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APPENDIX III

SIGNIFICANCE TO GERMANY OF NORTH AFRICAN IMPORTS¹

Textiles

For use in the year 1942-43, it has been estimated that Germany would have received about 5,000 tons of cotton and 10,000 tons of wool and animal hair from African trade across the Mediterranean. The bulk of these raw materials would have come from North Africa, although significant quantities of cotton from French West Africa formerly made their way to Germany via France, and have been included in the above figures. These quantities would have represented about 25 percent of the total German supplies of these fibers estimated to be available for the year 1942-43.

Apparently, Germany has already received practically all of the 5,000 tons of cotton she expected from Africa for 1942-43. Of the 10,000 tons of wool and animal hair expected, some 6,000 tons have already been received. The loss of anticipated shipments for the year 1942-43, therefore, is approximately 4,000 tons of wool and animal hair.

The deficiency in wool and animal hair will impinge directly upon military supplies of textiles, since it is to this use that practically all these fibers are devoted. Substitution will have to be made of less adequate synthetic materials. This will reduce supplies for civilians; but the reduction is not appreciable, since practically all civilian textiles were already being made from synthetic fibers. In subsequent years, however, the loss of all African shipments will definitely affect Germany's ability to carry on military efforts on the scale of 1941-42.

Foodstuffs

A. *Grains*.—Germany expected to import about 200,000 tons of wheat from Africa via France during the current year. To date only about 80,000 tons are known to have been received. Corresponding expectations for barley were in the neighborhood of 100,000 tons. Some 30,000 tons are known to have been received.

B. *Meats*.—Small quantities of meats—about 8,000 tons—were expected from Africa for the current year. It is believed that 6,000 tons have already been received.

C. *Fats and Oils*.—From Africa (including French West Africa) Germany was expecting to receive at least 60,000 tons of vegetable oils. Conceivably, as many as 100,000 tons could have been obtained. It is known that Germany has received only about 15,000 tons to date.

D. *Fruits and Vegetables*.—North Africa was a very important source of these commodities for Germany. It was expected that she would receive some 300,000 tons of various kinds of fruits and vegetables for the year 1942-43. Only a small percentage (roughly 10 percent) of these has already arrived.

The loss of North African sources will certainly affect the German food position adversely, particularly with respect to fats and oils, and fruits and vegetables. In both cases, the quantities involved represent appreciable percentages of total supplies available to Germany.

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Economic Division of the Office of Strategic Services.

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Fertilizers

European agriculture is now consuming phosphatic fertilizers at a rate of less than 50 percent of the pre-war level. Of the total quantity utilized in Axis Europe now (some 750,000 tons a year), about one-half came from North African phosphate rock. It is unlikely that substitutes can be found. A further reduction in the rate of fertilizer application will ensue. Within the following years, this factor can be expected to have appreciable effects upon agricultural yields.

Minerals

In addition to phosphate rock, North Africa exported to Europe significant quantities of Moroccan cobalt before the war. Germany expected to obtain about 130 tons of cobalt (metal content) during the last year, or about 25 percent of her needs. What amount has actually reached Germany is not known. Potentially, however, Morocco's cobalt output, if stepped up to the pre-war level of 1938, could have satisfied all of Germany's requirements. As cobalt has double uses as either a ferro-alloy (its properties are even more valuable than nickel) or as a catalyst in an important synthetic gasoline process, the subtraction of the North African supply from the Axis economy may further inconvenience the production of cutting tools and synthetic gasoline.

French North Africa produced considerable quantities of high-grade iron ore in pre-war times, but little went to Germany. As for coal, North Africa has had to operate at a deficit. Though production—which is centered on the Moroccan-Algerian border—has increased greatly since 1940, it is still far from sufficient to meet transportation and power requirements. At least 500,000 metric tons will probably have to be imported during the coming year to maintain the economy.

APPENDIX IV

GENERAL HENRI HONORÉ GIRAUD¹

General Eisenhower has delegated to General Henri Honoré Giraud responsibility "for military and civil affairs in the French North Africa Area". The American General is quoted as saying of his French colleague: "He and I understand each other perfectly." The terms of a special communiqué issued by General Eisenhower recognized that General Giraud's function is "to organize the French Army again to take up the fight", with a view to "the defeat of Germany and Italy and the liberation of France and her empire". The communiqué adds: "The United States has pledged itself to assist in providing arms and equipment for this new French Army."

Giraud's Background

The French army which Giraud organizes will undoubtedly be a force to be reckoned with. Giraud himself is an unusually distinguished soldier; he possesses

¹ Prepared in the Western European Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

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an unparalleled knowledge of French Africa; and he is dramatically popular throughout France.

General Giraud was educated as an infantry officer at St. Cyr. During the Great War, he fought in Champagne with great courage and distinction. In the recapture of the famous Malmaison Fort, he was left on the field for dead; but he survived as a prisoner in the hands of the Germans. At the outbreak of war in 1939, Giraud assumed command of the Eighth Army Corps. In May of 1940, he led his forces to the aid of Belgium. After advancing through Brabant as far as the Dutch border, he was called to the French right wing, to rally General Corap's army. He made his way to the front lines only to be surrounded and captured by the Germans.

Between graduation from St. Cyr and the outbreak of the Great War, General Giraud saw much service in the French colonies. His activities were especially associated with Morocco, where he was known as one of Lyautey's "young men." After the Armistice of 1918, Giraud returned to Morocco, he played a prominent part in the suppression of the Riff revolt, and later succeeded Lyautey as commander of the French forces there.

Escape From the Germans

While Giraud was a prisoner during World War I, he made, it is said, five attempts to escape before being successful in rejoining his unit. In April of the present year, world-wide interest was aroused by the report that he had again escaped from the Germans. The Nazis resorted to various tactics in the effort to obtain his return to the fortress-town of Königstein, where he had been previously interned. Giraud, however, was successful in resisting attempts to secure his surrender. He is reported to have remained in retirement at his sister's home near Lyons, until he appeared in Algiers to assume his present responsibilities.


In a moving letter to his children, which recently was confidentially circulated, General Giraud urged his sons and daughters, in the event of his death, to work untiringly for the liberation and reconstruction of France. "I forbid you," he wrote, "to resign yourselves to defeat. The method used does not matter. The goal alone is essential. Everything else must come after. . . . We should be ready at all moments to take advantage of the opportunities that will be offered us."

FRENCH NORTHWEST AFRICA

—— PRIMARY ROAD
 —— SECONDARY ROAD

—— RAILROAD (Standard Gauge)
 —— RAILROAD (Narrow Gauge)
 ○ CAPTURED AIRFIELD

SHOTT (Temporary Lake)
 — ALLIED ATTACK



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

November 12-19, 1942

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For the President

NOVEMBER 12-19, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

As Allied columns drove into Tunisia this week, the Axis countered by rushing air and ground forces into strategic Bizerte and Tunis. At the same time, General Montgomery's army was moving in rapid pursuit of Rommel's fleeing forces, already reported to have reached the vicinity of Benghazi. Observers consider it likely that Rommel will make a determined stand in the El Ageila region, but Axis North African resistance as a whole is probably conceived primarily as a delaying action to provide adequate opportunity for the massing of defenses in southern Europe. If Hitler intends to launch an offensive either in Spain or in Turkey, large-scale preparations for such a move are still in the future.

President Roosevelt has apparently made an important contribution to solving the Darlan imbroglio by referring to Allied acceptance of the Admiral as "only a temporary expedient." Nonetheless, the North African political situation continues to be studded with difficulties. At Vichy Marshal Pétain has given full powers to Laval, while the French fleet at Toulon still rides equivocally at anchor, studiously avoided by the nearby Germans.

On the Eastern Front the initiative has passed to the Soviets, but with the approach of frigid weather it is presumed that activity in Russia will soon lapse into a tempo somewhat similar to that of last winter.

American naval forces in the Solomons have won a striking victory, destroying one battleship and three heavy cruisers, among other units, and routing a large scale Japanese naval offensive which sought to retake Guadalcanal. Concurrent

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land drives by Australians and Americans in New Guinea are threatening the Japanese beachhead in the Buna-Gona area with early extinction—an accomplishment which would mark the end of the protracted and ambitious enemy effort to seize Port Moresby from the north.

Drive on Tunisia

After establishing bases in Morocco and Algeria, Allied forces this week drove eastward into Tunisia. German reconnaissance patrols have encountered Allied units, and a major clash is now imminent.

French sources and enemy communiqués report that the Allies, assisted by paratroops, are advancing east and south-east along the three principal routes into Tunisia. Forces consisting largely of the British First Army, supported by American mobile units, are striking toward Bizerte and Tunis along the coastal road and the Medjerda valley (see map at back). Another Allied column is reported to be moving southeast from Bougie and Bône in a drive to isolate Axis centers of resistance in the north. Elements of this force are believed already to have passed Tébessa on their way to Gafsa, and are apparently headed for the coastal city of Gabès along the communication lines indicated on the map.

Here they could take up positions along the dismantled Mareth line, thereby blocking the one route from Tripoli into southern Tunisia. The Allies can also move by road and rail from Tébessa to Sfax, Sousse, and other positions needed to dominate the vulnerable eastern coast of the Protectorate. The occupation of the Gabès area would make possible concerted action to reduce Axis forces in Tunis and to establish air bases for subsequent cooperation with the advancing British Eighth Army in a campaign for Tripolitania.

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The role of French forces remains obscure, although General Eisenhower has announced that small French units are cooperating with the east and central task forces. The French had only one division in Tunisia. Elements of these forces apparently withdrew from the coastal regions to Souk-el-Arba, presumably to join Allied forces there.

Elsewhere in French Northwest Africa, the Allies were consolidating their political and military position and opening up blocked ports for the use of our transports and supply ships. A military mission from Dakar was reported en route to North Africa, perhaps for the purpose of negotiating with the occupying forces.

Axis Countermeasures

To counter this Allied drive, the Axis has occupied the strategic centers of Bizerte and Tunis with forces estimated at approximately 10,000 men, equipped with light tanks and anti-tank guns. About 150-200 Axis planes, mostly German fighters, have been brought to airdromes at Tunis and Bizerte, in addition to the increase of Axis air strength in Sicily and southern Italy. Enemy air forces have persistently attacked Allied bases at Bône, Bougie, and Algiers, and enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar and the western Mediterranean are believed to number almost 50. Prime Minister Churchill announced that 13 enemy submarines had been sunk in the opening week. Allied raids have also inflicted heavy losses on Axis aircraft at the Tunis airdrome.

Axis Retreat in Libya

In Egypt, the retreating Axis forces avoided entrapment in the Sollum area and have for the present outdistanced the pursuing British Eighth Army (see map at back). The

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tempo of pursuit has been limited by the problem of establishing lines of supply, rather than by Axis resistance. The enemy has presumably been falling back on supply depots previously established, but his situation in motor transport and fuel may be critical. At latest report, the main Axis columns were still on the hump of Cyrenaica in the vicinity of Benghazi. Motor transport was seen withdrawing farther west in the Agedabia-El Ageila area.

The British apparently met little opposition in the Halfaya Pass-Sollum region, despite its strong natural defenses. A British armored column enveloped these positions from the south, and precipitated a rapid Axis withdrawal, primarily along the coastal road. Tobruk was entered by British land forces November 13, and by the British Navy on November 16. Many installations were found in good order. Quick occupation of abandoned landing grounds has enabled Allied air forces to maintain heavy attacks on the retreating Axis columns. On November 16 the British occupied Derna, on the coast, and Mekili, on the inland road across Cyrenaica. From these points they are now pushing on toward Benghazi.

The enemy is estimated to have about 27,000 combat troops, 9,000 of whom are Germans—the remnants of the Afrika Korps—together with about 325 guns and 30 available tanks. There are some indications that Rommel will shortly have increased air support. Military observers believe the Axis will make its stand in the Agedabia-El Ageila region, with a succession of delaying actions protected on the flank by the hitherto impassable sand and salt marshes of the Great Syrte Desert. From El Ageila west, the Libyan coastal highway completed in 1937 offers the only practical means of communication, until the Tripolitanian road net is reached at Bouerat el Soun, over 200 miles to the west.

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German Mediterranean Strategy

Military observers are undecided on Hitler's strategy with regard to the Mediterranean. Indications are that Rommel will make a determined stand along the coast of the Gulf of Syrte, and some reports suggest that the Axis is planning to send two divisions across to Tunis. Far larger forces—both German and Italian—could be made available if Berlin decided on full-scale resistance in North Africa, but supply difficulties would probably limit critically any such operations. Those who believe that Berlin must make an all-out defense of North Africa—or adopt the alternative of a drive through Spain or Turkey—argue that Hitler can not afford to be put on the defensive on all fronts, or let us have use of the Mediterranean to accumulate supplies for a future offensive against the “belly” of Europe.

Fears persist that Hitler may use forces withdrawn from the Russian front for a drive through Spain or the Middle East, but Germany has as yet made no overt act indicating that it plans so to disperse its strength. The slow start of Axis counter measures would seem to indicate that resistance in North Africa may be intended primarily as a delaying action, to make the Allies pay a substantial price for their gains and give the Axis time to mass its defenses in southern Europe.

Spain Trims Her Sails

A moderate reorientation of Spanish policy is under way, according to various reports from Madrid. The Spanish Government has issued a decree authorizing the partial mobilization of army, navy, and air forces, and military leaders are reported determined to resist, if Hitler should begin to apply pressure. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Jordana, has indicated to the Portuguese Minister that Spain will resist any move by Berlin to embroil it in war, and that

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he intends to loosen ties with the Axis, moving Spain toward Iberian solidarity and an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the United States. Franco and the military, overriding the Falange, have given wide publicity to events in North Africa, and Jordana has directed that the Falange cease its activities in the Western Hemisphere.

Spain will probably be cautiously neutral for some time to come, but she apparently feels that the tide has turned. Although some quarters have apparently expressed the fear that a total Allied triumph would bring a "Red" regime in Spain, her people are in general elated over events in Africa.

North African Riddle

President Roosevelt's announcement that the political arrangement with Admiral Darlan in North Africa "is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle" will probably go far to allay the fears of those who saw in the American action an appeasing of appeasers. Observers have generally recognized that the move was a realistic method of terminating hostilities in Morocco and Algeria prior to the attack on Tunisia. Some such "formula" for salving the conscience of conservative French officers—reluctant to break their oath to Marshal Pétain—was in the Gallic tradition, and of prime importance in a region where the attitude of certain careerists was possibly more significant than public opinion.

Yet the problem remains political as well as military. Critics of the current arrangement have been quick to point out that a permanent set-up more in line with the presumed wishes of the French people would be a prerequisite for enthusiastic popular support of an Allied landing on the Continent. The arrival of the collaborationists Pucheu and Flandin in North Africa has further emphasized the necessity of a more clear-cut political solution.

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For this reason, prior to the President's announcement, BBC commentators had already taken the position that the American action was intended "primarily to secure peace and order". In sardonic vein, the Moscow radio had called Darlan "an old and experienced rat", who "upon seeing that the Vichy ship is sinking, . . . swam to safety and hastened to declare himself to be a prisoner of war".

De Gaullist Reactions

For similar reasons, the Fighting French originally adopted an attitude of reserve. The Brazzaville radio announced that if the Allied action was inspired by purely military considerations "then, however abnormal and displeasing this situation may be, we shall abstain, for the time being, from raising objections to it". In reply to General Giraud's appeal for unity ("We have but one enemy, the one who occupies our country. . .") the National Committee in London refused to accept "arrangements that would in effect establish a Vichy regime in North Africa." Elaborating this statement, André Philip, Fighting French Commissioner for the Interior, declared: "We and we only have the right to speak for France and we know that France wants to have nothing more to do with the traitors of Bordeaux and Vichy who sold their country once and are now trying to sell it again to a higher bidder." It was "with gratification" that Fighting French circles in London learned of President Roosevelt's announcement.

In North Africa itself, a tug-of-war is still going on between Darlan and Noguès, on the one hand, and Giraud, on the other, according to an observer on the spot. The latter apparently represents the unofficial and strongly pro-American group, which resents Allied backing of men whom it regards as "trimmers". The legalistic position of Darlan and Noguès, however, seems to have the support of the important officials.

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Noguès also claims that Boisson, Governor of French West Africa, approves the new set-up, and that Pétain and Laval have sent a secret message expressing their approbation.

Laval Receives Full Powers

Official statements from Vichy, signed by Marshal Pétain, have declared Darlan an outlaw and given full powers to Laval. Simultaneously the Nazis have taken General Weygand into custody. With the Marshal more and more a cipher, it will doubtless be Laval's task to work out the new relation to the Reich that the occupation of Vichy France has necessitated. Although Laval's position may be little more than that of a *Gauleiter*, his past record would suggest that he will attempt to preserve some shred of bargaining power for future eventualities. At Toulon, the sole remnant of the unoccupied zone, the main French fleet still rides at anchor under the command of Admiral de Laborde, an elderly naval career officer, formerly military governor of Bizerte. According to Noguès, Laborde and his colleagues will resist all Axis pressure.

The Position of Italy

On Friday night the RAF struck at the Ansaldo arms plant at Genoa. Two days later they returned to the attack—for the sixth time since the beginning of the North African offensive—all planes returning safely to base. Preliminary reports suggest that this succession of raids has caused heavy damage, and that the liners *Roma* and *Augustus*, now in process of conversion into aircraft carriers, have both been hit. The Italian battle fleet itself evidently remains concentrated at Taranto—earlier reports of the appearance off Naples of a strong squadron, including three battleships, having proved unfounded.

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In general, Italy has apparently adopted a defensive attitude, restricting itself to cooperation with the Germans in the strengthening of Sicily and the reinforcement of Tunisia. Yet there is no indication that the disarray of public opinion is as great as the American press has suggested. According to a well-placed Spanish informant, morale among the armed forces is still fairly satisfactory, although the people fear an invasion of Sicily and Sardinia in the event of Allied success in Tunisia. High-ranking Italian military leaders, our informant continues, regard both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania as lost. Bern press despatches suggest, moreover, that Italian military commentators are interpreting the reinforcement of Tunisia as merely a delaying operation, preparatory to a withdrawal from both east and west on fortified positions in Tripolitania. In the absence of more definite information, one can conclude that, while many Italians are pessimistic about North Africa, they have greater confidence in their ability to defend Italy itself.

Turkish and Balkan Reactions

The Turkish press has vigorously expressed its approval of operations in North Africa. The semi-official *Ulus*, stressing the power of the Allied drives, concluded that "an exceptional period has begun for the Germans". Even the normally pro-Axis *Cumhuriyet* interpreted the news from Russia, Libya, and Algeria as indicating a dangerous situation for the Axis.

Reactions in the Balkans have been "extremely enthusiastic", especially in Yugoslavia and Greece. British sources have even expressed concern lest premature popular revolts take place in the latter countries.

Stalin Gives His Qualified Approval

After two days of silence, the first Russian commentary on the Anglo-American successes in North Africa appeared in

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the columns of *Pravda* on November 11. Colonel Kononenko, military commentator, stressed the deterioration of the Axis supply position which our action had entailed, and hinted at more far-reaching blows against the enemy. Stalin's letter to Mr. Cassidy was warmer in tone. Praising the organizing ability of the Anglo-Saxon military chiefs, the Russian leader predicted "that the effect will not be a small one and that a certain relief in pressure on the Soviet Union will result in the nearest future." Still more important, Stalin continued, was the fact "that the initiative has passed into the hands of our allies, . . . that that campaign undermines the prestige of Hitlerite Germany . . . provides a basis for building up an anti-Hitler French army . . . creates conditions for putting Italy out of commission and . . . finally . . . creates the prerequisite for establishment of a second front in Europe nearer to Germany's vital centers . . ." In the event of a large-scale Allied offensive from the west, Stalin concluded, ". . . the Red Army will fulfill its task with honor as it has been fulfilling it throughout the war."

The Initiative Passes to the Russians

With the inauguration of a large-scale counterattack in the Alagir sector—aiming to relieve German pressure on the Georgian Military Highway—the initiative on the Eastern Front has passed to the Red Army. Around Novorossiisk and Tuapse the Russians have likewise made gains, and in Stalingrad they have stopped a renewed Nazi assault in the northern industrial suburbs and counterattacked with some success. The freezing of the Volga River will enable the defenders to bring reinforcements across the ice in far greater security than over temporary pontoon bridges. On the other hand, the cessation of river traffic will probably reduce

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the volume of supplies arriving in the Stalingrad area from other parts of Russia.

On the northern and central fronts Soviet units have made small-scale attacks in the areas south of Leningrad, while the *Luftwaffe* has concentrated on Russian supply lines in the Kalinin sector. Thus far, there have been no indications of a concerted Soviet counteroffensive. Advices from Stockholm suggest, however, that the Russians are now preparing two major winter drives—the first to be launched from the Kalinin sector northwest of Moscow, the second from between Stalingrad and Voronezh, directed at the base of the long German salient into the Caucasus.

American military observers interpret current Axis troop withdrawals from advanced positions such as Stalingrad as merely a routine shift to winter quarters, a move which has come somewhat earlier and which has been somewhat better organized than in 1941. For the next six months, they anticipate less activity than during the corresponding period of last year on all sectors of the front except the Caucasus.

Naval Victory in the Solomons

In the Solomons, our naval forces on the night of November 12-13 won their first major surface engagement of the war. During the two-day air and sea battle which followed, the American forces destroyed at least 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, 8 transports, and 4 cargo ships, and damaged a second battleship and 6 destroyers. Our losses are reported to be 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers.

As a result, the war of attrition in this area has turned definitely against the Japanese and our "offensive-defensive" operations continue to gain time without losing ground. The Japanese, however, are still committed to the reduction of our Solomons bastion, if only to consolidate the outer defenses of their base at Rabaul. The more deeply mired

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they become in the Solomons, the less likely they are to open major new fronts. Meanwhile, although action in this area gives the Japanese time to consolidate their conquests elsewhere, it also whittles down vulnerable Japanese air and shipping strength, and cuts into enemy fleet strength while our own is building more rapidly.

Japanese Naval Losses

Japan's fleet losses in fact may now be reckoned as serious. A press tabulation of sinkings announced since Pearl Harbor both by American and Allied headquarters in battle zones throughout the Far East lists total Japanese losses in battleships, carriers, and cruisers as 37. This tabulation is known to be incorrect in one or two respects, and a conservative estimate (taking into account the possibility of confusion, especially in cruiser losses) might place the minimum number of enemy ships actually sunk at as low a total as 20. Even this latter figure, however, represents one-third of the 60-odd ships of these types with which Japan began the war.

It is entirely possible that the major portion of Japan's available cruiser strength now is engaged in the battle for the Solomons. In carriers, the Japanese situation for the moment appears to be very difficult, with two out of a probable total of four large carriers under repair, and a fifth too old and small to be effective in offensive action (this statement takes no account of converted carriers).

The Japanese Withdraw From Battle

The Japanese brought ample force to their latest attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal, but when the battle was over, much of it had not been committed to action. Four major groupings of Japanese naval units were apparently dispatched to participate in the attack. The first was a task force, led

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by two battleships, which intended to bombard our shore positions preliminary to landings. The second major group, a convoy of 12 transports and accompanying warships, was to move in after the bombardment. Meanwhile, a third group, consisting of a task force which included two aircraft carriers, evidently was to arrive and administer the *coup de grace* to Henderson Field, while the fourth group, another large convoy, discharged its troops for the final assault on our ground positions.

From fragmentary reports, it appears that the latter convoy and task force both arrived in the central Solomons November 14. But by this time damaged warships from the first task force already were returning northward, while the initial convoy of 12 troop ships was disintegrating under our air attacks. Only four of the latter reached the island on the night of November 14-15, the other eight having been sunk. These four were destroyed the following morning. The convoy and task force in the central Solomons withdrew, the latter without committing either its warships or aircraft to combat.

Japanese casualties, according to Admiral Nimitz, were 20,000 at a minimum. In late October, Japanese troops in the whole Middle Melanesia area were estimated to number 53,000 at a minimum, 70,000 at a maximum. Even if we assume the latter figure, losses in the two-day action cost the enemy nearly 30 percent of his troops immediately available for operations.

Approaching Climax on the Buna-Gona Front

Climaxing the drive over the Owen Stanley Range which began in late September, Allied troops have now pushed the Japanese back to their beachhead in the Buna-Gona area. Here, constantly harassed by intense low-level attacks of our aircraft and with American and Australian troops closing in

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from the south and west, the enemy's position daily becomes more precarious. Although relatively small forces are involved, Japanese casualties have been heavy (nearly 1,200 verified enemy casualties in the Buna-Kokoda region were reported during the first two weeks of November).

The last serious natural obstacle protecting the approaches to the Japanese beachhead was captured November 13 when Australians, encountering little resistance, occupied the Wairopi crossing of the Kumusi River. The fighting now has descended into the open grassland country around Buna itself—an area which has many native settlements, and a considerable network of tracks other than the main Buna trail around which fighting previously has centered. The terrain at Buna is swampy, and the Buna trail here is built on earth and log embankments. By mining these, the Japanese might impede the Allied advance to some extent, but it is hardly likely that enemy forces can hold out for any length of time unless reinforcements are landed.

Revived Japanese Activity on Attu

In the Aleutians, where our air offensive has been handicapped by bad weather and muddy fields, the Japanese are making an effort again to entrench themselves on Attu Island, which they had once evacuated. Landing barges have been observed in Chichagoff Harbor. Attu is some 210 miles to the west of the main Japanese base on Kiska Island, which has been severely battered since our fighter planes have been able to provide an escort for bombers.

Anti-aircraft fire already has been encountered over Attu, and it is believed that a force of about 500 Japanese have been landed there. On Kiska, Japanese strength is estimated at about 9,500.

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Anniversary in the Philippines

On November 15, the seventh anniversary of the establishment of the Philippines Commonwealth, American short-wave stations broadcast messages to the captive Philippines from President Roosevelt and President Manuel Quezon. In this connection, the Japanese had previously announced the execution of Filipinos for the crime of listening to American broadcasts. And for several days prior to the Commonwealth anniversary, Tokyo and Manila announcers had belittled the possibility that Americans might return to free the Philippines and expressed the hope that "no Filipino will be deceived by the specious promises of the Americans."

India: Negotiations Reach a Deadlock

The past week has seen an almost complete breakdown of negotiations among the four chief elements in the Indian crisis—the Congress, the Moslem League, the moderates, and the Government. After reviewing the whole problem of self-determination for the Indian Moslems, conversations between Rajagopalachariar, leading moderate, and Jinnah, head of the Moslem League, arrived only at the conclusion that self-determination was a good thing. Apparently the two leaders failed to agree on the method of taking a plebiscite in areas with a Moslem majority—Jinnah maintaining that only Moslems should vote, and Rajagopalachariar defending the right of the Hindu minority to participate in such a plebiscite. They concurred, however, in making a joint request to the Viceroy for an interview between Rajagopalachariar and the imprisoned Mahatma.

Even this initiative has proved sterile. Alleging that such an interview would be possible only if Gandhi should alter his policy of non-cooperation, the Viceroy has refused Rajagopalachariar's request. At the same time, Jinnah has

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induced the Moslem League Council to withdraw a resolution directing him to begin negotiations with Gandhi himself.

The Indian press has generally expressed its disapproval of the Viceroy's decision. Of the British-controlled journals, the *Times of India* has backed the Government, while the *Statesman* has ventured the cautious criticism that "the refusal is likely to be regarded as a psychological mistake." In the opinion of the *Bombay Chronicle* (Congress): "The Viceroy has . . . sabotaged what little chance there was of an early political settlement," and the *Leader* (the organ of the liberal Sapru group) has regretted that the "Government continues to remain reactionary." Jinnah's *Dawn*, after branding the Government's policy as one of "double-distilled non-cooperation," has concluded that the Viceroy's refusal leaves the British "with a devastating question which they will find it hard to answer."

Future of the Falange in Latin America

The possibility that Allied incursions into North Africa may cause reorientation of Franco's foreign policies gained substance last week as a highly placed observer in Spain reported that Foreign Minister Jordana has ordered the Falange to cease operations in the Western Hemisphere. Confirmation of this extraordinary decree is still lacking, but there seems little doubt that violent inner dissension, at least, is likely to develop in the Falange and Falange-controlled groups in Latin America as Franco's predicament between two fires grows more acute. Observers point out that this situation may soon present an opportunity for neutralizing and perhaps breaking up such pro-Axis movements as the Mexican *Sinarquismo* which are under close tutelage of the Falange.

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APPENDIX I

BOMBING WEATHER IN WINTER OVER NORTH EUROPE

As RAF and United States bombers in increasing numbers prepare for a winter of operations over northwestern Germany, a survey of weather conditions by the Geography Division of the Office of Strategic Services¹ indicates certain limitations which will be placed on their activities by meteorological factors.

Weather Over England

Any consideration of the problem of bombing Germany must be focused not simply on the weather over the target area, but on that over British airdromes. If Allied pilots can not see well enough to take off safely from England, it matters very little how clear the atmosphere may be over Cologne or Hamburg. Again, even if weather conditions for the take-off and along the route are perfect, a raid may be cancelled when the ceiling is expected to drop to zero by the time the bombers return to land. An air force based on England is at a peculiar disadvantage to one based on the Continent in this respect: both sides must consider atmospheric conditions at their own airports when planning a raid, but the Nazis are able to disperse their fields over such a large territory that bad weather is unlikely to blanket all of them at once. In England, too, some airfields may be clear when others are overcast; but their concentration upon one rather small island greatly increases the chances that cyclonic storms will ground the bulk of the airforce simultaneously.

These storms, which bring with them most of the conditions unfavorable to bombing operations, are more frequent and severe in winter than at any other season. Yet even during the winter, bombing on a limited scale is possible on from one-half to two-thirds of the days and nights. The long duration of the nights in the winter months affords a larger margin for British night-fights over Germany; but this factor is probably more than offset by the lack of "good-weather sequences"—three or more successive days or nights of favorable flying conditions, which allow repetitive, follow-up smashes at a given target. Such sequences occur, on the average, about three times a month in April, July, and August, but only once a month in November, December, and January.

"Suitable" Bombing Weather

Estimates of the number of days and nights with weather suitable for bombing will differ, naturally, with the definition of "suitable." In the accompanying tables, which are based on seven years' meteorological observations, three sets of weather requirements have been specified. The tables assume a take-off from a centrally-located English station, Upper Heyford; a target in northwestern Germany in the Aschen-Hannover-Nürnberg area; and a return landing at whatever English airdrome happens to have favorable weather. Category A assumes a

¹ Based principally on material from the Office of the Joint Weather Central.

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ceiling above 2,000 feet and visibility of more than two and a half miles for both take-off and landing. Category B calls for a ceiling above 1,000 feet and visibility of more than two and a half miles for take-off and landing. And Category C, the lowest of the lot, assumes a ceiling above 500 feet and visibility of more than a half-mile for the take-off, and a ceiling of 1,000 feet and visibility of more than two and a half miles for the return landing. As for weather at the target, Table 1 is based on a ceiling above 3,000 feet, while Table 2 specifies no minimum.

TABLE 1.—Average number of nights and days with weather conditions suitable for bombing

CASE I. TARGET CEILING ABOVE 3,000 FEET													
	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Year
Night:													
A.....	6	8	12	14	18	18	21	19	15	14	4	6	155
B.....	10	12	17	19	23	24	26	22	18	20	7	10	208
C.....	16	15	20	21	24	25	28	23	20	23	12	15	242
Day:													
A.....	5	7	13	15	19	19	20	23	18	15	6	7	167
B.....	10	13	19	21	26	26	26	26	24	24	10	12	237
C.....	15	17	22	23	27	28	28	29	27	26	15	18	275

CASE II. NO RESTRICTIONS AT TARGET

Night:													
A.....	14	15	18	20	23	25	27	22	19	20	9	11	233
B.....	21	19	22	23	25	26	29	24	21	23	15	17	265
C.....	21	19	22	23	25	26	29	24	21	23	15	17	265
Day:													
A.....	13	17	23	25	28	27	28	28	25	25	14	14	267
B.....	20	22	27	28	30	29	30	30	28	28	20	20	312
C.....	20	22	27	28	30	29	30	30	28	28	20	20	312

TABLE 2.—Number of days and nights with bombing weather, abnormal years

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Year
Night:													
Worst year...	4	6	13	18	26	21	23	22	20	12	7	4	176
Best year....	19	16	19	22	26	27	28	19	27	18	13	11	245
Day:													
Worst year...	4	2	10	21	21	25	23	23	22	15	5	5	176
Best year....	14	12	21	20	25	28	21	29	20	19	12	13	234

Number of Suitable Days and Nights

From these tables it can be seen that there are, on the average, 155 nights and 167 days a year with A-1 bombing conditions, 208 nights and 237 days with B-1 conditions, and 242 nights and 276 days with C-1 conditions. In all categories,

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winter has fewer days and nights with suitable bombing weather than summer, and fall and spring are intermediate. November has the fewest nights suitable for bombing: only 4 of type A-1, 7 of type B-1, and 12 of type C-1, compared with 21, 26, and 28 nights, respectively, for July. For daylight bombing, January is as poor as November, with 5, 10, and 15 days of A-1, B-1, and C-1 conditions, respectively.

During any given year, of course, there may be more or fewer days with suitable bombing weather than are indicated by the averages given in Table 1. Table 2 shows, for the worst and best years of the seven-year record, the number of nights and days with B-1 weather. It will be observed that variations are greatest in winter and least in summer. In the worst year, there were only about half as many good flying days and nights in winter months as would be normally expected, whereas in summer the difference was only about 10 percent.

An interesting rough check upon the validity of the figures given in Table 1 is provided by a tabulation of the number of German raids carried out against England at the height of the attacks in 1940. This tabulation (Table 3) shows that from September through November the actual number of daylight raids of 50 or more planes was about equal to the average number of B-1-type days of Table 1, and the number of night raids was distinctly greater even than the number of C-1-days of Table 1.

TABLE 3.—Raids upon England involving 50 or more enemy planes, 1940-1941

	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Year
Number of night raids....	5	24	29	26	16	14	10	18	19	19	8	1	189
Number of daylight raids..	2	20	24	9	0	1	1	5	1	4	9	1	77

Icing and Wind as Factors

Icing occurs at fairly low levels in winter along the route between central England and northwestern Germany. The freezing height over Holland, for example, is usually about 1,000 feet in January and 1,500 feet in mid-December and mid-February; towards central Germany the freezing level declines. Yet not all winter days or nights, by any means, bring icing to planes on the route: even with freezing temperatures, severe icing is rare except on the longer flights and within cloud masses and rain- and sleet-storms. On the whole, since the storms that bring icing weather usually bring poor ceiling and visibility conditions as well, tables of suitable bombing weather will not be much changed by the addition of this icing factor.

Wind, though it does have some effect on the accuracy of navigation and high-level bombing, is mainly important for the limitations it sometimes puts on the use of small, auxiliary airfields. These fields, which may have to be utilized when large-scale raids are planned, often have room for a landing strip laid out on only one axis, so that cross-winds from the wrong quarter can make take-offs and landings hazardous.

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High-Level Bombing

For precision bombing from high levels, visibility over the target becomes of crucial importance. Accordingly, if the requirement is imposed of having less than 30 percent of the sky cloud-covered at the target, the number of days suitable for high-level operations drops to fewer than half as many as those fit for ordinary bombing, as defined in Table 1, C-1. The greatest number of days with suitable weather for high-altitude demolition would average 12 in March, May, and June, and only 6 in December and January.

Incendiary Bombing

Wind velocity at the target is of paramount importance for satisfactory incendiary bombing; only a strong wind can spread the flames rapidly over a wide area. Though winter, with its high winds, would be expected to offer the best weather for incendiarism, that season also brings snow, frequent and heavy precipitation, and high relative humidity. Snow-cover on roofs, which greatly reduces the spread of fires by flying embers, is particularly important in neutralizing the effect of incendiary raids; and here the Nazis have the advantage of the British since northwestern Germany has twice as many days with snow-cover as central England.

For that portion of Germany west of a line connecting Essen, Hanover, and Hamburg, all months from March to October are classified as good for incendiary bombing. May is excellent, and November to February fair. Since most incendiary bombing is conducted from high altitudes, it is significant that weather suitable for high-level bombing has roughly the same seasonal distribution as that favoring the spread of fire.

Actually, the number of days per month with good weather for incendiary bombing changes but little with the seasons. According to calculations of averages for Hamburg, the least favorable months have four days suitable for such bombing, and the best months have six.


APPENDIX II

CHROME AND THE CLODIUS AGREEMENT¹

German stocks of chrome—essential to the production of alloy steel—have dwindled to such an extent that Germany is now critically dependent upon obtaining a large share of the future output of the Turkish mines. For the past three years, the United Nations have enjoyed a virtual monopoly of this source, which before the war furnished one-sixth of the world's annual production. But on January 8, 1943, this control terminates, and one week later the German-Turkish agreement negotiated in October, 1941, by Hitler's Dr. Clodius comes into effect. By the terms of the new contract Germany stands to gain enough chrome to meet her minimum immediate deficiency and enough "for the duration" if the desired 21-month extension of the contract is granted.

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared by the Near Eastern Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

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The Nazis' chromite reserves were, in 1939, estimated to have been adequate to cover the deficiency between European output and German requirements for two or three years. In addition, the Reich has probably received each year from the Balkans about 85,000 tons of high-grade ore and concentrates and 105,000 tons of low-grade ore. Yet, unless Germany can acquire from Turkey considerable additional shipments of high-grade ore, her supplies of alloy-steel will be seriously reduced.

Turkey's Output and Customers

As shown on the accompanying map, there are three primary areas of Turkish chrome ore deposits. Of these mines, the state-owned Guleman workings have been developed most rapidly. The output of all mines has risen from 33,063 tons in 1931 to 208,455 tons in 1938, and to a production rate of 250,000 tons a year during the first eight months of 1940 (actual production for the full year came only to 182,000).

Turkey exports her entire production. Sweden, Turkey's best customer up to 1939, secured only 1.39 percent of the 1940 exports. The United States has bought heavily but spasmodically, while England did not become an important purchaser until 1940, when American and British acquisitions totalled 79.6 percent of Turkey's output. In that same year, France took 15.4 percent—all of it before the June debacle. Germany's purchases, it should be noted, have risen steadily from 3.7 percent in 1932 to 54.6 percent in 1939, when the United States and Britain secured their monopoly.

The Clodius Agreement

Germany's anxiety to acquire Turkey's chrome was clearly manifested by attempted small-scale, round-about procurement deals. Under the Clodius Agreement, however, Germany should be relieved of the necessity for such indirect tactics. Though the agreement itself contains no specific allusion to chrome, its signing was accompanied by the exchange of one open and twelve confidential notes, one of which calls for exports in the first three months of 1943 of 45,000 (metric) tons of chrome ore.

In exchange, Turkey is to receive, nominally, only £T18,000,000 of war goods; but actually the Turks are expected to hold their ore against proportional deliveries on the specified total of £T55,000,000 of "essential" commodities. They have insisted, moreover, that (except for a 10 percent leeway) deliveries in Turkey must precede shipments to Germany.

So far, Germany has delivered £T12,000,000 of war goods, and a much smaller ratio of other commodities. How much of these deliveries was scheduled under the Clodius Agreement, and how much under previous commitments is still vague. Turkish authorities do not anticipate that the Germans can fulfill their obligations before March 31—the expiration date of the agreement—in which case, chrome exports will be correspondingly delayed. Moreover, Turkish output of chrome during the quarter-year covered by the agreement is expected to fall short of the stipulated 45,000 tons—and all output up to that period has been reserved for

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United Nations purchasers. In brief, it seems unlikely that Germany will receive as much chrome during the stated period of the agreement as its written terms might suggest.

Extension of the Agreement

Concern over the Clodius contract is focussed primarily on the possibility of its extension. A clause in it states that a 21-month extension may be negotiated within the three months prior to the expiration of the current agreement. According to one confidential note, exchanged at the time of the signing of the agreement, the extended contract would call for the exportation to Germany of 90,000 tons of chrome ore each year in 1943 and 1944, including the 45,000 tons asked for under the present pact.

The Turks have agreed that if any surplus above the 90,000 tons earmarked for Germany should appear, the United Nations would be entitled to purchase half of it. But since output has been declining to a level barely sufficient to meet the German orders, little or nothing may be left over for the Allies; and in any event, our "lifting" program at accessible ports is already so retarded that all of 1943 may be required to complete the moving of the chrome stocks we will have accumulated by January 8. However, since the objective of the United Nations is pre-emption rather than procurement, the acquisition of even small amounts, shipped or not, would mean that much less left for the Germans.

Diplomatic efforts by the Allies to prevent the extension appear to have failed, but at least the Turks have agreed to postpone parleys with Germany on the subject until the Nazis have completed deliveries of the promised £T55,000,000 in commodities—which may not occur before late 1943.


Other Obstacles

Even if the extension is negotiated, the Germans may never enjoy the full fruits of the new contract. Much depends upon the way in which the Turks see fit to "interpret" the extended agreement. They could, for instance, notify Germany that her chrome would be railed only to the nearest port, excluding her from use of the overland railroad route to Greece. This would fall within the "letter" of the agreement, at least.

The most powerful arguments the United Nations could present on this score, in the view of some observers, would be the delivery to Turkey of, say, 100,000 tons of wheat, and more manufactured goods and pharmaceuticals than she now expects from all other foreign sources. The Turkish Foreign Minister has already made references to wheat in such contexts as to indicate to American and British diplomats the weight such shipments would carry. If coupled with a show of power such as our North African offensive, and an evident readiness to come to Turkey's assistance in the event of invasion, these deliveries might well enable Turkey to resist German demands to the point of emasculating any extension of the agreement beyond March, 1943.

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For the President

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

The leading news of the week came from the wind-raked steppes about Stalingrad, where the Russians suddenly threw out two pincer arms toward the west. These twin drives have made spectacular progress, according to Soviet accounts, and are now moving toward convergence west of the great bend of the Don. The completion of this operation would threaten with envelopment large German units in Stalingrad itself and in the region between the Volga and the Don. The Russians have seized a strategic moment at which to launch this offensive—when the force of the Nazi drive against Stalingrad had begun to spend itself and when the Germans had begun to move substantial numbers of men from the front lines to winter quarters, or as reinforcements for Central Europe and the northern shore of the Mediterranean.

Allied and Axis forces continue to move into Tunisia, but the real test of strength is yet to come. Meanwhile the British have driven Rommel back to El Aghaila, and a further British advance to the west is conditioned in large measure by the problem of supply. Some close observers of the North African theatre believe that the Germans are in no position at present to build up a sufficient force to permit any prolonged resistance to Allied armies in Africa, and that the Nazis are fighting a rear-guard action which aims above all to give them time to strengthen their air and other defenses in Sicily and southern Italy. These observers seriously discount predictions of a German offensive in either Spain or Turkey.

In New Guinea Allied forces are gradually prying loose the Japanese grip on Buna. Our position on Guadalcanal is

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steadily improving, and the recent naval victory has lifted the threat from that area for the time being at least. A recapitulation of probable Japanese cruiser strength, moreover, shows that the enemy has suffered very seriously in that category.

Soviet Offensive Around Stalingrad

The Russian pincers attack around Stalingrad represents a bold, and thus far successful, effort to relieve the Volga River city. The southern arm, striking from Krasnoarmeisk, a Kalmyk village on the Volga south of Stalingrad, has driven southwest along the Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk railroad to Abganerovo and the small towns of Tundutovo and Aksai. Thence it has widened out to take Sadovoye, Umantsevo, and Peregruzny.

The northern arm, after enlarging the already existing Soviet bridgehead above the Don bend at Serafimovich, has wheeled southeast to cross the Don from west to east below the bend and establish another bridgehead at Kalach. Enlarging this bridgehead, Red Army units have driven down the spur railroad from Kalach to its intersection with the Don bend-Stalingrad railroad at Krivomuzginskaya. The Russians have likewise taken Surovikino on the same railroad west of the Don. A further column, headed due south from Serafimovich, has captured the village of Pogodinsky, and the towns of Chernyshevsk and Perelazovsky. North of Stalingrad, Soviet forces around Akatovka have driven south to the relief of partially isolated Russian units, and within Stalingrad itself the Soviets have recaptured several blocks of buildings in the northern suburbs.

The pincers movement has thus cut the only two railroads which the Germans can use as supply lines to their troops in and around Stalingrad. If the Red Army can succeed in joining the two arms of the pincers, it will have trapped the

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Nazi units in Stalingrad and between the Don and Volga Rivers.

The time for attack is well chosen. With many German divisions already withdrawing to winter quarters and with Axis attention focussed on the Mediterranean, the Russians have taken advantage of the new freedom of movement which these events, coupled with the freezing of the Volga River, have given them. As in December, 1941, they have counterattacked in force at the very moment when the enemy's attack had flagged and the Nazis had lost the initiative. Now the southern anchor of the German winter line is threatened. Unless the Nazis retaliate soon, they may be obliged to withdraw toward Rostov—thereby imperiling their long salient toward the Caucasus.

In the Caucasus itself, the week has been indecisive. On the Ordzhonikidze front, the Russians, after announcing a smashing victory over the 13th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, and the 1st German and 2nd Rumanian Mountain Divisions, have claimed little further progress. Around Tuapse, the Nazis have made small-scale counterattacks with considerable air support; and attack against shipping in the harbor has been unsuccessful. On the central front the Germans admit a Russian penetration west of Toropets (northwest of Rzhev), while east of Leningrad the Russians have made another effort to break out across the Neva. In the far north, the Germans have again bombed the Murmansk Railroad.

Finnish Isolation?

With the German loss of initiative on the Eastern Front and the Axis defeats in the Mediterranean, neutral observers (whose views can be accepted only with caution) are detecting signs of growing Finnish uneasiness. Their reports suggest that the Finnish General Staff is now convinced of eventual Nazi defeat, and that the Finns fear a repetition of 1918,

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when the Germans abandoned their allies and withdrew to the Hindenburg Line. Such an abandonment would appear unlikely for the present, however, in view of the reduction of pressure on the United Nations convoy route to Russia which it would probably entail.

Reports on public opinion suggest that a cleavage is growing between the extreme nationalists, who have staked all on a German victory, and the Swedo-Finns and Social Democrats, who see Russia as the only barrier to a pro-Allied course. The latter, apparently, fear a conservative coup should the Nazis meet further reverses. Within the Socialist camp, the nationalist attitude of Tanner, Minister of Finance and the leading Social Democrat in the Government, is causing concern. But the Socialists are apparently united in their fear of the Soviet Union, and in their conviction that the presence of an Anglo-American army on the Continent would aid in preventing the spread of Communist institutions. In brief, Finnish opinion remains tragically confused.

Campaign in Tunis

As the British First Army and attached American forces have pursued their comparatively slow advance into Tunisia, the Axis has retired to a line a little to the east of Djebel Aboid and Medjez-el-Bab. Both sides are showing a certain amount of caution, the enemy perhaps intending to dig in along his present positions, the Allies apparently awaiting the establishment of a firm supply line before launching a concerted attack on the Axis bridgehead in the Tunis-Bizerte area. A small British force has repulsed a German infantry column accompanied by a few tanks 45 miles southwest of Bizerte, while French troops supporting United Nations forces have stopped an Italian advance eight miles northeast of Béja. In the air, the Axis has replied to Allied attacks on

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the Tunis (Aouina) and Bizerte (Sidi Ahmed) airdromes by bombing United Nations airfields at Bône and Souk el Arba. According to current estimates, Axis strength is now about 12,000, plus many light armored vehicles and about 90 tanks, and is steadily increasing.

The enemy has also struck for control of the vital frontier zone between Tunisia and Tripolitania. South of the Tunis-Bizerte area, he already has small forces at Kasserine, Sbétla, Kairouan, and Graiba, and perhaps somewhat larger ones at Sousse, Sfax, and Gabès. At this last point, Axis units of unknown size have been arriving by land, sea, and air. From Tripoli another column has apparently also reached Gabès.

The purpose of this dispersal of Axis forces is not entirely clear. The occupation of points to the south probably aims to maintain communication with Tripoli, destroy installations, and prevent immediate Allied use of these rail centers—rather than to take up any major defensive positions. But the mining of the approaches to Tunis and Bizerte and of vulnerable points around these two ports would suggest a determined Axis effort to hold their main bridgehead. American observers question the probability of a successful "Dunkirk" from Tripoli—in view of the comparatively minor importance of remaining Axis forces in Libya, and the difficulty of evacuation along a sea route threatened by British aircraft based on Malta. It may be significant that the only reinforcements that have reached El Agheila have been troops already in Libya. The Tunis-Bizerte bridgehead, is, however, far easier to supply or evacuate. Even if only to gain time for the reinforcement of Sicily and southern Italy, a vigorous defense of northern Tunisia would appear to be a major Axis intention.

Rommel's Retreat: The End of the First Phase

With the capture of Barce, Benghazi, and Agedabia, the British have ended the first phase of their long pursuit of the

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Afrika Korps. They have reached the approximate point where their previous two advances stopped, and where the present campaign will necessarily narrow from a war of maneuver into a fight along the single coast road leading to Tripoli. Military observers emphasize that from now on the British advance will depend not so much on the forces available, but on the supplies that the Eighth Army can bring up from bases far to the rear. With Benghazi largely wrecked, it seems probable that the greater part of Montgomery's supplies must still come from Tobruk and the Nile Delta.

In other words, to the west of Rommel's present position at El Agheila, terrain and supply favor the Axis. Furthermore, in the course of his retreat, the Field Marshal's forces have grown considerably. A few days ago, estimates of Rommel's strength—including elements of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 90th Light, and the Italian Pistoia Division from Tobruk—ran to about 25,000. Since that time remnants of other divisions have joined him, and he has picked up various Italian coastal defense units along his way. Many of these accretions may be too demoralized and fragmentary to represent an effective addition to the Axis fighting forces. At El Agheila, however, Rommel has been joined by two operational units from Tripoli, the Spezia Infantry Division and elements of the Centauro Armored Division. His current strength may, then, be nearly twice the earlier figure.

Under these conditions, a battle of annihilation at El Agheila appears unlikely. More probably, the British will have a sufficient superiority in tanks and guns to push Rommel along the road toward Tripoli. Axis strength in Tripolitania has been considerably weakened by the reinforcements sent both to Tunisia and to El Agheila. Under continued pressure from both east and west, the Axis will probably attempt an orderly withdrawal on Tripoli itself.

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Tunisia and Tripolitania as Defensive Zones

The ability of Axis forces now in Tunisia and Tripolitania to withstand Allied attacks from the west and east will depend largely on three factors: first, the success with which they can reconstitute the dismantled French Mareth line and the Italian defense area opposite; second, the number of airdromes available for Axis planes in relatively unexposed sectors; third, the volume of tonnage which can be landed and distributed at Axis-controlled ports or beaches.

The crescent range of mountains from Gabès to Tripoli, called the Matmatas in Tunisia and the Jebel Nefusa in Tripolitania, forms the basis of both the French and Italian defenses on the Tunisia-Tripolitania border (see map at back). Although on the map the French triangle of maneuver (Gabès-Dehibat-Ben Gardane) and the Italian triangle (Tripoli-Nalut-Zuara) appear very similar, differences of soil and terrain have led to different types of defense technique. The former defenses of Tunisia were more continuous, with an organized system of trenches in the Mareth Line. The Tripolitanian defenses are rather groups of artillery fortresses and anti-aircraft platforms, with an excellent road network between them. In neither case, however, are the defenses fixed in the sense of the Maginot line: both have been adapted to the needs of plains and steppe warfare.

Tunisian Airfields

Axis efforts to build up air strength in Tunisia are meeting with two major impediments: in the first place, northern Tunisia, where considerations of strategy would place the bulk of the combat squadrons, is ill-adapted for such a concentration of planes; secondly, airfields anywhere in Tunisia are gravely handicapped by local shortages of gasoline, repair facilities, and ground personnel. These shortages can be

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overcome by air shipments, but only at the cost of tying up transport planes badly needed for troop supply.

Existing airdromes in northern Tunisia possibly under Axis control have an estimated capacity of 76 medium bombers, 70 light bombers, and 74 pursuits. Their emergency capacity might be 180, 130, and 170 planes, respectively. But in view of the danger of overcrowding on vulnerable fields, and conditions resulting from the winter rains, it is doubtful whether the Axis will come very close to this potential maximum.

The core of the French defenses, the Mareth Line, along with the other defenses of Tunisia, have been dismantled by order of the Italian Armistice Commission. The thoroughness with which the Italians have removed its armament and stores and demolished its barracks would suggest that it would be impossible to reconstitute the line very quickly—even if one should assume the possibility of adapting the gun emplacements for fire in the opposite direction from that originally intended.

Consequently, the Italian frontier fortifications will probably prove more important in the Axis defensive system. These latter are intended to trap an invading army from the west between the sea and the heavy artillery along the Jebel. The following are the main lines of defense: 1) the fortifications at Zuara covering the Via Litoranea and the road leading south to El Giose and Nalut, and the more important and stronger fortifications at Nalut, probably the strongest point in the system; 2) the fortifications in the Jebel, at Giado, Jefren, and Garian; 3) a line of artillery defenses running from Sidi Bilal, about 25 kilometers west of Tripoli, south to El Azizia and then southwest to Jefren. Behind this third line are secondary lines stretching from El Azizia to Bu Gheilan, and from Castel Benito south to the Jebel.

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Supply Problems

If the Axis is to offer more than a token resistance in Tunisia and Tripolitania, it will be forced to import much more than merely military supplies. In fact, it will need to bring in nearly all its motor transport, most of the coal required for locomotives and power stations, virtually all the gas and oil necessary for its trucks, tanks, and planes, and most of the food needed by the army itself.

That the Axis can land and distribute all these supplies, in addition to troops and their military equipment, seems unlikely. Under optimum conditions of weather and shipping, and without disturbance from air attack, Tunisian and Tripolitanian ports might be able to handle 15,600 tons a day, or 109,200 tons a week (*The War This Week*, November 5-12, p. 21). But these ports are so scattered along a 700-mile coastline that concentration of matériel in any one sector would put a considerable strain on inland transport facilities. Moreover, ports serving critical areas in Tripolitania and northern Tunisia have only two-thirds of the total tonnage-handling capacity of the region. For unloading supplies on beaches, the Axis could resort to the use of shallow-draft vessels. But even if the enemy can provide a sufficient number of lighters, the problem of transport inland from the beaches—often across marshes and lagoons—will remain.

Italy: Reinforcement and Air Attack

Despite the new threat from the east, the Axis appears intent on strengthening its Mediterranean defenses. During the past ten days, according to unconfirmed reports, four German Divisions have gone to Taranto and Sicily. Further reports suggest that three German divisions are moving south through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and that the Italian Second Army is being transferred to Sicily from the Dalmatian coast.

