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THE DIRECTOR

April 2, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

This week's Intelligence Report of the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of Facts and Figures is of such tremendous interest to me that I feel I must write you about it. A copy has already gone down to you but I am sending another on the chance that the first may not have reached your desk.

I hope you will agree with me that the indications of this report as to the state of opinion offer one of the few bright spots in a pretty stormy picture. I myself feel that this report is a challenge to the imagination and intelligence of every man working in the information field in the government.

Faithfully yours,

Archibald MacLeish

The President
The White House

Secret

April 1, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 17

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

Summary Report

Though oppositionism still thrives, there is strong evidence that isolationism as such is dying in the United States. There exists today a spirit which properly harnessed can lead to a victorious peace and can be used as a strong unifying influence during the war.

People may say that they prefer to win the war first and talk peace terms later. But when you talk to them about the post-war conditions and the post-war world, as has been done in several surveys and polls, you find that the American people are:

Overwhelmingly in favor of some kind of world organization.

Overwhelmingly for world cooperation to enforce and extend the Four Freedoms (a feeling which is tempered in some quarters by a feeling of distrust of our Allies, particularly Britain).

Strongly generous in the way they now expect to treat the enemy after the final victory.

But somewhat scared of the economic future.

Previous surveys have shown the American people to be divided on many issues connected with the war. Here they show themselves virtually unanimous on the issue of taking a full and active part along with other nations in guaranteeing access to raw materials, insuring better working and living conditions, guaranteeing freedom of speech and religion, and forming a world police force to guarantee against future wars.

This suggests that the key to U.S. unity in prosecuting the war is a concerted appeal to American idealism and practicality in pointing out the goals which can be ours for the winning.

THE POST-WAR WORLD

"Although the enlightened world pays just honor to the glory of the valiant heroes of the world war, it is forced to give a long thought to what it did with the peace that these men won. It failed to preserve the peace, hence it failed the men who won it. Today the same forces -- of democracy against tyranny -- are looked in an even greater struggle ... The errors of the council table are being corrected on the battle-field ... The proper memorial to the heroes of 1914-1918 is thus prescribed by events as a solemn vow to win back their gains --- and more. To win, this time, not only the war, but also the peace." --- Editorial, Indianapolis News, Armistice Day, 1941.

The End of an Era

Americans have rediscovered the roundness of the earth. There germinated among them in the 1930's a revulsion against the isolationism of the first post-war decade. And in the early 1940's there has been a swiftly growing awareness that America cannot be "an Iland intire of it self," but is "a peece of the Continent, a part of the Maine," that the world is incorrigibly integrated, that the brotherhood of man may be something more than a Biblical fantasy.

Isolationism, in the sense in which this term was employed during the reaction which succeeded the first World War, is now fast disappearing from the American approach to international affairs. The term is employed today largely as a misnomer to embrace Pacifists, Fascists and persons whose enmity to the New Deal is so extreme as to set them in opposition to whatever it endorses. But there is now general if somewhat tentative acceptance of the

thesis that America must meet the obligations of a great power in the affairs of the world and that it cannot wall itself against the impact of the deep social and economic changes reverberating through the earth.

The growth of American opinion toward a sense of responsibility about the problems of the world has been abundantly registered in the daily press. A great majority of American newspapers throughout the country, in small cities as well as large, and of Republican as well as Democratic political bias, now hold certain beliefs to be virtually self-evident: (1) that the United States erred by its failure to engage in collective security efforts after the last war; (2) that hope for future peace must be founded upon international collaboration when the present war is ended.

With increasing vigor during the first two years of the conflict in Europe and with genuine fervor since the time of American participation in this war, the press has been preaching that Americans must join hands with their fellowmen to preserve the kind of order in which they desire to live. Every available portent indicates that this is a view which has grown from the grass roots up and that, whether in this respect the newspapers have been responsive to or responsible for public opinion, a sense of unity with mankind has become basic in the thinking of most Americans.

In September, 1939, a Gallup poll asked, "Would you like to see the United States join in a movement to establish an international police force to maintain world peace?" To this query, 53 per cent of those with opinions said "Yes".

The Bureau of Intelligence asked a question very similar to this in the early part of March, 1942: "When the war is over, do you think the United States should or should not take a full and active part along with other nations in maintaining a world police force to guarantee against future wars?" The affirmative responses amounted to 85 per cent.

The National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver (employing the same field research facilities as the Bureau of Intelligence) posed the question in slightly different words: "If Germany, Italy and Japan are defeated, do you think the United States should try to form some kind of union of the allied countries to help keep peace and order in the world?" The answers closely approximate the Bureau's findings.

Yes	85 per cent
No	9 per cent
Depends	2 per cent
Don't understand the question	1 per cent
No opinion	3 per cent

These figures lead to the simple conclusion that fewer than one out of ten people in the United States today want to follow an isolationist policy when the present war is ended.

It may fairly be said that these responses indicate a deep emotional surge toward American integration with the rest of the world. The questions are admittedly of an extremely general nature, tending perhaps to elicit affirmative replies. And it is clear that the answers given to them were not completely analytical. It

does not necessarily follow that Americans would approve any specific form of world organization offered to them after the war or that, when confronted with all the practical implications of such a step, they would endorse the limitations of sovereignty inevitably involved. But that there is a strong and genuine impulse toward cooperation seems beyond question.

One significant distinction should be pointed out among those who believe in maintaining a world police force to guarantee against future wars. There is a direct ratio between endorsement of this view and education. The following table shows the distribution of answers among the several educational levels:

"Should maintain a world police force"

No Schooling	73
Some Grammar School	80
Some High School	87
Some College	89

Corroboration of the inference that enthusiasm for collective action is directly related to education appears in the current Fortune poll. Presented with a list of alternatives respecting post-war policy, only 11 per cent chose the option, "Stay home and have just as little as possible to do with any other country". Of the well-informed, only 6 per cent held this view as against 11 per cent of the partially informed and 20 per cent of the uninformed.

And conversely, those who chose the option, "Form a new league or association with all the different nations of the world

and take an active part in making it work" amounted to 34 per cent. A break-down on the basis of knowledge reveals that this approach was favored by 48 per cent of the well-informed, 17 per cent of the uninformed.

Since the better educated members of the community are likely to be most influential in its affairs, the conclusion seems warranted that this sentiment for world organization is waxing, not waning.

Apart from these educational differences -- no significant distinctions are discernible among the people supporting collective action. Men and women are nearly equal in their approval; only a slight increase in acceptance of the idea appears with rising economic status; no important differences appear in the geographical break-down, save that, notably, the highest percentage of proponents of a world police force, 88 per cent, were found to be in the West North Central states.

The Nature of Post-War Collaboration

"If there is some sort of an organization of nations after the war, which nations do you think ought to be in it?"

NATIONAL TOTALS

	Per cent	
All nations everywhere, including the Axis	51)	
All nations except the Axis countries	17)	
The United Nations--those nations now at war with the Axis	14)	82
Just the English-speaking nations	4	
Only those nations in the Western Hemisphere	2	
Other	2	
Not ascertainable	10	
TOTAL PERSONS QUESTIONED	100	

It is apparent from this question, posed during the early part of March by the Bureau of Intelligence and from others cited above, that a great majority of the people of America desires something more than a mere alliance for the maintenance of peace in the future. It is noteworthy that no more than 4 per cent of those interviewed were willing to pin their hopes upon simple Anglo-American collaboration.

More than four-fifths of the American people seek some sort of multilateral organization, with one-half of them desiring it to embrace all nations the world over. Again, a study of the educational background of those answering this question shows that the inclination to broaden the scope of world collaboration grows in direct ratio to educational status. Those who favor taking in all nations everywhere, including the Axis, were divided as follows on the basis of economic background and education:

Prosperous		Average		Poor	
Educated	Uneducated	Educated	Uneducated	Educated	Uneducated
69%	48%	66%	41%	58%	28%

This same relationship appears in an analysis of responses to a question asked by the Denver University National Opinion Research Center. Among those with some college education, 53 per cent favored taking Germany, Italy and Japan into a post-war union; 45 per cent of the persons with a high-school education held this view; 37 per cent of those with grammar school education or less were willing to include the enemy.

There is a decided feeling that the post-war organization of the world should be directed and dominated by the United States. A Fortune poll in the current issue of the magazine asks: "Which country do you think should have the most to say about what kind of a peace there should be? Which country do you think actually will have the most to say about the peace?" The results show that, although more than four-fifths of the American public feel that this country should have the controlling voice, only three-fifths of them feel confident that the direction of affairs will actually be lodged in American hands; one-fifth feel the British will take charge, in contrast to a mere five per cent who feel that they should do so. Apparently this lack of confidence stems, at least in part, from a distrust of the British previously reported in these surveys. And it may very well be that this feeling will diminish the enthusiasm of Americans for collective organization when they examine the practical implications involved.

The prevailing American sense of responsibility in international affairs is perhaps best illustrated by the desire to be of help to impoverished peoples in post-war reconstruction. The Denver National Opinion Research Center asked this question: "If, after the war, people in some of the countries in the world are starving, do you think the United States should help to feed the people in these countries?" Four-fifths of the nation-wide sample responded in the affirmative and an additional 11 per cent

gave a qualified answer, saying "it depends". Moreover, two-fifths of the American people are willing to make a free gift of this food to their fellowmen in need; 45 per cent believe that it should be financed by loans to foreign countries.

In order to determine more specifically the kinds of international activity in which Americans want their country to engage, the Bureau of Intelligence asked the following question: "When the war is over, do you think the United States should, or should not, take a full and active part along with other nations in:

A. Maintaining a world police force to guarantee against future wars.

B. Guaranteeing freedom of speech all over the world.

C. Guaranteeing freedom of religion all over the world.

D. Guaranteeing that all nations get a fair share of raw materials.

E. Helping to secure better working and living conditions for people all over the world.

More than two-thirds, 69 per cent, of the people were in favor of <u>all</u> of these activities.

Eighty-one per cent favored at least four of them.

Eighty-eight per cent favored at least three of them.

A blanket rejection of all five activities was desired by only 3 per cent of the whole nationwide sample.

These activities taken together embody the Four Freedoms. About four-fifths of the American public may be said to endorse them in general terms. But some indifference or hostility toward

them is manifested by the remaining one-fifth. An analysis of the nature of this minority reveals an interesting correlation with their attitudes toward the outcome of the war.

True defeatism and isolationism seem to be associated with the view that no decision and no progress can be anticipated as a result of the conflict.

Among persons who believe that the war is likely to end in a stalemate, only 57 per cent endorse all five activities enumerated above, as compared with 72 per cent of those who anticipate a decisive United Nations victory; among persons of lesser education who have no opinion as to how the war will end, only 48 per cent endorse these policies.

It is noteworthy, however, that this failure to embrace the Four Freedoms does not obtain in anything like so great a degree among persons who believe that the Axis may win the war. The better educated in this group support the freedoms by 66 per cent, the less educated by 72 per cent. Evidently these people are pessimistic and alarmed rather than pro-Fascist.

But an overwhelming majority of the American people view the war as decisive for the world's future. And to these people, apparently, the Four Freedoms constitute an articulate expression of the philosophy which they hope to see triumphant.

There is also a correlation between endorsement of efforts to ensure the Four Freedoms and confidence in our allies. Of the group anticipating post-war cooperation from both Britain and Russia,

76 per cent favored all the Freedoms -- as compared with only 56 per cent of those believing neither will cooperate.

It cannot be said, of course, that those who declare themselves to be in favor of these freedoms will be willing to give them literal application in their own personal affairs; they may not interpret freedom of religion as applying to Buddhists and Mohammedans, as well as to Christians. And they may be reluctant to translate freedom from want into real meaning by raising wages in their own factories or offices, or by providing better housing for Negroes.

But it can be said, generalizing, that endorsement of the Four Freedoms gives a fresh indication of the power of ideals in the American mind. And these ideals are susceptible of translation into irresistible motive force.

Treatment of the Enemy

There are significant differences between the feelings of Americans toward the German people and their feelings toward the Japanese. Quite clearly, race antagonism enters into popular attitudes to a marked degree. The Denver National Opinion Research Center inquired: "Which of the following statements comes closest to describing how you feel, on the whole, about the people who live in Germany (Japan)?"

	Results German	Results Japanese
a. The German (Japanese) people will always want to go to war to make themselves as powerful as possible	21%	41%
b. The German (Japanese) people may not like war, but they have shown that they are too easily led into war by powerful leaders	30%	27%
c. The German (Japanese) people are like any other people. If they could really choose the leaders they want, they would become good citizens of the world	42%	18%
No Opinion	7%	14%
	100%	100%

This feeling, which may be due to ignorance about the Japanese, as well as to racial considerations, was manifested in the answers to the question "Do you think that people in Germany (Japan) should be given a chance to vote, in a fair election, to choose what kind of a government they should have after the war?" Only one-half of the nationwide sample desired to give the Japanese people this mode of self-determination, as compared with 62 per cent who were willing to let the Germans choose their own form of government. And correspondingly, 41 per cent predicted that the Japanese would retain the kind of government they now have, while only 19 per cent thought that the Germans would desire to remain under their present system.

There appears to be no more than a minor measure of vindictiveness in the views of the American people as to the proper treatment of our enemies when they have been defeated. About one-quarter of the American public believes that we should "divide up

their territory and destroy them as nations". This group is counter-balanced by 29 per cent of the public who feel that we should "do nothing more to them -- just treat them like any other nation". Two-fifths of the people take a middle course, feeling that we ought to "let them remain as nations but keep an army there to police them".

Here, too, the factor of education appears to exercise some influence toward generosity. This is especially observable among poor people; 31 per cent of the uneducated poor favored destroying our enemies as nations, as compared with 20 per cent of the educated at this economic level taking so harsh a view.

There is some disposition on the part of Americans to exact payment for the costs of the war from our defeated enemies. About one-half of the public feels that they should be made to pay "as much as they can afford within a time limit set by the Allies". And 35 per cent argue that the whole cost of the war should be saddled upon them. Only 7 per cent believe that no attempt should be made to place such a burden upon the losers. On this score, opinions respecting Germany and Japan were identical.

If a substantial bloc of Americans desires to make the enemy defray the costs of this conflict, nevertheless the public shows no avidity to secure material gains for the United States. Just a little more than one-fifth of the American people feels that we should acquire additional territory when we have won the war; and some of these people, it seems probable, have in mind the acquisition

of bases for military purposes -- perhaps those which we have already secured by lease from Great Britain. Three-quarters of the American public are opposed to any territorial aggrandizement whatever.

Fear of the Economic Future

The New York Times took a full page in its issue of Sunday, March 8, for self-advertisement under a bold caption "DON'T BE AFRAID TO WIN!" The page contained a picture of a young American, feet planted firmly on the ground, eyes fastened upon an airplane flying presumably into the future. And the copy read, in part, as follows:

> "What seems to be worrying most people isn't the War!
>
> "We're battling for survival. But instead of worrying about beating Hitler and the Japanese some Americans are worrying about what will happen after we have won -- talking about ghost towns and idle factories, actually jumping at shadows.
>
> "It's all wrong to be afraid of winning! When it's over, there'll be so much work to do that the problem will be to find enough of us to do it.
>
> "There'll be a new world to build. A new kind of world! We're going to have better homes. Improved foods will make us healthier. All the things that make life worth while will be cheaper to make, easier to distribute, more economical to use, more fun to own.
>
> "And more of us will own them."

This advertisement is based upon a shrewd appraisal of popular sentiment. For vague misgivings and even grim forebodings about the future have become alarmingly prevalent in the United States.

The press testifies eloquently, if somewhat unconsciously, to their existence. Innumerable newspaper editorials reveal underlying fears that the impact of the war will basically alter the economic and social structure of the United States. Some suggest, more or less openly, that New Dealers are utilizing the emergency as a means of introducing radical social and economic innovations. Editorial heads wag unhappily over the prospect of inflation, over the growing strength of organized labor, over the centralization of authority in the federal government.

