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July 14, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS

SUPPLEMENT TO SURVEY No. 25

Bureau of Intelligence

Office of War Information


OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
~~OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES~~  
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of a  
supplemental report to Survey of Intelligence Materials  
No. 25 prepared for the Director of the Office of War  
Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence  
Office of War Information

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

*file*  
July 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: -- Miss Grace Tully

FROM: R. Keith Kane, Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Because the Bureau of Intelligence has a supplemental report this week concerning the Negro problem, which is being distributed today, the regular weekly report will not be issued until Friday, July 17.

**DECLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

July 14, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS  
SUPPLEMENT TO SURVEY NO. 25  
Bureau of Intelligence  
Office of War Information

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### S O U R C E S

This report is a supplement to Survey No. 25, "Negroes in a Democracy at War", and should be read in conjunction with it. It is based upon the following material — which is available to those who desire it:

- "Memphis Negroes and the War", Extensive Surveys Division, Report #26
- "The Negro Looks At the War", Extensive Surveys Division, Report #21
- "The Grievance Pattern", Division of Surveys, Report #15a
- Special Services Division report on the Negro problem, June 23, 1942
- "Editorial Emphasis in the Negro Press, May 29 - June 20", Special Intelligence Report #48, Division of Information Channels
- "Statements of Thought Leaders on the Negro Problem, March to June, 1942", and supplementary report of June 24, 1942, Source Materials Division.

Supplement to Survey No. 25

**MEMPHIS NEGROES AND THE WAR**

"Yes suh, the Army is all right to our people." When asked whether the Army treats Negroes fairly, seven out of ten Memphis Negroes gave this sort of answer to white interviewers. But only four in ten said that the Army is fair to Negroes when talking to interviewers of their own race.

On question after question Memphis Negroes exhibited this tendency to give whites the answers they felt were expected of them — to kowtow to white prejudices, to repress opinions which might not be well received by the dominant race. The chart on the opposite page shows the way they differed in their responses to white and Negro interviewers on ten important questions related to the war.

Only a month before, the same questions had been asked of Negroes in New York. As in Memphis, both white and Negro interviewers were employed. On one or two questions there was a considerable difference in the responses made to the two groups. But in general the differences were so slight that they could be disregarded in assessing the sentiment of New York's Negro population. Thirty-five percent of those questioned told white interviewers that the Army treats their race fairly; 31 percent gave this same answer to Negroes.

In Memphis, on the other hand, the answers given to white interviewers were apparently so influenced by deference or fear as to be almost valueless as an index of Negro opinion. Throughout this survey it is the responses which Negroes gave to members of their own race which are cited to show their views.

Even these responses may understate the amount of disaffection which exists among Memphis Negroes. Many of them were so apprehensive and suspicious that they may have concealed opinions which might have appeared unpatriotic or defiant even in talking to members of their own race. On the average, Memphis interviews took twice as long as those in New York because of the necessity of reassuring respondents. Their greatest concern was that someone in town might be shown or told what they said.

#### Significance

In assessing the war morale of Memphis Negroes their anxieties deserve as much attention as their views on various issues. A group which does not feel free to express its opinion probably does not feel full identification with the war effort and is inclined to regard this as a "white man's war."

Behind these anxieties are decades of living on a sufferance basis in a white-dominated world. Southern Negroes must "know their place." Discrimination and frustration are the lot of Negroes in all parts of the country. But in the North, where Negroes constitute a political force and are relatively secure against illegal physical attack, Negroes may at least venture to express their dissatisfaction and, within limits, even their hostility. In the South many forms of pressure — all of them backed by the lurking threat of physical violence — are exerted to keep them quiet and docile. Any manifestation of assertiveness is certain to arouse the most bitter opposition.

In Memphis this pressure is at least as severe as in other Southern cities. It is known that on one occasion the police commissioner exercised his influence to keep Memphis Negro newspapers from publishing "inflammatory articles." The following excerpt from a news item in a "white" Memphis newspaper describes the incident:

"[The Commissioner] said he summoned the two editors to his office. 'I simply told them that I would not have them running articles that would stir up feeling between the whites and the blacks,' he said. 'They assured me that none of the articles they had published were intended to do so, but the articles speak for themselves.'"