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On the nights of the eighteenth and twentieth, the RAF launched against the north Italian industrial city of Turin the heaviest raids which it has thus far made in Italy. The Fiat engine works were evidently a prime target. According to press reports, there were no losses on the first raid and only three bombers missing on the second raid. RAF planes have likewise attacked Axis airdromes in Sicily.

The Italian press has described the recent British raids as "devastating". Neutral sources assert that several individuals even shouted for peace when the King and Queen of Italy visited Genoa, target of earlier British attacks.

German Intentions in the Mediterranean

Some close observers of the Axis military position believe that the Axis will now adopt a definitely defensive position in Europe. They point out that the Germans can not safely remove any notable part of their forces in Western Europe by reason of the perennial threat of invasion from Britain, and that they are unlikely to be able to withdraw any considerable strength from Russia under existing conditions. Hence sufficient forces are not available for an offensive through either Spain or Turkey; moreover, an attack on the former would invite an Allied counter-invasion, while an attack on the latter would add the Turkish Army to the forces of the United Nations (see Appendix I). In view of the difficulty and slowness of the reinforcement of Axis strength in Africa, the present actions there should probably be regarded as efforts to gain time for defensive preparations in Sicily and southern Italy.

Spanish Neutrality Policy

The shift of Spanish policy from "non-belligerency" to neutrality is confirmed by further reports from Madrid,

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although technically the legal status of "non-belligerency" has not been altered.

Spain's partial mobilization, bringing her total number of men under arms to about a million, is interpreted as a precautionary measure in line with the reported decision of the Cabinet to oppose any possible pressure by the *Wehrmacht* for entrance into Spain. To date, however, the Germans have apparently made no demands on either Spain or Portugal. General Aranda believes that the Nazi threat to Spain has passed, and that the creation of a Spanish salient now would only weaken Germany strategically. The generals of divisions, or higher, along the Pyrenees are considered "safe" from the Allied point of view.

Appointment of 95 Falangists to the third National Council of the party (the former National Council having been dissolved) suggests no new international trend despite the inclusion of Serrano Súñer. Other ex-office holders are on the list. The National Council, legislative body of the Falange, is entitled by law to give advice on important international problems submitted by the Caudillo, but its role in general is subordinate to the Council of Ministers and the Junta Política of the party. The newly created Cortes constitutes another rival to the National Council.

Dakar Joins the Procession

The adherence of French West Africa to the administration of Admiral Darlan was the logical result of a military operation which had left Dakar and its vast hinterland practically isolated from continental France. Furthermore, with the elimination of Vichy as an effective political force, Admiral Darlan remained as the one relic of the previous administration to whom Governor Boisson could pledge his allegiance. In other words, it is not so much to the Allies that French West Africa has swung its power, as it is to the heir apparent of Vichy.

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The result may be to raise for the moment the prestige of Admiral Darlan. The Admiral has begun the organization of his domain with the appointment of another holdover from the Vichy administration, Admiral Fenard, as head of an economic secretariat for French Africa. Observers on the spot suggest, however, that Darlan's inability to induce the French fleet to move from Toulon to Africa has eliminated his chief *raison d'être* (the squadron at Bizerte has not cooperated with the Allies nor is there apparently any guarantee that the ships at Dakar will do so). These observers feel that the Admiral's position may soon become so difficult that he will be obliged to transfer his powers to Noguès. Yet even this change, they conclude, would do little to raise the standing of the regime which the United States has sponsored, in view of Noguès' past record of equivocation and compromise.

For the present, the Fighting French are in a most difficult situation, since the colonial areas that Darlan controls are a great deal more extensive and important than their own. According to press reports, some of their leaders fear that the "temporary" arrangement with the Admiral may last for the duration. De Gaullist representatives in Brazzaville and Cairo have, however, already registered their acceptance of President Roosevelt's explanation of the Admiral's status. The amnesty granted by the French North African Commission "to all persons who favored Allied action in Africa" may further reassure them. The Fighting French claim that the amnesty will make available for military service 10,000 of their comrades now in concentration camps; pro-Ally officers of the former North African administration, like General Bethouard, may also receive military assignments. But within France itself the underground organizations are still perturbed by the current arrangement; advices from London suggest that they have protested strongly against the recognition of Darlan.

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In Occupied Vichy

Darlan's titular chief, Marshal Pétain, has again denounced "Anglo-Saxon aggression" and urged on all Frenchmen their "one duty: Obey". The speech suggested that the Marshal wished to give the impression that he had not retired completely from the scene, despite his substantial abdication of power to Laval and his designation of the latter as his successor. According to Swiss observers, Pétain has refrained from flight in an effort to protect from the wrath of the Nazis the Jews of the former unoccupied zone, escaped French prisoners, Alsatian "deserters" from the German army, and intelligence officers whose activities have displeased the invaders. In the view of the Vichy Military Attaché at Helsinki, the Italian occupation of Corsica and Nice has significantly added to French bitterness against the Axis.

At Toulon, all Armistice restrictions on the French Navy have been removed since the Allied attack, and some of the warships are now kept ready for battle, according to a local source. Half the fleet can be ready at three hours' notice, the other half at six hours' notice. Only two of the officers, however, have refused to take an oath of loyalty to Pétain and of resistance to the Allies, our source concludes.

Unoccupied Toulon is apparently the dividing line between the new German and Italian zones of occupation. In former Vichy France the Nazis have now stationed a total of six to ten divisions, two or three of them Panzer divisions. The armored units, at least, were previously in Occupied France, and could presumably be replaced there only by Panzer divisions from Russia; there have as yet been no reports of the arrival of such units from the Eastern Front.

Relaxation of Tension in the Levant

Although a settlement has yet to be reached in the Levant, tension there appears to have subsided. Allied victories in

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Africa have eased the situation, and De Gaulle's visit is reported to have restored French prestige somewhat in the area. Catroux now appears willing—if all goes well, and if the British supervise the elections—to let the people go to the polls in the spring of 1943. Nevertheless, despite the report that a satisfactory Anglo-French arrangement has been concluded respecting the government of Madagascar, Catroux rejected the tentative agreement negotiated by the Fighting French in London with regard to the Levant. Personality conflicts there remain acute; and the superficial calm of domestic politics in Syria and the Lebanon apparently covers a tangle of distrust and rivalry which may break into the open with the expected wheat shortage of the coming months.

Iran's Currency Crisis

In Iran, a country in only the initial stages of a money economy, severe economic dislocations and price increases have resulted from the depletion of supplies, cash trade, and rise in employment attendant on the Allied occupation. By October the United Kingdom was spending in Iran 300 million rials a month, the Soviet Union was spending 100 million, and the 15 million spent by the United States represented merely a beginning of anticipated American disbursements. Currency issued up to the beginning of April 1942 totalled two billion rials. By November the Iranian Parliament had voted an additional one and one-half billions at British suggestion. With the British insisting on further large issues, and the Cabinet hesitating to adopt what it considered inflationary measures, a Parliamentary crisis appeared inevitable.

At this juncture, faced with the menace of a British occupation of the capital, the Prime Minister threatened Parliament with dissolution unless it complied with the desires of the British. On November 19 the Parliament delegated to

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a Note Reserve Control Committee full authority over paper money, within the limits of the backing required by law—60 percent gold and 40 percent dollars and sterling, with Anglo-American backing. Arthur C. Millsbaugh, an American political scientist recently appointed Director-General of Finances, is to be a member of the Committee. Having gained this concession, the British now promise a declaration assuring the Iranian people that their wheat needs will be met from Allied supplies.

Progress in Middle Melanesia

At Buna, the Japanese are clinging desperately to their beachhead, after 13 days of intense fighting. Australians have isolated the enemy's nearby coastal position at Gona, but a small number of Japanese troops surrounded there still are holding out. Americans, approaching Buna from the south, have captured one airfield and are fighting near a second in the immediate environs of Buna, where the enemy occupies well prepared positions.

Although the Japanese—under cover of darkness and during weather which grounded our aircraft—succeeded in landing some reinforcements on one occasion, two other attempts have been repulsed by Allied air attacks. The Japanese have increased their own air forces, based at Lae, but have not been able to diminish our air superiority either at Buna or over the waters approaching it. Unless this can be done, the Japanese position must become increasingly hazardous. However, time gained now at the perimeter of the defenses of Rabaul would enable the Japanese to reorganize their naval forces, build up their remaining bases, and replenish ground forces depleted during the recent abortive attack on Guadalcanal. This, evidently, is their objective.

Evidence of a strenuous effort to strengthen bases is reported from the northernmost of the Solomon Islands, Buka,

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where railway equipment, trucks, engines, power rollers, and abundant building materials are said to have been landed, preliminary to the development of a stronger and larger base and airfield. In the Buin-Faisi area, farther south, enemy shipping has been reduced to a small fraction of the 30-45 ships sighted there prior to the latest abortive attack on Guadalcanal, but there is no other evidence of slackened activity.

On Guadalcanal, Japanese forces on the northwest coast are being pressed slowly westward from the Matanikau River, and enemy troops to the east of Henderson Field have been largely eliminated. We have regained numerical superiority on the island, and while a further enemy attempt to retake it is expected by some military observers, our positions there are believed by Secretary Knox to be ". . . very secure."

Symbolic Value of the Solomons

If the psychological evidences in Japanese propaganda are reliable signs, an attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal will most certainly be made. Previous extravagant claims of "victories" in the Pacific have now come home to roost so plainly that the Japanese home propaganda line has had to be revised more completely than at any time since the war began (the new direction, designed to meet an adverse military situation, is not defeatist). During the process of reorientation, according to FCC analysts, the Solomons have become an area of great symbolic significance. The Solomons, in the words of one Japanese commentator, are like the rivet to the fan—"Indeed, . . . the rivet and key of the final battle of the Pacific war." Until Japan establishes control over the area, he adds, a fourth and even a fifth Solomon Islands battle must be fought.

Unprecedented Japanese statements urging the necessity

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for driving Americans out of this area seek to make further Japanese losses palatable, according to the FCC analysis. The admission meanwhile that the American fleet has not been "crushed," that on the contrary Americans fight fiercely and with large forces, must greatly confuse the Japanese, who since the Chinese "incident" have been attuned only to the "all-victorious and all-conquering" theme. Failure in the Solomons now would redouble confusion and—all questions of "face" aside—create the first serious internal propaganda situation the Japanese will have faced.

Japanese Cruiser Strength

As a result of recent losses, Japanese cruiser strength may have been reduced to half that which the enemy possessed at the beginning of the war. If several old cruisers built about 1900 are excluded, an initial Japanese strength of 37 is the figure generally accepted by naval observers. A light cruiser, two cruisers of 14,000 tons, and one "pocket battleship" of 19,800 tons were scheduled for completion in 1942. Adding these four to the 37 above and subtracting the number believed sunk since January 1, 1942—conservatively, 22—present Japanese strength may be estimated at about 19.

These loss figures are considerably lower than recent newspaper estimates, and they do not take into account ships "possibly" or "probably" sunk. Likewise, they do not include damaged ships. In the two months from September 15 to November 15, 21 cruisers were reported damaged, largely on different days and occasions, but doubtless with some duplication of damage to individual cruisers involved. If it can be assumed that a third of these are out of action, the Japanese may at present have scarcely more cruisers available for their far-flung naval tasks than they have battleships.

While this conclusion appears very optimistic, it does not preclude the possibility of further Japanese naval operations

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in the Solomons. In estimating losses, however, there is a wide range between the most conservative and the most liberal interpretation of reported sinkings—a range of possibly 10 cruisers. If the upper rather than the lower limits were accepted, the number of Japanese cruisers immediately available for operations theoretically would be reduced virtually to zero.

Chinese Reports of Japanese Troop Movements

The same Chinese sources who were responsible for earlier reports that the Japanese were threatening an extensive drive in North and Central China are now talking of an imminent Japanese attack on Yunnan. These sources state that the Japanese are massing troops near the Salween River and in French Indochina, for a push against Kunming. There is no corroboration of these reports and our observer cautions that the Chinese are apt to make predictions of imminent Japanese attacks whenever China's allies are undertaking major actions, on the theory that such talk helps to forestall suggestions that the Chinese might undertake something themselves. There has, however, been increased air activity by both the Japanese and the Allies in Burma, which might suggest that there is some basis for the Chinese warnings.

Meetings of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee

The Kuomintang Central Executive Committee is holding its annual meeting at Chungking. The economic situation will undoubtedly be the chief subject of discussion. The Generalissimo is reported to be entertaining the idea of establishing a Ministry of Economic Warfare, which would take over many of the functions now exercised by the Ministries of Finance, Economics, Food, and Social Affairs. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister, is known to have supported such

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a plan and is among those mentioned as a possible head of the projected Ministry. General Chang Ch'un, the devout Episcopalian who acts as a Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, is also a possibility. At present, however, according to our observer, it appears that General Ch'en Ch'eng, Commander of the Sixth War Zone, and an intimate of the Generalissimo, is the most likely candidate for the post.

Jinnah's Journey Through the Punjab

Mohammed Ali Jinnah's recent trip through the province of the Punjab has apparently strengthened his following in a critical area of mixed population. The Moslem League leader aimed to counteract the influence of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Moslem premier of the Punjab, who has followed a policy of reconciliation among Hindus, Moslems, and Sikhs. On the critical issue of Moslem self-determination, Jinnah characterized Sir Sikander's moderate ideas as "mischievous," and held to his uncompromising insistence on an independent *Pakistan* (see Appendix II).

Cripps Leaves the War Cabinet

The British Cabinet reorganization announced on November 22 removes Sir Stafford Cripps from the position of Lord Privy Seal, leader of the House of Commons and member of the War Cabinet, and reduces him to the position of Minister of Aircraft Production without War Cabinet rank. Here he succeeds Colonel J. J. Llewellyn who is to come to Washington to take charge of British Supply Missions. Anthony Eden takes Cripps' place as leader of the House of Commons, and Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary, takes Cripps' place in the War Cabinet. Colonel Oliver Stanley becomes Secretary of State for the Colonies, displacing Lord Cranborne, who becomes Lord Privy Seal.

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The American press has indicated that Cripps' displacement from the War Cabinet reflects a difference of opinion between himself and Mr. Churchill on the problems of post-war reconstruction. Attention has been called to the statement in the House of Commons by R. R. Stokes, a Labor member, to the effect that "we (the Labor Party) are sincerely disturbed on this side of the House at the sudden appearance of the forces of reaction everywhere." There has been a disposition to connect the demotion of Cripps with Churchill's recent statement at the Lord Mayor's banquet that "We mean to hold our own," a statement which Mr. Willkie declared in his recent broadcast "has shocked the world."

It is worth noting in this connection that Colonel Stanley, who succeeds to the Colonial Office, is the son of the Earl of Derby, a product of Eton and Christ Church and a former member of Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinet, though one of those opposed to Munich. It might be noted further that Herbert Morrison who enters the War Cabinet, although a Laborite, provoked a great deal of criticism from the Left by his suppression of the *Daily Worker* and his arbitrary imprisonment of suspected enemies of the State.

The reaction of the British press, so far as it can be gathered from short cabled résumés, is on the whole surprisingly moderate. The *Manchester Guardian* scents "some disharmonies of personal relations behind this change" but observes that Cripps has not been a conspicuous success as leader of the House. The *Daily Herald*, which is the Labor Party organ, takes the fall of Cripps very calmly and makes much of the promotion of Morrison to the War Cabinet. The *Daily Mail*, which, though professedly independent, leans rather toward the Right, remarks that Cripps "in his growing absorption in post-war problems may well have found himself at variance with cabinet members of all parties."

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APPENDIX I

THE AXIS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA

The following consideration of factors affecting possible Axis operations in the Mediterranean area against Turkey and the Iberian Peninsula is based upon studies prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

TURKEY

The advantages the Axis might hope to gain by invading Turkey would be several and sizable; but in the opinion of most observers, they are likely to be considerably outweighed in the enemy's estimation by the direct and indirect costs of the operation.

Prominent among Axis objectives would probably be the securing of a supply route and air bases to support an attack either on Batum (and thence to Baku) or an attack southeastward against Syria and Iraq; the acquisition of Turkey's chrome-ore stocks and mines; and the control of the Straits.

On the other hand, the Axis would have to face the fact that difficulties of transport, plus the probability of wholesale sabotage, would severely limit the number of divisions which could be supplied along this trans-Turkey route. Moreover, such air bases as the Axis might acquire along Turkey's southern coast would not greatly aid a Syrian invasion, since these fields are few in number and poorly-equipped. Chrome ore is already scheduled to come to Germany as a result of the Clodius Agreement (*The War This Week*, November 12-19, pp. 22-23). As for an attack on Batum and the clearing of the Black Sea, it seems questionable whether the success of either venture would compensate for the opposition of the whole Turkish Army. A thrust from the Trebizond sector toward Baku, through the Trans-Caucasus, would involve a supply line of nearly 1,500 miles overland from the nearest base in Greece, or about 1,200 miles by sea and land from Rumania.

There is a further deterrent factor which applies to Turkey (as it does also to Spain): the Axis may well hesitate before it deliberately converts a neutral "buffer" state into a possible avenue of approach for Allied forces.

Resistance

Few question the willingness of the Turks to resist an Axis invasion, given the present posture of the war. Although the Army, including the General Staff, has been German-trained, its reliability is assured. Marshal Cakmak, the Chief of Staff, is definitely anti-German, as are all of his aides. This attitude can be attributed largely to the devotion of all the present leaders to Ataturk—who maintained that the Turks should never fight a war on the opposite side from England, and who took no pains to hide his dislike of the Germans.

The Turks possess 54 divisions already mobilized, and could probably put in the field about 1,500,000 troops. They are well-equipped with small arms,

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machine-guns, and light and medium artillery, but are notoriously weak in tanks, planes, and heavy guns.

Terrain

The terrain of Turkey would offer obstacles to Axis invasion increasing in magnitude as the enemy advanced eastward. European Turkey, apart from man-made fortifications, is wide open to mechanized warfare; an attack southward from the Marmara and eastward from the Aegean would meet few natural barriers. The central plateau of Asia Minor is characterized by much greater topographical difficulty: steep mountains parallel the Black Sea coast, permitting few harbors; and in eastern Hatay the Gávrur Range, and along the Mediterranean the Taurus Range, sharply restrict military movement. As for eastern Turkey, it suffices to note that the mountains there closely resemble the Caucasian chain.

Transit

If the Axis should view Turkey primarily as a supply route to points further east, rather than as a goal in itself, the capacity of the Turkish roads and railroads may well prove disappointing. The highway network might be adequate for an initial invasion, but hardly for the continued supply of any large forces. Estimates of the capacity of rail lines from Haydarpaasa, Bandirma, and Izmir to Aleppo and Iskenderon give an average of only 22 trains a day, hauling some 6,100 net tons.

Whether the invaders could maintain even this transport capacity is dubious. The Turks would undoubtedly withdraw or destroy rolling-stock as they retreated, and Germany has no surplus that could easily be spared from the European system. Moreover, the Turkish railway grid is spotted with bridges and tunnels at many points; destruction of these by either the army or guerrillas would be virtually certain. Altogether, it appears entirely possible that, even if the Turkish armies were liquidated in a few months, the Axis would find itself in possession of a transport system quite inadequate for further large-scale operations.

Vital Areas

Though Turkey has been barred by treaty from fortifying her European frontier, she has poured considerable funds into the building of the Çatalca line, about 40 miles west of Istanbul. Reports indicate that the Turks might assign some eight divisions to fight a sacrificial, delaying action on this line. The invaders would be somewhat hampered by the narrowness of the front at this point; on the other hand, the defenders would apparently feel obligated to declare Istanbul an open city, to prevent destruction of its antiquities. The Dardanelles defenses, moreover, are directed largely against sea attack.

The whole Çatalca position, too, could probably be flanked by landings on the Aegean coast. Opposite Mitilene and the Greek and Italian islands, many serviceable beaches and harbors would be available for the debarkation of troops. This area is not unprotected, of course: fixed defenses surround the Gulf of Izmir, and one of the principal military zones covers the Gediz Delta and the road from vulnerable beaches to the north.

Axis operations along the Black Sea littoral would be difficult since, as is pointed out above, this area lacks beaches and harbors. If the Germans could manage to gain ingress, however, and cut off the Zonguldak coal basin from the rest of Turkey,

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they would deprive the defenders of annual shipments of 3,000,000 tons. Since Turkey possesses only slim stockpiles of coal elsewhere for its railways, this loss would be a nearly mortal blow to its transport system.

Turkey's southern coast, protected by the Gávrur and Taurus Mountains, would offer few enticements to enemy landing forces. To the east, the Turkish army would be falling back on rugged territory well adapted to its training and its limited equipment.

Air and Naval Bases

Turkey's Navy, unassisted by Allied squadrons, would be of little effectiveness in the event of invasion. The only full-scale naval base is at Izmit.

The Turkish airforce is equally obsolescent, with the exception of a few units recently given her by the Allies. Airfields, however, have been well placed for defense against attacks from the north and west, and are numerous enough to take care of considerable plane reinforcements from the United Nations.

Supplies

Of recent years, Turkey has had to import wheat; reserves, however, are probably sufficient to supply the army and civilians at a minimum level—though probably not any allied forces. Invading Axis armies would be able to capture little grain; most of it has been stored in defensible areas to the east.

THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

The flow of German troops southward through France has come to a halt at the Pyrenees. This barrier may be crossed and a full-scale invasion of Spain initiated, but it appears more likely that certain unfavorable factors will dissuade the Nazis from undertaking the venture: problems of transport and supply would prove difficult; resistance—either formal or guerrilla—would be virtually assured; the Germans would acquire an economic liability; and, lastly, the invasion of Spain would remove a neutral "buffer" state from the Nazis' southwestern flank and invite the United Nations to wrest the peninsula from them as a bridgehead to Europe.

The Franco government has made no secret of its pro-Axis orientation in the past. But it appears extremely unlikely that it will give the Germans any encouragement to cross the border. Spanish army, navy, and air forces, in fact, were partially mobilized last week, and reports circulated in informed quarters that the military command had made up its mind to resist further pressure. The abrupt decline in influence of the pro-Axis Falange may be a further indication of the drift of Madrid's policy.

The apparent change in alignment may be prompted in large measure by Franco's fear that invasion by the Germans, if acquiesced in or invited by the government, would be the signal for the renewal of civil war. Resentment by Spaniards of both left and right would be intense; and the still existent Loyalist opposition might be expected to emerge from underground and direct this hostility toward the foreign invader into general revolt against both the Nazis and Franco's group.

A further consideration which might sway Spain's ruling class to resist would be the growing feeling in some quarters of the Government (prompted by British-

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American successes in North Africa and Russian tenacity in the East) that the Axis can no longer hope to win the war. The knowledge, too, that entrance of the Germans would result in complete blockade of Spain by the Allies, with little hope of food-relief from Axis Europe, can be expected to influence Madrid's attitude not a little.

Dread of blockade, indeed, might be a major determinant: years of poor crops have left the Spanish people vitally dependent on imports of cereals and their flour from the Western Hemisphere—650,000 tons in 1941, and 400,000 in the first nine months of 1942. Another million tons are scheduled to be delivered from Argentina during the next year and a half; if these imports were cut off as an indirect result of the German invasion, the Spanish masses (already on the border line of starvation) would be in desperate condition.

Spain's position in oil and cotton is almost as critical. The United States has been supplying Spain with substantial tonnages of oil—though not enough to meet her full needs, much less to build up reserves. Deprived of these imports, with replacements from Europe rather dubious, Spain's economy would face a dangerous contraction. Nor would the blockading of Spain's imports of cotton from Argentina and Brazil—which reached 45,000 tons in 1941—make the situation any brighter.

Effectiveness of Spanish Resistance

How serious a factor Spanish opposition to the Nazis might prove would depend largely, of course, on the extent of the agreement (if any) which could be achieved in governmental and army circles upon a decision to resist.

Sporadic action by guerrilla bands could certainly be expected. But though this might impede, it could never prevent the German advance. The regular Spanish Army, though large, would be ill-equipped to battle the Nazis by itself, even if its leaders prove willing to fight; and its best units are understood to be based in the south and in Morocco. If some of these divisions, however, should go over to the Allies, they might become a notable asset at least in the defense of Gibraltar, or in any counter-invasion of the Peninsula.

The German Transport Problem—Overland

Both the Spanish and the Portuguese road and railway networks are inadequate for the transport needs of even a civilian economy; they would be severely strained by the necessities of military traffic. They would, moreover, be vulnerable to sabotage or to aerial bombing at several bottlenecks. Nevertheless, if the Germans are willing to make a major effort to organize all their own and all of Spain's available transport facilities, they would undoubtedly be able to bring in and supply a powerful striking force.

The cardinal fact about overland access to Spain is, of course, the Pyrenean barrier. This forces the bulk of Franco-Spanish traffic to enter at either end of the mountain chain—Irun and Port-Bou—forming two bottlenecks exposed to blockage. Three other considerations limit the effectiveness of the rail system. One is that no direct route adequate for heavy traffic runs from the French border to the southern coast of Spain. The second factor is the difference in gauge between the French and Spanish railways, which necessitates trans-shipment of goods at the frontier—further aggravating the bottlenecks there. The third

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consideration is linked with the second: because of this gauge-difference, the Germans will have to depend almost entirely on Spanish and Portuguese rolling stock. How much of it they will be able to capture is problematical. But even if they caught the whole volume, it would scarcely be satisfactory: Portugal's rolling stock is decrepit and obsolescent; Spain's has never recovered qualitatively from the period of the Civil War.

Roads

In consequence, the invading Nazis would have to depend largely upon the Peninsula's highway system. While both Spain's and Portugal's roads are in fair condition, few can take two-way military traffic for any distance. Trucks, moreover, would have to bring their own gas: Iberian reserves are close to the vanishing point.

Capacity of Railroads and Highways

Together, the road and railway networks could bring into the Peninsula each day about one and a half German infantry divisions (plus GHQ units) and their supplies during a period of 10 days—through the passes around Irun and Port-Bou. A smaller additional volume of troops could enter through the intermediate Pyrenean passes—weather permitting.

However, it should be noted that this rate of more than a division and a half a day could not be maintained for very long: the pace would have to slack off soon to allow a large proportion of supplies to enter to maintain troops already transported. Further, the rate of entry does not guarantee a similar rate of distribution; many bottlenecks in the dispersal of troops and supplies within Spain would occur—particularly if part of the invasion force came by sea, congesting communication lines near the ports. Altogether, the maximum number of divisions the Germans could effectively bring in and supply during the first month would probably not exceed thirty. If troop movements were halted after such a period, of course, a stock of supplies could be built up to supply fresh increments of troops. The ultimate maximum that could be supplied in Spain would approximate 70 divisions—and more if the fighting were not very heavy.

Shipment by Sea

If the Nazis could use without too great losses Spain's Mediterranean ports, German incoming traffic could be increased nearly 60 percent. Now that we are established on the Algerian coast, however, this shipping and its port facilities would lie within easy range of our bombers. Reliance on the harbors of north-eastern Spain, on the other hand, would also involve the risk of sinkings on runs from Bordeaux to Santander and Bilbao. Portuguese ports would be unlikely to be used in the invasion of Spain, of course, since the run from Bordeaux would be even longer.

Air Bases

Neither Spain nor Portugal possess air forces capable of more than annoying an invader. Correlatively, an invader would find few first-class airfields for his own use. Spain itself boasts but 44 airdromes with permanent facilities, and only 13 of these have runways of 1,400 yards or more. The only airbase in Portugal

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with concrete runways is Portela de Sacavon, near Lisbon, though the main military airdrome at Ota is a reasonably good field.

The Position of Portugal

Although the majority of the Portuguese people are inclined to favor the cause of the Allies, it is not to be expected that they would or could effectively resist invasion by the Nazis. Portugal's fate will, more likely, be decided in Spain. Realizing this, the Salazar Government apparently plans, in the event of attack, to remove itself to one of its colonies—if it has time.

The strategical position of Portugal, however, is no less important because of its military weakness. In the hands of the Germans, it would provide an excellently-placed base for submarines and raiders to operate against our newly-vital ship lanes to Africa. And in the hands of the Allies, it might offer a conceivable *point d'appui* for flanking operations against German forces in Spain.

No mountains separate Portugal from Spain, and only the meseta's escarpment divides the main Portuguese plateau from the coastal plain. While this escarpment is abrupt and rugged in the northern two-thirds of the country, the southern third slopes more gradually; armies heading either for Spain or from Spain could maneuver easily through this sector.

APPENDIX II¹

PAKISTAN


Pakistan—"Land of the Pure"—is the name of a proposal adopted by the Moslem League of India at its Lahore session on March 26, 1940, to separate India into distinct nations on the basis of cultural homogeneity.² Those parts of the country in which the majority of the population is Moslem, it was stated, would become "Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". The areas involved are indicated in the resolution as "the Northwestern and Eastern Zones of India". Discussion by various Moslem speakers at that time, and before and after that time, shows that the specific delimitation of the proposed Independent States varies; but the North-western Zone would undoubtedly include parts or all of the following regions: the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, Kashmir, all of which lie in India, and even by some extremists, Afghanistan, which is already a sovereign nation. The Eastern Zone would consist of Bengal or parts of Bengal and Assam (see map).

Cripps and Pakistan

The Pakistan scheme has been advocated politically since 1930, but got its greatest encouragement from the Cripps proposals (March 29, 1942) for Indian

¹ Summary of a memorandum prepared in the Office of Strategic Services.

² The name Pakistan is not used in the Moslem League's formal resolutions advocating independent Moslem states, but it has come to be the popular designation for the scheme and is commonly employed by the press and public speakers.



INDIA — PRESENT POLITICAL DIVISIONS

-  BRITISH INDIA
-  LEASED AREAS under BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
-  INDIAN (Native) STATES
-  TRIBAL AREAS

PAKISTAN — AS PROPOSED BY:—

-  1933 MOSLEM LEAGUE SIR MUHAMMAD IQBAL Northwest Zone only
-  PRESENT MOSLEM LEAGUE Northwest and Eastern Zones
-  DR. AMBEDKAR
-  C. RAHMAT ALI

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constitutional reform. These proposals, while providing for a United India Dominion, conceded "the right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it is so decided. With such non-accessing provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union." This status was to include the right of secession from the British Empire. Indian (Native) States were also to have their status readjusted. These various provisions would have made possible a full implementation of the Pakistan idea.

Moslem versus Hindu

The proposal for Pakistan grows out of the hostility which has existed between Moslems and Hindus for 900 years, a hostility deriving from widely different views of religion and social organization, and widely dissimilar art forms and literature. Since the Moslems have a theory of the state which in its strictest application would lead them to use force as a means of establishing Islam throughout the world, they are a constant potential obstacle to Indian national unity, and, although they comprise a minority group, their sense of community is so much stronger than that of the Hindus that they can compete on fairly equal terms.

During the latter part of the 18th and early part of the 19th centuries, Moslem strength in India waned, and, from being political rulers before the rise of British power, they declined to a community of importance second to that of the Hindus. Efforts were made in the middle and latter half of the 19th century to raise the educational and economic level of the Moslems. In the 20th century the conflict between the two groups, which, before then, had been economic, educational, and religious, also became political, as each strove for legislative representation and political patronage under the various constitutional reforms that were granted India in 1909, 1919, and 1935.

Certain sections of the Moslem community, indeed, became convinced that they could never gain equality with the Hindus in a single united Indian nation, but must seek to have the prevailing Moslem sections separated from the prevailing Hindu sections and set up as a separate Moslem state. This proposed state has come to be known as Pakistan. It should be noted, however, that the idea has less vogue in the very parts of India that would comprise this state than it has among Moslems in those districts of India where they are in the minority, a situation which, though paradoxical, may be explicable in terms of the Moslem majorities' relative freedom from fear of Hindu domination.

Jinnah and the League

The promoter of Pakistan is the Moslem League under its president, Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who represents in his own attitude, according to one close observer, the pride, sense of frustration, and fear of Hindu domination that have led so many Moslems to seek for Pakistan. The strength of the League, however, appears to stem not wholly from purely Moslem support of Pakistan, but from the serious consideration the British have given the proposal. That the British have been inclined to overrate the Moslem League because they wish to see in it a counterweight to the Indian National Congress Party, is often

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charged. Certainly, though the movement is strong enough to have exacted concessions from Hindus as well as from the British, many Moslems stoutly oppose Pakistan. Moreover, persistent reports from the Near East indicate that most of the Islamic world is indifferent to the Pakistan idea or actually hostile to it, and that Islam's sympathies lie with the Indian nationalists.

Pakistan and Indian Unity

If the Pakistan proposal should be put into effect, many observers feel it would end by destroying the present administrative unity of India. Every great ruler the country has ever had has hoped to achieve such a unity, not merely to enhance his own power but also to give the country necessary internal stability and put it in a position to ward off an attack from outside. Two great rulers went far toward achieving that unity—Asoka in the 3rd century B. C., and Akbar in the 16th century A. D. The British rule in India has come even nearer to success than these two, the only deficiency in its holdings being that part of Afghanistan adjacent to the Indian border which is needed to provide a "scientific" line of defense.

The British have been intensely proud of the "unification" of India; any plan for India's future which would divide the country would negate their whole previous policy. Such support as they have given to Pakistan must be viewed more as a political expedient than as a serious desire to split India. It would be especially unfortunate, according to neutral students of the problem, to separate the northwestern part of India from the rest: that sector is not economically self-sufficient, even though it may have the mineral resources to make it so in the future. At present it gets help peacefully from the rest of the country; if it were an independent state, it might feel compelled to meet its needs by conquest. History might then repeat itself, with the northwest trying to create an empire of the rest of India. Pakistan, in short, might well prove a disaster for India.

Antidotes

Pakistan is based upon communal distrust, and a final solution of that problem lies in dissolving that distrust. Such a result might come with education and the development of new interests in India, according to one observer. A notable increase in Indian industry, for one thing, might release both energy and enthusiasm which are now consecrated to the perpetuation of religious prejudices.

For the immediate present, the problem is to avoid actual civil warfare, or at least internal disorders, springing from Hindu-Moslem antipathy; and to achieve this object, postponement of the Pakistan crisis is necessary, in the opinion of close observers. Some kind of temporary compromise on the whole "independence" issue, which would grant increased representative responsibility to Indians, seems indicated, if India's attention is ever to be diverted from these internal problems and focussed on the larger task of winning the war.

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APPENDIX III

THE AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE OCTOBER, 1942¹

I. RAF Night Bomber Operations

The scale of night operations by the RAF Bomber Command declined sharply during October. The total number of aircraft dispatched, 1,753, was the lowest for any month since February of this year. Aircraft were sent against bombing objectives on only ten nights, and no operations took place during the last seven nights of the month. The average number of planes dispatched per night of operations was 175, the fourth lowest of the year. The maximum number of bombers sent on a single night was 289—below the average number of planes employed in June and July. A recapitulation for the year is shown in the following table:

TABLE I.—Recapitulation: RAF night bomber operations

Month	Total aircraft dispatched ²	No. of nights of operations ³	Average no. aircraft per night of operations	Average percent of aircraft reaching primary target		Average percent casualties	
				Germany	France	Germany	France
Jan.....	1,998	19	105	67	75	3.7	0.7
Feb.....	810	11	74	65	53	1.1	1.4
Mar.....	1,769	9	197	75	90	4.1	0.7
Apr.....	3,321	18	185	68	85	3.9	1.9
May.....	2,160	19	216	76	43	4.8	2.7
June.....	4,294	14	307	76	4.8
July.....	3,394	11	304	78	4.1
Aug.....	2,060	12	172	74	6.3
Sept.....	2,973	11	279	77	5.0
Oct.....	1,753	10	175	* 78	* 4.5

¹ Nights of operations when less than 25 planes were dispatched are not included.

² Three night raids on Italy are included in these averages.

Seventy-eight percent of the bombers dispatched claimed to have located and bombed the primary target. This proportion has not varied widely during the past eight months. The loss rate (bombers missing in action), which had been comparatively high in August and September, fell to 4.5 percent in October (Table I).

Three long-distance attacks were directed against Genoa and Milan on October 22-24 as part of the strategy of the United Nations offensive in North Africa. The remainder of the raids were against objectives in Germany. The cities attacked and the numbers of planes dispatched are given below. Flight distances indicated are only approximate, since they do not measure the circuitous routes generally flown.

³ Memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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TABLE II.—Flight distances

Date	City	Number of planes dispatched	Great Circle (miles from London)
<i>October</i>			
1	Wismar.....	78	495
	Flensburg.....	27	427
	Lubeck.....	25	471
2	Krefeld.....	188	269
5	Aachen.....	257	254
6	Osnabruck.....	237	334
12	Wismar.....	40	495
12	Wismar, Dornier Factory.....	19	456
13	Kiel.....	288	456
15	Cologne.....	289	334
22	Genoa.....	112	651
23	Genoa.....	122	651
24	Milan.....	71	576

Ratio of Incendiaries to High Explosives

Roughly 3,000 tons of bombs were dropped on objectives in Germany and Italy in October, more than half incendiaries. During all the 1942 night raids, more than 30,000 tons of bombs have been released over Germany; more than 50 percent of this total have been high explosive bombs. The proportion between high explosive and incendiary bombs employed by the RAF has varied widely in different raids, but in general there has been an increase in the use of incendiaries.

This change of ratio is in accord with present RAF area bombing strategy. Large German cities may be divided into zones on the basis of house construction and the nature and concentration of the industrial and transportation facilities. The heaviest weight of attack is levelled at the compact residential areas in the center of the typical German city, against which incendiary bombs are particularly effective.

TABLE III.—Percent of total weight of bombs dropped¹

Date	H. E.	Incendiaries	Date	H. E.	Incendiaries
Jan.....	93	7	June.....	35	65
Feb.....	100	0	July.....	65	35
Mar.....	72	28	Aug.....	56	44
Apr.....	55	44	Sept.....	50	50
May.....	43	57	Oct.....	43	57

¹ These figures apply to raids of 50 planes or more against objectives in Germany.

Proportion of "Block-busters"

There has been a striking increase in the use of the 4,000-pound high explosive bomb. This bomb, with a relatively high proportion of explosive to casing, is

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designed not to penetrate deeply but to produce an intense lateral blast. In conjunction with an incendiary attack, it is useful in breaking in doors and windows and creating draughts which spread the fires. The following figures show the trend in the employment of two-ton bombs:

TABLE IV.—4,000-pound bombs as percent of total high explosives dropped (by weight)

	Percent		Percent
January.....	6	June.....	26
February.....	8	July.....	39
March.....	12	August.....	39
April.....	15	September.....	49
May.....	27	October.....	59

Other bombs, even heavier in weight, were used more or less experimentally during October. A 4,000-pound incendiary bomb has been dropped on a few occasions in past weeks (the largest incendiary bomb previously used weighed 250 pounds). Several 8,000-pound high-explosive bombs have also been dropped since September of this year.

Other Activities

Night sea-mining activities in October remained at the high level of the preceding months. A total of 456 planes were dispatched on extensive mine-laying operations over a wide area from the Bay of Biscay to the Baltic Sea on 18 nights.

Distribution by air of propaganda leaflets declined in importance during October; a total of only 20 planes was sent out on three nights over cities in France.

11. Daytime Operations

A. United States Army Air Force.—The Eighth Bomber Command of the USAAF engaged in two large-scale daylight raids and one abortive operation in October. The Fortress and Liberator raids on the Meaulte Air Frame Factory and the Fives Steel and Engineering Works at Lille, the eleventh and twelfth bombings since the American Air Force began independent operations in mid-August, were the largest yet undertaken by American aircraft in Britain.

On October 2, 73 bombers were dispatched: 43 Fortresses to Meaulte, 12 Bostons against shipping in Le Havre, 12 Fortresses on a diversionary sweep near Cayeux, and 6 Fortresses against the GAF aerodrome at St. Omer. Twenty-two fighter squadrons accompanied the bombers, including 3 squadrons of P-38's and 5 squadrons of Eagle Spitfires. Attacks by German planes resulted in one Focke-Wulf-190 destroyed and 12 probably destroyed, without loss to the bombers.

The record attack on Lille of October 9 involved a force of 81 Fortresses and 22 Liberators. Seven additional Fortresses were sent on a diversionary sweep of the Cayeux area. The bombers released 500-pound H. E. bombs and 250-pound incendiaries on the steel and engineering works from an altitude of 21,000–24,000 feet. Using the fighter escort primarily for tactical purposes, the Fortresses and Liberators successfully defended themselves against the attacks of the Luftwaffe and destroyed 48 German planes, probably destroyed 38 more, and damaged 19. Only 4 American bombers were lost.

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In a third operation, most of the 90 Fortresses and Liberators which were dispatched with fighter escort against Lorient returned before reaching the coast, because of poor visibility. Twenty-one Fortresses proceeded unescorted, and were continuously attacked by German planes. Three B-17's were reported missing, while German losses were 9 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and 6 damaged.


The monthly total of USAAF losses in combat was 7 bombers. German fighter-plane strength in the West was reduced by the destruction of 58 planes, with 68 probably destroyed and 38 additional planes damaged.

B. Royal Air Force.—Bomber Command daylight operations were undertaken on 17 occasions and were featured by raids of 88 Lancasters each on Le Creusot and Milan. The 88 unescorted Lancasters which bombed the Schneider Works at Le Creusot flew a circuitous route, involving a round-trip distance of some 1,700 miles, to avoid enemy fighter concentrations. The attack, from an altitude of 4,000-6,000 feet, lasted for only 6¼ minutes during which 114 tons of H. E. and 39 tons of incendiaries were dropped. Only one bomber was lost.

The Milan raid, for which an escort was provided to the French coast, was conducted with the loss of three planes. The Lancasters attacked at altitudes ranging from 100 to 4,000 feet, dropping 4,000-pound bombs and incendiaries.

A total of 79 of the fast, light Mosquito bombers were dispatched during October. The Mosquitoes, generally operating singly, attacked specific industrial and military objectives in France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany at altitudes of from 50 to 27,000 feet. Seventy-three Boston bombers and 62 Wellingtons were also dispatched during the month, generally on precision bombing missions.

The Fighter Command of the RAF was actively engaged in providing escorts for the bomber sorties. American P-38's and Eagle Spitfires joined in the diversionary sweeps and regular fighter sweeps undertaken by British Spitfires on several occasions. Spitfires were also employed in harassing attacks against hangars and trains in Occupied France and as interceptors in the German daylight raid on Canterbury.



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

November 26-December 3, 1942

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For the President

NOVEMBER 26-DECEMBER 3, 1942

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Office of Strategic Services

THE WAR THIS WEEK

Although the Soviet drive in the south has been slowed and the precise situation in the region of the Don bend is unclear, it appears probable that the Russians will soon relieve Stalingrad. The end of the siege of Stalingrad, one of the most notable defenses in military annals, would free the vital Lower Volga waterway for transport from the Caspian in the spring, and would unquestionably have important repercussions on Russian military morale. Meanwhile the northern Soviet offensive is slowly expanding salients south of Rzhev and in the neighborhood of Velikie Luki, although this drive has yet to develop any of the spectacular characteristics attributed to it in the press.

Against the Tunis-Bizerte bridgehead, the Allies have thrown three columns. Despite strong Axis resistance, it still appears that the enemy is fighting only an important delaying action and that he would have to defend a larger bridgehead if he intended to hold the area indefinitely. In the meantime, Marshal Rommel has dug in about El Agheila; and, with lengthening supply lines, it is assumed that it may be more than a week before the British resume their offensive in this area.

French naval officers have been warmly criticized for shortsightedness in failing to take the Toulon fleet to North Africa. But the scuttling was in any event consonant with a policy pursued ever since the Armistice of 1940—a policy of neutrality and resistance to aggressive acts from whatever source. Although the scuttling was hurried and incomplete and left a few vessels afloat and apparently intact, naval observers point out that it will be anywhere from one to two years before the Germans can repair the ships and train

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crews for them. In the interim, the sunken ships will seriously encumber the Toulon harbor, to the disadvantage of its captors.

In North Africa, Darlan, whose recent elevation to power has already occasioned widespread uneasiness, has now assumed the position of Chief of State and "heir of Vichy". This act implies that not only Darlan but the Vichy regime have now been transferred to French Africa.

Progress of the Soviet Pincers

Although the progress of the Russian offensive north and south of Stalingrad has slackened somewhat, its southern arm has repelled a German counterattack from Kotelnikovo and has driven almost to the east bank of the Don River—below the great bend—on a broad front from Obilnoye and Nebykov to Romashkin (see map). On the west bank of the river, other Russian units may have cut the Don bend-Stalingrad railway again at Rychkov. To the east and west of the bend, fighting around Bolshoi Donshehinski and Peskovatka indicates the progress of the Soviet mopping-up operation.

Details of the attack are somewhat unclear, and military observers disagree in crediting towns captured to one column or another of the Red Army. It is apparent, however, that with steady Soviet gains in all sectors of the Don bend front, and with both railroads to Stalingrad cut, the chances of escape for the German forces between the Don and the Volga are at least problematical. Some evidence suggests that Nazi units within the bend are withdrawing eastward to join the forces in Stalingrad—a movement that can hardly be interpreted as an effort to break out of a trap. And it seems clear that, despite Soviet gains in the northern industrial suburb of Stalingrad itself, the Germans have slowed the left flank of the Russian drive, which seeks to relieve the city's

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defenders. This continued resistance between the Volga and the Don has suggested to some military observers that the German position there has not yet deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant a desperate attempt to escape toward the west.

Significance of the Relief of Stalingrad

The relief of Stalingrad, which now appears probable, would deliver to the Russians little more than a mass of ruins, whose industrial capacity has been almost entirely destroyed or evacuated. It would be difficult, however, to overestimate the moral importance of a successful defense which has been described as surpassing the epics of Verdun and Sevastopol and which may in a very real sense have been the turning point of the whole war. Furthermore the Russian counter-offensive has already broken the anchor of the German advance to the south, and may even cause the Nazis to withdraw from their whole Caucasus salient—especially if a holding attack now in progress at Voronezh should develop into a full-scale offensive. Such a withdrawal would mean the failure of the German effort to appropriate Russia's oil resources in the North Caucasus. For it would come at a time when the Nazis had not even reached Grozny or had time to reconstruct the demolished installations in the Maikop area.

Should the Russians recapture Maikop, it would be many months before they could obtain any oil from that region. On the other hand, the relief of Stalingrad would reopen the Volga River next spring as a vital artery for the transport of oil and other strategic commodities from the Transcaucasus. In 1935, the last year for which figures are available, the Lower Volga (from Astrakhan to a little above Stalingrad) carried 10,390,000 tons of freight, of which 6,873,000 were petroleum and petroleum products, and 1,462,000 were salt.

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In the same year, Stalingrad handled 4,185,300 tons of freight. At Astrakhan the Volga is closed by ice 100 days in the year, and at Stalingrad for 150 days. By about April 20 the Lower Volga should again be open to traffic.

Furthermore, if the Germans should withdraw from the North Caucasus, the Astrakhan-Kizlyar railway would again be secure. Although it would probably take several months to put the Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk line back into commission, this railway might eventually also be usable. The availability of either or both of these lines would immensely simplify the transport of oil from Baku north, which is now burdening the Central Asiatic railways. These latter lines are in turn already crowded with lend-lease goods from the Persian Gulf, whose delivery would thus be indirectly expedited by the clearing of the North Caucasus.

The Central Offensive

In the Kalinin-Rzhev sector, the second Soviet offensive is concentrating on the capture of the important airfield at Velikie Luki, which the Russians may now have partially surrounded. The attackers have apparently cut the railway line to the west of the town, but the railroad from the south may be still available to the Germans, who are offering a determined resistance. Other Russian units have cut the railway between Vyazma and Rzhev. In this sector, as around Leningrad, where Soviet forces have made another effort to cross the Neva, the Russians are evidently capitalizing on the comparatively favorable weather of early winter, prior to the coming of extreme cold.

Elsewhere on the front, action has been indecisive. In the Caucasus, east of Alagir, renewed Soviet attacks are aiming to wipe out the recently established German salient toward the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways.

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Attack on the Tunis-Bizerte Bridgehead

Striking in three principal columns from the arc indicated on last week's map, elements of the British First Army, supported by American and French forces, on November 24 began the direct assault on the Axis bridgehead in north-eastern Tunisia.

In the north a column advancing along the coastal road forced the enemy to a slow withdrawal to strongly held positions in the Mateur area—a road and railroad junction whose capture is a preliminary to an attack on Bizerte. In the center Allied columns have driven the Germans from Medjez el Bab and Tebourba, and thrust a spearhead between Bizerte and Tunis in the Djedeida area, cutting the railroad and one of the two connecting roads. Here Axis resistance has been intense. Low-flying aircraft have steadily attacked Allied forces, and Axis armored elements are reported to have led the heaviest counterattack thus far encountered. The Axis has reoccupied Pont du Fahs, a point from which British parachutists had advanced to capture Oudna, 13 miles south of Tunis. Farther to the south the mixed French and American column advancing from Tebessa and Gafsa is reported by the Moroccan radio to be approaching the coast north of Gabès.

Air activity has been heavy and important. After a lull of several days, enemy planes based on Sicily and Tunisia resumed attacks on Allied shipping and harbor facilities, and both sides have continued their unrelenting attacks on the very limited number of available airdromes. Large numbers of enemy planes have been destroyed on the ground.

Enemy forces in Tunisia continue to be relatively small, and were believed at the end of November to number slightly more than 20,000 combat troops—over half of them German. The core of this contingent was apparently the German 7th Air-borne Division. The rate of reinforcement has been estimated at about 1,000 men daily. Enemy tank strength

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
was placed at about 50, while Axis plane strength in southern Europe has been increased. The concentration of Axis submarines in the Western Mediterranean and the approaches to Gibraltar has declined considerably.

Axis Defensive Strategy

The general Axis strategy in northern Tunisia appears to be to effect extensive demolitions and offer severe resistance before taking final positions in the commanding hills south and west of Bizerte and in a defensive perimeter around Tunis. If the enemy limits his stand to these strongholds—which the Allies will presumably soon isolate from each other, and from reinforcement via Tripolitania—it will suggest again that Axis policy in Tunisia is simply a substantial delaying action. A larger bridgehead would appear essential to any effort to hold the area permanently. In the south, Axis resistance has been passive, and the coastal points occupied are believed lightly held, primarily by Italians. A more determined stand may later be made in the Gabès-border area, to which the Centauro Armored Division might be sent from Tripoli.

Halt at El Agheila

As Axis forces dug in around El Agheila, military observers predicted a halt in the rapid movement of the current Libyan campaign. Having advanced 800 miles in less than a month, General Montgomery must doubtless now pause to bring up infantry and artillery, to rest, to establish forward air bases, and especially to organize supply lines and fuel and ammunition dumps. Tobruk and the railhead at El Adam—435 miles from El Agheila—will probably be the principal entrucking points, with Benghazi presumably too vulnerable to enemy attack for any large-scale use. It may be a week or more before the Eighth Army is ready to resume its offensive.



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Rommel has a substantial force composed of the depleted three divisions of the Afrika Korps, two fresh Italian infantry divisions, remnants of other units that escaped the Alamein battlefield, and line of supply troops picked up during the retreat. Axis port and transport facilities are believed adequate to sustain the forces at El Agheila, and to form supply dumps at intervals along the Libyan highway. If forced back from their present positions, the Axis should be able to make a series of delaying stands on the narrow coastal strip along which, for more than 200 miles, all communications must go.

The Scuttling at Toulon

The destruction of the French fleet at Toulon was the logical result of a consistent policy which French naval officers have pursued ever since the armistice of June 1940—a policy of strict neutrality and resistance to aggression from whichever side it came—a course followed at Oran in July 1940, at Dakar in September 1940, and at Casablanca last month.

There is no conclusive evidence that the fleet at Toulon was planning an escape to join the Allies. More likely, Hitler's swift attack aimed simply to take the ships by surprise before they had an opportunity to do an effective job of scuttling. Some have suggested that the Fuehrer had learned of careful preparations for scuttling which he wished to forestall. In any case, the fleet probably had sufficient oil on hand to make a break for Africa in case of necessity. But the German attack came so suddenly that the greater part of the vessels never had time to get up steam.

As a result, the job was hurried and incomplete. The greater part of the heavier vessels (two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, one seaplane tender) are reported either burned out or resting on the bottom about ten feet below their normal water line. The battleship

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Dunkerque is flooded in drydock. One heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, five destroyer leaders, and two destroyers are "afloat and apparently intact". Six submarines remain in drydock, at least four of them undamaged. Of the 13 other submarines previously at Toulon, one attempting to escape hit a mine and blew up; the *Marsouin* and *Casabianca* have reached Algiers; the *Glorieux*, after putting in at Valencia, has arrived in Africa in a damaged state; the *Iris* is interned at Barcelona; and three more which may have escaped are as yet unheard from. "French naval sources" at Barcelona (presumably the crew of the *Iris*) state that casualties during the scuttling were very slight—mostly on destroyers which the Germans tried to board and on the submarine which blew up. Land installations are evidently almost intact.

The Balance Sheet


The Italian radio has claimed that the fleet "may be salvaged in the future by our admirable naval engineers." For the larger units, however, such an operation would probably consume the better part of a year. Furthermore, naval experts suggest that it would take an additional six months to a year to familiarize German crews with the handling of the French ships, although the submarines in drydock may be an exception. One can conclude that at least a year and perhaps two years will elapse before the Nazis can make effective use of any considerable part of the fleet at Toulon.

The harbor will likewise be greatly encumbered. Toulon harbor is a small bay about 4,000 yards long and 475 yards wide called Little Road (see map). The eastern two-thirds is the fleet anchorage, 35 to 45 feet deep. At the southeast corner of the Bay is the single entrance, a 2,000-foot channel extending approximately a mile south and east to Great Pass. The latter is a 1,700-foot passage, 96 feet deep, protected by

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batteries on Cepét Peninsula and by a boom extending north-east from the western jetty on the peninsula to a narrow passage in 70 feet of water near the south end of Great Jetty.

Along the north and east sides of Little Road are the buildings and docks of the fleet base. When the fleet was in the harbor, 25 to 30 vessels were usually anchored in Little



Road, while the remainder were docked. Anchored vessels were ordinarily west of the 40-foot channel between the entrance and the large dry docks at the northeast corner of Little Road. If this was the case at the time of the scuttling, surface or underwater movement in the harbor will prove very difficult during the next few months. Any vessels sunk in the outer bay (Great Road and Toulon Bay), which has minimum depths of 78-150 feet, would not be a serious encumbrance to navigation.

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Reactions in Africa

The repercussions of the events at Toulon on units of the French fleet stationed in Africa have been mixed. At Alexandria, French naval personnel is showing an unwonted sympathy for the Allied cause, but Admiral Godefroy is apparently still hesitating. Darlan he regards as a traitor, and he has irritated the British with his continued indecision; the latter may now be considering the cancellation of the original agreement demilitarizing the French Squadron. From Dakar, however, Governor Boisson has apparently flown to North Africa to put at Darlan's disposal the French naval units under his control.

