and refrained from comment, failing even to score the obvious point that it was Soviet resistance that had made the American attack possible, and that Russian cooperation would be an indispensable feature of a full-scale Allied offensive next spring.

In his anniversary speech Stalin had stated quite flatly that the Russians eventually expected a second front "in Europe" as the Anglo-Saxon contribution to the alliance. And President Roosevelt has revealed that Soviet complaints about the lack of a second front were made in full knowledge of American intentions in Africa. On the other hand, a few weeks ago an authoritative Soviet spokesman declared that a new front in Africa would be "enough" for 1942, if it diverted a significant number of Axis troops. Observers of the Russian scene point out that the American landings are the type of commitment which the Russians have consistently demanded as an earnest of Anglo-American intentions to fight an all-out war.

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The Finns Waver

In Helsinki the Allied victories have apparently discouraged Finnish pro-Nazis, and brought out into the open much pro-United Nations sentiment, which had previously not dared to express itself. Already anti-Allied publicity is beginning to slacken. Furthermore, the Finns seem to have been unimpressed by Hitler's Munich address, which they regarded as the weakest of his utterances.

Spanish and Portuguese Reaction

The Spanish and Portuguese governments have given "satisfactory" replies to the American notes and privately expressed their appreciation of President Roosevelt's assurances. Although restrained, the official press has given wide publicity to the American assurances and has implied no criticism in its coverage of events in North Africa. The Spanish government is obviously apprehensive of Axis pressure, with German troops now all along the Pyrennees, but has made no moves to strengthen the forces defending its northern frontier. The presence of an Allied Army should, however, stiffen Franco's determination to remain neutral. Popular opinion in both countries has been "downright enthusiastic" in its response to the news.

In Spanish Morocco officials have expressed relief that their zone is not involved. Quiet has prevailed, and there is no indication of any Spanish plan to try to annex part of French Morocco.

Allied Success and the Peoples of the Near East

Although the news of the Allied victories in Africa will probably not evoke an immediate pro-Allied reaction among the Arab peoples of the Near East, it will serve to arrest the current of anti-British and anti-Allied feeling which has been

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increasing at an alarming rate. As occupying powers, England and France have borne the brunt of nationalist resentment in the Moslem countries. Furthermore, since previous British advances in Egypt and Libya have proved to be indecisive, the general attitude will probably be one of watchful waiting. Until United Nations successes are confirmed beyond further doubt, probably only those in official circles will voice their pro-British sentiments.

On the other hand, the Arab has a strong respect for power successfully applied. And this visible triumph will give United Nations propaganda substantial support. At the same time, the Axis pose as the defender of Islam will become correspondingly difficult to maintain.

In Turkey the Anglo-American victories will doubtless confirm the pro-Allied orientation of the Saracoglu Ministry. A German invasion at this time would find the Turks more determined than ever to defend their country in cooperation with the United Nations.

Latin-American Repercussions

The successful American offensive in Northwest Africa, following upon the Nazi defeats in Egypt and before Stalingrad, will probably be of inestimable value for the Allied cause in Latin America. Removing the threat of a Nazi attack against Brazil and enhancing the prospects of ultimate victory of the United Nations, it will particularly affect the international attitude of opportunistic and other vacillating elements. Thus in Chile it may shortly prove to be the decisive element in persuading the Ríos government to break relations with the Axis. In Argentina it should strengthen General Justo's faction and further reduce Castillo's support within the dominant National Democratic (Conservative) Party.

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Elsewhere, as in Mexico (where President Avila Camacho quickly broke off relations with Vichy), in Cuba (which followed suit), and in Peru (whose president congratulated Mr. Roosevelt), the North African campaign will undoubtedly solidify pro-United Nations sentiment and will soon rid the greater part of the hemisphere of the Vichy missions which have been serving as a part of the Axis espionage system. As for Martinique, French Guiana, and the other French possessions, the anti-Vichy sentiments of the great majority of inhabitants can be counted on in case occupation becomes necessary.

Allied Pressure on the Pacific Fronts

The Pacific fronts are relatively quiet, but persistent Allied pressure has improved our ground positions both at Guadalcanal and in New Guinea. In the latter theater, there has been heavy fighting at Oivi, where the Japanese had prepared for a stand after their hasty retreat across the Gap in the Owen Stanley Range. Oivi lies on a rugged spur of the Range, the last to be crossed before the Kokoda-Buna trail descends to the coastal plain. Thereafter, the only important natural obstruction is the Kumusi River, location of the much bombed Wairopi Bridge. On November 10, our forces succeeded not only in occupying Oivi, but in clearing enemy detachments from the Gorari sector, five miles to the east.