Four out of ten of the Negroes interviewed in Memphis admitted reading the more militant Negro newspapers published in other cities. About one-third read the necessarily mild Memphis World. The remainder read no Negro newspaper. Grievances, North and South

At least so far as areas close to their everyday activities are concerned, Memphis Negroes do not need the prod of a militant press to be aware of the discrimination to which their race is subjected. They have sufficient first-hand experience with it in their daily life.

It is the discrimination they experience in their attempt to earn a living which is most keenly resented. When asked "What do Negroes feel worst about right now?", 43 per cent of those interviewed specified the wages paid to Negroes; another one-third referred to employment discrimination. Eight per cent mentioned housing and an equal percentage mentioned segregation.

The primary concern of Memphis Negroes with their economic situation is evident. Better economic opportunities are apparently regarded as the key to the improvement of Negro life in all its aspects.


The grievances mentioned most frequently by Memphis Negroes were by and large the same ones which received most emphasis in Harlem. Respondents in both cities were most aggrieved about economic injustices. But whereas New York's Negro population felt most rancor about employment discrimination, in Memphis wages were the main source of concern. Jobs are relatively plentiful in Memphis, but most of those open to Negroes pay poorly. And Memphis Negroes particularly resent the fact that they are often forced to accept lower pay than whites for the same work.

The "Double V" Campaign

Still another indication that Negroes in various parts of the country feel much the same way about the discrimination they suffer is the response of Negroes in New York and Memphis to the "Double V" campaign. Militant Negro leaders maintain that if the war is to have meaning for Negroes it must have a two-fold goal — victory for democracy at home, as well as abroad. The "Double V" campaign is intended, on the one hand, to mobilize Negro opinion and, on the other, to remind Americans generally of the contradiction inherent in the nation's allegiance to democratic ideals and its treatment of its Negro minority. In effect, it is an attempt to promote the idea that Negroes must be permitted to enjoy the full advantages of democracy before they can be expected to devote their full energies to defending it.

The chart below shows the extent to which this line of reasoning has taken hold in New York and Memphis:

## IS IT MORE IMPORTANT RIGHT NOW TO BEAT GERMANY AND JAPAN OR TO MAKE DEMOCRACY WORK AT HOME?



As will be seen, a far larger proportion of those interviewed in Memphis either had no opinion on the question of did not venture to express one. But of those respondents who did express themselves, almost the same proportion in Memphis as in Harlem felt that our primary preoccupation today should be, not the defeat of the Axis, but the perfection of our own democracy.

#### Views on Other Issues

Not only are Memphis Negroes discouraged about their present situation; many of them do not feel that a United Nations victory will mean any improvement in their lot. Only a third of those interviewed feel that Negroes will be treated any better if we win the war. Four in ten expect that Negroes will be treated just the same as at present. Seven per cent anticipate worse treatment.

Such expectations are hardly likely to generate enthusiasm for the war effort. The extent of the apathy toward the war among Memphis Negroes is dramatically revealed by their attitude toward a Japanese victory. Only one-fourth of those interviewed felt that they would be any worse off under Japanese domination than they are now. Nine per cent thought they would be better off; and it must be remembered that still others may have hesitated to express such a dangerous opinion.

These responses reflect not only apathy but some feeling of kinship with the Japanese as a dark-skinned race. Only a very small number of Memphis Negroes maintained that they would be as well off under German, as under American, rule. Nearly half of those interviewed said definitely that they would be worse off.

#### Ignorance

Nevertheless, notably fewer respondents in Memphis than in New York appeared to be aware of German racial theories and of the probable consequences

for Negroes of a German victory. The chart below compares the responses in the two cities:

### WOULD NEGROES BE TREATED BETTER UNDER GERMAN RULE?



The fact that more respondents in New York than in Memphis said that they would be worse off under German rule is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that outspoken criticism of American policies is more prevalent among northern Negroes. The difference must be attributed in very large measure to the greater ignorance of the Memphis respondents. Three Memphis Negroes out of ten "didn't know" whether their lot would be better or worse if Germany won. Less than half as many of those interviewed in New York failed to express an opinion on this point.

On almost all questions at all remote from respondents' everyday interests there was a wide difference in the proportion of "don't know" responses in New York and Memphis. The chart on the opposite page shows the extent of the variation on five issues:

## SUMMARY

The responses of Memphis Negroes to the same questions asked a month earlier of Negroes in New York show that the two groups have essentially the same grievances. Negroes in both Memphis and New York are patriotic and in full sympathy with our expressed war aims. But they feel that they themselves are not being treated democratically or given adequate opportunity to participate in the war effort.