Confusion in German Propaganda Regarding Toulon

The confusion of Berlin's propaganda concerning the sinkings at Toulon suggests that the Germans did not expect the French would actually scuttle their ships. The *Berliner Boersen-Zeitung* comments that the last loophole by which the Allies hoped to sneak into the back door of Europe has now been barred, and gloats over the denial to the Allies of the French naval force at Toulon. Elsewhere, in an apologetic vein, the German radio expressed regret that the treachery of French officers caused the events at Toulon, and emphasized that Germany bears no hatred for the French people. A third reaction was blunt indignation over the fact that France had not "followed the call for the European task". "Never in history has the vanquished rejected the victor's hand so clearly, so stupidly, so dishonorably."

Vichy Disintegrates

With the scuttling of the fleet at Toulon, and the disbanding of the French metropolitan army, the disintegration of the Vichy administration has been proceeding apace. Al-

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though Pétain nominally remains at his post "in complete harmony" with Laval, press reports tell of minor officials ceasing to perform their functions, and soldiers changing into civilian clothes without the formalities of a discharge. One Foreign Office official who has taken refuge in a neutral country has described the almost complete cessation of activity in that department, with the arrest or flight of many of its members. Reports of arrests include Herriot and General Doyen, former French representative on the Armistice Commission, while Reynaud and Mandel, already under detention by Vichy, may be tried in Germany by a "People's Court". In France itself, special courts (not sharing the independence of the regular French judiciary) will sit in summary judgment on "terrorists". According to advices from Bern, Laval is in Berlin, discussing the reorganization of his ministry. As for the French people, the vast majority of them apparently hope for the organization of a unified government-in-exile.

A French Government-in-Exile

In North Africa Darlan has proceeded with the organization of an old time-server's version of such a government. As the self-styled heir of Vichy, the Admiral has a strong legal position, which he has strengthened by establishing an imperial advisory council and assuming authority as Chief of State in French Africa. Furthermore, he has not appointed to his council refugee collaborationists and politicians from Vichy like Pucheu and Flandin, but has restricted its membership largely to military figures and colonial administrators (Generals Noguès, Boisson, Bergeret, Giraud, and Governor General Chatel). The last two of these have the reputation of being pro-Ally; Bergeret (formerly Secretary of State for air under Darlan) came over to Africa after having been removed from the government by Laval. To Vichy consular and diplomatic representatives Darlan

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has likewise sent instructions to follow orders from Africa rather than from metropolitan France.

Meantime, the British, the Russians, and pro-democratic French have shown signs of concern that Darlan's "temporary" administration may last as long as the war. The Fighting French and many other emigré groups are apparently convinced that the Admiral's administration in Africa can not serve as a rallying point for patriotic Frenchmen. In the French community of Ankara current developments have occasioned many conversions to Fighting France—but not to Darlan's "Vichy-in-exile". The adherence of Dakar to the Admiral has again aroused the dismay of certain pro-Ally Frenchmen, who had been temporarily reassured by President Roosevelt's explanation of Darlan's status. For instance, the De Gaullists of West Africa have rejected all cooperation with the Admiral, whom they regard as even more treacherous than Laval; Governor Boisson, they believe, is little better. In Cairo, Fighting French circles have expressed similar fears. One observer concludes that the original popular enthusiasm over Allied successes in North Africa is now changing to cynicism and disillusionment.

That the British permitted the De Gaullists to occupy the Vichy island of Reunion without Allied help may be a clue to the real feelings of the London government. Furthermore, in a restrained defence of the BBC refusal to let De Gaulle broadcast to the French people, Foreign Secretary Eden has implied that the elevation of Darlan was primarily an American decision, and that the ultimate responsibility for operations in Northwest Africa rested with the United States. His reference to the "extremely tense and serious operations now proceeding in Tunisia" may indicate his feeling that the conclusion of those operations would logically mean the end of Darlan's usefulness. In Moscow, Stalin has confidentially expressed his anxiety over the deal, and his hope that the

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Anglo-Americans in consultation with the Soviet Union would cooperate in the establishment of a satisfactory French administration in North Africa.

The Reinforcement of Southern Europe.

In Italy, punishment from the air has again this week paralleled the arrival of reinforcements from the north. As the RAF twice more raided Turin, Prime Minister Churchill confidently announced that "the centers of war industry in Northern Italy are being subjected to harder treatment than any of our cities experienced in the winter of 1940," and warned that "if the enemy should . . . be blasted from the Tunisian tip . . . the whole of the south of Italy . . . will be brought under prolonged, scientific, and shattering air attack." The Prime Minister's statement appeared to foreshadow a concerted effort to knock Italy out of the war. Responsible observers warn, however, that press predictions of an Italian collapse in six months are extremely optimistic, and that loyalty to Mussolini (whom many Italians regard as Italy's chief bulwark against the Nazis) is still strong.

While the Duce has reiterated his assurance of an Axis victory, his reply to Churchill was somewhat lame. "Italy," he declared, "is now clearing her cities of women and children . . . A nightly exodus must also be arranged from cities so only fighting personnel remains. . . . We have spent hundreds of millions of lire on shelters that can resist the biggest bombs."

Besides sending additional troops into the Balkans, the Nazis have apparently continued the reinforcement of Italy. Unconfirmed reports tell of the arrival of a new Panzer division in Milan, and of German concentrations in Calabria and Sicily (where two Nazi divisions may have arrived from Greece). Similarly, the Italians may be sending the greater part of their units in the Po Valley to the southwestern part

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of the peninsula. Current estimates give the Italians 24 divisions in Italy itself, and four more in southeastern France.

Spanish Activities in Morocco

The Spanish are regrouping their forces in Morocco, according to scattered reports from the area, and troops have apparently been moved toward the border of French Morocco (see Appendix III). Spanish activities may be intended primarily to demonstrate to the Germans Spain's determination to remain neutral. The Germans, in turn, have moved no troops toward the Pyrenees frontier.

Supply Purchase Agreement With Portugal

The conclusion of a general supply purchase agreement with Portugal on November 23, after protracted and at times difficult negotiations, makes possible the continuance of Allied economic warfare policy in that country. When the Portuguese signed the earlier wolfram agreement in August—through which the Allies are able to purchase from Portugal vitally needed wolfram that might otherwise go to Germany—the Portuguese Government imposed the condition that an agreement must also be reached for a general supply program. Delay in the latter negotiations, undoubtedly complicated by Portugal's fear of offending the Axis, threatened to cause suspension of the wolfram agreement. Under the new arrangement, the continuance of wolfram shipments is ensured and an exchange of needed commodities is provided for.

Turks Confident Axis Will Not Attack

Despite persistent rumors in the eastern Mediterranean of Axis designs on Turkey, Turkish officials do not expect any invasion, at least for the winter; and the conviction is spreading that Germany is heading toward defeat. The Turks have

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no evidence of Nazi preparations against them and regard all troop movements as defense measures to counter the Allied threat from Africa, according to authoritative advices. The reported transfer of German divisions to Bulgaria and Greece is thus interpreted as a move simply to reinforce Greece and its archipelagoes, and to replace Italian troops called home.

Sapru Summons the Forces of Compromise

Despite constant checks and disappointments, Indian moderate leaders are still seeking a way out of the present deadlock. The latest effort is that of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, an old and respected liberal, who has invited Rajagopalachariar and representatives of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, the Depressed Classes, the Indian Christians, and perhaps even the Communists to meet at Allahabad on December 12. If this group can come to some sort of agreement, Sapru proposes to open negotiations with Jinnah and if possible with Gandhi also. But in view of the Viceroy's refusal to permit Rajagopalachariar to see the imprisoned Mahatma, it seems likely that a similar request from Sapru would likewise be rejected (*The War This Week*, November 12-19, pp. 15-16).

Japan Seeks To Strengthen The Home Front

American victories in the Solomons, together with the recent Allied successes in Africa and Russia, have apparently induced the Japanese Government to devote increased attention to the problems of the home front. In an effort to inject a new realism into Japanese thinking, the Government has called for statements by ex-Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, whose silence since their return to Japan has indicated that they were being saved for some such major task of internal propaganda. Nomura, in an article in the *Yomiuri Hochi* of November 22 and a speech of November 25, stresses

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American production of ships and planes and the magnitude of the American challenge. Kurusu, in an important speech of November 26, has surveyed the whole history of Japanese-American relations with the obvious purpose of convincing the Japanese people that the war was forced upon Japan and that Japanese existence is at stake.

Simultaneously the Government has launched a concerted campaign to bring home to the Japanese the pressing problems of the economic situation. The emphasis laid on the necessity of increasing industrial production is typified by an address of Premier Tojo's to a Gubernatorial Conference on November 13. Tojo declared that Japan must renew her efforts on the industrial front because Japan's enemies have finally attained the productive capacity necessary to attack Japan. President Suzuki of the Cabinet Planning Board, and Kishi, Minister of Commerce and Industry, echoed Tojo's statements with similar pronouncements before the same conference. On November 15 some 200 representatives of business and industry were called to a Civilian and Government Officials Joint Conference for Increased Production. The Industrial Patriotic Association held a conference on the production problem on November 18. A few days later the Cabinet announced the establishment of a Committee for the Increase and Strengthening of Emergency Production, to be headed by Suzuki. And on November 28 the Government disclosed that it had invited 366 industrial leaders to take part in discussing problems of increasing production.

Japanese Transportation and Food Difficulties

Japanese authorities have also issued blunt statements on the difficulties of transportation. Tojo stated before the Gubernatorial Conference that "the strength to carry out a war is dependent upon the power of transportation," but that "our first impression that goods can be sent to Japan as

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a result of our occupation of the various areas in the south is wrong. . . ." Thus the same government which light-heartedly distributed rubber balls after the fall of Singapore is now telling its people that they cannot obtain the fruit of their conquests until the transportation problem is solved.

Government pronouncements on food likewise bear the mark of sober reality. Statements have been made to discourage the people from expecting an improvement in their rations. Ino, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, as well as Premier Tojo, have issued warnings on the food situation. As if to cap the whole campaign, the Cabinet announced, November 24, that it has decided upon a program for extensive use of unhulled rice, a most unpopular food.

This entire effort to strengthen the home front becomes most significant in view of the fact that this drive has taken place on the domestic scene with no publicity abroad, indicating that it is not for purposes of external propaganda.

Slow Going in New Guinea

In New Guinea, the slow but intense struggle to eject the Japanese from their Buna-Gona beachhead continues. After repulsing minor counterattacks, our ground forces—closely supported both by artillery and aircraft—have succeeded in entering the outskirts of Buna and in taking the beach beyond Gona. They are now driving along the beach toward the center of the enemy's position at Sanananda. Despite enemy air reinforcements, we still command the air. The Japanese, however, have not been challenged on the sea, and they may have had some success in running our aerial blockade at night with reinforcements or supplies, despite damage inflicted on their destroyers by our aircraft. Our difficult overland supply line to Port Moresby will doubtless prove a handicap in long-extended operations, forcing us to rely chiefly on air transport. Without air superiority, however,

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the enemy's position must remain hazardous, and there is no reason to believe that his well-prepared defenses in this area will not soon be overcome.

Elsewhere in the Southwest Pacific, there has been relatively little action. Our planes have attacked enemy shipping in the central Solomons, where the Japanese evidently are attempting to reinforce forward bases from which their troops on Guadalcanal can be supplied or augmented. But both here and in the Buin-Faisi area farther north, enemy shipping has been relatively scant. Military observers believe that another two or three weeks may be required before the Japanese will have regrouped their military and naval units and completed plans for a possible further attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal. Large naval forces still are in the vicinity of Truk and Rabaul, and ground forces available are formidable—perhaps 60,000 in the Buin-Rabaul area and 20,000 still on Guadalcanal. The possibility that further reinforcements are on the way is seen in confirmed reports of Japanese troop movements down the Yangtze River toward Shanghai, whence it is believed they will embark for the Southwest Pacific.

Japanese Naval Strength

Japanese warships which are undamaged and still available for operations are now estimated by authoritative naval sources to include 4 aircraft carriers, 7 or 8 battleships, 2 or 3 heavy cruisers, and 9 light cruisers. Ten cruisers, 2 carriers, and 3 battleships are thought to be damaged and therefore temporarily inoperative.

These estimates, which were made as of November 20, take into account losses sustained by the Japanese during the November 12-15 actions in the Solomons. The number of cruisers sunk since the war began now has evidently been scaled down considerably from the total number reported

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from time to time, and is conservatively estimated at 17, of which 12 were heavy cruisers and 5 were light cruisers. In addition, 1 light cruiser is listed as possibly sunk. Ten cruisers are thought to be out of action as a result of damage. Estimated sinkings of battleships and aircraft carriers remain at 1 and 6, respectively.

Castillo Intervenes

Irked by the unexpected defeat of his gubernatorial candidate in a provincial election, President Castillo, of Argentina, has ordered federal intervention in the state of Tucumán. Castillo's man, Dr. Alberto Piossek had been edged out by the margin of one electoral vote by Dr. Campero, who was supported both by pro-Allied General Justo and the Radical Party Candidate. Campero's technical victory, in a province whose politics are traditionally controlled by large sugar interests normally favorable to Castillo, demonstrated convincingly that where the Radicals can be induced to cooperate with other democratic elements, enough anti-Castillo and anti-Axis sentiment can be mobilized to carry the day. On the other hand, the government's alleged intervention indicates equally plainly that the Castillo party is ready to resort to more and more openly dictatorial tactics, if necessary to maintain itself in power.

Uruguay at the Polls

In the first completely free presidential election in many years, the Uruguayan people have given Sr. Juan José Amézagá a thumping plurality over his pro-Axis opponent, Senator Herrera. Moreover, constitutional reforms, abolishing division of the 30 senate seats equally between the majority and leading minority parties, and ending the arbitrary granting of a number of cabinet seats to the minority party,

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were also approved by the electorate. Elevation of Amézaga to the presidency should firmly orient Uruguay within the United Nations' orbit; and the accompanying changes in legislative structure should destroy the legal basis for such obstructionism as the Herreristas might otherwise have continued to exert, close observers believe. Moreover, in the new Congress, in which the liberal democratic party will have a large majority, women will hold seats—for the first time in Latin American history.

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APPENDIX I

REPERCUSSIONS OF RAF RAIDS ON GERMANY¹

The increasing magnitude of Allied bombing operations against Germany, and the added emphasis on incendiarism in congested civilian areas—both signalled by the Cologne raid of last May—have caused correspondingly significant changes in the Nazis' Air Raid Precautions system. The most important of these changes—the entrance of the Party into the field of air-raid relief—appears to have had a favorable effect upon civilian morale, counteracting in some measure the psychological impact of the new mass raids.

Pre-Cologne Period

During and after air-raids, responsibility for maintaining order and safety, combatting fires, repairing public utilities, clearing streets of debris, and similar tasks is vested in the Security and Auxiliary Service of the First Order (*Sicherheits- und Hilfsdienst I. Ordnung*). These functions are, in practice, carried out by various civilian defense organizations of a semi-military character. Long before the "thousand plane" attack on Cologne, the Security and Auxiliary Service in any given city, though nominally under Göring's Air Ministry, was subject to the immediate command of the Local Police Administrator, and thus indirectly subject to Himmler and his Order Police (*Ordnungs-Polizei*).

Backbone of the civil air-raid defense system (at least, numerically) was the mammoth, semi-official Reich ARP association, which in 1939 numbered 13,500,000 members. Often regarded as corrupt and inefficient, the association certainly had as one of its original purposes the collection of funds; nor has it, since its foundation in 1933, neglected the opening of additional sources of revenue.

If, thus far, no major scandal has developed over these financial transactions, it is because the association does render substantial service. From its inception, it has campaigned to make the population aware of the dangers of aerial attack—with such success that in early stages of the war, many Germans expected far heavier raids than actually occurred. As of 1939, the association was maintaining some 3,500 ARP schools, with 28,000 ARP teachers. It had no dearth of pupils, either, since nearly everyone, whether a member of the association or not, was legally obliged to attend.

Another vital unit in the civil defense system has been the fire-fighting force. War preparations made during the Munich crisis in 1938 apparently revealed that this department constituted a weak link, and some weeks later a law was enacted creating a centrally controlled, nationally organized fire-fighting force.

Drawn up according to the *Führerprinzip*, with Himmler in the role of Führer, the new Fire Protection Police remained largely a paper organization until the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Then the threat of air-raids made action imperative. The professional fire-fighting forces in about 65 key cities were taken over and incorporated in the Fire Protection Police. Uniform fire-fighting

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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techniques were established, fire-fighting equipment was standardized, and unity of command under Himmler was assured. Voluntary and Obligatory Fire Brigades, which comprised fire-fighting auxiliaries organized locally, were transformed into an auxiliary fire police troop (the Voluntary Fire Brigade alone had numbered about 2,000,000 in the pre-war period). Despite these organizational achievements, however, the operational strength of the Fire Brigades was at a low point by the time of the Cologne raid—owing to serious personnel losses to the armed forces.

As for the military anti-aircraft defenses, these were always under direct command of Göring's Air Ministry, and although their efficiency does not compare with that of Britain's system, they have by no means crumbled under attack. Confidence in these defenses, up to the era of the Cologne-type raids, was very high among German civilians.

After Cologne

The bombs that rocked Cologne shook the German ARP system almost as heavily. On the day following the attack, Göring hastily transferred titular control of the Security and Auxiliary Service to Himmler—perhaps with the desire of ridding the Air Ministry of a rather embarrassing responsibility, in view of the *Luftwaffe's* inability either to forestall or to avenge such attacks. Göring's relinquishment of control, on the other hand, was more apparent than real: as indicated previously, the Security and Auxiliary Service had always been under the *de facto* command of Himmler, and in the post-Cologne merger with Himmler's Order Police, immediate command of the Service was given to Göring's old friend, Kurt Daluege.

The Party Steps In

Other moves of greater significance, however, stemmed from the RAF's intensified bombing. The most important was, undoubtedly, the action taken by the Nazi Party itself, whose prestige prior to this time had not been particularly high. Previously, although it had engaged in air-raid relief along with other governmental agencies, the Party had not wished, through publicity about its activities, to emphasize the whole bombing problem. After Cologne, however, when there was no further possibility of minimizing the seriousness of the situation, the Party changed its tactics. It had learned, before, the political advantages of identifying itself prominently with effective relief measures and implanting in the public's mind the idea that the Party had foreseen and prepared everything down to the smallest detail. Now it moved with despatch to place itself in the position of a shock-absorber between individual citizens and the German bureaucracy—notorious for its exasperating lack of tact in dealing with the public.

The Party was already in possession of a comprehensive local organization built around blocks (40 to 60 households), cells (4 to 8 blocks), and Local Party Groups. With this advantage, it was soon able to work out an elaborate and generally efficient system for "raid relief".

Operation

The Party Block Leader has been made responsible for informing the households under his charge of the location of the concentration point selected for those bombed out of their homes. Immediately after the "all clear" signal has sounded

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following a raid, the homeless families gather at this designated point. After reporting to the Party leaders, the victims are provided with facilities for recovering from the shock of the raid. Then, in collaboration with the municipal administration, the Party assigns the homeless to temporary quarters which, prior to the raid, have been selected through questionnaires circulated by the Party Block Leaders.

Food and clothing, moreover, are doled out by the Party, or its National Socialist Welfare units. In heavier raids, field kitchens are rushed to the scene of disaster. Extra rations of tobacco, cigarettes, coffee, meat, sugar, and sweets are distributed. Offices are set up to give information about the missing as well as about claims for damage (advances up to 1,000 RM for damaged property are made within a week or ten days). In order that bombed-out victims may obtain prompt service in stores, the shops selling textiles, shoes, glass, porcelain, and household articles are instructed to sell exclusively to air-raid victims for fourteen days following the attack. Those who wish to be evacuated are cared for by the Local Party Group, which will in addition take charge of the storing or forwarding of evacuees' household goods.

Cities drastically bombed get more than these material services from the Party: praise and solace are also distributed lavishly. Thus, the people of Cologne were commended for their behavior and told that the Führer was the first to ask for information about the town. The Party *Gauleiter* in the Rhenish metropolis decorated 1,500 persons. The dead are usually buried publicly under Party auspices, and special transportation is supplied for the bereaved.

Fire-fighting Forces Strengthened

The raids on Cologne and Essen saw bombs dropped on German cities in ratios of between two and three tons of incendiaries for every ton of high explosive. The resulting conflagrations threw into bold relief the necessity of further strengthening fire-fighting facilities. Scarcely 24 hours after the Essen raid, Himmler ordered all Fire Brigades brought up to full strength, and in vulnerable areas to 20 percent above peace-time requirements. Fire-fighting equipment, moreover, was promptly transferred from former Czechoslovakia to the Reich's western areas, according to some reports, and mobile Fire Protection Police regiments were created and appear to have been stationed at strategic points within the Reich for special emergencies. Unconfirmed despatches assert that in recent raids Fire Protection Police units have been rushed to the aid of a bombed community from towns as far distant as 200 miles.

Other reports have indicated that losses of fire-fighting personnel and equipment employed during mass raids were so heavy that orders have gone out to keep both men and equipment under shelter until the "all-clear", despite the headstart thus given to any conflagration. Another consequence of the large-scale RAF raids, which were accompanied inevitably by a certain amount of bombing of country districts, was to induce the Germans to frantic efforts to reinforce their rural ARP system.

Effect on Morale

Insufficient and contradictory information places any conclusions concerning German morale upon a tenuous basis. But it is at least possible to sort out, and

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to some extent to weigh, those factors in the civil defense picture detrimental to the home front's morale, and those which tend to strengthen it.

Certainly the RAF raids have confronted German authorities with a series of situations which have had to be managed with the utmost care. The supply of electricity, gas, and water has often been seriously impaired; transportation facilities and food distribution have frequently broken down. Under these conditions, panic is an ever-present threat and criticism of ARP authorities inevitable.

Mass evacuation has in several instances been necessary: after the Rostock raids, 80 percent of the city's population was reported evacuated; after the first big raid on Lübeck, some 42,000 were believed to have been made homeless; and a reliable German source admitted some 60,000 families were without shelter after Cologne's bombing. During the past two years, 1,200,000 children have been evacuated from German territories endangered by air raids. The least that can be said about these movements is that the disruption of the family cannot help but affect the general morale.

The housing shortage, too, will have its influence. Germany entered the war deficient in housing, and since the beginning of the large-scale RAF raids a mass of evidence has accumulated to indicate that the housing situation has now reached an acute stage. One British estimate places the probable damage as a result of 66 major raids on 22 built-up areas (March to August, 1942) at 215,000 dwellings demolished or rendered uninhabitable. Damaged dwellings needing immediate repairs were placed at 107,000—which does not include houses receiving such superficial damage as broken windows and blasted doors.

Two less tangible factors also play their part in adversely affecting German morale. One is the collapse of the Göring-inspired legend that German cities would be relatively immune from serious air attack. Since this belief had been reinforced by nearly three years of comparative security, its sudden demise had an effect all the more serious. The second factor is the knowledge in Party ranks that the problem of air-raid relief may soon be growing beyond their capacity to solve it, and that even partial failure to meet this test may seriously undermine the Party's prestige with the people.

Qualifications

It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume from this enumeration of adverse factors that German civilian morale is in any immediate danger of cracking as a result of Allied bombing raids. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to show that the Party's handling of air-raid relief to date has proved extremely effective in maintaining the spirits of the public. Energetic action in the distribution of food has enabled Party units to save the situation more than once, and the Party's general on-the-spot alertness and thorough organization have shown no deterioration.

The drastic measures that have been taken to cope with the housing situation have also stimulated considerable public confidence. Summary examples have been made of "space-boarders": one man occupying a 7-room flat in Hamburg, for instance, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for refusing to shelter a bombed-out family. Office buildings, attics, and huts are being converted into dwellings; large houses are being subdivided; and, with the aid of government loans, temporary buildings are being erected. Moreover, by quartering bombed-

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out families in the larger dwellings of the more prosperous, the Party has been able to portray itself as the enemy of class distinctions and the friend of the common man.

Again, by encouraging self-help and self-reliance among the people, the Party may succeed both in raising the resourcefulness of the public and in staying off the day when Party and State aid may become inadequate to the demands upon it. Families are requested to make mutual arrangements with friends or relatives, providing shelter in case one family is bombed out. And, to conserve the depleted stocks of clothing, the population is asked to take hats, overcoats, leather shoes, and blankets to the air-raid shelters.

Finally, by actually encouraging civilians within the Reich to write their men at the front in general terms about bomb damage at home, the Party is converting a liability into at least a limited asset: it reasons that one of the most important factors in maintaining morale is the belief that the sacrifices of war are being equally shared by all. So far, the Russian campaign has demanded unprecedented sacrifices of the German Armed Forces. If now the men in the field can be assured that those behind the lines are meeting—and bravely—somewhat comparable dangers, the danger of fissures developing between the home front and the fighting front may be appreciably lessened.

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APPENDIX II

FOOD SUPPLIES IN FREE CHINA¹

Free China, as now constituted, is practically cut off from outside sources of foodstuffs, and must depend on her own resources to supply her needs. Fortunately, although the coastal regions, a large part of north China, and the principal cities have been lost to the Japanese, the Chinese Government still controls the larger portion of the total land area of pre-war China. Still more fortunately, the unconquered regions of China were normally surplus areas with respect to foodstuffs. While the population of what is now Free China² was only slightly more than half (51.5 percent) of the population of all China, it normally produced 61 percent of China's total output of foodstuffs. The percentage of cereal production was slightly higher (62 percent); and, although the percentage for supplementary foodstuffs was somewhat lower (57 percent), unoccupied China produced 95 percent of the rice output of Old China (it should be added that the present unoccupied area contains the bulk of Chinese rice-consuming people).

The war, however, has modified this favorable situation in two respects. In the first place, migration from the occupied areas has raised the population in the present area of Free China by as much as 10 percent, i. e., from 219,000,000 to some 240,000,000. In the second place, in spite of government efforts to maintain or even to increase production, the output of foodstuffs seems actually to have declined. From 1931 to 1937 annual production of cereals and supplementary foodstuffs for Free China amounted, on the average, to 76,000,000 metric tons. For 1941 and 1942, a Chinese Government estimate, presumably covering the same area, placed this output at 72,000,000 and 71,000,000 metric tons respectively. The extent to which the decline may be attributed to shifts in boundaries between free and occupied areas is not known. It is assumed here, however, in the absence of indications to the contrary, that the production data refer to the same area. Accordingly, the decrease should be attributed primarily to a decrease in the acreage under crops (due largely to land fighting and the draining of farm labor into the army), and to unusually bad weather conditions in certain areas.

In spite of these factors, Free China's over-all food position is still relatively comfortable. After deductions for seed, feed, and the like have been made, total food supplies in Free China in 1941 and 1942 amounted to 66,000,000 and 65,000,000 metric tons, respectively. On the assumption that the maximum increase in population indicated above has taken place, these supplies permit a per capita consumption of 275 kilograms for 1941 and 271 kilograms for 1942. Per capita consumption for China as a whole in the pre-war years was 267 kilograms. In terms of this criterion, therefore, the over-all food situation in Free China must be regarded as still satisfactory.

It must be emphasized, however, that this criterion is a relative one; it constitutes no proof that China's population is getting the nutrition it needs to resist

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

² Included are 13 provinces of China proper (with the exception of some districts) and the 2 border provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. The districts excluded consist of 64 Aseas in Honan, 30 Aseas in Hupeh, and 21 Aseas in Chekiang.

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effectively further Japanese aggression. Furthermore, the conclusion that total food supplies in Free China are sufficient to supply normal food requirements of the population must not obscure the fact that acute shortages do take place in particular areas within Free China because of the difficulties of collecting foodstuffs and distributing them from surplus to deficit regions.

Average production of the principal crops in all China and in Free China (pre-war)

	All China ¹ (1,000 metric tons)	Free China ²	
		1,000 metric tons	Percent
Cereals:			
Rice.....	41,586	39,456	95
Wheat.....	22,287	8,440	38
Kaoliang.....	6,877	1,625	24
Barley.....	7,847	4,169	53
Corn.....	6,155	2,976	48
Millet.....	6,632	1,257	19
Proso-millet.....	1,517	503	33
Oats.....	867	148	17
Total.....	93,768	58,674	62
Supplementary foodstuffs:			
Sweet potatoes.....	17,724	10,802	61
Soya beans.....	6,283	1,976	32
Field peas.....	3,165	2,065	65
Broad beans.....	2,975	2,201	48
Total.....	30,147	17,044	57
Others:			
Peanuts.....	2,807	998	36
Rapeseed.....	2,294	1,828	80
Sesame seed.....	904	346	38
Cotton.....	775	242	31
Tobacco.....	615	464	75
Total.....	7,395	3,878	52
Grand total.....	131,310	79,496	61

¹ Average production for 1931-34 for 20 provinces of China, including what is now Free China.

² Average production for 1931-37 for 13 provinces now comprising Free China.

APPENDIX III
SPANISH MOROCCO¹

A decision by the Axis to move into Spain would call for an immediate "clarification" of the position of Spanish Morocco in the war, for the latter is so placed as to be of great strategic value to either side. To the Axis it would represent an

¹ Based on a study prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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African bridgehead rapidly reinforceable by convoys from southern Spain. To the United Nations, its occupation would mean the safeguarding of the Gibraltar Strait's southern shore and the elimination of a possible threat to the main Moroccan-Algerian-Tunisian supply line.

Axis convoys could make the run from Malaga and other ports on the coast of southeastern Spain in one night. If a sufficient force could be landed, and Spanish troops there either proved acquiescent or actually allied themselves with the invaders, the Germans could strike from the eastern and western ends of Morocco over good roads, their center being buttressed by the rugged Rif Mountains (see map at back). At the eastern end, a good road runs toward the border from Melilla, and an improved road extends south to French Morocco. In the western sector, a paved road leads south from Tangier, with connections eastward to Ceuta, and Tetuan; moreover, a standard-gauge railroad connects Tangier with the French Moroccan system. Morocco's central area, on the other hand, possesses virtually no direct road connections with French territory: three poor trails cross the main Rif and Pre-Rif mountains—and snow closes these in the winter.

A significant strategic fact for both sides would be the nearness to the Spanish Moroccan frontier of the railroad and highways which run through French Morocco toward Algeria and Tunisia. At one point, south of Melilla, they come within ten to twenty miles of the border. Axis forces, accordingly, would need to strike only a short distance to achieve major results. Allied troops, for their part, would probably find it necessary, if they wished to defend this vital route adequately, to penetrate well into the Melilla sector in the east and the Larache-Tangier sector in the west, in order to establish a mountain battle line easy to hold.

If the Allied objective were the enforced neutralization or even the complete conquest of Spanish Morocco, advances from the eastern and western ends of the colony would be the logical course, for only the east-west highway within Spanish Morocco gives feasible access to the central zone. Once pushed back into this mid-sector, where the Rifs might prove unpleasant neighbors, the Axis divisions would find their own lines of communication or advance very poor, while the supply routes of the Allies, stretching back into French Morocco, would be fairly good.

Fortifications

For some time, the Spanish have been concentrating on strengthening their fixed defenses in Spanish Morocco, particularly against attack by sea. While the most important coastal points flanking the straits are covered by batteries of considerable power, the Atlantic littoral and the Mediterranean strip around Melilla are somewhat sketchily defended. Opposite Gibraltar, the areas best fortified are believed to be those around Alcazar-Seguir, Punta Cires, Ceuta, and south of Ceuta near Cap Negro, and Tetuan.

Defenses on the Franco-Spanish Moroccan frontier are not considered very formidable. Labor battalions have been reported at work in the Larache-Arcilla-El Kasar el Kebir area, indicating a renewed effort to build up fortifications and roads. Opposite Xauen, an extensive system of trenches is understood to have been dug, and along the Franco-Rif frontier a network of light fortifications,

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centered upon Tabarrant, runs from Izzi Ifri to east of El Tzenin with the aim of preventing a bisection of Morocco from the French base at Fez. East of Melilla, a complete chain of similar fortifications is believed to guard the approaches from the Moulouya valley in French Morocco.

Air Bases and Planes

Spanish Morocco possesses five first-class airdromes, of which the two best-equipped are those near Melilla and Tetuan; the other three are near Larache, Tangier and Alhucemas. In addition, many emergency landing fields are reported to have been laid out, and extensive construction is known to have been undertaken for a field at Tamarot. Seaplane bases, quite well-equipped, exist at Ceuta and Melilla, and a seaplane anchorage at Alhucemas. These various air-bases are clearly designed with a view to plane reinforcements from Spain: the number of squadrons now in Morocco is believed to be extremely small, and most of the planes are themselves obsolete.

The Army

The High Commissioner of Morocco, General Orgas, has under his command some 150,000 troops. What proportion of these are natives is not accurately known.

The two Army Corps which make up Spanish Morocco's forces—the 9th and 10th—are undoubtedly better-equipped than Franco's battalions in metropolitan Spain; but they remain a second-rate military aggregation, ill-supplied for any modern large-scale offensive. There are scarcely 2,000 trucks in the whole zone; most of them are too old for rough campaigning, but even if they were in better condition, the shortage of petroleum would keep many of them idle. Armored cars are estimated at 250, and tanks at from 180 to 250; none of these is modern and the tanks are understood to be mostly light Italian and medium Russian types dating from the Civil War period.

A reorganization of several years ago was supposed to have given Orgas's Army a substantial number of 75, 105, and 155 mm. guns. Troops on the Franco-Spanish frontier are reported to possess some anti-tank guns, mortars and howitzers; and though a few modern anti-aircraft pieces are known to have been imported and installed, most of the Army's anti-aircraft equipment is believed to be antiquated. One well-informed military observer has asserted that even the partially demilitarized French troops in North Africa before the Allied occupation could have given the Spanish-Moroccan forces a bad drubbing.

Political Complexion

How Spanish Morocco would react to Axis encroachments on metropolitan Spain would depend primarily on the comparative strength and disposition of the Allied and Axis forces, and secondarily on the attitude taken by Madrid. As each week sees the further consolidation of British and American strength in North Africa, the likelihood of a move by Orgas in the face of Allied tanks and planes diminishes proportionately.

Orgas himself has made it repeatedly evident that he is by no means eager to follow blindly the bidding of Madrid. Under last February's law (virtually

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drafted by Orgaz), the Moroccan general administration ceased to be dependent, in theory as well as in fact, upon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Orgaz has sought to consolidate his proconsular position by building up a strong personal following, and by ingratiating himself with those elements in the government who seem likely in his opinion to stay in the saddle. Though technically the head of the Falange in Morocco, he was one of those instrumental in bringing about the fall of Sdifer. He seems to retain the confidence of Franco, and has taken pains to keep on good terms with the monarchist generals—Jordana, Queipo de Llano, Varela, Kindelan, and the rest.

One fact on which the Allies could rely in believing that Orgaz will make no move against us is the High Commissioner's lukewarm attitude toward Spanish irredentist claims. Newspaper propaganda in Spain has clamored for the annexation of some or all of French Morocco, and the Falange is committed to this policy. The occupation in 1940 by the Spanish of the international zone of Tangier and its incorporation into Spanish Morocco was one step. Extremists urge further ones, such as the formation of a solid block of Spanish territory from Tangier to Ifni and Rio de Oro. Yet Orgaz has been reported as saying that Spain wanted only minor changes, that this was a poor time to bring this question to the fore, and that Spain was as little likely to attack the French in North Africa as in Europe. Giving substance to these expressions, Orgaz has maintained friendly relations over the past year with the French General, Nogues, still in power under Darian.

Axis and Pro-Axis Forces

Working against the generally dampening "neutral" influence of Orgaz have been both German agents and members of the Falange. Nazi penetration in Spanish Morocco has followed the familiar pattern. The German consulate at Tangier has a suspiciously large staff. Gestapo agents abound—with a conveniently closer approachement with the Spanish *Seguridad*. Fifth column activities among dissident elements are generously subsidized and guided.

The Falangistas are present in considerable strength throughout urban Morocco, particularly in Tangier. Here a party card is prerequisite to a state job or contract. Yet the key posts in the Moroccan government are held largely by Army men who are neither pro-Allied nor pro-Axis, but fundamentally pro-Spanish and anti-Falange.

Native and Pro-Allied Elements

Both Allied and Axis propaganda have been directed in full volume at the natives of Spanish Morocco, with the net effect of stirring up sentiments not so much pro-Allied or pro-Axis as anti-Spanish. There has been discontent among the Moors over Franco's failure to fulfill their nationalistic aspirations and over the continuing food shortage. Though Arab nationalist groups have generally adopted a pro-Axis line, and some of them have not hesitated to accept substantial subsidization from the Nazis, the Rifs are understood not to care at whose side they fight, as long as it is against the Spaniards.

As to the natives within the Moroccan military units, it appears likely that they will obey whatever orders their Spanish officers give them. Franco's prestige as a result of the victory he won in the Civil War, with the assistance of Moroccan


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natives, is still high—whereas that of France, which backed the losers in Spain and was then defeated itself, has sunk extremely low.

The Allies can count for support on much of the foreign population of Tangier and on all its Jewish refugees. Some of the ex-loyalists are pro-United Nations, and others, trapped in the forced-labor battalions, would welcome any opportunity to strike at Franco, whether it helped the Allies or not.

Economics

The economic assets of Spanish Morocco are scarcely apt to invite an Axis or Allied invasion. The area is deficient in flour, sugar, vegetable oils (other than olive oil), textiles, fuel products, cement, fertilizers, and nearly all varieties of metal manufactures. Its surpluses of iron ore, limestone and phosphate rock, and antimony ore would prove no great prize to the United Nations, nor are they likely to influence a German decision either for or against invasion.



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THE WAR
THIS WEEK

December 3-10, 1942

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For the President

DECEMBER 3-10, 1942

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THE WAR THIS WEEK

The events of the week have been unspectacular in all theaters of the war. Allied forces have been repulsed in Tunisia, but the numbers involved were apparently very small. The Darlan imbroglio continues to be confusing in its implications and embarrassing in its consequences. At El Agheila the lull continues. The Russians have broadened the salient to the north and south of Velikie Luki, and have drawn closer the pincer arms west of Stalingrad. Finally, Allied forces have overrun Gona and divided other elements of the Japanese beachhead remaining on the northern shore of New Guinea, and threaten soon to push the enemy into the sea.

Axis Counterattack in Tunisia

Despite the flurry of newspaper headlines, the situation in Tunisia has undergone no sweeping changes and the forces involved in the current engagements remain very small. Details of the fighting are obscure, but in general it appears that the enemy has capitalized on his strategic position, his air superiority, and his immediate advantages in communications to halt the advance of light Allied forces into the Djedeida area and drive them back along the Medjerda Valley to the hills west of Tebourba. Axis forces have maintained considerable pressure in this whole area. On December 7, however, Allied forces reoccupied the hills at El Guessa, five miles southwest of Tebourba. Farther north the Axis has retained its strong positions controlling the road and railroad junctions at Mateur. In the center and south, Allied units have taken Faïd and Pichon, points on the east-west roads leading toward Sfax and Sousse.

Air activity has been intense. Dive bombers from nearby fields operated in close cooperation with ground troops in the

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successive enemy counterattacks; and enemy bombers continued their attacks on Allied ports. The Allied air offensive has concentrated on enemy airdromes, and has given increasing support to ground forces west of Tebourba.

The size of Axis forces in Tunisia appears to be growing, as air transports and presumably shipping continue to supply and reinforce the original bridgehead. Total Axis combat forces in Tunisia have been estimated at more than 30,000. The Axis also enjoys the advantage of the major airdromes of Bizerte and Tunis, and of smaller fields in this area, as well as the use of bases in Sicily for bombers.

The Allies, facing severe problems of distance and communication, have to date been able to concentrate only small armored and infantry forces in the immediate combat zone. The battlefield is about 200 miles from Bône by rail, about 540 from Algiers, about 800 from Oran, and more than 1,300 from Casablanca. Similarly Allied air operations have been handicapped by lack of all-weather airfields in the forward area. However, with the improvement of Allied communications into Tunisia and the establishment of air-ferry routes to this theater, the gradual massing of air and ground power should be possible. It remains to be seen whether—in terms of diversion and attrition—Germany will consider it profitable to enlarge and strengthen its bridgehead to match any growth of Allied power.

Vichy-in-exile: Evidences of Incomplete Conversion

As the Allied forces have with difficulty maintained their ground on the Tunisian battlefield, the metamorphosed Vichy governors of French Africa apparently continue to be a source of some embarrassment. Although ostensibly cooperating with the United States, Darlan has withheld permission for the OWI to broadcast from North African radio stations to the European continent—presumably because the

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Americans were unwilling to alter their scripts to suit the Admiral's pleasure. In Morocco, former Governor General Noguès—now a member of Darlan's newly-created imperial council—unlike Giraud and the Admiral himself, has not forfeited his Vichy citizenship. According to a reliable report, Noguès has sent to Madrid and Vichy a certain Olivier de Sardan, formerly Laval's *chef de cabinet*, ostensibly as representative of the Moroccan Phosphate Bureau. Very possibly, however, he is to maintain liaison between Noguès, Pétain, and Piétri, French Ambassador to Spain, against the day when the Allies might meet serious reverses in North Africa. At the same time, numerous pro-Axis Frenchmen are freely passing from French Morocco through the Spanish zone on their way to metropolitan France.

Significantly enough, the recent agreement between Darlan and Boisson, Governor General of French West Africa, opening Dakar to Allied planes and ships, has restricted the use of West African air fields to transit purposes and has left undecided the disposition of the French warships in the area. Moreover, a report descriptive of the situation preceding the announcement of the current agreement, has painted a picture of extreme confusion and not a little double-dealing.

It appears that Governor Boisson came to terms with Darlan only after the pressure of public opinion and Allied successes in Morocco and Algeria had made any other course impracticable. At the same time, the authorities at Dakar maintained communication with Vichy; and General Falvy, the commander of the West African ground forces and a reputed Germanophile, proclaimed that any occupying forces would be restricted to American troops with no British or Fighting French permitted to enter the colony. Furthermore, Boisson has given no indications that he is purging former collaborationists. On the contrary, the execution of a "De Gaullist agent" on the nineteenth (the very day of the

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accord putting Dakar under Darlan), and the imprisonment of an army officer for distributing pro-American propaganda on the twenty-seventh have indicated the trend of the administration. Our informant concludes that the policy of keeping the public in the dark has produced a "disquieting situation," threatening the discipline of the armed forces, which may eventually pass out of the Government's control.

In Switzerland, a refugee from the Vichy government has reported that Pétain has been greatly pleased with Darlan's actions. The Marshal, our informant relates, withheld orders to Dakar to resist the Allies until he was sure that Boisson had decided to follow the Admiral. Confirming earlier reports, this official ascribes Pétain's remaining in France to his desire to protect refugees from Alsace-Lorraine and the former occupied zone.

Plain Speaking From Germany and Britain

The Nazis have been quick to sense the propaganda value of the Darlan imbroglio. In the words of the *Nationalzeitung*: "Darlan's defection appears to have made either no impression or a bad one in France . . . The public detects impure motives . . . American cooperation with Darlan confused and disorganized underground opposition."

In London, meanwhile, General Catroux, Fighting French Delegate General to the Levant, has warned that military expediency no longer justifies leaving Darlan in control—in view of the havoc that disloyal Frenchmen could wreak on the tenuous communication lines between Morocco and Tunisia. Speaking in the House of Commons on December 3, Foreign Secretary Eden has flatly stated that the British Government does not consider itself bound by the Admiral's "unilateral" assumption of authority in North Africa.

On the critical question of Darlan's organization of a North African government, the British press, breaking its previous

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restraint, had anticipated the Foreign Secretary's declaration. The conservative *Times* has pointedly advised that the Admiral's action be viewed in the light of President Roosevelt's explanation of the former's temporary status. Both the *Times* and *Telegraph* emphasize, however, that Darlan, far from accepting the President's interpretation, "is making every effort to put himself in the strongest possible position." According to the Fighting French, the *Telegraph* continues, Darlan "may be counting on the United States to set him up in power in France itself against the desire of the majority of Frenchmen."

In still plainer terms the *Manchester Guardian* finds it "difficult to see how this latest development . . . facilitates the military operations of the Allies. . . . This appears to be a purely personal political move and one which may cause more mischief and more discord than any he [Darlan] has yet made. . . . The probability is that the United States will be forced by this step to restate its position towards the Admiral." In Washington, the first signs of such a restatement have appeared in Secretary Hull's pledge to Fighting French representatives that the United States will not permit Darlan to impose an unpopular regime on the French people.

Lull at El Agheila

In Libya the anticipated lull continues, while General Montgomery has been establishing forward bases and organizing lines of communication to give him a rate of supply sufficient to sustain offensive operations. Contact with the enemy has been established east and southeast of El Agheila, where Rommel has prepared fixed positions, but ground action has been limited to patrolling. Axis air forces have at intervals bombed and strafed British positions and have carried out reconnaissance as far as Benghazi. Meanwhile Allied air-

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craft from this theater have ranged as far as Tunis, Bizerte, and Naples, besides attacking Tripoli and Libyan communications.

Enemy strength is currently estimated at about 30,000-40,000 men (10,000 of them Germans), 60 or possibly 100 tanks (50 German), 250 anti-tank guns, and more than 200 field and medium guns. With indications that the British may shortly be ready to renew their offensive, military observers expect that the enemy will make a strong and determined stand in his present positions. British operations may, therefore, follow the pattern of the early stages of the battle at El Alamein. A spectacular breakthrough is not expected, however, for, if Rommel is forced back, he should be able to use the favorable terrain to make a long series of delaying stands along the narrow coastal belt.

Bombing of Naples and Units of the Fleet

The attack on Naples last Friday by 24 Liberator bombers from distant African bases suggests what can be done if bases are gained in nearby Tunisia. Dropping heavy bombs from a high altitude, Army fliers claim hits on one battleship, two or more cruisers, and two or three other vessels in the harbor. Preliminary reconnaissance has shown a light cruiser of the *Attendolo* class lying on its side, and widespread damage to port facilities. Antiaircraft fire was heavy but inaccurate, and, with no attempt made at interception, all planes returned safely.

Damage inflicted on cruisers strikes at a vulnerable point in Italy's naval armament. Since last summer she had raised her number of effective battleships to six (prior to the raid on Naples)—three of the 35,000 ton *Littorio* class, including the newly-commissioned *Roma*, and three old ships of the 23,000-ton *Cavour* class. Italy has only three heavy cruisers, however, one of which is damaged, and she probably

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has only six light cruisers ready for action. Three more light cruisers are repairing damage and about 10 are believed to be under construction, consisting largely of units of the lightly armored *Regolo* class which carries only 5.3 inch guns. The battleship force has been divided between Naples and Taranto; the cruisers are concentrated in the Naples-Sicily area.

Italy has, to date, only one seaplane tender, but she may shortly have a converted liner in service as a carrier. Her strength in destroyers and submarines now effective is probably about 50 and 60, respectively. Although the showing of Italian surface units has not been impressive to date, there is no reason to believe that her fleet is not prepared to offer a vigorous defense against any amphibious attack on the Italian mainland.

Franco's Speech and Spanish Policy

In his speech of last Wednesday Franco reasserted the ideological identity of his regime with that of Germany and Italy, but he carefully made no mention of participation in the war. Although only incomplete texts of the address are as yet available, Franco apparently tried to rally his people by placing before them the choice of either his own fuzzy Fascism or the "barbaric formula of bolshevism." Liberalism he discarded as the selfish, senile faith of a by-gone era of capitalism, imperialism and mass unemployment. The only references to possible action were that Spain would fight if threatened by war and that Spain's hour would come after the war was over.

In response to Hitler's birthday greeting (which consisted of a telegram, a personal letter, and an automobile) Franco also wished the Fuehrer continued successes in the crusade against communism.

It is possible to interpret these statements as steps preparing Spain for further collaboration with the Axis. But

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observers question whether a Spanish Government that kept out of war even when France fell and England stood alone would enter the war at a moment when Allied armies are at the doorstep. A more likely interpretation is that Franco wants to keep out of war at all cost, fearing mass starvation and the possible renewal of the Civil War; that the Nazis are waging a war of nerves and Franco feels words are an inexpensive way of cooperating with his brother Fascists who, after all, put him in power; and that the Allied landings had so encouraged opposition elements and the anti-Falangist trend that Franco felt obliged to reassert the political principles of his regime—of which anti-communism was always the cornerstone.

Prior to Franco's speech Foreign Minister Jordana had stated categorically and direct from Franco that Spain's whole policy was directed toward remaining neutral. He told the Portuguese Ambassador that, contrary to rumors, Spain had not asked Germany for arms and denied that Germany had made demands of Spain. The removal of General Aranda from the Superior War College, and his replacement there by General Kindelan, transferred from his post at Barcelona—together with the report that General Orgaz may possibly be removed from North Africa—are changes unfavorable to us; but observers attribute them to internal pressure against avowed monarchists, rather than to any Spanish desire to join the Axis.

The Germans, in turn, have given no indication of intentions to move into Spain. The Pyrenees frontier is quiet, and occupation forces in southwestern France appear to have been reduced as a result of German movements toward the Riviera. Certain of the Spanish commanding generals on the border recently told an American observer that they expected no attack.

Simultaneously with Franco's speech the appointment of a

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new Junta Politica of the Falange was announced. The five men whom Franco personally selected seem to reflect his preoccupation with national unity, being representatives of the Army, the traditionalists, the economic radicals, and the Church, together with the founder of the Falange. Five others were ex-officio members and the last five were selected by Franco in agreement with the Council. At least three of these have served with the Blue Division against Russia and observers class several as "ardent" Falangists. The star of Serrano Suñer, however, appears to have fallen lower than ever, with the appointment of a number of his old enemies. In general, no very alarming shift appears to have taken place. Two interesting notes are the youthfulness of the group, which at a glance would seem to have an average age under 45, and the inclusion in the Junta of the Falange of General Asensio, ambitious Minister of the Army.

Action West of Rzhev

With the definite slowing of the Soviet offensive in the south, interest has shifted to the central front, where the secondary offensive begun last summer has in the past two weeks registered substantial gains. The deep Russian salient around Velikie Luki, while making little further progress in a westerly direction, has broadened out toward Staraya Russa to the north and Smolensk to the south. To the east, German units have counterattacked in an effort to restore the railroad between Vyazma and Rzhev, the latter nearly surrounded by Soviet forces.

The net result of the Russians' offensive has been the liberation of an impressive extent of territory, and the creation of a grave threat against four strong points in the German system of winter defense—Velikie Luki, Staraya Russa, Rzhev, and Smolensk. Military observers warn, however, that this offensive—astride the Bologoye-Velikie Luki

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railroad—is operating in the same areas in which the Soviet armies made some of their most spectacular gains last winter. But at that time, despite the virtual isolation of Rzhev and Staraya Russa, both these fortresses held out until the arrival of spring enabled the Germans to straighten their lines once more. Only the fall of one of these strong points will offer conclusive proof of the power of the Soviet offensive.

Stiffening Resistance West of Stalingrad

Meanwhile the Stalingrad pincers drew closer, as the southern arm established a bridgehead on the west bank of the Don, and the northern arm (astride the Don bend) concentrated on reducing the German defensive system east of the river. Here the Nazis have counterattacked to protect their positions around Stalingrad, while to the south they have harassed the Russians by raiding supply lines across the Kalmyk steppes. In Stalingrad itself, the Soviets have maintained the offensive. Apparently the German position between the Don and the Volga, while not yet hopeless, is still deteriorating.

The third Russian offensive, against the Voronezh bridgehead, continues with unannounced results. In the Ordzhonikidze and Tuapse sectors of the Caucasus front, Soviet forces have maintained the initiative, and Red Navy units have participated in the repulse of a German local attack south of Novorossiisk.

German Grain Reaches Finland

With the Finnish merchant marine feverishly engaged in importing what reports describe as "the whole amount of wheat promised to them by the Germans before January 1", it appears that the Finns will not starve this winter. According to an agreement signed last summer, the Reich was to send to Finland 230,000 tons of breadgrains in the 12 months



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following September 1, 1942—apparently enough (when added to Finland's own crop of a minimum of 390,000 tons) to suffice for the country's wartime consumption (*The War This Week*, September 10-17, pp. 4-5). But the current imports, arriving mostly from Danzig, seem to be of poor quality Polish wheat, which the Finns are mixing in a ratio of two to three with locally grown rye.

Finland's dependence on Germany for wheat, coal, and other necessities remains the insurmountable difficulty facing the increasingly vocal advocates of a separate peace with Russia and a policy of friendship toward the United States. Furthermore, the resignation of Fagerholm, Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs, has evidently strengthened the position of President Ryti and Foreign Minister Witting, whose belief in an Axis victory appears unshaken. In a recent speech lauding Germany as Europe's bulwark against the Soviet, Ryti "has burned his bridges behind him and gambled everything on German victory." At the same time, however, his Foreign Minister has been under fire from pro-American elements and has been asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet whether he was ready to terminate hostilities with Russia. And the third member of the governmental triumvirate, Tanner, is apparently beginning to waver in his loyalty to his German allies.

Anglo-American Wheat Agreement With Iran

The Anglo-American wheat agreement concluded with Iran on December 4 should ease a food crisis that threatened to cause disorders and should promote the solution of the critical political and currency problems confronting the present Government. The agreement—which followed progress in the currency negotiations—provides that the two Allied powers will jointly meet deficiencies in wheat and barley that may occur up to the time of the 1943 harvest,

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provided that the Iranian Government has previously made every effort to cope with the problem. Provision is made for Russia to become a partner to the agreement if she so desires. In an accompanying note Britain and the United States have arranged to ship 25,000 tons of wheat to Iran as a "replacement" for Russia's current purchases from Iran.

The current cereal crop—which constitutes 60-70 percent of the Irani diet—is believed to have been about 300,000-400,000 tons below normal domestic consumption. The scarcity has been accentuated by the disruption of the limited transport facilities to the cities and deficit areas of the south, by widespread hoarding, and by the failure of the Government to establish effective means of collection and control. The British last year sent at least 80,000 tons of wheat to Iran. It is hoped that supervision by Sheridan, the American Food Adviser to Iran, together with the effect of the present agreement on hoarders and speculators, will reduce to a minimum the burden that will actually be placed on Allied shipping in the coming months.

Japanese Reverse in the Southwest Pacific

In New Guinea, Allied forces succeeded after hard fighting in dividing Japanese forces strung out along the narrow Buna-Gona beachhead, and Gona itself has been wholly occupied. The enemy is clinging tenaciously to his foothold, but his counterattacks have failed and his hasty, last-minute efforts to combat our air supremacy so far have been futile.