American troops have been landed from air transports on the Buna side of the Range, and there is every indication that the Japanese may now be driven out of this base. The Japanese have responded to this threat by augmenting their meager air resources in New Guinea and, according to one report, by consolidating their defenses in the Lae-Salamaua area—scene of their initial landings in New Guinea.

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On Guadalcanal, and in the Solomons as a whole, the situation has not changed significantly. After moving more than two miles westward along the coast toward the main Japanese positions on the island, our troops were halted by enemy counter-attacks near Point Cruz. A similar expansion eastward, beyond Koli Point to the Metepona River, encountered little resistance. Enemy warships still are active in the northern Solomons, and shipping is being maintained at a fairly high level, although under that of late October.

In the Aleutians, the enemy position remains precarious. Seven Japanese float planes were sighted in Holtz Bay, Attu Island, November 7—the greatest number of enemy planes seen in this theater for some weeks. All seven were destroyed *in situ* two days later.

Chungking Links North Africa to Burma

The United Nations' offensives in North Africa have been greeted by the Chinese as a heartening sign of rising Allied strength. The influential Chungking newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*, hailing the American landings in North Africa, declares its belief that victories in the Mediterranean will have a beneficial effect on the political and military situation in India and thus make possible an Allied invasion of Burma. The Japanese, as if moved by a similar line of reasoning, have somewhat increased their concentrations near the Assam border.

Koreans in Chungking Strive for Harmony

Quietly, and with little public notice, Korean nationalist parties have met together in Chungking in the first Korean all-party "Congress" since 1924. Technically, a meeting

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of the Legislative Yuan of the "Korean Provisional Government," the convention actually includes 23 representatives of rival parties in addition to the 24 representatives of the Provisional Government Party. The meeting has been called in an effort to agree upon a united program for Korea. Military unity was achieved last May when the Korean Independence Army and the Volunteer Corps, representing the two major Korean factions, were united under the sponsorship of the Chinese Supreme Military Council. Despite the unhappy precedent of the 1924 "Congress," which ended in almost complete disharmony, the present convention hopes to achieve political unity.

India: Barriers to a Compromise

Two recent events in India have indicated once again the conflict of personalities and programs that still impedes a settlement. Mr. Jinnah, Moslem League leader and long advocate of a separate Moslem state, has jibed at the "kite flying going on in India and abroad" in the form of countless new schemes to break the Indian deadlock, and has expressed his regret that many of these schemes overlook the claims of the Moslems. Apparently, Mr. Jinnah fears that the rising pressure of public opinion in Britain and the United States may induce the London government to agree to a settlement that would not include a prior guarantee of *Pakistan*.

In Bengal the ministerial crisis has culminated in the resignation of Mookerjee, Minister of Finance and Hindu Mahasabha leader (*The War This Week*, October 8-15, pp. 13-14). His withdrawal expresses the Mahasabha's profound dissatisfaction with the policy of repression pursued by the Central Government. Without Mahasabha support, Fazlul Huq's Coalition Ministry would no doubt collapse, and might well be replaced by a Moslem League administration. Such a

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Ministry would probably prove far more responsive than its predecessor to the wishes of New Delhi.

Cabinet Replacements in Denmark

The change of ministry at Copenhagen on Monday was, on the surface, a tame and colorless replacement. Vilhelm Buhl, who had been Premier since the death of Stauning last spring, retired in favor of Eric Scavenius, Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1940. Eight members of the Buhl Ministry, apparently, were carried over into the Scavenius cabinet, four were dropped, and five new members were added. Not one of those dropped or added is a political figure of any magnitude.

Yet in the new government's lack of color may lie the clue to its composition. Scavenius, the self-styled realist, who still thinks in terms of World War I, is at last the Cabinet head. Though not pro-Nazi—his aristocratic instincts forbid that—he is pro-German and collaborationist. Moreover, he has a distressing way on occasion of circumventing his colleagues and presenting them with a *fait accompli* which they may then not be able to refuse. Doubtless many of the members of the Buhl Cabinet have accepted him as premier to hold off outright German control for a while longer. But some of his new colleagues will surely be little surprised if they learn that, with or without their knowledge, Scavenius seeks to yield more to Berlin than they are prepared to do as responsible ministers.

Observers feel, consequently, that Scavenius' rise will bring an added turn to Nazi pressure on Denmark. Already it is rumored that long-standing German demands for the relinquishing of the submarine fleet, tackling of the "communist" question, and providing of a larger labor supply have been renewed. Scavenius is unlikely to grant all that the Germans ask; but he can be expected to yield more than his predecessors have done.