The dissatisfaction they feel in consequence takes different forms of expression in the two cities. The militance which was so widespread in Harlem was conspicuously absent in Memphis. Memphis Negroes were fearful of expressing their views, and were more ignorant about war issues and more apathetic about them than New York respondents.

The greater ignorance of Memphis Negroes was most apparent from the large proportion of "don't know" responses. These were particularly numerous on all questions at all remote from the group's everyday experience. The proportion of respondents who failed to express an opinion on the question, "Is the army unfair to Negroes?", was not significantly greater in Memphis than in New York. But four Memphis Negroes in ten "didn't know" if the navy is fair to Negroes, whereas practically everyone interviewed in Harlem had an opinion on this question.

The apathy of Memphis Negroes was particularly evident from their responses to questions on the outcome of the war. Only a third of the sample felt that a United Nations' victory would mean any improvement in their lot. Only a fourth felt that they would be worse off under Japanese rule than they are at present. To some extent this response may reflect some sympathy with the Japanese as a colored race; but only 45 per cent believed that they would be treated worse by the Germans than they are by their fellow Americans.

The intimidation of Memphis Negroes revealed itself most sharply in the different ways they responded to white and Negro interviewers. They consistently tended to conceal their true views from whites and to give instead the opinions which they felt it was proper to express. Even in talking to members of their own race they were suspicious and apprehensive.


In both Memphis and New York, Negroes are most concerned about the discrimination they experience in trying to earn a living. The chief difference is that New York Negroes are most troubled about employment discrimination, whereas Memphis Negroes feel most resentment about the wages paid to colored workers. In both cities poor housing conditions and Jim Crowism are much less frequently mentioned.



# DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES TO WHITES AND NEGROES



"YES" ANSWERS TO:  white interviewers  negro interviewers








# "DON'T KNOW" RESPONSES



Would negroes be better treated under Japanese rule?



Is the Army fair to negroes?



If we win, will negroes be treated better?




Is the Navy fair to negroes?

\*



Is enough being done for air-raid protection?



■ New York

■ Memphis

\* Less than 1/2 of 1%.

Unquestionably, fear sometimes prompted Negroes to give "don't know" answers when faced with a dangerous question. But the failure to express any opinion may be ascribed in most cases to ignorance. This ignorance is a reflection not only of the lower educational level of southern Negroes, but of the way they react to discrimination. In the north, the frustrations Negroes suffer often generate outspoken hostility against the dominant race. In the south, where such a reaction would not be tolerated, discrimination begets discouragement and apathy. Ignorance is one consequence of that apathy.

### Hopelessness

The feeling of helplessness and hopelessness of Memphis Negroes is perhaps most clearly revealed in their answers to the question, "Who would a Negro go to around here if he couldn't get his rights?"

One-fourth of those interviewed said definitely that there was no one to whom a Negro could apply to get redress for his grievances. Another one-fourth said they would not know where to turn. Three per cent said they would invoke the help of God. Seven per cent would look to the benevolence of the federal Government.

Only five per cent indicated that they would seek the help of the police or courts of law, although 27 per cent of those who talked with white interviewers professed to have confidence in these regularly constituted authorities. Seven per cent said that they would go to see Memphis' mayor or its political boss.

An additional 18 per cent indicated that they would turn to other white people for help. Only three per cent said that they would seek help from members of their own race or from organizations working for Negro rights.

Yet the most widely publicized campaigns of what is perhaps the most influential of these organizations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, have been conducted in the South; and in response to another question, 20 per cent of those interviewed indicated that they were familiar with its work. Memphis Negroes may feel, however, that even such an organization as the NAACP functions very much on a sufferance basis in the South. In Memphis, Negro municipal employees cannot keep their jobs if they are members of the NAACP or any similar organization.

The attitudes of New York Negroes, as revealed in their responses to this same question, contrast sharply with those of Memphis respondents. New York Negroes show no more faith than the members of their race in Memphis in courts of law and the police, but they show far greater disposition to rely

upon their own resources or upon unofficial champions of their race. More than a fourth of those interviewed in New York said that if they couldn't get their rights they would turn for help to militant colored leaders or to organizations which seek to advance the welfare of Negroes.

Chicago — Atlanta

Another recent study conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence reveals that the same general contrast which prevails in Memphis and New York also exists between the Negro populations of Chicago and Atlanta.

