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SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS NO. 26

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.


OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES

June 5, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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June 3, 1942

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SUMMARY

Despite redundant assertions by the press that the official output of information is confused, wasteful and over-optimistic, the bulk of the American public feels that the Government is trying to present the war news accurately and that its censorship has been reasonable and necessary.

The public is by no means thoroughly satisfied, however, that it has a clear understanding of all the complex phases of the war. People seek additional information on a variety of subjects. The topics regarding which they express the greatest desire for more knowledge are the contributions which our Allies are making to the war effort and the part which they, as individuals, can play in helping to win the war.

A majority of Americans have come to rely upon the radio, rather than upon newspapers, as the primary source of their news about the war; they express greater confidence in broadcast, than in printed, news on the grounds that it is swifter, more condensed, more accurate and gives a greater sense of personal contact with personalities and events. They tend to regard radio as the best means of reaching their own minds with Government messages concerning the war. And they express a ready receptivity to increased interpretation of the news, either by Government spokesmen or by regular news broadcasters.

Newspapers are a primary source of news for a considerable minority of the public and a supplementary news source for most of those who put their chief reliance upon radio. The two media together afford abundant opportunities for the promotion of popular understanding of Government policies and problems.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR NEWS

News Sources

News is the first, rough draft of history. It is the basis of all popular information about current events. Few persons have the opportunity to observe these events at first hand. What they know concerning world affairs is reported to them -- and is subject, therefore, to the fallibility of human reporters. The public is obliged to take the reports on faith.

Public opinion respecting the war is conditioned, in large part, by the attention and confidence evoked by the news. And both attention and confidence are attracted or repelled by the contexts in which news is presented. Information is accepted as valid and important in accordance with the respect and credence reposed in the medium through which it comes to the public.

There are two principal media through which news reaches the public mind -- the printed page and radio. Until lately -- certainly throughout the progress of the first World War -- printing provided the outstanding technique for the dissemination of ideas. And the newspaper, perhaps the most potent and familiar form for the distribution of printed words, was a recognized and highly respected social institution.

In the present war, however, radio has challenged both the prestige and the power of the press. In the reporting of news it has rivaled, in a number of respects surpassed, the newspaper.

More than half the American people now regard radio as their prime news source. In the months of January, February, March and May, the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national cross-section of the public "Where do you get most of your news about the war -- from talking to people, from newspapers or from the radio?" Radio was chosen over newspapers consistently by nearly two to one.

These percentages are based on the expressed opinions of respondents as to the medium which provided most of their information about the progress of the war. They should not, of course, be interpreted as indicating that those who say that they rely primarily on the radio derive no news from the press.

Radio possesses several advantages over newspapers: it is able to report news more rapidly; its news can be received almost without cost once the receiving instrument has been purchased; it can be heard with a minimum of mental effort and while the listener may be otherwise engaged; and, finally, it affords a sense of intimate participation in certain events through sound effects and through the voices of personalities which it transmits.

A careful and detailed study of the characteristics of radio news listeners ("Radio and the Printed Page" by Paul F. Lazarsfeld) demonstrates that they are of two types: those who supplement newspaper reading, which they prefer, with radio news listening and those whose preferred, and probably main, source of news is the radio. The latter category is composed more largely of women than of men, of rural than of urban residents and, significantly, of persons on the lower economic and cultural level.

Radio has provided a means for giving news to elements of the population which have never been adequately served by any other medium; indeed, it has greatly widened the knowledge of current events, giving news to great numbers of people who, without this instrument, would neither seek it nor receive it. In addition, it has been an important supplementary medium for people habitually interested in news; data show that in periods of crisis the use of radio, as well as of newspapers, rises sharply among all levels of the public.

Newspapers, on the other hand, retain certain advantages over the radio; they deliver some kinds of news much more completely; they serve minority groups whose interests center in special phases of the news; they do not require attention at some specified hour; they permit selection by the reader and the skipping of uninteresting news; they permit the reader to set his own pace and to reread where he does not understand; they present news pictures.

One more distinction between the two media should be noted. The fact that radio operates under a governmental license results in certain editorial restrictions to which the press is not subject; radio has, in consequence, kept itself relatively free from the editorial campaigns in which newspapers so frequently engage.

In general, as has been established by the studies conducted under the direction of Dr. Lazarsfeld, those who employ newspapers as the prime source of news are more likely to be men than women, more likely to live in the cities than in the country and more likely to be in the upper economic and educational brackets. The newspaper, if slower than the radio, is more complete and is better able to present a rounded picture of the events which it reports.

It appears, therefore, that the radio has provided, not merely an alternative source of news, but an additional source. It has helped to give to large portions of the American public, whether they place their primary reliance upon it or not, a more intimate acquaintance with the world stage, and with the actors who play the leading parts upon it, than they have ever had before. In this respect, it is the one strikingly new factor in the psychological phases of the present world war.

Confidence in News Sources

Americans appear to have much more confidence in the war news which they

receive from the radio than they do in the war news reported by their newspapers. The Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample: "Do you have more confidence in the war news on the radio or the war news in the newspapers?" Radio was chosen by 46 per cent; newspapers by 18 per cent. It should be noted that 36 per cent of the public gave answers to this question which were not subject to classification in either category; perhaps many of them were without preference between the two media.

In explaining their choice, the people who expressed a preference for radio most frequently gave as a reason the statement that the radio has a better reputation for accuracy than the newspapers. The argument may seem somewhat anomalous in view of the fact that much radio news comes from the very press associations which also serve the newspapers. It is a fact, however, that broadcasting networks are able to maintain a higher caliber of editorship in the processing of news than is the average newspaper.

One factor which contributes significantly to radio's reputation for accuracy is its freedom from headlines. Newspapers, dependent in part for their sales on capturing the interest of potential readers, are prone to bedeck their front pages with capsule versions of events which magnify and distort their significance.

The networks, moreover, have secured ace correspondents for the oral transmission of news from various theaters of the war -- a fact which motivated five per cent of the public in their preference for radio. These reporters, who are merely by-lines to newspaper readers, become living human personalities to radio listeners.

Other factors offered as explanations for preferring radio were that its news comes direct from the sources, that it is briefer and more condensed

and that it is swifter. Among the persons who expressed greater confidence in printed news, the following explanations were offered: newspapers have a reputation for greater accuracy; radio reporting is frequently colored by one man's opinion; radio technique is too spectacular; newspapers have time to give more considered judgment and greater detail; evanescence of the oral word is a disadvantage.

As in the choice between radio and the press as a primary source of news, educational level plays a considerable part in determining relative confidence between the two media. There is a direct ratio between education and superior confidence in newspapers, an inverse ratio between education and superior confidence in broadcast news.

Satisfaction with the News

A majority of the American people, 55 per cent, felt that their news media have given them a reasonably clear account of the fighting in the Pacific.* Nevertheless, a substantial minority, one-quarter of the whole population, was dissatisfied with the news it has been receiving about this theater of the war. About one-fifth of the public was without opinions on this score.

There was a considerably higher degree of public satisfaction with the news about the progress of the battle of production on the home front.** Sixty-nine per cent said that the news has given them a good idea of the production program; 16 per cent felt that it has not done so.

* The question asked: "Since we got into the war, do you think the news of the fighting in the Pacific has or has not given a good idea of what has really been going on there?"

** "Do you think the news about war production has or has not given a good idea of how the program is coming along?"

Among those people who were dissatisfied with the news about the Pacific fighting, the reason most frequently expressed was that the reports from this front have been censored; 18 per cent of the whole sample made this charge, but most of them considered this censorship justified. Others expressed their dissatisfaction on the grounds that the news has been contradictory, colored, one-sided or repetitious.

Censorship was again the principal explanation of those who considered the news about production unsatisfactory; nine per cent of the whole sample referred to censorship in this sphere, again, for the most part, acknowledging its wisdom and necessity. Others who felt that they were not getting a good idea about the production program asserted that the news was contradictory, colored or untrue.

Knowledge of the War

It is extremely difficult to measure the effectiveness with which press and radio have reported the news of the war. A general question on this score was posed recently by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research: "Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what the war is all about?" The public was evenly divided on this question; 48 per cent answered "Yes" and another 48 per cent confessed frankly that they had no clear idea of what the war is all about; the remaining four per cent gave qualified responses.

This is an awkward question to answer categorically. People may believe that they have a clear understanding of some phases of the war, although they are confused about other phases. Nevertheless, it seems extremely significant that about one-half of the American public felt a sufficient degree of confusion to reply to this question in the negative.

The Princeton Office of Public Opinion Research asked another question

designed to determine something about the extent of popular information regarding the war. It presented a map to the persons interviewed and asked them to identify by number half a dozen sectors which have figured prominently in the news. The map employed was a Mercator's projection with only continents and islands outlined; the location of Europe, Asia and the United States was designated. The following table shows how the public scored on this test.

	<u>Right Answers</u>
Alaska	72%
Australia	68
China	42
Brazil	61
Iceland	50
India	44

Cataloging as well-informed the persons who successfully located at least four of the points on the map, it appears that this group is very much more prone to believe that it has a clear idea of the war than those who located less than four of the geographical areas. Among the well-informed, 63 per cent said they had a clear idea of what the war is all about; among the less informed, only 37 per cent expressed such confidence.


In an effort to find out the spheres in which people felt adequately and inadequately informed about the war, the Bureau of Intelligence asked the following questions: "Of the things on this list, which one do you feel you know the most about? Which one the least about? Which one would you most like to have more or clearer information about?" The list and the division of responses respecting it are shown in the chart reproduced opposite the next page.

It is apparent from this chart that the greatest number of people said they wanted to know more about the contributions of each of our Allies to the winning of the war; a close second in importance was the "part I could play now in winning the war". In choosing these as subjects concerning which greater information was desired, it may be that some of the respondents felt that these were the fields in which the country as a whole most required information. In other words, answers to this question may have been expressions of advice to the Government, rather than reflections of actual personal desires.

It seems significant that the topic on which people considered their knowledge greatest was the kind of world we are fighting to have; yet this ranked third in the list of subjects on which they desired better information. And the topic about which they felt that they knew least was what would happen if the Axis won the war. Again, it seems highly possible that the answers reflected estimates as to subjects which ought to be emphasized for the sake of general morale.

The two subjects on which there was least desire for information were the reasons for rationing and the fighting in Europe. In regard to the former, a high degree of knowledge was professed; in regard to the latter, a considerable percentage confessed ignorance. That there was no widespread demand for information about rationing would seem to indicate a belief that most people already understand this subject -- a belief not substantiated by their answers when they are asked questions about the complex interrelationship between rationing, prices, taxes, inflation and the cost of living. The lack of desire for information about the fighting in Europe, considered in conjunction with the confessed ignorance on this score, is probably a reflection of the fact that there was little American activity on this front at the time of the interviewing.

WHAT PEOPLE KNOW AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THE WAR



WHAT PEOPLE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THE WAR

 WHAT PEOPLE SAY THEY KNOW MOST ABOUT

 WHAT PEOPLE SAY THEY KNOW LEAST ABOUT



Educational differences in requests for information on the various topics were somewhat clouded by the inarticulate elements in the poorly educated groups. The "don't know" answers ranged from eight per cent among those with college training to 40 per cent among those with little or no formal education; the high percentage in the latter group seems to reflect a considerable degree of apathy or confusion. More of the better-educated wanted clarification on almost every topic than did the less educated. But among the better-educated, the strongest plea for more lucid information was in regard to the contributions of our Allies. This was relegated to second place by those who had not gone beyond grammar school, while their first choice for more information was in regard to the "part I could play now in winning the war".