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APPENDIX I

SHIPPING GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN¹

Axis capacity to evacuate or to reinforce Marshal Rommel's forces will be limited by a shortage of African port facilities and not by any lack of shipping. Under the assumption that the Axis is able to acquire all Vichy merchant ships in the Mediterranean not caught in Algerian ports, the improvement in the Axis shipping position in the Mediterranean is shown below in Table I. At the same time, the Allied invasion of North Africa has made notable additions to United Nations shipping tonnage.

TABLE I.—Shipping Available to, and Required by, the Axis
(Ships of 1,000 GRT and over)

	Non-tanker	Tanker	Total
Vichy ¹	821,000	144,000	965,000
Italy ²	750,000	110,000	860,000
Total GRT.....	1,571,000	254,000	1,825,000

¹ Excludes all tonnage outside the Mediterranean or in French North African ports, with the exception of Tunisia.

² Assumes monthly losses of 60,000 GRT during September and October. Excludes war damage of 200,000 GRT, normal repairs of 57,500 GRT, unsuitable vessels totalling 100,000 GRT.

Even if none of the Vichy tonnage laid up in French or Tunisian ports (about 600,000 GRT) is immediately available for service, there would still remain about one million GRT of Italian and Vichy vessels free elsewhere in the Mediterranean. A large proportion of this tonnage could be diverted temporarily for either the reinforcement or the evacuation of Rommel's forces.

Reinforcing Rommel

If we assume that at least one completely equipped panzer division and four infantry divisions would be a minimum requirement to reinforce Rommel's depleted Korps, and that these forces are available for shipment to Libya, the Axis would need some 800,000 GRT to carry out the operation.

This figure must be raised somewhat to take into account losses inflicted by Allied aircraft and naval units, which should rise considerably over the averages of previous months. During July and August, 1942, a time when Axis shipping losses were probably lower than in September and October, about 20 percent of the total southbound movement of 310,000 GRT to Tobruk, Bengasi, and Tripoli was sunk. Concentration of shipping routes and congestion in a smaller number of ports might increase this loss ratio to between 30 and 40 percent.

¹ Based on data compiled in the Economics Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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Nevertheless, lack of shipping would not prove a limiting factor in the reinforcement of Axis forces in Libya in the next few weeks. The principal limitations will probably be the difficulty of quickly mobilizing the necessary troops and supplies, and the capacity of those North African ports likely to be left in Axis hands in the near future.

Port Facilities

How many such ports will be available to Rommel depends, of course, on the speed of the Afrika Korps' westward retreat, the closeness of British pursuit, and the eastward progress of American forces. Under the most favorable conditions for the Axis—effective use of all ports in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Tunisia—only about 150,000 tons of shipping could be discharged per week. At this rate, it would take one and a half months for the Axis to build up (by sea) its African forces by the stipulated one panzer and four infantry divisions. The operation might be carried out in less time if the Axis were sufficiently equipped with small vessels and barges to enable them to use beaches for landing operations.

If Rommel is forced to retreat beyond Benghazi, and if, at the same time, American forces are able to cut off the use of Tunisian ports, the capacity of ports available to Rommel would be reduced to about 50,000 tons per week. In this event, the time required to build up an effective African force might preclude the possibility of Axis resistance and necessitate evacuation of troops already there.

Allied Shipping Gains

Apart from savings in shipping time by rerouting, Allied occupation of French North Africa has made the following shipping tonnage potentially available to the United Nations:

TABLE II.

	Non-tanker	Tanker	Total
Laid-up in North Africa (other than Tunisia). Trading with North Africa (average number in Algerian ports).....	110,000	29,000	139,000
Outside the Mediterranean.....	30,000	30,000
Total GRT.....	372,000	47,000	419,000
	512,000	76,000	588,000

It is probable that 200,000 GRT in port at the time of occupation is in Allied hands already. The remainder is cut off from Vichy and can be saved only by running for neutral or French colonial ports. The tonnage actually seized will depend on the attitude of the crews manning vessels at sea, and on the plans of the Allies for vessels in French colonial ports. Sabotage may, of course, prevent immediate use of the tonnage. On the other hand, some French ships in Vichy France may have been able and willing to flee to join the Allies.

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Saving by Suez

More important than the possession of the seized Vichy tonnage may become the renewed use of the Mediterranean-Suez Canal route. Savings in tonnage, while not as spectacular as some press accounts would indicate, would nevertheless be considerable. For example, the same tonnage employed to carry 100,000 tons of cargo from Eastern Atlantic ports of the United States to the Persian Gulf would carry 130,000 tons via Suez. In other words, only 77 percent of the shipping necessary to carry the same quantity of cargo around the Cape of Good Hope would be required by the Suez route. Comparable figures for cargo moving from England to the Persian Gulf show even greater savings. Shipping required to carry 100,000 tons on this route can transport 146,000 tons by way of Suez. Or, for the same cargo, only 67 percent of the former tonnage would be needed.

