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
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

Mr. MacLeish has asked me to send to you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information. You will find a copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~
February 23, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 11
Office of Facts and Figures
Bureau of Intelligence

C o n t e n t s

SUMMARY

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2-23-42

SUMMARY REPORT

Strong current criticism of government information policies seems to stem in part from general editorial dissatisfaction with the progress of the war. There is a vigorous demand for clearer and fuller news about the war and, at the same time, for simplification and centralization of information activities.

The established confidence of the American public in governmental sources of information may be diminished by present editorial criticism and the spread of defeatist rumors.

Considerable confusion is shown in current comments on complacency. Whether responsibility for the supposed complacency rests with the people or with the government is not made altogether clear. Undoubtedly, the public needs greater clarification as to the urgency of the existing situation and as to the ways in which it must assist the war effort.

There is a high degree of confidence in ultimate victory accompanied by growing uncertainty as to the duration of the war. That a sense of urgency is felt by many seems certain. Urgency and complacency are attitudes difficult to isolate or measure; they shift rapidly with the changing fortunes of war.

Available data indicate that the American people feels frustrated rather than complacent. The public awaits mobilization and resolute direction of its energies.

The superficial unity which succeeded Pearl Harbor now seems to be ended. While the United Nations concept has general editorial acceptance, criticism of Britain and of Russia and complaint about the far-flung operations of our armed forces are now fostered by former isolationists.

If raids along our coasts are a possibility, further efforts should be made to prepare the public for them and, at the same time, to fortify it against isolationist insistence that our forces be spread thin for the passive protection of our coast lines.

INFORMATION

The past fortnight has produced a crescendo of complaint against the information policies and agencies of the government. The burden of the criticism may be divided into four main categories:

1. Inaccuracy--"The Administration is not giving an accurate picture of the nation's position to the public," says the New York Times in a news story of February 15th. This charge of inaccuracy ranges from alleged minor distortions of fact to the more general allegation that the government has failed to give the people a comprehensive understanding of its purposes and problems in the prosecution of the war.
2. Censorship--The commonest, although the least specific, of the complaints leveled at the government's information policy is that it has deliberately withheld bad news. This accusation generally stems from the prohibition against publishing news about casualties or maritime losses. Sometimes it becomes more general and concerns an alleged failure to give the true picture of our production difficulties; there are fairly frequent editorial grimaces over the refusal to furnish statistics on our output of planes, tanks, guns and other military equipment. But that a dearth of bad news actually exists seems effectually belied by even the most casual glance at the front pages of our newspapers. Headlines may sugarcoat and broadcasts may soften the stark reality of what has happened in the Far East; nevertheless, he who runs may read that Singapore has fallen, that the East Indies are gravely threatened, that MacArthur is carrying on a hopeless struggle in the Philippines, and that everywhere the forces of the United Nations are on the defensive or in retreat.
3. Rigidity--A third species of complaint is leveled against the inflexibility of the army and navy in releasing information of strategic value. It is commonly asserted in newspapers and radio broadcasts that the armed forces withhold information which can be of no conceivable value to the enemy, such as the location

of army camps, the designation of fighting units or the location of battle lines on the Bataan Peninsula. The most frequent complaint is against the Navy for its refusal to "tell the whole story of Pearl Harbor."

4. Superfluity--A final complaint of great antiquity, which has lately been refurbished by the press, is that government information agencies clog the mails with a surfeit of meaningless handouts. Editors assert that much of the mimeographed material which comes to their desks is of little or no value and represents only a publicity agent's effort to inflate or validate the business of his particular agency.

Confusion

In the general indictment of the government's information policies, there appears to be a considerable degree of confusion between plain "information" and what the commentators are inclined to call "morale-building." It is against the "morale-building" efforts of the government that conservative commentators inveigh most vigorously. They are suspicious that these efforts are designed to propagate the principles of the New Deal. Consequently, they are very prone indeed to dismiss these as mere instances of "boondoggling." In the morale category are included many of the activities of the Office of Civilian Defense and of the Office of Facts and Figures.

There now appears to be a growing editorial demand for simplification and centralization of the government's information activities.

Public Reaction

There is plenty of evidence in the public opinion sampling results already presented in these surveys to indicate that the American people feel that a good deal of vital

information concerning the war is being withheld from them. It is equally clear, however, that a decided majority of the public has, in the past, accepted the withholding as wise and necessary. That this latter belief will be maintained in the face of the recent barrage of editorial criticism and other developments is, of course, altogether uncertain.

But in the weeks just preceding Singapore's fall a small sample showed the following pattern of public attitudes on the question: "Are we getting a clear news picture of the war?"

19%	... Yes	}	65%
17%	... Yes; any more might help the enemy		
2%	... Yes, too much, we <u>are</u> helping the enemy		
27%	... No, but more would help the enemy	}	27%
9%	... No, too little news		
7%	... No, inaccurate news		
11%	... No		
8%	... Don't know		

COMPLACENCY

Definition

Press, radio and individual speakers have joined recently in a wave of assertions that the American public is complacent. The term "complacency" is almost always used without definition. The sense in which commentators generally appear to employ it is that the public lacks awareness of the seriousness, urgency and magnitude of the problems posed by the war. Some blame this condition on the softness and smugness of the public itself. A greater number, however, believe that the government, because of its alleged failure to give the public full information, is responsible.

Complacency is a peculiarly difficult attitude to isolate or measure. It is susceptible of confusion with confidence; and the border line between freedom from complacency and defeatism is extremely tenuous.

Public Opinion

Public opinion sampling indicates that the American public retains a very large measure of conviction that the United States is going to win the war.

At the same time, however, there appears to be a growing uncertainty as to the duration of the war. The following table shows response on two different dates to the question, "Regardless of what you hope, about how long do you think the war will last":

	Dec. 26 - 30	Jan. 28 - Feb. 4
1 year or less	14%	14%
13 mos. - 2 years	27%	27%
25 mos. - 3 years	26%	17%
Over 3 years	28%	23%
Don't know	5%	19%

That the public has some sense of urgency about the war has been made manifest by the readiness with which it has accepted incipient changes in its living pattern. There have been few indications of discontent over the sharply increased income taxes to be collected next month. Restrictions on the sale of automobiles and tires seem to meet with general approval. The sharp upswing in the sale of defense savings bonds and stamps might be taken as another indication of popular readiness to participate in the war effort. According to a recent Gallup poll, 66% of the sample answered in the affirmative to the question: "Should 10% of your salary be set aside each

pay day to buy defense bonds for you?" Only 27% responded negatively, with 7% undecided. Fifty-four per cent indicated a willingness to have 15% of their salary set aside for the purchase of defense bonds.

It is possible, on the other hand, to draw an inference of complacency from the satisfaction with which the public has, at least until lately, viewed the progress of the war effort. According to trial tabulations of a Gallup poll taken prior to Singapore, 74% of the people answered "yes" to the question: "Do you think the United States is doing all it possibly can to win the war?"; 22% said "no", while 4% expressed no opinion. Possibly it is significant that those who answered affirmatively to the same question concerning the British effort amounted to only 68%; 22% responded negatively, with 10% giving no opinion. When this question was asked about the Russian war effort, the result was 85% "yes", only 3% "no", and 12%, no opinion.

It is essential to note, in considering the problem of complacency, that this attitude, by its very nature, is subject to frequent and rapid changes. Those who were complacent prior to the fall of Singapore may very well have been jolted by that event into a sharp awareness of the situation. And, on the other hand, news of a successful American raid on Japanese bases may speedily convert a feeling of pessimism or desperation into one of high optimism approaching complacency.

In a survey made in a few cities during late January and early February, the following question was asked: "How do you feel about the way the war is going?". Those interviewed were invited to make detailed and lengthy statements about their attitudes. A careful analysis of these responses makes it possible to divide the prevailing opinions into six categories:

1. Pessimistic 19%
2. Mildly pessimistic 10%
3. "Matter-of-Fact" 12%
4. Mildly optimistic. 33%
5. Optimistic 13%
6. Don't know 13%

Grouping the various shadings of opinion, it may be said that 46% of the sample take a fairly hopeful view of the war, as opposed to 29% who are rather gloomy about our prospects.

Reasons given in explanation of their viewpoint by those who were essentially optimistic reflected a good deal of unrealistic thinking. A number based their optimism on the advances made by the Red army, and the most common argument advanced was that the enemy is cracking up.

The pessimists, on the whole, show greater realism. In general, they offer as reasons for their point of view, America's failure to prepare, inadequate production, and inferior equipment for our troops. About 9% place the blame on our allies. Only 7% ascribe our present position to lend-lease policy; even fewer (2%) blame management's failure to cooperate or labor interference (an additional 2%).

Data in a previous study, confirmed here, indicates that a favorable job situation, with corresponding economic

well-being, is an important source of general optimism. There is evidence that workers earning better incomes than they have experienced for some time, tend to be the most optimistic about the progress of the war. This points to a difficult task: War workers whose relative economic well-being leads them to optimism must be made to feel that the war situation is extremely serious and that they must make every effort to produce a maximum of war goods at this time.

FRUSTRATION

It may very well be that the prevailing feeling is not at all one of complacency but rather of its precise opposite, frustration. It seems likely, in any event, that the welter of criticism which has suddenly been leveled at the government is a result of a failure to channel latent energies into constructive effort. The inability to strike at the Japanese may account, in some measure, for the current tendency to strike at the defects in the government's conduct of the war.

Editorial writers assert, and public opinion sampling seems to bear them out, that the American people are ready to meet any demands which the war may make upon them and are, indeed, eager to take a part in defeating the enemy. But much of the current talk within the Government, as well as in the press, about putting them to work has been on a morale basis - that is to say, participation for the sake of participation. It is a psychological fact, of course, that participation is a producer of enthusiasm for the effort in which it is directed. A public, however, needs more than an

invitation to participate; it needs resolute direction, a demand which challenges its patriotism, resolution and generosity.

The press expresses, and perhaps reflects, an extremely widespread feeling that the government itself is exceedingly confused as to what it is trying to do. This feeling is based upon a belief that the government has not yet put itself upon a wartime basis and that it has not yet formulated ways in which to mobilize the most potent of its resources - its own people.

DISUNITY

Press and radio give evidence of a growing acceptance of the United Nations concept. A great majority of commentators recognize that it is only through the joint action of those peoples who are ranged against the aggressor states that victory can be achieved.

Nevertheless, the fall of Singapore has brought in its train a good deal of recrimination, directed particularly at the British. There is an exceedingly strong feeling that lack of foresight and imagination were responsible for the tragic loss of the British bastion. Reverses in Libya, together with the unfortunate escape of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the English channel, have added fuel to this criticism. There remains a high degree of admiration for Winston Churchill; but along with this is a belief that British military and naval commanders are shackled by outmoded doctrines of warfare.

Churchill's Sunday broadcast received rather less acclaim here than any of his previous addresses. Isolationist newspapers attacked the Prime Minister as having failed consistently in all his military ventures and, naturally, made capital of his admission that he had sought to bring about the entry of the United States into the war. There are omens that fuel is ready to be ignited by such kindling.

The press attack on Britain seems to indicate a renaissance of the old isolationist attitude. Again one sees in such papers as the Chicago Tribune all the old complaints concerning British Imperialism. And it should be added that other more liberal sources than this newspaper find their enthusiasm for the United Cause diminished by Britain's failure to pledge India a greater degree of independence. Chiang Kai-Shek's encouragement of Indian aspirations seems likely to focus increased attention on this theme.