This desire for more information as to means of contributing to the war effort was most pronounced among better-educated persons on the lowest economic level. This may be the reflection of a desire to have greater participation in war jobs or it may suggest a frustrated eagerness to take part in civilian defense activities.

Government Information Policy

Despite minority complaints against governmental interference with news, there is a prevailing feeling among the American people that, on the whole, their Government is trying to give them a fair picture of the way the war is going. The Bureau of Intelligence asked this question: "Do you think the Government is trying to present the war news accurately or is trying to make it look better

or look worse than it really is?" The answers were divided as follows:

	<u>Per cent</u>
Accurately	62
Better	21
Worse	4
Not ascertainable	13

People whose education included at least graduation from high school were more prone than those with an inferior educational background to express confidence in the Government's efforts to present the war news accurately. And persons who had a high degree of exposure to news, whether by means of the radio or the press, were considerably more disposed to credit the Government with fairness than the persons who devoted comparatively little attention to either of the news media.*

This matter of public satisfaction with the Government's handling of news about the war is partially revealed in another question asked by the Bureau of Intelligence: "In general, do you think the censorship of news is too strict, not strict enough or about right?" Three-fifths of the people interviewed said they considered the censorship about right. Only eight per cent complained that the news is censored too strictly. More than twice this number, one-fifth of the whole sample, expressed the view that the censorship is not strict enough. The remaining 12 per cent gave answers which were not ascertainable.

As has been previously reported in these surveys, about two-thirds of the American public indicated a belief that the people of this country, as a whole, were not taking the war seriously enough. Among those who held this

* High exposure to the radio war news means listening to war news more than 30 minutes on an average week day; high exposure to newspaper war news means the respondent reads war news every time he reads the newspaper.

view, one-quarter felt that the censorship of news is not strict enough; in comparison, this feeling was expressed by only 13 per cent of those believing that their fellow citizens did regard the war with adequate seriousness. On the other hand, only 56 per cent of the former category considers the censorship about right as compared with 68 per cent of those who are satisfied with the country's attitudes about the war.

As a concrete test of popular reaction to censorship, the Bureau asked the following question: "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way the Government handled the news about the bombing of Tokyo?" Two-thirds expressed approval, as compared with a mere 10 per cent who disapproved; a quarter of the public gave answers which were not ascertainable.

Here, again, there was a direct ratio between approval and educational background. The endorsement among the educational levels ranged all the way from 79 per cent among those who had completed college to a mere 46 per cent among those who had received only some grammar schooling or less. Much of this difference was due, no doubt, to the greater articulateness of the better-educated, since the disapproval, however, did not follow a converse pattern; it was highest among those who had completed college and lowest among those who had failed to complete grammar school. The explanation for this lies in the high percentage of non-ascertainable responses among the people with comparatively little education; 48 per cent of those who had not completed grammar school gave responses which could not be cataloged as either approval or disapproval.

Among those who approved of the Government's handling of this news about the raiding of Tokyo, the justification most commonly offered was that the information would have been helpful to the enemy. A minority, however, offered

reasons in defense of their approval which showed a curious confusion respecting the way in which this event was reported; four per cent of the whole sample said, "Telling us about the bombing was good for morale", another four per cent said simply "The Government gave us the true facts" and an additional one per cent gave miscellaneous answers which also indicated an unawareness that any facts had been withheld or that the story had been released originally by the Japanese.

Axis News Sources

Although a small minority of the public apparently has no understanding of the fact that some of our news comes from enemy sources, a sizeable majority is aware of this circumstance and is somewhat disturbed about it. Following is the division of responses among the three choices offered by the Bureau to the question, "Which of these comes closest to the way you feel the press and radio should handle war news put out by the German and Japanese Governments?"

They should have to label it enemy propaganda	46 per cent
They should be allowed to pub- lish or broadcast it any way they want to	21 per cent
They should not publish or broadcast it at all	20 per cent
Not ascertainable	13 per cent

The question, to be sure, fails to distinguish among the types of war news which come from enemy sources. Some people who object to the publishing of unofficial battle claims broadcast by Axis radio stations might be quite willing to give currency to official communiques or to public addresses by enemy leaders. The answers, nevertheless, seem to indicate a recognition that

the Axis is employing news as a weapon of psychological warfare and a desire to safeguard the American public from it.

The same sample was asked this question: "If war news put out by the German and Japanese governments should not be published or broadcast at all or should be published or broadcast only if labeled enemy propaganda, who should see that this is carried out — the newspapers and broadcasters themselves, or the Government?" Four-fifths of those interviewed designated the Government. Among the persons desiring to have the news from Axis sources labeled enemy propaganda, 78 per cent felt that the Government should undertake this sort of regulation. And among those believing that news from these sources should not be published at all, 85 per cent reasoned that the prohibition should be made effective through governmental action.

The desire to have Axis news labeled as enemy propaganda was highest among those with most education and diminished as the amount of formal schooling decreased. On the other hand, the less-educated people were those most strongly in favor of forbidding the broadcasting or publishing of Axis news at all, while the better-educated were less disposed to take so drastic a step.

There was only a minority disposition to forbid Americans to listen to shortwave broadcasts direct from Germany and Japan. Thirty-one per cent of the public favored such a measure. But 57 per cent felt that there should be no restrictions on listening to shortwave radio from enemy countries; 12 per cent of the sample were without opinions. Here, too, the inclination to keep shortwave listening unfettered was highest among those with the greatest education, least among those with inferior schooling.

Popular Views on How to Reach the American Public

There is substantial agreement among the American people that the one

particular mode of reaching their minds most effectively is through the voice of the President of the United States himself. When asked what means they would choose in an effort to reach the most people to tell them how to win the war, 42 per cent said "radio speeches by the President." One-third of the sample suggested other uses of radio: news broadcasts, short radio announcements between programs, dramatized radio programs or radio speeches by Government officials other than the President.

Printed matter was mentioned by only 14 per cent of the persons interviewed; 11 per cent suggested front page stories in newspapers, two per cent suggested editorials in newspapers and magazines, one per cent suggested advertisements in these publications. Five per cent of the whole sample regarded news reels as the best way of reaching the bulk of the American people. And six per cent were without opinions on the subject.

The predilection of better educated people for the printed word manifested itself in response to this question too. Among people who had completed college, 15 per cent elected front page newspaper stories as the best device for reaching the public, while among those who had had only grammar schooling or less, nine per cent chose this method. The college graduates were also somewhat less disposed than those with inferior educational background to regard radio speeches by the President as the best means of getting messages to the whole public.

A study of the audience which heard the President's "map" speech of February 23 demonstrates how genuinely effective the voice of the Chief Executive can be to transmit a message to the American people. Four-fifths of the adult population of the United States either read or listened to some part of his address on that occasion. Seven per cent of the population both

heard and read the entire speech. Almost one-half either heard or read the speech in its entirety, and an additional quarter of the people were exposed to part of the address either through the radio or press or both. One-fifth of the public neither heard nor read the speech itself, but were divided into eight per cent who heard or read about the speech and 12 per cent who were not exposed to it in any way.

Americans are extremely receptive at the present time to governmental efforts toward moulding their opinions. Two-thirds of them indicated that they would be in favor of having the Government undertake a radio program for their information. When asked if they would prefer having this program confined to facts alone or to have the facts supplemented by comments, they chose the latter variety in the ratio of two to one. Indeed, a marked general preference was expressed for radio news programs combining information and interpretation; 62 per cent of the sample said that they would rather hear a radio program which told facts and commented on them; 32 per cent said that they would rather hear a radio program that just told the facts of the news.

This preference for the intermingling of information and interpretation was related to educational background; the better educated tended to prefer it, while the lesser educated, although also predominantly on the same side, were more prone to say that they would rather have facts alone.

Editorial Attitudes Toward Government Information Policy

From the very outset of the war, there has been rather severe criticism in the editorial pages of the newspapers and magazines of the Government's policies in regard to news and information. Apparently, judging by the data presented above, the bulk of the American public does not subscribe to the charges which have been raised by editorial commentators.

A diminution in the volume of editorial criticism has been observed of late. There remains, however, a pronouncedly hostile tone in a large portion of the press comment on this subject. The complaints may be divided into three main categories:

(1) The Government is seeking to stifle critics of the Administration. This is an allegation which has been leveled at the Office of Facts and Figures in particular. It has been advanced largely by those newspapers which have been consistent in their opposition to the foreign policy of the Government — the pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists.

(2) The Government is releasing insufficient information about the war and is deluding the American public into a belief that things are better than they actually are. This is a charge joined in by many newspapers and magazines sympathetic to the Government's foreign policy. It derives, in part perhaps, from a natural frustration on the part of editors eager to print as much news as they can about the war; it is expressed most commonly in the form of complaints against excessive caution and inflexibility on the part of the armed forces in releasing news from the fighting fronts.

(3) The information agencies are extravagant, over-staffed and are engaged in propagandizing for the social theories of the New Deal. Almost all publications, whether or not they are otherwise friendly to the Government, take part in criticism of this sort.

There has been a steady editorial pressure for simplification and centralization of the Government's informational activities. At the same time, however, commentators are wont to scoff at most of the concrete plans for reorganization which have been rumored or discussed. Acceptance of the idea of a centralized office for the dissemination of Washington's official

news was voiced recently, however, in "Editor and Publisher". It anticipates the announcement of such an office in the near future. This blessing, coming from the unofficial mouth-piece of the newspaper industry, will not guarantee the projected agency a welcome from all publications, but it indicates fairly widespread conviction among them that some such plan is necessary.

CONCLUSIONS

The American public, on the whole, accepts the policy in regard to information which was set forth by President Roosevelt in his radio address of December 9: "This Government will put its trust in the stamina of the American people and will give the facts to the public as soon as two conditions have been fulfilled: first, that the information has been definitely and officially confirmed; and, second, that the release of the information at the time it is received will not prove valuable to the enemy directly or indirectly." The assumption seems warranted that, in the main, the public feels satisfied that its Government has genuinely endeavored to observe this promise.

It seems important, however, for the sake of those who retain confidence in the Government's good faith and yet regard their news of the war as inadequate, to intensify the effort to provide them with information as fully, as speedily and as accurately as possible.

These people, indeed most Americans, would welcome attempts by the Government to interpret the news for them, to give them authoritative explanations of the significance of current events. They have been eager in their reception of the President's occasional fire-side reports to the Nation,

finding in these a clarification of the complex facts with which the war confronts them. Presumably, they would be glad also to have occasional comments on the news expressed by the President in his press conferences.

It is by no means necessary, however, to depend wholly on Government officials for the issuance of interpretive statements. It is almost certain, as a matter of fact, that the regular network news broadcasters can reach audiences far larger than would be likely to hear speeches by any member of the Government other than the President himself. And it is significant that these news commentators are listened to by people on the lower economic and educational levels whose minds can scarcely be reached through any other channel.

News commentators, in the press, as well as on the air, can usefully be given a greater amount of background information about the war's progress. With such information at their disposal, their comments could more effectively serve to promote public understanding of the purposes and problems of the Government in the prosecution of the war. Newspapermen and newscasters, in general, can be relied upon to handle with discretion information which is offered to them "off the record" by responsible Government officials.