While the bulk of the press manfully endeavors to subdue its uneasiness, the isolationist minority is busily engaged in fomenting and fostering a popular fear of the future. And even the bulk of the press which supports the foreign policy of the administration resists, because of its innate conservatism, the current of social change which it dimly recognizes as inevitable.

Despite the synthetic nature of the editorial alarms which have been sounded anent the trend toward state Socialism, it is evident from public opinion polling that only a very small minority of the American people anticipate such a development. Interviewing reveals that a small group believes this country is on the way to Communism and a still smaller group feels that it is headed toward Fascism.

But a study prepared in October, 1941, by the Psychological Corporation indicates that there are widespread <u>specific</u> fears regarding the economic consequences of the war. Three-fifths of

a nationwide urban sample answered "No" to this question: "There has been a lot of talk about inflation and its effect upon the value of money. If you have any money in life insurance or in savings of any kind, do you think that money will be worth as much or buy as much two years from now as it does today?"

About 70 per cent of the public indicated that they expect to be worse off when the war is over than they are today. And three-quarters predicted that there will be fewer jobs at the end of the war than at the present time; three-fifths expect that wages will be lower.

Upon minds imbued to such an extent with specific misgivings as to their individual security, the efforts of the Administration's enemies to undermine confidence in the government may have a shattering effect. This feeling, that even the winning of the war may bring disaster, constitutes a storm warning: it could bring about a resurgence of defeatism and isolationism. There seems to be little popular awareness of the rich opportunities for individual security and happiness which await the reestablishment of international peace and order.

Recommendations

Three fundamental generalizations respecting the American people may be made on the basis of the foregoing study:

1. Americans are essentially generous. Although the hardships and bitterness of a long war may diminish their readiness to forgive the enemy, they approach the problems of peace now in the tradition of Abraham Lincoln.... "With malice toward none, with

charity for all." There is latent in them a disposition to bind up the world's wounds.

2. Americans are idealistic. Their eyes can be lifted to new horizons and they are responsive to the visions that they glimpse there.

3. Americans are practical. They see the future, naturally, from the point of view of their individual welfare and security. They do not chase rainbows for very long. They insist that their generosity and idealism be mobilized toward the attainment of concrete goals.

These characteristics are the pre-requisites of human progress. Utilizing them as cornerstones, it is possible to lead Americans toward the building of a genuinely and revolutionarily brave new world.

But American leadership has not yet more than incidentally appealed to these qualities in the American people. It has appealed largely to their self-interest, rather than to their generosity; to their prudence and their pocketbooks, rather than to their idealism. It has pointed out the danger that their cities will be bombed, that their raw material sources will be taken from them, that their freedoms (made almost synonymous with privileges and comforts) will be destroyed.

It has convinced them, on an intellectual level, that it is sensible to fight fascism. But it has not kindled their imaginations, nor moved them to the heroic action which can be born only of profound emotion as well as conviction.

Men do not sacrifice their lives because it seems wise to do so. They sacrifice their lives, in the main, only for intangibles -- for deep feelings whether of consuming anger or high, romantic hope.

Americans now need to be shown that if they win they stand upon the threshold of a new age full of promise. They need to know that within their reach, if they will but grasp it, is an era in which great strides can be made toward realization of the Four Freedoms, an era in which the sciences and the arts can flourish for the enrichment of mankind, an era in which their children, and even their children's children, can move freely, interchange ideas and live with one another in a great community, in friendship and in peace. They have more than a past to lose; they have a future to gain.

Americans are now ready for such an era. Every available index to their minds reveals today a maturity which they lacked a quarter of a century ago -- and for the want of which they lost a world which they had almost won. Today they are prepared to make their visions real.

And it is to these visions that effective leadership must now appeal -- not to their fears, but to their hopes; not alone to their common sense, but to their sense of common humanity.

PSF
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OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure

~~Secret~~

April 1, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 17

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

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OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES DEFENSE
BONDS AND STAMPS

~~Secret~~

April 8, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 18

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C O N T E N T S

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SUMMARY

Although farmers view the war in much the same way as other occupational groups, they have benefited from it more directly through rising prices for their products and are consequently more optimistic about its future impact on their living standards.

Morale among farmers is bolstered by a belief that their occupation makes a direct contribution toward victory. They have responded in some measure to the Agriculture Department's Production Goals Campaign by increasing farm output in general. But further efforts seem necessary to inform them regarding the need for specific crop increases.

Farmers reveal a distrust of industrial workers; they are more prone than city dwellers to feel that labor is not doing its full part in the war effort. This distrust seems to be aggravated by a fear that high factory wages are promoting a farm labor shortage. Although in certain areas adjacent to war industry centers a shortage of farm workers has actually developed, in other parts of the country, the South particularly, the farm labor shortage appears to be fictional and motivated by a desire to maintain existing low wage levels. Broader understanding of the interdependence between farm and factory is requisite.

The distrust of labor has been fanned by a hostile press campaign against the 40-hour week and the union shop. This campaign, in which a great majority of newspapers have participated, tends to isolate labor as a group, distinguishing it from the public as a whole, and has already driven the labor press into a violent counter-offensive. National unity is suffering from internal aggressions which need to be redirected toward a common enemy.

Criticism of Government domestic management and information policy continues at a high level. Newspapers friendly to the Administration's foreign policy join with those which are essentially oppositionist in charges that the Government has failed fully to mobilize the American people for the war effort.

An analysis of newspaper and radio material shows that these media have devoted considerable effort toward promoting two of the major informational themes, the production program and its effect upon the civilian population. But they have comparatively neglected the themes defining the enemy conspiracy and the nature of our war aims. Greater emphasis on these latter topics may be useful in diverting energies from internal hostilities and channeling them toward the winning of the war.

FARM MORALE

Attitudes Toward the War

In most significant respects, farmers view the war in very much the same way as other major groups in the population. They reveal, in general, about the same opinions regarding the duration and outcome of the war, regarding the purposes for which the United States and others among the United Nations are fighting, and regarding the probability and wisdom of post-war collaboration.

Farmers are somewhat less inclined to be categorical in their views about the war than are city dwellers. When questioned by interviewers, they show in some instances a considerably higher tendency to withhold expression of opinion. Quite possibly this fact is attributable to reticence -- a reluctance on the part of country people to confide their views frankly to strangers. It may be due, also, to the fact that farmers are less exposed than people in the large cities to frequent sensational headlines about the war; though their radio listening is less than that of city dwellers, the people in rural areas rely in greater measure upon broadcasts as the source of their information. And since they are consequently less subject to the influence of editorial writers and columnists, perhaps they are less inclined to express positive opinions about the progress of events.

Farmers are, nevertheless, quite as satisfied as city people with the volume and veracity of the news which they receive. And,

like city dwellers, a sizable minority among them feels that the picture of the war presented to it is inadequate and inaccurate.

Personal Outlook

It is in regard to the impact of the war upon their personal interests that farmers manifest some real differences of opinion from city dwellers. Generalizing roughly, farmers are about twice as prone as the people who live in cities to feel that they are better off, personally, as a result of the war's effect upon their living pattern.

Farmers not only feel that their economic well-being has improved during the past year, but they also expect this improvement to be continued for another year to come. The following table presents a comparison of the views of rural and urban people in this regard:

	Last Year		Coming Year	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Better off	56%	29%	51%	23%
Same; better off in some respects, worse in others	18	34	15	22
Worse off	22	36	15	35
Don't know	4	1	19	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%

This optimism in regard to the immediate future appears to be due to the fact that farm prices have risen appreciably and to a recognition that farm interests have had the support of Administration and Congressional leaders. On the other hand, however, many

of the same farmers show a high degree of pessimism when urged to express their feelings in regard to the effect of all-out production on their personal well-being.

Despite a prevailing expectation that they will, on the whole, be better off, two-fifths of the people living in rural areas believe that, as war production gets into full swing, it will inevitably entail considerable personal sacrifice; one-third of the city people questioned on this score held the same expectation. About one-fourth of the city dwellers say that they expect peak production to produce an improvement in their personal well-being, as compared with a mere three per cent of the farmers exhibiting this optimism.

Participation in the War Effort

The most important distinction between farm and city attitudes toward the war lies in the relationship between regular occupation and the national effort. Farmers are very much more inclined than city folk to feel that the work they are doing is, of itself, making a real contribution toward victory. The contrast is vividly shown in responses to the question, "Do you feel that anything you yourself are now doing is helping the total United States war effort?"

65 per cent among farm owners said that their regular occupation contributes. So did

38 per cent of the skilled workers, and

13 per cent of the managerial class.

This conviction that their work is a contribution appears

to stem from a general recognition among farmers that food is essential to the winning of the war. And they apply the same thinking to the future. When asked, "What do you feel that you could do that would help the most to win the war?" more than three-fourths of the farmers gave "do our own jobs well" as an answer. In contrast, only about one-fifth of the urban sample felt that their most valuable contribution could be in vocational terms.

The attitude of farmers in this respect has evidently been somewhat influenced by the "Production Goals Campaign" of the Department of Agriculture. About two-fifths of the country's farmers were found to be informed about the campaign and among these, three-fourths had increased the crops which they produced. Among farmers who knew little or nothing about the "Production Goals Campaign", 47 per cent increased their crops, presumably because of the influence of rising prices and other similar considerations.

The "Production Goals Campaign" does not appear, however, to have been more than partially successful in stimulating farmers to foster the particular crops respecting which increased production is desired by the Department of Agriculture. The increase in planned production seems to have come about in part through an awareness that general increases are desirable, in part through the anticipation of greater income. But in regard to the special crops needed for war purposes, relatively few

farmers seem to understand the reasons why production increases have been requested. Evidently increased education as to the need for specific crops is requisite.

Farm and Factory

The war has aggravated a longstanding disharmony between farmers and industrial workers. This is indicated in an analysis of the appraisals made by people in large urban centers and in rural areas as to the degree to which factory workers and farm workers are contributing to the war effort. The following table shows the disparity between their views:

		Big City Opinion	Farm Opinion
Factory workers are doing all they can			
	Yes	61%	50%
	No	30	31
	Don't Know	9	19
Farmers are doing all they can			
	Yes	60%	79%
	No	13	13
	Don't Know	27	8

From these figures it appears that, although four-fifths of the farmers believe that their own group is doing all it can to advance the war effort, only one-half acknowledges that industrial workers are contributing with equal zeal. In the city, on the

other hand, people give credit about equally to farm and factory efforts. It is noteworthy that about one-fifth of the farmers are in the "Don't know" column respecting the efforts of industrial workers and more than one-quarter of the city dwellers are equally in doubt respecting the farm contribution; increased information might give each of these groups a greater appreciation of what the other is doing.

The distrust felt by farmers for the war contribution of city workers appears to be accentuated by a belief that industrial workers are receiving exorbitant wages and also by a feeling that these wages are luring farm hands away from the soil and into the big cities. The reason most frequently given by farmers for failing to plan increased production is a shortage of farm labor; 23 per cent gave this explanation.

This labor shortage on the farm is only occasionally factual, more often fictional. Dairy farmers, in areas near big cities which have war contracts, are apparently having real difficulty in finding sufficient hired hands; in New York some dairy farmers are selling off their herds, and in Pennsylvania there is discussion among farm organizations of a need for draft deferment for the dairy industry. Farm labor shortages seem imminent in the Northwest, in southern Illinois, southern Wisconsin and in the truck farming areas of Michigan. The discrepancies between farm and industrial pay scales have unquestionably exercised an influence in these regions in drawing men from farms into factories.

But in many areas farmers allege a labor shortage where none actually exists. In the Dakotas, for example, where concern about the labor supply is frequently and vociferously expressed, there are definite pockets of surplus farm labor; the same appears to be true of Indiana. And in the South, farmers seem determined to maintain a superabundance of available workers in order to keep wage rates at their current low level. In some localities, farmers are striving to maintain labor reserves in their own neighborhood at the expense of other areas in the same state where labor is needed; efforts to impede the use of Farm Security Administration funds to assist migratory labor are apparently a manifestation of this attitude.

Recommendations

The morale of farmers appears to be at a satisfactory level, at least as far as their own participation in the war effort is concerned. But the widening cleavage between rural and urban outlooks demands remedial action in order to mobilize the aggressive impulses on either side against the common enemy.

On the one hand newspapers have done much to exacerbate the resentment of farmers toward industrial workers, while on the other they have done little to acquaint city dwellers with the problems affecting the farm owners and managers. The interdependence of farm and factory needs to be made more plain by Government spokesmen and by farm and labor leaders.

The Department of Agriculture has already made some efforts

to promote understanding of farm problems among city people. This is an objective which could usefully be complemented by Labor Department efforts to inform farmers respecting the unity of their interests with industrial workers. High wages in factories make a market for farm products.

Meetings between farmers and businessmen have already been sponsored by the Department of Agriculture. Similar meetings between farmers and labor leaders may prove of even greater value in leveling this misunderstanding between them.

An information policy directed toward the farm population should make use of the following channels of information:

(1) Farm commentators on network and local farm programs

(2) The farm press

(3) Small town daily and weekly newspapers

(4) The educational resources and the farm committee organizations of the Department of Agriculture

(5) Local organizations of farmers through direct personal appeal by speakers

Education of farmers is needed to persuade them to share their increased income with their hired help and to promote an optimum use of the migratory labor supply.

At the present time farmers appear to be inadequately aware of the danger to their own interests in rising farm prices; the consequences of a sudden slump in the value of farm products, such as that which followed the last World War, should be made more clear.

Farmers require a greater understanding of their own vital stake in the war and of the specific means by which their own contribution to victory can be made more effective.

CLEAVAGE

A serious cleavage is developing in the United States between that mythical body commonly referred to as "the public" and an equally amorphous group known as "labor". The division is, of course, essentially an artificial one -- created in large measure, perhaps consciously, by the media of popular information, newspapers in particular.

According to the daily press, "the public" is outraged at "labor". Such an attitude regards the men who fabricate tanks or airplanes as "labor". But manifestly these men are also a part of "the public"; they can be isolated only at the expense of identifying them with their group rather than with their nation. It is precisely out of such a process of segmentation that national integrity can most effectively be destroyed. Indeed, this is the very foundation upon which fascism rests. An instance of the habitual tendency of the press to segment the country can be observed in a recent Gallup poll release which remarks, "In addition to business and labor, the third factor in the war effort is the public itself including the farmers."

The representation of "labor" as a fixed and dissident minority has been carried on with mounting fervor during the past

fortnight by an overwhelming majority of newspapers throughout the country. About three-quarters of the editorials and newspaper columns dealing with the subjects of the 40-hour week and the closed shop were definitely hostile to organized labor. Some of them openly proclaimed their desire to smash the growing power of "labor" in the economic life of the country. Radio commentators were notably more friendly toward the cause of the workers. Indeed, during the past week about 80 per cent of the commentaries on the air seemed essentially on the labor side of the controversy.

Editorial bias in regard to labor may be illustrated by a simple comparison. According to an analysis prepared by The James S. Twohey Associates, Thurman Arnold's labor statement was discussed by 56 per cent of the press, while his Standard Oil statement was discussed by only 34 per cent; 80 per cent strongly agreed with his views on labor, while only 15 per cent supported his observations respecting Standard Oil.

Result: the labor press, which had been enthusiastically supporting the production drive, is being rapidly driven into opposition.

In response to the general editorial attack on their group, the labor press has launched a violent counter-offensive. The principal thesis advanced in this medium is that the newspaper industry has joined with other capitalists to wage war upon labor rather than upon the Axis. The feeling is being sedulously fostered by the labor journals that workers must protect their interests

at home even before they combat their foes abroad.

A situation of grave urgency seems to be developing out of this schism which is likely to grow as syndicated material already sent to the labor press gets wider circulation. Group aggressions now directed at one another within the country must be channeled against the common enemy. In an early survey, the Bureau of Intelligence will present fuller material on this topic.

THE SIXTH COLUMN

Internal Dissension

Newspaper and radio commentators give a sense of marking time in their attitudes toward the fighting fronts. The fateful Spring, in which great new drives by the Axis are expected, is now at hand. While waiting for the outbreak of the season's fury, press and radio have turned their attention in large measure to domestic problems.