The isolationists are also refurbishing the bugbear about the Bolshevization of Europe. They present a Russian defeat of Germany as an imminent possibility and predict that Stalin will supplant Hitler as the dictator of all Europe.

ARUBA

The Nazi U-boat raid on the island of Aruba was treated sensationally by the headlines but with relative calm in editorial columns. Commentators pointed out that the raid demonstrated the ability of the Axis to attack our own shores, yet found relief in the fact that American forces seemed to be on the alert and prepared to repel the attack.

There is now a general recognition in the press that defensive action will not suffice to win the war for the United Nations. Massing of strength for the seizure of the initiative and for offensive action is urged vehemently by most American newspapers. And there appears to be some awareness of the inevitable corollary that the concentration of forces for offensive action will require the weakening of some portions of our long defensive line and the exposure of them to just such sporadic raids as took place at Aruba.

That the public recognizes the likelihood of such raids seems somewhat less certain. Secretary Stimson's observations on this score received only secondary attention. The President's press conference warning last Tuesday was excitedly headlined and may have served to produce the necessary awakening. Many newspapers, however, presented it as an attempt to shock the public, thereby largely diminishing its effectiveness.

So high a degree of security from air attack seems to be felt among the American people that a sudden and savage raid on any of our cities might well produce serious panic, followed by a demand for excessive naval and air protection. If such raids are considered a possibility, it would seem desirable that further efforts be made to prepare the public for them--and at the same time to fortify the public against the growing isolationist insistence upon the concentration of our weapons at home for the waging of a purely defensive, or America First, type of war.

This survey covers materials furnished by The Office of Government Reports, The Public Relations Bureau of the War Department, Special Defense Unit of the Department of Justice, Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service of The Federal Communications Commission, Labor Division of W.P.B. and a number of other agencies public and private.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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
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March 2, 1942

My dear Miss Tully,

Mr. MacLeish asked me to send you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and Committee on War Information. You will find the copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.



2, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 12

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C o n t e n t s

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APPENDIX

SUMMARY REPORT

The United Nations concept seems to enjoy substantial acceptance by editorial writers and the public.

Apparently a majority of people not only accepts the idea as an expedient for winning the war but is in favor of active collaboration by the United States with other nations in a world organization after the war.

Editorial opinion is showing a tendency to recognize that the status quo can never be restored in Asia and to think in terms of a war for the liberation of all the world, regardless of race. However, statements by Allied leaders on this issue have been somewhat confused.

There is a considerable degree of hostility to Britain. This is especially true in the middle income groups. Only a small fraction of the people favoring active participation in world affairs after the war feel in this connection that the United States and the British Empire should combine as one English-speaking nation.

Axis propaganda, of course, plays upon the differences or latent distrust existing among us. The currency given deliberately or inadvertently to the enemy "line" by domestic press and radio is not extensively and systematically combatted by a full and wide disclosure of the true nature of our enemy.

The superficial unity following Pearl Harbor is not only gone but the sentiment favoring acceptance or consideration

THE UNITED NATIONS CONCEPT

Editorial Opinion

In recent comment on the war, and particularly in reactions to the President's speech, a majority of the American press has shown genuine enthusiasm for the United Nations' idea. The association among the countries ranged against the Axis has been viewed, not merely as an expedient and transient alliance, but in large measure as a real partnership likely to endure after the war has ended.

Although criticism of some of the associated nations, especially Britain, has lately been of a most vigorous nature, American commentators have been inclined to acknowledge that the United States is equally guilty of the faults which they assail. On the whole, the press has sought to avoid recriminations, recognizing that unity among the United Nations is indispensable to victory.

Public Opinion

Editorial appreciation of the United Nations' concept is matched by a growing public feeling for international cooperation. A recent study prepared by Fredric Williams and Hadley Cantril on the basis of Gallup poll data shows that a great majority of the American people appear to be internationally-minded and feel that this country should take an active part in world affairs when the war is over. The following division was obtained in response to the question, "Which of these two things do you think the United States should try to do when the war is over?"

	% of National Total
Stay out of world affairs as much as we can, or	21
Take an active part in world affairs?	69
Undecided	<u>10</u>
	100

of a peace offer from Germany, even by Hitler, is by no means insignificant. This attitude is strongest in the East-central and West-central states.

There is increased concern about Japan and a growing recognition of the probability of a long war.

While a majority of the public appears to feel that the Government is giving it as much news of the fighting and production fronts as is consistent with national security, a substantial minority distrusts this information as designed to make the situation look brighter or darker than it actually is.

Those urging an active part in world affairs were asked: Which of these statements comes closest to what you think we should do?

	% of National Total
We should do everything by ourselves that is necessary to protect our own national interests wherever they are	19
The United States and the British Empire should combine as one English-speaking nation	5
The United States, the British Empire and <u>other nations</u> should form a world organization	43
Other	0.2
No Opinion	1.8

The first of these groups evidently can be considered only on the borderline of international collaboration; theirs appears to be essentially an imperialist view of America's share in world affairs. But the plurality preference for world organization as contrasted with simple Anglo-American collaboration may be regarded as striking acceptance of the United Nations' concept.

It should be noted that when the group favoring world organization was asked if any countries should be excluded, about 40 per cent of them answered "Yes". Most of these favored the exclusion of Germany and Japan, some of Italy; only a very small percentage, 3 per cent, would exclude Russia.

Axis Propaganda

In the face of the manifest trend of public thinking toward world integration, certain disunifying influences remain actively at work. Most obvious among these is the influence of Axis propaganda. By means of shortwave radio, the Axis is busily endeavoring to foment distrust of one another among the United Nations. The

circulation attained by the Axis propagandists is difficult to measure. No authoritative figures are now available as to the extent of listening to shortwave broadcasts from enemy sources in the United States, although a study on this subject is in progress. It may be pointed out, however, that the effectiveness of radio as a propaganda instrument by no means depends upon direct audition; the content of Axis shortwave broadcasts continues to receive wide circulation in the United States through the media of domestic radio stations and daily newspapers. Conveyed through these media, the propaganda receives an imprimatur of respectability and authenticity which it does not possess when its source is clearly recognized.

Axis attempts to promote disunity take three directions:

1. To create fear of the spread of Bolshevism;
2. To play upon the latent distrust and dislike for Britain in the United States.
3. To undermine confidence in the United States Government.

All three of these purposes are ably abetted by the isolationist elements in the American press.

Hostility to Britain

That a considerable degree of hostility to Britain exists in the United States is made evident by public opinion sampling. Another study conducted by Williams and Cantril based on polling conducted during the week after February 4 shows the following division on questions regarding attitudes toward Britain: "Some people say that the British are largely to blame for our being in this war. Do you agree or disagree?"

	% of National Total
Agree	24
Disagree	60
Qualified Answer	2
No Opinion	14

"Do you think the English will try to get us to do most of the fighting for them in this war, or do you think they will do their fair share of the fighting?"

	% of National Total
Will try to get us to do their fighting	32
Will do their fair share of the fighting	58
Qualified Answer	1
No Opinion	9

A break-down of those answering the second query shows that persons under 30 years of age are most inclined to believe that the British will do their fair share of the fighting and that the bulk of distrust of the British is within the middle income group; the extremes of opinion are:

	People Under 30 (Upper Income)	People Over 50 (Middle Income)
Will Try To Get Us To Do Their Fighting	15%	44%
Will Do Their Fair Share	77%	49%

The same survey affords another indication of the distrust felt in this country for the British. In response to the question "Do you think the British are doing all they possibly can to win the war", 63 per cent said "Yes", 27 per cent said "No", while 10 per cent expressed no opinion. An almost equal percentage, although not the same people, voiced the same dissatisfaction with the war

effort of the United States. Asked if this country was doing all it possibly can do in the war, 25 per cent said "No", 71 per cent said "Yes", with 4 per cent expressing no opinion.

Attitude Toward Russia

The division of opinion in respect to the same question about the Russian war effort provides an interesting contrast; 88 per cent of the sample feel that the Russians are doing all they possibly can to win the war, while only 4 per cent disagree with this view and 8 per cent hold no opinion on the subject.

This high degree of confidence in Russia's war effort finds reflection in current editorial comment. Newspaper reactions to Premier Stalin's anniversary Order of the Day to the Red Army reached a new high level of friendliness toward the Soviet Union. There were few hostile allusions to Communism; on the contrary, most comments praised the realism and determination of the Russian leader and the devotion and fortitude of the Russian people.

At the present time the prevailing expectation is that the German spring offensive will shatter the recent Russian gains; however greatly headlines have dramatized the Red Army's counter-offensive throughout the winter, editorial appraisals, particularly of late, have tended to minimize it. Only isolationist newspapers have pictured the Russians as being on the road to victory; and this picture has manifestly been presented in an effort to instill a fear that Communism will spread over the whole of Europe, and to make us feel the Nazis are no longer a menace. It is altogether possible that a large scale Russian success in the spring would bring in its train a greatly increased hostility toward the Soviet

Union; friendliness toward the Russians now may be sympathy for an under-dog, as well as recognition that they have effectively checked the Nazi drive.

India

One more manifestation of the United Nations' idea should be noted here. The statement of Indian aspirations for independence made recently by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek has received a great deal of editorial attention.

The realization of Indian hopes is generally supported by the American press, not only as a means of procuring the full mobilization of Indian resources on the side of the United Nations, but also because of a genuine desire to promote Indian freedom. Most commentators point with pride to the American colonial record in the Philippines and feel that the British might well emulate it. Many of them now recognize that the status quo can never be restored in Asia, and some are beginning to think in terms of a genuine democratic war for the liberation of all the world, regardless of race, creed or color.

THE "TURTLE" BLOC

Editorial Opinion

The shelling of the California coast by a Japanese submarine was heralded by the bulk of the press as confirmation of the President's view that "The broad oceans have become endless battlefields."

Only a very small isolationist segment of the press, and this somewhat diffidently, suggested that we should bring our naval forces home to ward off such attacks upon our shores. It seems likely, nevertheless, that this minority will grow more vocal as

the early effects of the President's admonition fade away.

Axis Propaganda

Axis shortwave broadcasts are working vigorously toward this end. Berlin, Tokyo and Rome radios magnify the attack and the damage inflicted, representing the American people as "very much alarmed". This magnification of the raid has been broadcast zealously to South America and to China as evidence that the United States Navy is incapable of extending its protection.

In their efforts to promote isolationist and "turtle" feeling in the United States, Axis radios have been making liberal use of quotations from speeches by Americans. Thus, on a beam to Latin America, the Berlin radio broadcast, "Senator Walsh demands that the United States Navy come home and protect the nearly defenseless shores of North America alone. If they do this, how can these Yankee gentlemen guarantee the defense of South American coasts in return for Ibero-American entry into the war?" Radio Roma asserted, "Senator Walsh stated that the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico coasts of the United States are practically without defenders, adding that it may soon become necessary to call back for the necessary defense of these coasts what Senator Walsh called 'our weakened American fleet'." Senator Hiram Johnson was quoted as expecting another Pearl Harbor catastrophe off the West coast.

The Isolationist Core

During the month preceding Pearl Harbor, the extreme opponents of the Administration's foreign policy were gradually whittled down to what may well be an irreducible minimum. It represented approximately one-fifth to one-fourth of the population. For those included

within this group, the term "isolationist" was wholly a misnomer. The group consisted in the main of three elements: genuine pacifists, Fascists or pro-Fascists and die-hard anti-New Dealers who carried their bitterness against the Administration so far as to be hostile to any policy which it endorsed.