At present the Japanese appear to hold the center of the coastal strip from Sanananda to Buna, but they are endangered on the west by Australians moving down the beach from Gona; and on the east by American forces which have driven a wedge through to the beach, isolating the eastern Japanese flank at Cape Endaiadere. The progress of our

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mopping-up operations on this swampy battlefield is not likely to be rapid, but the enemy's hold appears to be slowly giving way. Our advances again were characterized by the close cooperation of ground and air forces.

The Japanese succeeded earlier in dropping some supplies to their troops at Buna by parachute, but on the whole little aid appears to have gotten through. Recent attempts to run the gauntlet against our aircraft with destroyers have met with no discernible success. One destroyer group which apparently succeeded in getting fairly close to shore December 1-2 was kept moving and finally driven off when 21 enemy aircraft, providing air cover, were shot down. A second destroyer group was reported on December 9 to have been struck and turned back by our bombers while still 400-500 miles away.

On Guadalcanal, too, the enemy's supply position is deteriorating. A Japanese effort to improve it on the night of November 30-December 1 was broken up by a United States naval task force, which reported the sinking of 2 large destroyers or cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 transports, and a cargo ship, at the cost to us of 1 cruiser sunk and other unspecified warships damaged. Another small enemy naval force, attacked by our aircraft December 3 while still 150 miles northwest of Guadalcanal, lost either a destroyer or cruiser and also failed to land supplies or reinforcements.

Tokyo Celebrates Pearl Harbor

Tokyo has marked the first anniversary of the war with further warnings to the Japanese that a long, grim conflict lies ahead, and with more dilations on the theme of American war guilt, newest of these being the claim that the United States began the shooting war by attacking a Japanese submarine—at Pearl Harbor. Tokyo, however, has also taken advantage of the occasion to boast of Japanese naval

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exploits against the United States in the first year of the war.

According to the Tokyo summary, the Japanese Navy has sunk 5 American battleships of known type, has sunk 4 battleships (presumably American) of unknown type, and has severely damaged 7 American battleships—a total of 16 battleships out of the 17 with which the United States entered the war. In aircraft carriers the Japanese have done still better, since they claim to have sunk the *Lexington*, *Yorktown*, *Wasp*, *Enterprise*, *Hornet*, *Saratoga*, and 3 carriers of unknown type, presumably American, and to have damaged heavily 4 further American carriers. In the cruiser category, however, the Japanese have surpassed themselves (as well as the 1941 listed total of 37 American cruisers): they claim to have sunk 11 American heavy cruisers, and 21 heavy or light cruisers, presumably American, and to have damaged 3 heavy cruisers and 12 heavy or light cruisers, for a grand total of 48.

Koreans Reorganize "Provisional Government" in Chungking

The *Ijongwon* (the Legislative Yuan of the "Korean Provisional Government") which met in Chungking from October 25 to November 20, has brought about at least temporary unity among the Korean nationalist groups in China. The *Ijongwon* reconstituted itself to include representatives of rival parties, although the Provisional Government party retained a majority of the seats. New members of the *Ijongwon* included Kim Yaksan and Kim Kyusik, notable leaders of the opposition party, the United Front Federation.

The State Council (Cabinet) of the Provisional Government was reorganized with the inclusion of four new members, to form a total of ten. Two of these members are identified as leaders of the United Front Federation. Full reports of the proceedings of the meeting are not yet available, but the *Ijongwon* recommended a formal appeal to the United Nations for recognition of the "Korean Provisional Govern-

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ment" and a request for material aid to the Korean Independent Army.

Arrests in Argentina

The Castillo Government, goaded by United States memoranda on Nazi activities in Argentina, has not only indicted 38 Axis agents but has now preferred formal charges of complicity in espionage against several members of the German Embassy. Since this action involves the immunities of foreign diplomats, Argentina's Supreme Court must pass on the case.

Hard on the heels of the espionage case has come a new development to harass Castillo's regime: José Castells, Undersecretary of the Interior, has announced his intention of resigning within the next few days. In this key ministry, whose control of territorial governments, national and capital police, posts and telegraphs, and supervision over elections and labor relations is vital to the regime's security, Castells has been an exceedingly influential figure. Long an admirer of the Nazis but always a realist, he has lately hinted at the possibility of revising his position and renewing relations with pro-Allied General Justo. A break now between Castells and the governing clique, following so closely the resignation of Minister of War Tonazzi, may indicate a profound division within the ranks of the Castillo entourage, with one powerful group mentally prepared to scuttle Argentina's present policy of "neutrality."

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APPENDIX I

THE GOTHENBURG TRADE¹

Although subject to partial blockade by both Germany and the United Nations, Sweden is still running five ships a month from Gothenburg to neutral ports—under an agreement concluded in 1940 with the two belligerent groups. Pending major shifts in the military situation in Scandinavia, this "Gothenburg trade" seems likely to be continued with only minor modifications since, for differing reasons, the arrangement is satisfactory to all parties. To Sweden, the trade is definitely beneficial; to the Allies, it offers certain real advantages; to Germany, the political and economic costs of cutting it off (in terms of Swedish reaction) appear to be prohibitive.

Brief History of the Trade

Since December 7, 1939, Sweden's overseas trade with the United Kingdom and with neutrals has been regulated by the Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement. Under this agreement Sweden acknowledged the Allied blockade of the Axis and obligated itself not to re-export to Germany such contraband as Britain allowed to pass through to Swedish ports; Sweden also agreed to restrict exports to Germany of Swedish-produced goods to the pre-war level of 1938. With Norway's occupation by the Nazis in April, 1940, Britain took under control all Swedish ships destined for home ports, to prevent their falling into German hands. From then until the opening of the "Gothenburg route," Sweden's capacity to import goods from overseas was severely limited.

The opening of the Gothenburg route took place in March, 1941, after prolonged (although indirect) negotiation between Britain and Germany. Four ships per month were allowed to put into Gothenburg from neutral ports outside the Baltic, provided that an equal number sailed out of Gothenburg (preventing the retention in Sweden of reserves of idle shipping exposed to Nazi seizure). Subsequently, in the first months of 1942, accords with Great Britain and Germany were reached to raise the number of ships to five. Sweden is now seeking to have this number increased to six.

Imports and Exports

Imports to Sweden via the Gothenburg route have consisted largely of supplies to sustain her civilian economy, and oil to meet the needs of her military establishment. The civilian supplies—fats and vegetable oils, textile fibres, grain, and animal feeds—have come for the most part from South America, while the United States has provided the petroleum products.

Swedish exports overseas include pulp and paper to South America and certain small but essential shipments of machines and machine-parts to Britain, the United States, and South America. Swedish production of bearings is of particular importance to Britain's war industries; on order in Sweden now are approximately 1,200 tons of finished bearings—most of them for tank and aircraft production. Even Britain's building of new factories to produce bearings has not lessened her immediate dependence on Sweden: machines to make these bearings must be

¹ Based on a memorandum of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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imported from Sweden. Other much-needed goods which come to England from this source are special wire and wire rods, cold-rolled strip steel, precision tools, and spare parts for Swedish-built marine engines.

What Sweden Would Lose

The goods Sweden receives through the Allied blockade not merely cushion the war's impact upon her standard of living, but, more importantly, maintain her capacity to resist German pressure, economically and militarily. Unless for example, Sweden can continue to obtain the petroleum products which now come to her via the Gothenburg route, the effectiveness of her army, navy, and air forces will be gravely impaired. The following tables summarize the annual requirements of those forces under peace and war conditions, and the stocks available today.

Estimated Requirements Per Year (in metric

tons):	Peace	War
Navy (oil).....	45,000	425,000- 480,000
Air Force (gasoline).....	20,000	108,000- 136,000
Army (gasoline).....	54,000	420,000- 420,000
Total.....	119,000	953,000-1,036,000
Stocks:		
Navy (oil).....		77,500
Air Force (aviation gasoline).....		26,400
Army (gasoline).....		No information

From these figures, it can readily be seen that Sweden has on hand stocks sufficient (under combat conditions) to last its navy only two months and its air force only two and a half months. Since Sweden has virtually no domestic sources of oil, it becomes obvious that, without supplies from the Allies, its armed forces would be hard-pressed to maintain training activities and keep in operating condition. In the event of German invasion, they would be able to fight only a brief delaying action, starkly limited by a factor beyond their control.

Although the loss of imported consumers goods through cessation of the Gothenburg trade would be less serious for Sweden, it would nevertheless produce a definite reduction in the domestic standard of living. Sweden, if embittered by an Anglo-American severance of this trade, might be strongly tempted to make good the deficiency by increased imports from Germany. Naturally, Germany would not release these additional commodities without corresponding concessions on the part of Sweden. Already, in fact, Germany appears to be pressuring Sweden to raise her exports of iron ore to some 14,000,000 tons annually and to develop the port of Lulea to handle larger shipments. So far, Sweden has resisted these demands; but, if freed of her obligations to the Allies, she might be persuaded to send Germany increased tonnage in exchange for needed imports.

In addition, the severing of the Gothenburg link with the Allies, if instigated by the Allies, would make Swedish industry in general more amenable to taking German orders above present quotas. Exports to Germany of arsenic (important component in poison gas), abrasives, ethylene glycol, and lead metal have hitherto been prohibited. Denunciation of the Anglo-Swedish war-trade agreement

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might lead Sweden to furnish Germany with sizeable amounts of all these vital supplies. Further, if the continuation of Sweden's rearmament program, in the light of expected oil shortages, seemed futile, Swedish engineering and productive capacity might be turned over to armament manufacture for the Axis.

What the Allies Would Lose

It seems clear that the Allies would have much to lose and little to gain by stopping the official gaps in its Swedish blockade. It is true that the monetary value of the goods the Allies have permitted Sweden to import has far outweighed the value of those Sweden has shipped out over the Gothenburg route: in the first half of 1942, imports were estimated at 193,000,000 kroner, and exports at only 73,000,000 kroner. But those imports were materials which the United Nations could spare without strain (cotton, oil) or which, though "shortage goods", represented a negligible withdrawal from our total supplies (wool, fats and oils, hides). On the other hand, Sweden's exports to the Allies, of metal products and machinery components, are of considerable strategic importance to our war effort.

Of far greater significance, however, is the fact previously indicated—that the loss of Sweden's Gothenburg imports would interfere with the development of her military strength and would impair her bargaining position vis-à-vis Germany. This would be a diplomatic defeat for the United Nations and would probably close off the "listening-post of North Europe," with its valuable sources of economic intelligence on Axis capabilities.

What Germany Would Lose

If termination of the Gothenburg trade promises such a defeat for both Sweden and the Allies, it may fairly be asked why Germany does not unilaterally break off the agreement and close the Skaggerak to Swedish overseas shipping. The answer is probably twofold: Germany is already receiving voluntarily a high fraction of Sweden's potential export capacity, as well as certain concessions on troop and supply movements across to Norway; in cutting the Gothenburg trade on its own initiative, Germany would almost certainly arouse Swedish hostility and end this period of willing compliance. The possibilities open to an outraged Sweden of reducing her present and future contributions to the Axis would be many, ranging from delays in delivery to actual sabotage of productive facilities. Such a policy would mean heavy sacrifices for the Swedish people; but they might well be willing to undergo them if sufficiently angered.

Equilibrium

Altogether, the Gothenburg Agreement appears to present an equilibrium of advantages and disadvantages for the parties involved that militates against any major change. A margin of adjustment remains, within which the three parties can exert pressure for concessions—the Swedes attempting to get more ships put on the route, the Allies trying to lower Swedish exports to Germany and limit German transit facilities, and the Nazis arguing their right to bigger shipments of ore and a bigger volume of troop and supply movements across Sweden. But it appears improbable that any of these claims and counter-claims will, for the present, be pushed to the point of disrupting the Gothenburg trade itself.

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APPENDIX II EIRE TODAY¹

Three years ago, when President Eamon de Valera first declared his neutrality stand, few Irishmen believed that he could maintain it for the duration. As time has passed, however, their doubts have faded, and the most notable feature of the last six months has been the growing belief that, so long as Hitler is preoccupied in eastern Europe, Eire will remain outside the war. This increasing support of de Valera's foreign policy has been assisted by a powerful censorship which can readily control the expression of opinion running counter to the Government's wishes.

Eire's censorship policy has two ends in view: first, to avoid offending any of the belligerents; and, second, to discourage provocative political discussion at home. As it is, the censorship has achieved its purpose in minimizing political party fights, and to a great extent, it has also created an atmosphere of disinterest in the war. In the early days of the conflict, a few supporters of the opposition party, the Fine Gael, urged the Government to come out openly in favor of the Allies, but today, the leader of the pro-Allied members of the Fine Gael, Mr. Dillon, has been dropped from the party, and the Government's policy is not even subjected to modest pressure. One reason for this attitude within the Fianna Fail, the Fine Gael, and even in the small Labor Party, is the realization that neutrality will be the most successful possible platform in the general election expected within a few months in Eire.

Economic Price

Meanwhile, Eire has been slowly awakening to the economic costs of her neutrality policy. National income is decreasing, while the Government fills its budgetary deficiency by extensive borrowing. Since supplies for essential industries are no longer available, displacement of workers is likely to increase still further. If it were not for the possibility of emigration to England, where manpower is short, Eire's unemployed would be much more numerous. The country's dependence on imports from overseas becomes more and more painfully evident. In peacetime, Eire obtains the bulk of her raw materials from Great Britain in return for Irish livestock and food products. Today, tightened British export control precludes any chance of exchanging foodstuffs for raw materials which are urgently needed in England for the manufacture of arms. Imports of raw materials and machinery from the United States have also been cut off since we entered the war. As a result, Irish manufacturers have been seeking them elsewhere. Negotiations now appear to be under way for the purchase in Argentina of cotton yarns and other raw materials, which would be brought into Lisbon and transhipped to Eire.

Lack of gasoline and tires has ended private motoring; lack of coal and the doubtful practicability of peat as a substitute fuel have dislocated the whole transport system. Clothes are rationed, gas for cooking and lighting is turned on only a few hours each day, and certain foodstuffs—tea, bacon, butter, etc.—

¹ Based on a memorandum of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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are becoming increasingly short in supply and have been rationed for some time. Bread, as the result of a good wheat harvest, is less scarce than expected, but it, too, is rationed. In general, the rationing system itself has been carelessly planned, and an enormous black market flourishes unhampered throughout the country.

Northern Ireland

Save for the fact that service in the Armed Services and in Civil Defense remains voluntary, Northern Ireland's war effort is similar to that of the rest of the United Kingdom. All controls—such as rationing of gasoline, food, and clothing—apply in Northern Ireland as in Great Britain, and to all outward intents, Northern Ireland is fighting as much of an "all-out" war as England itself. Actually, however, this is not altogether true; large Roman Catholic and Nationalist groups in Ulster oppose British rule, and therefore disassociate themselves from a war they regard as "England's fight." Moreover, Irish Republican Army (I. R. A.) men and pro-Axis subversives are working in both Eire and Ulster to create trouble among the American and English forces in Ulster and to alienate the Irish people from the Allied cause.

The anti-war attitude of Roman Catholic and Nationalist groups has resulted in growing political unrest and constant outbreaks of strikes among carters, dockers, and munition workers. However, these disturbances still do not represent a majority desire to abolish partition or to give up British rule (pro-British elements still compose more than two-thirds of the population). These disturbances are rather a sign of general dissatisfaction with the Government's attitude toward labor, industrial, and unemployment difficulties.

I. R. A. Activities

As for the I. R. A. and other subversive groups, their strength has been estimated at 5,000 men, but this number is probably exaggerated, and does not take into consideration their constant flow back and forth across the Eire border, nor the internment of numerous I. R. A. members, both in Belfast and in Dublin.

The extent to which the I. R. A. is aided and abetted by Axis agents operating from the German Legation in Dublin is not accurately known; but the I. R. A.'s recent tactics are certainly reminiscent of those used by the Nazis elsewhere. British soldiers are told that the American troops, because of their higher pay, are stealing the Britishers' girls, and are causing a rise in local prices. Fights are promoted in pubs; and political, religious and social differences are constantly being turned into points of friction. I. R. A. activities have not stopped at propaganda. Throughout Ulster, constables, civilians, and soldiers have fallen victim to I. R. A. gunmen.

The climax of the I. R. A.'s campaign of violence came on September 2, 1942, when a manifesto was circulated in Belfast. This manifesto, besides stating the I. R. A.'s intention to carry on continuous warfare against the British forces and the Ulster police, also declared that it would wage this war against United States forces so long as they insist on remaining on Irish soil. Since this outbreak, the Royal Ulster Constabulary has been rounding up several hundred suspects, searching Catholic homes, and seeking out caches of arms hidden away in the mountains of Northern Ireland.

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For the President

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THE WAR THIS WEEK

The Soviets have closed the pincers about the German Sixth Army between the Don and Volga Rivers, but the southern arm remains relatively weak and inadequately supported against a strong enemy counterattack.

While the Allies are apparently consolidating their present positions in Tunisia, the Germans continue to reinforce their bridgehead with considerable rapidity. Enemy forces may number more than 35,000 in that area, and German air power has been notably strengthened—a situation suggesting that the Axis may now intend a major defensive stand in Tunisia. Meanwhile Rommel is executing a strategic retreat from El Agheila, along the exposed Libyan highway. If Rommel retires to the Buerat-Misurata region, he will have greatly eased his own supply problem and rendered that of the British correspondingly more difficult.

As Allied forces continued to narrow the hold of the Japanese on the beaches about Buna, the enemy boldly made a fresh landing some 45 miles to the northwest, aimed perhaps at diverting Allied strength and increasing the security of Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua.

The Soviet Pincers Close

Near Marinovka, on the Don bend-Stalingrad Railway, the Russian pincers have now closed, entirely surrounding the German Sixth Army between the Don and the Volga. But the contact between the broad northern arm and the relatively weak and poorly supplied southern arm remains unstable, and the Soviet triumph is by no means complete. While the Russians have maintained the offensive in Stalingrad itself, the invaders have made every effort to rescue their 20 or more entrapped divisions—by counterattacking against the northern pincers from the upper part of the Don

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bend, and against the southern pincers from the Kotelnikovo railhead. In the latter sector, the supply situation favors the Germans. For supplying the Sixth Army the invaders are apparently using large numbers of Ju-52's flying at high altitudes. The Russians report taking a heavy toll of these three-motored transports, and add that the Nazis are pressing all available planes into service, including mail carriers.

Similarly on the central front, the Russian drive below Rzhev toward Beli suggests that Rzhev itself may soon be completely isolated. Even if that should occur, however, the fall of the German outpost would not be inevitable, and Rzhev might offer a most effective "hedgehog" defense. Already the Nazis are counterattacking vigorously, especially in the Velikie Luki sector, where they have themselves encircled some Russian units southeast of Toropets.

The eight-day bombing of Murmansk, culminating in an unusually heavy attack on the tenth, suggests that the Germans will make strenuous efforts this winter to interdict the Allied supply lines to the north. Along the Don south of Voronezh, the Russians have staged a successful attack against an Italian-held sector. On the Caucasus fronts, the Red Army has maintained the initiative.

The Russian Press Warms Toward Its Allies

Concomitant with the recent Soviet successes, the Russian press and radio have been referring in friendly terms to Britain and the United States and explicitly calling them "Allies." The second front is no longer a subject of criticism, while the Russians apparently view our African campaign as the prerequisite for a continental landing. The *Moscow News*, an English language semi-weekly, has published articles denying that the Soviet Union is dissatisfied with our African venture, praising the North American medium bombers which have reached the Eastern Front, and describing the "ever-increas-

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ing stocks" of medical supplies, food, and winter clothing sent as gifts to the USSR.

Retrospect on Finnish Policy

In reviewing the events of the past year, an observer of the Finnish scene finds few alterations in policy. The chief accomplishment of American diplomacy, he feels, was our success in keeping the Finns from attacking Soroka or indeed anywhere else along the line. Aside from that, however, our diplomatic messages have impressed the Finns far less than our actions, and our rupture of consular relations had more effect than all our protestations.

As "realists," our observer continues, the Finns have little faith in the Atlantic Charter. To induce them to withdraw from the war, Britain and the United States must give them food, a satisfactory peace settlement, and guarantees against Soviet aggression (including a proviso that no Russian troops will enter the country). Meanwhile, the Finns still regard the Continent as impregnable and the Nazis as invincible—Allied successes in Africa being too far away to have much bearing on the northern front. As for actual military operations, our observer continues, the Finns, who now have all the territory they want, feel aggrieved every time the Russians break the informal truce that has been in effect for the better part of the year.

Certain evidences of an independent Finnish line have appeared in the past month. The Nazi censors are permitting Finnish newspapers to publish Allied communiqués—so long as pro-Axis captions appear above them. Furthermore, despite the efforts of local superpatriots, several Finnish youth organizations have resisted reorganization on a totalitarian basis. The Finns, our observer concludes, are now groping to discover how they can save their country if their Nazi support collapses.

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Change of Command in Germany

The replacement of General Franz Halder by General Kurt Zeitzler as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and the appointment of General Hans Jesschonnek and Admiral Kurt Fricke as Chief of the Air and Navy Staffs, respectively, have aroused newspaper speculation in this country about a supposed conflict between Nazis and "Junker" generals. Halder, however, was no Junker, and had never enjoyed high official favor, having failed to find a place on the list of generals promoted to the rank of field marshal after the fall of France. His successor, although an intimate of Himmler, head of the Gestapo and the SS, is not merely a politician, but has served as a regular Army officer since 1926. While the exact political and military significance of these changes is as yet unclear, the appointment of Zeitzler apparently represents a certain gain in power for the SS at the expense of Army careerists.

Operations in Tunisia

Although the weather is now improving, mud and heavy rains restricted land and air operations in Tunisia during most of the week. The movement of vehicles has been confined to roads, and in the forward area many of these were not usable. After the heavy losses in mechanized equipment suffered at Tebourba, the Allies were apparently consolidating their present positions, trying to move reinforcements and supplies to the forward area, and laying the basis for an expansion of air activities. German infantry and tank columns made three attacks on Medjez el Bab on December 10 and 11, and another attack southward from Mateur on the Allied spearhead. All attacks were repulsed. Subsequently the enemy has attempted infiltration around Medjez el Bab.

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A small enemy force also reoccupied Pont du Fahs to the southeast.

Farther south, small opposing forces continue to move for control of minor junctions on the east-west roads. The enemy is reported to be holding Kairouan, Djebel Krechem, and other such points with forces ranging from 200 to 800 men.

Air warfare has followed the familiar pattern, but operations have been limited by the weather. The Axis has concentrated on Allied ports, shipping, and the communications center at Souk el Arba, the Allies on shipping, airdromes, and harbor and storage facilities in Tunis and Bizerte. The rain and mud enhanced the Axis advantage of possessing the only all-weather airdromes in the forward area.

The Allied Problem in Tunisia

The Axis is still reinforcing its Tunisian bridgehead. Its shipping losses have been costly, but it is apparently getting through a number of small boats. Air transportation has been on a large scale. Escorted flights of 20 to 30 Ju-52's seem to be taking place with some regularity, and 6-engine transports with a capacity of eighty men are also in use. Total enemy forces are believed to number more than 35,000 men, with about 17,000 German troops in the Tunis-Bizerte region. The latter are reported to include advance elements of the 10th Panzer Division, formerly in France. Reports also continue of heavy German troop and train movements into Italy.

The Axis has concentrated a powerful air armada in Sardinia, Italy, and Sicily, increasing the number of German planes here by several hundred. This concentration, together with Rommel's withdrawal and the steady growth of Axis

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strength in Tunisia, suggests that Berlin is planning a major defensive stand in Tunisia.

The best general explanation of the Allied problem in Tunisia came in Secretary Stimson's release of last Saturday. After the prompt cessation of conflict in Algeria and Morocco, light forces raced ahead into Tunisia in spite of the fact that we had not had time for adequate preparation of air bases and lines of supply. This had to be done in an effort to deny the Germans the chance to gain control of Tunisia. The step by step foundations for our military operations are now being laid, and the real fighting thus lies ahead.

The ultimate objectives, Mr. Stimson said, were plain: "First, to expel or destroy Axis power in Tunisia; second, when that is accomplished, to attack Tripoli and destroy Rommel by getting in behind him; and third, finally to control, in conjunction with Great Britain coming from the other end, the entire North African coast and make the Mediterranean a safer line of communications with the Mid-East."

Rommel Withdraws in Libya

In contrast to press reports, the Axis withdrawal from El Agheila began as a strategic retreat with which British forces for a time lost contact. The enemy evacuated his advance positions east of El Agheila on December 13. Italian units had previously moved westward, and the large amount of movement observed suggests that the withdrawal may have been under way for several days. British infantry brigades, working their way through extensive minefields, had reached a point 40 miles west of El Agheila on December 16. At the same time, another British force advancing from the south cut off part of the retreating enemy, including some Panzer elements, 20 miles farther west. Allied air forces have steadily bombed and strafed the retreating forces.

Observers suggest that Rommel halted at El Agheila to

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rest and reorganize his forces pending Germany's decision regarding reinforcement. Unusually strong natural positions were available here, especially at a point about 20 miles west of the town where the inland salt marsh extends to the coast, traversed only by the Libyan highway. Here Rommel would probably have made a stand, if the High Command in Berlin had decided to reinforce him, or if he had seen any opportunity for a counterattack. But if German higher strategy decided to concentrate reinforcement in the Tunisian bridgehead, Rommel could ease his own supply situation and lengthen British lines by withdrawing to the Buerat-Misurata region (see map, *The War This Week*, November 19-26). He could thereby relieve his fuel shortage, perhaps triple the effectiveness of his motor transport, and gain use of the road network and air bases of the Tripolitan area. Here also it would be more difficult for the British to amass the supplies needed for a knockout offensive, 500 miles from Benghazi and 700 miles from the railhead near Tobruk.

The primary strategic feature of the region between El Agheila and Misurata is the absence of any available line of movement other than the great Libyan coastal highway. The terrain to the southward is totally unsuited to any heavy motor transport. This means Rommel's entire Army—if it is to withdraw to the west—will be exposed to Allied air attack on a road 23 feet wide. But the pursuing forces must pass the same continual bottleneck, and can probably be effectively delayed by efficient demolition of causeways and bridges along the road. There are five major concrete bridges between El Agheila and Misurata.

It seems doubtful that the Axis would withdraw this Army west of Tripoli, an act which would make that port available as a base to which the Allies could ship abundant supplies accumulated in Egypt. This opinion is confirmed by the

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movement eastward from Tripoli of Italian forces (which may consist largely of native units). Rommel's present forces are estimated at about 16,000 Germans, 20,000 Italians, 100 tanks and 140 planes.

Vichy: Collaboration and Its Results

As Vichy has settled down to serious collaboration with the Nazis, recent decrees have provided for the delivery of all arms, with heavy penalties for their transport, sale, or loan; have restricted the freedom of movement of French and foreign Jews; have extended the corporative organization of economic life; and have regulated concentration camps, imposing harsh punishment on those aiding prisoners to escape. According to Chilean diplomatic sources, German sailors have already appeared in southern France—presumably as prospective crews for the ships at Toulon that escaped destruction.

In reply to these measures, passive resistance has again become marked. At Marseille, reports of the first dock fires in many months suggest the outbreak of sabotage against Nazi arms shipments. In Alsace, the Strasbourg press has complained of the appearance of inscriptions vilifying the Germans and praising De Gaulle, the RAF, and the United States. Observers in Switzerland regard the Marshal's leadership as completely discredited with the French people, and Darlan's potential following as negligible compared with that of De Gaulle. Inside France, our informants state, the man in the street hardly knows the Admiral's name, which commands scant respect in any case. According to these observers, the French desire a union of De Gaulle, Darlan, and all other leaders in exile on the basis of a simple program for defeating the Germans, while following President Roosevelt's suggestion of leaving to the French people the organization of the future government of the country. Mr. Roose-

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velt, our informants conclude, enjoys the complete trust of the French: personal appeals like his radio address of November 8 will find a heartfelt response.

Darlan Explains His Position

Nothing as yet indicates that American explanations about the Darlan affair have reassured the French public, according to one observer in Switzerland. Two days ago, the Admiral himself joined in the chorus of reassurance, advocating a "maximum military effort" against the Axis and the "unity of all citizens, regardless of their political or religious opinions." While promising that "the French people themselves will decide freely the form of government and national policy they desire," Darlan claimed that he had liberated all United Nations sympathizers in North Africa. It is still too early to estimate the effect of this announcement. To judge from the Brazzaville radio, however, which has expressed surprise that Darlan did not declare himself a defender of democracy and the Third Republic and has again denounced the Admiral as a traitor, the Fighting French are still unreconciled.

Moroccan Miasma

In Morocco, the French official behavior toward the American occupying forces is "incomprehensible", according to a confidential neutral report, and is characterized not so much by enthusiasm as by confusion and a passive acceptance of *faits accomplis*. While the American authorities have reposed confidence in the French officers who opposed their landings, pro-Ally officers remained in custody long after our invasion. Members of the Vichy Legion have continued to wear their insignia, and Pétain's portrait is still publicly displayed.

From other sources, we learn that the position of the Moroccan press, controlled almost entirely by the former collaborationist Pierre Mas, is undermining American pres-

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tige: *Radio Maroc* has been broadcasting Vichy propaganda. In the Spanish zone, all the French consuls threaten resignation, with the exception of the consul at Melilla, whose pay the Moroccan Residency has not cancelled despite his continued allegiance to Vichy. Although these consuls are not granting visas to Italians desiring to return to the French zone, the border guards apparently permit them to pass unhindered. Former collaborationists and persons evading military service in French Morocco have likewise been able to slip out across the frontier. At least one French general has advised a zealous young officer not to be over-anxious about offering his cooperation to the United States.

Faced with these contradictions, a pro-American French official has expressed himself as completely disillusioned in his hope that Noguès might serve as a bridge between the Fighting French and former Vichy adherents in North Africa. Noguès' equivocal attempts to maintain himself in the favor both of Vichy and the United States, our informant feels, reflect his long residence in the treacherous atmosphere of Morocco. French reactionaries in North Africa will grow bolder the more they see themselves assured of Noguès' tacit support, and defeatism among the people may replace the present sympathy for the United States. Our informant concludes that the only way to check the progressive deterioration of the Allied political position in Morocco would be the prompt organization of a government-in-exile uniting De Gaulle, Giraud, and the less dangerous of the former adherents of Vichy.

Spain's Position in the War

An agreement has been reached with General Orgaz, the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, on measures to avoid any incident along the border. Fully aware of Nazi

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efforts to cause trouble between the French and Spanish Zones—and thereby detain Allied troops in Morocco—Orgaz suggested an agreement providing that no troop movements be made near the border and that no reinforcements be made in a zone farther back. He was reported to be highly gratified at Noguès' acceptance of these terms.

The Axis is apparently continuing its war of nerves with regard to Spain's position in the war. Although recent observation showed no troop movement in the Port Bou and other areas, the Nazis have taken over complete control of a 40-kilometer strip along the French Pyrenees frontier, according to reports. Axis propaganda is also pointing up and widely publicizing Spain's own defensive measures. Meanwhile, a review of Iberian policy will undoubtedly take place when the Spanish Foreign Minister, Jordana, makes a state visit to Lisbon in the coming week.

Pro-Ally Leanings in Turkey

The Turkish Foreign Minister has indicated to various foreign envoys in Ankara that Turkey is now sure the United Nations will triumph; that she would mobilize completely if the *Wehrmacht* crossed the Pyrenees; and that, if Allied successes continue, Turkey might in the spring or summer of 1943 deviate from her past policy of absolute neutrality. A Turkish military spokesman, echoing these views, has also pointed out the contribution Turkey has already made in our darker days by resisting Nazi demands and blocking off the Nazis from the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby giving the Allies some freedom of movement. The Turkish Government has lately begun a meticulous survey of enemy espionage activities, which has already led to several arrests.

These developments are reported to have caused Von Papen to inform his Government that Germany can no longer be certain of Turkish neutrality. Although Numan Bey assured

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Von Papen that Turkey would enter the conflict only if her fundamental interests required it, Von Papen is said to fear that the pressure of Allied successes "might become irresistible," if they continue. A Turkish source has apparently indicated that one reason why Turkey might eventually enter the war when our victory appears certain, would be to take a stand in Bulgaria and at the peace table to forestall any possible Soviet designs on the Bosphorus.

The Turks are still anxious not to provoke the Germans, however. They suspended the newspaper *Vatan* for trying to run an American broadcast to Turkey together with a picture of Charlie Chaplin and Jack Oakie impersonating Hitler and Mussolini. But the Government's most immediate concern seems to be with its declining internal prestige, resulting from fiscal and economic problems, particularly high prices and the food shortage.

German Movements Into the Balkans

German troops have been steadily moving into the Balkans in recent weeks, according to a number of reports reaching Ankara. These indicate three to five German divisions in Greece and from two to four German divisions in Yugoslavia. Most of the recent arrivals are understood to be tired and lacking fresh equipment, and appear to have been moved from the Stalingrad front. The number of German troops stationed in the Aegean Islands has apparently not increased substantially. Sizable German forces have been in Crete for several months, including an entire parachute division. The recent German movement seems to be primarily defensive in character.

Riots in Iran

Tehran was torn by riots on December 8. Following a bread demonstration of school children led by their teachers

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before the capitol, milling crowds gathered and pillaged food stores, broke windows, and damaged the residence of Premier Qavam before police and military authorities were finally called out. Several were killed and many wounded. Although Iran's food crisis is at the basis of the unrest, the immediate disorders were apparently aided and abetted by the Shah and an Army faction who wanted to oust the present Premier and establish a military regime subservient to the monarch. Seemingly this group was responsible for the failure of the police to quiet the riots more promptly. Other political groups, a youth organization, and some editors and legislators also participated in the demonstrations, which spread to include acts against the Legislature and against the English.

Assured of British backing, Premier Qavam refused the Shah's requests to resign, and the British Ambassador took a firm line with the Shah. The Ambassador apparently insisted on dissolution of the obstructionist legislature, full investigation of the riots, compensation for people who suffered damage, dismissal of corrupt and pro-German officers, the strict enforcement of laws against hoarding, and the setting up of a new ministry under Premier Qavam. With regard to the critical wheat question, the British envoy, it is reported, questioned the Shah's right to expect wheat until Iran adopted a more friendly attitude.

British policy on the wheat issue and the arrest of the Governor General of Isfahan as a Nazi conspirator, without consulting the Persian Government, have apparently caused native suspicion of British pressure aiming at more complete military and political control at Tehran. British authorities have, however, taken measures to move wheat to Iran, and are hopeful that transfers of grain can be effected from parts of the country now occupied by the Red Army. Stalin is reported to be anxious to give the Irani a square deal, and to have categorically promised to withdraw every man of the

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Red Army when peace is restored. At present the Soviet troops in Iran have excellent discipline and are causing a minimum of trouble.

At Tehran a precarious quiet now prevails, with Premier Qavam negotiating to form a new government. The Irani clearly feel that the Allies regard their country as little more than a convenient military highway. Their spokesmen have indicated that small shipments of food and other necessities could go far toward winning Persian support and good will.

Fresh Landings in New Guinea

Allied troops have pressed in upon the remaining Japanese positions in the Buna area, but the enemy has succeeded in establishing a new beachhead about 45 miles to the northwest in the neighborhood of Cape Ward Hunt. The new landings were made in the face of heavy counter action by our aircraft, but the first wave of landing craft—carrying perhaps 1,000 troops—is reported in news dispatches to have gotten ashore intact. The two enemy cruisers and three destroyers from which the landings were made sustained no direct hits, and all were able to leave the scene of battle after disgorging their troops and supplies. The main fire of our aircraft was directed against the latter, and casualties inflicted on enemy personnel are reported to have been heavy.

The area in which the landing was made—between the Kumusi and Mambare estuaries—is thinly settled and alternates between dense forest and swamp. The beach offers the only coastal trail to Buna, and it is crossed by many streams and lagoons which would impede travel. From the mouth of the Mambare there is a trail system which leads inland to Ioma, whence other trails lead to Buna—a round-about journey of more than 100 miles.

While it is unlikely that the Japanese could hope from this region to make a land attack designed to relieve Buna, they

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may have expected to divert some Allied strength from the present battleground. More likely—having given up their forces on the Buna beachhead—their intention is to increase the security of bases at Lae and Salamaua and to keep alive the campaign in the Papuan jungles. The enemy's desire to keep the Pacific war centered in jungle areas (where—except in the air—machines and mechanical skill are less at a premium than individual fanaticism and small appetites) is quite understandable.

The Situation at Buna

Allied capture of Buna village has widened the wedge driven last week between Japanese forces entrenched in the Buna-Cape Endaiadere area (site of Buna Mission) and those still holding out at Sanananda and Cape Killerton. In the former area, the hardest fighting is proceeding across the open spaces of Buna's two landing fields—the "old strip" and the "new strip" (see map at back, with Appendix III). Turning inland from the beach, American troops have occupied the north edge of the "new strip" and are attacking enemy trenches at the west end. Other contingents are attempting to clear the Soputa-Buna trail, to which the Japanese have been clinging tenaciously. At Sanananda and Cape Killerton, Allied troops, attacking along the road from the south, have repulsed repeated enemy counterattacks and continue a slow advance, while Australians move down the beach from Gona. At Gona itself—occupied last week—more than 600 Japanese dead have now been counted, and the number of prisoners still appears to stand at 16. The bodies of the dead reveal that the Japanese were in good physical condition, despite the siege which preceded the final occupation of Gona; apparently the Japanese did not suffer from a shortage either of supplies or ammunition. At Buna, however, enemy aircraft continue to drop some supplies by

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parachute, suggesting that here our aerial blockade may have had more telling effects.

Activity in the Solomons

In the Solomons, a force of 11 Japanese destroyers was attacked off the New Georgia group of islands on December 11 by our air and small surface craft. At least five were damaged by direct bomb hits, one was sunk by surface craft, a second probably sunk, and a third damaged. Reports do not indicate, however, whether supplies or reinforcements finally succeeded in getting through.

On the island itself, meanwhile, there has been little change. Our aircraft all week have bombed and strafed two new Japanese landing strips and other air facilities at Munda Point (New Georgia group), some 200 miles to the north of the airfield on Guadalcanal. The new facilities evidently are intended as bases for fighter-planes in the next full-scale attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal, where the enemy's inferiority in the air already has cost him heavily.

India: Extension of the Viceroy's Term

The extension of Lord Linlithgow's term as Viceroy of India has suggested that the British Government is planning no fundamental changes in its Indian policy. To this event, the Indian press has reacted in characteristic fashion, the British-controlled journals praising Lord Linlithgow's "sober but progressive policy", and the nationalists ridiculing the "repeated doses of 'expansion' of his Executive Council" indulged in by a Viceroy "who has agreed to stew in his own juice of repression and deadlock". A less extreme comment was that of the *Statesman*, which ascribed the extension to the "extraordinary difficulty of selecting a suitable qualified successor at this anxious time".

Shortly after the extension of the Viceroy's term, President

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Roosevelt announced the appointment of William Phillips as his personal representative "near the Government of India" with the rank of Ambassador.

New Conservative Leadership in Canada

The election of Premier John Bracken of Manitoba to the leadership of the Canadian Conservatives marks a party reorientation symbolized by the new leader's successful insistence that in future the party be called Progressive Conservative. At the Winnipeg Convention which elected Bracken, the former Conservative leader, Senator Arthur Meighen, convinced his own right-wing supporters that the Conservatives could never win another election unless they carried the agricultural west and that to do so they needed the undoubted political master of the west, John Bracken. Meighen was even willing to accept Bracken's low tariff views, although it is possible that right-wing Conservatives will balk at this change of policy.

While politically honest and personally sincere, Bracken has a firm belief in one-man government. Lacking a broad educational background, he offers a curious mixture of inherent conservatism and intellectual radicalism. Although he has largely outgrown the anti-American prejudices of his earlier years, he has retained, to a considerable degree, an instinctive distrust of the French Canadians. A former "dirt farmer" and president of the Manitoba Agricultural College, Bracken entered the provincial legislature in 1922, where as leader of the dominant Agrarian Party he was immediately chosen Premier. Subsequently he organized a coalition government including Progressives, Conservatives, Liberals, and the Canadian Commonwealth Federation.

Early this month, as a result of Bracken's decision to seek the conservative leadership, the C. C. F. withdrew its support. In fact, the urgency of the Conservative demand

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for Bracken's leadership was largely due to the growth of C. C. F. sentiment throughout the Dominion, particularly among ordinarily Conservative farmers. In the future, although the younger "progressive" Conservatives and the Old Guard under Meighen will probably both try to control Bracken, it is unlikely that he will be the tool of either faction. In time, however, Bracken might rally the support of left-wing Conservatives and right-wing Liberals to form a moderate Progressive Party. With the merger of the two old parties, the C. C. F. might then become the other major party in Canada.

State of Siege in Bolivia

Reorganization of Bolivia's cabinet on November 19 apparently has failed to solve the country's deepening political and economic crisis: President Peñaranda has now declared a state of siege. This decree may assist the Government in fulfilling its immediate commitments to the United States—among them several agreements with Standard Oil—but the fact that resort had to be made to such a drastic measure does not augur well for the regime's stability.

The C. G. T. Enters the Lists in Argentina

In Argentina, where President Castillo announced this week the continuance of that country's state of siege, a committee of the Argentine General Confederation of Workers (C. G. T.) has agreed to drop its stubborn aloofness to direct political action and has called for a conference of its affiliates "to launch a campaign against the pro-Hitler policies of Castillo." Rejecting the position of its now repudiated General Secretary, José Domenech, the new Executive Committee proposes to follow the example of its neighbor unions in Chile, which exert political pressure through the Chilean National Democratic Alliance. Active mobilization of the

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C. G. T.—whose 263,000 members represent over 75 percent of organized Argentine labor—should prove a most effective weapon, it is believed, in the current campaign of pro-Allied elements in Argentina seeking to align their country with the United Nations.

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APPENDIX I

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTROLS IN THE GERMAN
WAR ECONOMY¹

Until the spring of 1942, the German war economy operated under predominantly military controls. The *Wehrwirtschaftsamt und Ruestungsamt* of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, headed by General George Thomas, was largely responsible for over-all planning of war production. But the first Russian campaign revealed such serious defects in this organization of the economy—duplications and over-lappings of authority, a mounting volume of paper work, administrative bottlenecks, etc.—that in April and May, 1942, the Nazis began to overhaul the system. The military's sphere of control was definitely curtailed and civilian authority—in the person particularly of Herr Speer—was correspondingly enlarged.

Power Relationships

The reorganization has not, however, led to the establishment of one over-all supreme economic authority in Germany. Decisions on basic policy are reached by agreements between the major power groups which, in the order of their present importance, are: the Party, Industry, the Armed Forces, and the High Civil Service.

The rise in status of Industry, whose self-governing organizations have acquired their most substantial increment of power since the early days of the Nazi movement, is a salient feature of the reorganization. German business has now been thoroughly organized into functional economic groups and regional economic chambers. Every businessman now belongs to both units (which are operated on the *Führerprinzip*); in fact, the smallest workshop in the German economy is now fully integrated into a network of business agencies subject to directives from above.

The Party retains its measure of control over the economy by seeing to it that the key figures in government and industry are also leading Party members—Speer (Munitions), Sauckel (Labor), Funk (Economics), Backe (Agriculture), Reinhard (Finance), and, above all, Goering. This same system of personal union of Government and Party officials is repeated on the lower levels in the case of the presidents of the provincial economic offices, the trustees of labor, and the presidents and advisers of the economic chambers of the *Gaue* (who at the same time are also businessmen).

In general, the Party is less concerned with administration than with leading, driving, and manipulating the masses. Mass manipulation in particular has assumed prime significance as the demands made upon the German people have cumulatively increased during the past year. It was because the labor problem had become one of the most acute in the war economy that Sauckel and his band of Party Gauleiters took over control of the labor supply.

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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Cooperation between the Army on one hand, and Industry and Government on the other, is assured by the placing of high Army officers in responsible positions in the governmental and industrial hierarchy. During the past year, it is true, the number of officers so placed has declined markedly. Colonel Von Schell, Commissioner General for Motor Vehicles, was compelled to resign; and Lieutenant General Von Hanneken has left the Ministry of Economics for a post in Denmark. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the most powerful economic agents on the regional level are the *Ruestungsinspektoren* and *Wehrwirtschaftsinspektoren*—that is, officer-engineers who have received their training in the armed forces, even though they may now be subject to civilian authority.

Determination of Military and Civilian Requirements

Under the recent reorganization, final reconciliation between civilian and military requirements is the responsibility, not of the *Wehrmacht* command, but of two civilians: Walther Funk and Albert Speer. As Minister of Economics and as Commissioner General for War Economy, Funk enjoys supreme command over the civilian sector of the German war economy, having the power to appoint all the leading directors of the great business organizations. Speer, in his capacity as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, exercises effective control over the military sector. If Speer and Funk fail to agree on fundamental policy, the issue may be carried to Goering as chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich and chief of the entire war economy, or even, ultimately, to Hitler himself. Arbitration of this kind is, however, the exception—as a comparison between the number of rulings issued by Funk and Speer and the number issued by Goering makes clear.

The decree of May 30, 1942, established Speer's authority over arms production by splitting up the *Wehrwirtschaftsamt und Ruestungsamt* and placing the all-important *Ruestungsamt* under Speer's Ministry of Armaments and Munitions. The *Wehrwirtschaftsamt* remains under the supreme command of the Army, but its program of military requirements must be cleared through the *Ruestungsamt*, and even some of its officer personnel (officer-engineers, economic officers, and munitions inspectors) are subject to Speer's orders as well.

Demands for matériel which originate in the various branches of the armed services are first sent to the *Wehrwirtschaftsamt* which, by setting up a balanced program of requirements, seeks to eliminate competition between these rival claimants. From here, this program is transmitted to the *Ruestungsamt*, where it is considered on the purely economic level and adapted to raw material and labor resources and to the productive capacity of German industry. No branch of the armed forces can assert any demands which have not been sanctioned by this controlling body. The *Ruestungsamt* under Speer, therefore, is revealed as the central, directing agency of German arms production.

As an addendum to Speer's power, it should be noted that in the Ministry of Munitions there has been set up a special department entrusted with the expansion of armament plants (*Ruestungsausbau*) with regional offices (*Aussenstellen*) which carry out the policies of the Ministry in each army corps area.

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Contract-Letting

The letting of war production contracts under the present German economy is governed by two factors—prices and technical conditions of production.

(a) *Prices.* For government orders, cost-plus prices no longer exist, but are either uniform, group, cartel, or administrative prices. If the *Wehrmacht* requires goods subject to cartel prices (as with cement or coal) or administrative prices (as with leather or cloth), the government is compelled to pay them; but since combat material is not priced in this way, this is the exception rather than the rule. Uniform prices are established for one article (or a part of it) and are valid for every producer in the territory of the Reich.

But if, owing to variation in production costs, uniform prices cannot be set, group prices are fixed which take into account these differences. When such group prices are determined for a specific article, the producer may choose which group unit he desires to join: that is, if he is a high-cost producer he will probably join one of the lower-rated groups, in which he will receive a relatively high price but a low priority on materials, no tax-exemptions, etc. If he can join a higher group, his price may be lower, but he will run less risk of being shut down for want of materials; and he may suffer less from the excess-profits tax and other levies.

Uniform and group prices are fixed by a working committee (*Arbeitsstab*), which is a kind of liaison committee between the Reich Price Commissioner and the Ministry of Munitions. It is interesting to note that no industrialist is represented in the *Arbeitsstab*.

(b) *Technics.* The determination as to who is to produce and how the article is to be manufactured is in the hands of Speer and the industrial organizations proper. These organizations, representative of industry, are the so-called Main Committees (*Hauptausschusses*) and Industrial Rings (*Industrieringe*). These Main Committees and Industrial Rings are represented at the center of affairs in the Armament Council (*Ruestungsrat*), composed of five high army officers and eight industrialists, which serves as an advisory body to Speer. The Main Committees, made up chiefly of engineers, operate on a regional and local level and may be considered as agencies whose prime function is to rationalize war production. The Industrial Rings are national organizations, also composed of engineers, whose function it is to standardize the production of such commodities as are used in a variety of military articles. If, for example, a cog-wheel is used in tanks, trucks, and other armored vehicles, it is they who design its type and construction.

Contracts may be placed either directly with an industrial firm, or indirectly through a national peak cartel (*Reichsvereinigung*). If directly, the contract is concluded between the Ministry of Munitions and the firm, but only after the Main Committee or the Industrial Ring pronounces the firm's technical equipment satisfactory. If the contract is placed with a peak cartel, the cartel in turn allocates the order to one or more of its members, at its own discretion.

Once a contract has been awarded, subcontracting and farming out are left to the prime manufacturer, who furnishes both the designs and the raw materials. There are, however, certain cases in which the Ministry of Munitions deals directly with pools of small manufacturers, especially in the case of goods designed for both civilian and military consumption, such as uniforms and boots.

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Scheduling and Allocation of Raw Material

No precise information is available on actual scheduling. The method applied, however, may be inferred from the system by which raw materials are allocated. The methods now employed were established in the summer of 1942. At that time the center of gravity was shifted from the *Reichsstellen*—which were government bureaus for the control of raw materials—to the organizations of the industrialists. The new quota system employed in the iron and steel industry may serve as a fair example.

A limited liability company (*Ruestungskontor*), organized in the Speer Ministry, has established a clearing department (*Verrechnungstelle*) which opens an account for each of the agencies that order iron and steel. The firms that use iron and steel draw upon their accounts by means of "iron checks" (*Eisenscheine*), which are certified by the clearing department. With this transaction the intervention of the government agency ceases: the remaining transactions are exclusively private in character. The owner of an "iron check"—which is a kind of draft upon his raw materials account—issues on his own responsibility "iron-transfer-checks" (*Eisenebertragungsscheine*) to his subcontractors up to the total amount of the quantities to be supplied.

Accounts are established on a quarterly basis. Each "iron check" contains a note indicating the holder's prospective requirements for the ensuing quarter. If an order exceeds an entrepreneur's quota for the current quarter, a sufficient quantity of iron and steel is reserved for him to enable him to meet his commitments. Since entrepreneurs are thus given only quarterly quotas, and are held to strict account for additional supplies, hoarding of steel becomes almost impossible.

What is decisive, of course, is the manner in which the accounts or quotas with the clearing department are set up. This was formerly the duty of the Commissioner General for Iron and Steel, Lieutenant General Von Hanneken. Since he was sent to Denmark, his functions have been transferred to the peak cartel, the Iron and Steel *Reichsvereinigung*. Briefly, therefore, it is the iron and steel monopolies that allocate the quotas, which, in turn, are handled as accounts.

As indicated above, production schedules are set ordinarily for three months, on the basis of a production plan drawn up by the Ministry of Munitions according to those military requirements specified by the *Wehrwirtschaftsamt*. The Minister of Munitions transmits this plan—which determines the amount of raw material to be allocated for this period—to the *Ruestungskontor*.

The Allocation of Labor

Supreme authority for the allocation of labor is vested in the Commissioner General for Labor Supply, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel. Sauckel's office has been superimposed upon the Ministry of Labor, upon the trustees of labor who fix wages and determine labor conditions, and upon the labor exchanges, which are the agencies that hire and fire and train and retrain labor. Until the regional armament commissions were set up, Sauckel used the local Gauleiters as instruments for the control of the trustees of labor and the labor exchanges. He has, however, no power to interfere with drafting for the army, although the *Wehrmacht* generally accepts the deferment recommendations of the labor exchanges.

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Within the scope of civilian labor Sauckel appears to be supreme in Germany and the occupied territories. Yet a careful perusal of the decree of March 14, 1942, appointing Speer as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, makes it quite clear that Speer has final authority over the raw materials and the labor required for armament production. It is quite probable, therefore, that Sauckel is bound by Speer's decisions. Obviously, military requirements come first, and Sauckel is there to see that the necessary labor is available. Concretely, this means that the Minister of Munitions informs Sauckel of the production plan for the next three months. Through his local agents Sauckel is in a position to discover whether sufficient labor is available. If there is not, he must take measures in conjunction with the regional armament commissions which will inform him which plants should be closed and which should obtain a larger supply of labor.

Relation between Central and Regional Agencies

While the decree of May 30, 1942, established in the *Ruestungsamt* an authoritative central agency for the control of German war economy, regional administration until recently presented a picture of considerable confusion. This confusion was due to the existence of a multiplicity of regional officials and bodies with ill-defined jurisdictions, and to the lack of authoritative control within the scope of regional administration. All previous efforts to introduce greater coordination among these regional agencies had failed completely. In the hope of remedying this situation, Goering established by his decree of September 17, 1942, the 42 regional armament commissions or *Ruestungskommissionen*. The chairman of these armament commissions are henceforth appointed by and responsible to the Minister of Munitions. By forcing all the organs of regional economic control, those of the state and army as well as the self-governing agencies of industry, into these commissions, Speer hopes effectively to centralize regional authority. The membership of these armament commissions embraces the following major agencies:

1. The munitions inspector (*Ruestungsinspekteur*) of the Munitions Ministry, the real representative of the interests of war production in the regional area. He is an army engineer and frequently the chairman of the armament commission. There are also the *Wehrwirtschaftsinspekteur* and the *Wehrkreisbeauftragter* representing both the *Wehrwirtschaftsamt* and the Ministry of Munitions. Clearly, both the Supreme Command of the *Wehrmacht* and the Ministry of Munitions are amply represented.
2. The armament chairman (*Ruestungsobmann*) representing the Main Committees of experts and the Industrial Rings. This chairman is an industrialist who must also be an engineer or a construction man. He controls the other chairmen of the committees of experts and rings in his district (*Besirksobmannen*).
3. The president of the provincial labor exchange (*Landesarbeitsamt*), operating under the authority of the Ministry of Labor.
4. The president of the provincial economic office (*Landeswirtschaftsamt*) operating under the authority of the Minister of Economics.
5. The president of the district economic chamber (*Gauwirtschaftskammer*) and his economic adviser (*Gauwirtschaftsberater*).
6. Whenever the need arises, the chairman of the armament commission may

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call in other officials, such as the presidents of the regional railway administration, the managers or leaders of the regional organizations of industry proper.

These armament commissions have complete authority over all the five agencies that are represented in them. By appointing the chairmen of these commissions, the Minister of Munitions can impose his will on all the regional agencies involved in the execution of the war production program. Should the orders of the armament commission conflict with policies established by other ministries, the regional office affected by such an order may appeal to the Minister of Munitions, who has the right of decision after consultation with the ministry to which such a regional office belongs. Such an appeal, however, cannot postpone the execution of the order.