Background information of this sort is indispensable if news analysts are to assist the public in a genuine appreciation of the magnitude of the job facing them. There seems reason to believe that the interpretation of events through these sources which are regularly relied upon by the public can do more to advance understanding of the war than the most elaborate special programs designed for this purpose.

The greatest need for additional information appears to be in regard to the contributions which our Allies are making to the war effort.

Knowledge on this score is essential to preserve the solidarity of the United Nations in the prosecution of the war and also to assure a spirit of international cooperation in the formulation of a peace.

There appears to be a real need also for concrete suggestions as to the ways in which individuals not directly engaged in the production program or with the fighting forces can participate in the war effort. It is perhaps of equal importance to give to those people who are already engaged in civilian defense or other forms of civilian participation a reassurance that what they are doing is of genuine service to the country.

An understanding of their own problems is essential to the morale of a democratic people. For the first time in history, the machinery is now available to reach nearly all Americans and to give them this understanding.

June 10, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 21

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON


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June 12, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures and the Committee on War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

June 10, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 27

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

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SUMMARY

Eight out of every ten Americans now believe that we need the help of our allies to win the war — a striking index to the decline of isolationism. And there is a growing expectation that these allies will cooperate with us when the war is over.

Despite this sense of dependence, however, American attitudes toward our allies are tinged with distrust. Many Americans feel that the British are not doing all that they could to win the war. Yet they regard England as our most indispensable ally and are prone to believe that she will cooperate with us in the solution of post-war problems.

Russia is commonly recognized as making the greatest contribution to the common war effort. But many are fearful that the Russians may abandon us and make a separate peace with Germany. Less than half believe that she can be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war, although distrust on this score appears to be diminishing.

Americans express a high degree of confidence in China as an ally; they are not inclined to suspect that she will make a separate peace with Japan and they anticipate cooperation from her when the war is ended. But they tend to consider her a less important partner in the war effort than either England or Russia.

Two-thirds of the American public believes that Germany would like to make peace with us now if we let her keep all the territory she has won. Nearly half of the public thinks that Japan would like to make peace on the same basis. Americans overwhelmingly reject the idea of a settlement with the enemy on these terms. Nevertheless, a small minority thinks such a peace would be a good idea.

Many members of this minority have other ideas about the war which most of their fellow Americans would consider unrealistic and unhealthy. They tend to believe that the war will be over in less than six months or, on the other hand, that it will last for more than four years. And they are prone to think that we should fight the war by retreating behind our ocean barriers and protecting our own shores.

The group entertaining these opinions is drawn to a disproportionate extent from people at the lowest socio-economic level. It is on this level that views about the war are least crystallized and issues least understood. And it is among these people that the importance of the United Nations concept is least appreciated.

"The United Nations constitute an association of independent peoples of equal dignity and importance. The United Nations are dedicated to a common cause. We share equally and with equal zeal the anguish and awful sacrifices of war. In the partnership of our common enterprise, we must share in a unified plan in which all of us must play our several parts, each of us being equally indispensable and dependent one on the other." — President Roosevelt, February 23, 1942

THE UNITED NATIONS

Concept

This is a cooperative war. Americans understand that they are engaged in a common enterprise with other peoples of the earth. And they welcome the sense of solidarity and support which derives from this association.

It cannot be said that Americans yet feel that they belong to a union of nations. But the United Nations concept has captured their imaginations. They are beginning to understand what it means and to value it highly. A good many signs point to the conclusion that their sense of kinship with the nations ranged alongside them in this war has been growing and strengthening.

The demise of isolationism is perhaps best recorded in the fact that eight out of every ten Americans now believe we need the help of our allies to win the war. This seems for many of them at once a confession of error and a profession of faith.

Nevertheless, Americans are far from accepting the United Nations idea wholeheartedly. In some respects, they continue to show a marked distrust of their allies. And the idea itself is one which their minds have no more than partially grasped. When asked recently by the Bureau of Intelligence if they had ever heard of the United Nations, three-fourths of a national sample answered "Yes". But many of them revealed uncertainty and ignorance when requested to identify some of the nations belonging to this union and to tell something about its origin and development. These defects in understanding were especially pronounced among persons of lesser education and lower economic status.

American news media have made constant use of the term, United Nations, in reference to the allied forces ranged against the Axis. Most American commentators, indeed, have tried to promote understanding of the concept and to familiarize the American people with it. It is clear, however, that much remains to be done in educating Americans with respect to the vital nature of their partnership with the citizens of other lands.

It seems a fact that most Americans have but a meager knowledge of foreign countries. Canada and Mexico are the only lands which they have visited in any appreciable numbers. It is significant, however, that the foreign country about which the greatest number of Americans say that they know most is England; this feeling stems, no doubt, from a familiarity with its literature and institutions. The countries about which the largest number of Americans say that they desire to know more are India, Russia and Australia; the extent to which the names of these nations have been in headlines of late may account for this interest. Despite the melting pot tradition and the influx of immigrants from other countries, Americans have retained a considerable measure of insularity and a distrust of alien peoples and alien ideas.

Dependence on Allies

"Do you think the United States alone could beat Japan and Germany or that we will need the support of our allies if we are going to win?" The national sample interviewed during the first half of May 1942 divided as follows in answer to this question:

Will need allies	78 per cent
Can win alone	17 per cent
Not ascertainable	5 per cent

Certain considerations should be taken into account in assessing these responses. It seems possible that some of the 17 per cent asserting that we can win the war alone were motivated by a patriotic desire to express confidence in the strength of the United States. And, on the other hand, some of the majority who declared that we will need allies may have done so because they believed this to be the expected response, in view of recent emphasis on the United Nations theme.

The answers may be said to reflect attitudes rather than considered judgments. The attitude of the 17 per cent is essentially one of overconfidence. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is held more largely by people of lesser education and lower economic status than by Americans with greater advantages. Moreover, these people tend, more than other people, to be over-optimistic about the duration of the war; among people who believe that the war will be over within six months, 30 per cent say that we can win it unaided, while among those who think that it will last between two and three years, only 12 per cent say that we can do the job without allies.

Those who think we can win alone are also drawn in disproportionate numbers from those who feel, without qualification, that this country is sure to win the war. It seems especially significant that among those who favor

vigorous offensive action against our Axis enemies there was a much stronger feeling of dependence upon our allies than there was among those who believe that we should keep our forces at home for the protection of our own shores. In short, the cluster of opinions disproportionately entertained by this minority indicates an over-optimism and a lack of realism which can scarcely be considered components of healthy morale.

Among the three principal powers associated with the United States in the war, England appears to be considered our most important ally. Three-fifths of the American people say that we shall still be able to win the war if we lose the support of Russia but keep our other allies. Two-thirds of the public assert that we shall win if we are deprived of China's aid. But only half, actually 48 per cent, of the country expresses a conviction that we can achieve victory without the aid of England. The proportion which did not know how to answer these questions was high: 21 per cent were not sure how England's fall would affect our chances for victory. Fifteen per cent were uncertain in case of Russia's defeat and 13 per cent expressed no opinion on the chances of winning should China collapse.

Because of the military situation and the fact that England was named last in the interviewing, some people may have interpreted the question as meaning the loss of England's support, in addition to that of Russia and China. But Americans probably felt inclined to attach special importance to their partnership with Britain because they have been taught to think of the British navy as a bulwark and because they have had cultural ties of peculiar intimacy with the English people. Still the stress placed upon the significance of our alliance with England in response to this question may seem somewhat paradoxical in view of other attitudes toward the British.

For a large number of Americans are dissatisfied with the quality of England's effort in the war. They divided as follows in answer to the question, "Considering what each of these countries could do, which one do you think is doing the least to win the war:

England	24 per cent
United States	11
China	9
Russia	2
Not ascertainable	54

Dissatisfaction with Britain's earnestness and wholeheartedness in prosecuting the war seems to stem, in part, from deep-rooted and traditional attitudes of antipathy toward Englishmen. Many of those who charge that Britain is not doing her full part in the war offer explanations to the effect that "England can't be trusted". A good deal of rancor remains over the British failure to pay their debts after the last World War; this failure is often employed as a justification or rationalization for the belief that the British are untrustworthy. In addition, there is evidence to indicate that anti-British Axis propaganda has made some headway among the American people. Phrases such as "the British always want someone to pull their chestnuts out of the fire" and "England will fight to the last Frenchman" have attained considerable currency in the United States. Finally, there are some who hold the notion that the British have become weak and decadent.

Many believe, on the other hand, that England is doing as well as she can, considering her weakened condition. Some who qualify their approval of England's part in the war feel that the English people are doing their best, but that their leaders are unimaginative or incompetent. The failure of native

peoples in India and Burma to support the British war effort has revived discontent with the British colonial policy.

There is a considerable measure of identity between the people who are dissatisfied with England's contribution and those who are dissatisfied with our own war effort. Three-fifths of those who express disapproval of our own Government's conduct of the war also believe that the British are not doing all they can.

Criticism of the British war effort was greatest in the period succeeding the fall of Singapore. Lately, however, it has diminished appreciably -- no doubt as a result of intensified RAF raids over Western Europe and other manifestations of an offensive spirit. The following table shows the development of opinion in response to a question asked at regular intervals by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research: "Do you think the British are doing all they possibly can to win the war?"

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Nov. 19-29, 1941	60%	34%	6%
Feb. 3-13, 1942	63	27	10
Feb. 23 - March 5, 1942	49	34	17
Mar. 10 - 20, 1942	49	36	15
Mar. 26 - April 7, 1942	52	38	10
Apr. 30 - May 9, 1942	65	24	11

In assessing criticism of the British war effort, as well as of our own, it may be well to bear in mind that Americans seem to set higher standards for the English-speaking peoples than for others. They expect more of Englishmen and of themselves than they do of Russians or Chinese. Perhaps this fact accounts, in part, for the high percentages naming England and the United States as the countries contributing least to victory in proportion to their abilities.

The Russian war effort, by contrast, stands very high in the judgment of the American people. Only two per cent of the sample interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence named Russia as the country doing the least to help win the war. There appears to be a prevailing recognition, bolstered by frequent press and radio expressions of admiration for the stubbornness and courage of the Red army, that the Russians have been the most successful of all the allied peoples thus far in destroying the myth of Nazi invincibility.

Sentiment in favor of sending American aid to Russia is now at a very high level. A majority of Americans express outright approval of this policy. And all but a very small minority approve with certain qualifications. These qualifications seem to revolve around suspicions, not of the vigor of the Russian effort, but of the dependability of Russia as an ally.

The dissatisfaction with China's share in the common effort seems to center less around her intentions than around her abilities. The prevailing explanation offered by those who criticize the Chinese takes the form of an apology — that Chiang Kai-Shek's armies lack adequate equipment. Judging from this feeling and from the prevailing belief that America could win the war even without Chinese aid, the inference seems warranted that Americans tend to consider China as a trustworthy, but not very important, ally.

Negotiated Peace Sentiment

A large proportion of Americans believe that Germany and Japan would like to make peace today if we would permit them to keep the territories they have conquered. Seven out of every ten Americans think that the Germans would be glad to end the war on these terms. Perhaps because Japan has had a greater degree of military success of late, only four out of every ten people in this

country regard the Japanese as eager for a settlement on the basis of existing circumstances. In overwhelming numbers the American public rejects the idea of peace at such a price with either enemy.