Public opinion research sheds some light on the composition of this die-hard "turtle" group. In numbers it appears to be just about the same size as it was prior to Pearl Harbor -- an indication that its constituents are not liable to a change of heart or mind on any basis whatsoever.

Two weeks after Pearl Harbor, about one-tenth of the people in the United States were in favor of accepting a peace offer made by Hitler on the basis of his leaving matters as they then stood. In the latter part of January, when a sample was asked "If Hitler offered to stop the war now and discuss peace terms with the Allies, would you favor or oppose accepting Hitler's offer?", 12 per cent said they were in favor, 81 per cent were opposed, with 4 per cent undecided, and 3 per cent giving qualified answers.

A larger percentage of the public would be in favor of making peace with the German army, as distinguished from Hitler himself. When asked "If the German army overthrew Hitler and then offered to stop the war and discuss peace terms with the Allies would you favor or oppose accepting the offer of the German army," 30 per cent were in favor, 61 per cent opposed, 6 per cent undecided, with 3 per cent giving qualified answers.

That a substantial portion of those favoring peace on either of these bases are out-and-out Fascist sympathizers is made evident by their response to the question "If the Allies accepted the German peace offer and stopped the war now, do you think the peace settlement would mean a victory for Germany, or a defeat for Germany?", twenty-nine per cent said it would mean a victory for Germany, 50 per cent said it would mean defeat, 21 per cent admitted they didn't know. This means that about 10% of the total would make peace now on the enemy's terms, and that about 15 % think we could make peace now on our own or compromise terms.

A geographical break-down, prepared by Cantril and Williams, of those favoring the discussion of peace terms with the German army reveals that they are predominantly those living in large cities and in the East-central and West-central states.

PUBLIC THINKING ABOUT THE WAR

Figures obtained this week reveal a marked shift in popular expectations as to the duration of the war. There is a sharp decrease in the number of those believing that the war will be over in two years or less and a corresponding increase among those anticipating a long war, over three years. The following table shows the results of three nationwide OFF polls based upon interviewing at different dates:

	Dec. 26 - 30	Jan. 28 - Feb. 4	Feb. 18 - 23
Under 6 months	(.9%	.7%	.6%)
6 months - 1 year	40.8% (12.9	12.1	7.6) 28.1%
13 months - 2 years	(27.	26.5	19.9)
25 months - 3 years	26.4	16.4	21.5)
37 months - 4 years	(12.6	8.8	10.6)
49 months - 5 years	27.9% (9.4	9.9	11.5) 44.6%
Over 5 years	(5.9	5.6	12.5)
Don't know	4.9	19.9	15.8

At the same time there is a good deal less certainty as to the outcome of the war. A marked decrease is discernible in the percentage of those believing that the United States will win without question, while there is a corresponding rise both among those who feel that the victory may not be altogether decisive or that the result will be a stalemate. Following is a comparison of public responses on this topic at different dates: "Which of these statements comes closest to the way you feel the war will end?"

- a. There is no question but that the United States and her Allies will win the war and be able to write the peace terms.

Dec. 26 - 30	68.5%
Feb. 16 - 23	54.6%

- b. We will win the war all right, but the losers will be strong enough so we will have to make some concessions too.

Dec. 26 - 30	22.4%
Feb. 16 - 23	30.8%

- c. We won't be defeated, but neither will the Axis -- the war will end in a draw.

Dec. 26 - 30	3.9%
Feb. 16 - 23	6.5%

- d. I am afraid the Axis powers will have a pretty good chance to win the war.

Dec. 26 - 30	.9%
Feb. 16 - 23	3.9%


- e. Don't know.

Dec. 26 - 30	4.3%
Feb. 16 - 23	4.2%

The concentration of attention on Pacific fighting is reflected by an increased public disposition to regard Japan either as our prime enemy or as equal in importance with Germany. The following

illustrates the trend in this direction:

WHICH DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONSIDER
ITS NUMBER ONE ENEMY - JAPAN OR GERMANY?



EIRE

Although there has been a great deal of public and editorial discussion of Eire's relationship to the war, the rather surprising fact is that only about one-half of the people of the United States have any knowledge of what this relationship actually is. In response to the question "Do you happen to know whether or not the Irish Free State (Eire) has gone to war against Germany," 48 per cent of a national sample answered "No", 2 per cent said "Yes", while the entire balance, 50 per cent, found themselves in the "Don't know" column. New Englanders proved to be best informed on this topic -- no doubt because of the high percentage of Irish among them; 64 per cent in this area knew that Eire is a non-combatant. But in the South only 40 per cent were aware of the Irish position.

These figures provide a rather startling indication of the degree of popular indifference sometimes manifested toward issues which seem to be of prime political importance. They should be considered in evaluating published Gallup poll results respecting Eire. Of those aware of existing Irish neutrality, 90% "would like to see the Irish Free State let the Allies use war bases along the Irish coast", while 71 per cent feel that the Irish Free State should "join the Allies in declaring war against Germany." Irish-Americans, a majority of whom a year ago voted against abrogation of Eire's neutrality, now record themselves as 56% in favor of an Irish declaration of war against Germany and 72% in favor of letting the Allies use bases along the Irish coast.

INFORMATION

Public feeling about the Government's output of information is freshly reflected in the results of a limited telegraphic poll, based upon small sample and taken in a limited number of places on February 21 of this year. In response to the question "Do you think the Government is giving the public as much information as it should about the fighting in this war", 68.3 per cent said "Yes", 22.7 per cent said "No", 9 per cent were in the "Don't know" column.

When this question was stated inversely, "Do you think the Government could give us more information about the fighting in this war without helping the enemy," a slight variation resulted. The number answering "Yes" was 28.6 per cent, those answering "No" amounted to 63 per cent, with the "Don't know" group at 8.4 per cent.

Similar questions were asked about information on the production program as follows: "Do you think the Government is giving the public as much information as it should about our production program here in the United States?"

YES: 63.7% NO: 26.3% DON'T KNOW: 10.0%

"Do you think the Government could give us more information about our production program without helping the enemy?"

YES: 28.6% NO: 63.0% DON'T KNOW: 8.4%

As to the accuracy of the Government's information the following results were obtained: "Do you think the war news the Government does release is accurate, or that it makes the situation look better than it really is, or makes it look worse than it really is?"

Accurate: 38.3% Looks better: 35.4% Looks worse: 10.4%
D.K.: 15.9%

"Do you think the news the Government does release about our production program is accurate, or that it makes the situation look better than it really is, or makes it look worse than it really is?"

Accurate: 48.2% Looks better: 26.5% Looks worse: 11.5%
D.K.: 13.7%

While these data may be taken to indicate a fairly high measure of popular satisfaction with the quantity of the government's information on the fighting and production fronts, they also reveal a significant distrust of the quality of this information. A considerable portion of the public seems inclined to discount news from official sources as overly optimistic and a smaller but not negligible minority feels that the government is painting too dark a picture.

POLICY STATEMENTS

Some degree of confusion appears to exist as to the policy of the United States and of the United Nations on two issues now claiming public attention. There are discrepancies between the authoritative statements made by the chiefs of the American, British and Chinese governments respecting the nationalist aspirations of the Indian people. And uncertainty exists as to the attitude of the United Nations in distinguishing between the German people and the Nazi government.

Both Hitler and Goebbels have sought to persuade the German people that the United Nations are waging war, not merely against the Nazi government, but against all Germans. In his anniversary Order of the Day to the Red Army, Premier Stalin endeavored to shatter this impression, at least as far as the Soviet war effort is concerned. But the policies of the United States and Great Britain have never been entirely clarified on this score.

A comparison of authoritative statements on this subject and on the subject of Indian independence will be found in the appendix.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S TALK

The President's radio address of February 23 received the highest radio audience ever recorded (78.1 per cent), with the single exception of his broadcast on December 9 which exceeded it by only .9 per cent. A minute by minute check on the audience in 32 cities from coast to coast showed that the audience grew as the talk progressed and was larger at the conclusion than at the outset. This fact seems noteworthy considering the hour at which he spoke -- a time when radio attention is normally at a relatively low ebb.

Morning newspapers of February 24, of course, gave the speech banner headlines, although a majority of the press placed it in a position slightly subordinate to news of the Japanese submarine raid on the California coast.

APPENDIX 1
Authoritative Statements Concerning India

Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941

Point 3:

"They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live;....."

Great Britain

China

United States

September 9, 1941- Churchill - "The Joint Declaration (Atlantic Charter) does not clarify in any way, the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or other parts of the British Empire . . . At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of sovereignty, self-government and national life of the states and nations of Europe now under Nazi yoke . . ."

February 3, 1942- Under-Secretary of State for India and Burma -

"We have . . . invited Indian leaders of all shades and opinion to get together to formulate some scheme whereby an Indian government or governments may be formed, to which we can transfer power, and we have given assurance that the transfer will take place as early as possible after the war."

February 21, 1942- Chiang Kai-Shek "I hope Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people, as speedily as possible will give them real political power so they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength."

February 23, 1942-

Roosevelt "We of the United Nations are agreed on certain broad principles in the kind of peace we seek. The Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border on the Atlantic, but to the whole world."

APPENDIX II
Authoritative Statements Concerning German People vs. Nazi Regime

RUSSIA

Stalin, February 23, 1942

"Occasionally the foreign press engages in prattle to the effect that the Red Army's aim is to exterminate the German people and destroy the German State. This is, of course, a stupid lie and a witless slander against the Red Army. The Red Army has not and cannot have such idiotic aims. The Red Army's aim is to drive out the German occupants from our country and liberate Soviet soil from the German fascist invaders.

"It is very likely that the war for liberation of the Soviet land will result in ousting or destroying Hitler's clique. We should welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German State. History shows that Hitlers come and go, but that the German people and the German State remain.

GREAT BRITAIN
(Empire & European Allies)

Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941

Point 6. "After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace . . ."

Point 1. "Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise."

Point 2. "They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."

Point 4. "They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

Resolution of Allied Governments, June 12, 1941

"That they will continue the struggle against German or Italian aggression until victory is won..."

Churchill, January 27, 1942

"The 'Union' of the United Nations 'is based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter; it aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in all corners of the globe."

UNITED STATES

Roosevelt, January 6, 1942

"Our own objectives are clear; the objective of smashing the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved peoples..."

Roosevelt, February 23, 1942

"We and the other United Nations are committed to the destruction of the militarism of Japan and Germany."

GERMANY

Hitler, January 30, 1942

"We Germans cannot in general imagine that if a country near us suddenly decides on a certain form of government, we must declare war on this country just because that particular form of government doesn't suit us. We can't comprehend this at all, and naturally the others can't understand it either. They did not enter the war for this reason. They did not declare, and they did not go to war because they were irritated by the form of the state. They are capable of embracing the lowest form of government when necessary, in order to collaborate with it. No, no, it is not a question of a form of a government, but other reasons which brought them previously into a war against the German Reich . . ."

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

PSF
OWI

March 9, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

Mr. MacLeish asked me to send you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and Committee on War Information. You will find the copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary,
President of the United States,
The White House
Washington, D.C.



~~Secret~~

March 9, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 13

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C o n t e n t s

SUMMARY

Civilians and the War page 1
Pacific Coast Attitudes Toward Aliens .. page 9
Taxes page 13
Race Problem page 14

APPENDIX

SUMMARY REPORT

Underlying national unity can be gauged from the degree of public participation in the war program. Slightly more than two-thirds of the American people now feel that they are helping, in some measure, to win the war.