Half of the Negroes interviewed in Chicago had negative views on four or more of eight issues which were selected as indices of discontent; only four per cent of these interviewed in Atlanta had so many grievances. On the other hand, a far larger proportion of respondents in Atlanta than in Chicago were either ignorant of the issues or afraid to express their opinion.

In Chicago far more Negroes than whites had numerous grievances — even though the number of disaffected whites was high as compared with Atlanta. In Atlanta, on the other hand, Negroes voiced even fewer complaints than the relatively satisfied white population.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of both the New York-Memphis and the Atlanta-Chicago studies suggest that discontent is prevalent among American Negroes generally, but takes a different form of expression in the north and in the south. In Chicago and New York grievances are freely expressed, and a militant, defiant spirit is evident. In Memphis and Atlanta lack of enthusiasm for the war is revealed most clearly by apathy — by ignorance of the issues involved and a "don't care" attitude.

The need to reduce the resentment and frustration experienced by Negroes in all parts of the country is clearly indicated. Because Negroes are especially bitter about economic discrimination, efforts to enlarge their opportunities for employment and to eliminate inequitable wage differentials present particularly promising possibilities. The federal government has an unprecedented opportunity to exercise leadership in this area because of the growing importance of defense work, with which it is concerned, in the total economy.

Those policies of the armed forces which arouse the resentment of Negroes should also be reexamined. An obviously indicated way of improving the morale of Negroes is to give them wider opportunities to participate in the war effort in ways that, while consistent with their ability and training, do not make them feel humiliated.

Negro leaders should be invited to cooperate with the federal government in publicizing its efforts and achievements in reducing discrimination.

The essential grievance of Negroes is that they have not been admitted to full partnership in our democratic society. Once they are convinced that the justice of their demands is recognized, their full participation in the war effort may be confidently anticipated. The poor morale they manifest at present does not stem from lack of patriotism, isolationist sentiment or any lack of enthusiasm for democratic values. It is a direct result of the frustrations they experience in their daily lives and, very frequently, even in their attempts to contribute to the war effort.

It is important that America heed the just complaints of its Negro minority and enlist their full cooperation not only or even primarily because the nation needs their strength. Rather such a course must be followed

because any other one would weaken the faith of the American people themselves, as well as of their allies, in the sincerity of their objectives and the greatness of their cause.

July 16, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 32

Bureau of Intelligence

Office of War Information


OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
**OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES**  
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of  
Survey of Intelligence Materials Report No. 32 pre-  
pared for the Director of the Office of War Informa-  
tion.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence  
Office of War Information

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

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SECRET  
July 16, 1942

SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE MATERIALS No. 32

Bureau of Intelligence

Office of War Information

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## SUMMARY

Most Americans are now convinced that the weapons needed to fight the war are being produced at a satisfactory rate. As a result they are less critical than they were two months ago toward workers, labor leaders and executives. Nevertheless, four respondents in ten of a national cross sample recently interviewed felt that labor leaders are not doing all they can to win the war. Seventeen per cent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the contribution of executives and workers.

Corruption and irresponsible trouble-making are the charges most frequently levelled against labor unions. Excluding workers, half of those interviewed feel that the Government has not been sufficiently strict in its treatment of unions.

Nine respondents in ten believe that strikes in war industries should be banned for the duration. Three respondents in four believe that they should be outlawed even in non-war industries. On both issues the overwhelming majority of workers share the view of the general public.

Although three-fourths of the sample approves of the idea of wage ceilings, there are many different conceptions of what wage control means. Even when the idea is carefully defined, respondents tend to hedge their replies with qualifications. A large proportion of those in favor of wage control believe that it should be applied only to wages above a certain amount. And there is a strong feeling that wages should not be frozen until they have been adjusted to the rise in the cost of living which has already occurred.

In recent months there has been a notable increase in public understanding of the 40-hour week issue. Opinions on the desirability of retaining a basic 40-hour work week appear to be closely related to occupational status. Among farmers and the managerial and professional classes, half of those interviewed believe that the 40-hour week should be abandoned. But only two workers in ten are willing to accept a longer basic work week, and those opposed to any change feel strongly about the matter.

Americans generally approve, with reservations, expanding the labor forces through the employment of large numbers of married women. But only six in ten believe that more Negroes should be hired. Eight out of ten are opposed to hiring aliens.