Dissension over internal affairs has now reached the highest level since the temporary and superficial unity created by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With the exception of the current controversy over labor and the 40-hour week, the editorial division respecting domestic problems does not seem markedly different from that in regard to foreign affairs.

In general, violent attacks on the Administration for its information policy, guidance of civilian activities and other aspects of domestic war management come from the same segments of the press

which habitually attack its foreign policy. These newspapers have assumed a mantle of martyrdom: to allegations that they are promoting disunity and distrust at home, they assert that the Government seeks to silence all criticism by labeling it treason.

Criticism of the Government from newspapers which are fundamentally sympathetic to its war policy is couched in a wholly different context; there is an abundance of this sort of criticism directed largely at the Government's failure to enlist the full resources of the American people in the war effort. A good deal of impatience and irritation toward the Administration is apparent among commentators who are fundamentally friendly, as well as among those who are essentially oppositionist.

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of editorial division in domestic affairs was produced by the controversy between Congressman Dies and Vice President Wallace over charges brought by the former against 35 employees of the Board of Economic Warfare. The isolationist minority in the press supported Martin Dies, both by violently angled news and feature stories and by editorials which carried on their customary efforts to undermine confidence in the Federal Government. A great majority of press and radio commentators, however, viewed the congressman's charges as mischievous, politically-inspired and somewhat silly. Some of them cataloged him as belonging to that group recently identified by the President as the sixth column.

PRESS AND RADIO TREATMENT OF THE INFORMATION THEMES

The Government's efforts to promote public understanding of the principal information themes outlined by the Office of Facts and Figures has had rather uneven support from the channels of communication. During the past month, primary emphasis has been placed by press and radio upon the first of these themes -- the "production program".

Two of the themes, the "statement of our objectives" and the "nature of the conspiracy against us and against our way of life," have been comparatively neglected.

The following table shows the apportionment of space in newspapers and of time devoted by radio commentators to the advancement of the principal information themes. For newspapers, the figures given constitute an average for the four-week period ending March 15. For radio, the figures are an average of the four-week period ending March 27.

	Press	Radio Commentators
1. Production Program	31%	25%
2. Effects of Production (Sacrifice)	21	18
3. The Fighting Job	12	26
4. Aims and Issues	4	7
5. Nature of the Conspiracy	7	1
6. Counter Strategy (United Nations)	7	18
7. Complacency and Defeatism	18	5

An experimental study prepared for the Bureau of Intelligence by C. E. Hooper, Inc. discloses the division of time allotted to all material concerning the war effort broadcast by the four Washington network stations during the week of February 23 to March 1. The entire 19 hour period from 6 A.M. to 1 A.M. was monitored each day.

The total time devoted to war topics on the four stations during the entire week was 45 hours and 56 minutes. This time was distributed as follows:

	Per Cent of Time Devoted
"Sales" (material designed to recruit manpower or money)	16.3%
"Inspiration" (material related to morale)	71.8%
"Instruction" (instruction in community or family problems)	11.9%
	100.0%

"Inspirational" topics were classified into six of the OFF information objectives. All "inspirational" material which could not be so classified was cataloged as "undirected effort". This "undirected effort" amounted to 55 per cent of all "inspiration" time. It should not be assumed that all of this 55 per cent can or even should be eliminated by proper coordination. Much of it is non-informative in character (patriotic songs, etc.).

The directed portion (45 per cent) of the "inspirational" material was divided as follows:

Production Program	5%
Sacrifice	3
Aims and Issues	6
The Fighting Job	10
The Enemy Conspiracy	9
Counter Strategy (United Nation)	12
	45%

A study of editorial cartoons discloses that almost all of them are related in some way to the war. Only about one-seventh of them, however, could be classified directly under any of the major information themes -- and of these almost all dealt with the first three themes.

A more detailed breakdown of newspaper information about the war, not confined to the major information themes outlined by OFF, is to be found on the next page. This portrays graphically the relative attention accorded by newspapers to several major topics of discussion during the month of February 15 to March 15. It will be noted that press comment in regard to Russia, while not great in volume, was almost wholly favorable -- much more so than in regard to Britain or to the United States Government itself. Press treatment of the Government's information policy was almost uniformly hostile.

QUANTITATIVE MEASURE OF PRESS COMMENT ON SELECTED SUBJECTS

FEBRUARY 15 – MARCH 15



HEIGHT OF BAR INDICATES VOLUME OF COMMENT
SHADING INDICATES PROPORTION OF FAVORABLE COMMENT

FUTURE PROBLEMS

In accordance with a recent suggestion, the Bureau of Intelligence submits the following list of problems which are likely to require remedial attention during tho weeks ahead:

(1) Labor and social legislation. Current efforts to drive workers into a defense of their special group interests may have a serious effect upon national unity. A campaign against the whole body of New Deal social legislation affecting labor is likely to promote a serious internal struggle. Additional difficulties may arise from the possible enactment of a general sales tax, the inauguration of compulsory war bond purchases and the reduction of wage earnings through abrogation of the 40-hour week. Attempts to control or curtail purchasing power may be carried to the extent of a destruction of purchasing power.

(2) The divisionist activities of the neo-isolationists appear to be mounting in intensity. In the forthcoming congressional campaign, subversion will probably be intermingled with politics.

(3) An Axis peace offensive may promote defeatism or play upon the war-weariness of the American people. (Numbers 2 and 3 are closely intertwined)

(4) Tension among enemy and United Nations allies in the U. S. in relation to employment and morale is heightening.

(5) Drastic price control and rationing may pose special difficulties for business groups, small business in particular.

(6) The dissatisfaction of Negroes with discrimination against their race in the war effort seems to be waxing, rather than waning.

PSF
OWI

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

file
personal

April 17, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES DEFENSE
BONDS AND STAMPS

~~Secret~~

April 15, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 19

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

C O N T E N T S

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SUMMARY

A considerable minority, here referred to as Divisionists, opposes the United Nations' concept of the war. Perhaps as much as one-fifth of the American people, or approximately 17,000,000 adults, may constitute the Divisionist strength today.

Many of these people are underprivileged, uneducated and youthful, backed in some measure by older persons and reactionary men of wealth. By and large they derive from despair and discontent. They can be changed, perhaps, only by the long-term influences of education and improved economic opportunities.

The immediate problem lies in preventing the Divisionist core from infecting other portions of the population.

The leaders may be readily identified by their adherence to a pattern closely paralleling the Axis line. Their activities may ordinarily be distinguished from legitimate criticism by the fact that they touch not one but several of the specific themes associated with Divisionism. Legitimate criticism occurs in a context designed to advance the prosecution of the war.

The fanatical fringe of subversive and anti-democratic publications are not only easily identified but they may also be controlled or nullified.

Those of greater influence, such as active remnants of the America First groups, Congressmen, and large metropolitan dailies, engaged in Divisionist tactics in the course of their normal functions, constitute a greater threat to our effective participation in the United Nations war. Nullification ordinarily can be achieved by vigorous counter-propaganda.

* * *

Job discrimination against aliens is so widespread as to leave many disaffected, unemployed, helplessly impoverished and wasted for the war effort. There is much misunderstanding among employers, officials and the public as to the legal restrictions and other problems involved.

* * *

Further evidence is now available as to the willingness of the public to sacrifice for the war effort. Those who have been hit the hardest appear to be the ones most ready to face future difficulties philosophically.

PRESS REACTION TO THE FALL OF BATAAN

The final, long-delayed American relinquishment of Bataan Peninsula to the Japanese invaders came as a climax to a week of almost unrelievedly bad news. The United Nations naval forces suffered serious losses in the Bay of Bengal, and the proposals offered to India by Sir Stafford Cripps, after high hopes had been raised for them, came to naught.

In most of the newspapers there seemed little tendency to equivocate about the gravity of these reverses. The headlines were black and unhappy. But in editorial pages, there was some disposition to see a brighter side of the Philippine disaster.

The key-note of most editorial comment was pride in and praise for the heroism displayed by American and Filipino troops who had held out unbelievably long against overwhelming odds. Many newspapers referred to the defense as a symbol -- a portent of victory to come. The Philadelphia Record, for example, observed that "Bataan was a defeat. So was Bunker Hill. Americans have always drawn their most inspiring battle cries, not from the glories of victory, but from the challenge given by temporary defeats .... More important than strictly military considerations will be the effect on our determination to make the defeat at Bataan the beginning of an ultimate victory."

Some commentators emphasized the strategic gains which had been secured by the effective delaying action of the American

forces. Isolationist papers, on the other hand, tended toward an insistence that the loss of Bataan constituted an unqualified defeat for which the Government must be held accountable. The Chicago Tribune took this view: "It is hoped that our people will not for a moment allow themselves to think that the Bataan campaign has been anything but a disastrous defeat. The Nation prays that the bureaucrats in Washington whose bungling brought this catastrophe upon us will be replaced before they can repeat their folly."

The expectedness of the defeat on Bataan scarcely detracted from the sense of shock and disappointment which it inevitably occasioned. A keener, more personal feeling of loss resulted from the Japanese victory in this sector than from any other setback which the United Nations have suffered in the Pacific. Again, the common moral drawn from the situation was that the United Nations must assume the offensive. "Bataan", said the San Francisco Chronicle, "is a bugle call to tell us that only attack will win."

THE DIVISIONISTS

Definition

A considerable minority of the American public has been for a long period in consistent opposition to the settled foreign policy of the United States. There is little that is homogeneous about this minority. It consists of extremely diverse elements. Perhaps the sole common denominator which can be applied to its

components today is an apathy or an antipathy to the war in which this country is now engaged.

No single label can satisfactorily be applied to all the members of this group. They are commonly referred to as isolationists, as appeasers, as defeatists, as Fascists. These terms are descriptive of segments within the group. None of them, however, is properly applicable to the minority as a whole. For purposes of this discussion we shall employ the term "Divisionists" to designate all those persons who, from various motives and with varying degrees of intensity, oppose and obstruct prosecution of a United Nations war against the Axis.

Dimensions

In the latter part of January, slightly more than one-tenth of the American people indicated in a Gallup poll that they would favor the acceptance of a peace offer made by Hitler on the basis of the territorial and political situation existing at that time.

About 30 per cent of the American public revealed a willingness to end the war and discuss peace terms with the German army, if it were to take over the reins of government from Hitler. One-half of the people taking this view professed a belief that the acceptance of such a peace would constitute a defeat for Hitler -- indicating either a total failure to grasp the realities of the situation or a concealed preference for an Axis triumph. A quarter of the group (7 per cent of the total population) openly

acknowledged that this sort of peace would amount to a Hitler victory.

Of those who favored acceptance of a peace offer by either Hitler or the German army, 29 per cent (9 per cent of the total) felt that such a settlement would mean victory for Germany. Presumably, therefore, this percentage of the American public is entirely willing to see the United Nations beaten by the Axis.

It seems significant that a like percentage of the population, although not necessarily the same persons, gives answers which are essentially unsympathetic when asked what the United States is fighting for. And about 8 per cent of the American public register opposition to American participation in the extension of the Four Freedoms to the post-war world. Moreover, the segment of the public which believes we should stop sending supplies to Britain and Russia also amounts to 8 per cent. And it seems relevant that a slightly smaller minority, 6 per cent, holds that we should either make peace with Japan now or withdraw our forces for a defensive war to Hawaii or our own coast line.

These people, amounting to approximately 8,000,000 adult individuals, can be characterized as Fascist sympathizers or even as out-and-out Fascists. They are the nucleus of the Divisionist strength in the United States.

But to this number must be added those who are so indifferent to the outcome of the war, so deluded as to its consequences or so hostile to the Administration and to the United Nations concept

as to be ripe for the acceptance of proposals to end the war on terms far short of a full United Nations victory. The size of this group is more difficult to estimate. One index to its proportions may be found in the fact that about a quarter of the American public is distrustful of or hostile to the British; but not all of these, certainly, would welcome a negotiated peace.

On the basis of a rough appraisal, it may be suggested that perhaps as much as one-fifth of the American people, approximately 17,000,000 adult individuals, may be cataloged as the reservoir of Divisionist strength in the United States today. It is no accident that this group is similar in composition, though not equal in size, to that portion of the population which, prior to American participation in the war, constituted the isolationist bloc.

These people, many of them underprivileged, uneducated and youthful, backed in some measure by older persons and reactionary men of wealth, are peculiarly susceptible to a discharge of their resentments in Fascist patterns. They are, in background, not unlike the people who responded to Fascist leadership in Italy and Germany. They are people prone to respond to demagogic appeals which provide a target for their aggressions in the form of helpless racial and religious minorities. The danger which they constitute should not be minimized. For adversity may increase their number; they derive from dispair and discontent. And a large portion of them have the armor of native Americanism.

These are the people upon whom the Divisionist doctrines

have taken hold. They constitute the core of defeatism and of negotiated peace sentiment in the United States today. And a few major industrialists have not scrupled to make use of them for the purpose of checking the growth of the organized labor movement.

It is doubtful that any remedial action can rapidly alter the attitudes of these people at the present time. They can be changed, perhaps, only by the long term influences of education and improved economic opportunity. Those who, in some measure, shared their views prior to Pearl Harbor and who were susceptible of conversion from them, have already, apparently, been winnowed from their ranks.

But if this Divisionist core is not itself open to correction, it is important, nevertheless, to keep it from infecting other portions of the population. Its leaders are now employing the viruses of suspicion, bigotry and despair, to augment their ranks and to undermine the faith of Americans in their Government.

Tactics of the Divisionists

The main purposes and theses of the Divisionists may be enumerated as follows:

1. To do business with Hitler. Efforts are now being inaugurated to make such a course palatable to the American people by calling it a "negotiated victory". The rationalization offered is that further fighting can produce only defeat or at best a stalemate.

2. Abandonment of our Allies and of any participation in post-war collaboration. The "line" is that the British are decadent and "sold us a bill of goods".

3. Limitation of the American war effort to the Continental United States and the waters immediately adjacent; our real peril is from Japan.

4. The conversion of the war into a "crusade" against Communism; "Stalin is too strong, and Bolshevism will sweep over Europe."

5. Indictment or impeachment of the President for "getting us into the war at the behest of Jews, Communists and international bankers".

6. Overthrow of the New Deal social philosophy. In this aim, the allegation that the Administration is dominated by Communists is a customary tactic; American democracy will be lost during the war.

7. Destruction of the organized labor movement and subordination of labor to a docile peonage.

8. Development of anti-Semitism -- in part a means, as well as an end.

9. The cost of the war will bankrupt the nation; civilian sacrifices will be more than we can bear.

Not all of the Divisionists, naturally, subscribe to all of these purposes. But the hallmark of Divisionism may be considered an adherence to several of them.

It is necessary, of course, in dealing with the problems of Divisionism to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of the Government. Legitimate critics may and, indeed, frequently do touch on many of the specific points raised by the Divisionists. But they do so, as a rule, within a context designed to advance the prosecution of the war and enlarge the American contribution to victory. Much vigorous and valid criticism is directed toward prodding the Government into a fuller and more effective mobilization of the

Nation's human and material resources and into a fuller and more inspiring statement of its goals.

Divisionist Groups

The effective instruments of Divisionist activities in the United States today may be listed as follows:

(1) Members of Congress who impede the effort to carry on a United Nations war; the "turtle" bloc.

(2) The still formidable remnants of the America First Committee ready to revive their organization at a propitious moment.

(3) The fanatical fringe of organizations issuing a motley number of subversive and anti-democratic publications.

(4) The publishers and editors of a small number of powerful metropolitan newspapers -- The Chicago Tribune, The New York Daily News, The Washington Times-Herald and the Hearst chain.

The groups and publications carrying on Divisionist activities may be separated into two categories on a functional basis:

(1) Those whose function is to divide and to destroy.

(2) Those to whom division and destruction are incidental to their normal operations.

Following are some of the principal components of the former category:

(1) National Union of Social Justice under the leadership of Charles Coughlin and the publication Social Justice, which, according to the best available figures, has a circulation at present of nearly 200,000.