But of these people, many seek additional means of sharing in the national effort. And the necessary contribution of others has not yet been enlisted. It seems clear, therefore, that the present level of public participation is not adequate to sustain that feeling of united action which is the essential foundation of morale.

There is real anxiety among West coast residents in regard to the alien problem. No such degree of hysteria exists as the press has suggested but the situation demands prompt and careful action. There is some approval of Government action to date but many want further action taken against both Japanese subjects and nationalized Americans of Japanese parentage.

The bottom of the trouble in Detroit lies in the dearth of housing facilities and a genuine race antagonism of the Poles for negroes, aggravated by special interests. There is a real danger that trouble will spread unless negro confidence in democratic justice is restored.

Radio networks have not featured the Treasury's tax proposals as the newspapers have in the past week. This deficiency might be corrected if considered advisable. A strong editorial campaign for a general sales tax has developed in the newspapers.

CIVILIANS AND THE WAR

It is an accepted psychological principle that unity is a product of unified effort. One index, then, of the degree to which national unity has been achieved can be found in the degree of civilian participation which has been enlisted in the war program.

Participation

A nationwide study conducted in February, asking "Do you feel that anything you, yourself, are now doing is helping the total United States war effort?" reveals that, of the whole population, slightly more than 70 per cent now feel that they are making some contribution. The contributions vary widely. Many of these people, and particularly the men, feel that their regular occupation is in itself a means of participating in the national program. Among women, however, the contribution is made mainly in the form of voluntary defense work and efforts toward economy and conservation.

Following are the principal means by which people feel that they are helping in the national war effort, many of them feeling that they are helping in more ways than one:

Buying defense bonds	24%
Regular occupation	20%
Volunteer defense work	19%

Seven per cent feel that they are contributing through donations to the Red Cross, the U.S.O. and other service organizations or by collecting paper, metals, etc.; eight per cent of the

public derive a sense of participation by economizing on materials necessary to war. And ten per cent believe that they are sharing through vicarious efforts, such as giving sons to the Army, maintaining health and morale, or supporting the Government.

The point to be emphasized here is that, whether or not these contributions are of genuine value, they are believed to be so by those who responded affirmatively to the original question. From the point of view of morale, the sense of participation is the essential consideration. But it by no means follows necessarily that this sense will persist or be wholly satisfied by the current level of endeavor. Of those now eager to volunteer, more than two-thirds believe they are already helping. Those belonging to the upper income and higher education levels lead other groups in the percentage who feel they are helping. Skilled workers and farmers reveal a specially strong sense of participation, no doubt because of the conviction that their regular work is in itself an important contribution to the national program.

Of the total population, roughly two-fifths feel that their regular jobs have little or no connection with the war effort. One-third feels that there is an indirect connection between its work and the war. Slightly more than one-fifth discern a direct connection between what they are doing and the national program.

Rural people are far ahead of urban people in feeling a directness of connection between their occupation and the war effort. It seems probable that the high proportion of farm people feeling a direct sense of participation is in part, at least, a result of the Agricultural Production Goals Campaign conducted between October 15 and December 15 by the Department of Agriculture. In this campaign, every farmer in the country was called upon by personal visit to increase the production of foods and fibers needed to win the war. Wide publicity was given to such slogans as "Food For Freedom" and "Food Will Win the War and Write the Peace."

Volunteer Activity

Between fifteen and twenty per cent of all the people are now engaged in volunteer war work of some sort. And about 29 per cent of the population, not now active, feel that they have time for, and would like to undertake, some sort of volunteer war activity. In examining the components of this latter group, interviewing indicates, as was to be expected, that those actively engaged in defense work are somewhat less eager to accept additional assignments than those whose contributions are confined to the more passive types of service. The relationship between doing something and wanting to do something is shown in the following table:

activity. There is, however, a sharp difference in the types of work in which the sexes would like to engage. The largest group of men seeking volunteer activity would like to undertake active civilian defense efforts, while the women are more anxious to get into organizational work, chiefly knitting, sewing, etc.

Those who feel that their regular job is directly or indirectly connected with the war effort, are already doing more than their proportionate share in the active aspects of civilian defense, but seek little additional in this line. Fifty-nine per cent of the people feel that their jobs are sufficient contribution. It is a possible measure of complacency that those believing the war will be short are more prone to regard their jobs as an adequate contribution than those anticipating a long war. There appears to be a further indication of this attitude in the fact that 30 per cent of the men and 40 per cent of the women regarding their jobs as sufficient contribution, also feel that these jobs have little or no connection with the war effort. Their relative importance in the total population is shown in the following pattern of attitudes:

18% of the men
16% of the women.....think that their jobs are connected with the war effort and feel that doing their own jobs is not enough. They feel they ought to volunteer for additional defense work.

38% of the men
34% of the women.....feel that their jobs are connected with the war effort and feel that doing their own job is enough; they should stick to the last and not volunteer for anything in addition to whatever volunteer work they are already doing.

16% of the men
15% of the women.....feel that their jobs have little if any connection with the war effort and feel that attending to these jobs is not enough. They feel they ought to volunteer for defense work.

18% of the men
25% of the women.....feel that their jobs have little or no connection with the war effort and feel that sticking to their own jobs is enough.

(For an additional 10% of the sample the answers were incomplete)

Public Evaluation of OCD

Criticism of the civilian defense program is expressed by only a minority. Eight per cent of those interviewed felt that the program is being run poorly and about 10 per cent felt that there are not "enough things to do for people who want to get into civilian defense work."

There is, however, a rather widespread ignorance about civilian defense. In the Middle West, for example, 40 per cent said they "did not know" how civilian defense was being run in their communities. For the nation at large, 29 per cent professed a lack

of information on this score; significantly, more than one-fourth of this group declared that they were anxious and ready to get into some sort of volunteer activity.

An analysis on the basis of income and education levels of those now engaged in civilian defense work suggests the possibility that social distinctions may have operated against the less privileged portions of the population. For this there is confirmation in a study prepared by the Office of Public Opinion Research on the basis of Gallup poll data, which indicates that, although the poor volunteer less frequently than the well-to-do, when they do volunteer, they are accepted less often than those on higher income levels.

Total Mobilization

Recently published Gallup poll figures were interpreted as indicating a strong national majority in favor of total mobilization of the American people. The Gallup data were based on two questions: (1) "Should all men and women over 18 who are not already in military service be required to register with the Government for some kind of civilian defense or war work?" and (2) "After finding out what each person can do, should the Government have the power to tell each citizen what to do as his part in the war effort and require him or her to do it?"

Results have so far been published for only three localities, the city of Philadelphia and the states of New York and Massachusetts. Responses to the second question for the country as a whole, which have not yet been released by Dr. Gallup, are as follows:

	Yes	No	Undecided
National Average	61	32	7
New England	57	36	7
Middle Atlantic	60	33	7
East Central	56	35	9
West Central	62	32	6
South	66	25	9
Rocky Mountains	69	24	7
Pacific	63	33	4

The inference drawn by Dr. Gallup, that the public "would vote by a majority of nearly two to one in favor of total mobilization" does not seem altogether warranted. In the first of the two questions, the phrase "some kind of civilian defense or war work" may be said to confuse the issue in some measure. The term "civilian defense" carries a connotation of volunteer endeavor over and above one's regular occupation. It may be, therefore, that in answering the second question people felt that the Government should have mandatory direction over volunteer efforts, but not necessarily over normal employment. Plainly, this would not constitute total mobilization.

The responses to these two questions do seem to indicate, however, that the American public is well ahead of its Government in approaching the problem of mobilizing the country's human resources for war. There is apparent here a readiness to serve and, if necessary to sacrifice, which has been only partially stimulated by the existing civilian defense program.

PACIFIC COAST ATTITUDES TOWARD ALIENS

Newspapers, particularly those on the West coast, have presented a picture of alarm approaching hysteria over the problem posed by aliens in the far western states. There is undoubtedly real anxiety in regard to this problem among West coast residents. But careful interviewing, and analysis of the popular attitudes revealed, indicate no such degree of hysteria as the press has suggested. Tension does exist, however, and the situation certainly demands prompt and careful attention.

There appears to be a widespread belief on the Pacific coast that aliens residing there, especially Japanese, are disloyal to the United States and a menace to security. Two-fifths of those interviewed in the western coastal states, during the week of February 7-13, manifested a belief that there are many disloyal aliens in their vicinity.

There were wide differences among the three coastal states in the intensity of suspicion toward aliens; while slightly less than

one-half the Californians and Oregonians agreed that there were many aliens disloyal to the United States, only one-seventh of those interviewed in the state of Washington held this view.

It is significant that in the three states, practically all who felt suspicious of aliens directed their suspicions specifically against the Japanese; they were named twice as frequently as Germans. Oregonians and Southern Californians considered the German aliens much more of a menace than the Italians, but in Washington and Northern California, where the Italian population is larger, Italians were cited as disloyal just as frequently as Germans.

Racial or national antagonism seems to account in large part for the unfavorable attitudes toward the Japanese. More than half of those interviewed manifested this feeling, commonly voicing such sentiments as, "You can never trust a Jap," or "Once a Jap, always a Jap." Economic competition in one form or another accounts for about 14 per cent of the unfavorable replies. And about 19 per cent of those hostile to the Japanese simply cited as a reason the fact that they are an enemy people.

The following distribution, indicating the relative distrust of the three alien groups in four far western areas, was obtained in response to the question "Would you say there are many aliens

around here -- that is, people who are not citizens -- who are not loyal to the United States?" (Those answering this question affirmatively were asked "What nationality are they?")

	Total	Washington	Oregon	Northern California	Southern California
YES:					
Japanese	34%	11%	42%	41%	40%
German	19	5	27	23	22
Italian	13	4	12	22	14
Other	4	-	-	4	7
Don't Know	2	1	1	1	3
<hr/>					
Total persons answering "yes"	40	14	46	49	47
<hr/>					
NO	41	67	36	28	36
Don't Know	19	19	18	23	17

It is in Southern California, however, that the strongest revulsion against the Japanese makes itself evident in more detailed questioning. Three-fourths of the people in this region think that "only a few" or "practically none" of the Japanese aliens are loyal to the United States; in Oregon, only 41 per cent hold this extreme view, in Northern California 44 per cent, in Washington 50 per cent. Southern Californians also show a higher conviction than the residents of the three other areas that the Japanese would actually do something* against the United States if they had a chance, and similarly, Southern Californians are more prone than other far westerners to urge drastic treatment of these aliens.

*Corroborative evidence from another survey shows that sabotage is very much on the minds of 60% of West coast citizens, though half of these do not expect sabotage to be so successful as to cripple the war effort.

Three-fourths of Southern Californians recommend segregating all Japanese aliens in camps. In Northern California, less than one-half of the people favored this treatment. One-third of the Southern Californians would also segregate Japanese who are citizens, while in the other three Pacific coast areas no more than 14 per cent recommend this drastic action. (See Appendix 1)

Although perhaps less than indicated by the press, there is some degree of dissatisfaction with the way the alien problem has been handled on the West coast. The course pursued by the Federal Government is accorded partial public approval. While 37 per cent of the people in the far western states believe that it has dealt with the situation "very well," an equal number credit it with having handled the problem "only fairly well;" 18 per cent believe that it has done its job "poorly," and 9 per cent admit that they "don't know."

Roughly one in four persons in all three states thought their state government had been handling the problem "very well;" approximately the same number so appraised the local officials' handling of the situation. Southern Californians were most critical of all three governmental agencies.