One of the interesting features of the decree of September 17, 1942, is the fact that the old army corps areas (*Wehrkreise*) have been abandoned in favor of the Party Districts (*Gaue*) as the new administrative units. It is, therefore, the regional organization of the Nazi Party that provides the pattern for regional organization. The munitions inspectors, originally appointed for each army corps area, are now appointed for each one of the 42 Party Districts, or *Gaue*. The regional economic offices of the Ministry of Economics were adapted to the *Gaue* on November 1, 1942, and the provincial labor exchanges are soon to follow. The decree of April 20, 1942 had already abolished the prevailing chamber system in favor of the *Gau* economic chamber (*Gauwirtschaftskammer*).

Certainly, the decree of September 17 leaves no doubt about the sweeping powers of these armament commissions. They can order the provincial economic offices to close down any plant which they do not deem efficient. They can, through the *Gau* economic chambers, order business firms working on war orders to exchange trade secrets, technical information, machines, and machine tools. They can order the provincial labor exchanges either to grant or deny manpower to particular industrial firms. In this matter the armament commissions have absorbed the functions of the combing-out commissions, which have since been dissolved. By the same token, however, the power which the Party *Gauleiter* possessed over the provincial labor exchange appears also to have been nullified.

APPENDIX II

POLISH POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES¹

The arrival in this country on December 1 of Prime Minister Sikorski of Poland, and his recent activities here, have been interpreted by some liberal and leftist Polish circles in the United States as evidence that, apprehensive of a too strong post-war Russia and attentive to the criticisms which are being voiced in this country of his Russian policy, he has thought it wise to seek some measure of political reinsurance in the West.

The purpose of Sikorski's visit is stated officially to be military. He wishes to inspect our tank and plane production and to confer on lend-lease problems. It is understood that he is also concerned to obtain American as well as British help

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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in welding into a single military force the Polish elements which are now distributed in the British Isles, the Near and Middle East, and Russia.

The Prime Minister has gone out of his way to confer at some length with the President of Ecuador, and he plans now to make a special visit to Mexico. The purposes of the trip are not known, but it is widely rumored that, perhaps as part of his reinsurance policy, he is now trying to build up among the United Nations an anti-Russian, Catholic bloc. It is said, moreover, that he is, for this reason, not wholly displeased by criticism of his Russian policy on the part of Polish rightist elements in the United States and Great Britain.

At all events, the Prime Minister's visit has thrown into high relief the divergent forces that underlie Polish opinion in this country. These forces may be roughly classified for purposes of analysis into three main groups—the Right, the Center, and the Left.

The Right

This is, pre-eminently, the nationalistic bloc, stemming from the "Colonels" or "Sanacja" group which led Poland at the time of its defeat in 1939. Its opposition to the Sikorski Government-in-Exile came into the open after the signing on July 30, 1941, of the Russo-Polish pact which restored diplomatic relations between Russia and Poland and provided for future collaboration.

In May, 1942, a number of these rightists, who had come to the United States, inspired the presentation to President Roosevelt, by some 131 American citizens of Polish descent, of a memorandum directed against Russia's alleged designs on Eastern Poland; and in June, 1942, the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent (abbreviated from the Polish as "KNAPP") was organized.

The KNAPP is now a mounting political force, thanks in part to the organizing ability of its secretary, Ignacy Morawski, one of the editors of the *New York Nowy Swiat*. Morawski has been touring Polish communities and delivering fiery anti-Russian speeches. Through such activities and with the aid of the *Nowy Swiat* and the *Dziennik Polski* (two of the largest and most influential foreign-language dailies in the United States) the KNAPP has grown rapidly. Since June, some twenty new branches have been set up.

The outstanding intellectual in the rightist group is Colonel Ignacy Matuzewski, a Polish citizen who came to the United States shortly after the fall of Poland. As one of the "Colonels" he has a background of wide and varied experience in war, diplomacy, politics, and journalism. From 1929 to 1931 he served as Minister of Finance to the Polish Republic, and for several years he edited the official government organ in Warsaw, *Gazeta Polska*. Today he contributes what are generally agreed to be brilliant articles on political and military affairs to the *Nowy Swiat* and the *Dziennik Polski*.

The anti-Russian platform of the KNAPP makes it possible for the organization to appeal directly to the nationalistic element among Polish Americans. Arguing that Poland, prior to 1939, "embraced only a part of those territories which for centuries belonged to Poland", the KNAPP platform demands reconstitution of Poland *in toto*, with changes in the Polish-German frontier "which would give Poland security and freedom of economic development, primarily through the liquidation of Eastern Prussia". The KNAPP argument calls for recognition of

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the principle "that with the establishment of the new world order nothing shall be instituted without Poland or against Poland that concerns the territories situated about the tributaries of the Danube, Oder, Niemen, Dwina, and Narwa."

In addition to the "Colonels" group and the KNAPP, there is another extreme rightist element which looks for leadership to Dr. Tadeusz Bielecki, head of the Endek (National Democratic) Party and one-time member of the Sikorski Government-in-Exile. In Poland, Dr. Bielecki headed the reactionary Youth Movement wing of the Endek. He has become today one of the strongest opponents of Sikorski in London and has vehemently denounced those members of the Endek Party who have given their support to Sikorski. Through the monthly *Mysl Polska* (London), Bielecki and his followers carry on a campaign against the Pilsudski-ites as well as against the Sikorski-ites, both of whom they regard as "remnants of the regime which led Poland to catastrophe."

Bielecki is said to be represented in the United States by two members of the Endek Party, Prince Drucki-Lubecki and Romuald Gantkowski. Official Polish circles look upon Gantkowski as a military deserter on the ground that he failed to register with the Polish military authorities in Lisbon. Some assert that Drucki-Lubecki and Gantkowski work closely with Matuzewski and other members of the "Sanacja" group. Drucki-Lubecki and Gantkowski have centered their activities primarily on the Polish clergy in the United States, it is said, hoping thus to gain moral and financial support; they argue that Catholicism is endangered by the Sikorski Government's pro-Russian policy. Working toward the establishment of a Polish Catholic anti-Sikorski union in the United States, Gantkowski is alleged to have the private support of one or more officials of the Polish Information Center in New York.

The Center

This is represented primarily by the Polish American Council, which asserts that it speaks for some 4,000,000 Polish Americans. Its leadership supports the Sikorski Government, but declares that after final victory has been achieved, the people of Poland should themselves determine the character and composition of their government.

Among the organizations which compose the Council, by far the largest is the Polish National Alliance. Founded in 1879 in Chicago, the Alliance today has 2,300 branches in 26 states and a total membership of 275,000. Older by a few years than the Polish National Alliance, but not so large, is the Polish Roman Catholic Union. The Union has a membership of 180,000, centered primarily in Chicago. Other prominent Polish organizations with national headquarters in Chicago are the Polish Women's Alliance of America with 60,000 members, and the Polish Alma Mater of America with 16,000 members.

In the East, the important Polish organizations are: The Polish Union of the United States (40,000 members), the Polish Falcons (15,000), the Polish National Alliance of Brooklyn (15,000), the Polish National Union of America (10,000).

The Left

The principal strength of this fraction comes from the Polish Labor Group, the Communists, the Polish Section of the I. W. O., and to some extent from the

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Polish membership of the American Slav Congress. By and large, these leftist elements have supported the Government-in-Exile, particularly on its pact with Russia, although they would like to see the Left better represented in the Cabinet.

One of the more important figures on the Polish Left in the United States is Wladyslaw R. Malinowski. Mr. Malinowski is prominent in the Polish Labor Group in New York, which although officially unconnected with the Polish Socialist Party, appears to be its ideological counterpart in America. An affiliate of this organization is the American Friends of Polish Democracy, made up of American citizens headed by Professor Robert M. MacIver, the eminent sociologist. For some time, this affiliate has been publishing a bulletin entitled *Poland Fights*, to which Malinowski and his associates contribute. Although Malinowski and his friends are, on the surface, friendly to the Government-in-Exile, they are believed (as socialists) to stand fundamentally in opposition.

APPENDIX III
THE BUNA REGION¹

Australian and American troops, continuing their offensive across New Guinea, last week captured Buna village and pinned Japanese detachments against the sea (see map). Possession of the beachhead now in dispute appears essential to any plans the enemy may have for a renewed overland assault on Port Moresby; conversely, elimination of this threat by seizure of the coastal strip has become equally important to MacArthur's forces. The following are notes on the strategic geography of the Buna area.

Settlements

Buna itself, although the government headquarters station for the Northern Division of Papua, included in peacetime but three European-style buildings, several native-style structures, two white officials, and one white trader. The adjoining native settlements—Buna village and Siwori—had a population of scarcely 120 persons.

Eastward along the shore, for about a mile from Buna, stretches a government coconut plantation of about 200 acres. Four miles northwest of Buna, Sanananda (outlet for the government coffee plantations around Sangara) boasted at the opening of the war a coffee shed, rest-house, and two trading stores; from here a motor-truck road had been cut to the Sangara region to transport Sangara's coffee to the coast.

Gona and Eroro on the coast, and Sangara and Isivita in the interior, are stations of the Anglican Mission, with white missionaries normally in residence. As for the Sangara region, it contains quite extensive rubber plantings and some experimental sugar plots. Ten miles south of Buna, near the coast, lies the Wariwota Plantation, which raises rubber and coconuts.

Native settlements are quite numerous on the plains back of Buna and on the slopes of the range to the south; the region's native population totals about 9,000. These people, the "Orokaiva," far from being the head-hunters of the public's

¹ Based on a memorandum of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

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imagination, are a peaceful and friendly lot, accustomed to work on the plantations or in Papua's gold mines, with a game of soccer their only approved form of communal violence.

Airplane Facilities

Before the war, there was a small emergency landing-field a mile and a half southeast of Buna, and a somewhat better airfield at Kokoda (the former, together with a new landing strip nearby, has been the scene of recent fierce fighting). In addition, the grassy plains inland from Buna have flat areas capable of being turned quickly into large airfields, particularly in the Debuduru district. The strategic significance of airfields in this region is indicated by the following table of air distances from Buna:

	Miles
Port Moresby.....	105
Salamaua.....	147
Lae.....	167
Rabaul.....	400
Buka Passage.....	500

Terrain

The land around Buna barely rises above sea level; swamps are prevalent, especially between Buna and Sanananda, and back of Buna. Since so much of the terrain is waterlogged, fox-holes and trenches are often out of the question, and defenses must generally be built above ground. Where the ground is firmer, it is usually covered partly by forest and partly by rank *alangalang* grass, which grows about four feet high.

From Soputa, eight miles southwest from Buna, the land rises slowly to the undulating plains of the Sangara and Kumusi River regions. Southward rise spurs of the Hydrographers Range and Mount Lamington—the area through which the American forces moved in surprise attacks on the Japanese flanks.

The foreshore in the Buna region consists of a hard beach of brown sand, stretching almost unbroken for many miles to the northwest and southeast. Offshore lie extensive coral reefs and sandbanks—particularly opposite Buna and Cape Endiaderere. These have not been carefully surveyed; even captains of coastal vessels familiar with these waters prefer to anchor at night. No harbors exist, but channels in the reefs lead to reasonably sheltered anchorages at Sanananda, Gona, Oro Bay, and Buna, where boats drawing even 10 feet can approach within 50 yards of the shore. Smaller boats or barges can come right to the beach. For embarkation purposes, the Japanese would find the river-canoes of the natives not very serviceable; on the other hand, such an operation would be aided by December's generally calm weather.

Climate

The winter months of December, January, and February in the Buna region are usually the wettest of the year, precipitation averaging about 13 inches per month. Sudden squalls (the most tempestuous of which are known as "gubas") occasionally disrupt the general calm; at such times, rivers and streams are subject to quick flooding.


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Trails

The Buna region has an elaborate network of native trails, good and bad, and also several main government roads and trails. The truck route from Sanananda to the Sangara area is about 11 yards wide, and runs through forest and grass country. Buna settlement is the coastal terminus of the historic Port Moresby-Kokoka-Buna "road"—which is really a foot trail only. Another important trail leads from Buna southeastward to the airfield and on to Dobuduru. A coastal trail, which follows the beach, may in places be covered at high tide. The mouth of the Girewo River and the lagoons in this region are crossed either in native canoes or on foot at low tide; they form substantial obstacles for our troops advancing along the coast. Eastward this coast trail passes around Cape Endaladere, and a fair trail system continues right along from here to the Milne Bay area.

CONFIDENTIAL

BUNA AREA IN PAPUA



NUMBER 43

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

December 17-24, 1944

Printed for the Board of Directors

Copy No. 1

[Handwritten signature]

From MAP Room

DECEMBER 17-24, 1942

THE WAR THIS WEEK

The Soviet armies this week struck southward from the Boguchar area in an offensive which apparently aims at Rostov itself. Success for this drive would virtually nullify this year's German gains in the south and would menace the enemy with entrapment on a large scale. The attack faces difficulties, however, of a more serious character than those connected with the original offensive for the relief of Stalingrad. Meanwhile, current Russian attacks in the Caucasus may be the forerunner of large scale operations in an area where normal January weather lends itself to winter operations.

The retreat of Axis forces in Libya is now carrying Rommel rapidly toward the port of Tripoli. It remains to be seen whether he will attempt seriously to hold Tripoli or will push on to join forces with the Axis in Tunisia. In Tripolitania, the Axis faces mounting hazards to supply lines, with Allied control of the Mediterranean being steadily extended. The enemy has continued to reinforce its bridgehead in Tunisia and has consolidated a strong position which may well permit a prolonged resistance.

While the confusion over Darlan persists in North Africa and elsewhere, Laval is developing a single party in France.

In the Far East General Wavell has launched a limited offensive along the western coast of Burma, and an exceptionally large concentration of shipping at Rabaul may presage renewed Japanese activity in the Solomons.

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Second Break-Through on the Don

The Soviet offensive against the Italian-held sector along the Don, around Boguchar, can be far more decisive in its effects than the earlier pincers attack for the relief of Stalingrad. Last month's offensive apparently aimed simply to encircle the German forces between the Don and the Volga and to force the invaders to establish a new line west of the Don bend. In the current attack (which has already cut the Voronezh-Rostov Railroad at Kontemirovka, and has reached this strategic line on a broad front from Millerovo to Svoboda), the eventual goal is apparently Rostov itself, the base and communications center of the 300-mile salient reaching toward the Caucasus. Military observers have long argued that such an offensive, launched southward from the Soviet defensive area around Voronezh, would be the bold and logical way to cancel the German gains of 1942. In an area where the terrain offers few natural obstacles to a mobile advance, the Russians have recaptured dozens of towns and villages almost as fast as they fell to the Nazis last July.

Yet by striking at the heart of the German position in the south, the Red Army is attempting an operation far more difficult than the relief of Stalingrad. Between the Don and the Volga, the Germans held only two single-track railroad lines, which the Russians were able to cut with rapidly-moving advance columns. South of Millerovo, however, the Nazis have available the dense railway net of the Donets Basin, and a large number of industrial towns that offer shelter and communication far more adequate than those of the steppes farther east. As the Axis forces fall back on their supply centers and shorten their lines, their resistance will probably stiffen in inverse ratio to their distance from Rostov.

The German counterattack against the southern arm of the Stalingrad pincers already represents a major effort to strike

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back at the weakest point of the Soviet triple offensive. From a supply base at Kotelnikovo, this drive has advanced along the Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk railroad as far as the Aksai River, about 55 miles from Stalingrad. At the same time the new Soviet offensive has apparently diverted Nazi reinforcements previously destined for the northern loop of the Don bend, where enemy counterattacks have notably slackened. In sum, the new drive against Millerovo has considerably lessened the chances of escape for the German divisions within the Stalingrad pincers.

A Russian Caucasus Offensive?

In the Caucasus, the current Russian efforts to recapture the Malgobek oil fields west of Groznyi may represent the beginning of large-scale operations. Some military observers anticipate that by early next month Soviet progress along the Don may be decisive enough to warrant the opening of another major offensive from the south. In this sector, January weather, although ordinarily the coldest of the year, should not prove unfavorable to Soviet winter operations. Mean temperatures of several degrees below freezing, occasionally falling below zero, keep the ground hard and suitable for troop movements, while blizzards sweeping down from the northern steppes insure a few inches of snow cover the greater part of the time. Occasional thaws might, however, temporarily hinder operations.

On the central front, after a brief let-up last week, the Red Army has resumed its advance around Velikie Luki, while the enemy has counterattacked to defend the airport there. The Russians have likewise registered slight gains around Rzhev. On the Arctic front, a German attack in the Kandalaksha sector, where the invaders are only 30 miles from the Murmansk Railway, has suggested that the enemy may try to cut our lend-lease route. But in view of recent German

troop withdrawals, a major effort in this sector at present appears unlikely.

Departure of the American Minister from Helsinki

On the occasion of the American Minister's recent departure from Finland for consultation in Washington, both President Ryti and Foreign Minister Witting drew attention to Finland's economic dependence on Germany, while insisting that their country had no political ties with the Nazis. Finland's position as a small state, they explained, made it impossible for her to follow an independent line, and it was for the security of small nations that their country was most concerned.

While the Foreign Minister was vague about the future, President Ryti cautiously suggested that when the proper moment came he might take the initiative in ending the northern war, as he had done in 1940—the first time that a responsible Finnish statesman has made such a suggestion. The President further stressed Finland's democratic traditions dating from the Middle Ages, and hinted that his pro-Axis Foreign Minister might not remain long in power.

In brief, Finland's rulers apparently appreciate the political significance of our Minister's journey. The press, on the other hand, has optimistically announced that his departure is of no importance and that he plans to return soon. Among the Finnish public, some interpret the event as an indication of American displeasure, while wishful thinkers predict that our Minister's explanations of Finland's position will help improve relations between Helsinki and Washington.

The harsh reality of the Finnish position has again become apparent in a press announcement that Finland and Germany have decided to prolong their trade agreement until the end of 1943. As in previous years, the two countries will regulate their trade during the first quarter of 1943 on a temporary


basis, while negotiations for a final agreement will take place in Helsinki next February.

Axis Retreat in Libya

Rommel has continued his rapid withdrawal to the west, delaying the British by demolitions and extensive use of mines and booby-traps. At latest report the British had occupied Syrte and were moving on Bouerat-el-Soun without having encountered any serious opposition (see map). Most of the elements of the German 15th Armored Division trapped by the New Zealanders around Wadi Matratin were able to cut their way out to the southwest and rejoin the retreating forces, though with losses in guns, tanks, and trucks. Allied air forces have had almost unchallenged control of the air.

There is considerable speculation about the enemy's strategy in North Africa. British observers apparently feel that Rommel's primary concern is to move his army with minimum losses into Tunisia. This would eliminate the problem of a double supply line, and give the Axis a combined force of probably more than 70,000 men fighting under a single air umbrella, in a region close to air and supply bases in Sicily and Italy.

Other observers question whether the Axis can afford the immediate surrender of Tripoli and its airfields, which would enable the Allies to close the pincers on Tunisia. With this as a forward base, the British could avoid the tedious overland movement of supplies from Benghazi and Tobruk, and bring them by sea from Egypt. Admiral Cunningham has foreshadowed this development in his statement that the Allies now have full freedom of movement at both ends of the Mediterranean, and that Malta is being supplied without loss. Although there appears to be no position before Tripoli that Rommel can assume which cannot eventually be outflanked, a stand in defense of the Tripolitan area


might be made along a line running from the great salt depression northwest of Bouerat-el-Soun to Gheddahia and southwest along Wadi Zemzem. A final stand might be expected before Homs, west of which the Tripolitan road network and the coastal strip fans out to make defense more difficult.

In the final analysis the Axis may not be able to make a free decision. The pressure of Allied air and submarine attacks on the route from Italy past Malta to Tripoli may have made it impracticable for the Axis to supply Rommel in Tripolitania. Although air transport has been heavy, no ships are believed to have reached Tripoli last week and aviation gasoline was known to be going by truck from Gabès.

Axis Consolidation in Tunisia


Ground fighting in Tunisia has this week been limited to patrols and minor actions, as both sides have regrouped and strengthened their forces in the forward area. The enemy has been constructing defenses west of Tebourba; and extensive movement in the central sector around Pont du Fahs indicates that the enemy has now linked his outposts in a defensive front running roughly north and south along a line just west of the following points: Mateur, Tebourba, Pont du Fahs, and Kairouan. Pichon, 25 miles west of Kairouan, has changed hands three times this week, and is now held by an Allied (French) force. A concentration of enemy armored and motorized forces southeast of Medjez el Bab suggests that another enemy attack on this communications center is imminent.

The Axis has continued to reinforce its bridgehead. Air transport is reported to have been heavy, and shipping has reached Tunis and Bizerte despite the fact that, as Admiral Cunningham announced, the enemy is losing about a ship a day on this run. Reconnaissance also reveals that Allied

AXIS RETREAT IN LIBYA

- Paved Highway
- Improved Earth Road
- Motor Trail
- - - - Caravan Trail
- +++++ Railroad
- X X X Retreating Axis Forces
- ← British Drive
- Aerodrome
- Principal Landing Field
- - - - Intermittent Stream (Wadi)

0 10 20 30 40 50
MILES



air attacks have inflicted heavy damage on ships and port facilities in Tunis and La Goulette Harbors.

Reports of train and troop movements into Italy persist, but specific information is meager. Meanwhile it is clear that the Axis has exploited its advantage of air power and supply to consolidate a strong defensive position in Tunisia during the first two phases of the campaign—the phase of rapid advance by light Allied forces until the reverse at Tebourba, and the current period of Allied preparations for larger operations.

Clarification of the American Position in French Africa

Admiral Darlan's temporary status in French North and West Africa has received further clarification in the news that lend-lease aid for this area will be a purely military transaction under the control of General Eisenhower. Furthermore, an arrangement permitting the OWI to broadcast news programs from Rabat will doubtless help to eliminate the confusion created by pro-Vichy broadcasts over *Radio Maroc*.

At the same time, Darlan himself, in an apparent effort to combat any diminution of his authority, has declared to news correspondents that he intends to bring the French ships at Dakar and Alexandria into the struggle against the Axis. Whether the Admiral will be able to do this, however, is a matter of some doubt, since the decision about the vessels at Alexandria rests with Admiral Godefroy, the French commander there—apparently a most indecisive character. Up to now Godefroy and most of his officers have favored a policy of neutrality (the Admiral has characterized Pétain as a captive unable to issue orders), while the enlisted men have desired to reenter the war on the side of the Allies. All elements seem to agree in their pro-American attitude, and in their hostility to Britain and De Gaulle.

Evidently with British encouragement, the Fighting French have now invaded French Somaliland. The majority of the people have apparently favored cooperation with the Allies, while the higher officers and General Dupont (recently installed as governor by a coup d'état) have been reluctant to abandon their neutrality and technical allegiance to Vichy. Desertions to the De Gaullists have substantially reduced the number of troops at Djibouti.

Retrospect on Morocco

According to eye-witness accounts now reaching this country, the political situation in Morocco following our landings was confused and disturbing. Rioting between Jews and Arabs began almost immediately, while members of the Vichy S. O. L., after a short lull, resumed their hooligan operations against Fighting French and American sympathizers. French Army officers who had planned to take part in General Béthouard's pro-Ally coup, which had failed at the last moment through the quick action of Noguès, were so disappointed when they heard of their leader's arrest that some of them apparently planned to enroll a native militia for the release of Béthouard. Naval officers were sullen and uncooperative.

Except among a small pro-Vichy element and officers of the Navy, general disappointment greeted the announcement of the American negotiations with Admiral Darlan. Nor was the retention of Noguès any more popular. Many army officers accused the latter of misconduct as a soldier in withdrawing inland after directing his troops to resist the Americans. As a matter of fact, Noguès' administration adopted an uncooperative attitude, especially in the operation of public utilities. Secret orders (our accounts state) provided for the arrest of United Nations' sympathizers and directed that enemy agents be left at large.

Subsequently, with the cancellation of these orders, the dissolution of the S. O. L., and the liberation of Béthouard, the situation improved somewhat. The Navy, however, remained sullen, and the civil population kept comparatively calm only in the hope that President Roosevelt's announcement heralded the removal of Noguès and his clique. While the latter directed his followers to look on the Americans simply as invaders, French anti-aircraft batteries received instructions to shoot down no Axis aircraft. The current mobilization resulted in the relegation of pro-Ally sympathizers to interior outposts, and the installation of Vichy adherents in key positions. In other words, our accounts conclude, Noguès and his followers were so afraid that the Axis would attempt a counter-invasion that they avoided everything that might implicate them as collaborators with the United States.

Foreign Repercussions

A similar summary of reactions in London to the American arrangement with Darlan finds sentiment among various Allied officials unanimous in disapproval. British and Russians both oppose the arrangement, and both vigorously support the Fighting French in their conflict with the Admiral. The Russians especially, our summary continues, see in the American policy toward Vichy, Darlan, Franco, and Otto of Hapsburg, a consistent effort to reach an understanding with reactionary clerical groups in Western Europe. The Fighting French are drawing closer together, the National Committee in London having recalled two of its representatives who were to have gone to North Africa to negotiate with General Giraud.

Certain members of the Governments-in-Exile express the feeling that the moral principles of the United Nations cannot find expression in "immoral actions". Furthermore, they

██████████
declare that our country's first venture into European politics since our declaration of war sets a dangerous precedent, creating an impression harmful to American prestige and difficult to correct. Finally, our summary concludes, certain Allied statesmen fear that our agreement with Darlan does not correspond to any long-range expediency: whatever American lives it saved may be more than counter-balanced by the bloodshed of the French civil war that may be the logical result of our actions.

Toward Single-Party Rule in France

With the moral support of the Nazis and in cooperation with Déat, Laval is now developing a single party for France (which may bear the title *Gauche Moderne*), according to advices from neutral sources. A force of "shirts" of some sort is likely to be its inevitable adjunct. For manning this new organization, the two Fascist Legions, the "Tricolor" and the "African," will probably offer cadres; members of the now disbanded French Army will doubtless feel disinclined to join a frankly pro-Axis organization.

The announcement that Vichy will enforce the Nuremberg laws against the Jews, on the basis of race rather than religion, indicates that Laval is already at work buying Hitler's favor. Our informants further predict that by spring the Government will move to Paris, while Pétain will have his residence at Versailles. To ensure the maximum "cooperation" of Laval the Nazis are apparently planning to maintain Doriot as a chronic pretender threatening the present incumbent at Vichy.

The Iberian Bloc

While Hitler, Ciano, and Laval met to plot the future of Axis strategy in the Mediterranean, the Spanish Foreign

██████████
Minister journeyed to Lisbon to underline Iberian solidarity. Public pronouncements were cautious and vague to the extreme, but Jordana once again indicated that the principal concern of Portugal and Spain was to keep out of the present conflict.

The Spanish Government at the same time apparently toned down the grand reception planned by Party enthusiasts for General Muñoz Grandes, returning from his command of the Blue Division in its "crusade" on the Eastern Front. Personal rivalry rather than political considerations probably caused Franco to countermand the original order to play up Grandes' arrival; but Franco also undoubtedly wished to avoid any embarrassing "incident."

Mussolini's Party Changes

In an apparent move to tighten his control of the Party, Mussolini this week named a new national directorate of the Fascist Party. He appointed as vice secretaries, it is reported, Carlo Ravasio, Carlo Scorza, Alessandro Tarabini and Mario Farnesi—men who have been associated with Fascism from its early days. Observers note that in both Italy and Germany bombings and reversals have not resulted in any effort to appease dissident elements, but rather have brought an increase in the power of Party "dependables."

Limited Offensive in Burma

General Wavell's Indian troops this week began operations directed against Akyab, Japanese-held air and sea base on the western coast of Burma, about halfway between Calcutta and Rangoon. Akyab, on the Indian side of the land barrier formed by the Arakan Mountains, was occupied by the Japanese toward the close of their Burmese campaign in May. Its value to either side lies in its position as an

advance base for a combined sea and air attack—for the Allies, against Rangoon, and for the Japanese, against Calcutta. As an air base alone, its airfield offers some advantages to the side which holds it, although it has apparently been less used by the Japanese than other and drier bases in central Burma. Akyab has an unusually high average annual rainfall—196 inches—but with the end of the monsoon season, this disadvantage has largely disappeared.

In their advance along the jungle coast, the British troops so far have been impeded only by natural obstacles. A small contingent of Japanese holding the border towns of Buthidaung and Maungdaw withdrew the day before the British entered, and as yet there has been no contact with the enemy. The Japanese are thought to have no more than a single regiment in Akyab (where they are now hurriedly constructing beach defenses on Akyab Island); and the withdrawal of border units might be intended to reinforce this garrison until other Japanese troops could be brought up. This will be no easier for the Japanese than for the British, unless the sea is used, since the Japanese also must traverse difficult coastal terrain. A track and a dry weather road cross the Arakan Mountains from central Burma in this area, but both reach the seacoast considerably south of Akyab.

The move into Burma was hailed enthusiastically by publicists at Chungking, who saw in it the beginnings of "the great opportunity," but Allied spokesmen at New Delhi were quick to emphasize the limited nature of the operation.

Chinese anxiety to draw attention to this front—and to China's own efforts—continue to give rise in Chungking to accounts of "large-scale" operations directed against Yunnan Province. As yet the only factual basis for such reports is the mopping up operation being conducted by a Japanese regiment against Chinese elements which crossed the Salween

River in the Tengyueh sector (the Salween is the Japanese defensive line in western Yunnan).

Air Raid Over Calcutta

Allied observers have long feared that a Japanese air attack on the crowded industrial area around Calcutta would bring panic to the civilian population. When the Japanese finally struck early last week, damage was slight and casualties were few. During the first raid, on Sunday night, Calcutta's industrial population apparently gave little indication of fear, and work in the dock area returned to normal the next day. Monday night's attack, although apparently no more devastating in its results than the first one, caused a considerable exodus of port workers, and a certain falling off in port activities. Yet few industrial workers left the city, and the net effect of the raid was scarcely one of panic.

Controversy Over Indian Unity

Vigorous criticism has greeted a somewhat veiled statement by the Viceroy of India advocating the preservation of India's unity "in so far as it may be built up consistently with full justice for the rights and the legitimate claims of the minorities" and questioning whether the country can effectively "speak with two voices." Jinnah termed it a "statement of extreme wickedness," which would serve to encourage the Hindu majority and postpone the achievement of *Pakistan*. Dr. Ambedkar, representative of the Depressed Classes on the Viceroy's Executive Council, echoed the Moslem leader's views, while Rajagopalachariar characterized his own feeling as one of "sad amusement," and reiterated his conviction that an "Ulster phase" would be a necessary preliminary in the development of a free India.

The Viceroy's statement may reflect a certain change in British policy from the Cripps proposals of last spring. These proposals, which remain the authoritative declaration of the Government's intentions, anticipated the possible organization of a number of Indian dominions. Furthermore, the controversy over the current statement has drawn attention once again to the serious cleavage of views between Jinnah and some of the moderates, who advocate varying degrees of autonomy for Moslem areas, and the Congress and Mahasabha, predominantly Hindu parties, which favor guarantees for the minorities but no partition of India. Such a controversy can not fail to complicate the task of Sapru's group of conciliators, who, after disbanding in a "mildly optimistic mood," are now reporting back to their respective parties. Subsequently, Sapru himself is to decide whether they are sufficiently in agreement to confer with Jinnah himself (*The War This Week*, November 26-December 3, p. 15).

Chungking Faces Its Domestic Problems

In the plenary sessions of its annual meeting at Chungking, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party has adopted a series of resolutions which stress the necessity of strengthening domestic political solidarity, intensifying the military effort, improving administration, and tightening price controls.

The resolution dealing with political solidarity is so phrased as to be capable of varied interpretation. According to the official Chinese explanation, the Central Executive Committee is holding out an olive branch to the Communists and other minority groups, but other observers believe that the resolution constitutes a last warning to the Communists to behave or take the consequences. Observers are also skeptical as to the possibilities of great increase in the Chinese military effort, since they believe the Chinese army is, in general, too

poorly fed and equipped to depart for long from the present pattern of predominantly defensive military operations.

The resolutions which stress the need for improved administration and stricter price controls, however, undoubtedly reflect the increasing pressure of economic difficulties upon the Chinese Government and Kuomintang Party. Demands for curtailment of expenses, control of prices, reform of taxation, increase in bond sales, and reorganization of the finances of local governments, have been frequently heard and the Government has been forced to take cognizance of them. The shortage of competent administrative personnel, the lack of established machinery for enforcing price controls, and the difficulties involved in radical administrative reform, make it improbable that any great improvements will result. But it is obvious that the Kuomintang feels pressed to make some moves against inflation, if only to maintain its present dominant political position.

New Wedges in the Buna Beachhead

In New Guinea, Allied forces have made some new gains, but while the Japanese position is regarded as desperate, the enemy is still showing no signs of collapse. On the contrary, despite the reported loss of their commander, their failure to receive reinforcements, and our superior fire power both in the air and on the ground, the Japanese are defending their intricate jungle positions with a zeal which can only be compared in this war to that of the Russians at Stalingrad. In the Buna sector, a general attack of air, artillery, infantry, and light tank units has won us control of Cape Endaiadere and the "new landing strip", but the Japanese are holding the east side of the "old strip", and progress elsewhere in the sector has been slow. Around Sanananda, there apparently has been little activity (see map, *The War This Week*, December 10-17). Our forces evidently are proceeding

cautiously in order to keep casualties down and to take full advantage of air power.

Along the New Guinea coast farther to the northwest, where Japanese landings were made last week, our aircraft have been active in strafing operations, but apparently fewer enemy troops reached shore than was at first reported in news despatches—perhaps no more than 200. At Madang, still farther up the coast (beyond the Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua), an enemy convoy was caught by our aircraft December 18 and one light cruiser was left in a sinking condition; the Japanese nonetheless succeeded in landing troops. Immediately above Buna, near the mouth of the Amboga River, Australian patrols are engaging a few Japanese forces put ashore December 1-2 from destroyers which originally had been headed for Buna. Small Japanese landings along the jungle coast probably will continue, in line with the evident enemy intention of making any hold we may obtain on the strategic positions—air fields and harbors—as costly and hazardous as possible.

In the Solomons, the situation is unchanged, but at Rabaul in New Britain an unprecedented concentration of merchant vessels—together with a heavy cruiser, 20 destroyers, and other light vessels—suggests the possibility of renewed operations here, as well as of further efforts to strengthen Japanese positions in New Guinea.

Repression in Bolivia

Unrest among Indian workers in the tin mines, culminating in a strike, has evoked sharp measures of repression by the Bolivian Government. Food and fuel supplies for striking miners have been cut off, and three of the most prominent labor leaders, active in the *Partido Izquierdista Revolucionario*, have been arrested and sent to the Beni region, in the tropical eastern lowlands of Bolivia.

These latest moves in the Bolivian Government's campaign to suppress the P. I. R. and end labor "agitation" at the mines may prove effective for the time being. But they are not likely to increase tin production. The Indian laborers on the bleak Bolivian Plateau have genuine grievances, according to many observers, including Ernesto Galarza, Chief of the Division of Labor of the Pan-American Union. Low wages, shortage of food and fuel, a rise in cost-of-living prices of more than 1,700 percent since 1931, and the knowledge that profits from newly-increased tin prices are flowing into the pockets of the mine-owners—these are among their reasons for downing tools.

Conservative and reliable banking sources in the United States, moreover, scout the Bolivian Government's charges of Communist and Nazi influence among the strikers. It has been pointed out that, as far as the Communists are concerned, any agents they might have there would be interested primarily in ending the strikes and resuming production, in order to speed lend-lease aid from the United Nations to Russia. Other independent groups, such as the Ethno-Geographic Board of the Smithsonian, have called attention to various steps the owners might take both to win the Indians' confidence and to increase their productivity. So far, however, the owners and the Government have apparently been content with trying to starve the strikers into submission.

Predicament in Argentina

The decision of Argentina's Supreme Court to prosecute for espionage the German Naval and Air Attaché, Captain Dietrich Niebuhr, confronts the Castillo Administration with an embarrassing dilemma: a sensational spy trial, or a German refusal to waive Niebuhr's diplomatic immunity. Either event will give aid and comfort to Argentina's anti-

Nazi and anti-neutrality forces. Moreover, the thorough entanglement of foreign and domestic issues in Argentina means that a defeat on the espionage affair would endanger Castillo's reactionary policies not only on the diplomatic, but on the home front as well.

Aftermath of Bracken's Election as Canadian Conservative Leader

The election of Premier Bracken of Manitoba as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party has, on the whole, been well received throughout the Dominion. Liberal and Conservative papers alike have acclaimed the new leader's honesty of purpose and political skill. Only the C. C. F. (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) and its leader, M. J. Coldwell, have expressed serious doubts about the ability of Bracken to force his own progressive principles on the reactionary groups among the Conservatives.

Meanwhile a recent Gallup poll shows a strong swing to the C. C. F. Throughout the Dominion the poll estimates that the Liberals would obtain 36 percent of the electorate today against 55 percent at the 1940 election, the Conservatives 24 percent today against 31 percent two years ago, while the C. C. F., which polled only 8 percent in 1940, would today obtain 23 percent of the electorate. The Gallup experts estimate that while the greatest C. C. F. strength—40 percent of the electorate—would be in British Columbia, the party could probably poll 36 percent in the prairie provinces, 27 percent in Ontario, 14 percent in the Maritime Provinces, and 7 percent in Quebec.

APPENDIX I

ENGLISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES¹

The English press throughout the past six months has been uniformly friendly in its attitude towards America, loud in its praise of American military and naval successes, hardly less enthusiastic about American war production, and eager to promote a larger measure of Anglo-American cooperation both during and after the war. Issues which might well have arisen over the American invasion of British spheres of interest in Africa, in South America, and in the Near East, though no doubt troublesome to those in high places, have found hardly any expression either in the public press or in the debates in Parliament.

Though the Darlan affair in North Africa has not helped matters, there is, on the whole, much less evidence in England of tension in the relations of the two countries than there was in the six months immediately succeeding Pearl Harbor. This has no doubt been due in part to the successes of the United States in the Pacific. It is probably due in part also to increasing awareness that the closest cooperation with the United States offers the best promise not only of winning the war but also of winning the peace. The heroic efforts of the Russians still continue to command the admiration of the English rank and file, but except among a handful of Communists there is little evidence in England of close kinship with the Russians. The English rejoice in Russian military prowess against the common enemy, but they recognize that Russia is fighting her own fight for her own purposes, and they are not at all certain that these purposes are consonant with their own. Towards America, however, English feeling is increasingly that of common action toward the common end. This feeling has clearly been intensified by joint planning, by joint action on the high seas and in North Africa, and by the utterances of American statesmen, particularly Mr. Wallace, Mr. Hull, Mr. Welles, and Mr. Perkins, on post-war aims.

Kinship and Candor

Indeed, it is probable that the English are much more conscious of kinship with Americans than Americans are of kinship with the English. There is nothing in the English press comparable with the anti-British sentiment that permeates an important part of the American press. Probably Americans are much less conscious of their need for British help than the English are of their need for American help. In any case, the English in their public utterances, not only in the press but increasingly in the House of Commons, appear to be almost pathetically anxious to avoid giving offense to America. For that reason it is perhaps not altogether safe to accept the English press as frankly expressive of English feeling towards America.

In this respect the English weeklies are much more outspoken, and on occasion

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

much more critical, of America than are the English dailies. It would be hard to find on either side of the Atlantic a more unbiased but at the same time a less inhibited analysis of American attitudes, policies, and performances than in the London *Economist*. Equally frank are Julian Huxley's articles on American affairs in the London *New Statesman and Nation*. But the circulation of such periodicals is very limited, and they can hardly be taken either to reflect or in any large measure to direct English opinion.

In general, the English daily press limits its attention to those matters about America which have a direct bearing upon Anglo-American relations. It gives a great deal of attention to American military and naval operations, American war production, American war aims, and American post-war planning. It is, almost without exception, enthusiastic about President Roosevelt. This enthusiasm early transferred itself to Mrs. Roosevelt on her recent visit to England.

The Elections

So far as the internal affairs of the United States are concerned English comment has in the main been confined to the American elections.¹ Early in the summer, most of the English dailies predicted an increased majority for the Democratic Party; after the primaries they were not so sure, and after the election they were mainly concerned with pointing out that the Republican victory, so far as it was not due to merely local causes, was to be interpreted chiefly as a call for more vigorous effort in the prosecution of the war. The London *Economist*, however, struck quite another note in an article which bears a title—*Luce in Tenebris*—reminiscent of Luce's notorious attack upon Britain in a recent number of *Life*. "Americans," it declared, "have voted for dead party loyalties and living mediocrities . . . for the equivalents of the men who told Abraham Lincoln that he was quite wrong. . . . In this election, as in the primaries, it has not done any harm to have had a most vulnerable pre-Pearl Harbor record . . . To represent this vote as chiefly an expression of the will of the American people to wage more vigorous war is to display a power of faith that is dangerous, if very English. President Roosevelt is weakened, not strengthened, by the repudiation of his friends and the election of his enemies. . . . To do the victors in this election justice, they are not disposed to impose their pattern on the world. They want victory . . . but they do not wish to use victory for any coherent purpose. . . . The people of the United States seem this year to have voted to wage war with the arms of the flesh but not the arms of the spirit. . . . It is by no means certain that the victory does not mean a return to Hardingism."

Provocation

For the most part, expressions of disagreement between England and America in the English press have been provoked by American criticism of England. In general, the English have ignored the perennial virulence of Colonel McCormick, Captain Patterson, Mr. Hearst, and Anglophobes of that kidney, but they were provoked by the attack of Mr. Luce in *Life*, the essence of which was that America was not fighting to hold the British Empire together and did not mean to be exploited by England for that purpose. On the whole, the English papers took

¹ The American struggle against inflation provoked some interest, and Sir Walter Citrine's visit to America invited some consideration of American trade unions.

the matter calmly and were content either to point out that Mr. Luce did not speak for America, or else to quote Dorothy Thompson's broadcast refuting him. None of them were anything like so outspoken as Vernon Bartlett was in his communication to *Life* on the subject (*Life*, October 26).

The Luce letter was soon forgotten, but its critical attitude toward British imperial policy continued to find expression in America and was brought once again forcibly to the attention of the English by Mr. Wilkie's broadcast on October 26. It is true that Wilkie's attack upon the British policy in India was a reflection rather of anti-British sentiments which he encountered in the Far East at large than of any special knowledge of India. Nevertheless, it was received in good part by the English press, and in papers like the *Manchester Guardian*, the *New Statesman*, and the *Economist* was even applauded.

This was due in part to the fact that many influential English papers, including even the *London Times*, have been critical of the government's Indian policy. It was due no doubt in part also to Mr. Wilkie's commanding position in American politics. In any case, the issue passed without ill-will and may even have served to good purpose by awakening the English to a realization of the fact that their whole imperial policy called for careful scrutiny. Margery Perham's special article on America and the Empire in the *London Times* for November 20 and 21, and the brilliant editorial on the same subject in the same paper on November 21, clearly admit that American criticism, though ill-informed, is not without foundation and call for another approach to the colonial problem than Churchill's "We mean to hold our own."

Friction From the AEF

The problem of Anglo-American cooperation has, of course, been brought most forcibly home to the British by the presence of large numbers of American troops in North Ireland and in England. Upon the attitude of the English towards these visitors we have abundant evidence from many sources, though the English newspapers have relatively little to say about it. In general, the Americans have been well received, and the English have made heroic efforts to make them feel at home. There have been some complaints of American arrogance, a few of American drunkenness, and quite a little resentment among the English at what they consider the unequal treatment of American negro troops by their white compatriots.

The chief causes of friction, however, appear to arise out of the relatively high pay of American troops which give them greater spending power and greater attractiveness to lower-class English girls. It has been suggested more than once in England that the inequalities of pay might be met if part of the soldier's pay were withheld and credited to him for use in America. Hostile criticism of American troops has apparently been much more pronounced in North Ireland than in England. They have even been charged there with spreading infantile paralysis and with drugging young Irish girls. This may be taken as an evidence of Nazi propaganda, which is rife in Ireland and is doing its best to sow dissension between Allies.²

² It is reported from Australia that the chief causes of friction with American troops there are: (1) that they have more money; (2) that they have more tobacco; (3) that they have smarter uniforms and therefore are more attractive to the feminine eye.

L'Affaire Darlan

The latest manifestation of friction between England and America is in connection with the Darlan affair in North Africa. To some extent this has been the natural outcome of the differing attitudes of the British and the Americans toward the Vichy Government. The British have never been strongly in sympathy with the American disposition to keep on speaking terms with Vichy. Instead, they have given full support to De Gaulle and the Free French and have insisted that Vichy and all its partisans, Pétain, Darlan, and Laval in particular, were enemies and should be treated as such. So, when General Eisenhower came to terms with Darlan, there arose almost at once a loud outcry in the English press and in the English House of Commons. Newspapers like the *Daily Herald* (labor) and the *News Chronicle* (liberal), which generally take a very friendly attitude toward the United States, have been particularly outspoken.

The *Herald* calls upon the Prime Minister to make a public statement as to where Britain stands and what American intentions are. The *News Chronicle* remarks, "We believe that were the proper restraints of wartime not now operative, there would be a popular outcry in this country against the deal with Darlan comparable to the uprising of public opinion against the Hoare-Laval deal." The *London Times* is more moderate but still hostile. The *Economist* (November 21) goes so far as to say, "It is doubtful whether the intervention of Darlan altered the actual course of events by more than a few hours at the most," and concludes, "there is a strange and frightening contrast between the remarkable military cooperation which has altered the whole face of the war in a fortnight and the complete absence of any political counterpart."

In the House of Commons members were even more outspoken. The following comments are typical. "In the view of a large number of people in this country, Darlan must go." "Is General de Gaulle . . . to be sacrificed to Darlan the rat? . . . The statement of President Roosevelt does not help us. To put things right Darlan must be removed at once." "Are we to understand that the position has now been reached in which a General in the field is allowed to decide the government's allies in the war?" On the 26th of November permission was asked to discuss a motion which began, "That this house is of the opinion that our relations with Admiral Darlan and his kind are inconsistent with the ideals for which we entered and are fighting this war."

The Strains of Dependence

Mr. Eden, as leader of the Commons, has done his best to quiet this agitation and has publicly announced British official endorsement of General Eisenhower's policy in North Africa. But it is quite apparent that sentiment in England is running strong against the Darlan arrangement, and that there is a definite undercurrent of resentment at the United States in consequence. One member of the House of Commons observed that the British "government do not dare to do anything because they have to move to the tune which is played by the piper in New York." And the same sentiment appears in the weekly surveys of British opinion made by the Ministry of Information. Note for example the following: "Many think Americans are chiefly responsible for present arrangements with Darlan. Some assert that if our keenness to please the Russians were half of

that to please the Americans, the war might end sooner. Trust in Roosevelt is declining."

It is interesting to observe that the liberal and labor papers and the labor members of the House of Commons have been most vociferous in this attack upon Darlan. And it is not without significance that in the expression of public opinion the point is once more raised that more attention should be paid to Russia and less to the United States. It would be dangerous to conclude, however, that the rank and file of the English lean towards Russia, the upper classes toward America. What we had better say is that the English are becoming increasingly conscious of their dependence on the United States and a little resentful of the fact. It may be that this resentment is quickened among ordinary English folk by occasional revelations of arrogance on the part of the American troops stationed among them. They tend to romanticize about the Russians, but they realize that they have to live with us.

APPENDIX II

TURKEY'S FOOD POSITION¹

Shortages of certain foods in Turkey, while by no means acute from the standpoint of health, have apparently convinced the United Nations of the need for continued exports of wheat to that country. Apart from humanitarian impulses, the Allies seem to be motivated by consideration of the following advantages: receipt of grain from the United Nations should improve Turkish civilian morale and generate friendly feelings toward the providers; it should strengthen the Turkish Government's faith in our lend-lease commitments; and, finally, it should help to build up supplies in a strategic sector of the Middle East.

Accordingly, the United States and Great Britain have shipped between 100,000 and 200,000 tons of wheat to Turkey during the past year. Turkey hopes to continue imports on as large a scale in 1943, if necessary.

The limiting factor on the amount of grain which can be sent to Turkey is, of course, shipping. The Turks have tried to arrange for French ships to transport it, but recent developments have probably eliminated that possibility. The United States has agreed to give wheat priority over all other shipments to Turkey and has consented to provide any amount of wheat which the Turks may want, within reason; but we have made it clear that we cannot undertake to provide transportation for it.

The Shortage

Compared with the peoples of nearby European and Middle Eastern countries, of course, the Turks can hardly be described as having a food shortage at all. Their supplies of legumes, olive oil, sheep's milk cheese, dried fruit, and nuts appear to be sufficient to meet the average citizen's dietary expectations. But in meat and—more importantly—in bread, Turkey is experiencing in certain

¹ Based on a memorandum of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

areas a deficit grave enough to necessitate rations which, for at least some sections of the public, are definitely subnormal.

Meat

The current shortage of meat can be traced in large measure to the severe winter of 1941-42, which is estimated to have killed about 2,000,000 head of livestock and to have reduced drastically the acreage of fodder crops. In addition, large requisitions by the Army and the reluctance of peasants to sell at prevailing prices have further curtailed stocks available to the public.

Bread

Turkey's bread shortage is the more remarkable in view of the fact that the country is presumed to have had repeated "carry-overs" of grain. Because of the record crops of 1938, 1939, and 1940, wheat stocks either in government or in private hands must have amounted to nearly 1,000,000 tons at the time of the 1941 harvest—even if one makes liberal allowances for grain wasted, used as seed, or fed to livestock. Under ordinary circumstances, such a stockpile would have been more than enough to offset the poor wheat harvests of 1941 and 1942.

That it has not sufficed must be attributed to increased requirements and to weaknesses in the country's distribution system.

Rise in Requirements

With the building up of the Army and the diversion of many persons to more active pursuits, the nation's need for food energy has been increased. Since bread is Turkey's chief source of that energy, the demand has risen correspondingly.

Rations instituted early in 1942 amounted to 750 grams daily for soldiers, peasants, and manual laborers, 375 grams for other adults, and 187 grams for children—or an average of 550 grams for the population as a whole. This was roughly the same as pre-war average consumption, but since requirements had risen, the rations were lower than the amounts which would have been consumed if controls had not existed. The incidence of these controls has been borne by the less active adults and children. Furthermore, successive cuts in rations have fallen on these two groups, while the allowances for heavy workers, soldiers, and peasants have been maintained.

Hoarding, Public and Private

Unless the Government has concealed stocks of grain somewhere—which would be difficult on any large scale—it seems unlikely that official reserves have been large enough to affect the country's total market supply to any significant degree. Public storage capacity is inadequate to take care of more than a small percentage of the yearly crop.

Grain hoarding by the peasants, however, has been a cardinal factor in the present situation. Wheat production is carried on by some 4,000,000 farmers scattered throughout Turkey, and the problem of collecting their stores—if they are reluctant to sell—is extremely difficult. Their grain is stored in underground pits covered with straw, in small villages all over Turkey. Since the prices now

offered by the Government are not very attractive to the farmers, the latter are doubtless holding back a large share of their supplies, with the aim of selling at least a part on the black market. Repeated requisitions by the Government have failed to bring forth anything like the desired quantities.

Transportation

The problem of grain distribution is aggravated by the geographical separation of wheat-producing from wheat-consuming areas. Non-wheat producers, numbering over half of Turkey's population, are located chiefly along the seaboard at a considerable distance from the Central Anatolian Plateau, which is Turkey's richest wheat-producing area. Since Turkey's chronic lack of rolling stock has been further accentuated by the strain of military movements, and since the submarine menace has probably diverted to the railroads much of the coastal shipping which ordinarily traversed the Black Sea, a bottleneck in transport has—unexpectedly—occurred.

It may be noted that this difficulty in collecting and transporting grain to the cities has its advantageous aspects for the Government: besides warding off demands for grain from the Axis, retention of grain by the peasants provides a safeguard in case of invasion. Since the heaviest output of wheat takes place in the interior and is hidden there in numerous small caches, an enemy force could not easily appropriate it.

APPENDIX III

"MAPS FOR A NEW WORLD"¹

Enemies of the Nazis have frequently, during the course of this war, made them a present of psychological weapons. But in no case perhaps have these blunders produced such unfortunate effects in so many different countries as the now notorious article, "Maps For A New World," by Professor George T. Renner of Teacher's College, Columbia University (published in the June 6, 1942, issue of *Colliers*). Theodore Kaufman's book, *Germany Must Perish*, which advocates the sterilization of all Germans, has been translated by the Nazis into German, equipped with a trick-photography frontispiece showing President Roosevelt dictating its contents, and widely disseminated among the *Wehrmacht*. Sir Robert Vansittart's indictment of the German people has proved extremely useful to Goebbels' men in convincing the Germans that they have no other course but to fight on and stave off utter destruction. Neither of these instances, however, has provoked repercussions quite as widespread and as serious as Professor Renner's.

What Renner Proposed

Purporting to present a "brave new world redesigned for lasting peace," Mr. Renner's three colorful maps not only dispose arbitrarily of all ancient,

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

rankling, territorial controversies, but in effect, wipe out the independent existence of every small nation in Europe. (See map). Switzerland is partitioned among France, Germany, and Italy; Portugal is swallowed up by Spain; Belgium and Holland are divided among France, Germany, and England, which is given a portion of both, as well as all of Ireland; Estonia goes to "The United States of Fennoscandia," Latvia to the U. S. S. R., and Lithuania to "Czecho-Polska." France gets a portion of Spain; an enormous new Germany includes not only Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, and those portions of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, already mentioned, but also all of western Poland, the Sudetenland, Austria, Hungary, and part of Rumania. Italy, on the other hand, gets Corsica, Nice, and Savoy, as well as the whole Dalmatian coast. Russia loses to "Fennoscandia" the Kola Peninsula and Karelia, but receives from Turkey the whole European coast of the Black Sea and the Straits, while Turkey gets Syria, Iraq, and portions of Iran. The newly-created Balkan Union has thus no outlet to the Adriatic or the Black Sea.

In Africa, Spain gets the coast of French Morocco, Italy a huge Libya extending south to the Congo, and Germany a great block of Belgian, Portuguese, French, and British colonies. In Asia, the Russian Maritime Province is ceded to Japan, which keeps Korea, Formosa, and a large number of Pacific islands; great areas of China are ceded to Russia; India annexes Burma, and is divided into separate Moslem and Hindu states; Siam and Indochina are fused.

Use of the Article

If this staggering solution of the world's ills, which rubs salt into nearly every extant grievance between nations, had been generally regarded merely as an instance of one man's irresponsibility, it would, perhaps, have done little harm. The Axis, however, has seized upon Professor Renner's maps, declared that they represent official American policy for the post-war world, and made special use of them in those countries where they would best serve its interests.