(2) Gerald L. K. Smith and the committee of 1,000,000 with their publication, The Cross and the Flag, together with other brochures, radio programs and agents in the fundamentalist clergy; although Smith claims an audience of 3,000,000, he reaches a total of perhaps several hundred thousand.

(3) The Klu Klux Klan which publishes The Fiery Cross, said to

reach an audience of 500,000 or more.

(4) Gerald B. Winrod and his publication, The Defenders with a circulation of about 110,000.

There is undoubtedly a good deal of overlapping among these various audiences but it may be roughly estimated that taken together they reach a total of somewhere between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000.

In addition to these there is a considerable group of minor organizations and publications which are equally noisy and anti-democratic but which cannot be said at this time to exercise any widespread influence. Included among them are Publicity published by E. J. Garner in Wichita, Kansas; X-Ray published by Court Asher, Muncie, Indiana; Beacon Light published by William Kullgren, Atascadero, California; America in Danger published by Charles B. Hudson, Omaha, Nebraska; The Round Table Letter published by Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling, Chicago; The Broom published by Leon de Aryan, California; The Galilean published by William Dudley Pelley, Noblesville, Indiana; The Individualist published by Charles B. Phillips, Lincoln, Nebraska.

The most expert estimates do not attribute an audience of more than 15,000, even to the largest of these; most of them reach no more than 2,000 to 3,000 persons and many have a circulation of no more than a few hundred. Again undoubtedly there is a sizable overlapping of readership.

It is noteworthy that these groups have almost uniformly

recruited "God" as an ally. The term "Christian" appears commonly in their titles and is employed as synonymous with "white Protestant"; they are anti-Catholic, anti-Jewish, anti-Negro -- and, above all, anti-democratic.

In addition to these Fascist cells, there exists another considerable class of organizations which functioned as a radical fraction in the isolationist movement prior to December 7. These include a number of women's associations such as Women United, We The Mothers Mobilize for America, The National Legion of Mothers of America, The Legion of Mothers and Women of America, The Mothers of Sons, etc. Of similar nature are such minor groups as Gifts for Our Boys, Lend Lease for America, Americans For Peace, Citizens Committee (formerly The Citizens Keep America Out of War Committee) and many others. None of these groups at the present time is large or effectual. They suffer from organizational incompetence and lack of funds. And the rivalry among their leaders is such as to prevent effective integration.

Ethnic minorities help to swell the dissident chorus. Among the German-Americans, pro-German and anti-British sentiment is strong and manifests itself in the argument that America's real enemy is Japan -- and the radical New Dealers at home. Although the explicitly Nazi organizations have suspended public existence since December 7, such ostensibly non-Nazi groups as The German-American National Alliance, The Citizens

Protective League of New York and The Steuben Society are centers of Nazi enthusiasm. Nazi influence is pronounced in the city and state-wide federations of fraternal and athletic societies. And a majority of the German-American press is, if not avowedly pro-Nazi, markedly anti-British, anti-Russian and anti-New Deal.

Far greater influence is exercised, however, by the organizations and publications in the second category -- those engaged in Divisionist tactics in the course of their normal functions. For these reach an audience of much greater proportions, not already imbued with their attitudes and disarmed by their prestige and respectability.

This group is obviously much more difficult to identify. And it is plain that the components of this group are more or less Divisionist depending upon the scope and the intensity of their activities. The best test which can be applied by way of making an objective appraisal is the degree of adherence which they manifest toward the Divisionist purposes outlined above.

In some measure, it is plain, so highly respectable an organization as the National Association of Manufacturers participates in Divisionism when it attacks labor as a group and endeavors to isolate it from the rest of the American public. When the Saturday Evening Post publishes an article such as its recent "Case Against the Jew" it serves a Divisionist end. Newspapers such as those controlled by Hearst, McCormic and Patterson may properly be called Divisionist because they consistently

impugn the motives of the Government and endeavor to divide the American people from the United Nations. Members of Congress who, like Representative Dies, persistently attack the Administration with no evident purpose save to embarrass it or who, like Senator Walsh, insist upon limiting prosecution of the war to narrow national interests are unmistakably serving the Divisionist cause, however lofty may be their own rationalization of their purposes.

Integration

The Divisionists are at the present time scattered and uncoordinated, save for the nuclear leadership which is a remnant of the America First Committee. For the most part, the affiliations between the functional and non-functional Divisionists -- among Congressmen, organizations and publications -- are tenuous and tentative; there is more mutual admiration than actual administrative integration. Nevertheless, several segments abet one another in considerable measure. The fanatic fringe finds it useful to quote Congressmen giving a semblance of respectability to their Divisionist arguments. And the Congressmen in turn are helped by support from the more respectable newspapers.

The coming Congressional election may, however, provide a setting for much more effective coordination of the Divisionist groups. As in the fight over the Lend Lease Act and other symbols of the interventionist trend, a super-organization such as the America First Committee may seek to bring together the various

strands of Divisionism and weave them into an effective political pattern. Editorial views in Divisionist newspapers indicate an awareness that next November affords an opportunity to enlarge their influence in the Government of the United States.

Recommendations

The measures to be taken against the Divisionists must be determined by the nature of their activities and by an appraisal of the motivation prompting them. In instances where the tactics of Divisionists violate the laws of the United States and amount to treason, prosecution before courts of law seems entirely in order. Denial of access to the mails may be valid in some instances where prosecution is considered inappropriate.

There appears to be no sound objection on ethical grounds to a limitation upon the freedom of speech of enemy agents. Nor is there any real danger that the identification of such agents with the enemy will have the effect of creating sympathy for them in the public mind. The determination of treasonable activity and of the motivation prompting it are proper subjects for our courts.

But in relation to the more influential Divisionists -- particularly those in the non-functional category -- prosecution is not feasible. To combat these, publicity seems the most effective instrument available. It must be shown that, however unwittingly, they are doing the work of the enemy. The parallel between their doctrines and the propaganda of the Axis should be established for all to understand. The sources of their support

should be uncovered. And the violence which their preaching does to fundamental American principles should be vigorously exposed.

Caution should be exercised in dealing with the minor publications which promote the Fascist philosophy. The specious lies and arguments which they set forth should not carelessly be given currency. Well-meaning anti-Fascist organizations, in endeavoring to disparage these publications by quoting their views, have sometimes given their propaganda a circulation far beyond their own meagre range.

Propaganda can best be combatted by counter-propaganda. Much more needs to be done to inform the American people of the nature of the enemy and of the conspiracy against our way of life. And, conversely, much more needs to be done to tell people what they have to gain by victory. The fears upon which Divisionism feeds can best be counteracted by proclaiming the great American hope for the future.

The Congressional elections next November will be one of the important battles in the current World War and a definitive test of Divisionist strength. The outcome will greatly influence the nature of America's participation in the war.

There seems no choice but to meet the Divisionists upon this battlefield. No appeals to national unity can forestall their efforts to take advantage of the occasion. They must be combatted individually in each district where they aspire to secure control. They will join together in support of their

chosen candidates for Congress. And there must be a similar joining together of those who wish to defeat them, regardless of traditional party affiliation.

The Divisionist candidates, like the organizations which support them, can best be encountered by exposing them for what they are -- tools or agents of the enemy. The American people can be relied upon to reject them -- provided the identity between their proposals and the aims of the Axis is made nakedly clear. Defensive tactics will no more suffice to win a political campaign than a military campaign. And the time to take the offensive is at once.

SELECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF ENEMY ALIENS

Discrimination

There are more than 1,000,000 enemy aliens residing in the United States today. Since the beginning of America's participation in the war, they have been the victims of job discrimination so widespread as to leave many of them disaffected, unemployed and helplessly impoverished. Their potential contribution to the United Nations war effort is being wasted.

Under existing statutes, aliens may be employed in industries dealing with classified contracts only if the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy has given consent to the contractor involved. The employer has the option of submitting or refusing to submit an application. The alien cannot himself make a direct

appeal to the War or Navy Department.

Moreover, it is widely believed by employers, by foremen and by employment office officials that aliens may not be employed in <u>any war industry</u> and it is reported that Government officials appear to have been guilty of strengthening this impression by telling employers that it is preferable to hire citizens. In addition, employers who do understand that they can hire aliens after permits have been secured from War or Navy refuse to undertake the paper work, delay and red tape involved and adhere to a policy of hiring citizens only.

United Nations aliens, including Scotch, Canadians and Englishmen with good qualifications are frequently denied employment in war industries as a result of this confusion. Naturalized citizens also frequently experience difficulty in gaining employment at plants where they are not well known. Even employers engaged in work which has no connection with the war often refuse employment to aliens on the assumption that the Government desires them to give preference to citizens.

The Bureau of Employment Security reports that discrimination against aliens occurred in 529 employment centers scattered throughout the country. In 281 of these centers, the discrimination was on a citizenship basis; unnaturalized persons of foreign birth were rigorously denied jobs. In 248 of the centers, the discrimination appeared to have been on a basis of race or nationality origin or both. And these strictures against

the employment of foreign-born workers obtained in every state in the Union -- even in states where practically no aliens reside.

Recommendations

The hardships created by this confusion would be ameliorated by a blanket order authorizing employment in war industries for United Nations aliens of good character and by the formation of local hearing boards for the individual classification of enemy aliens. Once a local board has certified that an enemy alien is loyal and dependable, war contractors shoudl be encouraged to submit his application for employment to the War and Navy Departments without delay.

The British experience in dealing with enemy aliens presents an object lesson in the inadvisability of a too rigorous and too inclusive internment policy. There were 75,000 enemy aliens in England after Dunkirk. The internment of large numbers of them caused a disruption of alien morale and a serious loss of productive power. More than 90 per cent of the internees were subsequently released, each enemy alien being individually examined and classified in one of three groups: (1) Permanently interned; (2) Restricted as to movement and employment; (3) Unrestricted as to movement and employment.

Some similar selective treatment of enemy aliens in this country would offer the following advantages:

(1) Permit utilization of maximum manpower for war production.

(2) Permit utilization of the many specialized skills among enemy aliens.

(3) Cement loyalty to the United States of democratic German and Italian groups and facilitate their future Americanization. Many of these people are the most vigorous anti-fascists in America.

(4) Check alien baiting hysteria which might develop to uncontrollable proportions and which, once begun, would undoubtedly include United Nations aliens as well as enemy aliens among its victims.

(5) Demonstrate that the United States and the United Nations are not fighting the German and Italian people as peoples, but are fighting only Nazism and Fascism.

(6) Avoid a false sense of security which might result from wholesale internment of enemy aliens who, as the record of recent spy trials indicates, are not the only spies and saboteurs.

At least partial correction of the existing discrimination against aliens can be brought about through widespread publicity about their problems. Workers, both citizen and alien, should be informed of the truth about alien employment and labor newspapers should be utilized to press for increased employment opportunities for aliens of good character. Employers similarly might be informed through effective publicity of the fact that they may quite properly make use of the skills and abilities of aliens certified for employment.

Both for the sake of exploiting their skills and of promoting their allegiance to the United States, emphasis should be placed in all informational efforts upon the "melting pot" tradition of America and upon the rich contributions to its culture which have been made by men and women of foreign birth.

READINESS FOR SACRIFICE

As the war's impact begins to be felt, there appears to be a growing awareness among the American people of the fact that it will entail certain reductions in their normal living standards.

In an effort to learn something about the degree to which Americans are ready for the sacrifices which a war economy inevitably entails, the Bureau of Intelligence posed a series of questions to a small nationwide sample. In January, responses indicated that just about one-third of the population were ready to face the difficulties which a shortage of producers' goods is likely to impose upon them. War changes were just beginning to be felt at that time. Tires could no longer be purchased. Sugar began to disappear from restaurant tables.

By February, however, the percentage of those who seemed to be ready for necessary sacrifices had gone up rather sharply -- to 45 per cent of the American people. It should be noted that these are people whose expressed attitudes indicated a willingness to meet anticipated pressures; that these people will actually respond as they themselves anticipate, may be open to question.

How they will behave is forecast to some extent, however, by their acceptance of the shortages which have already had an influence on their daily lives. It is paradoxical that those who have been hit the hardest appear to be the ones most

ready to face future difficulties philosophically. The under-privileged, to generalize roughly, seem to be prepared to sacrifice, while the privileged classes are simply getting ready to defend their privileges.

Interviewing indicates that the people most ready for sacrifices are likely to be those who have already felt the impact of rising prices. People with incomes of less than $50 a week showed much more preparation for an expected lowering of their living habits than the people whose incomes were above this level. Married people and single women were far better prepared for future economic difficulties than were unmarried men.

These are the groups which normally experience the greatest economic pressures. A preponderance of the people willing to make sacrifices belong in these categories.

Conversely, the people who approve of "stocking up" and who appear to be unready for the sacrifices involved in a war economy are much more likely to be among the more fortunate economic groups. A disproportionate number have incomes over $50 a week; and they are single men as opposed to single women or married persons. There is a clear socio-economic contrast between these characteristics and those describing the groups ready for sacrifice.

4-15-42

RELATIVE EMPHASIS ON EACH OF THE SEVEN O.F.F. THEMES

IN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL STATEMENTS



IN THE NEWSPAPERS



100% = TOTAL OF ALL STATEMENTS PERTAINING TO ANY OF THE THEMES

THEMES :

- I PRODUCTION PROGRAM
- II EFFECT OF PRODUCTION PROGRAM; CIVILIAN SACRIFICE
- III THE FIGHTING JOB
- IV AIMS AND ISSUES
- V THE ENEMY CONSPIRACY
- VI UNITED NATIONS COUNTER STRATEGY
- VII DANGERS OF COMPLACENCY AND DEFEATISM

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Materials #20

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES

Bureau of Intelligence

REACTIONS TO COST OF LIVING, PRICE CONTROL, SHORTAGES AND RATIONING

(For Administrative Use Only)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Division of Surveys
Report Number 11
April 14, 1942

REACTIONS TO COST OF LIVING, PRICE CONTROL, SHORTAGES AND RATIONING

Summary

I. How aware is the individual of the pressure of prices and shortages?

Over one-third of those interviewed were not yet concerned about price rises; one-fourth were willing to state that there would be no significant shortages. The extent of this economic unrealism suggests the need for informational correctives.

Lower income groups, for whom cost has always meant scarcity, are more concerned about prices, less about shortages; higher income groups are more concerned about shortages, less about prices.

Food is the item most often designated as that in which the price rise was felt most; cutting down on the quality or quantity of food was the common way of meeting it. Nutritional hazards may be involved.

II. Does the individual understand the interrelationships of living costs, shortages, rationing, price control?

Many do not understand how shortages, prices, and controls interact. Hence contradictions arise: those most concerned about shortages are not most in favor of rationing; those concerned about price rises are less commonly in favor of rationing than their fellows.

III. What is thought to be the government's role in price control and rationing?

Price control and rationing are thought of as legitimate governmental functions, and a substantial majority believe that the government should exercise control. Those who hold back do so because they think the situation is too complicated for the government to handle, because they fear government interference in private affairs, or because they are afraid injustice may be done.

IV. How can the government achieve appreciation and understanding of rationing, price control and other forms of regulation?

The principal requirement for continued success in governmental action is that the problems and their solutions be clarified for the people. The prestige of the government, coupled with the readiness of the people to cooperate, make the situation favorable.

Since drastic action by the government is bound to be needed, the situation is urgent. That people have faith in the government means that most of them will accept programs of regulation as they are announced. But since this faith is for many a blind one, accompanied by economic illiteracy, the danger exists of a rise of criticism of regulation based on rumor-mongering, imputed injustices, and acceptance of irrational appeals by oppositionist groups playing upon the lack of understanding of the real issues.

REACTIONS TO COST OF LIVING, PRICE CONTROL, SHORTAGES AND RATIONING

Contents

I. How Aware is the Individual of the Pressure of Price Rises and Shortages?

II. Does the Individual Understand the Causes, the Implications, and the Consequences of Price Changes, Shortages, Rationing, and Price Control?

III. What Does the Individual Conceive as the Proper Role of Government in Relation to Prices and Rationing?

IV. In What Ways Can the Government Most Effectively Achieve the Desired Appreciation and Understanding of Rationing, Price Control, and other Forms of Regulation?