"The American people are aroused and determined today. They want our industrial mechanism to produce. If management and labor are unable to sink their differences, forget their suspicions, and work together to make that mechanism produce as it should, then public indignation will sweep both management and labor aside and insist that rigid government controls be set up—controls which we might find it difficult to remove after the war."

D. M. Nelson, March 23, 1942

#### WAR TIME LABOR PROBLEMS

##### I. Beliefs Affecting Labor Attitudes

There is evidently a definite relationship between people's satisfaction with the progress of production and their feelings toward the groups manning the production front. Of a cross section of the public interviewed in June, seven in ten of those who thought that production was going well believed that workers were doing all they could in the war effort; in contrast, only two in ten of those who thought that production was only going fairly well were satisfied with labor's contribution. This same pattern was evident in the public's evaluation of the contribution of labor leaders and of management.

The relationship is confirmed by the changes in people's attitudes toward those responsible for production. Between March and June, as a result of first-hand knowledge and of official statements to the effect that we were "over the hump" in the battle of production, the public grew more satisfied with the rate at which the tools of war were being produced. During this same period satisfaction with workers, labor leaders and executives mounted sharply. In March and again in June a cross section of the public was asked whether these three groups were doing all they could do to help win the war. The following

table shows people's responses on both occasions:


	<u>EXECUTIVES</u>		<u>WORKERS</u>		<u>LABOR LEADERS</u>	
	March	June	March	June	March	June
Doing all they could	59%	67%	57%	73%	25%	36%
Not doing all they could	26	17	32	17	55	40
Don't know	15	16	11	10	20	24

Government's Attitude Toward Unions

Peoples' beliefs on a number of other questions evidently color their attitudes toward labor and toward labor issues. Their economic status affects their views on some of these questions. In the chart below it will be noted that workers and the general public see eye to eye on two questions, and differ considerably in their appraisal of the other two.



**BELIEFS THAT AFFECT PUBLIC  
ATTITUDES TOWARD LABOR**



Difference of opinion among various occupational groups on the Government's treatment of labor unions is even sharper than the chart indicates. In the managerial and professional class six out of ten people feel that the government has not been strict enough in its attitude toward unions. Only one war worker out of four shares this view.

Labor, Labor Leaders and Unions

Criticism of the Government's lenience toward labor unions probably reflects some dissatisfaction with labor itself—with workers, their organizations, and their leaders. Despite the notable increase in public approval of these groups between March and June, what criticism there was of war production was largely directed against labor. Much of this criticism, however, was leveled against labor leaders rather than workers.

Resentment about strikes appeared to be the most important cause of dissatisfaction with labor. Four respondents in ten believed that strikes were delaying production, although one half of those who made this charge conceded that they were delaying it "only a little."

Two respondents in ten believed that some war workers were deliberately holding back and giving less than their best to production. But only four per cent of the sample felt that any considerable number of workers were guilty of such a practice.

Labor unions and labor leaders were far more frequently and sharply criticized than workers. A majority of the public recognized the notable accomplishments of unions in protecting and raising wage levels, improving working conditions, and "keeping workers from being kicked around." However, large numbers of people were unwilling or unable to specify any good things done by unions. Excluding workers, 17 per cent of all respondents said unequivocally that they had done

nothing good. Farmers were least prone of all occupational groups to credit unions with any worthwhile accomplishments.

Most of those who denounced unions mentioned two types of abuses:

1. Racketeering, corruption, high dues and initiation fees.
2. Irresponsible demands, trouble making, and unnecessary strikes.

#### Press Handling of Labor News

The feeling that the Government is inclined to pamper labor unions is counterbalanced to some extent by the belief that newspapers are partial to management. One person out of every four interviewed felt that the press is unfair in its treatment of labor news, and most of this group felt that it leans to management's side.

The facts appear to support this contention. Except in labor publications, labor's role in the war effort is seldom praised. The credit for production achievements is usually given by newspapers to "American industry", to "free enterprise", to "inventive genius". Workers are sometimes attacked editorially for striking and impeding production even during periods when strikes are demonstrably few. During May, when strikes dropped to an all-time low of 6/100 of 1 per cent of total man'days worked, numerous editorials appeared denouncing striking workers and implying that strikes were widespread.

#### Criticism of Management

Criticism of management was only a little less widespread than criticism of workers. One third of all respondents--and almost one half of all respondents with definite opinions on the issue--felt that the profits being made by the companies producing war materials are too large. The "selfishness of management" was frequently mentioned by respondents dissatisfied with the progress of war production.