There remains a small number, however, about seven per cent of those considering Germany and Japan ready to offer peace, who do not express opposition to accepting such terms from the enemy now. Persons of inferior education on the lowest economic level are most willing to embrace such a settlement.

Sharp differences are apparent among those who hold divergent views as to the strategy we should pursue in the prosecution of the war. The belief that it would be a good idea to make peace on the enemy's terms is strongest among those who think that the way to fight the war is to keep our forces at home and protect our own shores. In this group more than 30 per cent were either willing to accept an Axis-dictated peace or expressed no opinion on the issue. Those who would "protect our own shores" are, apparently, our latter-day isolationists and form the nucleus of defeatism and negotiated peace sentiment on the home front.

On the other hand, those imbued with the offensive spirit show very little inclination to grant concessions to either branch of the Axis. Only five per cent of this group think that it would be a good idea to make peace under existing conditions. The chart on the next page illustrates the differences between the two orientations to the war.



WOULD GERMANY WELCOME PEACE
if permitted to keep
conquered territory ?



WOULD JAPAN WELCOME PEACE
if permitted to keep
conquered territory ?



Those for
offensive
action



Those for
"protecting
our shores"



Those for
offensive
action



Those for
"protecting
our shores"

If yes - WOULD SUCH A PEACE BE A GOOD IDEA

with Germany ?




Those for
offensive
action



Those for
"protecting
our shores"

with Japan ?



Those for
offensive
action



Those for
"protecting
our shores"

Black areas indicate percentages expressing no opposition to acceptance of enemy peace terms.

It should be noted that there is also a greater willingness to accept an Axis-dictated peace among those who differ from the majority of their fellow-Americans respecting the duration of the war. The minority which anticipates either a very short or a very long war are reconciled to the acceptance of peace on German and Japanese terms in significantly greater numbers than the vast majority who anticipate that the war will last between six months and four years. Similarly, among the minority believing that the war may end in

a draw or compromise, there is a greater willingness than among the general population to permit the aggressors to keep their gains.

This cluster of opinions is symptomatic of unhealthy morale. The people who hold them apparently fail to grasp the issues and purposes of the war or to visualize the consequences of defeat. "No-opinion" responses are expressed by them with unusual frequency. They constitute a fringe of public opinion peculiarly susceptible to the blandishments of those who propose a negotiated settlement before victory has been genuinely achieved.


Confidence in our Allies

However dissatisfied Americans may be with the nature of the British war effort, they retain a high degree of respect for certain fundamental British characteristics. They have an appreciation of Britain's traditional bull-dog tenacity and they are not worried that Englishmen will quit in the middle of a fight.

Satisfaction that the Chinese will see the war through to the finish is held in this country to an even higher degree. But Americans are not nearly so uniform in their certainty that the Russians will remain steadfast as allies.

The Bureau of Intelligence asked this question, "Do you think England might make a separate peace with Germany without talking it over with her allies?" It asked the same question about Russia. And in regard to China, it asked, "Do you think China might make a separate peace with Japan without talking it over with her allies?" The following chart shows how opinions were distributed:

DO YOU BELIEVE OUR ALLIES MIGHT MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE?



In interpreting these figures, it should be noted that more than half of the American public is confident that none of our allies is going to desert us. To some extent, there may have entered into these answers an estimate as to the possibility that one or another of these powers might be forced to surrender. In particular, the high percentage believing that Russia might make a separate peace may be partially accounted for by a belief that Russia's position in the war is peculiarly precarious. And undoubtedly Russia's former association with Germany has been a source of suspicion.

It may be said, in general, however, that there is a close association between suspicion of our allies and negotiated peace sentiment. Among people who think that it would be a good idea for the United States to make peace with Germany on the basis of existing conditions, 24 per cent take the view that England would make a separate peace without talking the matter over with us. But among those who oppose the idea of American negotiations with Germany, only eight per cent think that the British would take a step of this sort.

The same pattern holds, though not quite so forcefully, in respect to Russia. Among those favoring the acceptance of German peace terms by the United States, 35 per cent say the Russians would make a separate peace. Among those who think the United States should not consider German peace terms, only 25 per cent suspect that the Russians might embrace them; that this latter group is larger in respect to Russia than it is in respect to England makes it evident that distrust of the Russians is not confined to American defeatists, although it is strongest among these people.

In regard to China, the pattern obtains with even greater force. Among Americans who would like to see this country make peace with Japan, 35 per cent think that the Chinese might take such a step. But among those who disapprove of any American peace discussions with Japan, only seven per cent have fears of a Chinese desertion.


Views as to Post-War Cooperation

When they look ahead into the future and consider the problems to be solved in the post-war world, Americans again reveal a far higher degree of confidence in the British and in the Chinese than they do in the Russians. More than four-fifths expect post-war collaboration from China and more than three-fourths believe that the British can be counted upon to join hands with

us in the making and the maintenance of the peace. But less than half feel convinced that this sort of cooperation can be expected from Russia.

It is noteworthy, however, that reliance on Russia for future collaboration appears to be growing among the American people. And this increase of confidence is part of a general pattern of expectation that post-war problems will be solved on the basis of international cooperation. The following chart shows the development of opinion in this direction in answers secured through interviewing in February and in May to the question, "After the war is over, do you think Russia (England, China) can be depended upon to cooperate with us?"

WILL OUR ALLIES COOPERATE WITH US AFTER THE WAR?



In every instance there has been an increase in the percentage of those expecting cooperation, a decrease in the percentage of those who say that the allies will not cooperate. In the cases of Britain and Russia, the "don't know" vote has gone up slightly; since this increase has been gleaned from those distrustful of these countries, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the trend of opinion is toward a faith in cooperation.

Two-fifths of the American public, as compared with 31 per cent in February, now believe that all three of our principal allies will engage in joint efforts with us when the war is ended. Only nine per cent of the entire sample interviewed definitely feel that none of the three will cooperate.

There is a variety of opinion among Americans as to the kind of post-war collaboration in which this country should engage. Interviewing indicates that the high degree of approval for the concept of cooperation in general diminishes as soon as specific measures of collaboration are proposed. Americans are wary about relinquishing any part of this country's sovereignty and independence of action.

A number of Americans retain the notion that we have no interest in European affairs. Some look at the future from points of view which are essentially imperialistic. And a small, but by no means negligible, minority scorns collaboration on the ground that an enduring peace is impossible. These attitudes, coupled with anti-British feeling and fear of Communism, constitute a serious threat to the effective prosecution of the war, as well as to the attainment of future security.

Nevertheless, though it be cautious and hesitant, there appears to be a growing internationalism among the American people. It is manifested in two ways at the present time: general acceptance of the doctrine that some form

of post-war collaboration is inevitable and desirable; widespread endorsement of some sort of multilateral association of nations when the war is ended. These are enthusiasms which may have been engendered in part by the war and which may suffer diminution when the self-abnegating spirit of wartime has passed and when specific international obligations and responsibilities are proposed.

Predominance at the Peace Table

Americans are extremely prone to believe that their own country will have the dominant voice in the post-war period -- or at least in determining the peace settlement. Three-fifths of them named the United States when asked the question, "If the allies win the war, which country do you think will have most to say in writing the peace treaty?" England was named by 12 per cent; four per cent said Russia; 23 per cent were without opinion.

The reasons most commonly advanced by those who designated the United States or Russia were: (1) that the country named was making the largest contribution to victory; and (2) that it was strongest. As is natural, those who named the United States and those who named Russia couched these concepts in somewhat different terms. The value of America's contribution to victory was expressed in such phrases as "they couldn't win without us"; "we came to the rescue"; "we furnish so much material". Tribute to Russia's contribution was praised in other ways: "She has suffered the most"; "she has done most to win the war". Similarly, those who paid tribute to America's strength used such superlatives as "richest", "most powerful". Those who designated Russia commented on her size and predicted that she would emerge from the war the strongest power.

Those anticipating predominance for the United States reasoned also that this country would have the greatest prestige and that its influence would prevail because it would stand for fair ideals in international relationships. Some suggested that this country would have the most to say because of the outstanding position of President Roosevelt.

Those who designated Russia mentioned only one reason for the belief that she will dominate the peace in addition to the two already cited: her suspiciousness and unfriendliness to other nations; these people evidently feared that, in the event of victory over Germany, Russia would arbitrarily impose her own terms.

The minority expecting England to dominate the peace settlement offered reasons which were, for the most part, rather cynical and unsympathetic to the British. The prevailing argument was that England has always had the most to say in the past. Others reasoned that the British have the best and smartest diplomats -- reflecting an ancient uneasiness that wily Englishmen may outsmart innocent Americans at a conference table.

Finally, considerable numbers of people expect England to dominate the peace for the same sort of reasons that others give for naming the United States or Russia. They believe that she has contributed the most to victory and is the strongest power. "They're fighting on all fronts". "They have taken the brunt from the beginning." People referred to England's far flung possessions to indicate her power.

In every educational group six out of every ten respondents expressed the view that the United States will have most to say at the peace table if the allies win the war. But the higher the educational level the larger the proportion of the remaining respondents who designated some other country. Thus,

more than a fourth of the college graduates felt that either England or Russia would dominate the peace; only eight per cent of those who had less than a grade school education named either of these countries. On the other hand, one out of three in the latter group failed to designate any country, while only 15 per cent of the college graduates made no selection. These results suggest -- as do indeed the responses to many of the questions -- that the better educated Americans are more likely to have convictions about important current issues, and are better informed, in particular about foreign countries.

The small percentage of Americans predicting that Russia or England will be foremost in the peace settlement may indicate a lack of realism which could prove embarrassing in respect to the recognition of their aspirations in post-war negotiations.

Attitudes Toward Leaders of the United Nations

The Bureau of Intelligence asked three questions in an effort to learn how Americans feel about the leading statesmen of the countries with which we are allied: "Which of these three leaders do you feel you know the most about -- Stalin, the Russian leader; Chiang Kai-Shek, the Chinese leader; or Churchill, the British leader? Which the least? Which one do you personally like or admire the most?" The table below shows the way in which the answers were divided:

	<u>Know Most</u>	<u>Know Least</u>	<u>Admire Most</u>
Stalin	6%	35%	7%
Chiang Kai-Shek	5	44	25
Churchill	75	2	45
Not ascertainable	14	19	23

Churchill obviously stands highest in the esteem of the American people. And he is also the foreign leader about whom Americans think they know most. It seems significant that as many as one-fourth of the American public expressed the greatest admiration for Chiang Kai-Shek -- particularly in view of the fact that least is known about him. The contrastingly small percentage of those expressing prime admiration for Stalin is evidence of the distrust which Americans still feel for the Soviet leader.

But when the sample was asked "Which one of these leaders do you think has the most support from his own people?", Stalin emerged at the head of the list. Thirty per cent gave him this rating, as compared with 24 per cent who named Churchill and 23 per cent who named Chiang Kai-Shek.

There is a rather interesting correlation between these two scales of value. Among the people who believe that Stalin has the greatest support in his own country, 19 per cent select him as the man for whom they have the greatest admiration among the three. Among those thinking that Chiang Kai-Shek has the most support from his own people, 57 per cent select him for the greatest admiration. For Churchill, the score on the same basis is 72 per cent. Evidently, Americans have a good deal of esteem for leadership which enjoys the confidence of its own particular people.