North Africa

North Africa is the only region close to operations in which the article has as yet been used. In mid-September, the Nazi Armistice Commission in French Morocco drew the attention of French authorities to the maps. Naturally, the future allotted by Renner both to France and to French Morocco caused a very considerable stir. General Nogués himself appeared to believe firmly that American professors are paid by the Government, and that their utterances are therefore official. All that our representative could say to the contrary failed to convince Nogués that Renner is only a private citizen. Early in October, it was authoritatively reported from Casablanca that Vichy military and naval intelligence officers were circulating the article to line officers. Only three days before the beginning of our invasion, *España*, the pro-Axis Spanish paper in Tangier, took up the cry. Renner's map, it said, deserves attention because his "rank as a university professor and his close relationship with political circles in Washington indicate that his ideas are very influential in the United States."

Turkey

Foremost among neutral countries where the article has been used by the Axis is Turkey, whose good will is of obvious importance to the United Nations. For centuries the Turks have fought Russian pretensions to the Dardanelles, and still actively suspect Russia of ambitions to control them. Thus Renner's bland announcement that we must avoid the mistakes of Versailles and at the next peace give the Straits to Russia, was well calculated to alarm the Turks.

The Germans, taking clever advantage of this, timed their two propaganda campaigns to coincide with the two most important American moves to win Turkey—Wilkie's visit to Turkey, and the visit of a group of Turkish newspapermen to the United States.

On August 25, during the negotiations for Mr. Wilkie's reception, the normally pro-Axis paper *Cumhuriyet* ran an article by its military commentator, General Erkilet, who expressed his fear that the Renner program "gives an inkling of what may happen in case of an American world victory," and linked Wilkie's forthcoming visit with Renner's proposals. This innuendo apparently had its effect in high quarters. On August 27, the Foreign Minister, Numan Bey, told our Ambassador that Prime Minister Saracoglu and President Inonu had for some time been planning to be out of town at the time when, it now appeared, Wilkie was expected. Numan also raised the problem presented by Wilkie's plane—an army bomber and its crew, neither of which was technically permitted to enter Turkey. The content and tone of the Foreign Minister's statements were, in the opinion of our Ambassador, "partially the result of" General Erkilet's article.

A month later, enthusiastic despatches from the Turkish newspapermen visiting the United States began to appear in the Turkish press: at this point the Germans resuscitated Renner. The Axis-subsidised press put on a solid week of propaganda. Referring to Renner as "this world famous professor of professors, . . . this highly respected scientist," *Tasiri Etker* declared: "This map is based upon the so-called humane principles of the Atlantic Charter . . . Istanbul and the Straits have been in Turkey's possession for nearly five centuries—that is, fifty years before the discovery of America. We on our part now ask the esteemed professor on what grounds and authority he is so generously giving Turkish rights and Turkish territory to others. Before receiving an answer to this question, however, we hereby declare our national hatred of this expression of utter nonsense in America."

This defiant utterance was followed up in the next day's *Son Posta* with a typical Nazi propaganda statement: that Renner "was among the experts consulted by the United States Government in the preparation of the Atlantic Charter." An American denial that the article was official was pushed scornfully aside: "We know only too well the important place which Columbia University of New York occupies in the field of American culture." *Tasiri Etker* continued the attack: "We would like to know what would be the reaction of Americans and their press if one of our professors were to state that the Panama Canal should be returned to Colombia, its rightful owner. . . . The ridiculous views of this professor do not in themselves constitute the only indication leading us to surmise that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are, like those of President Wilson, only a trap laid to deceive humanity."

[REDACTED]

Idem adds a Goebbels touch. "This blockhead of a professor is no stranger to the author, who met him in Istanbul some twenty-five years ago as a tourist dancing in the street to the tune of a Turkish soup dealer chopping tripe, and childish enough to believe his Jewish guide, who told him that this was a Turkish polka played on a special instrument. This may help to throw some light on the authority of this eminent professor."

Picking out the themes of these inspired articles, Rome radio, in a broadcast in Turkish, quoted the Turkish press as saying that anything can happen in America, but that this incident derives its significance from the fact that Professor Renner "is the very same man who was called as a geography expert aboard the Potomac (sic!) when the Atlantic Charter was drawn up."

Turkish newspapers friendly to us protested that Renner did not represent official opinion; but their demurrers were mild and ineffectual. It is difficult to estimate the net effect upon Turkey of this Axis campaign; but it can scarcely have failed to undermine confidence among some groups in the integrity of our post-war intentions.


Portugal.

Portugal provided an arena for Axis operations on the propaganda plane: the country was both neutral and a victim of Professor Renner's reorganization of Europe. A propaganda leaflet in Portuguese, colorfully printed in red, white, and blue, carried the German message. In three circles on its front cover Portugal proper, Angola, and Mosambique were each represented as crossed off the map with a heavy X of red paint, splashed from a brush dipped into a can covered with the stars and stripes. The heading: "It is enough that the imperialism of Roosevelt wipes Portugal and her empire from the map." Page 2 reproduced Renner's maps themselves and pages 3 and 4 gave the message in full: "Compatriots! The Democracies, convinced that they cannot win the war, now turn to threats. They who pretend to be the heralds of liberty for small nations have dropped the mask. The United States has a diabolical plan for the new world, a world made by Mr. Renner in which there is no room for us Portuguese. In America, where there is no liberty of the press, a professor is an official mouthpiece of the American Government, all the more because he is professor of geography in Columbia University."

The leaflet went on to contrast Renner's assertion that Portugal is a "more or less artificial state, maintained exclusively by the British fleet" with Premier Salazar's statement that "The unity of the Portuguese Empire is not an artificial creation." Disclaiming any desire on the part of the Axis for the Portuguese colonies given them by Renner, the leaflet continued in a burst of patriotism: "If on the one hand we are convinced of the faith of the Reich and of the ability of our soldiers, who will fight to the last man to prevent this diabolical plan being put into practice, we derive on the other hand consolation from certain of Mr. Renner's own words 'It is possible that the Axis will win the war. In this case our plans cannot be carried out.' Let us all pray for this turn of events, and let us be grateful to the United States for having confided its intentions for a new and better world. Now we shall remember this slogan which the United States gives us: An Allied victory will mean the destruction of Portugal."


EUROPE

from "Maps for a New World"
by
GEORGE T. RENNER
Published in Collier's, June 6, 1942



MAP NO. 1448, DECEMBER 22, 1942

REPRODUCED BY THE U.S. REPRODUCTION SECTION



AFRICA
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

December 24-31, 1942

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For the President

DECEMBER 24-31, 1942

SECRET

THE WAR THIS WEEK

The past year has witnessed a profound improvement in the fortunes and prospects of the United Nations. The War This Week is devoting the greater part of the current special issue to a series of critical analyses of the developments of the past year and to certain probable trends for the coming year. A general analytical summary, "The War This Year, 1942 in Retrospect," (beginning on page 10), has been prepared by a member of the staff of the Office of Strategic Services who has been continuously concerned with both broad and detailed aspects of Axis capabilities. This summary is followed by a series of appendices prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch:

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This week, Russian offensives in the Don loop developed fresh vitality and may soon imperil the whole German position east of Rostov. The offensive southwest of Stalingrad captured the important supply center of Kotelnikov. The drive from Boguchar has swept around both sides of Millerovo, and from this point to the Volga, the Rostov offensive and the Stalingrad pincers now form a continuous front. Meanwhile, the Soviets have launched a new offensive in the

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Caucasus with the recapture of Alagir and the lifting of the Nazi menace to the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways. Although it is too early for prediction, this recently evidenced Soviet offensive power is considered to have injected a new element of prime importance into the picture of Allied military prospects.

While relative quiet has persisted on the two North African fronts, the assassination of Admiral Darlan and his succession by General Giraud have been generally greeted as having solved a problem which was becoming increasingly embarrassing for the United Nations.

The Far Eastern theater, too, has been relatively inactive during the past week, although certain indications suggest that the Japanese are preparing for new offensive moves.

The Fall of Kotelnikov

The Soviet capture of Kotelnikov has further reduced the chances of escape for the 22 Axis divisions between the Don and the Volga. After pushing the Nazis back from the Aksai River, the Russians closed in on Kotelnikov from three sides before breaking through to take the town itself. It was from this railhead that the Germans launched their counter-offensive to relieve the Sixth Army entrapped to the east, and its fall will rob the invaders of their chief remaining supply base within striking distance of Stalingrad. As the Russians continue to broaden their hold over the Kalmyk steppe area south of the lower Don, the German supply lines to the west are likely to run increasing danger of interdiction by Red Army mobile attacks. To the north, with the practical fusion of the northern pincers offensive around Stalingrad and the more recent attack directed toward Rostov, the Russians have further consolidated their position in the Don bend. The capture of Tatsinskaya on the Rostov-Stalingrad railway

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about 50 miles east of its junction with the Moscow-Rostov line suggests that the Red Army is gradually eliminating effective communication between the German forces west of the Donets and those in the Don-Volga area.

Although the Russians have again cut the Moscow-Rostov railroad south of Millerovo and have penetrated to the west into the Ukraine, the Germans have made a strong stand at Millerovo itself. Even should the Red Army isolate this city, the enemy will probably make a determined effort to hold Voroshilovgrad and Kamensk—the line of the Donets, where two lateral railroads favor the defense. The loss of the Don-Volga area—although extremely damaging in prestige and manpower—would be one that the Nazis might accept. The loss of the Donets and Rostov, however, would threaten the enemy forces in the North Caucasus with an encirclement still more costly than that around Stalingrad, and the virtual elimination of all German gains in a year of unparalleled sacrifice.

In the Caucasus, the recapture of Alagir and the elimination of the German threat to the Georgian and Ossetian Military Highways has launched the fourth of the expected Soviet offensives. The new operation not only indicates that the Red Army has sufficient offensive power to conduct large-scale attacks in three sectors at once. It also suggests that the Soviet winter drive will not confine itself to infiltration, but may aim to liquidate the net German gains of 1942 (see Appendix I and map). The new offensive is at present mopping up valley towns on its way northwest toward Nalchik. To the north, around Mozdok, while rain has temporarily reduced the tempo of operations, the Russians will probably soon resume the attack in an effort to pinch off the tip of the Caucasus salient from two directions at once.

The remaining Soviet offensive, in the Rzhev-Velikie Luki sector, has alone made no substantial progress. And in the

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far north, the Germans have stepped up their bombing of Murmansk, Kandalaksha, and the Murmansk railway.

The North African Fronts

No important change has taken place in the situation on either of the North African fronts, according to the meager reports that have come from the front.

In Tunisia heavy rains limited operations, and ground conditions remain boggy even though the weather has improved. The principal fighting of the week came in a series of severe attacks and counterattacks for control of a hill area just northeast of Medjez el Bab. At some cost the Axis has now retaken the hill. Other ground operations were largely confined to patrols and consolidation, and to minor actions to the south. Allied aircraft attacked shipping and harbor facilities at Sousse and Sfax with success. Reports continue of German materiel and personnel movements southwards through the Alps, and events in Tunis are clearly building up toward the opening of large-scale fighting.

In Tripolitania Axis forces halted in the Bouerat el Soun area, apparently taking up positions in wadis running to the east and southwest of the great Tauorga salt depression. Their supply situation is assumed to be difficult, and there are indications that the enemy lacks the motor transport to withdraw all his forces simultaneously. The British occupied Syrte on December 25, and established contact with the enemy. They may shortly overcome the delays occasioned by enemy mines and their own supply problems sufficiently to be able to renew the attack. The Egyptian railway is in operation to Tobruk, and the capacity of Benghazi has been considerably increased. Meanwhile light British raiding parties have harassed the enemy's communications as far west as the city of Tripoli.

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Aftermath of Darlan's Assassination

The death of Admiral Darlan and the designation of General Giraud as his successor by an imperial council that included Governors Boisson, Chatel, and Noguès, has brought expressions of relief from the British and the Fighting French, and has evoked attempts on the part of the Axis to split the United Nations by attributing the crime to English machinations. The appointment of General Juin to succeed Giraud as military commander in French North Africa has aroused little comment. (Juin is an able officer, conservative, but believed to be strongly anti-German, despite any "pledges" he may have made to the Nazis after his imprisonment in 1940).

In commenting on the assassination, British official spokesmen have indicated in confidence their gratification that the murderer had no apparent connection with De Gaulle (before his execution, the young man confessed that he acted only because he hated the Vichy regime and for the honor of France). Darlan's death, they feel, has wiped the slate clean, and improved the outlook for French unity. General Catroux, they add, would be a satisfactory representative for Fighting France in North Africa, but any effort to use the Comte de Paris (pretender to the French throne) in a provisional French government would be most inappropriate. When the Tunis campaign is over, one of these spokesmen concludes, the Fighting French might very well receive the civilian control of North Africa, while making available for the common cause as many of their troops as General Giraud might desire.

On Christmas day, the Brazzaville radio spoke out with utter frankness: "Whatever the nationality or the exact motives of the man responsible for this execution, his action expresses the indignation and rage of the great majority of

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French people before the changed tactics of this traitor and the indulgence he found with Allied authorities . . . The man who shares such a large part of the responsibility for a shameful armistice in 1940, for criminal collaboration with the enemy, for Vichy, . . . for the sufferings of the French people . . . could not and should not remain unpunished." Fighting French leaders in Cairo have echoed these sentiments.

While deploring the assassination as an evil precedent, General de Gaulle has declared his intention of cooperating with Giraud, since no further obstruction to French unity exists. From Air Marshal d'Astier de la Vigerie, recently returned from a mission to North Africa, the General has apparently received a favorable report on Fighting French prospects there. Before his death (according to D'Astier), even Darlan had recognized the importance of the De Gaullists in Metropolitan France. With the future position of Fighting France in the balance, De Gaulle's talks with President Roosevelt will assume an unusual significance.

A new accretion of power for Fighting France has come with the capitulation of French Somaliland to De Gaullist forces. In resuming Fighting French broadcasts from London, André Philip, Commissioner for Interior and Labor, has explained the De Gaullist position that replacement of Darlan by Giraud does not solve the problem of creating a "provisional direction of French interests and allowing the voice of the nation to be heard at the conference tables of the United Nations." Thus far, the United States has recognized both the Vichy succession administrations in Africa and the Fighting French on a purely local basis, while President Roosevelt has declared that the choice of a future government rests with the French people alone.

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Axis Innuendoes

Broadcasting to Corsica, the Rome radio has called Darlan's assassin "an agent of the British police." The Nazis have elaborated on this theme by suggesting that "since the secret session of the House of Commons . . . a radical solution was to be expected." Stressing the mystery surrounding the name, nationality, and political antecedents of the assassin, Berlin has drawn attention to the cleavage between American and British views on the Darlan issue, and ascribed to the Admiral "last words" in which he foreshadowed an English attempt on his life. The Japanese have limited themselves to the assertion that "The United States was hard hit by Darlan's assassination, but nevertheless the Americans will never give up their imperialist ambition and will make strenuous efforts to maintain a puppet regime in North Africa . . ." It was "Anglo-American imperialism," according to *Domei*, which "brought about the fall of France."

Spain's Policy

The Spanish Foreign Minister has again emphasized that the recent announcement of an Iberian bloc on the occasion of his visit to Lisbon was intended to inform the world that Spain and Portugal would henceforth adopt the same policy in foreign affairs. He admitted difficulties in eliminating Axis sentiments from radio and press, but asserted that he had the support of Franco and the Government in efforts to reorient Falangist elements of the press to the new foreign policy. There has apparently been no transfer of units to Spanish Morocco or southern Spain in connection with the recent partial mobilization. Nor are there any signs that the Germans intend to undertake operations in Spain.

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New Japanese Offensive Operations?

Japanese air activity has increased somewhat, both in Asia and in New Guinea, but the Pacific front as a whole has been relatively quiet—a quiet, however, which may soon be interrupted, according to some military observers. Evidences of large-scale enemy preparations for the offensive are increasing, these sources say, although the direction an offensive might take still is uncertain. The most notable evidence pointing to a new offensive comes from China, where since early December the Japanese have been withdrawing their veteran troops. Throughout Central China and some parts of North China these men are being replaced by puppet forces and Koreans, while in the Wuhan area they are being withdrawn and shipped to the embarkation center at Shanghai.

Presumably some of these troops will be sent to the Philippine Islands for tropical training, replacing men already forwarded to the Southwest Pacific, the theater which still seems the most likely choice for renewed operations. Our local superiority in the waters around Guadalcanal now apparently has forced the enemy to attempt to supply his troops by parachute—evidence of a supply situation the Japanese can not allow to continue indefinitely, unless they intend to sacrifice these stranded troops. On New Guinea, the Japanese cling perilously but tenaciously to their Buna beachhead. Despite losses, they have evidently not yet given up hope of challenging our air supremacy in the Melanesian area, where Japanese construction of strategic airfields continues.

In Burma, where advance British units have now reached a point 25 miles from Akyab (still without meeting significant enemy opposition), British activity may have aroused the Japanese High Command to strengthen defenses, and some troops may be destined for this front. But as yet there are no reports of large-scale movements in this direction, and

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little evidence of Japanese offensive intentions. Japanese patrols have clashed with the British near Kalembo in northern Burma, but enemy movements in this area appear to be for purposes of defensive reconnaissance. In India, further Japanese air attacks on Calcutta have occasioned a considerable exodus of stevedores, burlap workers, and jute balers, and a notable weakening of the morale of the laboring population.

In sum, while the Japanese are thoroughly capable of a surprise blow anywhere from India to Hawaii, the evidence as yet points only to an attempt to complete the conquest of the Melanesian "barrier," as a bulwark against a counter-attack from Australia. With this in hand, Japan might hope to secure the time to prepare for the "real war" which Premier Tojo has warned his people is just starting.

Death of the Premier of the Punjab

The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan has robbed India of perhaps the most statesmanlike of its Moslem leaders. As Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikander, in opposition to the Moslem League's narrow insistence on Pakistan, had followed a broad policy of compromise among Hindus, Moslem, and Sikhs. His death can scarcely fail to strengthen the position of Jinnah and other Moslem extremists.

Strikes in Bolivia

End of the Catavi strike leaves labor tension in Bolivia's tin mines unchanged as the Government continues to delay application of a new, ameliorative labor code. Twelve hundred workers in the Patifo mines at Huanuni now threaten to lay down their tools. Instead of meeting demands for wage adjustments to offset soaring prices, the Government has decided to reply with further measures of repression, arresting "agitators" and cutting off supplies to the strikers. Meanwhile, desperately needed tin production is dropping.

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THE WAR THIS YEAR

1942 in Retrospect

1942 was, for both ends of the Axis, a year of large territorial gains accompanied, however, by proportionately expanded military commitments. Since neither the Far Eastern nor the European Axis partners proved capable during this period of disposing of major opponents, the problem for both had become by the end of 1942, one of (a) developing the resources of vast—but as yet unassimilated—empires to support a maximum war effort, and (b) achieving a strategic position from which efforts to dislodge them would be fruitless. The position of both has become, then, in a fundamental sense, defensive. While it is too early to say that the period of Axis expansion is over, it is becoming clear that such offensive objectives as may be within their capabilities are limited.

European Axis

The past year has, in absolute terms, witnessed little decline in the military strength of Germany or its satellite powers. In numbers of combat divisions the German Army has slightly increased. This has been accompanied by a decline in average divisional strength, sufficient probably to cause a numerical reduction in total armed strength. Disproportionate casualties have, no doubt, been inflicted upon the spear-head divisions, manned by the choicest troops. But all these losses are, to some extent, balanced by increased combat experience. Armament supplies, except for planes, have been well maintained, though there is some evidence of cumulative obsolescence in plane and tank design. The failure of plane production, however, to keep pace with

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wastage has brought about a substantial decline in Germany's first-line strength. The plane position—with particular respect to combat planes—is undoubtedly the weakest point in Germany's military façade.

The over-all limiting factor to German military effort is clearly the shortage of manpower rather than a shortage of plant and equipment or of industrial materials. But there is nothing in Germany's manpower position to suggest that, in the absence of unexpectedly high casualties, the scale of her military effort must be reduced in the near future. There has been an undeniable decline in the quality of the German labor force which has made it impossible to sustain total output, but to date this has not seriously affected armament production. The food situation in Germany and her satellite powers has been well maintained, and it is within the range of possibility that sufficient tonnage may be imported through the blockade to relieve an otherwise dangerous position with respect to fats and oils. Although the supplies of civilian articles other than foods are pinched, there is not much evidence that the standard of living is sufficiently low to cause a decline in worker stamina and efficiency.

Oil stocks are lower than at the end of last year but prospective increases in production must be judged sufficient to permit a scale of military effort probably somewhat higher than in 1942. Transport conditions grew slightly worse during the year, but the program of new construction now under way will repair any deficiencies by the middle of 1943. No shortage of industrial materials will limit German output in the coming year, though it is probable that the process of substitution necessary to eke out dwindling supplies of copper, antimony and a few other materials will increase industrial labor requirements. Although, in a long view, the Axis war economy is "running down", the process is not sufficiently advanced to lower appreciably the Axis military effort in

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1943. On the contrary, except in the air, the scale of military effort might—for a short period—be substantially increased, though at the expense of long-run capabilities.

The few cracks only now becoming visible in the German edifice are still too slight to impair the short-run soundness of the structure. Differences between the army and the party may develop into an important limitation on Axis military action, but there is no evidence that the cleavage has as yet gone this far. Nazi administration has proved incapable of winning the mass of the population of occupied countries to support of the New Order, but increasing acts of insubordination and sabotage are still in the nature of pin pricks. The most important of the growing fissures in the Axis structure is probably the crumbling resistance of the Italian ally. The thesis favored in some quarters that, when Germany cracks, the process of dissolution will be rapid, may be a sound one, but to date there is little evidence that the beginning of the process is in sight. On the contrary, in terms of the scale of military effort which the European Axis can sustain in 1943, there is no reason to expect a substantial diminution.

Although there has been no substantial diminution in German military strength in absolute terms, the change in Axis strength in relation to commitments has been remarkable. At the end of 1941 it appeared altogether possible that the Axis might eliminate effective Russian resistance before England and the United States could bring substantial forces to bear. At the end of 1942 Germany is faced with the war on two or more fronts that she has always feared and has striven to avoid. Not only in Russia, but in Southern Europe and in the West the Axis is vastly weaker in relation to the strength of her enemies than at the end of 1941. While Axis strength was substantially maintained in 1942, the totality of opposing forces has been greatly augmented.

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Russia

When Germany turned on Russia in June 1941 after the failure of two attempts to knock England out of the war—failure in the air "Battle of England" and in the less publicized, but equally important, battle of the sea lanes—the turn made military sense only on the assumption that Russian resistance could be crushed before her western opponents were ready to engage Germany in full strength. The attempt to crush Russian resistance had failed by the end of 1941, though this failure did not become clear until the campaign of 1942 unfolded. Among the many "turning points" of the war, it now seems probable that the German withdrawal from Moscow in December, 1941 was the most important. The development of the 1942 campaign made it obvious that Germany was abandoning her earlier objective, the crushing of the main Russian military force, and was pursuing a war of attrition. While in 1941 the German army sought to encircle and annihilate the enemy in his strongest concentrations, the next year saw the same army attacking only in the southern sector and neglecting the main enemy force in central Russia.

The Axis objectives in 1942, as they developed, were not so much the pursuit of economic gains as the infliction of economic loss upon Russia. While it is true that the acquisition by the Axis of surplus grain-producing areas and of oil resources represents a real gain, the Axis position in grain and oils was not sufficiently critical to make such acquisitions a prime military objective. More important was the damage to the Russian war effort which the complete attainment of the 1942 objectives would have entailed. The loss to Russia of extensive grain producing areas and the manufacturing facilities of Rostov and Stalingrad, and interference with transport on the Volga have been serious but not critical. If, however, the Axis had succeeded in occupying the North

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and South Caucasus, the damage to Russia's war potential might well have been vital.

The 1942 Axis campaign of attrition must then be regarded as a partial failure. In 1943 Germany has the choice of renewing the war of attrition (attempting again to conquer the Caucasus) or of shortening her lines in Russia and assuming the defensive. (The crushing of Russian resistance in 1943 seems definitely out of the question). Whatever the choice, the Axis would appear to be faced by a Russian war potential which the 1942 campaign has not decisively reduced. Whether a renewed German offensive can sustain the scale of 1942 depends largely on how actively the United Nations push the attack in Southern and Western Europe.

The Mediterranean

The European Axis, in the war to date, has possessed two enormous advantages over its western opponents. The fact that the United Nations lines of communication have been extended sea lines, peculiarly vulnerable to submarine attack, has meant that the Axis could, with a relatively small expenditure of resources, inflict tremendous damage on its enemies. Secondly, since the only area in which the United Nations could bring ground forces into contact with the Axis was Egypt and Libya at the end of a 12,000-mile supply line, the Axis possessed an enormous logistical advantage. Four German divisions and a half-dozen Italian divisions have been able to divert continuously from 2% to 3 million tons of shipping into the supplying of United Nations forces in the Near East. As long as the United Nations were denied Northwest Africa and their forces were held in Eastern Libya or Egypt, this advantage persisted and Germany was well content with this type of "second front". The events of the last three months have completely changed the position of the Axis in the Mediterranean. The almost bloodless

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conquest of Northwest Africa has lopped 8,000 to 9,000 miles off the length of United Nations supply lines. The scanty port capacities still left to the Axis in North Africa will not permit a long continued resistance to United Nations attack in this area, unless diversion of United Nations forces is within the capabilities of the Axis. The most promising avenue for a limited Axis counter-offensive is probably Spain, but without the cooperation of the Spanish Government, which seems unlikely, this approach is beset with danger.

Possession of the whole North African coast by its enemies would confront the Axis with a second front of major potentiality. It would not only give the United Nations a supply line protected by land-based aircraft to the Near and Far East and would deny to the Axis in large part the use of this sea, but it would immediately entail extensive redistribution of Axis ground and air forces. These changes are real and inescapable. What is involved for the Axis in the Mediterranean over and above this is contingent on the forces which the United Nations devote to this area. There can be no doubt, however, that 1942 has witnessed a major decline in Axis capabilities in the Mediterranean.

The West

When Germany threw 200 divisions into the attack on Russia in June 1941, it was a gesture of supreme contempt for the offensive capabilities of her British opponent. The are facing England from Trondheim to Bordeaux was garrisoned by a handful of divisions and protected by less than a quarter of German plane strength. During 1942 this are continued to be held by not more than 45 divisions. In the meantime, however, the air situation has completely changed. German plane losses in Russia and elsewhere have been in excess of production rates and her effective combat plane

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strength has declined from around 10,000 at the beginning of the Russian war to a present figure of not over 5,000. In the meantime an air offensive mounted from England has inflicted increasing damage on the Axis economy and war potential.

The decline in the number of combat planes is, of course, to a certain extent seasonal, and ordinarily the winter months would witness some recuperation of German air strength. The recuperation of last winter, however, was insufficient to permit the replacement of losses of the previous summer, and the pressure this winter promises to be far heavier. It is within the power of the United Nations to continue and to accelerate the downward spiral of Axis plane strength.

Appendix III points out that during the first eleven months of 1942 the RAF undertook bombing missions against Axis Europe on 135 nights with an average of 100 planes per night. This weight of air attack was augmented by high and low level daylight attacks and from August on by the precision bombing missions of the American Army Air Force. The German air effort in the west during the same period was essentially defensive. There is every reason to believe that the weight of air attack on Germany in 1943 will be greatly increased and no reason to believe that German air capabilities on this front will be augmented.

At the same time that Germany's air position in the West has become progressively worse, the United Nations have been building up ground forces based on England. To the Axis this represents a potentiality of attack which must be taken into account in its military commitments.

In summary, the capabilities of Axis Europe, vis-a-vis its enemies, have declined in the following principal respects:

1. There has been an absolute decline of considerable magnitude in air strength. The relative decline is even greater.
2. The probable Axis loss of North Africa will provide the

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United Nations with an effective base for operations against Southern Europe.

3. The growing strength of opposing forces in the West and South has not been compensated by an appreciable decline in the capabilities of Russia.

4. There is some evidence of widening fissures in the structure of the Axis New Order in Europe.

5. The war economy on which the military effectiveness of the Axis is based is in decline in the sense that labor replacements are of insufficient quality to maintain total output and that replacement of capital equipment is inadequate.

The relative decrease in European Axis capabilities, however, should not be interpreted to mean that the scale of Axis military effort must be less in 1943 than in 1942. Germany will, no doubt, wish to keep it less if she decides to pursue a defensive war of attrition. It is, however, within the capabilities of the Axis to increase substantially the scale of activity, though at the expense of a later, more rapid, decline in military strength.

The Far East

The rapid and striking gains of the Japanese against weak opposition in the first five months of 1942 attained for the Far Eastern Axis an empire the full exploitation of which would make Japan one of the strongest powers on earth. It early became evident that immediate Japanese objectives embraced nothing less than the exclusion of the United Nations from the area bounded by the great arc from Burma and the East Indies through the Melanesian barrier to the Solomons and beyond. With the exception of New Guinea, these objectives were quickly attained. Since June, however, further Japanese efforts have been abortive and accompanied by very considerable losses.

Already in April a naval reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean

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had met with unexpected opposition from British planes based on Ceylon, leading to a retirement of the Japanese force. On May 7 a Japanese approach toward Australia was routed in the Coral Sea. In June came the smashing defeat at Midway and with it the cessation of further attempts at offensive action by the Far Eastern Axis. Although Japan strengthened her already sizeable Manchurian forces during the summer, the opportunity to attack Siberia while Russia was fully engaged was not seized. In August American forces landed in the Solomons and during the last four months of the year Japan's major military effort has been devoted to the unsuccessful attempt to dislodge her enemies from these islands and from New Guinea. This lack of success culminated in the naval battles of November 12-15 off the Solomons, resulting in Japan's worst defeat of the war to date.

Japanese offensive capabilities in the near future must be judged with her naval, merchant marine, and aircraft position in mind. While this position is not such as to preclude a major offensive, it is sufficiently tight to deter the Nipponese from incurring further heavy losses unless the probable gains are of decisive importance.

Japanese naval losses have been especially heavy in aircraft carriers, heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers, that is, in those ships which are particularly useful in the amphibious operations which have characterized the war in the Pacific. As of the end of November, 6 out of 12 aircraft carriers had been sunk with an additional 2 damaged; 12 out of 19 heavy cruisers with 4 damaged; 5 out of 20 light cruisers with 6 damaged, and 45 out of 124 destroyers with 15 damaged. While these losses still leave the Japanese navy much stronger than any naval force likely to be brought against it in the West or Southwest Pacific in the near future, they represent a rate of decline in strength which can not be long sustained. Japan can not, at this juncture, afford to trade loss for loss

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with an enemy who can so overwhelmingly outbuild her, unless this trading process brings with it a decisive improvement in her strategic position.

Estimates of Japanese plane strength remain highly uncertain. While it is thought that a strength of around 5,000 combat planes at the beginning of the war had been reduced to about 3,600 by the end of November, both the estimates of initial strength and subsequent loss rates are conjectural. It seems clear from recent operations, however, that the Japanese are unwilling to risk plane losses of more than 500-600 a month which argues, perhaps, that their production rate is not in excess of that figure and that first line strength is low in relation to existing commitments. It seems probable that inability to undergo a marked increase in air losses was one of the principal deterrents to action against Siberia during the late summer and autumn.

Nor does the Japanese merchant marine position—although its weakness is much exaggerated—appear favorable for a major offensive involving ground operations in areas distant from Japan. The Far Eastern Axis member started the war with a highly modern merchant marine of 6.7 million tons. Despite the capture of a few hundred thousand tons of neutral and enemy shipping, Japanese losses have been sufficient to reduce the present merchant marine tonnage to not more than 5.7 millions. After allowance is made for existing economic and military requirements, it is thought that some 600,000 tons would be available for a new military venture (see Appendix VIII). If the present estimated high rate of sinkings and low rate of new construction are accurate, even this small surplus would be wiped out by June 1943. There is reason to believe, however, that the now commonly accepted rate of 400,000 tons of merchant ship construction per year—based as it is on a pre-war estimate of Japanese shipbuilding capacity—is considerably short of present Japanese capa-

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bilities. As our own experience shows, shipways can be rapidly constructed and it seems unlikely that a shortage of ship plates, propulsion machinery, other materials and equipment, or manpower would limit our Far Eastern enemy for any long period to this rate. Furthermore, it is probable that the Japanese are substituting rapidly-built wooden ships for steel cargo carriers on every possible route. While the shipping position probably limits to some extent not only military operations but the economic exploitation of conquered territory, it would be wishful thinking to suppose that a continuation of ship sinkings at their present rate will—either in the near or distant future—have decisive effects.

While it can not be asserted with confidence that Japanese naval and air losses and lack of merchant shipping condemn the Far Eastern Axis partner to a fundamentally defensive position, it appears unlikely that it will undertake any one of the four major offensives which, if successful, might decisively improve its strategic position, i. e., offensive against India, Australia, the United Nations' South Pacific supply lines, or Siberia. Action against India or Australia would involve the transportation of large ground forces as well as the use of extensive air and naval strength. Cutting our South Pacific supply lines appears a task too large for present Japanese naval and air strength. As against Siberia the circumstances are now less propitious than four months ago.

But, if Japanese offensive capabilities do not appear to be major, her defensive position and capabilities, on the other hand, have been scarcely called in question. Four months of fighting on the periphery of the newly acquired Japanese empire have yielded a few square miles of territory and, if the air and sea losses inflicted have been heavy, it is rather in relation to the immediate objectives and to the forces involved than in relation to total Japanese strength. In the meantime, the Nipponese have been fortifying and strength-

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ening island bases further north in such fashion as to make the island-by-island approach to the citadel of Far Eastern power an extremely tough one. The engagement of Japanese forces in China and the effective use of Chinese territory for aerial bombardment will require the reconquest of Burma and the reopening of the Burma Road, a difficult task in view of the logistical problems involved in moving large forces from India. From the north, Japan remains practically impregnable as long as Russian territory is not available for United Nations' use. There remains the sea route to Japan proper from Pearl Harbor, an approach requiring overwhelming naval strength not at present at the disposal of the United Nations.

Within the area occupied by Japan are industrial materials adequate, with the principal exception of cotton and copper, for a self-sufficient military power of great strength. The factors which mainly limit the rate of exploitation of this empire are shortages of skilled labor, various types of equipment, and shipping. The principal vulnerability of the area lies in its long lines of sea communications. Information on the speed and efficiency with which Japan is developing the potentialities of its newly acquired empire is almost wholly lacking. It is probable, however, that Japan has increased her peacetime rate of industrial advance; and that the present scale of United Nations activity in the Pacific will not prevent the Japanese from consolidating their gains and adding to their power to wage sustained war.

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APPENDIX I

THE EASTERN FRONT: FROM THE RELIEF OF MOSCOW TO THE RELIEF OF STALINGRAD

I. *The Russian Winter Offensive*

The winter offensive of 1941-42 was undoubtedly the product of excellent timing and judgment of the enemy's capabilities on the part of the Russian High Command. After a summer and autumn of disasters, which had cost the Soviet Union about three and a half million casualties, and the loss in combat of at least 7,000 planes and 8,000 tanks, the defenders of Moscow chose exactly the right moment to strike back. The result was the relief of the Soviet capital, the recapture of Klin, Kalinin, Mozhaisk, and Volkhovstroi, and the creation of a salient in the Valdai Hills-Velikie Luki sector seriously threatening the flank of the German central armies. (See map facing page 26.)

There are those who assert that the final attack on Moscow was never seriously intended, and that the major part of the *Wehrmacht* was already going into winter quarters late in November of 1941. The narrow sweep of the December Panzer encirclement, and the fact that the Germans announced their withdrawal the day after their Japanese allies had irrevocably committed themselves by the attack on Pearl Harbor, have suggested to some that the last offensive was psychological and political rather than military in inspiration.

There is probably an element of truth in these assertions. The attack of late November was a desperate venture, undertaken perhaps against the advice of Hitler's most reliable advisers and conducted with predominantly mechanized forces. It is doubtless true that a large part of the German armies had already retired toward the winter barracks prepared in the vicinity of Smolensk, Vyazma, and other cities to the rear—witness the comparatively small number of troops captured by the Russians in their successful counter-advance, and the fact that once the Germans had reached their previously prepared positions they were able to bring their withdrawal to a halt.

On balance, however, it appears that the final attack was probably a serious effort to reduce Moscow. The collapse of this drive set the seal on the strategic failure of the whole German campaign of 1941. Similarly the Russian winter offensive was of profound moral sig-

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nificance. It not only disproved Nazi claims about the destruction of the Red Army: it also helped to convince the doubting Thomases in the Anglo-American camp that Russia was a good risk, which in return for assistance in planes, trucks, and tanks served to tie down three-quarters of Hitler's army.

The Russian offensive actually lasted less than two months. By early February, the recapture of Mozhaisk had completed the relief of Moscow; the successful landings in the Crimea had eased the pressure on Sevastopol; and the establishment of the Russian salient toward Lozovaya had created a constant threat against Kharkov, the most important city in German hands. At this point, however, the Soviet advance came up against the Nazi winter line. In an irregular arc from Schlüsselburg on Lake Ladoga to Taganrog on the Sea of Azov, the invaders had established a series of almost impregnable hedgehog fortresses—including such advance bastions as Staraya Russa, Rzhev, Vyazma, and Orel. These strong points were prepared to hold out for weeks at a stretch without contact with the outside world and supplied only by air (as actually happened in February and March at Staraya Russa, where the Russians claimed the encirclement of the whole Sixteenth Army). To garrison these fortresses and the lonely village outposts between them, the Germans may have used no more than 40 divisions; perhaps 75-100 more were in reserve in such areas as White Russia and the western Ukraine. The rest of Hitler's army was resting and reequipping in Poland, France and Central Germany.

At the same time, with the coming of the extreme cold, the Russians began to restrict themselves to isolated, semi-guerrilla activities, the establishment of sweeping salients through lightly-held areas, and the cutting of strategic railroads around Rzhev and Kharkov. In an apparent effort to keep up the morale of a home front and of Allies disappointed at the Russian failure to capture these two cities or to liquidate the German resistance at Staraya Russa, the Soviet High Command resorted to "victory by communique" and took refuge in generalities. In brief, the winter offensive was unable to break the German line; it recaptured areas of comparatively minor agricultural and industrial significance.

The winter fighting imposed ghastly hardships on the Nazi soldiers who garrisoned the forward areas, and may have forced the German High Command to bring back from France eight or ten divisions whose rest period had been curtailed. These hardships, however, never

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broke the Nazi armies on the Eastern Front; typhus never reached more than mildly epidemic proportions. The winter offensive was essentially an incomplete victory, but one which assured Russian participation in the war for at least another year.

II. *The German Spring-Housecleaning*

As the thaws of April turned the Russian front into fields of mud in which all action was impossible, interest centered on the convoy route to Murmansk. By early April, Ambassador Standley was able to announce that American deliveries at last equalled our commitments, and the steady arrival of convoys from Britain—as yet with a comparatively low percentage of losses—marked the faint beginnings of an effective cooperation between Russia and the Anglo-Americans. This liaison was to increase in importance until early June when the simultaneous signature of the master lend-lease agreement with the United States and the 20-year mutual assistance pact with Great Britain marked the beginning of the protracted conflict over “the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942.”

Ever since February, the German units that had been resting in the West had been steadily returning to the Russian front. By late April, the ground was presumably dry enough around Kharkov to permit the resumption of major operations. But the expected spring offensive failed to materialize. Until June 28, Hitler restricted himself to local attacks, aiming to straighten his lines by destroying the salients created during the Soviet winter offensive.

To explain this Fabian strategy, some observers have contended that the Nazis were so confident of a rapid victory that they felt they could afford to wait until the season was far enough advanced to permit of an attack all along the line. But the fact that the *Wehrmacht* eventually waged its campaign on the southern front alone would appear to rule out this hypothesis. Others have stated that Timoshenko's Kharkov offensive of late May disorganized the German time-table. Yet this offensive proved to be a most costly operation, in which the Russian advance became overextended, and in which Timoshenko lost perhaps 30 percent of the three armies originally committed. The most likely explanation is that the Germans were actually weaker—especially in air power—than competent American military opinion believed. With the beginning of a large-scale British air offensive in the West, the Nazis were obliged to leave about 1,000 planes in this theater. As a result the Germans had only about 2,400

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first-line planes, with very low reserves, for the Eastern Front as opposed to about 2,500 in the initial establishment, plus adequate reserves, in the previous year. With allowances for routine activity in comparatively quiet areas, the invaders had available sufficient planes for major activities in only one or two sectors at a time. It was not until the last days of the month-long siege of Sevastopol, in which the Germans may have used 900 planes, that the great summer offensive began.

Meantime, the Nazis had proceeded in workmanlike fashion to eliminate the Soviet salients. By May 1, all the major dents in the German lines had disappeared except for the one south of Lake Ilmen, which remained in reduced size all through the summer. On May 19, the last Russians evacuated the Kerch Peninsula. On June 31, Sevastopol fell.

III. *The Don-Caucasus Offensive*

The same factors which had limited German spring operations to local attacks probably dictated the organization of the great summer offensive on a relatively narrow front. Consequently, General von Bock was able to concentrate about 65 divisions—11 of them Panzer units, with about an equal number of motorized and SS divisions—for a three-pronged attack from Kursk to the Sea of Azov. The result was a heavier concentration of mechanized units than had participated in any German attack in 1941. The Russians, whose major forces remained around Moscow, had no alternative but retreat.

As to the skill of Timoshenko's withdrawal, opinions have varied. Some claim that his delay in evacuating the Rostov position forced the bulk of his army to retreat into the Caucasus where it was of no use in defending the main line of resistance at Stalingrad. These critics concede, however, that fewer units were trapped in Rostov than those who remembered the Kiev encirclement of 1941 had anticipated, and that the one major battle of annihilation that Timoshenko suffered was in the Don bend. And even in this latter area, the defenders of Kletskaya met defeat only after postponing for two weeks the attack on Stalingrad. Furthermore, the divisions which escaped south from Rostov, far from being reduced to a disorderly mob, were able to cooperate with the Army of the Caucasus in stemming the German advance at Mozdok and south of Novorossiisk. By mid-September, both in the Caucasus and around Stalingrad, the Nazi offensive had substantially halted.

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In the Caucasus, this halt was largely the result of supply difficulties. At the end of a 400-mile salient, the Germans had behind them a railway net capable of supporting only 20-30 divisions. Furthermore the terrain of the Caucasus foothills favored the Russians, and the recurring factor of air power was a real limitation in an area where the Nazis had available only about half the number of planes they had, concentrated around Stalingrad.

At the Volga River city, the causes of the German failure were more complex. Here also supply difficulties were of prime importance, since the invaders could use only one single-track railway, and the dirt tracks that served as roads over the Don steppes were reduced to quagmires by a few days of rain. The air situation was likewise tight, for the Germans discovered in mid-September that they could not keep up a pace of 1,500 sorties a day. Furthermore, Panzer and blitz tactics were ineffective against an enemy that chose to resist from street to street and from house to house. The Russians, of course, faced equal supply difficulties, since the roads along the Volga and the pontoon bridges for the reinforcement of the city were constantly being interdicted by enemy air attack. But by daring makeshifts and reinforcement operations by night, Timoshenko was able to supply the city and to keep contact with the Russian reserve concentration in the Saratov-Tambov area. About October 1 the arrival of 10 fresh divisions from western Siberia helped to maintain pressure on the German northern flank. Military explanations, however, do not fully account for the epic of Stalingrad. The defense of the Volga River city was an unprecedented triumph of popular courage.

One cannot gauge the magnitude of Hitler's failure without examining the purposes of the great offensive of 1942. Some commentators have maintained that Von Bock's drive was essentially a geopolitical campaign for grain and oil with its ultimate goals at Stalingrad and Baku and as such represented a radical departure from previous German strategy, which had always aimed at the annihilation of the enemy's major forces. Hitler himself has given this interpretation his implied approval. On the other hand, competent analyses of German capabilities have revealed no such crying need for oil as the American press has supposed. In 1942, oil production in Nazi-controlled areas nearly balanced consumption, and a slight rise in production, exclusive of the North Caucasus, is anticipated for 1943.

Furthermore, the Axis timetable produced by Stalin in his anniversary address last November called for a vast encircling movement

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on Moscow, coupled with a thrust toward the Trans-Caucasus, which was to have brought the Germans to Stalingrad by July 25, to Arzamas (250 miles east of Moscow) by September 10, and to Baku by September 25. This timetable largely coincides with the plan which many American military observers were attributing to the Germans as late as last June, despite the fact that the delay in launching a "spring" offensive had already suggested that Hitler might be intending something less than a victory of annihilation.

On the basis of evidence now available, it is impossible to judge the extent of the German objectives for 1942. It seems obvious, however, that a battle of annihilation around Moscow—where perhaps 40 percent of the Russian forces remained concentrated last September—represented the only way the Germans could have eliminated the Soviet Union from the war before the power of the United States became a major factor on the European continent. And it is difficult to see how under any more limited plan the Nazi leaders hoped to bring the war as a whole to a victorious conclusion. Stalin's hypothesis, then, appears the more logical. On the other hand, the hypothesis of a limited objective represents an estimate of German weakness pregnant with possibilities for 1943.

Even on this narrower basis, Hitler's achievements in 1942 fell far short of his goal. In the months of July, August, and September, the Germans may have lost 2,100 tanks, 3,565 planes, and 450,000 men (killed, missing, and permanently disabled). Stalingrad and Baku remain in Soviet hands. The Volga will probably be open to Russian traffic next spring. While the Germans have denied to the Soviet Union the steel capacity of Rostov and Stalingrad (with a 1937 production of 4,000 tons of finished steel daily in one plant alone), the complete destruction of plant, at least at Stalingrad, has left the invaders little aggregate gain. Neither the Germans nor the Russians for the present can use the crude oil output and crude refining capacity of the Maikop area, which represent approximately 9 and 11 percent respectively of the Soviet Union's total resources. The grain of the Kuban is perhaps the most serious loss which the Russians have suffered in 1942. Yet the summer harvest was almost complete when the invaders arrived, and with the evacuation of most of the tractors, draft animals, and able-bodied men, the 1943 crop will probably fall notably below that of previous years.

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IV. After Stalingrad.

By mid-November, the number of Axis divisions in and around Stalingrad, which in September had totalled perhaps 30, had fallen off sharply. Although Hitler did not publicly admit it, he had already implicitly recognized the failure of his 1942 campaign, and by sending his soldiers into winter quarters somewhat earlier than in 1941 was seeking to avert the calamities that had befallen them during their first winter in Russia. And as in 1941, the Red Army struck back at the very moment when its enemies had begun to waver. The result was the relief offensive north and south of Stalingrad, and the development of the secondary offensive which had been in progress on the Kalinin front ever since August into a considerable effort threatening the security of the German anchor at Rzhev.

The original pincers attack on the southern front apparently aimed simply to relieve Stalingrad and the Volga. The two more recent offensives—one south along the Voronezh-Rostov railway, and one against the tip of the German Caucasus salient—are more extensive in scope, strongly suggesting that the Red Army will attempt to reduce Rostov and liquidate the whole Caucasus position this winter. If the Russians could virtually annihilate the 20-odd Axis divisions around Stalingrad, and the 50-odd divisions in the North Caucasus, they would cripple the *Wehrmacht's* offensive power. In this area the weather will be suitable for large-scale Soviet operations all winter. In the center and north, however, the experience of last year would indicate that from February on, the Russians will probably concentrate on harassing and infiltration, and that the Germans may be able to hold substantially the same winter line as in 1942.

Whatever the Soviet High Command decides will depend to a great extent on the attitude of its Allies and on the requirements of coalition warfare. The "crisis of the United Nations" last summer shook relations between Russia and the Anglo-Americans to their depths, and its effects have not yet completely disappeared. After the disastrous experience of the June-July convoy to Archangel, no further convoys went through until September. And the press campaign for a second front—which reached a crescendo in October long after the Soviet leaders had learned of the Anglo-American plans for November—evidently reflected Stalin's dissatisfaction with what Churchill had told him in August—that the second front for 1942 would be in Africa and not on the European continent.

Since the African invasion, the Russian attitude toward Britain

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and the United States has been somewhat warmer, and comment on the Darlan question was notably restrained. Yet the Kremlin can hardly fail to remember that the appeasers of the past were frequently advocates of conservative cooperation against the "Communist menace." While the Russians are apparently prepared to commit their ultimate reserves in the most far-reaching military and political offensive of the United Nations effort, the mutual scepticism and incomplete understanding between the Soviet Union and its Allies may well remain the major problem of the war—and of the peace to follow.

APPENDIX II

THE MEDITERRANEAN FRONT: 1942

The Axis position in the Mediterranean has now fallen to its lowest point since the war began. Despite various reversals of the pendulum in Libya, the total Axis position in the Mediterranean had grown steadily stronger since Italy's entrance into the war, reaching its peak last July when Rommel threatened the Middle East. Today Hitler is struggling not to control North Africa or the Middle East, but to maintain a foothold across the Sicilian narrows in order to deny the Allies use of the Mediterranean for assault on the continent of Europe.

At no time, however, has the Axis made a total effort to develop its potential position in the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern theater. Specifically, German commitments in this arena have never been large, and at each critical juncture German strategy has treated this as a theater of secondary importance.

Attack and Counterattack in Libya

The years 1940, 1941, and 1942 have all closed with British counterattacks driving the enemy from Egypt across the Cyrenaican hump to El Agheila. General Wavell's offensive of December, 1940, repelled the first Italian advance into Egypt; but, following the arrival in Tripoli of the German Afrika Korps in February, 1941, and the diversion of Allied forces for the Balkan campaign, the enemy again drove to the Egyptian frontier one week before Germany opened her

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attack on Russia. Here Rommel halted until forced back by General Auchinleck's offensive of November, 1941, which relieved Tobruk after six months of siege. This, the "Fourth Libyan Campaign," carried the British to the El Agheila region in January, 1942, before losses, tactical errors, and problems of supply caused their withdrawal to the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line from which Rommel eventually launched his summer offensive.

This pattern of attack and counterattack in Libya was possible because—given the few divisions involved and the mobile conditions of desert warfare—a slight advantage of strength or supply, or a single tactical judgment could result in a spectacular advance. Yet none of these campaigns produced decisive results, because none annihilated the enemy's forces. Both sides, however, were slowly but steadily raising the ante. The battles and the stakes had grown apace by the time the campaigns of 1942 began.

Azis Mediterranean Peak

All during last winter Allied capitals were apprehensive lest the Axis use the period of reduced activity on the Russian front to undertake major operations in the Mediterranean. Fears were widespread of either an Axis movement into French North Africa or a drive on the Suez Canal to clear the Mediterranean and possibly the Middle East. The Axis concentrated in the islands of Crete and the Aegean a total of about 90,000 men, and stepped up its propaganda to the Arab world. The Italian Navy, having repaired much of the damage suffered at Taranto, came to enjoy a relatively better position than at any time since Italy's entrance into the war. Britain, although sending men and planes to Libya, was forced to divert strength to the Far East at this time. The British naval position in the Mediterranean, which had never fully recovered from the Battle of Crete, had deteriorated sharply, and Malta was virtually neutralized by incessant air raids. In February only five to ten percent of Axis shipping en route to North Africa was being sunk.

But the Axis made no move to use the winter months for operations in the Mediterranean. German strategy apparently called for conservation and concentration on the coming campaign in southern Russia—rather than exploitation of its Mediterranean potential. A limited flow of supplies and reinforcements to Rommel was the only exception.

By May the latter had accumulated sufficient strength to reopen

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the Battle of Libya. When the Afrika Korps swept around the southern end of the Allied line at Bir Hacheim on May 26, its immediate objectives were probably only the reduction of growing British striking power and the capture of Tobruk as a basis for future operations. However, after narrowly averting entrapment east of the minefields, Rommel achieved such spectacular success against British armor on June 12-13 that the way was open to Egypt. Tobruk fell by storm on June 20, with heavy losses in men and stores. Faced with encirclement at the frontier and again at Matruh, the remnants of the Eighth Army finally fell back at the end of June to the El Alamein line. Only the coverage provided by the RAF made possible this withdrawal. Here fatigue, supply problems, and British reinforcements halted Rommel's advance at the gateway to the Middle East.

This was the high tide of Axis success in the Mediterranean. The Eighth Army had dwindled from 125,000 men to considerably less than half that number, and losses in tanks and guns had been even more severe. This situation made necessary a transfer of forces that seriously reduced the already weak Ninth and Tenth Armies in Syria and Iraq-Iran. All heavy units of the British Mediterranean fleet had to be withdrawn, and Alexandria and the French ships interned there were in peril. The Arab world appeared ready to receive the Axis in the Middle East. Turkey asserted her determination to resist any attack, but she was threatened by Axis pincers advancing through the Caucasus and Egypt. In the west Italian war morale skyrocketed, and collaborationist groups in France and Spain were notably strengthened.

Berlin's Higher Strategy

Yet even at this juncture Berlin neither gave Rommel the reinforcements needed for a break-through, nor attempted any other operation against the Middle East. Observers estimate that two armored divisions, together with adequate air power, might have been enough to turn the tide in Egypt. Yet neither in July nor again in early September (when Rommel made his last abortive attack) did the Axis make available the margin of strength needed for victory.

Primary in this turn of German strategy was the fact that both in 1941 and 1942 Rommel reached Egypt in the same week that Germany opened her offensives against the Soviet. The magnitude of commitments on the Russian front probably precluded any simulta-

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neous operations against Turkey or Cyprus and Syria, and may have weighed against diversion of air or armored strength to Africa. Some observers suggest that ample forces and air power for operations in Egypt were at hand, but that supply and terrain were the limiting factors. The Axis situation in supply and in fuel and servicing facilities for aircraft was continually tight; but an ample margin of Italian (and if needed Vichy) shipping was always available, if the Axis had ever decided on major operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

The enemy's decision was rather part of its total plan of operations, and indicates that the German High Command—whatever might be Italy's stake in this theater—did not feel the war could be won here. Accordingly, beset by the two-front "lesson" of the last war and anticipating the requirements of 1943, Germany never committed more than four divisions in Africa, prior to the Allied landing in the West. Her commitments in air power have been larger, but still secondary. She has been content to maintain a force sufficient to deny the United Nations the use of the North African littoral as a bridgehead for attack on Europe; and sufficient to force the Allies to send men, materiel, and shipping 12,000 miles around Africa to check Rommel's army, supplied by interior lines only 1,500 miles from Germany.

In the last analysis the strategists in Berlin perhaps made two basic errors in judgment. First, they may have failed to appreciate the long range importance of driving the United Nations from the Mediterranean and Middle East. Second, they apparently did not assess accurately the latest growth in the power of the Eighth Army, both in material resources and in its command of the tactics and problems of desert warfare.