Appendix A. Quotations from interviews

Appendix B. Interview schedules

Appendix C. Tables

(Appendix B and Appendix C are on file in the Office of the Bureau of Intelligence)

Sources of Data

Dates of interviewing:	January 20 through February 28, 1942*
Number of interviews:	477
Geographical distribution:	Nine cities, as follows: Kansas City, 80; Minneapolis, 68; Rockford, 38; Detroit, 55; Birmingham, 77; New Orleans, 29; Memphis, 14; San Francisco, 62; Los Angeles, 54.
Date of this report:	April 14, 1942

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* Some material is drawn from 856 interviews held during December, 1941.

REACTIONS TO COST OF LIVING, PRICE CONTROL, SHORTAGES AND RATIONING

As shortages become more acute and rationing more widespread, the changes will be felt increasingly by the individual.*

> He pays more for butter, buys a cheaper cut of meat. His new suit is half-wool. He walks to work or doubles up on driving with his neighbor. He buys a radio or a new toaster while he can, if he can. He takes his change in Defense Stamps.
>
> Defense workers get bigger wages, other workers hope to get defense jobs. Single men await the draft; married men become uneasy about it. Housewives stock up a little, just in case. The economically secure expect better income, the insecure hope for it. Big businessmen suffer the throes of conversion, little businessmen the axe of priorities.

What economic developments are pressing people hardest? Do they feel the rising costs in food, in rent? How do they cut down their costs?

Are they concerned about the shortages likely to become more noticeable?

Do they see any connection between shortages, prices, and regulatory measures such as rationing and price control?

What do they think the government should do about rationing and prices?

Have they confidence that the government can keep the situation under control?

The months of December 1941 through February 1942 found people gradually sensitized to what might lie ahead, as the nation went on a war footing. How they reacted during these months gives some hint as to ways in which they will receive the more stringent restrictions likely to be imposed upon them.

I. How Aware is the Individual of the Pressure of Price Rises and Shortages?

A. Cost of living. Over one-third of the people interviewed reported the price rise as not yet of serious concern to them (Table I).**

1. The attitudinal responses of different groups run true to what might be expected: those better off are less concerned over the impact of price rises than those worse off (Tables II and III), those with family responsibilities feel price rises more than those without such responsibilities (Table IV).

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* The extent to which the individual is ready to make the necessary sacrifices in the shortage situation has been discussed in Report Number 10, April 7, 1942.

** All tables are in Appendix C, on file in the Office of the Bureau of Intelligence.

2. Even among the lower income groups (earning under $20 a week and from $20 to $29 a week) nearly a third (32%) of those interviewed expressed little or no concern at all about the rising cost of living. Many apparently do their buying in a hit-and-miss fashion so that price changes go unrecognized until they are drastic.

   This material suggests that, as conditions tighten further, the national stake in maintaining a welfare standard of living will prompt encouragement of more systematic home economy. The easy-come-easy-go attitude toward money of many Americans suggests a real job for local schools (with their home economics departments) to take over as a war contribution.

3. Expectation of further price rises in the next few months was widespread, but one-eighth were willing to say that they thought prices would remain about the same, and an equal number gave qualified replies. Only one in twenty-five stressed the idea that the future course of prices would depend upon government price control (Table V).

4. Where is the rising cost of living felt? "We notice it most in food" represents the reaction to rising living costs of nine out of ten people over the months from December 1941 through February 1942. Clothing and rent come next in importance, with taxes, fuel and luxuries as 'also-rans' (Table VI). Meat was commonly referred to as the food item whose rising cost was beginning to hurt.

5. Of adjustments being made by the individual in December to the rising cost of living, sacrifice in the quality and quantity of food consumption was mentioned by one in four of those interviewed (Table VII).

   "We are lots more careful. Second day cakes and pies. Second day bread. Cut down on meat." This reply of a Minneapolis housewife represents many besides herself.

   a. Fifty-six percent of the families interviewed in December were already cutting down on quantity or quality of spending, or both. One in seven (14%) was not cutting down but was swapping the extra costs against increased earning power, either by the head of the family or by an extra member sent into the labor market. A quarter (24%) of all families were standing pat--admitting themselves to be affected, but doing nothing about it. One in eight (12%) claimed the impossible, i.e., that they were not affected by the rising cost of living.

The changes in the habits of the public suggest a place where emphasis on modern nutritional practices may become urgent, as people find food the easiest item to cut down on. Meat consumption is reduced, or cheaper cuts substituted. Dairy products presently are used less. What foods can be substituted cheaply without sacrifice of essential ingredients?

The group affected by rising prices but doing nothing about it is likewise in need of education along the lines of domestic economy. Being less clear in their planning, as the pinch becomes more severe they may actually establish practices injurious to the health of their families.

B. Shortages. One-fourth of those interviewed during January and February were willing to state that there would be no significant shortages (Table VIII).

"We have always raised or produced all we need" says a confident Los Angeles hotel porter.

"This is a great and prosperous country. Don't see how we can have any shortages of food. Not unless they take care of everybody else first. Don't think that will happen. Bound to be some other shortages, but we'll get along, and I don't worry about it." Thus the wife of a Kansas City machinist sums up the situation.

1. The group not expecting shortages is only slightly higher among the less well educated (26%) than among those who have been to high school or beyond (18%). Men and women do not differ in the proportions denying the likelihood of shortages (Table IX).

2. Two out of five people (41%) express little concern over the shortages they are likely to experience (Table X).

   a. True to expectation, concern over shortages was expressed by a higher proportion of those concerned over prices than of those not worried about prices, and by a higher proportion of married than of single persons (Table XI).

   b. The more highly educated are more concerned over shortages than those with less education. This perhaps represents greater realism with respect to the economic future among the more educated (Table XI).

   c. The higher income group, composed of those earning above $50 per week, represents an exception to the relationship between concern over prices and concern over shortages. This group, the least concerned over prices (Table II) is the most concerned over shortages (Table XI).

The impact of prices and shortages strikes upper and lower income groups differentially. Lower income groups think in terms of prices, since for them scarcity has always been a matter of price. That is, goods on the merchant's shelf were for them a "shortage" if the price was high. Higher income groups think more in terms of availability than in terms of price. Genuine scarcity, which cannot be met by over-bidding a competing buyer, is a new and somewhat alarming experience.

2. Among those designating particular items for which shortages were anticipated, food was mentioned more frequently than any other item.

   a. In the December survey, twice as many mentioned food as mentioned any other commodity. The proportion among those expecting shortages and citing specific commodities was, in order: food, 48%; metals, 28%; clothing, 21%; rubber, 20% (Table XII).

   b. In January and February, while food continued to be the thing in which a shortage was most commonly anticipated, the rubber shortage had received widespread recognition.

   c. Those specifying food shortages in January and February selected sugar for mention two-thirds of the time (66%), no other group of items being mentioned by more than one person in six: imported foods, 16%; canned foods, 13%; meats, 2%; dairy products, 1% (Table XIII).

3. People's plans for meeting shortages had not yet crystallized. There were about an equal proportion suggesting that they would use substitutes (25%), would do without (24%), or would conserve (17%) (Table XIV).

   a. One-fourth (24%) placed the responsibility for meeting shortages outside themselves, by suggesting that distribution would have to be regulated. Another one-sixth (16%) expressed the optimistic hope that new sources would be discovered to alleviate the temporary shortages.

   As in the case of adjustments to prices, what people are to do about shortages is an occasion for educational effort. How to use substitutes, what to do without, how to conserve, are questions needing answer.

C. Implications of reactions to living costs and shortages. That one-third of the people were not aware of the impact of rising living costs on them at the time of the survey, and one-fourth believed there would be no serious shortages, shows a certain insensitivity of these people as to what is going on about them.

Those little concerned about price rises may be expected to resent government price control as unreasonable interference.

Those not expecting shortages may think of rationing as unnecessary.

These minorities are in need of better understanding of what is happening. They will be educated to an awareness of shortages as the things which they seek to buy disappear from the store shelves. But they may have to better prepared then they now are for that awakening.

II. Does the Individual Understand the Causes, the Implications, and the Consequences of Price Changes, Shortages, Rationing, and Price Control?

To what extent does the individual understand the interrelationships of shortages, living costs, rationing, price controls? Does he know enough about them to understand why hoarding is frowned upon, why compulsory saving is suggested, what inflation means? Is he misinformed, confused, indifferent?

To what extent is it necessary for him to understand the intricacies of economic theory in order to cooperate willingly in the governmental program? There is no simple answer. Surely the "man in the street" cannot be expected to interpret Defense Bonds as a means of reducing his surplus buying power if they are sold to him only as a means of buying guns for soldiers.

His understanding of economic issues must be such, however, as to make policies advocated by the government sensible to him, and not such as to tax his credulity. Reasons against hoarding should go deeper than "It's not patriotic." His reasons must make sense to him, must satisfy him, must not leave him confused and bewildered.

In what follows, some inconsistencies in economic outlook are described as a basis for considering how informational policies may be designed in relation to prevalent misconceptions.

A. Prices and their control

1. The causes of rising living costs are not well understood. Many causes are assigned, with little unanimity and a strong tendency to refer to such motives as profiteering and hoarding as chief causes (Table XV).

   a. "Profiteers" as an explanation of living costs are mentioned by more of the group (36%) than mention any other single cause for higher prices. The profiteer is identified most commonly as the retailer or middleman.

   b. "The war" is cited next to profiteering as the most common reason for rising costs (28%). Of those mentioning the war in this way, many were not at all analytical about it, merely stating that prices were always high in wartime. Other

comments dealt with more specific effects of the war or of policies connected with it, such as government buying for the army, lend-lease shipments abroad.

c. "Hoarding", while mentioned by only 8% of the group, is cited nearly as often as taxes.

d. "Taxes" as a cause for higher living costs is mentioned by only one in ten.

The slight mention of taxes by the group as a whole probably reflects a lack of association between taxes and living costs. While taxes may be something of a burden, they are not complained of in the context of cost of living.*

e. The low emphasis upon the diversion of productive effort away from consumers' goods, the lack of mention of the relationship of surplus buying power to prices, suggest that for many of the population there is no clear understanding of the factors determining prices.

2. Government price control is not well understood.

a. Half of the people do not know of existing government price control; others who do know of it often misunderstand it.**

b. Expectation of further price increases is modified only slightly through belief that the government will control prices. Of those answering the inquiry about what would happen to prices in the next few months, only 4% mentioned the importance of such control (Table V).

3. The effect of excess buying power on inflation is not understood.

a. The buying of Defense Bonds is conceived only as aiding the war effort or as an investment and saving. The buying of Defense Bonds is virtually never conceived, in addition, as an anti-inflationary measure.***

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* The low mention of taxes as a factor in living costs appears again in a survey conducted just after March 15, the deadline for income tax returns. Data from this survey will be reported later.

** Based on information contained in a report from the Polling Division, February 28, 1942.

*** Based on summaries by interviewers.

B. Shortages and Rationing

1. The meaning of rationing is not clear. Especially in the low income group the knowledge of rationing is inadequate, three out of ten knowing nothing about it or being unclear or indifferent (Table XVI).

> Many simply do not know the word, and when the idea is explained to them, they do not fully comprehend, replying with remarks such as "This country produces everything" or "It wouldn't give people enough to eat."
>
> Hoarding is a much more direct answer to the problem of expected shortages--an answer more easily understood. A Negro in Kansas City who knew nothing whatever about rationing, and had no comments when it was explained, said of hoarding: "It's the only thing people can do--to avoid being hit too hard by higher prices."

2. The relationship of rationing to shortages is not fully understood.

   a. It would be expected that those most concerned about shortages would be the ones most likely to approve of rationing. This is not the case; those concerned and unconcerned about shortages approving of rationing in equal proportions (Table XVII).

   b. It would be expected also that those ready for sacrifices in the shortage situation might see the need for rationing, and hence approve more fully than those not thinking in terms of sacrifice. The differences are, however, very slight (Table XVII).

> The most plausible conjecture to explain the failure of relationship between concern over shortages and approval of rationing is that those interviewed make the distinction between shortages as a function of natural economic laws and rationing as a matter of governmental action. Those realistic about the likelihood of shortages may at the same time be uneasy about what they consider governmental interference.

3. The relationship between rationing and prices is not clearly conceived.

   a. The plausible supposition that those expecting considerable price rises should be more likely to approve rationing is not borne out (Table XVIII).

b. The even more plausible expectation that those greatly concerned about the price rise should approve of rationing is not only refuted, but the inverse is found: those more concerned over prices are less likely to approve of rationing (Table XIX).

> Why this inverse relationship? It is probably a reflection of the difference between the groups concerned over prices and the groups concerned over shortages. The low income groups, concerned over prices, are less concerned over shortages. The high income groups, more concerned over shortages, are less concerned about prices. It is probably this negative relationship between concern over shortages and prices which produces the unexpected result that those concerned over prices are not the ones predominantly approving rationing.
>
> Lack of correspondence between views on prices and rationing arises also among those who think in different terms about the one than about the other. Thus a women in Kansas City much affected and greatly concerned over the rise in living costs, says of rationing: "Don't like the idea. Want to be able to go to the store and get all I want. Don't want to be told I can't have but so much."

To the extent that rationing is designed to handle the distribution problem and reduce speculative prices, this inverse relationship between concern over prices and approval of rationing represents a misconception.

4. The consequences of hoarding are not fully understood.

a. The disparity between those admitting "stocking up" (around 10%)* and those reporting knowledge of "stocking up" by others (76%) (Table XX) tends to the interpretation that governmental strictures on hoarding have exerted social pressure against admitting the practice without thereby preventing it.

b. There is a good deal of confusion over the disapproval of hoarding.**

> Many who are against it as unpatriotic say they would do it if they had the money. Others see it as the only way to provide protection for one's family against rising costs.

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* Report of the Division of Surveys, February 9, 1942, page ii.

** Hoarding was discussed more fully in Report Number 10, April 7, 1942.

C. Implications of the misunderstanding of cost of living, prices, rationing, and shortages

To the extent that the individual lacks a clear conception of the inter-relationships of prices, rationing, and shortages, he is likely to place the blame for rising prices upon the "profiteer" alone, or else to take refuge in the fatalistic feeling of the inevitability of high prices during wartime.

Prevailing misconceptions of the ways in which shortages, prices, and rationing are related one to another are shown by several "obvious" relationships which prove to be unfounded:

1. It seems obvious that higher taxes should be felt as significant in increasing the cost of living. This is found not to be so.

2. It seems obvious that expectations of future price changes should be conditioned upon what the government does about it. Only a small minority temper their expectations of price rises, however, in terms of governmental control.

3. It seems obvious that those concerned about shortages should be more in favor of rationing than those not concerned about shortages. This is not found.

4. It seems obvious also that those concerned about the effect on themselves of price rises should be those approving most strongly of rationing. The reverse is found to be true.

When a situation is so poorly understood as to allow prevailing logical inconsistencies in outlook, beliefs tend to be formed on the basis of factors only slightly relevant to the total picture. Such a state of affairs provides a serious obstacle to overcome in producing an appreciation of the necessity for governmental regulation, or for the acceptance of such regulation as it becomes more widely imposed.

III. What does the Individual Conceive as the Proper Role of the Government in Relation to Prices and Rationing?

A. Price control is not only recognized as a legitimate governmental function, but a majority of those interviewed have confidence in the government's ability to control prices.

1. Five out of six believe that the government should control prices; only one in sixteen expresses himself as opposed to government regulation.*

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* Based on report from Polling Division, February 28, 1942.

2. As reported in previous studies, confidence in the ability of the government to fix prices is expressed by a substantial group, 65% in January, increasing to 72% in February (Table XXI). The proportions expressing such confidence have not changed appreciably since last fall.*

   a. Many expressions of confidence in the government's ability to control prices merely reflect confidence in governmental power, including prices along with other things: "In wartime the government can do darn near what it pleases, and that's a good thing because it takes authority to regulate things effectively in wartime." "If the government can force men into the army it can force price ceilings." "Roosevelt is the 'governor' and he can do anything."

   b. Lack of confidence in governmental regulation of prices takes two chief forms.