The FBI is most frequently favored as the agency which should deal with the Japanese problem on the coast. In all the areas, one-half of those interviewed indicated a preference for putting the FBI in charge; 31 per cent voted for the Army, only 2 per cent for the Navy, 9 per cent for the state police, 11 per cent for the local police, and 4 per cent in the "don't know" column.

TAXES

Editorial attention has suddenly been drawn back to fiscal problems by the announcement of Secretary Morgenthau's tax proposals for the new fiscal year. It is almost uniformly agreed, in the regular daily press, that a steep increase in taxes is necessary as a means of financing the war and avoiding inflation. Accordingly, there have been few editorial complaints that the amount of revenue sought by the Secretary of the Treasury was excessive. Indeed, a number of commentators warn Congress against whittling down the Treasury Department's proposals as a means of catching votes; the public, they insist is ready and willing to make sacrifices.

Disagreement arises, apparently, only as to which segment of the public shall bear the sacrificial burden. A heavy majority of the press is convinced that it should be borne by those on the lower economic levels. This majority, consequently, advocates a general sales tax; it very much prefers this form of levy to a withholding tax which, the commentators argue, would bear heavily on the low and middle income workers, while permitting farmers and professionals to escape. The virtue of the sales tax, the editorial writers maintain, is that it would distribute the burden "painlessly" among all groups.

RACE PROBLEM

The clash in Detroit last week between the White and Negro groups can scarcely be dismissed as an isolated instance of race rioting. On the contrary, all indications point to the conclusion that it was symptomatic of a bitter underlying discontent among Negroes. There are reasons to fear that something of the sort will be repeated soon in Buffalo, Philadelphia or in other cities where accelerated war production has created acute housing shortages and where white and colored workers are juxtaposed.

Competent investigators who have studied the Detroit situation find that at the bottom of the trouble lies a real dearth of housing facilities to meet the requirements of Detroit's rapidly growing industrial population. But what rocks Detroit today is not so much the problem of finding homes for Negroes as of keeping them out of homes that have already been built for them.

The Poles live in close proximity to the colored elements of Detroit's population and, in normal times, compete with them for jobs. Out of this economic competition and perhaps also out of the desire to find substitute targets for their aggressions and their resentments against injustice and oppression, the Poles have turned upon the Negroes in genuine race antagonism in Detroit. The Poles are the largest cultural minority in this city; the Negroes are second, but they are growing in number much more rapidly than the Whites.

Investigation makes it plain that the conflict between the two groups was aggravated by individuals who have special interests, particularly the maintenance of realty values involved in the Sojourner Truth housing project. Certain real estate men fomented the Polish resentment; leaders of the Polish Catholic Church in the neighborhood heaped fuel upon the fire; finally the Ku Klux Klan seized upon the situation to promote unrest and rancor.

The Negro position, on the other side, has had the backing of Detroit's leading liberal and labor groups, the CIO unions in particular, and, to some extent, the Communist party which, as usual, has not hesitated to support an underdog for the sake of advancing its own interest. Its participation has, of course, enabled the opponents of Negro occupancy to becloud the issue with allegations of radicalism.

It seems clear also that the situation was accelerated by the vacillating management of the problem in its early stages by both local and federal authorities. Investigators report that it is now definitely beyond local control. Some feel that only the intervention of the President, himself, can procure a peaceable solution.

Among Negroes, and especially in the Negro press, the Detroit situation is producing a real dissatisfaction with American democracy. The cry is now growing in volume -- "If we've got to fight for democracy abroad, let's fight for democracy at home"; by fighting, they do not mean signing petitions. There appears to be

some real danger of spreading Negro uprisings against White neighbors. Detroit is being looked upon as a test case. It demands a solution which will help to restore Negro confidence in democratic justice.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION


"There are many disloyal aliens around here."

"Few if any Japanese can be trusted."

"Half or more of the Japanese would harm U.S. if they could."

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE JAPANESE (A. Aliens (B. Nisei

Concentration camps Rigid Control (*) Pre-caution (**) Treat as Individuals



(*) Bar them from places and jobs where they might be dangerous and make them report to the police regularly.

(**) Bar them from places and jobs where they might be dangerous but otherwise let them alone.

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

PSF
OWI

*file
personal*

March 16, 1942.

My dear Miss Tully,

Mr. MacLeish asked me to send you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and Committee on War Information. You will find the copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence *

Miss Grace Tully,
Secretary,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.



March 16, 1942

M E M O R A N D U M

The attached Survey is the last one to be delivered on Monday at the meetings of the Committee on War Information. Hereafter they will be completed on Wednesday and distributed then to the Board of Facts and Figures. They will be discussed on Thursday by the Board and distributed with the Agenda on Saturday to the Committee on War Information.

~~SECRET~~
6, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 14

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C o n t e n t s

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SUMMARY REPORT

The fundamental patriotism of Negroes and their loyalty and warm, almost filial, confidence in the Government should not be allowed to obscure the frustration, pessimism, cynicism and insecurity which appear to characterize their attitudes toward the war.

On the whole the better educated Negro seems to expect a longer war than the Whites of comparable income status; so too they are more inclined to expect the Axis, even if defeated, to be strong enough to exact concessions from the United Nations.

While economic and a number of other factors affect the Negroes' attitudes regarding the war, there is no doubt that some are motivated by a degree of sympathy for the Japanese as colored men.

The growing importance of the Negroes in our population, especially as their educational status improves, makes two major war information needs stand out:

- 1) Among the Negroes, it must be demonstrated that this is not a race war and that other peoples allied with us have colored skins.

- 2) Among the Whites, effort must be made to remove prejudice so that discrimination in the armed services, war industries, civilian defense, housing, etc., may be reduced.

The first objective may be achieved in large measure through churches, fraternal organizations and the Negro press. The latter can only be brought about by resort to all the media throughout the country.

* * *

Almost all people have felt the pinch of rising prices since Pearl Harbor and a large majority expect continued rises this year. There is more concern in the cities than in rural areas. Generally those who expect a long war are most concerned over price rises. Price regulation is not only accepted as a corrective but it is widely advocated.

NEGROES AND THE WAR

Status

Negro attitudes toward the present war differ materially from those which prevailed during the first World War. Two significant shifts have taken place in the status of Negroes during the intervening quarter of a century.

The primary change is geographical. There has been a steady and considerable migration of Negroes from southern to northern states. Figures supplied by the United States Army indicate, for example, that whereas in 1917 only one out of five Negro enlisted men came from the North, today nearly one in three are from this portion of the country.

There has developed from this migration a marked alteration in the educational status of Negroes. Compulsory education in the schools of northern urban centers has materially reduced the illiteracy so prevalent among Negroes two or three decades ago. Indeed, it is a fact that young northern Negroes today are, in general, better educated than southern Whites at the same age level.

It seems especially significant that the advancement in education among northern Negroes is most marked in the younger age groups--particularly those who constitute the prime material for military service.

Half the northern Negroes between the ages of 25 and 27, have more than a grade school education. Of southern Whites in this

age group, 54 per cent have received a similar educational background. But the educational superiority of the young northern Negroes appears in the fact that 86 per cent of those between 18 and 20 have had at least some high school education as compared with 58 per cent of the southern Whites between 18 and 20.

Older Negroes, and in fact older Whites as well, have had less schooling; and the superiority of the Negro diminishes in direct ratio to his age. A morale problem arises from the fact that the younger age group constitutes a prime reservoir for military service and, indeed, for participation in every phase of the war effort.

Attitudes

In their attitudes toward the war, Negroes--to generalize roughly--reveal a tendency toward optimism as far as their personal interests are affected; but, on the whole, they take a pessimistic view respecting the progress of the war itself.

Interviewing indicates that Negroes are inclined to feel that their individual positions have been somewhat bettered by war conditions. In this view, they show a considerably higher degree of satisfaction than do White persons. Moreover, a high percentage of Negroes expect that their circumstances will be further improved as the war goes on, while Whites feel apprehensive that their economic well-being will be reduced. In part, certainly, this contrast stems from the fact that Whites at present enjoy a superior economic status and have more to lose, in a material sense, than Negroes.

Indeed, economic status and education appear to be more important than color in controlling Negro opinion on certain issues. Negro attitudes toward price control and rationing, for example, are closely in accord with the pattern of poor whites. And the fact that Negroes lag far behind Whites in the purchase of Defense Bonds is due to economic, rather than patriotic, considerations; in matters such as these, Negroes behave and think as an economic class, not as a race.

Race consciousness, on the other hand, appears to have more weight in the determination of Negro attitudes on the abstract issues of the war.

Negroes seem a good deal more skeptical and cautious, if not more pessimistic than Whites in their opinions as to the war's outcome. Educated Negroes, in particular, are more inclined than educated Whites in the lower and middle income brackets to feel that the Axis powers, though defeated, will be strong enough at the conclusion of the war to exact concessions from the United Nations. Only 58 per cent of Negroes with high school or college education believe that the United Nations will win and be able to dictate the terms of peace, as compared with 74 per cent of poor, but well-educated, Whites. Ten per cent of this better-educated Negro group, as compared with 3.4 per cent of their White counterparts, expect the war to end in a draw.

Along with better-educated Whites on all economic levels, better-educated Negroes feel that the war is likely to be of long duration. Indeed, a higher percentage of them than of any other group predicted that the war will continue for more than five years. In general, however, Negroes, to a much higher degree than Whites, expressed no opinion as to the length of the war.

This tendency to avoid the expression of opinion became especially evident when Negroes were asked: "Which do you think we should consider our number one enemy--Japan or Germany?" This question was posed in identical terms early in January and again in February. Nine per cent of the better-educated and 16.5 per cent of the less-educated Negroes gave a "Don't Know" response on the first occasion; the percentage of those who answered in this way rose to 17 for the better-educated, 31 for the less-educated at the later date.

Negroes on both educational levels, in the second survey lagged behind the corresponding Whites in considering Germany the number one enemy. And they also showed less inclination than Whites to favor an all-out war against Japan. In both surveys the question was asked: "In the war against Japan, do you think we should: A. Fight an all-out war including bombing of Japanese cities? or B. Attack only their navy and other military objectives?" Here, too, the percentage of Negroes with no opinion was extremely high--between 18 and 19 per cent on the second occasion.

A variety of factors may be taken into consideration as responsible for Negro reluctance or inability to make specific choices in answer to these questions. Some of the respondents may have been merely inarticulate. Some may have felt that the war is so remote from their lives and their ordinary concerns as to make decisions regarding it impossible. It may be, also, that a number of those interviewed felt fearful or intimidated and consequently unwilling to risk a specific answer. But more exhaustive questioning conducted in another survey reveals unmistakably that a portion of the Negroes were motivated by some degree of sympathy for the Japanese as colored men.

There has been a tendency on the part of Negroes to identify themselves with the Japanese and to consolidate the "dark races." Occasionally, Negroes have made informal observations to interviewers, such as "The Japs are our brothers;" or they have suggested that the successes of the "little yellow men" may help to reduce the arrogance of White people. Among all classes of Negroes there is discernible some feeling that this is, in fact, a race war. That other peoples including some who are allied with the United States, have colored skins, too, seems to occur only rarely to American Negroes.

Such feeling may account in part for the facts that Negroes are less inclined than Whites to name Japan as our number one enemy

and to conduct an all-out war against the Japanese. What is most notable in the shift of Negro opinion between survey 1 and survey 2 is the tendency of those who, on the earlier occasion, selected Germany as enemy number one, to move into the no opinion column. Quite possible they consider Japan a more immediately dangerous foe, but do not care to go on record as holding this opinion.