There is also a general correlation between knowledge of the foreign leader and admiration for him. Those who think they know most about Stalin are the most prone to express admiration for him. And the same holds true respecting the Chinese and British statesmen. People of superior education not unnaturally know more about these personalities than those of inferior educational background. But they are also more candid in acknowledging that they know little about them. At the same time, they are more prone to express admiration for

Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader about whom they admit that they know least. People on the higher income levels show the least esteem for Stalin.

Relative Standing of Our Allies

Most of the questions asked in this survey served to elicit expressions of preference, rather than of absolute opinion. The results, therefore, are largely in relative terms. The following table brings together the rankings which Americans give to our principal allies in five separate frames of reference:

	<u>England</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>China</u>
Importance as an ally	1st	2nd	3rd
Quality of effort	3rd	1st	2nd
Confidence that they will make no separate peace	1st 2nd	3rd	2nd 1st
Anticipation of post-war cooperation	2nd	3rd	1st
Admiration for the national leader	1st	3rd	2nd

CONCLUSIONS

A faith in international cooperation is nascent in the American people. It manifests itself today in a general recognition that this country is dependent for victory upon joint action with its allies and in the expression of generalized desires for a combined effort to solve post-war problems.

But many Americans lack adequate knowledge of the nations with which they are now associated. They have only a partial understanding of the contributions which these foreign peoples are making to the common war effort. They know little about their ways of life, their problems or their aspirations. And these defects in understanding breed suspicion and distrust.

For the courage and determination which these peoples have shown in

resisting the Axis, Americans feel genuine admiration. But the admiration finds expression only in the most general terms. It is admiration for the characteristics, rather than for the people. There seems to be lacking in it any full understanding of the interests, problems, sufferings and hopes of the human beings who are England, China, Russia and the other United Nations. These people need to be humanized to be understood. Their values and ways of life, though different, are not irreconcilable with our own; their dreams of the future are not incompatible with ours.

The failure to understand these people of other lands is strongest among our own people who have been least advantaged, economically and educationally. It is among these Americans that the will to smash the Axis is least conspicuous. Only a small percentage of them have succumbed to defeatism or to a readiness to make peace at any price. But many of them have no positive convictions about the war and are confused and uncertain as to why we are fighting it. As a result they would probably be peculiarly susceptible to speciously attractive peace proposals.

It is to these people in particular that the information which is requisite to sound morale should be addressed. The attitudes of many of them are, as yet, uncrystallized. Their interests must be identified with the interest of others like them in foreign lands. The war must be given fresh meaning for them so that they can participate in the common hope and in the common effort.

June 17, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 28

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
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED



June 17, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 28
Office of Facts and Figures
Bureau of Intelligence

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SUMMARY

The war has helped to unite the American people. On most basic issues related to it there is general agreement. Defeatism is notably absent. An analysis of the attitudes which indicate discontent and low morale resolves itself into a study of minority opinion.

Disaffection does exist. It expresses itself, positively, in a tendency to voice grievances, to be suspicious, and to dissent from generally accepted objectives and policies. It expresses itself, negatively, in a lack of interest in the war, in ignorance of the issues.

Grievances provide opening wedges for Axis efforts to divide the American people into warring camps. For the basic objective of Axis propaganda is to aggrivate already existing cleavages.

Disaffection expresses itself in fairly well defined ways: in grievances against some group in the economy, in complaints against the Government, suspicion of our allies, misgivings about sending forces abroad, skepticism about war aims, and anti-Semitism. Expression of a number of these hostilities suggests a fundamental antipathy to the settled policies of the United States.

Twenty per cent of the respondents interviewed in the rural midwest have hostile attitudes on four or more of the eight issues used as indices of discontent. In five cities which were surveyed, fifteen per cent of the people, and in the rural south five per cent, revealed a similar degree of disaffection.

To a considerable extent the infrequency with which complaints were voiced in the south indicates, not enthusiasm for the war effort, but apathy. Responses indicating no opinion one way or the other were given to one-fourth of the questions asked people in that region.

As these facts suggest, the grievance pattern takes a different form in the five cities surveyed, in the rural midwest and in the rural south. The most important determinants of opinion on war issues in cities appear to be social status, religion, nationality, and the ways in which Negroes react to discrimination.

In both rural areas, hostility to labor is widespread. In the rural midwest anti-British attitudes are also prevalent, and in the rural south anti-Semitism is marked.

Both disaffection and apathy jeopardize a vigorous and united war effort. They are attitudes which render the minorities holding them vulnerable to the psychological warfare of the enemy.

"America is permanently on the brink of revolution. It will be a simple matter for me to produce revolts and unrest in the United States so that these gentry will have their hands full." -- Adolph Hitler.

ELEMENTS OF DISUNITY

Criticism

Complaint is a symptom of democracy in operation. In a society based upon the principle of freedom of expression, criticism is a source and sign of strength. It represents, in the most real sense, participation by members in the affairs of their community.

The Fascists order things differently. They silence criticism, creating a superficial semblance of unity. Friction is submerged; there is complaint neither against the policies of Government nor against the behavior of minority groups within the population. The vocalization of unrest is eliminated; its tensions remain, however, and are perhaps magnified.

Such tensions exist within all societies. Among the diverse elements of the United States they develop out of the natural cleavages between social and economic minorities whose interests are in conflict. War inevitably heightens them. And in wartime, they vitiate the concentration of energy upon the common enemy.

But these conflicts can no more be dissipated by patriotic exhortation than by forbidding the expression of them. They spring from real grievances and real anxieties. In America, they have four principal sources:

(1) Group grievances. War upsets the normal balance between domestic groups. Whenever circumstances seem to operate to the special advantage of one, as against the other, friction develops and criticism is expressed.

(2) Individual deprivations. The burdens of war are not always equitably distributed. Distinctions among individuals naturally evoke resentment. And there is some tendency to blame minority scapegoats for the difficulties endured.

(3) International distrust. Americans are now taking part in a community larger than their own nation. They are associated in a common enterprise with the peoples of other lands and are dependent for success in this war upon cooperation with and from these peoples. Distrust or lack of understanding of their allies promotes criticism which tends to undermine united action.

(4) Fear of the future. Perhaps the most potent disunifying force in America today is a general anxiety lest the war bring in its wake unemployment, inflation and economic depression. Such fears create a sense of individual insecurity, leading men to seek personal advantage and to limit their participation in community efforts.

Criticism, whatever its origin, its motivation and its value, has a disintegrating effect upon national or international solidarity. Much of it that finds expression in America today stems from a desire to promote commonly accepted purposes -- to speed the successful prosecution of the war. Directed at the Government, at domestic minorities or at our allies, it reflects a healthy impatience, and insistence that special interests be subordinated and a desire for national and international unity.

But some portion of current criticism has its origin in a fundamental antipathy to the settled policies of the United States. It tends toward disunity in purpose, as well as in effect. It seeks to retard, rather than to promote, the attainment of objectives upon which an overwhelming majority has agreed.

An even greater danger to the national welfare may lie in a dearth of criticism. For it is behind the failure to criticize that there lurk complacency, apathy, fear and that ignorance of real issues which most imperils the operations of a democratic society. Insofar as lack of criticism indicates lack of interest or lack of understanding, it is an expression of unhealthy morale. For among the people whose basic attitudes toward the war are uncrystallized there exists great vulnerability to the opinions which the enemy seeks to foster. An uncritical outlook may also mask a failure to participate in the common effort.

Psychological Warfare of the Axis

The Axis has given a new stature and importance to psychological warfare. It recognized long before the outbreak of the present conflict that opposition to its ambitions could best be withered by the promotion of disunity among its enemies. It did not primarily seek to introduce divisions of opinion. Its plans called simply for the aggravation of existing divisions into dangerous cleavages, for conversion of them into corroding tensions and paralyzing disunity.

Hermann Rauschning, in the Voice of Destruction, reports a discussion of psychological warfare among Nazi leaders:

"Every state, they reminded me, could by suitable methods be so split from within that little strength was required to break it down. Everywhere there were groups that desired independence, whether national or economic, or merely political. The scramble for fodder and distorted ambition -- these were the unfailing means to a revolutionary weapon by which the enemy was struck from the rear. Finally, there were the businessmen, whose profits were their all-in-all. There was no patriotism that could hold out against all temptations. Besides, one could always dress these things up.

It was really by no means difficult to find patriotic slogans that would at the same time win over men who were glad to salve their sensitive consciences with some such balsam. And ultimately it was all a question of money and organization."

All internal divisions are elements of disunity, susceptible to aggravation by the enemy's propaganda. All apathy or ignorance constitute a vulnerability to the Axis line. The enemy's awareness of these facts is best attested by his efforts to take advantage of them.

The Nazi propaganda organization, long before the outbreak of war, deliberately indoctrinated German organizations and individuals living abroad as distribution centers for the points of view it wished to foster. Through these organizations and individuals and through native elements sympathetic to fascist points of view, normal domestic grievances were inflamed and enlarged. Complaint is contagious; rumor is self-aggrandizing.

The enemy's most direct avenue of communication with the American people, however, is by the shortwave radio — an instrument the effectiveness of which is multiplied by the currency given to its messages through regular American media of information. An analysis of the propaganda beamed to North America by Axis broadcasters shows that they devoted a considerable portion of the time at their disposal to propaganda obviously contrived with divisive intentions.

The primary target of Axis divisive propaganda directed at this country is the confidence of the American people in their Government, and in the President of the United States in particular. According to the enemy propagandists, Mr. Roosevelt is mistreating the American people in economic matters by his inflationary and rationing program, in political matters by dragging them into the war and depriving them of their rights, in military matters by improper planning and in cultural matters by keeping them in ignorance or giving them

distorted information.

Second in order of emphasis is the attempt to widen existing divisions between economic groups in this country. Labor, farmers, businessmen and professional groups are represented as being mistreated in regard to their economic position, primarily by President Roosevelt but also by "Big Business" and by Congress. The Axis presents "Big Business" in a three-fold character: (1) as a group which is mistreating and exploiting labor and the American people; (2) as a critic of the President and (3) as a recipient of special favors from the White House.

Axis broadcasters make vigorous efforts also to magnify the differences between racial and religious groups. Germany, whose broadcasts have always contained more anti-Semitic references than those of her partners, has stepped up this form of attack markedly in the past three weeks. And the numerous nationalistic groups in this country are represented as the victims of discrimination and maltreatment. Every effort is made to play on their nationalist feelings in order to divide them from the community as a whole.

Native publicists, particularly Westbrook Pegler and the Hearst and Patterson - McCormick newspapers, have recently given considerable impetus to this Axis propaganda line. They have adopted a strong anti-foreign, ultra-nationalistic attitude, encouraging suspicion of foreign peoples, a rigid isolationism after the war and the exclusion of immigrants from our shores.

Correspondence Between Domestic Attitudes and the Axis Line

That the attitudes fostered by the Axis should have some currency in the United States is natural enough in view of the fact that the Axis propagandists have sought only to widen existing differences. The holding of opinions fostered by the enemy does not, therefore, by any means necessarily constitute

disloyalty. Most of these opinions were prevalent in the United States long before the totalitarian governments ever came into being.