APPENDIX II

THE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA¹

The Allied invasion of North Africa used the sea—the only practicable avenue for large scale military attack on that essentially isolated area. The upraised mass of land that constitutes French North Africa is separated from the Egyptian border to the east by a thousand miles of desert and steppe land, and from the French bases in the Sudan on the south by the Sahara Desert. Regional divisions within French North Africa also favor attack from the sea: the best land and climate, and the principal resources, population, centers, and communication lines are located close to the coast. (See map at back.)

Strategically, the French North African sector can be divided into three relatively independent seaward-facing regions and a central plateau region surrounded by mountains. The central plateau forms a giant elevated trough running east and west through Algeria 1,500 to 4,000 feet above sea-level, sometimes interrupted by mountain chains. Dry, with great alkaline basins, sparsely-settled, without a single all-weather road traversing its length east and west, the plateau is of negative significance in the strategy of the current campaign. Southward it opens by a series of moderately elevated passes through the southern Atlas Mountains into the still more inhospitable Sahara Desert. To the north, west, and east, passes lead through the mountains to the more important regions of French North Africa:

- (1) The westward-facing *Moroccan Atlantic Region*.
- (2) The northward-facing *Tell Atlas Region*, skirting the Mediterranean coast of Algeria and northern Tunisia.

¹ Based on memoranda prepared in the African Section and the Geographic Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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(3) The eastward-facing *Tunisian Lowland*.

These three regions are separated from each other by mountain barriers and inhospitable and steep coasts, which make communication possible only by narrow passes.

Coastal Plains

The principal nerve centers of French North Africa are situated in plains at the coastal margins of these three regions. Whoever controls these coastal plains controls North Africa. Vulnerable to sea attack because of the inadequate French defenses, these nerve centers are, however, protected against land attack by mountain barriers. Consequently, if sea landings at all of these nerve centers are not feasible, then control of the few narrow valleys which connect the coastal plains with the hinterland would immediately become strategically vital.

Communications

The only important west-east artery in North Africa consists of a standard-gauge, single-track railroad line and a parallel highway from Casablanca to Tunis, about 1,350 miles. It is this route which any military force will have to follow to establish land connections between the vital coastal plains. A secondary highway, which parallels this main artery from Oran to Tunis, is only of marginal importance because of its vulnerability to sea attack and to sabotage in the many sections where it winds its way by tunnels through the coastal mountain ranges. Another possible road of secondary importance runs to the south of the main artery near the line which separates the plateaus from the desert. This road, from Agadir through Colomb-Béchar and Touggourt to Gabès, is strictly limited in its capacity to carry troops—it is in bad condition and transport is handicapped.

Southern Flank

The whole of North Africa is protected from the south by the Sahara Desert, which probably furnishes a more adequate barrier than an ocean. The desert is crossed by only three routes: (1) Dakar to Agadir (1837 miles); (2) Gao (French Sudan) to Colomb-Béchar (1405 miles); (3) Zinder to Laghouat (1980 miles). No force of any size would be able to cross this desert region against even limited air defenses. The scarcity of water and the complete lack of supplies on these routes would slow up any column to such a degree that its chances of making an effective surprise raid on North Africa would be practically non-existent. Without the element of surprise, the attacking force would be unable to reach an area which could furnish sufficient supplies for a continuation of the campaign.

Tunisia

Tunisia is probably more vulnerable to sea attack than any other part of North Africa. Its low coastal plain, stretching from Biserte to Gabès, is difficult to defend, and once a landing is made, the hinterland is easily penetrable by way of parallel valleys running east to west.

The strategically important part of Tunisia, however, is the northern region. There most of the population is concentrated in the neighborhood of the capital, Tunis (population about 220,000), and in the Medjerda valley—an area fertile and enjoying comparatively abundant rain.

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In central and southern Tunisia, strategically important places include the coastal towns of Soussa and Sfax, whose hinterland is an arid plateau with few natural defenses toward the west.

The paved Italian strategic highway from the east gives access to southern Tunisia. Until the signing of the Armistice of 1940, this route of entry was defended by the French Mareth line, which dominated the narrow coastal corridor between Gabès and Médenine. The Axis Armistice Commissions are, however, reported to have supervised the complete dismantlement of this African Maginot Line. Even at the present time, this corridor represents the main defense line for southern Tunisia—to the north of it stretch only vast open plains, with no defensible position which could not readily be outflanked.