Grievances

Negro newspapers give eloquent testimony to a deep undercurrent of bitterness and resentment felt by the Negro respecting his relation to this war. The one dominant, swelling and poignant plaint of the Negroes everywhere is a simple query: "If you want to win the war so badly, why don't you let us fight?"

This fact of discrimination in the armed services of the United States is perhaps the most bitter of the Negro's current grievances. He sees, and his newspapers point out to him redundantly, that men of colored skin are denied admission to the Marine Corps, are accepted only in the most menial capacities by the Navy and are segregated and relegated to the least desirable types of service by the Army. Negroes object to the practice of assigning their draftees predominantly to the quartermaster and engineer corps regardless of their educational background. The whole military service issue has a symbolic significance to Negroes who are asked to die for a country which accepts Filipinos, Indians and recently arrived aliens into its armed forces without discrimination while segregating Negroes with long records of loyalty.

The "blood bank" issue is cited repeatedly by Negro newspapers and by Negroes interviewed in public opinion surveys. It is a matter of the deepest resentment that White men who ask Negroes to sacrifice their lives refuse to have Negro blood mingled with their own.

Almost equally irritating to the Negro is the fact that discrimination against him continues almost unchecked in the war industries. Most Negro newspapers printed a report prepared by the Reports and Analysis Division of the Social Security Board's Bureau of Employment Security indicated that Negroes were not considered for employment in 51 per cent of 282,245 openings that occurred in selected establishments in war industries during the period from September, 1941 to February, 1942. There seems to be general disappointment with the enforcement of the President's executive order designed to eliminate discrimination against minority groups in war employment.

There is also a feeling that Negroes have been neglected in the organization of civilian defense activities. In a recent study, 45 per cent of the Negroes, as compared with only 8 per cent of the Whites interviewed, reported that "the opportunity to participate in civilian defense activities has not reached me."

Housing presents another acute problem in which Negroes feel with especial severity the discrimination against their color. As recently reported, the handling of the Sojourner Truth project in

Detroit has greatly aggravated this feeling. The Negro press continues to regard it as a test case--one which embodies the whole problem of the Negro's relation to White people in a democracy.

Negro organizations, among which churches and fraternal associations exercise the greatest influence, have taken no decided stand on the war issue. Many of the younger elements among the Negro clergy are militant racialists and assume an anti-war attitude, violently protesting against the failure to translate the war's declared objectives into realities for their own people. Negro professional and fraternal associations, although not vocal in their objection to the war, are inclined to express dissatisfaction with the Negro's part in it.

While Negro newspapers can scarcely be considered representative of the thinking of the rank and file of the American Negro, they do, nevertheless, give expression to points of view held by some Negro leaders and by at least a portion of the better-educated colored people. And since the education level of Negroes is now rising sharply, their influence is by no means negligible.

The general feeling among Negroes appears to be one of fundamental patriotism and loyalty to the United States and of warm, almost filial, confidence in the Government. But frustration, pessimism, cynicism, and insecurity characterize many of the Negro's attitudes toward the war. There is no conviction that the war's outcome will bring to him any full realization of the

democratic ideals for which he is asked to fight. As one prominent Negro spokesman put it: "This war is not going to result in a full liberation of the Negro, and intelligent Negroes want it won in spite of this lamentable fact. We cannot force the issue." There is a growing participation among Negroes in the Double-V campaign sponsored by militant elements of the Negro press--Victory for democracy at home, as well as abroad.

PRICE CONTROL AND RATIONING

Pinch

About nine-tenths of the American people declare that they have felt the pinch of rising prices since America's entry into the war in December. This experience has been common to all educational and economic groups and to every geographical area.

Seventy per cent of the American people expect that prices will continue to go up during this year. And approximately two-fifths of the people anticipate that prices will go up "quite a bit".

It is interesting to note that a correlation exists between anxiety over price rises and the conviction that the war will be a long one. Among those who think that the war is likely to be over in a year or less, only 42 per cent expect prices to jump quite a bit during 1942. But among those who foresee a war lasting from three to five years, 46 per cent anticipate that prices will increase "quite a bit". And 51 per cent of the people who estimate the duration of the war at more than five years look forward to serious price rises. There is, of course, no necessary causal relationship

implied in this correlation; it appears to stem from a common pattern of feeling about the war.

As pointed out in an earlier survey, people who live in rural areas seem to be less concerned over the danger of rising living costs than do city dwellers -- perhaps a significant commentary on the current demand of farm leaders for the maintenance of parity prices on agricultural produce; this disparity may also be due, of course, to the comparative ability of farm dwellers to produce their own necessities. In every section of the country, with the exception of the South, city people show more expectation of price increases than do country people. And in every section of the country save New England those living in the towns exceed those living in the country in the expectation that prices will go up "quite a bit".

This disparity between city and country people in apprehension over the cost of living is most marked in the west north central states. In this area 75 per cent of the urban residents feel that prices will go up during this year, while only 57 per cent of those living in the country hold this view. This area also shows the greatest disparity between urban and rural expectation of considerable price rises; 41 per cent of the city people think that prices will go up quite a bit, as compared with 27 per cent of the country people.

Causes

The explanations which people offer for the rises in living

costs are numerous and varied. The reason most commonly cited by people was "profiteering"; one-quarter of all the people interviewed gave this answer to the question "What do you think has been the chief reason why prices have been going up?" "Hoarding" was the factor to which the next largest group of respondents attributed price increases. Other reasons assigned included shortages due to the needs of the armed forces, through helping our Allies, for transportation difficulties, to curtailed imports and to the scarcity of labor.

Remedies

The seriousness with which the public views this problem of increased living costs may be gauged from the fact that five-sixths of them advocated definite Government price regulation as a corrective.


Interviewing indicates that the people who do not expect living costs to go up rely in large measure on the Government to keep prices in line. And those who favored Government regulation of prices, were less inclined to anticipate price increases than those who are opposed to regulation.

There appears to be a widespread failure on the part of the American people to understand the current efforts of the Government to keep the cost of living on an even keel. One-half of the persons interviewed did not know whether or not the Government was regulating prices.

More than three-quarters of the persons interviewed felt that the rationing of tires by the Government was necessary; 10 per cent held a contrary view. It should be noted that the question on which this distribution of opinion was obtained was asked prior to the Japanese conquest of Java and Sumatra which have been publicized as important rubber sources, and prior to Leon Henderson's recent testimony before Congress.

OUTCOME OF WAR

Attitudes of Poor but Well Educated Whites
versus
Well Educated Negroes



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OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

Mr. MacLeish has asked me to send to you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information. You will find a copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.



~~Secret~~

March 18, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 15

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C O N T E N T S

SUMMARY

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Appendix

SUMMARY REPORT

"News" is employed by the Axis as a weapon of psychological warfare.

This news comes directly to the American people via the short-wave radio. But the size of the actual shortwave audience in the United States is small at this time, and its potentialities of growth are limited by the deficiencies inherent in shortwave reception.

It is not upon direct shortwave listening to its "news", however, that the Axis depends for its effectiveness. This "news" is given wide currency by American newspapers and domestic radio stations. By their use of Axis sources, these American media lend credibility to the enemy's "news" and accustom the American public to rely upon the enemy for information about the war.

Several remedies may be considered for this condition:

- (1) Fuller and prompter release of bona fide news by Government
- (2) More careful handling of Axis "news" by American media to guard the public against its propaganda
- (3) Additional governmental warnings to the public regarding the nature and purposes of Axis "news"
- (4) Voluntary action by American newspapers and radio stations eliminating their use of Axis news sources.
- (5) Censorship of the American press and radio (though this course is not recommended.)

SHORTWAVE RADIO AND THE WAR

"To all newspapers and radio stations -- all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people -- I say this: you have a most grave responsibility to the Nation now and for the duration of the war.

"If you feel that your Government is not disclosing enough of the truth, you have every right to say so. But -- in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources -- you have no right to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe they are gospel truth." -- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, radio address to the Nation, December 9, 1941.

Weapon

Radio may reasonably be regarded as the one genuinely new element in the current war. It appears to be, in fact, the real "secret weapon" with which the Nazis have boasted that they would overcome the plutocracies. It provides a means, for the first time in the history of warfare, by which enemy can communicate directly with enemy.

The strategic importance which all of the Axis nations have attached to the radio as a weapon is demonstrated by two facts:

- (1) Long before the commencement of military hostilities, the Axis nations fostered the distribution of radio receiving sets among peoples, particularly in economically undeveloped countries, to whom they wished to address their propaganda messages. And so successfully, indeed, did they utilize this instrument, as,

in many cases, to obviate or to facilitate actual military operations.

(2) All of the Axis nations, aware of the potentialities of radio as a weapon, took effective measures to prevent the use of it by their enemies. They so governed radio reception from abroad by their own peoples as to render them comparatively immune from this type of attack.

Understanding of the Axis use of radio as a weapon has been confused by the connotations surrounding the word "propaganda". This term is commonly viewed as a technique for the presentation of ideologies or "causes" in a favorable light; in this meaning propaganda is essentially a technique of persuasion, of advertising-- in a sense, of defense. But the Axis has employed radio for this purpose only in a comparatively minor degree. It has used radio rather as an instrument of attack -- to undermine the confidence of foreign peoples in their governments, to spread alarm, confusion and dismay, to incite discord between minority elements within enemy populations and, in short, to divert the attention of the enemy from the real issues confronting him.

For these purposes, "news" not "propaganda", has provided the chief ammunition of the Axis strategists.

In using the radio to attack peoples of the western hemisphere, the Germans, Italians and Japanese have employed two types of broadcast -- those in the language of their enemies and those in their own language to their nationality groups residing here. The

purpose of the broadcasts in their own language appears to be principally to consolidate loyalty to the fatherland and to give general directives to those who are already sympathizers abroad.

Approximately one-third of the 7½ hours broadcast daily by Italian shortwave stations to the western hemisphere is in the Italian language and intended apparently for persons of Italian origin on this side of the Atlantic. Germany broadcasts a total of approximately 15 hours a day to the western hemisphere, of which roughly one-fifth is in the German language. Of the 3 hours and 5 minutes of daily Japanese broadcasting to the western hemisphere, 1 hour is in Japanese. The balance of the time of all three Axis radio stations is divided among English, French, Spanish and Portuguese language broadcasts. It is apparent from this division that the psychological warfare of the Axis radio is essentially offensive, rather than defensive.

The Shortwave Audience in the United States

The best available data from industry sources indicates that there are roughly between 10 million and 15 million radio sets in the United States theoretically capable of reception from abroad.*1

A poll conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence early in February reveals that 27 per cent of the American people, or about 8½ million families, declare that they have radio sets actually capable of receiving shortwave broadcasts direct from foreign countries.*2

Approximately 2 per cent of the sample had listened to shortwave broadcasts from foreign countries within a few days prior to the interview. Another 2 per cent had listened within about a week; thus, a total of 4 per cent of the American people may be said to have heard shortwave broadcasts recently. An additional 4 per cent of the sample said that they last listened to a shortwave program from abroad about two or three weeks or a month ago. And 3 per cent said that they listened "one to three months ago". The 15 per cent whose most recent audition of shortwave was from three months to more than a year prior to the time of the question, can scarcely be considered in any sense a regular or dependable audience for foreign broadcasts or susceptible to their influence.