Nevertheless, insofar as expressions of opinion and dissent along these lines tend to split and confuse the American people and to detract from their attention to the war effort, they constitute, in a real sense, aid and comfort to the enemy. When these opinions, as in the case of prejudices directed at minority elements, serve to disrupt the community, they are imminently dangerous. When they are constructively designed to correct inefficiencies and to promote the prosecution of the war, their divisive effects may be more than offset by the improvements they procure. Finally, when they are expressions of conflict between fundamental social concepts, they are an inescapable part of the war itself. For the pattern of the future will be determined by the ideas which now emerge as dominant. Real issues will not lie dormant but will be vigorously contested on the battleground of public opinion.

Essential Unity

The war has tended to knit the American people together. The attack by the Axis has served to remind us of our common core of traditions and our essential identity of interests. Today, even when the initial feeling of outrage provoked by the Pearl Harbor attack has subsided, America is basically united and her morale is high. Neither defeatism nor discontent is widely prevalent.

During the month of April the Intelligence Bureau probed the opinion of representative Americans in five cities,* in the rural midwest and in the rural south about the progress of the war. Only two per cent of those interviewed feel that the war is going so badly that we may lose it. The minority who feel that the war is going very well is almost equally small. The vast majority is

* Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta

inclined to the sober, realistic view that the war is now going badly but will improve. Such a response, neither cocksure nor apprehensive, indicates, not defeatism, but determination. Like the existence of a certain amount of criticism, it is a sign of good morale.

One's wishes may influence one's judgment of the progress of the war. Perhaps a more reliable index to the essential balance of the American people is the extent to which they are satisfied with the war effort on the home front. It is in connection with domestic issues that disaffection is likely first to express itself. If morale were low and Hitler's attempt to foment discontent were succeeding, one would expect to find rancor and bitterness, widespread recrimination between groups and a general naming of scapegoats for the release of frustration and anger.

Thus it is encouraging to find that, in fact, a majority of Americans are satisfied with the war effort on the home front. The opinions of those interviewed on this significant issue are given below.

"Satisfied with home front war effort"	Cities	77%
	Rural Midwest	58%
	Rural South	59%
"Dissatisfied with home front war effort"	Cities	14%
	Rural Midwest	27%
	Rural South	10%

In the rural midwest a relatively large proportion of people express dissatisfaction with the war effort. But everywhere those who are dissatisfied constitute a distinct minority.

It seems extremely significant that most Americans, when they were inclined to blame anyone or anything for defects in the war effort, named, not individuals or small minority groups, but large impersonal aggregations -- labor, industry and Government, or the indifference of the people themselves. A substantial minority of those interviewed refused to name any scapegoat, even when

specifically invited to do so. Discontent, furthermore, was rather evenly distributed; there was little tendency to concentrate what dissatisfaction was felt on any single group.

The analysis of disaffection which follows resolves itself into a study of minority opinion. The vast majority of Americans is neither apathetic on the one hand nor excessively critical on the other.

Elements of Grievance

The disaffection which exists centers around three or four sore spots. There are grievances against economic groups — labor and management. There are the omnipresent complaints against the Government. There is distrust of two of our major allies, Britain and Russia. There are misgivings about an expeditionary force and skepticism about our war aims — doubts which reflect distrust of our allies and a feeling that we should not be in the war. In the rural south there is evidence of a considerable degree of anti-Semitism.

There are, of course, still other types of complaint. Discontent manifests itself whenever the public feels that sacrifices asked of it are unnecessary, or are inequitably imposed. Some people are less than wholehearted in their eagerness to prosecute the war because, consciously or unconsciously, they are afraid of the cost of winning it. But at present the major focal points of disaffection are those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

As is shown on the chart opposite, the grievance patterns of the five cities, the rural midwest and the rural south are quite different. Of the Americans interviewed in the recent Bureau of Intelligence survey, a substantial number, particularly in the rural midwest, express dissatisfaction with the part labor is playing in the war. Two out of ten in the rural south, three out of ten in the cities, and five out of ten in the rural midwest feel that labor

EXPRESSION OF SPECIFIC GRIEVANCES*

		FIVE CITIES	RURAL MIDWEST	RURAL SOUTH
ANTI-BRITAIN		40	48	11
FEAR OF ALLIES BACKING OUT		31	32	14
ANTI-RUSSIA		30	34	16
ANTI-LABOR		29	52	21
MISGIVINGS ABOUT A.E.F.		23	23	16
ANTI-ADMINISTRATION		14	26	13
SKEPTICISM ABOUT WAR AIMS		10	14	8
ANTI-SEMITISM		4	2	15

* In percentage

is not cooperating. Those who are critical of labor complain of strikes, what they regard as unfair demands of labor with respect to wages and hours, and the corruption of labor leaders. People at the top of the socio-economic scale are most prone to voice these complaints.

Except in the rural south, where many of those interviewed express no opinion one way or the other, management is also subject to a considerable amount of criticism. About three respondents out of ten, both in the rural midwest and in the cities, believe that management is not cooperating to the fullest possible extent in the war effort. These critics charge that management is primarily interested in its own profits and position, and was slow in converting American industry for all-out production. The critics of management are not simply disgruntled and jealous individuals on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. Unlike the critics of labor, they are rather evenly distributed among the various income groups.

Attitudes towards the Government's conduct of the war are somewhat more complex than attitudes toward labor and management — natural enough in view of the many ways of reacting to the numerous things the Government is doing. When asked "What do you think of the way people in Washington are running the war?", the following proportion of people voiced complete or partial disapproval:

1. Disapproval, Complete	Cities	7%
	Rural Midwest	11%
	Rural South	4%
2. Disapproval, Qualified	Cities	7%
	Rural Midwest	12%
	Rural South	9%

Complaints about the Government covered a wide range and were in some instances contradictory. But in general critics leaned to the view that the Government isn't being hardboiled enough in its conduct of the war. Among those

who criticized the Government, there were undoubtedly some who had no specific grievances but who felt that in general things aren't moving rapidly enough; the Government is perhaps the most convenient object of criticism for those who are impatient with the progress of the war. Many objections were leveled on vague, conventional grounds -- red tape, extravagance, inefficiency. Very few respondents complained that the Government is asking too much of the people. But a number charged that it is neither clear in its demands nor candid in its information.

Hitler's use of anti-Semitism to deflect hatred from himself to a convenient and relatively defenseless scapegoat is well known. Interviewing reveals that anti-Semitism exists among certain elements of the American population to an extent which may well suit his purposes. Fifteen per cent of the people interviewed in the rural south spontaneously made some comment indicating that they blamed many of their present troubles on the Jews. More than a fifth of the Negroes interviewed in Chicago exhibited anti-Semitic tendencies.

Distrust of our major allies reflects itself in many ways -- notably in the belief that England is not exerting herself to the full and that Russia may yet make a separate peace with Germany. Like our differences over domestic issues, this lack of complete confidence in our allies can be, and is, exploited by the Axis to breed dissension about our war policies.

Distrust of our allies may in part explain the fact that, even today with American troops already stationed in many lands, one in ten among the persons in the areas surveyed doubts the wisdom of sending our forces abroad. But in part this attitude undoubtedly stems from antipathy to the war itself -- from a feeling that it is not worth waging, that we were dragged in, or are fighting for no good purpose. Ten per cent of those interviewed in cities,

eight per cent of those in the rural south and fourteen per cent of those in the rural midwest are skeptical or cynical about America's war aims. An additional fifth of those interviewed in the south "don't know" why we are fighting -- an expression of apathy and confusion. Doubts about our war aims and opposition to an AEF constitute two additional focal points of disaffection about the war.

An Index of Discontent

As has been said, the manifestation of a certain amount of distrust or divergence of opinion is not necessarily a sign of low morale. On the contrary, it may indicate a profound interest in the progress of the war, a feeling of participation and a natural impatience with any nation or group which the individual regards as less zealous than himself. But excessive distrust and criticism of a number of basic policies seem to indicate an essential lack of sympathy with the national effort. At the very least, they reveal a susceptibility to those who are deliberately trying to foment so much internal dissension in America that there will be little energy left over for the prosecution of the war. And the individual critic himself -- perhaps unwittingly -- may lower morale through the expression of his numerous grievances.

Thus the significant thing to ascertain is not so much a person's views on any one subject as the number of subjects about which he complains or shows lack of confidence. Those who were interviewed in the five cities, the rural midwest and the rural south were rated in accordance with the opposition they expressed on seven topics about which they were questioned. There was no question on anti-Semitism, but anti-Semitic remarks made spontaneously during the interview were recorded under an eighth heading. The chart opposite the next page shows the number of items respecting which various percentages of the samples registered criticism.

The tendency for the same people to associate negative views on a number of issues is pronounced. Thus 46 per cent of those disapproving of the Government's conduct of the war feel that labor is not cooperating in the war effort. In contrast, only 17 per cent of those who unqualifiedly approve of what the Government is doing are critical of labor.

Six in ten of those dubious about our own Government believe that England is not doing all she can, whereas only two in ten of those favorably disposed to the Government are suspicious of England's war effort. Those who believe that England is doing all she can are more prone than those suspicious of her to favor aid to Russia.

The attitudes most likely to form nuclei for undesirable clusters of opinion are skepticism about our war aims and hostility to the administration.

The Urban Grievance Pattern

The full significance of the grievance patterns becomes clear only when one attempts to identify the groups which are hostile or apathetic toward the war, and to analyze the cultural conditions which explain their attitudes.

Four factors seem to be primarily responsible for the differences one finds among city dwellers in their attitudes on war issues -- social status, religion, nationality, and the way disaffection expresses itself among Negroes.


Those high in the socio-economic scale are inclined to be far more critical of the way things are going than those who are less prosperous and less well educated. Among those earning \$65 a week or more, for example, almost twice as many have negative views on at least four of the eight issues as among those earning less than \$25 a week. In part this may reflect their greater articulateness. But it unquestionably stems also from their conservatism and their anti-administration bias, which was marked before the outbreak of war. The Government's

NUMBER OF GRIEVANCES


FIVE CITIES




Number of Grievances



RURAL MIDWEST



RURAL SOUTH



conduct of the war and the extent of labor's cooperation are among the issues about which there is most marked difference of opinion among upper class and lower class groups.

Religion also affects the attitude of urban dwellers toward issues connected with the war. Jews, whose very existence would be most obviously threatened by an Axis victory, are least inclined to be critical about what is being done by the United States and its allies to win the war. Catholics are somewhat less critical than Protestants, although the differences between the two groups are slight and might be accounted for in part by economic factors.

A highly interesting pattern is apparent among urban dwellers of foreign extraction. Men and women who have come to America as immigrants have relatively few grievances about the way the war is being waged. In part this may be due to their fear of expressing discordant opinions, in part to low educational status. But many of these immigrants came to America to escape persecution and hardship in Europe. It is reasonable to suppose that their morale is high primarily because they know what the triumph of the Axis would mean.

In contrast, complaints are more frequently voiced by second generation city residents of foreign origin than by either their parents or the urban population in general. Discontent is more prevalent, furthermore, among second generation persons of Axis descent than it is among those of non-Axis descent. Such facts call for an explanation. It is probable that the children of immigrants are more ambitious than their parents, and less tolerant of the imperfections and unpleasant aspects of American life. Thus any frustrations that they suffer are felt more keenly. Those of German or Italian descent, without feeling disloyal to America, may nevertheless experience a vicarious satisfaction in the successes and strength of their countries of origin.