      One of these is concern because of the complications of the price system. "Prices and demand are pretty complicated things--takes more than government to control them."

      The other is the fear that governmental regulation is politically unwise. "The government can't regulate prices without becoming a dictatorship." "It can't be done under the constitution."

B. Rationing is likewise approved as something for the government to do. Three-fourths approve, while disapproval is expressed by one in ten (Table XXII).

   1. The proportion favorable to rationing increased slightly among those interviewed from January (71%) to February (76%).

   2. Approval of rationing was more common among the better educated (82%) than among the less well educated (70%) (Table XXIII).

   3. As might be expected, a greater number of those confident in the ability of the government to fix prices also approve of rationing than among those lacking in this confidence (Table XXIV).

C. Tire rationing, as illustrative of something under way at the time of interviewing, shows approval on the part of those commenting, but there was much indifference and ignorance.

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* Division of Program Surveys, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Report of October 23, 1941, page 3, states: "Three-fourths favor some sort of governmental control over prices."

1. Almost half (48%) of those commenting on the idea of tire rationing expressed their approval of the idea, with only a few (4%) disapproving. But the rest, knowing about and commenting on it, were either indifferent or had not made up their minds (Table XXV).

2. Those whose comments were about the administration of the tire rationing program showed about the same proportion approving (45%), but a slightly larger group (16%) disapproving (Table XXV).

   Reasons for disapproval of rationing fell chiefly into two groups, those confused about how the program worked and therefore complaining about features not present, and those emphasizing that the idea was all right but there were injustices in its administration.

   As illustrative of the first kind of argument: "It's crazy. People who haven't money can't buy tires and those who have money can get them."

   As an illustration of approval, with caution against injustice: "The working class of people if they have to drive to work should be allowed to buy tires. It's all right otherwise."

D. Implications of price control and rationing attitudes

There appears to be a widespread readiness for and even demand for increasing government control over prices and over shortages through rationing. Those who hold back do so for one of several reasons:

1. Economic laws are thought to be too complicated for government to control.

2. Too much government control is thought to be a threat to democracy.

3. There is some fear of injustice in administering the program.

IV. In What Ways Can the Government Most Effectively Achieve the Desired Appreciation and Understanding of Rationing, Price Control, and Other Forms of Regulation?

A. There is in the American people an enormous potential of willingness for sacrifice and readiness to cooperate. These are coupled with a high degree of governmental and administrative prestige. Together these provide the way for the government to achieve its domestic needs in the wartime situation.

B. The principal requirement for continued success in government action is that the problems and their solutions be clarified for the people.

The following topics appear to be in need of such clarification.

1. Causes of rising living costs (See page 5).

2. Nature of governmental price control (See page 6).

3. Reasons for shortages and the acuteness of the shortage situation (See page 3).

4. The nature and significance of rationing (See page 7).

5. The relation of rationing to shortages and prices (See page 7).

6. The relation of hoarding to shortages and prices (See page 8).

7. The interrelationship between wages and prices to the consumer.

8. The interaction of farm prices and retail prices in the city.

9. Defense Bonds and other savings in relation to present and future purchasing power, and in relation to inflation (See page 6).

APPENDIX A

QUOTATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS

QUOTATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS

Kansas City

An attractive young woman of 21, stenographer in a wholesale clothing firm, was interviewed while at luncheon in a restaurant near her work. The following quotations represent her opinions about the cost of living and shortages.

Rise in cost of living. "We've all noticed it a good deal. I buy the groceries at home and I think that is the thing we notice most. Clothing is some higher. We aren't yet making changes in the food we eat because our income has improved and we haven't had to.

"The main cause of rising living costs is profiteering - made possible by the panic of buyers. Merchants know people will pay more.

"They are going to do something about rising costs, aren't they - price ceilings put on. But prices may go up in spite of such ceilings. I believe the people will be concerned enough to cooperate with the government to help it enforce price control so it will work. Clothing people are aware that the public may boycott if prices go too high."

Shortages and rationing. "There will probably be shortages in cotton because it's used in gunpowder; woolens are going to the army; tuna fish, salmon, pineapple - sugar, of course; things that are imported.

"Most of it is really due to hoarding; stopping hoarding would help. Many people are stocking up - lots by people who have the money - the rest of us have to get along. They buy canned goods and shoes - afraid of a leather shortage. It isn't right because some will have more than they really need - others will be short.

"I don't like the idea of rationing, -- hate to think of people standing in line for food - babies waiting for milk - too much like Europe - but maybe the best thing so there'll be enough for people."

San Francisco

A 45-year old driller working in a San Francisco shipyard expressed his views freely.

Rise in cost of living. "Everything has gone up - especially meat. We aren't making much change in food, but I am drinking cheaper liquor.

"Anytime you see wages go up, you see everything goes up with it. Just as much stuff as there ever was. I expect to see prices go sky-high. Then we won't be able to buy some things.

"Yes, the government could keep prices from going too high. Have to go through Congress and put prices on things. If they do that, though, they will also cut wages."

Shortages and rationing. "Shortages are unlikely in the U. S. if they don't load it on boats and sink it as Hoover did in the last war to raise prices. Whatever is done about shortages has got to be done by the government. They can declare anything.

"No, I don't think many people are stocking up--everybody who is working is making money and they don't worry when they are making money. The public in general cannot stock up. The government ought to take care of that--it's better for the government to stock things up in warehouses.

"I am against rationing. You are entitled to get what you work for. There's no shortages and no need for this."

Detroit

The 60-year old wife of a moulder in a defense plant was interviewed in her home, a large, well-furnished house on a corner in Highland Park.

Rise in cost of living. "There are just the two of us. I go to a store that has raised very little, but there has been quite a rise in meat prices. Bread has gone up a cent or two. Everything is up some. California oranges are outrageously high.

"I won't cut down the quality of our food because that is what makes us or breaks us. If the price of milk goes up and helps the farmer I don't mind.

"I think the higher wage is what is the cause of higher prices. Let Ford raise his wages 5 cents an hour and living will go up ten percent. Even when there is no other reason for it than that they can get it.

"I don't believe in the government sticking their nose into those price things. I believe when the government sticks their nose in there's too much dictatorship. We could bring prices down by refusing to buy for a week or two. The paying public controls the prices. The public is what causes these things. I don't believe the government could really... Of course, I'm not educated. When something goes too high I try to look for something else."

Shortages and rationing. "I just cannot see rationing...it may be necessary ...but personally I don't like to be told what I can do and what I cannot. I do believe we should all be a law unto ourselves in respect to rationing. That is too much like dictatorship. We are not in Europe... we are in the U. S. and shouldn't put up with such poppycock ideas. Of course if it came to it I would take it just like anyone else.

"I don't think there is any reason in the world for a shortage. We have acres and acres that isn't cultivated or fertilized. We have millions of barrels of oil. Why should we be short of gasoline? To me it is a farce to talk about those things. I know of 50 oil wells that are capped because of over-production. We are the most blessed nation in the world. If we count our blessings...If there is a shortage, people brought it on themselves by hoarding.

"I know there is a number of people hoarded sugar. The grocery stores told me that. Naturally that is pretty good information. I haven't stored a pound because I know I can get what I want and if not can use something else. Flour is something I also hear they are hoarding, but we were short in the last war and it did us no physical harm, so why worry?

"People hoard from fear and lack of faith. These are the worst enemies of mankind. I don't approve of hoarding. I believe in living and let the other fellow live. I am satisfied to take my chance. If you take it all, how can the other fellow live?"

~~Secret~~

April 22, 1942

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SUMMARY

The President continues to hold the confidence of about six-sevenths of the American people. Distrust of him centers among people on the top economic levels. The great weight of his support comes from wage earners.

A similar relationship is apparent between economic status and approval of Congress' part in the war effort.

People tend to be more critical of the civilian war agencies than of the armed forces. In general, however, they accord moderate approval to those in charge of all the major segments of the war effort.

Although people who assert that they themselves take the war seriously are prone to regard their fellow-citizens as deplorably complacent, they are much less inclined to attribute complacency to official Washington.

About one-half the people of the country feel dissatisfied with the quantity of the news they are receiving about the progress of the war. Twice as many feel that they are getting too much news as feel that they are not getting enough.

Over one-third of the people feel that war news is given a favorable color; approximately one-twelfth believe it makes things look worse than they actually are. Those who think the news rose-colored tend to blame the Government, while those who consider it needlessly dark tend to hold the press responsible.

Seventy-two per cent of the public feel confident that the Government can control inflation, but the consequences of hoarding and the nature of rationing and price control do not appear to be fully understood.

* * *

Despite the generous contributions made by organized labor to the war effort, there is widespread distrust of labor leaders. The press has tended to isolate labor from the general public, and its attacks have promoted deep resentment in labor's ranks. Labor publications have recently put their emphasis on the excessive profits and iniquities of industrialists, instead of upon the need for sacrifice by workers.

The public in general appears to be uninformed and confused about labor problems.

The indications are that John L. Lewis remains a staunch isolationist. Though the rank and file appear to be out of sympathy with him now, he constitutes a potential rallying point for defeatist tendencies in the labor movement.

CONFIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The President

The President of the United States continues to hold the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the American people. Not all of these people endorse him without qualification. But they have trust in him and feel, on the whole, that he is conducting the immensely difficult problems of his office about as well as they could reasonably expect.

A Gallup poll published in the latter part of March showed the following responses to the question, "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling his job as President today:

Approve	78 per cent
Disapprove	13 per cent
Undecided	9 per cent

These figures show a slight decrease in endorsement of the President from January, when Gallup found an 84 per cent approval in response to the same question.

A poll conducted for the forthcoming issue of Fortune Magazine by Elmo Roper discloses an even greater majority of Americans endorsing the President's behavior. These people are divided about equally into two groups. One group, amounting to 42 per cent of the whole population, expressed a belief that "Roosevelt is the best possible man to have as President in times like these". Another group, amounting to 44 per cent of all the people, indicated that

the following assessment of the President came closest to their own views: "Roosevelt has made some mistakes but, on the whole, he is doing a pretty good job".

There remains a small minority of the American people, 11 per cent, who are essentially dissatisfied with President Roosevelt's conduct of the war. Six per cent of these say that "While he has done some good things, we might be better off if someone else were President now". And another five per cent go so far as to assert that "It is a bad thing for the country that Roosevelt ever became President".

There is an extremely significant relation between endorsement of the President and economic level. The highest degree of enthusiasm for him was manifested by Negroes. And white people on the lowest economic plane were next in their approbation; 52 per cent of them regarded him as the best possible man and an additional 39 per cent felt that he is doing a good job on the whole. Only six per cent in this group were inclined to reject his leadership.

But a very contrary picture is presented by the group on the top economic level. These people showed the least enthusiasm for Mr. Roosevelt; only 18 per cent of them cataloged him as the best possible man to have in the White House. Nevertheless, they were high in their partial approval; 52 per cent acknowledged that, all things considered, he is doing a pretty good job.

Conversely, of course, the largest element of dissatisfaction with Mr. Roosevelt was found in this category. Among those most

privileged economically, 15 per cent felt that another President might be preferable at this time, and 12 per cent condemned him outright.

This group on the top rung of the economic ladder is numerically only a minor segment, 6.3 per cent, of the population. Its influence, however, is extensive and the significance of its attitudes should not be minimized. These people appear to be, in large measure, the core of the anti-Roosevelt sentiment during the last two national elections.

An identical tendency is disclosed when rejection of the President's leadership is broken down on the basis of occupation. The great body of support for Mr. Roosevelt, as the following table indicates, comes from wage earners, as distinguished from wage payers:

	Total	Economic Status					Occupation			
		A	B	C	D	Negro	Exec.	Farmer	White Collar	Factory Worker
Roosevelt is the best possible man to have as President in times like these	42	18	32	41	52	66	28	35	39	54
Roosevelt has made some mistakes, but on the whole he is doing a pretty good job	44	52	50	47	39	23	48	50	50	41
		70	82	88	91	89	76	85	89	95

	Total	Economic Status					Occupation			
		A	B	C	D	Negro	Exec.	Farmer	White Collar	Factory Worker
While Roosevelt has done some good things, we might be better off if someone else were President now	6	15	9	6	4	1	11	8	5	2
It is a bad thing for the country that Roosevelt ever became President	5	12	8	4	2	1	11	6	4	3
		27	17	10	6	2	22	14	9	5
Don't know	3	3	1	2	3	9	2	1	2	

The Congress

A very similar relationship is observable between economic status and approval of the behavior of Congress in the war effort. Again, Negroes accord the highest measure of commendation; 50 per cent of the group feel that Congress is doing a good job in helping the United States to win the war. Among white persons on the lowest economic plane, 40 per cent hold this view. Only 19 per cent of the people who are economically most privileged give Congress this full measure of endorsement.

Conversely, the people who give the behavior of Congress a "poor" rating divide as follows: among Negroes, seven per cent; among poor whites, eight per cent; and among people of top income, 27 per cent.

The War Agencies

In assessing the job done by those in charge of the major sections of the war effort, people are more prone to grant enthusiastic approval to the armed forces than to civilian bodies. The Fortune poll shows the highest endorsement of those entrusted with command of our military operations; 67 per cent of the nationwide sample felt that a good job is being done in this sphere. In regard to the conduct of our naval operations, 58 per cent expressed hearty endorsement.

But, comparatively, only 48 per cent felt that civilian defense was being well handled. 46 per cent applauded the conduct of the weapons production program and 48 per cent were cordial in their approval of those charged with protecting our war industries and projects.

It seems likely that the higher approval given to military and naval authorities is attributable, in some part, to a sense of noblesse oblige; people are prone to feel that the men in the armed services who are fighting and dying merit a vote of confidence. And the glamor surrounding General MacArthur no doubt helps to account for the enthusiasm. Moreover, fewer people feel competent to criticize the conduct of the military and naval forces.

The work on the home front, on the other hand, is much more easy to observe and criticize. Defects in civilian defense precautions or lags in the production program are customary targets for the criticism of laymen. Indeed, a feeling of frustration

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respecting the fighting services is likely to promote criticism of the civilian officials at home.

Among those critical of the conduct of civilian defense activities and of the handling of home protection, there is once more the previously noted relationship with economic status; those on the top economic level tend to be more critical, while those less privileged give a greater measure of endorsement. This relationship is somewhat less apparent among the people approving or disapproving the leadership in charge of the armed services and of the production program.

Attitudes Toward Washington

The Fortune poll reveals a tendency among Americans to feel that their fellow-countrymen are somewhat complacent about the war. It is noteworthy, however, that this feeling does not apply with anything like the same force to the Government in Washington. People who assert that they themselves take the war seriously are only about one-third as likely to attribute a complacent attitude to Washington as they are to consider that the country, as a whole, is complacent.

Confidence in News

About one-half of the people in the United States feel satisfied with the quantity of news they are receiving about the progress of the war. But the balance of the public expresses some measure of dissatisfaction on this score.

It is significant that the number of persons who feel that they are getting too much war news is roughly twice as great as

those who complain of too little such information. Again, as the Fortune poll data indicate, there is a relationship between these attitudes and economic status. Those on the higher economic levels tend to complain more about a dearth of news and slightly less about an excess than do those lower down on the economic ladder.

There is also a rather strong feeling that war news is somewhat colored. About two-fifths of the public regard the information they are receiving about the progress of the war as reasonably accurate. But about 36 per cent of the people feel that it is colored to give a favorable cast to events; and eight per cent believe that the news is presented in such a way as to make things seem worse than they actually are.

The people who feel that they are receiving too little news are the ones most prone to believe that it is rose-colored; 64 per cent of this group make such a complaint. This feeling is strong also among those charging a surfeit of news, 46 per cent of these people asserting that it is presented in a more favorable light than the facts warrant; at the same time 14 per cent of these people, a higher percentage than in any other group, feel that things are not as bad as the news makes them seem. Even among those who think that they are getting about the right amount of news, slightly more than one-quarter consider it favorably tinctured, while five per cent regard its bias as too dark.