Supplies

Any plan of campaign in North Africa must take into consideration not only the natural difficulties of occupation, but also the limited resources of the area. This latter factor also bears on the usefulness of Algeria as a base for future operations.

(1) *Food:* In general, only the five coastal plains of Casablanca, Oran, Algiers, Bône, and Tunis offer small or specialized surpluses of food for the occupying troops. In Algeria, the interior and especially the Chéfil Valley, are the main sources of the North African meat and wheat supply. The desert regions are deficient in everything except dates. This separation of types of agriculture results in regional interdependence and consequent reliance on transport. For this reason the main roads and railroads run northward, connecting the Algerian plateau and the coastal regions.

(2) *Water:* Water presents a serious problem in all but the coastal regions. The installation of even one division in the high plateaus or in the desert would necessitate careful consideration of the availability of water, since, in many localities, the existing wells and small springs are capable of supporting only the present population. In some of the coastal regions water shortages may also occur during the summer months. Along the southern part of the Philippeville-Touggourt route, however, artesian wells have an abundant flow.

(3) *Housing:* Except in the large cities—and in these to a limited extent—the housing of even 10,000 men in one region would present a serious problem. In many areas the supply of sawn wood for the construction of temporary barracks is practically non-existent, and climatic conditions in all regions would make camp life for any considerable period of time very difficult and unpleasant. In the interior, billeting facilities for American soldiers are again practically non-existent.

(4) *Supply Routes:* The railway system of North Africa is single-tracked except for short sections about Oran, Orléansville, Algiers, and Constantine. Its steep grades and sharp curves, its many tunnels and high bridges restrict its capacity. Its rolling stock is reported to have deteriorated greatly since the Armistice of 1940. Since that time the road has depended for nearly half of its coal supply on imports from France.

To put this railroad in condition for any large scale transport of heavy equipment would require reconditioning of rolling stock and track, as well as the

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installation of new sidings or double track sections. Moreover, possible damage to power plants may interfere with transport on the electrified sections of the railroad in Morocco and Algeria. Adequate replacements of steam locomotives are not available.

Highway transport will probably be limited to light trucks. Although the main North African roads can be considered good, they would probably not stand up under constant heavy trucking. Moreover, the winding course of these highways and the frequently steep grades make it difficult to maintain, even for passenger cars, a 30-mile-an-hour average.

Such transport would require the importation of practically all the requisite trucks, which thereupon would require fuel and lubricants from outside the country. Spare parts, servicing facilities, as well as motor mechanics, would also have to be brought into the country, whose mountainous character and heat will undoubtedly mean much repair work.

In sum, the occupation of North Africa will raise important future problems of supply.

Climates

(a) *Rainfall:*—The climate of French North Africa closely resembles that of California. Rainfall is concentrated in the cool season; the summer is dry. In the coastal areas, where United States troops are now establishing themselves, the rainy season has been under way for a month, and will continue well into May. Rainy spells and clear sunny weather alternate throughout the winter, with sunny days twice as numerous as rainy days. During and shortly after each rainstorm, the soil is muddy and sticky, impeding traffic except on surfaced roads. When the rainfall is particularly concentrated, or when snows melt rapidly in the spring, the streams which flow down from the mountains may become formidable torrents, and portions of the low-lying coastal plains may be seriously flooded by the swollen rivers.

November is the rainiest month along both the Moroccan Atlantic and the Tunisian coasts. Along the north coast of Algeria, the peak of rainfall usually comes near midwinter, in December or January.

(b) *Visibility:*—Along the Mediterranean coast of Algeria and Tunis, winter is nearly fog-free. Algiers has fog on less than two days per year on the average. Westward from Algiers foginess increases, but even Oran expects less than one day of fog per month in the fall and winter.

(c) *Heat:*—Winter is far better than summer for intense physical exertion in French North Africa. The coastal temperature from the middle of November to the end of March averages about 55° F., with a mean daily maximum of 65° and minimum of 45°. Along the coast the temperature very seldom touches freezing, although a few miles inland frosts are frequent from December to March.

In the summer dry season, the average daily temperature along the coast is around 70° or 75°, the inland plateau, around 80° or 90°. In addition, the dry season is subject to visitations of the *sirocco*, a suffocating hot, dry wind, often accompanied by clouds and dust, blowing from the south into Algeria and Tunisia, from the southeast into Morocco. The *sirocco* is most frequent on the plateaus, although even along the north coast it blows on about 20 days per year.