The attitudes of Negroes deserve special attention in any analysis of the grievance pattern of the five cities. Because the war morale of Negroes has been discussed in a recent Survey (Survey No. 25, May 27, 1942) and will be dealt with again in a forthcoming Survey, it is not extensively considered here.

In general, it may be said that urban Negroes have far more grievances about the conduct of the war than urban whites. When the comparison is made city by city, the contrasts are striking. In the three northern cities surveyed, Chicago, Boston and Detroit, from a fourth to a half of the Negroes feel negatively about at least four of the eight issues which have been selected as indices of discontent. In each of these cities, almost three times as many Negroes as whites voiced a large number of complaints.

In Atlanta, on the other hand, complaints were far less prevalent among the Negroes than among the white population. The amount of frustration and privation suffered by Negroes in Atlanta and in northern cities is probably not significantly different. Northern Negroes have reacted with hostility to the discrimination to which they are subjected. In the south, where such a reaction would not be tolerated, Negroes have become apathetic. The failure of Negroes in Atlanta to voice many grievances does not indicate high morale, but on the contrary, ignorance of the issues and, in many cases, fear of expressing any "unpatriotic" sentiment even to strangers of their own race.

Except for Atlanta, the divergence of which is largely explained by the apathetic attitude of its Negro population, the five cities surveyed do not differ markedly from one another in the extent to which their residents complain about war issues.

Bostonians express distrust of England more frequently than any other complaint -- which is hardly surprising in view of the large number of Irish

Catholics in its population. Yet anti-British sentiment is more marked in other cities, notably in Chicago, than it is in Boston.

Two out of ten people in Chicago and Boston express anti-administration feelings — almost twice as many as in the other three cities.

Chicago is lowest of any of the five cities in anti-labor sentiment, and Atlanta, where unions have only recently appeared upon the scene, is highest.

Chicago manifests more skepticism of America's war aims than any of the other cities. Detroit and Los Angeles both show a considerable distrust of our war allies; but, interestingly, Detroit, an inland city, has more misgivings than any of the other cities about an expeditionary force, whereas Los Angeles, understandingly eager to keep the war away from our shores, is most reconciled to an AEF.

The Rural Grievance Pattern

As the chart opposite page 8 shows, discontent is far more widespread in the rural midwest than it is in either the five cities or the rural south. Anti-labor and anti-administration feeling, and suspicion of Britain, are particularly conspicuous. Except that many of them express anti-Semitic feelings, the people of the rural south, on the other hand, appear to have relatively few grievances.

In both the rural midwest and the rural south more complaints are voiced against labor than against any of the other groups or policies which have been utilized as indices of discontent. Competition between industry and farmers for the limited supply of manpower now available may be the most important factor in explaining this anti-labor sentiment. Farm people blame labor for the high wages which are attracting their workers and their children to cities. But distrust of unions and labor leaders is not a new phenomenon in rural areas and has long been

fostered by the conservative press. Magazines and newspapers have lately renewed their demands for a more drastic labor policy, including job freezing.

The midwest, with its equalitarian tradition, has always been suspicious of England's stratified society. In the rural midwest, anti-British sentiment is even more prevalent than in the cities. Farm people distrust England's commercialism. They still feel bitter about England's failure to pay her war debts in full.

The rural south's anti-Semitism and its low complaint score on other issues both require explanation. Jews are a relatively safe group to attack. One can "let off steam" against them without any likelihood of retaliation either from them or from the community in general. The extent to which anti-Semitism is now prevalent in the south suggests the possibility that the antipathy which southern farmers have always felt against the north, Wall Street, and the "moneyed interests" has somehow been channeled against the Jew.

The relative infrequency with which complaints are voiced in the rural south might, at first glance, appear an unequivocal indication of high morale. Unfortunately, such an interpretation is not warranted. The scores in the chart opposite page 12 were based on expressed grievances. The rural south ranks low on this basis in large part because many respondents there expressed no opinion one way or the other on many issues. Twenty-six per cent of the questions -- as compared with five per cent in the midwest and six per cent in the cities -- drew "don't know" responses. It must be concluded that the paucity of complaints is, in large part, due to lack of information and lack of interest. Evidence for this inference is found in the fact that respondents in the rural south were less well educated than respondents in the midwest, and that "don't know" responses disappeared when they were asked a question of obvious and close personal concern.

Thus, to a considerable extent at least, the grievance pattern of the rural south indicates apathy, not high morale, and reveals a dangerous situation. For the uninformed are as vulnerable to the enemy's psychological attack as are the disaffected.

CONCLUSIONS

Of the criticism now expressed in America, that portion which is directed toward the Government seems least disturbing in itself. It is intended, in large part, to hasten the achievement of victory and is, therefore, of a healthy nature. But often it is associated with other critical and less healthy attitudes. The Government can best meet it by effective action and the greatest possible candor in explaining its policies and problems.

The war inevitably circumscribes civilian life. There is abundant evidence that an overwhelming majority of Americans are ready to do all that is necessary to advance the war effort. But they need to understand clearly what is necessary and why. And they need assurance that restrictions are being imposed equitably.

In wartime, equality of treatment is impracticable. Young men must bear a special burden. Other elements in the population may have to carry disproportionate loads, depending upon their occupations and their economic status. All that the Government can do is to make the nearest possible approach to equality and to explain where necessary the equity of inequality.

The criticism directed against internal elements is potentially more damaging to national morale. Since it cannot be eradicated, it must be alleviated by information emphasizing the contributions which each of these elements is making. Anti-Semitism and anti-alienism, the most flagrant manifestations of

the tendency to seek a scapegoat for misfortune, are perhaps the most dangerous of these internal divisions. They are the fulcrums for cleavage most persistently employed by the enemy and by conscious divisionists in America.

It is in the criticism of our allies that Americans show the most alarming degree of adherence to the opinions which Axis propagandists seek to foster. Anti-Russian feeling is still prevalent, although it appears to have diminished considerably. In conjunction with rather widespread anti-British sentiment, it constitutes an attitude which, if unchecked, can undermine the strength of the United Nations and impede the formulation of a wise peace. In this connection, distrust of our war aims or failure to understand them may have disastrous consequences.

The degree of apathy and of ignorance disclosed in this survey must be of particular concern to those charged with information policy. For these are the soils in which disunity germinates. These are the dark places which information must illuminate.

Through its distortion and restriction of normal life, war inevitably increases the factors of frustration and promotes an accumulation of aggressive energies seeking release. Competing groups and individuals tend to lay the blame for their misfortunes on their rivals or upon the Government which seems to neglect their special interests. The function of the Government in such a situation must be to mitigate these aggressions and to redirect them outward against the common enemy.

June 24, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS NO. 29

Office of War Information

Office of Facts and Figures

Bureau of Intelligence

file

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of
the latest Survey of Intelligence Materials prepared
for the Director of the Office of Facts and Figures.

Sincerely yours,


R. Keith Kane
Assistant Director
In Charge, Bureau of
Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully
Secretary
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
June 24, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 29
Office of War Information
Office of Facts and Figures
Bureau of Intelligence

SUMMARY

There was general public readiness for the President's 7-point economic program. Almost all Americans were aware of rising prices. The cost of living is the major economic concern of a large portion of the population. In general, the public is confident that the Government can regulate this cost.

There is majority endorsement of each of the items in the President's program. But their interrelation is not clearly understood. There is, moreover, considerable confusion concerning the application of the anti-inflation measures. Criticism has been directed mainly at the ways in which economic controls have been put into practice, rather than at the principles involved.

People tend to view each anti-inflation measure in terms of its effect upon their own interests. Approval of price control is greater among city workers than it is among business owners and farmers. Wage control, interpreted in different ways by different people, is more favored by the businessmen and farmers than by employees.

The public applies two standards to economic restrictions — necessity and equity. It seeks assurance that sacrifices are genuinely requisite to the war effort and that their burden is equitably distributed.

Most Americans view the economic future with marked pessimism or uncertainty. They fear the post-war period will bring severe depression. These fears are somewhat mitigated by a hope that the Government can devise means to cushion the war's economic impact.

Public education is needed to promote understanding of the interdependence of the President's anti-inflation measures and to allay anxiety over post-war economic problems.

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SOURCES OF THE SURVEY. This survey is based upon the following reports: "Attitudes of Certain Groups Toward Price Control and Rationing", Extensive Surveys Division, Report #24; "Reactions to the War Economy", Division of Surveys, Report #16; "Anti-Inflation Measures", National Opinion Research Center's National Survey for June 1942; American Institute of Public Opinion surveys on the tire situation and gasoline rationing; "The Buying of War Bonds and Stamps", Division of Surveys, Special Report #12; "Economic Impact of War", special report of Source Materials Division, June 18, 1942; Weekly Media Reports #17, 18, 19, and 20, Division of Information Channels; "Small Business Attitudes Towards Shortages, Price Fixing and Rationing", special report of Special Services Division, June 16, 1942.

"The rise in the cost of living during this war has begun to parallel the last... There are obvious reasons for taking every step necessary to prevent this rise. I emphasize the words 'every step' because no single step would be adequate by itself. Action in one direction alone would be offset by inaction in other directions. Only an all-embracing program will suffice. — President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, April 27, 1942.

THE ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM

The President's economic program necessarily depends for success upon the understanding and cooperation of the American people. It is a program which embraces a complex interrelationship of controls designed to prevent inflation.

These controls, as defined by the President in his message to Congress, are as follows:

- (1) Price control.
- (2) Rationing of commodities of which there is a scarcity, to insure their equitable distribution,
- (3) Wage stabilization.
- (4) Heavy taxation; control of corporate profits and personal earnings.
- (5) Stabilization of farm prices.
- (6) Systematic purchase of war bonds out of earnings.
- (7) Discouragement of credit and installment buying.

Awareness of the Inflation Danger

There is a general awareness in all parts of the country and among people in all occupational groups that prices have risen. Workers, in particular, express keen realization of wartime increases in the cost of living. Poorer people are

most cognizant of these increases.

Items which contribute directly to the everyday cost of living are generally singled out for special mention as having leapt in price. Foodstuffs, meat in particular, are stressed most frequently, with clothing in second place.

Prior to announcement of the President's 7-point program, this awareness of price rises was coupled with a general fear that the trend would continue. Three-fifths of those interviewed shortly before the President's message to Congress said that they expected prices to go up; half of these people anticipated sharp advances.*

Prices and Purchasing Power

There is also general awareness that the purchasing power of American families has stepped up sharply since the war began. Half of the people interviewed say that their own incomes have increased during the past year; eight out of every ten express the belief that incomes in general have gone up.

There is only partial understanding, however, of the causal relationship between this increased purchasing power and the increased cost of living. Asked to explain why the Government wants to keep prices from going higher, the greatest number of people said, "to prevent profiteering".

When asked to explain the rise in cost of a specific product, meat, only a very few of those interviewed gave answers which showed that they understood the real causes involved. Profiteering was again the most popular explanation; two in ten ascribed the price increases to this sort of gouging of the public by retailers. Another 15 per cent gave the irritated response that they could see no good reason why prices should have gone up. Ten per cent attributed

* Continuing studies are in progress on this subject.

the extracost to Army buying.

The idea that there is such a thing as "excess purchasing power" — much less that the disease is dangerous — just doesn't make sense to many Americans. For these people, more money in the pocket means an opportunity to buy things they've wanted and needed for years. They see the situation in personal terms. They don't see the dangers inherent in 86 billion dollars of purchasing power competing for 69 billion dollars of consumers' goods.