The blame for coloration of the news is divided fairly equally

between the Government and the press. Newspapers and radio broadcasters are held responsible by 34 per cent of the public, while 39 per cent attribute the distortion to the Government; an additional 18 per cent feel that the guilt must be divided between the two.

In general, those who regard the news as rose-colored tend to put the blame upon the Government; but those who feel that the coloration is on the other side of the spectrum are more inclined to hold the press responsible. Indeed, one-half of the people who feel that the news is made to seem worse than it actually is blame this fact upon their information channels, while only 26 per cent call the Government to account on this score; 13 per cent blame press and Government equally.

Conversely, among the people feeling that the news presents an unduly optimistic picture of events, 41 per cent blame the Government, 31 per cent the press, and 20 per cent place the blame on both.

Rationing and Price Control

Divisionist newspapers have inaugurated a campaign for the abandonment of present plans for rationing and price control, "in favor of the law of supply and demand". They are endeavoring to create the impression that such measures are "totalitarian", in line with their consistent effort to depict the federal Government as totalitarian in nature.

Every available index to public opinion demonstrates that this view is not subscribed to by more than a small minority of the

American people.

A recent poll conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence shows that 73 per cent of the public feel that the Government should now ration all materials on which shortages may develop and 84 per cent believe that, in general, the Government should undertake the regulation of prices. These figures are closely confirmed by results obtained in response to similar questions posed in Gallup polls and by intensive surveys conducted by this Bureau.

Shortly after passage of a price, wage and salary control law in Canada, Gallup interviewers asked a Canadian cross-section if they approved or disapproved of the new law. Unfortunately, for comparative analysis, the number of persons expressing no opinion was not reported. Of those who did express an opinion, however, 76 per cent said they approved and 24 per cent expressed disapproval. Housewives voted 81 per cent in favor to 19 per cent opposed; farmers were 71 per cent in favor, 29 per cent opposed; wage earners 76 per cent in favor, 24 per cent opposed. Apparently the bugbear of totalitarianism has not frightened most Canadians.

It is true that the minority which disapproves of price control and rationing does so, in part, because it fears governmental interference in private affairs; more frequently the objection given to such measures is that they are impracticable, too complicated for the Government to handle. Nevertheless, polling indicates that 72 per cent of the public are confident that the Government can effectively control prices.

Moreover, the consequences of hoarding do not appear to be fully appreciated. There now appears to be a rather widespread recognition that "stocking up" is considered undesirable by the Government; consequently, there is a strong tendency on the part of individuals to deny that they have engaged in this practice, although they are prone to believe that their neighbors have done so. People need a clearer explanation of the effects of hoarding.

In general, it may be said that a very large majority of the American public looks to its Government for the protection of its economic well-being, despite its failure to understand clearly the means by which this can be best accomplished. There appears to be also a general willingness, if not an actual eagerness, to embrace the strictures which Government regulation of prices and of scarce materials involves.

Recommendations

It is doubtful that the confidence of the general public in President Roosevelt can be advanced greatly beyond its present level. The core of hostility to him as a national leader resides in the small, well-to-do minority of the public. And this hostility, which has been of long duration, derives, for the most part, from the social philosophy of the New Deal which he has championed.

It seems unlikely that much can be done to elicit the enthusiasm of this small minority save by measures which would antagonize the great majority supporting the President. The influence of this minority, which controls a number of the media of information, must

be consistently counteracted by an information program which will enable the majority to understand the purposes and policies of their Government.

The prime demand which the American public seems to make of its chosen leadership is forthright, affirmative action. Particularly in the sphere of economics, the public welcomes the initiation of a comprehensive and effective program to distribute the burdens of the war equitably and to insure protection against the disaster of inflation.

But announcement of such a program should be supplemented by extensive informational efforts. There is in the American people an enormous potential of willingness to sacrifice and to cooperate. Given an understanding of the reasons for the imposition of controls upon their normal ways of living, they can be counted upon to respond readily and cheerfully.

The information program should be couched in something more than inspirational terms. What appears to be needed at the present time is a widespread system of adult education in the rudiments of economics. The causes of increased prices and of shortages, the nature of Government price control and rationing procedure and the inter-relationship between wages, prices and hoarding require careful and painstaking explanation.

AMERICAN LABOR AND THE WAR

Labor Participation

It seems a matter of simple and self-evident fact that organized labor today is, in the main, supporting the war effort with an energy and devotion unsurpassed, and perhaps unequalled, by any other segment of the American public. Most of the leaders of organized labor have sought zealously to rally their followers to the shouldering of a generous share of the war burden.

Labor unions have actively promoted the purchase of defense savings bonds: they have bought them as groups and have pressed the sale of them among their individual members. They have developed state and local "Production For Victory" programs. Some of them have utilized overtime pay to buy submarines or planes as a special contribution to the armed forces. Many of them have staged campaigns to provide entertainment, dances, tobacco, books and other benefits for the men in the Army and Navy.

If industrial workers have taken less than their proportionate part in civilian defense activities, air raid warden work and first-aid classes, it is because of a strong feeling among them that their jobs are a direct contribution to the war effort. A number of unions have given generously to British, Chinese and Russian war relief funds. They have promoted conservation programs. And they have undertaken a good deal of educational work among their members to further an understanding of the need for

all these efforts.

Moreover, some of the labor union leaders were in the forefront of the drive to promote a genuine conversion of industry to the war program. More clearly than any other single element in the population, they appear to have recognized the need for all-out production and the total mobilization of the Nation's human and material resources. And they have implemented this recognition, in the main, by eschewing strikes in war industries.

Hostility to Labor

Despite the extent and variety of these contributions, however, there has grown among the American people a rather strong feeling that organized labor as such has failed to do all that it could for the promotion of victory. And this feeling manifests itself especially in a distrust of labor leaders -- a belief that they have seriously impeded the war effort.

These views may stem in part from the notoriety achieved in recent years by certain unscrupulous figures, such as Bioff, Scalise and other under-world characters who forged their way into controlling positions in the labor movement and whose activities have been widely publicized. It may also be attributable, in some measure, to the known fact that Communists exercised an important influence in a number of labor organizations. Labor's use of its strength in occasional strikes which retarded production has also evoked serious popular resentment.

In a very real sense, however, American newspapers must be

held responsible for much of the hostility toward labor which is now current throughout the United States. The press has tended to isolate labor from the general public and to identify it as a group greedy in the pursuit of its special interests. Consistently and almost uniformly, the conflicts between labor and management have been represented in newspaper accounts as incited by labor, with little acknowledgment that the intransigence of management may have shared in the responsibility.

In their attitudes toward labor unions, newspapers have made it abundantly clear that they are business enterprises and that their publishers, not unnaturally, possess a managerial point of view. With little recognition of the economic and symbolic importance to labor of such principles as the 40-hour week and the closed shop, newspapers have consistently attacked these as unmitigated and unwarranted impediments to production.

Although the press barrage against labor, exhausted apparently by its own rancor, has abated somewhat during the past week, it has already promoted deep resentment in labor's ranks. This resentment has manifested itself in some waning of labor's enthusiasm for the common cause and has turned the attention of unions toward a domestic struggle against business management. Labor publications suddenly put their emphasis on the excessive profits and iniquities of industrialists, instead of upon the need for sacrifices by workers; this counterattack has been tempered during the past few days, however, with abatement of the press assault on the 40-hour week.

The nature of public opinion respecting labor and labor leaders was reflected in a poll conducted during the first half of March by the Bureau of Intelligence. The Bureau asked a nationwide sample, "Do you feel that, as a whole, the people in charge of factories -- the executives -- are doing all they could do right now to help win the war?" And the same question was asked about workers in the factories, about labor leaders and about farmers. The following table shows the distribution of responses:

	People in charge of factories	Workers	Labor Leaders	Farmers
Doing all they could	59%	57%	25%	67%
Not doing all they could	26	32	55	14
Don't know and no answer	15	11	20	19

A majority of the public appears to be satisfied with the efforts of each of these groups -- with the glaring exception of the labor leaders.

An examination of the views held by the various elements involved in this question reveals that even workers themselves are highly dissatisfied with the behavior of the men who head their unions. Among workers, only 36 per cent felt that labor leaders were doing all they could to help win the war; 44 per cent took a contrary view.

Only one-fourth of the unemployed in the sample expressed

satisfaction with the contribution made by labor leaders; nearly one-half of this group agreed that they are not doing all they could. A full one-half of the farmers were dissatisfied with the behavior of labor leaders and 70 per cent of the white collar workers expressed similar dissatisfaction.

Misconceptions About Labor

Antipathy toward labor leaders on the part of the general public is significantly colored by an extremely widespread confusion concerning labor problems. Again newspapers must be held partially accountable for this confusion. In regard to the 40-hour week, for example, there was a marked tendency among them to represent the Wage and Hour Law as exercising a rigid limitation upon working time; the flexibility of the law and the fact that employees of war industries worked considerably in excess 40 hours weekly seemed to be deliberately ignored.

A public opinion poll conducted by Elmo Roper and published in a recent issue of Fortune Magazine shows that the American people, workers included, know relatively little about unions. When asked to define the term "open shop", 30 per cent of the public gave a "Don't know" response; among the families of union members, 25 per cent were in this category. And nine per cent of the general public gave incorrect answers.

When asked to define the term "closed shop", 28 per cent of the public said they didn't know -- an ignorance manifested by 22 per cent of union families. And 11 per cent of the national

total responded incorrectly.

The public also revealed a rather surprising degree of ignorance respecting leadership of the national labor associations. The following table shows the answers given to the simple query, "Who is President of the A.F. of L.? Of the C.I.O.?"

A.F. of L.:	Green	43.6%	C.I.O.:	Murray	23.8%
	Lewis	2.6		Lewis	32.9
	Murray	1.0		Green	1.4
	Other	1.0		Other	2.0
	Don't know	51.8		Don't know	39.9

It is in this context of confusion and ignorance that the bitter debate over labor legislation is carried on by newspapers and employers' organizations. Popular attitudes have been formulated to a very large extent on a purely emotional basis.

John L. Lewis

Newspapers have tended, perhaps deliberately, to personify labor leaders in the form of an individual demon, John L. Lewis. More than any other single figure in the labor movement, Lewis today embodies the qualities which appear to evoke popular suspicion and enmity.

The Lewis family occupies a peculiar position in relation to organized labor and to the war. For a number of years, John L. Lewis has stood for a policy of aggressive utilization of labor's own economic strength. He not only believes that labor cannot rely

upon this Government, or any Government, for the advancement of its interests, but he also opposes any concessions to the Government on account of the war emergency.

This is a philosophy with which the rank and file of labor appears to be out of sympathy at the present time. But there may be very much greater receptivity to it in the future, if workers become disgruntled by the hardships which the war occasions or in the event that they become infected by war weariness and defeatism. Under such circumstances, John Lewis might well hope to recapture the leadership of the American labor movement as an advocate who appears to subordinate all other considerations to its special interests.

Although John L. Lewis, since December 7, has indulged in no public criticism of American participation in the war, all indications point to the conclusion that he remains a staunch isolationist. He has worked consistently behind the scenes to undermine the power of the pro-Administration labor leaders, and in particular of Philip Murray who succeeded him as president of the CIO. It is generally accepted by those who know him that Lewis cherishes a bitter personal antipathy for President Roosevelt.

Lewis' strength stems mainly from the powerful United Mine Workers Union which reputedly has a treasury of $5,000,000. In addition, he exercises control through his daughter, Kathryn, who is its Secretary-Treasurer over district #50 of the United Mine Workers, which was originally formed to organize workers in the

chemical industries and which now threatens to become a separate federation reaching into a number of fields. Presumably he can count also upon the support of the United Construction Workers Union, which is headed by his brother, Denny Lewis. The membership of these Lewis unions is estimated to be between 800,000 and 850,000.

District #50 has recently increased its staff of organizers and is militantly seeking to unionize public utilities and agricultural workers. It has taken under its wing recently the Dairy Farmers Union, claiming a membership of 7,000 in Michigan and 22,000 in New York. The Department of Agriculture has estimated the actual membership of this organization in Michigan at no more than 3,500 and in New York State at about 7,500.

Though not in itself important, the Dairy Farmers Union appears already to have stirred a bitter division among farmers, some of whom have banded together in a counter-movement called Free Farmers Inc., which proposes to indemnify individual owners against loss from the organizing efforts of the Dairy Farmers Union. Free Farmers Inc., is a strongly anti-labor group.

Not only among farmers, but also among other segments of the population, John L. Lewis serves as a pretext for violent attacks against labor legislation. The very fact that he stands as a target for these anti-labor demands may regain for him his former position as the apostle of organized workers should events divert their present confidence in President Roosevelt and his Administration.

John L. Lewis is essentially a rival of the President of the United States for the leadership of the American labor movement. His brother, Denny, recognized this fact as long ago as October 1940, when the United Construction Workers News made the following editorial comment on John Lewis' endorsement of Wendell Willkie: "John L. Lewis has said that he would step aside as leader of the CIO if Roosevelt were elected. This means that the basic issue in this election is not Roosevelt or Willkie, but Roosevelt or Lewis. The only question presented to any CIO member is whether he prefers Roosevelt to Lewis. The CIO cannot have both; it must choose."

Recommendations

To counteract Lewis' ambition -- an ambition which can become an important element in a general defeatist campaign -- the Administration must retain the confidence of trade union leaders and of the rank and file of labor. The maintenance of existing legislation on which labor gains have been based in recent years is essential to this confidence. Demands for restrictive labor legislation must be effectively combatted by the Administration.

Perhaps the best means of allaying the current popular antipathy to labor is to give wider publicity to the contributions which have been made by labor organizations to the war effort. Radio can be used effectively toward this end, if newspapers, as is to be expected, decline to promote labor's cause.

Efforts should be made to promote understanding of the Wage-Hour

Law. The 40-hour week should be shown as merely a basis for determining the compensation of workers. To this end, it might prove extremely useful to foster an abandonment of the phrase "40-hour week" in favor of some term such as "basic work week".

An additional elementary means of retaining confidence on the part of workers is to enact an excess profits tax which will genuinely carry out the President's promise that no new millionaires are to be created out of the national necessity. Wage earners are showing a good deal of bitterness over stories such as that recently publicized about the Jack and Heintz Company in Cleveland; if they are to be temperate in their demands for pay increases, they need to know that their bosses will not be enriched by this self-restraint.

Finally, the confidence of workers would be immeasurably enhanced if their representatives were given a larger share in the determination of war production policies. Labor is intimately affected by the conversion of industry and demands some influence in determining the ways in which it shall be accomplished.

Fortune Survey data used in this report are furnished to the Bureau of Intelligence in advance of publication with the understanding that they will be treated as "Secret" material until publication May 1.

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

file personal

FSF
OWI

May 2, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,

R. Keith Kane

R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

S e c r e t

April 29, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 21

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

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SUMMARY

Several indications point to the conclusion that Americans are mentally prepared for all-out war, both on the fighting fronts and at home.

Three-quarters of them can be rated as having a real sense of urgency about the war. They see it as a job which will require time and effort; many of them do not feel that their fellow citizens take the war seriously enough -- a view which indicates seriousness on the part of the individual expressing it.

Drastic measures on the home front are approved by overwhelming majorities: rationing universally, requiring women and men beyond military age to take up war work, confiscating factories of uncooperative owners, requiring everyone to carry identification cards.

On fighting fronts, Americans tend to regard the war as indivisible and make no vital distinction between Germany and Japan as enemies. But prevailing opinion at present is that our strength should be concentrated first on defeating the Japanese.

Only 7% would like to concentrate our aviation for protection at home. But 48% want to use the air force offensively in the Far Pacific, 17% in Europe.

Moreover, Americans are ready to wage all-out war by whatever means may be necessary to destroy the enemy: all-out bombing, even if it means retaliation on our own cities, sinking enemy ships without warning wherever we can hit them, blockading and starving, matching the enemy in ruthlessness -- even using gas if the enemy uses it first.