The foreign country commanding the largest number of listeners in the United States is England, with Germany in second place.*3

A study prepared by Dr. Harwood Childs of the Princeton Listening Post based upon Gallup Poll data of April, 1941, indicated that approximately 3 per cent of the total population then listened to the British Broadcasting Company once a week; and slightly less than 3 per cent listened to Germany with this degree of frequency. There appears to be virtually no listening to Japan save on the west coast.

Those who hear broadcasts from foreign countries only irregularly are unlikely to be greatly affected by their propaganda content -- particularly since this depends for its effectiveness in large measure on repetition. It seems reasonable to presume that

many of these listen only occasionally for the simple satisfaction of successfully "getting" an extremely distant source -- or merely to scoff; those who remain tuned to their radios to pray must be relatively few in number.

British experience with listening to German radio should not be taken as analogous to the American problem. In England, the Berlin radio can readily be heard on long-wave and medium-wave sets.

In the early stages of the war, therefore, the British people listened in rather considerable numbers to German radio broadcasts, especially to Lord Haw Haw. There is no clear cut evidence to show, however, that this propaganda, with its source unmistakably identified, had any appreciable effect on British morale. When the British government broadened its information policy to give its people fuller and prompter news of the war, attention to the German radio dropped markedly.

Since Axis radio can be heard in the United States only on short-wave receiving sets and since reception at best is inferior to that from domestic long-wave stations, there appears to be small likelihood that listening to Axis broadcasters will grow to great proportions. (Notes 1, 2 and 3 in the appendix provide additional data on short-wave listening.)

Circulation

But it is not upon direct audition that the Axis depends for the effectiveness of its psychological warfare in the United States. Gratuitous repetition of the Axis "line" by American news media gives

it a currency far beyond anything which shortwave radio could achieve unaided.

In its radio bombardment of the United States, the Axis takes advantage of the American habit of presenting news impartially. And because it is in the form of "news", Axis propaganda, which, if it were brought into this country in conventional printed form, would be promptly impounded and destroyed by American authorities, is given the widest possible circulation by means of domestic newspapers and radio stations.

It may fairly be said that the dearth of news from official sources at home contributes materially to the extensive assistance which American newspapers and radio stations give to the Axis propagandists. Frequently Axis sources of information have demonstrated themselves to be swifter, and sometimes fuller, than the military and naval authorities of the United States who control the release of facts about the progress of the war.

Accordingly, American newspaper reporters and broadcasters under the stress of competition employ Axis radios as among their prime news sources. By doing so, they are accustoming the American public to rely upon the enemy for information about the war.

No data are available to demonstrate the impact of Axis "news" funneled through the American press. Nevertheless, it seems beyond question that a story gains a semblance of respectability and credibility from its appearance in the newspaper which people habitually read and on which they rely; the very fact that the

newspaper regarded the story as credible enough for publication to, some extent disarm the reader. Similarly, the reputation for veracity of American radio stations lends a seeming authenticity to the Axis "news" which they disseminate.

Most American newspapers and radio stations label stories from Axis sources either by dateline identification or in the body of the narrative. It is extremely doubtful, however, that this precaution goes more than a minor way toward putting the American public on its guard. For the casual reader or listener is not prone to note a dateline; he is more liable to remember headlines than the source to which they are attributed.

A single example will serve to illustrate the method by which the Axis employs "news" as a weapon and the assistance rendered to Axis strategists by the American press: Morning newspapers on March 9 bore bold headlines asserting that Allied resistance had collapsed on the island of Java. The Associated Press story on which some of these were based spoke of " ---- unconditional surrender of 93,000 Dutch and 5,000 United States, British and Australian troops. The official Tokyo announcement heard here said that defending troops capitulated near Bandoeng and near the naval base at Socraboja." Other headlines were based on the United Press version which read as follows: "Tokyo, March 9 -- (Japanese broadcast reported by United Press in New York) Imperial headquarters said that the 'main army of 93,000 Dutchmen and 5,000 American, British and Australians' had surrendered unconditionally

in Java following battles with the Japanese on the Soeraboja and Bandoeng fronts".

It should be noted that the sole source of this "news" was the Tokyo radio. That American newspapers and radio stations publicized it without confirmation from any official sources at home seems, at the very least, a gross violation of the President's injunction against dealing with "unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people think they are gospel truth." The effect of this story was to confuse and dismay the American people -- precisely the purpose for which it was invented by the Japanese.

Illustrations of this sort can be offered endlessly. The American press has gullibly, though guilelessly, printed innumerable rumors palpably inspired by Axis propagandists and put into circulation by shortwave stations known to be under Axis control.

A study of 23 representative American daily newspapers for the period from March 4 to March 10 reveals that they contained 398 new articles based on Axis shortwave sources, an average of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per day in each paper. Tokyo was the source of 48 per cent of these items, Berlin of 40 per cent, while Rome accounted for the remaining 12 per cent. Sixteen per cent of the items were published on page one. Use of these sources is reflected about equally in radio broadcasts which employ the same press association dispatches.

American shortwave stations and press associations commonly re-broadcast to foreign countries the Axis "news" which their own listening posts have picked up. The point may be illustrated by

the following quotation from the Columbia Broadcasting System's broadcast to Turkey on March 11: "This morning's report shows that there is increased activity in Libya and London states that many prisoners were captured; on the other hand, Italy claims that two British flying boats were sunk, a British convoy was under attack in the Mediterranean and six British submarines were sunk during the past four weeks."

It is noteworthy that the Axis frequently quotes American newspapers and radio stations as authentic sources for the very "news" which Axis strategists themselves originally put into circulation; when an American news medium publishes a story secured from radio Tokyo, the broadcasters at Berlin pick it up and give it authenticity by attributing it to an American source in their own shortwave version.

Editorial writers, columnists and radio commentators show an uneasy awareness of the aid and comfort which their media are giving to the enemy. They frequently warn the public to discount news from Axis sources -- in effect, discrediting their own headlines and news bulletins. And a number of newspapers endeavor to extract the poison from the Axis "news" which they publish by heading it "enemy propaganda" or otherwise emphasizing the nature of its origin.

It is doubtful, however, that such practices can constitute much more than a palliative. It may be that nothing less than a code subscribed to voluntarily by newspapers and radio stations wholly eliminating the use of unconfirmed Axis "news" will serve to combat the danger of enemy psychological warfare.

Apparently press and radio do not yet fully recognize that "news" is a weapon in the hands of the Axis and that their adherence, in war as in peace, to the journalism-as-usual spirit of neutrality plays into the hands of the enemy.

American newspapers and radio stations need to give stricter observance to their own editorial admonitions. And they urgently need greater help from their own Government in securing promptly and fully the bona fide news which the American public demands. Despite their manifest good will and their brilliant records of achievement in the field of journalism, they seem far from meeting what the President has defined as their "grave responsibility to the Nation now and for the duration of the war".

Note *1:

Approximately one-third of all radio sets manufactured go beyond the standard broadcast band; but this is a manufacturers' classification and includes sets which receive only police and aircraft signals without being able to tune in on foreign shortwave.

In the past eight years, some 70,347,500 radio sets have been manufactured in the United States, of which about 14,450,000 were equipped with real shortwave bands. Allowing only a 10 per cent depreciation for obsolescence, this nets down to 13,000,000 sets in working order today.

It should be noted that a single home may possess two or more sets, so that the number of families able to receive shortwave from foreign sources is considerably lower than the total number of sets. Most sets for which the ability to receive foreign shortwave is claimed can do so only imperfectly and under favorable conditions.

Note *2:

A poll taken about a year ago by Dr. George Gallup indicated that 35 per cent of the public had listened to shortwave broadcasts at some time. The question on which this poll was based did not make it altogether clear, however, that only broadcasts received by shortwave directly from foreign stations were concerned. Some respondents may have confused the domestic rebroadcast of material emanating from foreign stations with direct audition. This confusion may have existed also even in the more carefully worded Bureau of Intelligence question, so that the percentages given here may be excessive.

On the other hand, since American entry into the war, people may be reluctant to admit that they listen to radio broadcasts from enemy sources. Foreign-born persons speaking only their native language are liable to be suspicious of interviewers and, consequently, to give unreliable responses. In view of all these factors, it seems essential to point out here that the data given on number of listeners are at best rough approximations.

Note *3:

The following table shows the countries heard directly via shortwave and the percentages who have ever heard them, both among the total population and among the 26 per cent of the population who declared that they have at some time or other listened to broadcasts from abroad. It should be noted that this table is based upon the question "Have you ever listened to shortwave stations direct from foreign countries -- not those relayed over American stations, but stations actually broadcasting direct from foreign nations?" (Those who answered "Yes" were asked "From what country?") The table, therefore, gives no indication of regular listening.

	<u>Per cent of listeners</u>	<u>Per cent of total Population</u>
England	60.2	16.7
Germany	35.4	9.2
South America	22.8	5.9
Italy	12.0	3.1
France	7.8	2.0
Mexico	6.1	1.6
Cuba, Bahamas, etc.	3.6	0.9
Other Allied Countries	9.8	2.5
Other Axis Countries	4.8	1.2
Other Countries	12.9	2.1
Countries not identifiable	9.2	3.8
Total ever listened*	100.0	26.0
Total never listened		74.0

*The figures above this line add to more than the total here indicated because multiple answers were permissible.

Listening varies in some measure in different regions of the United States. The highest percentage of listening is to be found in New England and the Middle Atlantic regions; the lowest in the West North Central area. The other regions fall in the following order: West, South, East North Central.

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personal*

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OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

Mr. MacLeish has asked me to send to you a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information. You will find a copy enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.



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March 25, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 16

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

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SUMMARY REPORT

Americans have a greater confidence in the intensity of the Russian war effort than in the intensity of the British war effort; they feel that Russians are putting our Lend-Lease supplies to better use.

But, though they feel the Russians are better fighting allies, the American people seem convinced that after the war greater cooperation can be expected from Britain and China than from Russia. Apparently, as to Britain, this is accounted for by a stronger sense that the British like ourselves are motivated at least in part by idealistic considerations.

While an overwhelming majority of American newspapers and magazines promotes vigorously the United Nations concept, a strong minority actively foments distrust of Britain and Russia. References to "yellow peril" and like phrases impair Chinese-American relations.

The need seems great not only to promote more unity of effort in the prosecution of the war but also to lay essential foundations of mutual respect, confidence and understanding for cooperative solution of after-war problems.

* * *

Fuller and more frequent release of information in Government communiques is again indicated as a means of maintaining and increasing public confidence in official sources. And combined communiques by the United Nations command in the several theatres of operation seem essential to the presentation of a rounded picture of the war's progress.


In statements by Government spokesmen and releases there appears to be a conspicuous neglect of the important information objective referred to as the "nature of the enemy" or "the nature of the conspiracy against us and against our way of life." Emphasis on this theme seems a prerequisite to understanding of the need for all-out fighting and hence for all-out production. Indeed, there is a need of greater effort to promote a balanced awareness of the war's significance as a whole.

ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR ALLIES


Cooperation

A significant contrast emerges from an analysis of four separate nation-wide public opinion studies of American views respecting Britain and Russia.


Americans, as indicated in the diagram below, have a higher confidence in the intensity of the Russian war effort than they have in the intensity of the British war effort - an attitude which has become more strongly marked since the fall of Singapore.