Nevertheless, there is some popular appreciation of the fact that growing purchasing power and limited supplies of goods may mean inflation. While people do not understand the theory of the "inflationary gap", a large proportion of them do recognize that war, shortages, and increased demand have an effect upon prices. Thus they are mentally prepared for simple explanations of what would happen if we went on a national buying spree.

Furthermore, they are highly responsive to appeals couched in terms of sacrifices necessary to win the war. It is to be expected that they will cut down on their purchases, once the importance of moderation is given sufficient emphasis.

Press and Radio Treatment of the Program

The speech in which the President announced his program to the public was not only listened to by millions but received widespread coverage in the news columns of America's newspapers. But relatively few news stories appeared about subsequent radio addresses by such people as Morgenthau, Henderson and Nelson.

The anti-inflation program has received a considerable amount of discussion in editorials and signed columns. But much of this discussion has been centered around specific issues (e.g. gasoline rationing), and some of it

has been critical in character. Little general consideration has been given the program in the press.

More attention has been accorded the anti-inflation measures on the air. Twice each week prominent Government officials discuss them over approximately 75 of the 200-odd stations of the Mutual Network. But these talks reach an audience insignificant in comparison with that addressed by the President. Radio commentators have devoted a good deal of attention to the seven points -- an overwhelming majority in favorable terms. Recently a number of commentators have criticized Congress for being laggard in implementing Mr. Roosevelt's economic objectives.

The anti-inflation program has been widely and intelligently discussed in periodicals. But, in general, the discussion has bulked in trade papers (and much of this has been critical in nature) and in magazines of small circulation. Inflation has received little space in the mass-circulation magazines. It has been similarly neglected in motion pictures.

Reactions to Inflationary Controls


1. Price Control

The idea of governmental price control is viewed with favor by an overwhelming majority of the American people. Furthermore, most people believe that control should be extended to all articles without exception, and to both wholesale and retail prices. Workers and white-collar employees are most prone to favor price regulation, but in no occupational group studied were as many as ten per cent of those interviewed opposed to the idea. The attitudes of city, town and farm people are shown in the chart on the opposite page.

Although almost everyone is aware of increases in the price of articles he buys in stores, only five in ten of those questioned have noticed an increase in


ATTITUDES TOWARD ANTI-INFLATION MEASURES

 CITIES
  TOWNS
  FARMS



VIEWS CONCERNING WAR'S EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL INCOMES

"Do you have more money or less coming in this year than a year ago?"



"Do you think you will have more money or less coming in as the war goes along?"



rent during the last six months; still fewer expect rents to go up in the immediate future. Nevertheless, eight out of ten favor ceilings on rents.

Overt criticism of price control has been largely confined to trade papers. Particularly when the program was first launched, fears were expressed in the trade press that manufacturers and dealers would be caught between rising costs and fixed selling prices. Farm papers have also voiced a certain amount of criticism of price fixing. Recent comment, in both trade and farm papers, has been on the whole more favorable.

Some covert criticism of price regulation has appeared in the form of expressions of sympathy for small business. Many retailers are bewildered by the complexity and apparent contradictions of the rulings; many are still uncertain as to which of several operational policies they are expected to pursue. But there is little question about the desire of a majority of them to comply with the price fixing and rationing programs. The prevailing opinion among small businessmen is that price control is a good thing, not only for the consumer, but for them.

2. Rationing

Upwards of 80 per cent of the American people believe in rationing commodities of which there is a shortage. Rationing is seen as a mechanism for insuring fair distribution.

Those who are most inconvenienced by tire, gas, and sugar rationing are somewhat less likely to regard these programs as necessary than are those not so inconvenienced. But even among those who are inconvenienced, seven in ten recognize that tire rationing is necessary; five in ten that sugar rationing is necessary.

People in cities, small towns and rural areas were asked to give their views on the seriousness of the sugar shortage. Even though a majority in all three places regarded the shortage as not serious, about three-fourths of them were in favor of sugar rationing. They feel that rationing will facilitate a fair distribution of sugar and discourage profiteering by merchants or hoarding by the public. Some of them look upon rationing as a precaution against future shortages.

The widespread popular acceptance of rationing is in contrast to the extensive criticism this phase of the President's program has received in the press. Complaints about the confused and contradictory ways in which gasoline rationing has been explained have been almost universal; and some newspapers have questioned the wisdom or necessity of one or another of the rationing programs.

There have been numerous complaints, on the part of both the public and the press, about the way the gasoline program has been administered. Such complaints were particularly heavy when the program was inaugurated, and X cards for Congressmen were a live issue.

The President's recent speech on the rubber situation appears to have reduced criticism of gasoline rationing, at least for the time being. But it is possible to put too optimistic an interpretation on the equanimity with which rationing is now accepted. Allowances have been sufficiently generous so that relatively few people have been seriously inconvenienced thus far by restrictions.

3. Wage Stabilisation

Perhaps no portion of the President's anti-inflation program has been so frequently and enthusiastically commented upon by the press as wage freezing.

Nevertheless, it is one of the phases of the program about which there is most misunderstanding and most difference of opinion.

There is general acceptance of the principle of "wage fixing". But there are many different notions of what the phrase means. Laborers and low income white-collar workers are much less prone to approve it than are farmers, owners of businesses and better paid white-collar workers. Many of those favoring it think of wage fixing as a means of helping the individual rather than of curtailing buying power. This results in considerable difference of opinion as to the level at which wages should be fixed and as to the kind of measure which should be adopted. People tend to interpret wage control in terms of their own self-interest. Few favor outright freezing at present levels.

4. Taxation and Profit Control

War promotes a readiness to accept the burden of taxation. The comments of many of those interviewed show that, even though they regard their income tax as high, they are perfectly willing to pay it.

Two out of three of those who voiced an opinion of the present income tax schedule regarded it as equitable. However, a substantial minority of those questioned -- mostly low income people who have never paid an income tax -- expressed no opinion.

Most of the individuals who take exception to the present schedule feel that it bears too heavily on low incomes, too lightly on high incomes. Their criticisms are seldom voiced with any real sharpness.

Among people interviewed in a survey conducted by the Denver University National Opinion Research Center, six in ten say they would like to have money regularly deducted from their pay to take care of their income tax. Those in the low income group are particularly prone to favor such an arrangement.

The idea of limiting profits during wartime meets with widespread approval. But there are a number of different ideas as to just what "profits" means. And a substantial minority of those who favor profit limitation would make exceptions in the case of certain types of business. Thus there might be a good deal of difference of opinion with regard to any particular measure to regulate profits.

5. Stabilization of Farm Prices

People were not asked specifically whether they favored the President's proposal that farm prices be stabilized at parity. But there is reason to believe that many farmers think of overall price control largely in terms of their own produce. Approval of price control is highest in the cities and lowest in rural areas.

The skepticism with which some farm papers view price control reflects their fear that it will hurt the farmer. The urban press is, of course, overwhelmingly in favor of stabilizing farm prices at parity levels.

6. Purchase of War Bonds

People show that they think the purchase of war bonds is a good idea by actually buying them. Most of them indicate approval of the voluntary payroll deduction plan. But few seem aware of the importance of bond purchases out of current income in checking inflation. People say they buy bonds to help their country win the war, and because they regard them as good investments.

The infrequency with which they mention "to prevent inflation" as a reason for buying bonds may be due to the fact that this reason has received comparatively little emphasis thus far in the war bond campaign.

7. Discouragement of Credit and Installment Buying

In response to a question posed by the Denver National Opinion Research Center, 83 per cent of a nationwide sample expressed approval of the Government's restrictions on installment buying.

General Economic Attitudes

The President's 7-point program comes into operation in an atmosphere of general confidence in the Government. There is at once a willingness to have the Government exercise control and a belief that it can do so effectively.

Price regulation is generally considered the solution of the cost-of-living problem — the most pressing economic problem in the public mind. A majority of people in all income and occupational groups feel confident that the Government will be able to maintain control over the price structure.

As has been pointed out, other economic controls are viewed in different ways by different people. They tend to judge them on the basis of their own personal situations. But there is little objection on ideological grounds to Government intervention in economic affairs. Controls are appraised in terms of specific problems.

The minority opposed to price control is somewhat larger in the country than in the city. The difference is probably due to the fear of some rural people that the stabilization of farm prices will take place at an unfavorable level.

Conversely, approval of wage control runs highest in the farm population, lowest in the cities. The concern of farmers over the wages of farm help and the fear of urban workers that the measure will adversely affect them are two of the factors which explain the divergence.

Next year offers uncertainty to most people. As the chart opposite page 4 indicates, about one-fifth of those interviewed expect to be making more money. But the prospect of higher income alone does not insure an optimistic outlook. Fewer than one-fifth expect to be generally better off a year from now. There is a nearly even division among those who think they will be better off, those who expect no change, those who expect to be worse off and those who say the future will depend on unpredictable factors.

When people's expectations are projected into the more distant future, they become far more pessimistic. Half of the people interviewed think that there will be a depression after the war is over. Farmers are the most prone to hold this view; people who live in small towns tend to look ahead somewhat more gloomily than those who live in big cities.

Many of the people predicting a depression believe that it will be the worst in history. The reason most frequently given is that depressions always follow wars and that this is the worst of wars; they consider a bad post-war period virtually inevitable. They foresee idle plants when war production is ended, and demobilized soldiers flooding the labor market. Some feel that an enormous national debt will require crippling taxes.

A smaller group thinks that there may be an immediate post-war boom to be followed by a serious slump. A few anticipate difficult conditions immediately following the war, but feel that they may improve later on. About one in six persons takes the optimistic view that times will be better when the war is over.

In spite of these fears, people look with considerable confidence toward their Government to alleviate the economic future. Some offer specific suggestions. A greater number merely suggest that the problem is one for experts

or that "something" could be done.

Of the persons who anticipate a post-war depression, about one-third spontaneously mentioned the Government as an agency which might prevent or mitigate it. Governmental action is mentioned much more frequently by city people than by farmers or the residents of small towns.

CONCLUSIONS

It is through its economic impact that the war makes itself most intimately felt among civilians. Americans thus far have shown readiness to accept this impact cheerfully. Restrictions have in the main, received approval. Indeed, the public has expressed a desire for stricter regulation than the Government has yet imposed.

In appraising governmental regulation of economic life, Americans apply two standards — necessity and equity. They need to understand that the restriction is necessary and that its burden is distributed fairly. Because of the latter feeling, they insist upon strict enforcement of regulations. Laxity is the principal complaint leveled against the rationing of gasoline. Criticism of price control has been almost wholly directed toward defects in its application.

Clarity and vigor are the prime needs in the application of anti-inflation measures. Emphasis by news media is essential in explaining these measures to the public. A program of adult education in the elements of economics is necessary to promote popular understanding of the complex inter-relationships between the phases of the President's economic program and of the necessity for each of them. Thus far the subject has received inadequate

attention in opinion-forming media -- perhaps because they have not been enlisted in the effort or given sufficient material to advance public awareness of its importance.

The public attitude toward the Government in the role of economic supervisor is generally hopeful and confident. But vague fears of the future, despairing beliefs that post-war upheaval is inescapable, need to be combatted by vigorous informational efforts. Given a conviction that depression can be avoided, the public is likely to have faith that its Government can meet the problem.