AMERICANS APPRAISE THE WAR

Sense of Urgency

It is a common allegation that Americans view the war complacently. The President of the United States himself has denied this. So, too, have innumerable newspaper editorials. But individual Americans are inclined to feel that the bulk of their fellow-citizens do not fully recognize the seriousness of the situation which confronts them.

Complacency is a term not susceptible of easy definition. Nor is it an attitude which lends itself readily to measurement by public opinion sampling. It is confused often with optimism. And simple confidence that the United States will ultimately triumph may be mistaken for a failure to appreciate the urgency of contemporary events.

The Bureau of Intelligence has sought by several means to determine the degree to which Americans recognize the gravity of the dangers facing them. Perhaps the most elementary approach to the problem is contained in a question posed to a nationwide sample during the first half of March: "In general, do you feel that the people in this country are taking the war seriously enough?"

It is interesting that nearly two-thirds of the people interviewed gave a negative answer to this question. The very prevalence of this view suggests the possibility that it is mistaken. For these two-thirds apparently themselves regard the war with a

considerable degree of seriousness.

Persons who had received at least some high school education were considerably more prone than others to feel dissatisfaction with the attitude of the country as a whole; 69 per cent of them, as compared with 54 per cent of those who had less formal schooling, answered the question negatively.

Similarly, persons on the prosperous or average economic levels were more prone to be critical of their fellow-citizens than were poor people; 69 per cent of the prosperous and a like percentage of the average felt that the war is not being taken seriously enough, while only 49 per cent of the poor held this view.

Some indication of the gravity with which people regard the war may be found in their estimates as to its duration. Roughly, half of the American public seems to feel that the war will last for two years or more.

People who believe that the war will last for more than two years are, as might be expected, more prone to feel that the public as a whole fails to take the situation seriously enough than are those who believe we can win in two years or less.

The Bureau of Intelligence tried to get at the problem from another angle by asking people to pick one of four choices in response to the following question: "Which of these comes closest to the way you feel the war with Japan is going"?

One per cent said, "We have practically licked them already."

Forty-six per cent said, "It may take a little time, but we

cannot lose."

Forty-seven per cent said, "If we don't work harder, we won't lick them at all."

Two per cent said, "It looks like it's too late -- it would take a miracle to overcome the losses we have already had."

Four per cent gave answers which were not ascertainable.

It seems clear that the 47 per cent who believe that we are in danger of losing the war unless we work harder may be freed from the charge of complacency. And it is equally plain that real complacency must be attributed to the one per cent who say that we have practically licked the Japanese already; just as obviously, the two per cent who declare that we have already lost the war can be considered outright defeatists.

But the degree of urgency about the war felt by the balance of the public can be better determined by analyzing their answers to this question in terms of their views as to the seriousness with which the public as a whole regards the war. By a process of cross tabulation, we find that 58 per cent of these people (those who feel certain that we will win the war in time) believe that their fellow-countrymen are not taking the situation seriously enough. This group, therefore, may properly be added to the 47 per cent already found to have a genuine sense of urgency. Together, they comprise nearly three-quarters of the American public.

There remains a group amounting to slightly less than one-quarter of the whole population (38 per cent of those who believe

that we are certain to win in time) who also believe that their fellow-citizens are alive to the seriousness of the situation. Some of these people may be considered complacent; but some of them, undoubtedly, are merely confident, or perhaps over-optimistic, about the outcome. These are attitudes which do not necessarily preclude a real sense of urgency.

A great many remedies are offered by people to correct the complacency which they allege to exist among their fellow-countrymen. These range all the way from heavier taxation, more air raid alarms and more intensive war activities to occasional suggestions that a few bombs be dropped here and there as a means of shocking people into an awareness of the war's gravity.

A number of persons interviewed made recommendations concerning information policy. The general tenor of their ideas was that the Government should exercise greater candor in the release of news; they favor wider publicity for casualties and strategic reverses. Others urge increased publicity about the progress of the war, the nature of the enemy and the magnitude of the job ahead of us.

The specific recommendation which had most adherence among those charging the country with complacency was that rationing be extended to bring a sense of the war's meaning into the daily lives of the people. Three-fourths of the whole American public, indeed, urges that rationing of all scarce materials be undertaken by the Government at once -- not merely to bring the war's meaning home to their fellow-citizens, but because they themselves feel that

the gravity of the situation compels such a step. It may reasonably be argued that such an attitude connotes some real appreciation of contemporary realities.

But rationing is only one of a series of drastic measures which large portions of the American public desire to have their Government undertake at this time. The Fortune poll for May discloses the following division of responses to the question, "Which of these things do you think the Government should do now and which do you think would be going too far?"

	Do now	Going too far	Don't know
a. Register all men not in the army for work in defense industries wherever they are needed	79	14	7
b. Make all women without jobs give 3 or 4 hours a week to war work activities according to their abilities (unless they have young children)	75	19	6
c. Register all able bodied women for possible full-time jobs in war work according to their abilities (unless they have young children)	68	24	7
d. Strictly ration all foods or materials that might become scarce	77	16	7
e. Take over and run any factories that can make war materials if the owners refuse to do it themselves	88	6	6
f. Make men who strike on defense work join either the army or navy	73	17	10

	Do now	Going too far	Don't know
g. Require everyone to be fingerprinted and carry identification papers at all times	72	21	7
h. Require everyone who makes overtime pay or gets an increase in salary to buy defense bonds with it	46	46	8

The responses tabulated above are a good indication that most Americans have a considerable sense of urgency about the war. At least they take it seriously enough to advocate a drastic regimentation of their lives.

It seems highly significant that, in regard to most of these proposals, the largest measure of support came from elements in the population most likely to be affected by their adoption. Men were even more prone than were women, for example, to approve the first choice -- register all men not in the Army for work in defense industries wherever they are needed. And the age group most concerned, 35 to 49, was more in favor of this measure than either younger or older people.

Conversely, compulsory war work for jobless women was considerably more favored by the women themselves than by men. And again, younger people supported this in greater number than the middle-aged or elderly.

In like fashion, women gave greater support than men to the third option -- registration of all able-bodied women for possible full-time war work.

In regard to the recommendation that the Government should take over factories to make war materials when owners themselves refused to do so, executives were 90 per cent in favor and only nine per cent opposed as compared with factory workers, who were 91 per cent in favor and five per cent opposed. Factory workers, however, were somewhat less enthusiastic about the idea of compelling war industry strikers to join the Army or Navy; they endorsed this proposal by only 61 per cent, as compared with 74 per cent of the executives. Farmers constitute the group advocating this measure the most strongly; more than four-fifths were in favor of it.

Effects of Participation

A trial study conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence of civilian defense organization in the city of San Francisco sheds some light on factors conditioning national morale. Morale appears to improve markedly with participation in a community undertaking. Complacency, on the other hand, seems to be promoted by inactivity.

San Francisco was the first American city to experience a blackout after Pearl Harbor. In view of the genuine alarm over bombing possibilities, its air raid defense activities have proceeded at a fairly rapid pace. Some significant distinctions emerge from a survey of two of its defense areas.

One of these was an area of high economic and educational level. Residents owned their homes. Professional and business people were available for positions of leadership. People were able to buy equipment for air raid precautions. As a result, organization

has developed rather smoothly, real interest has been manifested in the training courses and the area seems relatively well prepared to meet the problems which would be posed by a bombing raid. While it is true that a superior sense of urgency may have been responsible for initiating joint participation within this area, it seems equally true that the experience of participation has bolstered the sense of urgency.

The second area was one near the marginal level of economic subsistence in which there was a lack of home ownership, of leadership accustomed to organizational work and of equipment for practice air raid precautions. A sense of unreality about air raids prevails, in part, at least, because the absense of equipment makes preparations seem entirely unrealistic. Even the air raid wardens themselves are largely unprepared. In consequence, the area is one of general apathy about the war in general and about responsibilities in respect to air raids in particular.

Conclusions

It may be said, in general, that there is in the American people a genuine willingness to accept the practical implications of modern warfare. If, in the face of this willingness, there remains any large degree of complacency, the fault can scarcely be attributed to the public itself.

For the public apparently awaits direction from its elected leadership. A fuller sense of urgency can proceed only from an information policy based upon action, upon concrete demands for

sacrifice and for universal participation in the war effort.

To a very large extent, people are prone to gauge the seriousness of a situation by the degree to which it affects their accustomed ways of living. They do not stop using gasoline and rubber because they are informed that shortages exist. Rather, they become informed about the shortages through measures which restrict their use of these articles. And they become aware of the seriousness of air raids by participation in precautions against them. In short, behavior begets belief as often as belief begets behavior.

Belief untranslated into behavior tends to lose its force and vitality. No people can remain aroused over their problems unless they are given an opportunity to work toward the solution of them. The lack of such an opportunity creates a sense of frustration, which is the begetter of apathy and defeatism or of internally disintegrative aggressions.

It should be noted that economic circumstances play an important part in determining the extent to which individuals are able to assume an initiative in undertaking voluntary war activities. Participation, as the San Francisco cases indicate, cannot be secured wholly by exhortation; means must be made available in situations where they are now lacking.

More than anything else, the experience of participation in a joint effort breeds community of purpose, creates what is commonly referred to as morale. National unity is not so much the producer as the product of unified action.

AMATEUR STRATEGY

With a volume of information at their disposal unparalleled in any other portion of the world and with complete freedom for the expression of their individual opinions, Americans are naturally prone to formulate their own ideas as to how the war should be conducted. These ideas are a product of the quality and quantity of the information they receive. Their significance, accordingly, lies in the index they afford to the validity and effectiveness of the information policy pursued by the Government, rather than in their technical wisdom.

The #1 Enemy

"Which do you think the United States should consider its #1 enemy -- Japan or Germany?" In answer to this question, asked of a national sample early in April, 35 per cent said "Japan", 46 per cent said "Germany", 12 per cent said "Both" and seven per cent made unascertainable replies.

It should be noted that the question was posed in such a fashion as to elicit the naming of either Japan or Germany; the option "Both" is not included within the question itself and was consequently overlooked by all but a small minority. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that those who picked Germany as enemy #1 nevertheless view Japan as an important adversary; and, conversely, those giving Japan first place take Germany very seriously.

This inference becomes obvious upon examination of the

reasons given for the choice. Only 12 per cent of those who chose Japan gave as a reason that the Japanese are stronger than the Germans. Of those who reasoned that Germany is enemy #1, 26 per cent said that the Germans are stronger than the Japanese.

Among persons who put the Japanese first on their list, 21 per cent explained their view on the basis of traditional attitudes of fear and hatred toward Japan. On the other hand, such traditional attitudes of fear and hatred motivated only eight per cent of those who considered Germany our prime enemy.

It is in these groups -- about one-third of the whole in either case -- that there resides a genuine selection of Germany or Japan as the #1 enemy.

But the remaining two-thirds who chose one or the other of these countries gave reasons of expediency. Among those choosing Japan, 52 per cent said that she has demonstrated that she is the more immediate threat and 14 per cent said that defeating Japan is the first step toward fighting Germany. On the other hand, of those who picked Germany, 36 per cent said merely that she was the first aggressor, and 31 per cent said that she is the instigator of Japan's attack. These reasons suggest that <u>no very vital distinction is made between the two enemies</u>.

It may be worth observing in this connection that the greatest tendency to nominate Japan occurred in the West, while the highest percentage of those choosing Germany came from West North Central cities and from the rural areas of the Middle Atlantic Region.

The #1 Opponent

In choosing between Japan and Germany as enemy #1, (judging from the reasons offered) there was obviously a certain amount of confusion as to the meaning of the term. Some interpreted it as signifying "the greatest ultimate threat"; others took it to imply "the adversary to be eliminated first".

As a means of clearing up this confusion, the Bureau of Intelligence asked another question at the beginning of April: "Granting that it's important for us to fight the Axis every place we can, which do you think is more important for the United States to do right now -- put most of our effort into fighting Japan or put most of our effort into fighting Germany?"

On this basis, 62 per cent chose Japan, 21 per cent chose Germany and 17 per cent had no opinion. Those with opinions on the subject were three to one in favor of concentrating on Japan at the present time, rather than on Germany.

The most compelling evidence that people regard the war as indivisible is to be found in the fact that among those who designated Germany as enemy #1, 53 per cent reasoned that we should put most of our effort into fighting Japan. More than four-fifths of the persons who named Japan as the #1 enemy felt that we should concentrate our attention against this particular enemy now. And among those who answered "Both" to the #1 enemy question, 52 per cent picked the Japanese as the prime object of our immediate efforts.

The #1 Fighting Front

The predilection of Americans for arm-chair strategy blossoms best when they are confronted with hypothetical questions. At the beginning of April, (after announcement that American convoys had reached Australia under General MacArthur's command, but before news of the bombing of Tokyo) the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample the following question: "If you were running this war and had a lot of airplanes to put in one particular place where they would do the most good right now, where would you put them?"

In assessing the opinions on this imaginary situation, it should be noted to begin with that 28 per cent said they didn't know -- a not unreasonable answer. Persons of lesser education were dominant in this group.

Those who did answer ascertainably showed an offensive and planetary psychology: they gave a variety of specific locations scattered round the globe; 48 per cent of these were on the Pacific front, 17 per cent on the European front and only seven per cent on the home front.

By all odds, the highest specific location selected was Australia; 30 per cent of the whole sample declared that they would put the airplanes there.

It is perhaps no less significant that a majority of those choosing the European front picked Russia as a specific location; 10 per cent of the whole sample made this choice.

Among persons who believe that we should put most of our effort into fighting Japan at this time, 63 per cent sought to base the airplanes on the Pacific front, while only eight per cent chose the European front. But among persons believing that most of our effort should go into fighting Germany, 53 per cent selected the European front, only 24 per cent named the Pacific.

The fact that the largest number of responses named Australia as the best place upon which to base airplanes may be interpreted as a reflection of the news emphasis on this location as an offensive base. The establishment of General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia and the convoying of American troops there have evidently induced a large part of the public to believe that this is the logical place from which to launch an attack, at least in the Far East.

The specific selection of Russia, rather than of England, may be more noteworthy. For there is embraced in this a judgment that the best means of combatting the Nazis lies in giving assistance to the Red army.

Judgments such as this, however, are inevitably conditioned by events and are, consequently, subject to rapid change. It should be pointed out in this connection that the question was asked prior to the recent visit to London of General Marshall and Harry Hopkins; perhaps the highlighting of England as a potential offensive base would persuade a greater percentage of people to locate the hypothetical airplanes there.

Readiness for Total War

Most Americans seem to have reached a recognition that it is impossible to wage limited warfare against the Axis. Enemy tactics and the desire to wage the war successfully have largely dissipated any scruples against ruthlessness which the American public may once have entertained.

Two-thirds of the American people expressed a belief, prior to our recent air raid on Japan, that we should engage in all-out war against the Japanese, including bombing of their cities; more than one-half of the public made it clear that they would endorse such action even if it meant retaliatory bombing of our own cities by the enemy.

Similarly, by sizable majorities the American public reveals a willingness to undertake other stringent measures for the prosecution of the war. More than two-thirds of those interviewed believe that the Allies should sink enemy merchant ships and blockade the food supplies of enemy civilians, or that they are already engaged in these practices. When questioned about the use of poison gas, Americans showed greater qualms. But they would be willing to employ it if the Axis should do so first.

Conclusions

Naturally the opinions of Americans as to how the war should be conducted are not presented here in any sense as a tactical guide to those in command of our armed forces. Military strategy will be determined, of course, on the basis of

circumstances which none but informed and qualified experts are competent to evaluate.

Those entrusted with the determination of military strategy may find it useful to know, however, that the American public is apparently ready and eager to take real risks in the prosecution of the war. Most of the public is thinking of the war in planetary terms and is aware that it can be waged successfully only on far flung battle fronts. There is only minority resistance in the United States today to the dispatch of our armed forces to foreign fields. Most of the public, indeed, actively desires to seek the enemy out and attack him in his own territory by whatever means may be most effective.

The common denominator running through all of the data above appears to be a desire to inaugurate offensive action against the enemy in whatever quarters seem most feasible. Indeed, it is this eagerness to assume the offensive which appears to be the most significant inference to be drawn from this material.