Americans also feel that the Russians are putting our Lend Lease supplies to better use than are the British:



But despite the dominant feeling that the Russians are more effective allies than the British at the present time, there remains a solid conviction that in the future, when the war is ended, greater cooperation with the United States can be expected from Britain than from the Soviet Union:



This expectation that the British will cooperate with us in the future seems to be definitely tied up in the public mind to the appraisal of the motives for which the British are fighting. When asked what they think the United States is "really fighting for in this war," 63 per cent of a sample interviewed expressed the belief that we are defending an ideal. In response to the same question about England, 32 per cent gave idealism as a motive; 16 per cent didn't know. But only 15 per cent believed that the Russians are fighting for an ideal, with 23 per cent uncertain.

It is apparently this sense that the British, as well as ourselves, are motivated at least in part by idealistic considerations that accounts for the popular feeling that these two nations will find common ground for collaboration in the future.

It does not follow by any means, however, that Americans are unsympathetic to the motives which have brought Russia into the war; 49 per cent of them said

that Russia is fighting to defend herself, as compared with 31 per cent who attributed this motive to Britain's participation in the conflict.

The following table, based upon the question referred to above, illustrates the distribution of American opinion respecting the purposes for which the United States, Russia and England are fighting:

	U. S.	Russia	England
Fighting for an Ideal	63%	15%	32%
Self Defense	21	49	31
Unsympathetic Reasons	9	15	23
Miscellaneous Reasons	3	-	1
Don't know	7	23	16
Total	103%*	102%*	102%*

* Answers add to more than 100% because some people gave more than one answer.

And there is shown below the degree to which the American public anticipates future collaboration from various combinations among the three principal countries associated with it in the war:

That all three will cooperate	31%
England and China will, not Russia	35%
Russia and China will, not England	4%
England and Russia will, not China	3%
China will, not England and Russia	10%
England will, not China and Russia	8%
Russia will, not China and England	1%
None of the three will cooperate	9%

It is noteworthy that among the three principal allies of the United States, China is considered the most likely, Russia the least likely, to join hands with this country in the approach to post war problems; 80 per cent of the sample interviewed expressed a belief that China can be depended upon to cooperate with us.

Editorial Attitudes Toward Our Allies

A minority segment of the press, led by the New York Daily News Syndicate, The Chicago Tribune and the Hearst papers, is currently engaged in what appears to be a conscious campaign to destroy Anglo-American amity. This campaign, of course, has the support of such factional publications as Social Justice, the Socialist Call and some church papers. Taken together, these attain an impressive circulation.

The attack leveled by this segment of the press is designed to fan ancient American prejudices and to foment distrust of British leadership. The failures of Winston Churchill as a military commander are recited redundantly. And the Hearst papers have already taken to assailing Sir Stafford Cripps on the chance that he may be Churchill's successor. Britain's policy in respect to India is roundly condemned; some critics assert that British imperialism shackles the United Nations' war effort in the Pacific, while others go so far as to argue that America has no interest in the fate of peoples as remote as those in India, Burma, China and Australia. William Randolph Hearst, through his personal column, "In the News", has been the most vehement proponent of these points of view.

Hostility toward Russia is also currently fomented by a fresh magnification of the Communist bugbear. Axis propaganda on this score is blandly echoed by the isolationist editorial minority. The Bolshevization of all Europe is portrayed as a likely consequence of Russian victory over the Germans. And simultaneously the Government of the United States is represented as under the domination of radical and Communist elements sympathetic to the Sovietization of the world.

Little criticism of China is to be found in American newspapers. Yet the minority faction impairs Chinese-American relations by use of the phrase "yellow peril" and other invidious racial references.

An overwhelming majority of the American press, however, remains firmly wedded to the United Nations concept. With steady and increasing vigor, these newspapers and magazines seek to dispel recriminations against the British, mitigate distrust of the Russians and foster appreciation of the Chinese.

Public Opinion Toward Britain

Public opinion polling makes it plain either that the minority vilification of the British has already borne fruit or that there exists in the United States a substantial area of fertile ground in which it may fructify.

An analysis of interviewing conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion during the latter part of February shows that little more than a bare majority of the American public feels confident that Britain will play its full part in the war effort. The following division of opinion was obtained in response to the question "Do you think the English will try to get us to do most of the fighting for them in this war, or do you think they will do their fair share of the fighting?" Twenty-nine per cent chose the first alternative, 54 per cent chose the second; 7 per cent gave qualified answers and 10 per cent expressed no opinion.

An intensive survey, in which the expression of opinion by those interviewed was solicited, reveals that distrust of the British is both widespread and, in many cases, exceedingly bitter. The main types of criticism may be roughly characterized by four typical comments:

- (1) John Bull is playing Uncle Sam for a sucker.
- (2) The British are stupid, incompetent fighters.
- (3) The British do not pay their debts and, therefore, cannot be trusted.
- (4) The British only half want to beat Hitler and are too fearful of Communism. (expressed by only a small number)

It is evident that the British failure to repay the debts incurred during World War I has left a bad taste in the mouths of a good many Americans. A Bureau of Intelligence poll posed the question, "Do you think we will get repaid in some way by England for the supplies we are sending them?" Of the nationwide sample interviewed, 42 per cent answered negatively, 39 per cent affirmatively, 8 per cent gave qualified answers, 11 per cent expressed no opinion.

In comparison, 35 per cent answered negatively to this same question about Russia; 38 per cent indicated that they expect we will be repaid by the Russians, 10 per cent gave qualified answers with 18 per cent in the "no opinion" column.

Many of those inclined to write off the current loans we are making to the British and Russians did so for reasons which were essentially sympathetic. Fifteen per cent thought that the British will be unable to pay when the present war is ended; 17 per cent felt the same way about the Russians. It seems significant that only 1.3 per cent felt that we should not expect payment from the British since we are all fighting together and only 1.5 per cent took this attitude toward the Russians.

Among the unsympathetic explanations (17% for Russia, 29% for England) given for expecting a renunciation of their debts, the fact that the British did not pay after the last war loomed largest; 23 per cent offered this as a reason for predicting that we will not be repaid by Britain this time. In contrast, only 7 per cent mentioned this to explain their view that the Russians will not repay us. Nine per cent felt that the Russians cannot be trusted.

In the main, there appears to be a correlation between optimism as to the outcome of the war and confidence in our allies; conversely, those who are pessimistic about the war are more inclined to be suspicious of those fighting with us,

of the British in particular. Cause and effect are perhaps intertwined in this relationship.

Remedies

It seems improbable that American distrust of Britain and Russia can ever be wholly eliminated. In regard to the British, its roots run very deep and are fertilized by ancient prejudices, some of which have become virtually a part of American folklore. Suspicion of Russia, though less entrenched, is complicated by a fear and hatred of Communism.

Much can be done and needs to be done, however, to combat the growing hostility toward these allies. It seems imperative, indeed, that efforts in this direction be made now, not only to promote greater unity of effort in the prosecution of the war, but also to lay the essential foundations for cooperative solution of problems when the war is ended.

Since the impediments to cooperation are largely founded upon popular misunderstanding, the spread of information would appear to be a prime corrective. The British and Russians might profit from a greater knowledge of prevailing American attitudes toward them; to this end, such intelligence materials as these could usefully be made available for their guidance. And, reciprocally, American information authorities might benefit from increased understanding of popular feelings in Britain and Russia.

Current information programs to promote sympathy among the United Nations are diffused and sometimes contradictory; British efforts in this country are uncoordinated with those of the United States Government; Russian efforts seem virtually negligible and Chinese essentially passive or negative.

Only a jointly planned and comprehensive information policy can successfully combat the disruptive tactics of the Axis and of those who, consciously or unconsciously, are carrying on the work of the Axis in this country. Only the vigorous, unified application of such a policy can translate the United Nations concept into reality.

ARMY AND NAVY COMMUNIQUE

In the light of widespread editorial criticism of the Government's release of information about the war, all Army and Navy communiques were analyzed and assorted into three broad categories.

Those which recounted a successful military operation or an act tending to raise national morale were cataloged under the term "Gain". Those which dealt with the repulse of an enemy attack, the maintenance of a position or an act which did not vitally affect military strategy or morale were put under the heading "No Change". Those representing an admission of defeat, loss of ground and materiel or impairment of morale were classed under the term "Loss". Since the first of the military and naval communiques was not issued until December 10, these catalogs naturally carry no reflection of the losses suffered in the initial Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and the Philippines.

It was found that 24 per cent of the Army communiques fell into the "Gain" class; an additional 4 per cent which concerned citations for individual gallantry in action might also be placed in this category. Sixty-four per cent of the Army communiques were of the "No Change" variety. And 8 per cent of them could properly be classified under the heading "Loss".

The Navy communiques were divided as follows: "Gain, 40 per cent, with an additional 2 per cent devoted to citations for heroism under fire; "No Change", 30 per cent; "Loss", 28 per cent.

The ratio of "gain" to "loss" in both Army and Navy communiques may give some substance to a minority public feeling that news from official American sources is sometimes unwarrantedly rose-colored.

During the second week of March the Bureau of Intelligence put this question to a national sample of the American public: "Do you think the war news the Government does release makes things look better than they are, makes things look worse than they are, or makes them look just about as they really are?" Twenty-nine per cent of the sample took the first of these alternatives; the people in the upper economic brackets and in the larger urban centers seemed most inclined toward this suspicion of Government sources.

Fifty-one per cent of the sample regarded the Government's releases as accurate, and 6 per cent felt that they made conditions look worse than they are actually.

The rather high proportion of "gain" in relation to "loss" announced by both armed services appears somewhat anomalous in view of the whole progress of the Pacific war in which they have been engaged.

The anomaly derives primarily from the fact that these communique concern only purely American activities in the war theater. Newspaper accounts based upon communique of our allies, or upon Tokyo radio broadcasts, have informed the American public that Malaya, Sumatra, Java and New Guinea have been successfully invaded by the Japanese. It seems probable, however, that the failure of American official sources to provide this information has led the public, in some measure, to rely upon other sources for essential knowledge about the progress of the war.

Fuller and more frequent release of information by the Government would seem indispensable as a means of maintaining and increasing public confidence in official American sources. And combined communique by the United Nations' command in the several theaters of operation seem essential to the presentation of a rounded picture of the war's progress on which the American people can depend.

AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE PRINCIPAL INFORMATION THEMES

Some progress has been made toward familiarizing the American people with the fundamental themes enunciated by President Roosevelt in his great message on the state of the union of January 6. But the treatment of these themes by Government spokesmen appears to have been uneven and, in some instances, wholly inadequate.

During the month of February, the several executive branches of the Government, excluding the White House, issued a total of 42 speeches and statements which dealt directly with one or more of the President's major themes. Nine of these were speeches by members of the Cabinet; 21 were speeches made by other officials; 12 were major statements of policy issued in release form. Press conference statements and testimony before congressional committees were not embraced in this survey.

Of the 42 releases, more than one-half, 28, were devoted to a discussion of Themes I and II, the production program and its effect on the civilian life of the American people. Five dealt with Theme III, the fighting job; the task of our armed forces. Seven endeavored to clarify theme IV, the statement of our objectives and the definition of our cause. Only 3 took cognizance of theme V, the nature of the conspiracy against us and against our way of life. Five were devoted to the development of Theme VI, the counter strategy of the United States. And 8 gave consideration to theme VII, the dangers to ourselves, the complacency on the one hand and defeatism on the other.

From this diagnosis it seems evident that Government spokesmen endeavored with considerable energy to give meaning to the most immediate of the problems confronting the American people in the prosecution of the war. But some of the other themes, particularly theme V, were comparatively neglected. It may be said, at least, that

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a rounded picture of the fundamental meaning and issues of the war have not yet been hammered home by the Government. Greater effort to promote a balanced awareness of the war's significance as a whole would seem to be in order.