The British Offensive

In the months from July to October the Eighth Army increased from less than 50,000 men to more than ten combat divisions and received significant reinforcements of new equipment, including American M-3 and M-4 tanks. The RAF and Ninth Air Force were greatly expanded in size and range of operations. At the same time reinforcements brought the Tenth Army in Iraq-Iran from a "blueprint" Army to very substantial fighting strength. In August Churchill effected a change in command that turned over the forces in Egypt to Generals Alexander and Montgomery, men who had learned the lessons of Libya.

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During the summer both sides awaited reinforcement. The British twice felt out enemy positions, but neither side possessed sufficient advantage for a major offensive. The scope of Allied air war mounted sharply, and told heavily on enemy supply lines. Three thousand tons of bombs were dropped on Tobruk alone in the three months after its fall. In early September Rommel made a final effort to reduce Britain's growing striking power. His forces had increased to 70,000-85,000 combat troops, over half of them German, and he probably had 400-500 tanks. He was denied any large scale air reinforcement, however, and the British won a tactical victory.

It was this force that General Montgomery routed in the offensive that began on October 23. Taking full advantage of the enemy's failure to concentrate his forces in the northern sector, the British worked their way through the fixed defenses at El Alamein, defeated the enemy's armor, and then advanced almost 800 miles in 29 days. The Axis left on the Alamein battlefield seven or eight much reduced Italian divisions that had been in the front line, several German Battle Groups, and most of the 164th German Infantry Division. The British, however, were never able to encircle the depleted Afrika Korps and other remnants which retreated to El Agheila. Axis forces at this point, augmented by two fresh Italian divisions and other units, were estimated at 35,000 combat troops and 100 tanks.

When Berlin apparently decided to concentrate reinforcements in Tunisia, Rommel was obliged to withdraw from the strong natural defenses of the El Agheila region. Although he thereby lengthened British lines of communication another 250 miles while easing his own fuel, supply, and transport problems, his present positions are vulnerable to outflanking movements whenever the British are able to renew the attack. It therefore seems doubtful that the enemy will be able to hold Tripoli indefinitely; but a delaying defense to the east of this port may be expected, for with Tripoli as a forward base, the Allies could close the pincers on Tunisia, moving forward by sea the extensive supplies accumulated in Egypt.

Allied Operations in Northwest Africa

On the heels of the British break-through in Egypt, American land, sea, and air forces—aided by the RAF and the Royal Navy—made multiple landings in French North Africa at 3:00 a. m. on November 8. Resistance was offered chiefly by French naval forces and coastal artillery, and by troops under Noguès' command. Algiers

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capitulated that evening, and three days later Admiral Darlan gave the general order to cease firing.

Elements of the British First Army and an American armored force promptly pushed eastward into Tunisia in an effort to forestall the establishment of a major Axis bridgehead. Although lacking forward air bases, small Allied forces advanced as far as Mateur and Djedeida by November 30. Here they were halted. During December 1-6 the Djedeida column was driven back along the Medjerda Valley west of Tebourba with substantial losses in armor, trucks, and guns. This closed the initial phase of the Tunisian campaign. With the enemy established in relative force in strong positions, the Allies paused to bring forward over tenuous lines the reinforcements and supplies, and to organize the air bases and ferry-services needed for large-scale operations.

Apparently not absolutely certain of just where and when the Allies were going to land, the Axis had shifted no large forces to Africa before November 8. It had previously concentrated submarines for the attack and enlarged its air forces and air facilities in Sicily and Italy. Not until November 10, it appears, did the airborne movement to Tunisia begin. Since that time, in addition to strengthening the defenses of southern Europe, the Axis has moved to impose a maximum delay on the Allied conquest of Tunisia, for the immediate purpose of denying us both passage through the Mediterranean and air bases for sustained attacks on Sicily, Italy, and southern Europe.

Enemy forces in Tunisia, estimated at 8,000-10,000 combat troops on November 16, had increased to almost 40,000 a month later. Most of this force was concentrated in northeastern Tunisia, with small forces at strategic points southward along the coast and the east-west roads. German combat air power in the Italy-Sicily-Sardinia region has been increased by several hundred planes since early fall, though this transfer has been partly cancelled by losses in Libya.

If the Germans consider that the objective justifies the expenditure of strength, ample forces should be available. The limiting factors are transport and supply, especially the small capacity of the African ports at the disposition of the Axis.

Assuming that Russia continues to contain the mass of German strength, and that Allied tonnage continues to flow to North Africa, the United Nations should be able to isolate and eliminate this Axis toehold. But even should the enemy maintain a foothold in Tunisia into the spring, it may be possible from bases all along North Africa

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to impose a diversion of strength and a rate of air attrition that the Axis can not afford in the face of 1943's demands.

The Mediterranean Scene at the End of 1942

This reversal of the Axis position from the high tide of July had important effects on all the watching, wavering countries of the Mediterranean, although only in France did spectacular consequences follow. Here Germany had maintained Laval in power since April because he offered them more in the way of security and supply at less cost than any other alternative. With the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany was compelled to occupy and fortify southern France. The scuttling of Toulon denied the Axis an important potential addition to its naval power. Our friends in France were enormously encouraged by the American landing, and a more united French front should follow the reestablishment of Giraud.

Upon Italy has fallen the full impact of the Allied offensives in Africa. After 30 months of war, Italy has lost her Empire and now faces a grim winter under heavy air attack. High Italian officials are undoubtedly bitter over Hitler's policy of playing with France, which prevented the defense of North Africa against the present developments. General morale in Italy is low, but that of the armed forces is apparently better. The Italian Navy is strong in numbers (except in cruisers) but its strategic position has been weakened by increased threat of air attack. Its commanders will probably be no more anxious than in the past to take the offensive, but in defensive operations, the Italian Navy is expected to fight vigorously. Although its conservative officer corps is traditionally tied to the monarchy, the modern Navy is a Fascist creation both in ships and function, and observers feel that it considers its fate identified with that of the present Government. In general, there is no reason to believe that Mussolini's regime is in danger, especially as long as German "influence" is present.

Germany has waged a war of nerves against Spain and against the Allies with regard to Spain's fate and Spain's position in the war; but the Franco Government, relieved by President Roosevelt's assurances, has cautiously trimmed its sails away from nonbelligerency in the direction of strict neutrality—a trend that has been under way since the eclipse of Serrano Suñer in September. The Spanish Foreign Minister has assured us "direct from Franco" that Spain will resist German pressure. Observers who even two months ago were

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questioning whether Germany would disperse her strength by undertaking operations through Spain (in the face of the known difficulties of logistics, terrain, and guerrilla opposition) now feel that developments on the Russian front make any such action highly improbable.

In the Near East, our successes in North Africa halted the progressive decline of Allied prestige in the Arab world. The change of fortune has not, however, resulted in any flocking to the Allied cause. Long standing nationalist issues remain to the fore, and the wheat problem throughout the Middle East is of mounting gravity. Turkey has been elated at our success and there are indications that, if the trend of events continues, Turkey might in 1943 deviate from her past policy of absolute neutrality. Such a development might create a serious challenge to the difficult Axis position in the Balkans.

The net Axis position in the Mediterranean, then, is notably weaker than six months ago. Its enormous logistical advantage has been reduced with the establishment of an Allied front whose supply lines are about 8,000 miles shorter than the vulnerable route around Africa to Egypt. Furthermore, during the winter season, which Germany has in the past devoted to building up her war potential, the Axis must now construct defenses and divert strength to the long southern European front. Germany has had to increase her plane commitments in this theater, for example, by about 500 additional combat and 200 transport aircraft. At the same time fears that the Nazis would strike through Turkey or Spain have been substantially allayed by the absence of German preparations. It now appears, therefore, that the Axis will limit its counter-measures in the Mediterranean to a determined stand in Tunisia, conserving its forces for the land and air battles of 1943 on the continent of Europe.

APPENDIX III

THE AIR OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST

Throughout 1942 the RAF maintained a strong night and day offensive against German-occupied Europe. With the *Luftwaffe* restricted largely to defensive operations, the British metropolitan air force, later joined by the USAAF, conducted extensive bomber and fighter forays against enemy objectives ranging from Norway to Italy.

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Night Operations

In the first eleven months of the year, the Bomber Command of the RAF despatched some 26,000 aircraft on night raids of which the vast majority were directed against cities in Germany proper (excluded from this summary are those raids in which fewer than 25 planes participated). During this period, bombing missions were undertaken on 135 nights; an average of 190 planes was engaged on each of these nights. More than 30,000 tons of bombs, divided about equally between high explosives and incendiaries, were released on German objectives in these night sorties. French, Belgian, and Dutch targets received 3,500 tons of bombs, while 1,900 tons were released over Italy (Table I).

Increasing in scope and intensity, the bomber offensive reached its peak in June, when an average of more than 300 planes was despatched on operational nights. In the final months of the period the scale of night operations declined sharply owing, in part, to unfavorable weather conditions.

While shipping installations and German naval vessels in Occupied France were attacked frequently in the initial months, major night raids were subsequently directed against objectives in Germany. Systematic bombing of Italy, planned to coincide with military events in North Africa and designed to exploit the lengthening period of darkness, began in late October.

An outstanding feature of night operations was the initiation of 1,000-plane raids, three of which were directed against Cologne, Essen and Bremen during May and June. Two raids on Düsseldorf and one each on Hamburg and Bremen, involving 639, 476, 425, and 446 planes, respectively, took place in the three months following the 1,000-plane raids. These, and the earlier attacks upon Lübeck and Rostock, were reported to have been the most effective raids of the 1942 offensive. Essen, Bremen, and Cologne, in that order, were the most frequently and most heavily raided German cities. Essen alone was favored with 17 night attacks, while Cologne, on May 30, received the heaviest weight of attack on a single night when 1,500 tons of bombs were released over the city.

Bombing Policy

Area bombing, as contrasted with precision bombing, continued to characterize the RAF's night bombing policy. With but few exceptions, no effort was made to hit specific military or industrial objec-

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tives. The heaviest weight of attack was generally levelled against compact residential areas with the intention of maximizing indirect industrial damage through the destruction of housing, transportation, and communication facilities, etc. In some instances, however, additional bombers were directed against important plants in or near the target city, such as the Heinkel works at Rostock or the Fiat factories in Turin.

This adherence to an area-bombing policy resulted in the employment of heavier bombs, larger bombers, and a greater proportion of incendiary bombs. The use of 4,000-pound H. E. "block busters," particularly effective against residential areas, increased nine- or ten-fold between January and October. Eight thousand-pound H. E. and 4,000-pound incendiary bombs were introduced on a limited scale late in the year.

The type of plane used by the RAF Bomber Command changed markedly during the year. Four-engine Lancasters, Stirlings, and Halifaxes rapidly replaced the two-engine Manchesters, Whitleys, and Hampdens, which had constituted the RAF's early equipment. In January only 4 percent of the planes despatched were four-motor bombers; by October this figure had been raised to 68 percent and by November to 84 percent.

In a similar manner, the average bomb load of planes participating in night raids on Germany increased from 1.4 tons in January to 2.2 tons in October and November. The more extensive use of the four-engine planes with larger bomb-carrying capacities, the employment of heavier bombs, and an increase in the size of the bomb bay of individual planes, all contributed to the increased bomb-load.

Approximately 4½ percent of the planes despatched against Germany failed to return to their bases, but casualty rates among planes sent over France, the Low Countries, and Italy were considerably lower. There is some evidence of a gradual trend upward in casualty rates of planes raiding Germany. This may be attributable to quantitative and qualitative improvements in German anti-aircraft defenses.

The laying of sea mines and sowing of propaganda leaflets continued to play an important role in night operations. More than 4,200 planes were despatched on mine-laying flights on 160 nights during the first eleven months of 1942. They extended over a wide area from the Bay of Biscay to the North and Baltic Seas, the Helgoland Bight, and the Skagarrak and Kattegat. Six hundred planes despatched on 95 nights dropped leaflets on Germany, Occupied and

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Unoccupied France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. In July, 33 million were dropped, in August, 23 million, and in November, the month of the Allied invasion of North Africa, 42 million.

Daylight Operations

More varied but less intensive were the RAF Bomber Command's daylight activities which, unlike the night operations, comprised low or high level precision bombing.

Objectives in Occupied France and the Low Countries were mainly industrial targets such as power stations, docks, shipping installations, enemy naval vessels, and airdromes. Thirteen hundred planes, mostly Boston and Mosquito Bombers, frequently accompanied by fighter escort, were despatched on 100 attacks in this area; but less than 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the targets. The most striking daylight raid was the long-distance attack by 88 Lancasters on the Schneider-Creusot Works.

Daylight raids on Germany and Italy were less frequent, and seldom involved forces of any consequence. Fewer than 600 planes were sent over Germany in 70 daylight bomber operations, during which not more than 500 tons of bombs were released.

On August 17, the 8th Bomber Command of the USAAF joined in the daylight sorties against Western Europe. By the end of November more than 1,000 B-17's and B-24's, usually with fighter escort, had been despatched on 21 high-altitude, precision bombing missions against harbor installations, submarine pens, airdromes, and power stations in occupied territory. Greatest of the raids was that of October 9, when 115 bombers were directed against the Fives Lille Steel and Engineering Works.

Operations of the RAF Fighter Command were manifold. They ranged from frequent escort of RAF and USAAF bombers to regular offensive sweeps of areas in which enemy fighters were concentrated but where serious opposition was rarely encountered. American P-38's and Eagle Spitfires joined in these activities. United Nations fighter planes also engaged in diversionary sweeps to draw off enemy fighters and in bombing operations aimed at railroad installations, locomotives, and military centers.

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TABLE I.—RAF night bomber operations, January–November, 1942¹

Month	Total aircraft despatched	Number of nights of operations	Average number aircraft per night of operations	Average percent casualties		Bombs dropped (metric tons)			
				Germany and Italy	France	Germany and Italy		France	
						H. E.	I. B.	H. E.	I. B.
January.....	1,908	38	108	3.7	0.7	500	90	1,100	90
February.....	810	11	74	1.1	1.4	500	100
March.....	1,768	9	197	4.1	0.7	1,200	450	800
April.....	3,331	18	180	3.9	1.9	1,500	1,200	600
May.....	2,180	30	215	4.8	2.7	1,000	1,300	200
June.....	4,294	14	307	4.8	1,900	3,900
July.....	3,294	11	304	4.1	3,900	1,800
August.....	2,090	12	172	5.2	1,950	1,500
September.....	2,973	11	270	5.0	2,300	2,400
October.....	1,753	10	173	4.4	1,200	1,500
November.....	1,414	10	141	2.7	1,200	1,000

¹ Nights of operation where less than 25 planes were despatched are not included. The figures presented in the table are based on preliminary reports.

APPENDIX IV

GERMAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Any estimate of the productive potential of the German economy during 1943 must be framed in terms of certain assumptions concerning the size of the forthcoming Nazi military effort. The only generalizations that appear feasible within this context are very broad ones: namely, that if the Nazis remain largely on the defensive and if they are not severely pressed in Europe itself, they should be able to strengthen considerably their productive position, whereas, if they attack in Russia or elsewhere on a scale comparable to that of 1942, or if the Allies open a continental front in Europe, the effectiveness of their forces will be perceptibly impaired by deficiencies in the output of certain military items. Moreover, military operations of these dimensions would in turn reduce Germany's economic capacity to wage war on a comparable scale in the succeeding year.

Manpower

Our first assumption of German defensive operations in the East and of no Allied offensive on the continent carries with it the estimate

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that the Germans would thus be able to reduce safely the size of their armed forces by some 1,500,000 men in 1943: permanent losses, which might be expected to amount to some 1,000,000 men in 1943 under this assumption, could be allowed to go unreplaced, and 500,000 soldiers could be given "industrial furloughs." This would permit the disposition of 130 divisions to hold the Eastern Front, 45 divisions to man the West and the Mediterranean littoral, and 75 divisions for garrison and line-of-communications duty. Table I indicates the German labor position under these assumptions:

TABLE I.—Labor Force in Germany, November 1942–November 1943 (Assumption: Germany on Defensive, no Major Attacks by United Nations)

[In thousands]			
	Total	Male	Female
A. Position as of November 1942:			
1. Germans, normal working population.....	28,280	13,510	14,770
2. Internal recruits.....	940	290	650
3. Disabled veterans.....	710	710
4. Foreign civilians.....	2,920	2,270	650
5. Prisoners of war.....	1,500	1,500
Total.....	34,350	18,280	16,070
B. Net change, November 1942–November 1943:			
1. Furloughed from armed forces.....	+500	+500
2. Natural growth.....	+125	+100	+25
3. Internal recruits.....	+100	+100
4. Disabled veterans.....	+640	+640
5. Foreign civilians.....	+300	+200	+100
6. Prisoners of war.....
Total.....	+1,665	+1,440	+225

If, on the other hand, Germany renews her offensive or is subjected to severe Allied pressure, she may require anywhere from 150 to 200 divisions in the East, 45 to 95 divisions in the West and along the Mediterranean, and some 75 divisions for garrison and line-of-communications duty. Moreover, activity on such a scale should boost permanent losses to perhaps 1,500,000, and, contrary to the situation envisaged under our former assumption, these losses would have to be currently replaced. Withdrawals from the civilian labor force, rather than industrial furloughs for the *Wehrmacht*, would consequently be necessary. The estimated net numerical decline in the German working force, after allowing for new entrants, would be no more

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than about one percent; but in terms of "effective replacement value," the decline might total 2.5 percent, since the induction of 1,500,000 able-bodied laborers into the armed forces would lower by a good 1.5 percent the qualitative average of the remaining aggregation of German workers, disabled veterans, foreign civilians, and prisoners of war. Attempts by the Germans to compensate for these losses by increased recruitment of non-German workers from Axis Europe would undoubtedly meet with even more stubborn resistance if the *Wehrmacht* appeared to be hard-pressed on one or more major fronts and if the Reich itself came under heavy and persistent attack from the air. In Table II, the position of the German labor force under this second set of "offensive" assumptions is estimated:

TABLE II.—Labor force in Germany, November 1942–November 1943 (Assumption: Germany on offensive or heavily attacked by United Nations)

[In thousands]

	Total	Male	Female
A. Position as of November 1942:			
1. Germans, normal working population.....	28, 280	13, 510	14, 770
2. Internal recruits.....	940	290	650
3. Disabled veterans.....	710	710	—
4. Foreign civilians.....	2, 920	2, 270	650
5. Prisoners of war.....	1, 500	1, 500	—
Total.....	34, 350	18, 280	16, 070
B. Net change, November 1942–November 1943:			
1. Replacement of permanent losses.....	-1, 500	-1, 500	—
2. Natural growth.....	+125	+100	+25
3. Internal recruits.....	+100	—	+100
4. Disabled veterans.....	+840	+840	—
5. Foreign civilians.....	+300	+200	+100
6. Prisoners of war.....	—	—	—
Total.....	-335	-560	+225

Strategic Materials

Apart from the unpredictable effects of 1943's bombing raids on Axis Europe, Germany's supplies of strategic raw materials would appear, on the whole, to be sufficient for her essential military and industrial needs. The copper position can be described as "extremely tight and still deteriorating"; chromite supplies depend to a critical degree on the Clodius Agreement with Turkey; tungsten requirements must be met in part by blockade-running. But there seem to be

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sufficient supplies of rubber, coal and coke (if the ovens in the Ruhr-Rhineland area are not too severely damaged by bombs), iron, steel, manganese, magnesium, aluminum, lead, and zinc. Chemical production will apparently be adequate in 1943. If the Nazis can exploit successfully Finland's Petsamo mines, enough nickel can be acquired to meet the war economy's reduced requirements. The German position in antimony is strained but not apt to be critical in 1943; there will probably be enough tin to meet basic requirements through 1943, but after that only by blockade-running. Present and expected supplies of molybdenum will suffice; but if the Caucasus were lost, the situation would become noticeably tighter, and if both Caucasian and Norwegian sources were cut off, Germany would be left with supplies adequate to meet only 20 percent of her requirements.

As for oil, the Axis position appears to be in a tenable balance. Although stocks are low, new supplies of petroleum and its substitutes are, in fact, expected to be larger in 1943 than in 1942. More motor vehicles will be adapted to run on solid and gaseous substitutes, freeing liquid fuel for other uses. Full operation of the new hydrogenation plants at Bruex, Blechhammer, and perhaps elsewhere should bring a considerable rise in the output of synthetic oil—as should the opening in the course of the year of more plants using the Fischer-Tropsch process. Moreover, exploitation of the captured fields at Maikop may yield anywhere from one to two million tons next year.

As a result, unless Allied bombing interferes, the Axis can look forward to an increase of 2,500,000 to 3,500,000 tons in its supply of petroleum products and substitutes. Since 1942 saw no significant withdrawals from Axis oil stocks, this prospective rise in output in 1943 should provide a large margin for expanded military operations.

Transportation

The inland transport position of Axis Europe hinges to a significant degree upon the extent of German military operations in the East. The task of supplying the Eastern Front in 1942 engaged about 13 percent of all Axis locomotives, and 10 percent of all freight cars. If, after withdrawing from their advanced positions in the south, the Nazis should merely maintain a shortened defensive line through 1943, only about half as much rolling stock would be required to supply the front. Even the opening of a "Western Front" in Europe by the

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Allies might not offset such a gain, since the supply of a division on a western front would call for only a third of the locomotives and freight cars needed to supply an equally active division facing the Russians.

Under these assumptions, the 200,000 freight cars and 6,000 locomotives scheduled to be built in 1943 would, after the first half of the year, release the Axis rail-transport position from the worst of its strain. A small reserve capacity in the transport facilities of inland waterways would probably be offset by reductions in Mediterranean coastal shipping.

If, however, German military activity increased in 1943 above the scale of 1942, without any compensating shift of that activity to nearer fronts, the burden placed on inland transport would necessitate reductions in the volume of industrial and civilian freight hauled. This reduction might be further accentuated if Allied air attacks took on greater proportions than the present "locomotive hunts."

Military Supplies: Aircraft

An acute shortage of skilled labor—aggravated by the *Luftwaffe's* need for trained maintenance and repair men in the newly-extended Mediterranean air theatre—will probably prevent the Germans from expanding their output of combat planes in 1943 much beyond their present production rate of about 1,300 per month. Moreover, bombing raids by the Allies, which hitherto have had but a limited effect on German plane output, may increase sufficiently in weight and in precision during the coming year to check any rise in production, if not actually to lower it.

To these factors may be added the effects on output of a possible large-scale change-over in plane models. Basic models for the *Luftwaffe's* present aircraft were, with a few exceptions, developed in 1940-41, and many of them may now be regarded as obsolescent in relation to recent United Nations designs. If Germany in 1943 attempts to put new models into production on a major scale, the labor and machine tools available to turn out present models will be reduced, and output will, for a time, decline. On the other hand, a change in emphasis from bombers to fighters—in line with a policy of defense—might eventually allow a higher number of planes to be produced each month, since fighters call for fewer man-hours of labor than do heavy bombers.

Despite the adoption of a policy of plane conservation and the grant of "high priority" to the plane industry, the *Luftwaffe's* recent

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rates of loss have somewhat exceeded its rates of production. On balance, it would seem likely that, with increasing pressure from the Allied air forces, German air operations will be limited by the dearth of reserve strength and by the difficulty of expanding production.

Submarines

Steady expansion of Germany's submarine construction capacity from early 1940 until the autumn of 1941 made possible a rise in the rate of completions in 1942, so that the monthly rate now fluctuates around 25. During the late spring and summer of 1942, however, failure to keep the rate of crews trained up to the rate of submarines completed resulted in a corresponding increase in the backlog of uncommissioned boats. Recent efforts to break this bottleneck may prevent any actual decrease over the year in the rate of submarine accretions.

Prospects for 1943 launchings depend primarily on increases in shipyard capacity effected in 1942, balanced against last summer's bombing of submarine ways. Between March and June of 1942, the number of ways apparently rose 10 percent—which would normally result in an enlarged number of submarine launchings early in 1943. But, while an exact appraisal of bomb damage wrought last year is impossible, it seems quite possible that the Allied raids may have prevented that anticipated rise in the rate of launchings.

Tanks

If Germany confines her military operations to defensive efforts or to limited offensives on the scale of last summer's campaign, the *Wehrmacht's* present tank strength—some 17,000—plus current output, should be sufficient. But if Germany anticipates either launching or having to resist a full-scale offensive, she would have difficulty in revamping her obsolescent tank models, without curtailment of even current rates of output. Further improvements in armor and armament can no longer be readily superimposed on those basic tank designs developed in 1938-39. But a thorough change-over in production would call for substantial quantities of skilled labor—at a time when submarine, aircraft, and locomotive construction are presumably to be stepped up. If, to take only one competitor, the locomotive program of some 6,000 units a year were to be pushed, it would render out of the question a significant output of newly-designed tanks.

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Guns, Ammunition, Explosives

Although the lack of satisfactory data on holdings, wastage, losses, and production makes any estimate of the German armament position extremely hazardous, certain new demands on the Nazis' gun production that may appear in 1943 can be noted. Large quantities of all types of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns will be needed to meet present strategic requirements. Moreover, Germany's industry will have to meet increased requirements for new and improved anti-aircraft batteries for use not only within the Reich but in the Balkans and Italy. It may be necessary, too, to produce more heavy guns for fixed fortifications in France and elsewhere.

As for ammunition, it appears that the *Wehrmacht* is assured of an adequate supply in 1943. Germany's engineering industries are under increasing strain, and deficiencies may develop in lead, antimony, or high-grade steel; but apart from some technical difficulties attending the substitution of gilded or lacquered steel for brass, and the replacement of copper by soft iron or bimetallic driving bands, these factors are not expected significantly to affect the output of projectiles this year.

Trucks

Should Germany be allowed to remain during the coming year on the "stationary defensive," her supply of lorries will probably prove entirely adequate. If, however, Germany either chooses, or is forced, to engage in military operations in 1943 on the scale of 1942, her deficit of motor trucks will become serious enough to affect markedly the mobility of her armies.

Increased truck production is no longer possible except at the direct expense of other essential military items. The number of lorries in civilian use within the Reich has already been whittled down to its minimum, nor would it be possible to withdraw any sizeable number of trucks from civil use in occupied countries without seriously impairing the efficiency of those states in producing for the Axis.

Civilian Supplies

Though food supplies in the second half of 1943 will be largely determined by the unpredictable size of that year's crops, it would seem reasonable to estimate that even a subnormal harvest will leave the Germans with sufficient food supplies for a diet adequate in energy content, though perhaps deficient in relation to long-run nutritional

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needs. At all events, the Nazis have themselves emphasized that as long as there is food in Europe, it will go first to the Germans; and among the Germans, soldiers and munitions workers will be the last to go without. Rations as established on October 19, 1942 apparently assured an average intake of approximately 2,450 calories per capita per day. As the rations allotted to the German population in 1917-18 allowed only about 1,500 calories, the Germans would seem to have a considerable margin as yet before a critical situation appears.

The quality of German textiles will doubtless continue to deteriorate, but the quantity allotted to consumers still appears well above minimum physical needs. In leather, however, the German position may be even worse in 1943 than during the past year. While there may be enough heavy leather for the most important military needs, industrial and agricultural consumption will have to be pared to the bone, and civilians will receive none at all. Soles for civilian footwear will be fashioned largely of substitute materials.

An increasing housing shortage in certain areas of Germany may be expected in 1943 if Allied air raids continue at the same or a higher level. Already the British estimate that these raids have required the continuous labor of some 100,000 men for repair work on homes alone. However, the fact that Germany has only now begun to consider measures for rationing dwelling space tends to indicate that no crisis in housing has yet been reached. More acute may be the persisting shortage of household equipment.

In general, civilian supplies in Germany appear to be short, but not critically so. It may indeed be asserted that further cuts in the civilian sector could be and probably are being made to the advantage of purely war production. Rationalization has already been pushed far; it can still be pushed a little further. Quite possibly, a huge increase in bomb damage inflicted by the Allies on German civilian areas might produce a progressive and cumulative encroachment on military output to sustain minimum civilian supplies. But there is no convincing evidence that this stage has yet been approached.

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APPENDIX V

THE OUTLOOK FOR RESISTANCE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE

Perhaps no other aspect of the war is less susceptible to accurate prognosis than the question of resistance to the Axis in occupied Europe. The weighting of scanty, contradictory data on current activities is an operation hazardous enough; but estimation of what the coming year will bring in the way of anti-Nazi opposition depends to an almost prohibitive degree upon factors beyond our knowledge—particularly the extent and success of our military ventures, and the cumulative effects of near-starvation on the subject peoples.

Generalizations upon European resistance confront a further difficulty in the diversity of conditions that exist on the continent. What might apply to Poland would be irrelevant to Denmark. Sabotage in Yugoslavia occurs on quite a different scale and in quite a different context from that in Belgium; and attitudes toward the Allies vary sharply even within one country—as in Czechoslovakia.

Yet occupied Europe does present a picture of substantial unity in its hatred of the Nazis; and it is possible to draw certain conclusions about resistance in 1943 which will fit at least a majority of the Axis-dominated countries. As a basic datum it can certainly be laid down that "moral" opposition to the New Order will show little sign of slackening in the coming year, barring any catastrophic reverses for Allied arms. In Upper Silesia large numbers of Poles have accepted *Volksdeutsch* status, but their defection from the ranks of the opposition is and will undoubtedly remain a striking exception.

On the other hand, it can probably be said with as much safety that even if nutritional standards in the occupied countries fall no lower than their current levels, the progressive effects of present dietary deficiencies will seriously reduce the capacity, if not the will, to resist. In Greece, active opposition to the Axis forces is largely confined to mountainous areas, near sources of food inaccessible to the weakened, starving city-dwellers. In what was "Occupied France," the caloric average of the population's diet was clearly below the amount necessary for consistent, normal activity, and it is doubtful whether conditions in what is now fully-occupied France will be any better. In Poland, where even in peacetime a large sector of the population lived under the almost perennial threat of famine, malnutrition is now a commonplace of existence. In Belgium, too, and Yugoslavia, resist-

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ance is being widely undermined by the enervating consequences of semi-starvation.

Food and sabotage

In nearly every occupied country in Europe in fact (with the exception of Denmark and perhaps Norway), malnutrition is tending to confine the ability to resist to two sections of the populace: those who can afford to patronize the black market, and those who live close to the source of food supply. The urban proletariat, in short, on whose revolutionary capacity some observers have relied, is gradually being reduced to a point of political ineffectiveness, a point where the effort required for large-scale, active revolt will be beyond its physical resources.

That sabotage of industrial and communications facilities will continue in every country through 1943 seems assured; but that it is now or will be then on a scale sufficient to affect the Axis economy significantly is extremely dubious. Direct sabotage by workers within factories is difficult at best and has become more so under the Nazis' increasingly close surveillance. The slow-down can be resorted to with more safety, but its overall effect in most countries does not seem to have been very disturbing to the Germans. In the Czech "Protectorate," for instance, sporadic sabotage and slow-down tactics have been much more than offset by enlargement of productive facilities and the labor-recruitment of the entire Czech younger generation, no longer liable to military service.

Where sabotage can be carried on by guerrilla bands, as in Greece and Yugoslavia, it is not so likely to diminish; but elsewhere there appears to be a discernible tendency for opposition groups to conserve their strength and perfect their organization, awaiting the ultimate hour of rebellion rather than exhausting their forces on day-to-day exploits. It may be significant in this connection that reports of resistance in occupied countries increasingly emphasize *agricultural* sabotage—efforts by the peasants to withhold crops, slaughter livestock illegally, damage German-owned farm machinery, etc. This is not to say that industrial sabotage has ceased or will cease; in the Netherlands alone, during June and July of 1942, some 48 freight trains en route to Germany are reported to have been destroyed. But it does seem true that such acts of sabotage are now considered even by their perpetrators as being primarily important for maintaining anti-Axis morale rather than crippling the German war economy.

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Rifts Among the Opposition: Poland

In most of the occupied countries, hatred of the Nazis so dominates the thinking of all political groups that operational unity is largely assured. In four nations, however, divisive elements have either appeared in virulent form or threaten to do so in the near future.

Poland, for one, is showing now the effects of the Nazis' policy of "divide and rule." The mere task of keeping alive in Poland tends to generate bitterness and mutual distrust. The thousands of deportees quartered upon peasant villages scarcely able to support themselves have met with and have returned antagonism aplenty. Previous ill-feeling between peasants and landlords, and between poor peasants and rich peasants, festers anew under Nazi encouragement. Because their functions make them seem part of the ruling German machine, Polish engineers and foremen in industry are suspected by the workers of being "collaborators." Such suspicions arise the more easily because a great many Poles, for venal or other reasons, have in fact "sold out" to the Germans, accepting *Volksdeutsch* status.

Moreover, the Nazis' calculated policy of preserving many of the outward forms of private property rights, even while pursuing an actual process of exploitation, has effectively prevented large elements of the "owning" classes from allying themselves with the rebellious masses. While great sections of the poorer peasantry and factory laborers are riper than ever for a radical economic revolution, the landlords, richer peasants, and business proprietors (including some Jewish ones) would apparently in a showdown prefer Hitler to Stalin.

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria, too, resistance to the Nazis is considerably qualified by the contradictory aims of different classes. Much of the opposition which the workers and peasants are providing is Communist-inspired, and certain defeatist middle class groups who otherwise might hope for an Allied victory to "save Bulgaria" from the New Order are still confused by the fear of Soviet domination. More serious as a drag on whole-hearted resistance to the Nazis is a fear shared by nearly all groups in some degree that defeat of Germany would mean the loss to Bulgaria of her newly acquired Dobrudja, Macedonia, and Thrace.

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Yugoslavia

Division in Yugoslavia has been dramatically underlined by the armed quarrel between General Drazha Michailovich's forces and the Partisans, a quarrel which has taken on aspects of the "class struggle." Michailovich, fighting under the aegis of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, has been orientated primarily toward the British, the Partisans toward Russia. Since efforts by the Yugoslav Government to stop this strife through appeals to Russia have failed, the Axis can apparently look forward in 1943 to the advantages of fighting a divided foe.

Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia also it is salutary to note that though the Sudeten Germans are somewhat disillusioned over the joys of being part of the Greater Reich, the Czechs have not wholly recovered from their own disillusion over their allies at Munich. Their scepticism may well have been kept alive by the continuing output of anti-Beneš propaganda since that time. They are not prepared to go back without change to the pre-war set-up. This wait-and-see attitude reinforces an understandable tendency to make the best of things as they are; and though the opening of a continental front in Europe by the Allies would undoubtedly electrify them into action, their present urge to commit overt acts of resistance has been somewhat weakened.

Nor can reports of recent sabotage in Slovakia be taken too optimistically. Violence here seems to have been directed more against the corruption of the "independent" government, the excesses of the Hlinka Guards, and the economic distress of the country than against the Germans. Moreover, the Slovaks have continued to cultivate their resentment of the Czechs; they know that their "independence" is due solely to German help and exists solely on German sufferance. This acts as a quite effective brake on any large-scale resistance.

In summation, it can be repeated with some safety and not a little triteness that the question of effective resistance in occupied Europe is bound up in a race between Allied invasion and internal attrition. No one outside of Europe and few within it are competent to say whether postponement of the opening of a second land front in Europe during 1943 would result in a general collapse of the underground movement. But it would seem undeniable that in a majority of the occupied nations such a postponement—if it appeared to be compelled by German strength—would find active anti-Nazi elements markedly weaker at the end of 1943 than at the beginning.

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APPENDIX VI

THE PACIFIC FRONT

The contrast between the calculated boldness which marked the opening Japanese drives in the Pacific and the restraint which has characterized Japanese military operations since the conquest of Burma, has made it increasingly clear that the strategic plan with which Japan began hostilities in December, 1941 was limited in scope. Japan hoped to take a great step toward the fulfillment of her long-standing ambitions; she did not plan to attain her final goal at one stride.

Japan has long and openly aspired to the achievement of a dominant, unchallenged, and self-sufficient position in East Asia. The Japanese, however, have never defined this ambition in precise territorial terms. They have certainly regarded China, Southeast Asia, and the Indies as regions which must come under their control. Acquisition of Eastern Siberia has also been a constant objective. Australia and probably India have been within the sphere of their ambition, and many Japanese have postulated still wider boundaries of empire. Territorially, long-term Japanese aspirations have been intentionally vague.

The specific strategic plan which the Japanese began to implement with the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, was directed toward the conquest of a well defined geographical area. Its content was dictated to some extent by immediate circumstances. Japan faced the imminent danger of a raw materials blockade, with oil already on the embargo list. Lend-lease supplies and American piloted planes were on the point of adding further difficulties to the Japanese campaign in China. British capital ships and Australian troops at Singapore, American planes in the Indies, Canadians at Hongkong, and American heavy bombers in the Philippines were evidences of a gathering military strength which threatened to multiply the cost and hazard of any future southward drive.

The immediate Japanese problem was to seize the sources of Japan's raw material requirements, to occupy the territory through which military supplies could reach China, and to capture the bases where military strength was gathering. Occupation of Malaya, the Philippines, the Indies, and Burma would achieve these ends. For the conquest of these regions Japan formulated her strategic plan. Within a few months the plan had been fulfilled (see map facing page 56).

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The Japanese Offensive

The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, Hongkong, the Philippines and Malaya initiated one of the most brilliant campaigns in military history. Surprise, timing, concentration, coordination, aggressiveness, and imagination were outstanding characteristics of the Japanese offensive.

The occupation of French Indochina and astute political maneuvering in Thailand had assured the Japanese of bases for the southward push. In a few hours, at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sank or damaged eight battleships of the Pacific Fleet, crippled the American air force in Hawaii, and banished the possibility of an immediate American advance into the Asiatic theater. Assurance was made doubly sure with the occupation of Guam, Wake and the Northern Gilberts.

Meanwhile concentrated Japanese air attacks, by both land-based and carrier-based aircraft, secured considerable surprise and uniformly excellent results in the Philippines and Malaya. The Japanese rapidly achieved complete local air superiority. With the sinking of the *Republic* and the *Prince of Wales* and the destruction of Cavite, the Japanese were assured of a minimum of local naval opposition. Supreme in the air and at sea, they were free to develop their land campaigns.

The Philippines

The Japanese left wing pushed down through the Philippines. Here the Japanese exhibited bold strategy and perfect timing. The preliminary landings in the north and the south of Luzon held the main American army in the center of the island. When the southern landing had engaged the attention of local American forces, the Japanese landed in strength, without covering forces, on the east coast. Before this threat could be countered, another strong landing force put in at Lingayen Gulf on the west coast. Our strongest opposition developed here, but despite this, the Japanese, with help from the forces which previously had been landed in the north, secured their beachhead. Threatened from north and east, the Americans and Filipinos had to evacuate Manila. The Japanese seized the key points in the other islands, and, except for the gallant defense of Bataan and Corregidor, the Philippine campaign was over.

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Malaya

The Japanese right wing, in Malaya, gave an expert demonstration of the favorite Japanese tactics of infiltration and outflanking. Striking south in two columns, with the stronger force following the western coastline, the Japanese were frequently stopped in their frontal assaults by determined British resistance. But time and again, particularly in the west, the Japanese by infiltration, surprise river crossings at lightly defended spots, or well rehearsed coast-hopping, came up on the flank or appeared in the rear of the British positions, forcing retreat. By the end of January the Japanese had occupied the entire Malayan mainland. Battered by siege artillery and raked by bombing, Singapore was doomed. The weary and demoralized defenders surrendered February 15, after six days of desperate and confused fighting.

The Indies

The Japanese then closed in on the Indies. Preliminary landings in December had already given them air bases in British North Borneo and Sarawak. When the Philippine and Malayan campaigns were well under way, and naval forces were free for other tasks, the Japanese organized a series of strong landing parties with powerful naval escorts. By concentrating preponderant forces against relatively weak defenses, the Japanese were able to reduce the key points in the outer island defenses of Java as well as to fling a barrier eastward through the Bismarcks, New Ireland, and the Solomons. The fall of Singapore released ground forces for the assault on Java. Heavy concentrations of air and naval power destroyed or dispersed the local remnants of United Nations strength at sea and in the air. The enemy pincers met in Java, and by mid-March the Japanese had won the Indies.

Burma

Of the original Japanese plan, only the occupation of Burma remained to be achieved. Japanese forces, striking across the Thailand-Burma border, had made steady progress, and by the time of the fall of Java the Japanese were entering Rangoon. With this large port at which to land reinforcements, the Japanese set off in a two-pronged northward drive along the Sittang and Irrawaddy Rivers. Heavy fighting slowed their advance, but by the end of April the Japanese were converging on Mandalay, and shortly after-

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wards the British and Chinese defenders were forced to retreat toward India and China.

Repercussions in China

The Japanese may have believed that the occupation of Burma might bring immediate cessation of organized resistance in China. If so, they were not alone in their belief. At least one high Chinese official confided to friends, in the early days of the Pacific War, that cutting of the Burma Road would mean collapse at Chungking. China, however, managed to weather the crisis, and, curiously, the very pace and magnitude of the Japanese victories were in part responsible for continued Chinese resistance.

In China, as in all the Oriental world, the fall of Hongkong and Singapore brought a virtual collapse of British prestige and a rise of anti-British feeling. The Chinese chose to ignore the instances of native loyalty to British arms, and judged fifth column activities in Malaya and Burma to be just retribution for imperialistic oppression. American prestige also dropped sharply. The long stand at Bataan and Corregidor, Filipino participation in armed resistance to the Japanese, and the exploits of American planes in China, served somewhat to soften the blow to America's reputation. But in Asia the white man was humbled.

The prestige of the yellow man rose correspondingly, and the Chinese, as Orientals, took new pride in their own long resistance to the Japanese. The Shanghai of 1937 was frequently contrasted with Hongkong, Manila, and Singapore. The new prestige of the Oriental seemed to promise greater importance in the post-war world. The Chinese felt assured that, if they hung on, China would emerge strong and independent in a new Asia. Despite the shock of isolation, Japanese occupation of Burma did not end Chinese resistance.

The Search for Easy Victories

With the conquest of the Philippines, Malaya, the Indies, and Burma, Japan completed her initial strategic plan—probably more quickly than she had anticipated. The costs had been relatively light, and Japanese capabilities were still adequate for further major tasks. Yet Japanese operations in the following months were tentative and even cautious. Japan displayed little of the willingness to accept major risks which had marked her early offensive. The

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Japanese tested and probed, sent out strong forces in reconnaissance, but withdrew when important enemy strength was encountered.

The explanation undoubtedly lay in the wealth of the resources Japan had already seized, the absence of an agreed strategy for further expansion, and an over-abundance of likely opportunities. Japan had secured her immediate raw material requirements and in the course of her campaign had opened several immediately promising possibilities. The swift campaign in Malaya and the British losses at sea and in the air seemed to leave a potentially rebellious India relatively defenceless. Australia and the American-Australian line of communications were near at hand and lightly protected. The major part of Hawaii's guardian fleet was still *hors de combat* from the blow at Pearl Harbor. An imminent German offensive in Russia might bring Japan the one opportunity she could not afford to miss—a chance to seize Eastern Siberia without the risk of indefinitely prolonged hostilities. To agree upon any one venture, and to press it home to the exclusion of other moves which might prove even more feasible, was a difficult task for Japan's leaders.

Japan, therefore, engaged in a species of opportunistic extemporizing, but undertook no all-out offensive. The Japanese fleet tested the defenses of Ceylon in April, during the latter part of the Burma campaign, ran into unexpected British fighter strength, and withdrew. In May, a Japanese task force probed the outer Australian defenses, encountered punishment in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and retired. In June, a Japanese naval force, complete with transports, struck toward Midway and Hawaii, ready to seize the American bases and dislocate American supply lines in the Pacific. The Japanese met formidable American strength and in losing four carriers suffered a severe setback. Significantly, however, most of the losses were incurred while the Japanese were retiring. Even at Midway the Japanese were not ready to press home their attack against strong resistance. In the Aleutians they gained an outpost for possible use in case of an attack on Siberia, and all during the summer they concentrated strength in Manchuria. But the German offensive in Russia slowed, and the great opportunity did not materialize.

The American Initiative and the Beginnings of Attrition

The American surprise landing at Guadalcanal, in August, marked the first important United Nations' initiative in the Pacific War. It also marked the end of the Japanese search for easy victories.

WAR IN THE PACIFIC 1942

MIDWAY

JANUARY 2


HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS

FEBRUARY 15

MARCH 9

AUGUST 1

DECEMBER 30



SECRET

Balked in their attempts to secure great gains at little cost, the Japanese settled down to the problem of expelling the American intruders. Mised, perhaps, as to the extent of their naval victory off Savo, August 8, the Japanese underrated American strength and committed insufficient forces to the task. The Americans held their own, and the beachhead at Guadalcanal gradually developed into the focal center of a campaign of attrition.

The issue was supremacy on the sea and in the air along the supply lines to Australia. Near Cape Espérance, in October, American naval forces avenged the earlier disaster off Savo Island, when four Allied cruisers were sunk. An engagement off Santa Cruz, October 30, was indecisive, but in it we lost our fourth carrier. Then, in the naval battles of November 12-15 in the Southern Solomons, the Americans established a clear lead by sinking 9 enemy cruisers with a loss of only 2 of our own, and destroying at the same time our first enemy battleships. In the the air the attrition rate favored the Americans from the beginning—on the average, about 4-5 to 1. Japanese air losses, particularly of naval planes, have assumed respectable proportions.

On land, in New Guinea and the Solomons, Americans and Australians have displayed a grim efficiency in jungle warfare. But here it is too soon to say that the Japanese warrior has been outdistanced—his fanaticism still makes him a most formidable foe. Indeed, the war of attrition on land as well as in the air and on the sea is only in its beginnings.

With the close of the first year of the Pacific War, the early Japanese successes still dwarf the gains of the United Nations. The Japanese achieved what they set out to achieve—the conquest of the Philippines, Malaya, the Indies and Burma. They assured themselves of rich resources and they isolated China. Later Japanese ventures proved abortive, and at times costly, particularly in the case of Midway. But none of these could be characterized as a determined offensive.

The United Nations have gained small footholds in the outer fringes of the Japanese defenses and have made a beginning in the development of attrition. They have not been able to mount a large scale offensive. The United Nations have yet to meet and stop a Japanese drive launched with all the force of which the enemy is capable. Despite enemy air and shipping losses, there is no convincing evidence that the Japanese yet have been so weakened that they are incapable of such a major offensive—if they should so decide.

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APPENDIX VII

THE JAPANESE CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

The chief objectives of the Japanese military campaigns of the past year have been the acquisition both of strategic bases and of material resources adequate to support modern warfare on a heavy and sustained scale. It is this latter objective which most responsible Japanese leaders have had in mind when speaking of Greater East Asia, or the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. By their recent conquests, the Japanese may be considered to have filled in the territorial outlines of Greater East Asia. Japanese leaders claim that they are well on the way toward achievement of their economic objectives and that Japan will soon be in a position to sustain indefinitely her present scale of warfare, or even to expand her war-making capacity. It is vital to Japan's enemies to know what basis there may be for these claims.

Initial Assets

Japan began the Pacific War with substantial resources essential to modern military operations already within her control: a steel capacity of some 8½ million metric tons (ingots and castings); an adequate coal supply relatively near at hand (cooking coal in occupied North China and Karafuto and poorer grades in Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria); an electric power capacity of more than 11 million kilowatts in Japan proper alone; a large and expanding production of light metals. Japan had a merchant marine of approximately 6.7 million tons and adequately manned industries experienced in the production of ships, ordnance, aircraft, and chemicals. She had large stockpiles of those strategic materials not produced in adequate quantities within her boundaries.

Japan also had that most important military asset, reasonable assurance of self-sufficiency in food. Eighty-five percent of her total requirements of approximately 13.5 million metric tons of the principal grains—rice, wheat, and barley—could be met from production within Japan proper. The remaining fifteen percent was covered by exportable supplies from Korea and Formosa. Imports from Indochina and Thailand permitted her to enter the war with stockpiles much larger than the usual year-end carry-overs. With Korea and Formosa, her food position was easy.

On the other hand, Japan began her campaigns in Southeastern

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Asia a year ago without control over an adequate production of many important commodities. She was partially dependent upon imports from outside the yen bloc for iron ore, manganese, tungsten, molybdenum, aluminum ores, copper, zinc, and phosphates; she was very heavily dependent on such imports for petroleum, tin, lead, mercury, cobalt, nickel, chromium, antimony, cotton, wool, cordage, and potash.

First-year Gains

The effect of Japan's first-year conquests on her pre-war shortages has been spectacular. As long as she holds her present gains and maintains sea communications with them, Japan is assured of supplies to meet any conceivable requirements of tin (Netherlands East Indies and Malaya: 75 percent of world supply), rubber (NEI and Malaya: 90 percent of world supply), quinine (NEI: 95 percent of world supply), abaca (Philippine Islands: 95 percent of world supply), kapok (NEI: 70 percent of world supply), and petroleum (NEI: former production eight million tons). In Malaya, French Indochina, and the Philippines, Japan has won sources of iron ore which, together with those in China, Korea, Manchuria, and Japan proper, are sufficient to supply even expanded requirements. From the fantastically rich Badwin mines in the northern Shan States of Burma, Japan can meet her needs in lead, and cobalt, and complete her requirements in zinc.

As a result of her territorial gains of the past year, Japan has also become self-sufficient—potentially, if not immediately—with respect to many other materials. Nickel deposits in the Celebes and Burma will supply the bulk of Japan's annual wartime requirement of 10,000 tons. Manganese and chrome reserves, located chiefly in the Philippine Islands, can satisfy all Japanese requirements. Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and especially China and Burma, can contribute tungsten in adequate quantities. Antimony can be secured from various minor sources, or by well-established smuggling routes from unoccupied China. Ample bauxite is available in Malaya and Bintan Island.

Japan's food position has also been still further strengthened. Thailand, Indochina, and Burma are the major world sources of trade rice. Subject only to limitations on shipping space, Japan can now supply reasonable quantities of rice to deficit areas she has occupied and still build up stocks at home against the future.

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Remaining shortages

Not all Japan's requirements have been met by her conquests, however. Japan does not now mine enough copper to meet her requirements without far-reaching and inconvenient substitutions. The newly won areas give her little relief. Cotton and wool remain deficient in Japanese-controlled territory, as do mercury, potash, mica, asbestos, quartz crystals, and diamonds.

The existences of these shortages, however, does not primarily alter the obvious conclusion which can now be drawn with regard to Japan—namely, that the Japanese have acquired a sufficient complement of natural resources to support a substantially increased military effort, provided these resources can be effectively developed, transported and processed.

Shipping

The most pressing problem Japan faces in developing Greater East Asia is that of shipping. Her vital lines of communications run by sea, and the greater part of her raw materials come from abroad. Coal, iron ore, and salt are imported from China, coal, food, chemicals, and a host of miscellaneous products from Manchuria and Korea, and bauxite, oil, and raw materials of many different kinds from South-eastern Asia and the Indies. In return, manufactured goods flow back to the occupied areas. An adequate supply of bottoms, therefore, is a prerequisite to the maintenance and expansion of the Japanese economy.

Japanese shipping losses have been severe, and it is estimated that as of December 1, 1942 the 6,700,000-ton merchant marine with which she began the war had been whittled down, despite Japanese captures and new construction, to 5,685,000 tons. Generous estimates of Japanese requirements are: 3,100,000 tons for the China and the coasting trade; 700,000 tons for military and economic requirements in southern areas; 500,000 tons of naval auxiliaries. If, in addition, allowances are made for 700,000 tons of lay-ups for repairs, and 100,000 tons of captured vessels which were already used in essential trades, the total of 5,100,000 tons still leaves a theoretical surplus of 585,000 tons available for other purposes, such as for new military campaigns.

Japan's shipping position is therefore tight, but not yet dangerous. She still has sufficient shipping to maintain her economy, but her "surplus" for military adventures is dwindling. If the estimated

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present rates of high sinkings and limited new construction are correct and remain unchanged, this surplus will be wiped out by June, 1943.

Japan is making great efforts, however, to solve this shipping problem by increased construction, and there is reason for thinking that she will be successful. The above shipping estimates are based on a new-construction rate of 300,000 tons a year up to November 1, 1942, and thereafter, 400,000 tons a year. Japanese preoccupation with naval building and repairs, as well as shortages of material and labor, are thought to contribute to this estimated low rate of production of merchant shipping. The Japanese, however, had in 1941 a shipyard capacity of some 800,000 tons; and in 1937 and 1938 they were building approximately 450,000 tons of merchant shipping a year. They have already given one demonstration of their ability to expand construction at a rapid rate: in 1917 the Japanese built steel, steam vessels totalling 337,716 tons (approximately the present estimated rate). The next year, 1918, under the incentive of American bonuses, they built 688,659 tons.

As a subsidiary means of easing their communications difficulties, the Japanese have begun the construction of wooden ships. Indications of the importance which this variety of shipping might attain can also be found in the World War period. Japanese production of wooden ships rose from 26,024 tons in 1915, to 45,431 tons in 1916, to 126,773 tons in 1917, and reached 186,580 tons in 1918. The Japanese regard shipping as a problem of utmost urgency, and it seems very probable that they will expand their rate of production, perhaps very notably.

Manpower

Japan's manpower situation is not easy, but it is far from critical. One basic reason for this is that a larger proportion of Japan's 75 million people are in the age group between 20 and 39 than is the case with most other nations. Thus, in terms of men of military age or of age suitable for employment in munitions industries, Japan is relatively better off than her total population would indicate. At present some 3,000,000 men are in the armed forces and some 4,500,000 men in munitions production (metals, chemicals, machinery, engineering, shipbuilding). It is estimated that each of these figures could be increased by at least a million within a year's time by withdrawals from less essential occupations (building, woodwork, textiles, professions, commerce) and through the normal population increase. More-

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over, if the need for manpower became great enough, Japan could draw more of her food from occupied territories and release additional agricultural labor in Japan proper.

Although the general manpower situation is satisfactory, the Japanese are short of highly skilled labor. Strict and reasonably efficient occupational controls, together with a well established official program of mechanical training in elementary and middle schools, have helped the Japanese to meet their requirements in semi-skilled labor. Technicians and highly skilled laborers, however, are at a premium, and the Japanese undoubtedly suffer from this scarcity.

Techniques

Related to the Japanese shortage of technicians is the occasional lack of "know how" in such industrial techniques as advanced metallurgy and the production of certain machine tools and heavy machinery. Japanese backwardness, however, does not rise out of any general lack of ability. The "Zero" is only one of many proofs of Japanese skill and capacity. It is a fact, however, that a large part of Japan's machine tools and heavy machinery were purchased abroad, and Japanese producers are correspondingly inexperienced.

The fact that the Japanese have heretofore not produced certain things is not, however, a guarantee that they are incapable of doing so. The Japanese had never built a battleship before the Russo-Japanese War; but during the war, when they could not buy ships abroad, they laid the keels of two battleships and in due course completed them successfully. At the present time Japan can benefit from German technical assistance, and the Japanese have always followed scientific developments in the Western countries with assiduous care. Given the need, and the necessary time, they probably can produce anything for which they have the raw materials.

Liabilities Acquired by Conquest

Japan's conquests have presented her with certain new problems, all of economic significance, but of varying importance in their relation to the immediate economic prospects of Japan. Japan is faced, for example, with the necessity of making readjustments in export industries such as rubber, tin, sugar, and copra which have been cut off from their customary markets. Japan must also meet the demand for consumers' goods on the part of the populations in occupied territories. Japan can, however, defer the settlement of both of these problems,

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despite the hardships which delayed solutions will entail for the inhabitants of the "Co-prosperity Sphere."

More important is the fact that Japan has inherited the task of policing the newly occupied territories, and of establishing the political machinery required for effective economic exploitation. The material costs of an actively hostile population have already been demonstrated to the Japanese by crop hoarding in Manchuria and by railroad sabotage and cotton growers' strikes in North China. As yet, however, the Japanese appear to have met only negligible economic losses from either active or passive resistance on the part of the peoples in Southeast Asia. In the regions of occupied China such losses have apparently slackened.

The maintenance of effective machinery for economic development makes severe demands upon Japan's limited pool of trained administrative personnel. The actual policing of occupied areas, however, has as yet required but few more Japanese troops than those necessary for garrison duty alone. The Japanese have been able to restore a semblance of order within moderately brief periods after each of their successive conquests, and the burden of petty police work is largely carried by natives of the occupied areas. For the present the economic losses and the drain on manpower which might arise out of hostile activities from the inhabitants of Japanese-held regions are potential rather than actual problems.

Time

In the last analysis, Japan's only urgent need is time. The present production of "Greater East Asia" is adequate to sustain Japanese military action on its present scale and, in addition, to support Japan's recent high rate of capital formation. But "Greater East Asia's" as yet undeveloped resources and as yet untrained manpower are sufficient for the creation and maintenance of a far greater and more dangerous military and industrial power. The deficiencies are those which time can supply. With time, new mines will be opened, more blast furnaces and rolling mills will be built, and more keels will be laid. With time, Japan will find men and tools to convert her mushrooming production of aluminum and magnesium into more and better "Zeros." With time, increasing thousands of Chinese, Filipinos, and Javanese will work for Japan.

The rate at which Japan can develop new industrial power will depend wholly upon the "excess" resources of shipping, plant ca-

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capacity, and personnel skills she can devote to this task after meeting immediately pressing military needs. During 1943 Japan cannot hope to grow in strength as we will grow, but she may well entrench herself so that effective action against her will become very much more difficult and costly. She will beyond all doubt do so, unless the rate of attrition imposed upon her is sufficient to absorb in current operations all her industrial capacity. She cannot do so if relentlessly harassed by air and submarine attacks against her shipping, by organization of sabotage and sedition in the areas she has occupied, and by bombing of her industrial centers.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 9, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The War This Week is being discontinued, and I am sending you herewith the final number.

Sincerely,


William F. Donovan
Director

Attachment

The Honorable

The President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

NUMBER 65

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

THE WAR
THIS WEEK

January 1-7, 1943

Printed for the Board of Analysts

Copy No. A

For the President

DECEMBER 31-JANUARY 7, 1943

THE WAR THIS WEEK

On the Eastern Front the Russian Armies again made substantial advances this week. The capture of Velikie Luki exposes the flank of the German forces protecting Smolensk. The Russians have made fresh gains in the Caucasus, perhaps aided by voluntary German withdrawals. At the same time the Soviets are fanning out over the Kalmyk steppes and moving steadily forward in the area north of the Don.

With the rainy season extending through February, the stalemate in Tunisia may last another month or two and until such time as our air and mechanized forces can operate without serious handicap. The lull likewise continues in Tripolitania, where it may be several weeks before the British are in a position to resume the offensive. Meanwhile the Allied situation in North Africa is still complicated by the Giraud-DeGaulle issue, which bristles with difficulties.

In the Far East, only one small pocket of Japanese resistance remains in the Buna region. From the Vladivostok area come reports that the public fears a Japanese attack before spring.

The Russian Triple Advance Continues

Soviet gains on three fronts this week have again given evidence of solid offensive strength, but have made somewhat less progress than press reports would lead one to believe. The most important advances were on the central front, where the capture of Velikie Luki and the current drive against the nearby rail junction of Novo Sokolniki represent the farthest westward penetration in force of the Red Army

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since 1941. It is incorrect to say, however, that the fall of this latter place would seriously disrupt rail communications for the German forces before Leningrad. Should the Russians interdict the railroad (mostly single-track) from Vitebsk through Novo Sokolniki to Leningrad, the enemy could still use the single-track line from Tallinn and Narva east, and the railway (mostly double-track) from Vilna and Pskov north.

On the other hand, those who maintain that the Russians have breached no essential part of the Nazi winter line are perhaps being over-cautious. The Germans, it is true, have always held the sparsely-settled area between Smolensk and Staraya Russa comparatively lightly, and Velikie Luki was in no sense a key strong point like Rzhev. But, with its fall, the flank of the German forces guarding Smolensk is now exposed, and the invaders in this area are apparently in a more dangerous position than they were at any time last winter.

Second only to these gains in importance have been the Russian advances in the North Caucasus. By the capture of Malgobek, Mozdok, Nalchik, and Prokhladnaya, the Red Army has put pressure on both sides of the German salient. It appears probable that Soviet progress farther to the north has induced the Nazis to withdraw voluntarily from their more advanced positions. Since the Germans failed to reach Grozny and the Georgian Military Highway, their long salient east of Maikop has become simply an encumbrance. A shorter line protecting Maikop itself—perhaps running north from Armavir to Salsk and the Manych River—might well be preferable.

But with the victors of Kotelnikov fanning out across the steppes to Leninskii, Elista (capital of the Kalmyk A. S. S. R.), and Priyutnoye, the Russian drive south of the Don is beginning to threaten Salsk itself. This third Soviet advance has been moving faster against comparatively slight opposition than has the fourth advance on the northern front



between Millerovo and the Volga. North of the Don, the capture of Chernyshkov and Tsimsylanskaya has indicated that the cautious advance and consolidation which form the necessary preliminary to the assault on the main centers of German resistance in the Donets Basin, are making satisfactory progress. Despite the adequate net of railways available to the Soviet forces in this area, observers from the front report that the Red Army must retrace many of these lines, and that supply problems remain the chief limitation on further advance.

From German reports of air attacks on Soviet concentrations around Gelendzhik on the Black Sea, the press has drawn the conclusion that a further Russian drive directed at the Kerch Peninsula is about to begin. Such an attack would be the logical completion of the encircling operations now in progress throughout the southern front. Should Rostov fall, the Kerch Strait would be the most practicable avenue of escape for the German divisions in the Caucasus. The Black Sea shore in this area has a mean temperature of about 33 degrees in January—an indication that the Strait is usually unfrozen. Evacuation operations in these waters would be under constant danger of attack from Soviet aircraft and advance units of the Black Sea fleet. On the other hand, an offensive north from Gelendzhik would face critical logistic difficulties, since the Russian forces in this area—practically isolated from the bulk of the Soviet Army of the Caucasus—could receive supplies and reinforcements only from the Trans-Caucasus, by way of the Black Sea railroad and coastal highway.

Moscow in Winter

The people of Moscow are now comparatively well-clothed, well-fed, and in good spirits, according to a confidential and very reliable report from the Soviet capital, dating from

just before Christmas. Food is more plentiful than it was early in the autumn, and ration norms are being fulfilled, although prices may have gone up slightly in the peasant bazaars where the inhabitants supplement their ration cards. Supplies of fur coats and caps and felt boots (issued against cards) are apparently plentiful. In fact, our report continues, the population seems better clothed than during the period 1934 to 1938. Stockpiles of wood and coal brought in from the neighborhood of the capital are much in evidence.

While in September many factories were idle, now almost every factory chimney is smoking. Although the curfew and blackout of buildings are still in force, dim lights are now permitted in the streets—which are more crowded than in September, but still much less crowded than before the war. The cheerfulness of the population sometimes rises almost to gaiety—in striking contrast to the period 1934–38. In this connection, our report concludes, it is of some importance that the Government does not permit refugees to go to Moscow, and evacuees can return only if they will engage in essential work. Hence, most people now in the capital possess ration cards and the right to purchase in closed shops. As a comparatively favored group of essential workers, the inhabitants of Moscow apparently do not feel the very real food shortage existing in the Soviet Union as a whole.

The Halt in Tunisia

The factors of weather and terrain that stalled operations in northern Tunisia in December may postpone decisive action for perhaps another month or two. Even after the Allied command has worked out its immediate problems of organization, supply, reinforcement, and air support, boggy ground will severely restrict operations. The recent torrential rains have apparently flooded the valleys leading into Tunis from the west, most important of which is the Medjerda Valley, the route of the Allied advance in November. Wet ground

conditions and mountains limit the use of Allied mechanized equipment and seriously hamper air operations. Thousands of tons of wire netting must be brought up, and even then forward air forces operate under great difficulties. Rainfall tables indicate that the rainy season will last through February and into March. The amount of rain indicated by press reports in the last few weeks, however, would appear to be abnormal.

Supported by aircraft operating from developed bases in Tunisia and Sicily, enemy forces hold a strong perimeter defence. From their positions at Mateur and in the hills east of Medjez el Bab (where the principal fighting is taking place), they control the few main roads available for attack on the Tunis area from the west; and the Allies are not yet in a position to attack this area from the south. To protect this southern flank the enemy is steadily working small forces west from Kairouan. French forces, increasingly active in the sector from Pont du Fahs south, have this week repulsed Axis attacks on Fondouk and Pichon, points west of Kairouan.

Allied air forces in Northwest Africa, Malta, and Libya have cooperated effectively to pound enemy ports and shipping in Sicily, Tunis, Sfax, Sousse, and Gabès. To move supplies to Tunis, Italian destroyers are being used as transports as well as for escorts, and the enemy has apparently laid mines to protect a channel for shipping to Tunisia. Enemy aircraft have repeatedly attacked the port of Bône and the Allied air base at Biskra.

Halt in Libya

In Libya, too, the front appears to be stabilized, with no expectation of a British attack in the near future. The enemy has dug in with mines and wire along a line running roughly from the salt marsh behind Bouerat el Soum toward Gheddahia and then southwest along the Wadi Zem Zem (see map, *The*

War This Week, December 17-24). This line is held by the depleted Afrika Korps, with two fresh Italian divisions and remnants of other Italian units believed to be in the rear. British armored patrols are in contact with the enemy, but it may be several weeks before the Allies have brought up forces and accumulated sufficient supplies in the forward area for another major offensive. In his distribution of forces and organization of communications, General Montgomery is apparently establishing centers of strength well to the rear as insurance against the debacle that has followed previous British drives into Libya.

In the eastern Mediterranean the Axis is reported to be strengthening the obstacles and wire around airfields in Crete, and reinforcing Rhodes with coastal artillery, new fortress walls, etc. Over the past several months pill boxes and defenses have also apparently been built in Bulgaria, along the Turkish border.

De Gaulle and Giraud

Amid a confusing variety of broadcasts and press reports of a projected meeting between De Gaulle and Giraud, and a series of pleas for unity emanating from all sides, the American public has remained bewildered as to the specific points at issue between two thoroughly admirable professional soldiers, both of whom have a long record of patriotism and opposition to the Axis.

De Gaulle has the advantage of a fairly close-knit organization and a clear program. The Fighting French apparently view their leader as the incarnation of their country, and one whom Giraud and all patriotic Frenchmen should recognize as their political chief. Fighting France, the De Gaullists feel, is the provisional government of the nation, which should logically have its seat in Algiers. Giraud can well lead its armed forces, but only under the orders of the Fighting French National Committee, and only after a purge of the

Vichy members of his Imperial Council—Chatel, Noguès, and Boisson. After the removal of these governors, the National Committee would be ready to enlarge its membership to include pro-Ally leaders from North Africa.

In other words, De Gaulle apparently believes that a political agreement must precede any military arrangement with Giraud. For this reason, according to advices from London, the Fighting French leader has not complied with Giraud's suggestion that the former send an emissary to North Africa, and has intimated that he wishes to see Giraud himself. A statement issued on New Year's day from De Gaulle's headquarters summarizes the whole position: "Complete military cooperation requires political and administrative unification under a provisional central organ. If not, we would have the paradoxical result that a great many Frenchmen would be fighting by the side of the Allies without any French interest being represented during the war or at its end. Such a state of affairs would represent a backward step from the present situation in which the French National Committee has concluded with the United Nations a series of specific agreements of which some have a political character. . . ."

That the British public is in general sympathy with this program is apparent in editorials printed in journals as far apart as the *Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*. The former, in commenting on the appointment of Harold MacMillan as Minister Resident in North Africa, has stressed the need of "Allied advice and Allied tact" in helping the French to reconcile their differences, and has suggested that a "fusion" between Giraud and De Gaulle would be preferable to a mere "friendly understanding." The *Manchester Guardian* has characterized the "complete eradication of Vichy influence in French North Africa" as a "question of principle" with the De Gaullists, while emphasizing that "specialized

training in technical or administrative duties" has made Fighting France a far more significant governing body than the present Imperial Council in North Africa.

Giraud's position

Giraud's advantages lie in the practical cooperation already established with the Allied forces in the field, and in his "legal" position as heir of Vichy through Darlan. Since the latter's death, however, the Imperial Council has apparently decided to dispense with any further references to Marshal Pétain, and its constitutional position is now confused. In short, the key to Giraud's weakness and strength would appear to be the middle position he occupies between ex-collaborationists and the enthusiasts in the De Gaulle camp.

Each party to the current controversy, our reports conclude, is burdened with adherents whose attitude blocks cooperation with the other side. With Giraud, there are Noguès and Boisson, timeservers whose equivocations and indecision, even after the Allied landings, have disgusted pro-Ally elements. Around De Gaulle are grouped many politicians who have perhaps exaggerated the indispensability of their own organization and who hope to play an important role in a liberated France; the bitter attacks on Boisson broadcast by the Brazzaville radio, have, for example, proved a real embarrassment to the Fighting French National Committee. The removal of antagonistic elements on both sides may be a necessary preliminary to French unity.

Evidences of Unity

In Dakar, the death of Darlan seems to have significantly strengthened popular hope for unified action. Reports from local observers point out that the assassination aroused little comment, and that, aside from a few die-hards in the military, administrative, and business communities, there exists a general desire for cooperation among all Frenchmen in exile.

Shortly after Darlan's death, General Barrau, the military chief at Dakar, handed in his resignation, and further changes in the administration and in the army are apparently in the offing.

Similarly at Alexandria, the Admiral's death occasioned a change of feeling among the officers and enlisted men of the French ships interned there, who now express a desire to serve with the United Nations. The chief remaining difficulty seems to be the legalistic one of effecting a transfer of allegiance.

Fortification of the French Mediterranean Coast

Press reports of the evacuation of civilians from a zone three to five miles deep along the whole French Mediterranean coast corroborate confidential despatches detailing German efforts to fortify this shore in depth. The protection of this vulnerable flank was obviously one of the chief reasons behind the occupation of the Vichy zone, and since that event, fortification activities have proceeded apace. Furthermore, faced with the resistance of French labor against Laval's program of "volunteering" for work in the Reich, and the danger of spreading sabotage and underground activity in Germany, the Nazis have apparently made a virtue of necessity: many of these workers they have rerouted to the Mediterranean. Observers point out, however, that similar fortification projects in Norway have met with widespread resistance, and forecast the same sort of situation in southern France.

Spanish Neutrality

Spain has indicated to Germany that she will maintain her sovereignty by force if necessary, according to diplomatic advices. This neutrality policy is reported to have the backing of all but certain elements of the Falange. It is to be publicized by a volume entitled *the Iberian Bloc*, which will consist of recent addresses by Salazar, Jordana, and others

at Lisbon. Presumably as a result of this moderate reorientation of Spanish policy, Germany has shifted her Ambassador to Madrid, replacing Eberhard von Stohrer (whose ascendancy was great in the days of Suñer) with Hans Adolf von Moltke. The latter has recently served in the Foreign Office in Berlin. Earlier, as German Minister to Poland, he negotiated the German-Polish Agreement of 1934 and enjoys a reputation for strength and dexterity.

General Patton's arrangement to call on General Orgaz in Spanish Morocco was gratifying to the Spanish, and may help to shape a settlement with regard to the frontier. Confidence as to the security of Moroccan supply lines would enable the Allies to divert forces from this area into Tunisia. Orgaz has appeared anxious to avoid any difficulties, but officials in Spanish Morocco have shown nervousness as to the security of their regime. Arrests of Spanish Republicans and Allied sympathizers have increased lately, and numbers of Spanish and native soldiers have apparently been skipping across the border to the French Zone.

Shipping Concentration at Genoa

The transfer of substantial tonnage of French shipping from the Riviera to Genoa is believed to have been undertaken to remove it from ports where danger of sabotage was considerable. The shift coincided with the movements to La Spezia, Livorno, and La Maddalena of several heavy units of the Italian fleet; but observers feel the redistribution of fleet units was dictated by the Allied air offensive, rather than by any immediate major convoy movement from Genoa. Presumably an expedition against such an objective as the Balearics would be preceded by a similar concentration of cargo and warships; but no such operation appears to be planned.

Changes in Yugoslav Government in Exile

Last week's reorganization of the Yugoslav Government in Exile appears to have a double significance: General Michailovich has been strengthened and the Partisans rebuffed, while the other changes seem to foreshadow a shift in policy with regard to the United States. Up to last week the Cabinet of the Yugoslav Government in Exile consisted of Premier Slobodan Jovanovich, General Michailovich as Minister of War, and two representatives from each of seven Yugoslav political parties—sixteen in all. In the present reorganization one man apiece has been dropped from six of these seven parties, leaving a Cabinet of ten men.

The Navy and Air Force have been added to Michailovich's command—a gesture of no military importance, which nonetheless signifies the continuing confidence of the Government in Exile in Michailovich. It also implies a rebuff to the Partisan forces, with whom he is at odds, but who are now generally believed to be the most effective opponents of the Axis in Yugoslavia.

Momcilo Nincich, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radical Party, has been dropped, and his duties taken over by the Premier. The Radicals are an authoritarian group, who strongly favor a Greater Serbia. The Yugoslav Minister in Washington, Constantin Fotich (who has intimate connections with the German-sponsored Nedich Government in Belgrade), has been one of the most extreme members of the Radical Party, and has been the target of unfavorable criticism from those who favor a restored United Yugoslavia. Nincich has been Fotich's strongest backer, and some observers see Nincich's departure as clearing the deck for the future removal of Fotich, and his replacement by a proponent of United Yugoslavia.

As if in compensation for the loss of the reactionary Nincich, the Government has in each case chosen for dismissal from the Cabinet the more liberal of the two representatives

from the other parties. The others to go are all pro-Yugoslavs of varying shades and include no fewer than three men now in the United States: Bogoljub Jeftich (Yugoslav National Party), Director of the Yugoslav Information Center in New York; Sava Kosanovich (Independent Democratic Party—Serbs living in Croatia), a liberal, who wants a democratic regime for the future Yugoslavia; and Franc Snaj (Slovenian Clerical Party), a Conservative, opposed to the Slovene Partisans. These changes, and notably the dropping of Nincich, lead some observers to guess that these men may also have been relieved of their duties in preparation for a change in Yugoslav policy in the United States.

Anti-Zionist Demonstrations in Damascus

The latent tensions aroused in the Arab world by the Zionist issue have caused demonstrations in Syria. Axis agents and the Axis radio, keynoted by the former Mufti of Jerusalem, have long exploited this problem; but the immediate cause of the present protest was the Proclamation (published in the *New York Times* December 7) signed by 62 Senators and 181 Congressmen petitioning for the establishment of the Jewish National Home. In Damascus, Arab groups gathered, fired a shot at the shield of the British consulate, and left a protest averring that the memorandum heightened Arab fears that the Allies may not uphold their announced principles. Shops were closed and large crowds attended political speeches. The Palestinian students at the American University were reported by authorities to be "terribly upset;" and the disturbances apparently spread to Homs and Hama.

Japanese Ships Move As Buna Falls

In New Guinea, Allied ground forces supported by tanks have completed destruction of organized Japanese resistance

in the Buna-Cape Endaiadere area. A small remaining pocket of Japanese resistance is being surrounded at Sanananda. On Guadalcanal the isolated Japanese land forces are under pressure from American forces in the vicinity of Mt. Aesten.

In addition to the considerable concentration of Japanese shipping at Rabaul (reported on January 2 to include some 18 warships, 53 merchant vessels, and 21 small vessels) there is reported a marked increase of shipping in the Buin-Faisi and in the New Georgia Island areas where 26 vessels, including 6 heavy cruisers or battleships, 5 light cruisers, 2 destroyers, and 6 cargo ships were sighted on January 3. Meanwhile, southwest of Munda and later north of Guadalcanal, 8 Japanese destroyers were attacked by Allied planes and effectively intercepted subsequently by United States torpedo boats which prevented troop landings on Guadalcanal and destroyed supplies cast offshore in watertight containers. Allied air activity continued over Lae and Salamaua, Vangunu Island, Wewak, Madang, Rekata Bay, Munda, Gasmata, and Rabaul, the most severe Allied air assault on Rabaul leaving some 50,000 tons of Japanese shipping ablaze and sinking. Intense enemy activity was observed on airfields at Kavieng, north of Rabaul, at Timor, and in general to the north of Australia.

Complications in the Advance on Burma

Operations in Burma have been inconclusive. Allied planes have attacked airdromes and Japanese rail, inland water and seagoing transport from Myitkyina to the Gulf of Martaban. Meanwhile, in their two pronged movement down the Mayu River towards Akyab, the British left column has advanced upon the Japanese who are again evacuating the Rathedaung area. At Akyab, some twenty miles south of Rathedaung, a Japanese garrison of some 3,300 is constructing beach defenses and increasing its air activity. The Japanese in the Mayu

Peninsula and along the entire west coast have disappeared, and the British have advanced there to within some thirteen miles north of Akyab. In addition to supply difficulties, the British have encountered the complication of developing communal strife between Burmese Moslems and Buddhists, the latter having attacked British light craft in the Mayu River.

Morale of the Indian civilian population at Calcutta appears to have deteriorated under impact of nuisance Japanese air attacks. It is reported that great numbers including skilled industrial workers, have quit the city, and that the rate of operation for the port, the jute, engineering, and munitions industries has fallen respectively to 60 percent, 80 percent, 50 percent, and 50 percent.

Chinese Military Mission

Despite British warnings as to the limited significance of their activity in Burma, the Chinese look there with anxiety and expectation. Airborne freight into China has increased, and opening of regular traffic through the northwest and Soviet Central Asia is under negotiation, but the Chinese believe that fulfillment of China's exacerbated supply requirements can come only by the reconquest of northern Burma. Some Chinese dissatisfaction with their share in the planning and scheduling of this enterprise was indicated in the announcement that the Chinese Military Mission to the United States would be withdrawn. Headed by General Hsiung Shih-hui, who is a member of China's National Military Council and highly regarded in Chungking military circles, the Mission arrived in Washington on April 13, 1942. Chungking has explained that the Mission would visit London and may be called home to report, but has not been withdrawn permanently. Colonel W. T. Tsai will remain to represent China in ways called for by war councils in Washington. Before leaving the United States, the Mission will visit production plants. Asked whether or not the

Mission was satisfied with its treatment in Washington, General Hsiung Shih-hui stated to the press that his country "should never be satisfied unless our enemy is completely defeated."

Defense Preparations at Vladivostok

The Chinese, while not counting upon it, have expressed hopes that expansion of hostilities into the Soviet Far East would accelerate plans for activating the Asiatic continental war fronts as a base for offensive operations which they feel unprepared to initiate alone. In this connection, it is reported that there is considerable precautionary military activity in the Vladivostok area, and popular discussion there indicates that development of hostilities before the advent of spring is freely anticipated. Nevertheless, sea-borne transport from North America to the Asiatic mainland continued during November in Russian bottoms which passed unmolested through the Strait of Laperouse. Fourteen freighters cleared and thirteen entered Vladivostok alone.

Appointment of Stahmer to Tokyo

Japanese activity in the southwest Pacific serves the strategic interests of her European Axis partners less directly, at the moment, than would development of an active, or potentially active, front in the Soviet Far East. General Eugen Ott, in Tokyo since Hitler's advent to power in 1933 and Ambassador there since 1938, has been replaced by Heinrich Georg Stahmer, who was in Japan when the Tripartite Alliance negotiations were concluded. Stahmer, a trusted Nazi and close associate of Ribbentrop, moved without publicity in Tokyo, but was known to have been particularly active within the Department of Home Affairs, where he offered advice upon Nazi techniques of social repression and established contacts with the younger officers and Japanese youth organizations, notably those of Nakano and Hashimoto

whose activist influence upon Japanese foreign policy is established. Japan's acceptance of Stahmer's appointment may foreshadow intensification of political and economic mobilization at the expense of moderate elements inclined towards a defensive mentality within Japan and possibly closer coordination of anti-Soviet elements in both countries. Germany's dissatisfaction with Japanese inactivity has been evident.

Toledano and the Tin Strikes

Responsibility for securing better wages and working conditions for Bolivia's striking tin miners was publicly placed upon the United States this week by Lombardo Toledano, President of the Latin American Confederation of Labor. In telegrams to Vice-President Wallace and to President Peñaranda of Bolivia, Toledano denied that fifth column activities lay behind the strikes and ascribed them instead to abominable conditions at the mines and to the owners' intransigence.

Since the United States is Bolivia's sole customer for tin, Toledano argued, and since Mr. Wallace, as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, can determine contract conditions for such purchases, why should not the Vice-President compel Bolivian producers to earmark for improvement of the workers' lot a definite part of the price paid for tin? Toledano's telegrams carry somewhat more weight in view of his recent visit to Bolivia, and his successful collaboration at that time in averting a strike at the Potosí workings.

APPENDIX I

THE GERMAN COMBAT PLANE POSITION¹

The year just past has seen a notable deterioration in Germany's supply of combat planes. Production has fallen slightly; losses have, on the whole, run well ahead of output; and the number of planes tied up in the factory repair pool has remained high. As a result, the *Luftwaffe's* total combat strength has been reduced from 10,060 in January, 1942 to 8,585 in November, and the number of planes currently available for service at the front has dropped from 7,660 to 6,210.² Moreover, Germany's ability to recover is now open to serious question: this winter there will be no lull in aerial warfare allowing her production to regain a comfortable lead over wastage.

The Question of Quality

In terms of quality the *Luftwaffe* faces a problem almost as grave. Germany's last major change-over in plane models occurred in the winter of 1940-41. Now it confronts the necessity of developing new and more powerful aircraft capable of meeting at any height the challenge of an increasing number of Allied fighters specialized to excel within definite altitude ranges. These Allied planes will have the tactical advantage of being able largely to choose or to refuse battle—to their own liking. In answer, the performance of the Focke-Wulf-190 and the production of the Messerschmidt-109-G will have to be stepped up.

Unfortunately for the *Luftwaffe*, one of its most important engines, the Bayrische-Motorenwerke-801, is reportedly still plagued with "bugs" limiting the use of its maximum power; output of the new Daimler-Benz-605 engine is apparently only just past the experimental stage; and the Me109-G itself may yet have some structural weaknesses. Further, although Germany has undoubtedly undertaken a vast amount of the experimental work necessary for the development of more modern planes equipped with more powerful

¹ Based on statistical studies by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.
² "Total strength" is considered as the sum of first-line planes (including initial equipment, plus immediate reserves), planes in Reserve Training Units, planes stored and in transit, planes allocated to Operational Training Units, and planes under repair at the factory. The "total available for combat" are first-line planes, plus RTU's and reserves stored and in transit.

engines, it is doubtful whether present shortages of skilled labor will permit these to be produced outside of existing plane factories. And if produced inside existing factories, output of the new models could only be obtained at the cost of old-model production during the period of re-tooling.

Figures

The accompanying table presents an estimate of the *Luftwaffe's* total combat strength and its distribution among various categories of availability.

TABLE I.—Distribution of German combat-type planes

Date (end of month)	Grand total	Total available for combat	First line	Initial equipment	Immediate reserve	Reserve training units	Stored reserves and in transit	Operational training units	Factory repair pool
1939									
August.....	5,900	4,000	4,330	3,250	1,070	380	1,000
September.....	5,845	4,745	4,400	3,330	1,080	345	1,000	100
October.....	5,335	5,195	4,480	3,300	1,090	715	1,040	130
November.....	6,975	5,620	4,800	3,430	1,110	1,200	1,080	75
December.....	7,385	5,390	4,640	3,510	1,130	1,700	1,130	75
1940									
January.....	8,340	5,980	4,720	3,370	1,100	2,300	1,160	100
February.....	8,945	7,645	4,800	3,530	1,170	2,845	1,200	100
March.....	8,980	8,345	4,900	3,710	1,190	3,445	1,340	100
April.....	10,365	8,900	5,400	4,210	1,190	3,500	1,280	125
May.....	9,405	7,435	5,000	4,400	1,200	1,835	1,320	630
June.....	8,995	6,635	5,000	4,400	1,200	1,035	1,360	1,000
July.....	9,470	7,485	5,000	4,430	1,270	300	1,385	1,110	875
August.....	8,965	6,890	5,200	4,430	1,270	330	1,180	1,130	1,125
September.....	8,280	5,930	4,800	4,430	1,270	390	870	1,200	1,450
October.....	8,555	5,005	4,800	4,400	1,200	390	1,015	1,350	1,400
November.....	9,090	5,440	4,800	4,400	1,200	420	1,220	1,300	1,350
December.....	8,530	5,905	5,000	4,400	1,200	450	1,455	1,300	1,275
1941									
January.....	10,215	7,715	5,390	4,400	1,200	480	2,005	1,400	1,100
February.....	10,970	8,630	5,470	4,400	1,070	510	2,540	1,450	900
March.....	11,720	9,520	5,730	4,430	1,210	540	3,250	1,500	700
April.....	11,795	9,565	5,700	4,430	1,240	570	3,295	1,550	650
May.....	12,055	9,900	5,800	4,420	1,280	600	3,490	1,600	575
June.....	11,870	9,670	5,900	4,540	1,330	630	3,130	1,600	600
July.....	11,200	8,800	5,800	4,540	1,350	660	2,400	1,600	800
August.....	10,570	8,090	5,520	4,540	1,310	690	2,070	1,600	950
September.....	9,500	6,730	5,400	4,540	1,310	720	1,600	1,600	1,150
October.....	9,165	6,390	4,400	4,500	-100	750	1,300	1,600	1,175
November.....	9,335	5,900	4,200	4,520	-100	780	1,815	1,600	1,075
December.....	9,535	6,925	4,500	4,130	-100	810	2,265	1,600	1,000

TABLE I.—Distribution of German combat-type planes—Continued

Date (end of month)	Grand total	Total available for combat	First line	Initial equipment	Immediate reserve	Reserve training units	Stored reserves and in transit	Operational training units	Factory repair pool
1942									
January.....	10,060	7,000	4,100	4,100	900	2,900	1,600	800
February.....	10,550	8,300	4,200	4,200	900	3,500	1,600	650
March.....	10,725	8,625	4,225	4,225	900	3,700	1,600	350
April.....	10,800	8,700	4,400	4,275	900	3,750	1,600	325
May.....	10,455	8,155	4,400	4,300	940	3,750	1,600	700
June.....	10,130	7,665	4,400	4,270	280	3,265	1,600	525
July.....	9,900	7,000	4,400	4,700	70	1,600	1,550	900
August.....	8,790	6,280	4,700	4,700	500	1,040	1,500	1,000
September.....	8,255	5,705	4,625	4,700	-275	500	790	1,300	1,000
October.....	8,065	5,565	4,200	4,900	-300	550	815	1,300	1,000
November.....	8,565	5,210	4,400	4,510	-30	600	1,100	1,300	875


Method

The tabulated estimates, it will be noted, differ in greater or less degree from those drawn up by either the Air Ministry or the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Since these variations result primarily from the methods of computation respectively employed, rather than from any discrepancies in information, a word may be necessary on the procedure adopted by the Office of Strategic Services. In general, it can be said that our study has emphasized the over-all schematic pattern of a monthly time-series, rather than disparate, though well-supported, estimates for isolated dates or periods of time. It will be best to discuss this in relation to specific problems.

Production

OSS estimates of German aircraft production rest neither upon research into factory capacity, as do those of the MEW, nor upon tabulation of planes identified as having been produced at certain factories, which appears to be the core of the Air Ministry's calculations. The first method is believed here, on the basis of OSS estimates of wastage and other requirements, to credit Germany with too many planes, whereas the Air Ministry's system seems to award them too few. Instead of relying upon these techniques, the OSS puts its trust in a deductive production curve constructed on statistical foundations, which, while not specifically related to either operational or engineering intelligence, fits somewhat better the available data on wastage and strength.

This deductive curve leans heavily upon the principle that after departmental work in a new industry has been completed and production models have been agreed upon, expansion is rapid in the



subsequent stage of mass-production, but that the rate of expansion thereafter tapers off sharply as production approaches its upper limits. The operation of this principle is easily discernible in the growth of the armament industry in Germany in 1939-40 and in the United States today.

The OSS curve reaches its high point in the fall of 1941 and declines slightly thereafter as the full effect of "comb-outs" for the Army on the Eastern Front begin to be felt in aircraft production. Up to that point, however, output is shown as having increased at its maximum absolute rate from the start of the war—a gain of 50 additional planes each month. The accompanying chart compares this OSS estimate with those of MEW and the Air Ministry.

Wastage: Combat Losses

Any estimate of the *Luftwaffe's* strength will naturally be drawn up in terms of a basic equation, in which production over time less wastage (and other deductible factors) over time equals strength at a terminal period of time $\left(\frac{\text{Production}}{\text{Time}} - \frac{\text{Wastage}}{\text{Time}} = \text{Strength} \right)$. One component of "wastage" is combat losses. Consistent data on German combat losses has come primarily from two sources: the Air Ministry's Weekly Intelligence Summary, for losses in the West; and the Russian and German communiqués, for losses in the East.

OSS practice in handling AMWIS data is to assume that all planes listed as "destroyed" are indeed total losses, and that half of those listed as "probably destroyed" were actually destroyed. The other half of the "probables" and all those described as "damaged" are treated among "operational losses" or among planes under repair.

As for communiqués from the Eastern Front, the discrepancy between German admissions and Russian claims is so great as to render each type of information by itself valueless. It has been found, however, that Russian admissions of their own plane losses, adjusted to summaries covering several months each, fall about midway between Russian claims and German admissions. They provide in practice a fairly reliable measure of the *Luftwaffe's* losses in the Russian theater, because (a) at the very least, Russian loss-admissions indicate the scale of activity on the Eastern front; (b) those admissions are not likely to be greater than losses actually suffered, nor are they likely to be larger than those known to have been inflicted on the Germans; (c) there is no reason to believe, in any event, that actual

Russian losses would be greater than German losses, for Russian aerial operations have not been so intense as those of the *Luftwaffe* nor are their planes considered seriously inferior to those of the Germans.

Operational Losses

Plane losses incurred in connection with combat missions are by no means completely covered by pilots' reports of craft shot down or "probably destroyed": planes crack up while taking off or landing at home fields, or when forced down at inaccessible points. Since these losses, while not directly of a combat character, result from operations against the enemy, they are a function of the intensity of air warfare and can be estimated accordingly as a proportion of actual combat losses.

OSS computations of these operational losses are based in part on RAF experience over England during recent months. The RAF found that the number of planes destroyed incidental to enemy action amounts to some 30 percent of combat losses, while planes badly damaged in action or incidental to action amount to an additional 27 percent of battle losses. Moreover, of these 27 percent, the RAF believes that some 30 percent returned by forward echelons for repairs at the factory are not, in fact, repaired at all, because of shortages of parts, labor, etc. If these unrepaired planes are added to those destroyed incidental to enemy action, then operational losses are equivalent to 38 percent of combat losses.

These operational losses, of course, vary according to the flying seasons and the front in question. The *Luftwaffe* is believed to have suffered as high as 60 percent of combat losses in winter and as low as 30 percent in summer. In Russia, however, where factory repair shops are remote, and in the Mediterranean theater, where sandstorms and other operational hazards are found, an all-year proportion of 50 rather than 38 percent seems probable.

In addition to these losses connected with enemy action, flying accidents take a certain toll of planes as they are moved behind the lines from base to base, or from factory to front, and as pilots are sent aloft on training flights. In lieu of any specific data, OSS has assumed that flying accidents subtract 2 percent of first-line strength each month.

Factory Repair Pool

Clearly, planes damaged badly enough to need repair in the rear areas will not be available for combat service for a lengthy period. Two months has been taken as the time consumed by sending planes damaged in Western Europe, the Balkans, Poland, etc., to factories in the rear, repairing them, testing them, and returning them to the front—three months for those damaged on the Eastern and Mediterranean fronts.

Allocations to Training

The necessity of using tactical planes in training represents a further drain on the supply of combat craft available for immediate service at the front. Although replacement pilots are instructed by means of basic, primary, and advanced training aircraft, they require a certain period in which to become familiar with the planes they will fly in first-line squadrons. These planes must, of course, be replaced when destroyed, damaged, or worn out, and additional units furnished whenever the size of the training group is enlarged.

Scarcely any data is available on the number of such planes engaged in this operational training in the *Luftwaffe* at the outbreak of the war. Some sources have asserted that the Germans allocated relatively few planes to this use, perhaps because they miscalculated the war's duration or perhaps because they shared that excessive optimism which possesses most airforces before entering a war. Nevertheless, the OSS has assumed that Operational Training Units (OTU's) began the war with a supply of 1,000 planes, raised that to a peak of 1,600 in May, 1941, and have maintained it at about 1,500 since then.

In addition, other planes are withheld from consistent duty at the front by their allocation to Reserve Training Units (RTU's), newly-formed combat squadrons stationed at advance airfields but ordinarily held in reserve. RTU's were first organized by the *Luftwaffe* in July, 1940, when the rate of pilot wastage incurred in the Battle of Flanders showed that a link was needed between the OTU's and the operating squadrons. Apparently, 300 planes were diverted from the OTU's to form these new units; by May, 1941, they had been increased to 600.

In estimating the number of planes that the *Luftwaffe* has had to allocate to the OTU's and RTU's each month, wastage has been broadly calculated at 6 percent of strength per month for the RTU's and 8 percent per month for the OTU's. It has been assumed, moreover, that after the initial transfer of planes from OTU's to RTU's,

growth in the latter force was provided by allocation of planes available for operating squadrons or of planes drawn from stored reserves.

Stored Reserves

OSS's figures on the *Luftwaffe's* stored reserves are arrived at by a process of elimination: from our estimate of Germany's total combat plane strength we subtract the number of first-line planes and their immediate reserves, RTU's, OTU's, and planes tied up in the factory repair pool. The resultant quantity is believed to be the number of planes stored and in transit. If, in turn, our month-to-month estimates of stored reserves correspond—as they do—to the whole body of available intelligence on that item, and to the "historical probabilities," the correlation will tend to prove the soundness of our basic calculations.

Stored reserves, if we consult Table I, are seen to grow from the outbreak of the war to a peak in April, 1940; nor has this been accomplished at any sacrifice of first-line strength or OTU's. With the Battle of Flanders, however, a rapid decline sets in, reaching a low point in September, 1940, after the "daylight phase" of the Battle of Britain. By the spring of 1941, a long period of relatively low wastage has brought total strength and stored reserves to a new high, but the succeeding attack upon the Soviets reduces stored reserves once more to a low level by the end of October, 1941. Though this depletion is partially made up by April, 1942, resumption of the Russian campaign and increased pressure by the RAF and USAAF drags the level of stored reserves down to a minimum by the end of September, 1942.

Thus, it would appear that OSS estimates for German stored reserves correspond closely with the fluctuating conditions of the war in the air. The exactness of this correlation stimulates further confidence in the reliability of the estimates on which those figures were based.

APPENDIX II

OTTO HABSBERG IN THE FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PRESS¹

Discussion which followed publication of the Secretary of War's letter of November 19, welcoming the aid of a Military Committee headed by "Otto of Austria" for the recruitment of an Austrian unit in the United States Army, has died down in the standard English-language press—partly as a result of Secretary Stimson's assurance that aid from other sources would be equally welcome. In the foreign-language press, however, comment on the subject continues to be voluminous and intense.

During the month which has just closed, the newspapers of nearly every Central European group in the United States have dealt repeatedly with the "Otto affair" and the fillip presumably given to an eventual Habsburg restoration in Central Europe. Czech and Slovak newspapers were perhaps the most persistent; but the Carpatho-Russian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Greek papers maintained a running discussion, too. The Italian press was particularly agitated, not only because of national opposition to the Habsburgs on historical grounds, but also because plans for raising an Italian military legion, long discussed, gave Italian liberals a special interest in the matter.

Indifference in Some Quarters

Certain papers ignored the issue, possibly more because they considered the Habsburg issue unimportant than because they hesitated to make their true opinions clear. Thus, Hungarian-language papers—notably the Cleveland *Szabadsag* and the Pittsburgh *Magyarasag*—which previously had supported Tibor Eckhardt as representative of the Hungarian national interest, seemed unwilling to oppose Otto, though still not wishing openly to support him. The same reason may have accounted for silence on the part of the Russian Tsarist paper *Rossiysk* and the formerly pro-Fascist Italian papers, such as the New York *Il Progresso* and the Philadelphia *Il Popolo Italiano*.

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

Several other papers dismissed the incident as unduly inflated. The nationalistic Polish *Nowy Swiat* declared that the letter to Otto of November 19 had been no more than a *faux pas*, and that there was no sense in magnifying the incident and broadcasting it as a menace to Europe and democracy. The Hungarian New York daily *Nepszava*, which is under the same ownership as the *Nowy Swiat*, took a comparable attitude, minimizing the significance of Otto's role. The *Nepszava* has been a strong supporter of Eckhardt and is thought to be pro-monarchist. The controversial Slovak weekly, *Slovak v Amerike*, which is said to be inspired by Magyar sympathies, also belittled the affair. This paper, however, almost automatically opposes every stand maintained by pro-Beneš organs.

In all the cases just mentioned, special reasons appear to have motivated the editors. A few instances may also be noted, such as that of the independent Polish daily published in Buffalo, *Dziennik Dla Wszystkich* (December 3) in which, with apparent disinterest, the importance of the incident was judged to have been exaggerated.

The Main Line

With these exceptions, however, the foreign language press has kept up an unbroken stream of discussion. Comments of foreign nationality writers have been reinforced by reprints of articles by Dorothy Thompson, Freda Kirchwey, and Representative Celler, as well as of material which has appeared in *PM* and the *Daily Worker*. Cross-fertilization has also been resorted to, one foreign-language group reprinting the arguments of another (cf. the article by Count Sforza reprinted in the Czech *New Yorkske Listy*, December 10). In these ways the heat and volume of the comment has not been allowed to diminish.

The substance of the discussion may be classified under three heads.

Arguments Favoring Otto's Ascendancy

In general, as has been pointed out above, the papers which might have been expected to support the Habsburg claims have tended either to remain silent or to cloak their approval under the assertion that anti-Habsburg elements were showing undue alarm. There has been little outright expression of support. Nevertheless, the Himmler chain of Associated Hungarian Weeklies, as well as the Chicago *Othlon* and the Cleveland *A Jo Pastor*—all papers of the Hungarian extreme Right—have expressed some degree of approbation. Usually,

as in the case of the editorial printed in all Himmler papers for the week of December 10, it was said that the American Government, "whether right or wrong," had given Otto a definite role to play. Any protest, said *Othlon*, was bound to cause a "painful impression" at the State Department.

The Catholic press has not as a whole supported Otto. Although some non-Catholic papers (the Czech *Seznam*, December 10; the New York Yiddish-language *Day*, December 2) have been inclined to see a connection between the letter to Otto and Myron Taylor's visit to the Vatican, Catholic papers have looked unfavorably upon any suggestion that the Habsburg empire be restored (cf. the Polish *Nowiny Polskie*, November 25; the Czech *Narod*, November 29, December 6; and the Slovak *Katolicky Sokol*, December 2). However, some indications of Habsburg support are to be found in the Polish *Dziennik Chicagowski* (December 10) and the Hungarian *Magyarek Vasarnapja* (December 4). In the former case the journal seems more concerned with attacking the "Jews and socialists" who have protested against Otto than in supporting Otto himself.

Arguments Opposing Otto on Historical and Nationalistic Grounds

A large part of the foreign language press which speaks for Central European nationalities bases its opposition to Otto on traditional aversion to Habsburg domination. Occasionally, Otto's supposed assertion of leadership is taken to apply only to Austria (cf. the Slovak *Slovenska Obrana*, December 8); but in the vast majority of cases Otto's ambitions are believed to include the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czech-, Slovak-, and Ukrainian-language papers are perhaps the most violent in their denunciations. The Yugoslav press in the United States has been too preoccupied with internal Yugoslav matters to give to the Habsburg issue the attention which might have been anticipated. Yet through all papers speaking for the Central European nationalities runs an avowed determination not to submit again to the old imperial rule.

Arguments Opposing Otto on Ideological Grounds

Arguments objecting on ideological grounds to any trafficking with Otto are to be found in all sections of the foreign-language press. In these discussions the letter of November 19 to Otto is usually linked to arrangements with Darlan and other "figures of the Right," and it is asked whether such procedures are congruous with the Four Free-

doms and with democratic ideals. This type of argument is naturally most prevalent in papers of the Left, particularly in Communist papers—witness the articles in the Hungarian *Magyar Jovo*, the Rumanian *Romanul American*, the Ukrainian *Ukrainski Shehodenni Visti*, etc. Communist papers of nationalities not directly affected by a possible Habsburg restoration reveal a similar ideological pre-occupation. Thus the Lithuanian Communist *Vilnis* (December 14) and the Finnish *Tyomies* (December 3) significantly break the silence which the remainder of the press of these national groups have maintained respecting Otto.

APPENDIX III

THE FOOD SITUATION IN FRANCE¹

The increasingly grave shortage of food which confronts France today can be traced primarily to Vichy's mismanagement of supply and distribution and to requisitions imposed by Germany. Only secondarily can the problem be attributed to the British blockade or to deficiencies in fuel, labor, or agricultural machinery.

Domestic Supply

France's shortage, in other words, is not one inherited from the pre-war years: the French food economy was normally independent of any basic agricultural imports, with the exception of fodder and vegetable oils. Other items such as rice, tropical fruits, and coffee were secured from abroad; but, though useful, they were by no means indispensable.

Domestic production then—had it been distributed equitably, efficiently, and completely to the French population—would have sufficed to give the average citizen even after the invasion a passable diet, regardless of the blockade. For, aside from the year 1940, when military operations interfered rather severely with sowing and harvesting, French agricultural output has never fallen dangerously below pre-war levels. The fodder-deficit imposed by the blockade, it is true, brought a reduction in the number and weight of livestock and a corresponding drop in supplies of meat and dairy products available to the consumer. Shortages of labor, fuel, and farming machinery did not help matters, either. But none of these restrictions caused any disastrous fall in the supply of food products potentially available to Frenchmen.

Requisitions

Much more important than variations in domestic output or the effects of blockade were the requisitions imposed by the German authorities. During the crop-year of 1941-42, the Germans exacted from the French some 550,000 tons of wheat, and from the crop of 1942-43 they are expected to requisition about 850,000 tons—which may amount to nearly 15 percent of the French yield. German

¹ Based on memoranda prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

requirements of meat are expected to reach in 1942-43 about 15 percent of French production, and—a fact even more important—some 20 percent of France's fats and oils will go this year to the invaders. These requisitions bear all the more heavily upon the French food economy because they are collected, not from the Black Market, but from supplies which would otherwise be available for rationing.

It should be pointed out, however, that these requisitions—crucial as they were—never assumed the proportions familiar to other countries conquered by the German armies. Remaining within the broad limits of "normal contributions" which the victor exacts from the vanquished, the German demands have not, at least until now, had the character of a systematic drive to undermine completely the economic life of France and to deprive its inhabitants of the minimum means of subsistence.

The reasons for this German decision to abstain in France from a "Polish" policy of extermination and spoilage are political, economic, and psychological. The idea of French collaboration loomed large in all concepts of the "New Order." Integrating the economic resources of France into the German war effort became, very shortly, part and parcel of the German blueprint of total European mobilization. Finally, the general German attitude towards the "cultured" French was always markedly different from the contempt and hatred which they felt for the lesser nations of eastern Europe.

Vichy

The appalling mismanagement of the French food economy by the Vichy government provides an essential background against which reductions of imports, declines in output, and requisitions by the German authorities assume their proper proportions.

A decline in the quantity of available consumer goods and the inflationary process set in motion by exaggerated payments to the German occupation authorities could not, perhaps, have been prevented by Vichy; but it was the almost complete breakdown of that government's price-fixing system which vastly aggravated the food-supply problem. Runaway prices for consumer goods made farmers balk at delivering their products at officially decreed prices. In fact, deliveries had to be enforced by police power and became virtual requisitions.

As a result, the volume of foodstuffs available for distribution through officially approved channels was not sufficient to fill even

the extremely meagre rations. Farmers who withheld their products began to increase their own consumption and dispose of the surplus on the Black Market. Consequently, instead of acting as an irregular supplement to the official distributive system as in Germany, the Black Market has developed in France into a major channel of supply. Since its prices are, however, exorbitant, only well-to-do persons can avail themselves of its supplies. Thus, inequalities of distribution, instead of being mitigated by governmental controls, as is usual in wartime, have been accentuated.

If injustice were the only result of this system, it would be bad enough. But the system tends as well to lower agricultural production still further. Profitable as selling on the Black Market may be, the handling of large quantities of goods in an illegal way—particularly when they are bulky—is extremely inconvenient, if not prohibitive. More and more producers, therefore, are inclined to grow only as much as they need themselves, plus whatever quantities can be sold without too much risk on the Black Market.

Additional dislocation of the food economy is provided by the failure of Vichy to secure an interregional equalization of the available food supplies. Division of France into two zones, obstructionism by the German authorities, and a shortage of transport facilities were, of course, mainly responsible for the breakdown of interdepartmental traffic; but the Vichy government certainly proved unable to use whatever freedom of action had been left to it. The consequence of its impotence was the creation of artificial surpluses in some departments and of acute shortages in others. The result of this was, in turn, to facilitate German requisitions and to help disorganize the internal distributive system.

What the Frenchman Gets

Under the impact of all these factors, the food position of France has deteriorated very considerably. In pre-war France an average citizen consumed about 3,100 calories daily, which were contained in some 99 grams of protein, 67 grams of fats, and 470 grams of carbohydrates. Instead of this undoubtedly high norm, French nutritional specialists have accepted as a subsistence minimum for an average consumer not involved in heavy labor, a figure of 2,000 calories, which should be composed of 66 grams of protein, 38 grams of fats, and 330 grams of carbohydrates. If we compare this minimum with the ration obtained on cards by "normal consumers" (category "A"), which consists of 1,100

calories daily, contained in 33 grams of protein, 19 grams of fats, and 220 grams of carbohydrates, we find that the daily caloric deficit amounts to 900 calories. Carbohydrates show a deficit of some 33 percent, while proteins and fats are short by 50 percent. More striking than any, however, is the deficit of animal protein: the consumer receives only a third of the theoretical minimum.

Even if we take into consideration that about 200 additional calories can be obtained in workers' canteens, restaurants, and similar places, the remaining deficit of 700 calories a day is critical enough. These 700 calories can usually be obtained on the Black Market—but only by the few who can afford it. For the rest, severe malnutrition and heavy loss of weight are inevitable.

The position of consumer groups whose physically-exacting occupations entitle them to higher rationing categories is hardly more favorable. Although their rations may permit a caloric intake of about 2,000 or even 2,400 calories daily, their physiological requirements lie between 3,500 and 4,000 calories daily. Their deficit is, therefore, proportionately about the same, and a sharp decline in their efficiency and productivity appears quite as probable.

APPENDIX IV

"TWO ENEMIES"

One month ago, *The War This Week* published as an appendix a memorandum on "Polish Politics in the United States" (December 10-17, 1942). The following account of a lecture given by Wacław Spiewak in New York City on December 18 is presented as a vivid footnote to that article's discussion of rightist sentiments among Polish exiles. The substance of Mr. Spiewak's lecture, as reported from a reliable source, reveals how intense the feeling against both Germany and Russia has become in some Polish-American circles.

Wacław Spiewak is an American citizen who returned to this country in July, 1942, after taking part in the Polish underground movement. He told his audience, described as deeply sympathetic, that Poland's "two enemies" were Germany and Russia. Poles could never forgive Russia, he said: "no treaties will have any significance." Although this could not be said "before the Americans," it was ridiculous to argue about Poland's eastern boundaries. "Poland must get more. Russia must repay us."

For Germany Mr. Spiewak foresaw nothing but vengeance. "We do not care about public opinion. We are going to murder German children in their cradles . . . Every German is born a Hitler . . . Poland will do a lot of killing . . . No overseas tribunal will be able to interfere."

That this was an occasion of consequence and the speaker a man of some standing in Polish American circles is suggested by Peter Yolles' presence as chairman. Mr. Yolles, an editor of the *New York Nowy Swiat*, mouthpiece of the Matuszewski group, characterized Mr. Spiewak's address as "a voice from the heart." He warned the assembly that London and Washington were planning for Allied occupation of all liberated territories in order to forestall the possibility of a "bloody vengeance." The Polish underground, he urged, should be so organized as to be able to act "properly, rapidly, and effectively" before Allied occupation could interfere.

Mr. Spiewak introduced himself not as a politician but as a soldier preoccupied with Poland's struggle. He charged that Polish labor had

¹ Based on a memorandum prepared in the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

been indifferent to the German threat in 1939, but said that experience of life under the Nazis had welded all Poles together. Although post-war Poland would be a democracy, Mr. Spiewak was convinced that it could not afford "too much babbling and experimentation." The Ukraine, he said, would be "free" and would "line up with us. . . . This is already in the making." Lithuania would also be free and "in union with us."

Sikorski he respected as a soldier, Mr. Spiewak declared, but the exiled Government would have to give way to a "revolutionary government" in post-war Poland. He defended the pre-war Government, saying that "Minister Beck straightened out Polish politics * * * The Generals did everything in their power, but they were not allowed by the Allies to mobilize all their forces."