Unlike much of the criticism voiced against labor, criticism of management did not vary in accordance with economic or occupational status. The prosperous were just as critical as the poor. The professional, managerial, and white collar groups were somewhat more inclined than workers to feel that current rates of profit are exorbitant.

#### The Critically-Minded

A substantial portion of all the criticism voiced against the various groups on the production front is unrelated to economic status. It comes, rather, from a group of respondents on all economic levels who are dissatisfied with the progress of production and inclined to regard the public as dangerously complacent.

This group, which includes a relatively large number of well-educated individuals, is far more critical than the public at large toward workers, labor leaders and management. It wants harder work all along the line.

#### Workers and the Public

It has been pointed out, however, that economic status does affect beliefs on certain questions. While the beliefs of one important group of people are primarily determined by their views on the progress of the war, the beliefs of other respondents are markedly influenced by their economic position.

As has been seen, managerial and professional people are far more likely than workers to feel that the Government has been indulgent with labor unions. Workers, on the other hand, are more critical than the general public of the way the press handles labor news.

Similar differences manifest themselves in response to other questions. As the chart on page 2 shows, workers are considerably more pessimistic than the public about the prospect of getting back gains given up during the war. Six out of ten people in the occupational and professional group feel that any sacrifices

made by labor will be only temporary; only one-third of those war workers who are union members are confident of this. Thus executives and workers approach the question of whether labor should give up certain of its present prerogatives in an entirely different frame of reference.

Previous surveys, as well as this one, have shown that workers are much more keenly aware than the public at large of the rising cost of living. They are not more inclined than the public to expect a post-war depression, but the fear of hard times to come may have more influence upon them.

Workers are naturally more aware than the public of deficiencies in their housing, transportation and amusement facilities, although large numbers of respondents in all groups recognize that conditions are nothing to brag about. Farmers and residents of towns were especially critical of living facilities for workers--providing an accurate reflection of the deficiencies so conspicuous in many suddenly swollen small communities.

A final factor which affects the opinion of workers on controversial labor issues is their fear of the temper of the public. Rightly or wrongly, workers believe that the general public is unsympathetic with their situation and unlikely to do them justice. This fear may very well complete a vicious circle by making them more reluctant to make concessions, thus reenforcing the resentment certain elements of the public now feel toward labor.

## II. Opinions on Controversial Issues

All of the beliefs which have been discussed find reflection in people's views on controversial labor issues. There is a high correlation, for example, between the demand that labor make sacrifices and dissatisfaction with the Government's labor union policy. Similarly, those who felt that labor would get back the gains it relinquishes, were more prone than those who did not to demand

sacrifices now.

Despite these correlations, opinion on controversial issues does not necessarily follow class or occupational lines. As has been seen, all Americans tend to view certain current developments, such as the progress of production, in very much the same way. Furthermore, workers are not unwilling to make sacrifices for the common good when they regard those sacrifices as necessary and reasonable.

#### The Right to Strike

Despite their fear that the rights they give up now may not be restored, workers were almost as prone as any other occupational group to feel that the right to strike should be given up for the duration. Ninety per cent of the general public and 84 per cent of the workers favored a ban on strikes in war industries.

Fifty-five per cent of all respondents believed that the Government was the proper agency to enforce the ban on strikes. Twenty-eight per cent felt that unions should enforce it.

Three respondents out of every four believed that strikes should be banned even in non-war industries during the emergency. On this issue, too, workers shared the view of the general public.

#### Wage Ceilings

The issue of wage ceilings is distinctly muddled. In general, it may be said that people approve of the idea of wage control, but tend to interpret it in such a way that it will not hurt themselves. There are many different conceptions about wage control current, and even when the idea is rigorously defined people tend to qualify their views.

When asked, "If rents are kept from going higher during the war, and if profits are limited, do you think wages ought to be limited, too?", three people

out of four said "Yes." But two-thirds of those who approved of wage ceilings indicated that they would apply them only to wages over a certain amount. Some of those who favored ceilings were loathe to have their own wages fixed, and the highest approval of ceilings came from the group that would be least affected by them: executives and professional people, farmers and the non-employed.

Workers object to a general imposition of wage ceilings on three counts. They feel that they would be unfair to all workers whose pay has not been increased in the past year, in view of the rise in the cost of living during that period. They point out that ceilings would be particularly unjust to those workers whose wages have gotten out of line with pay for similar workers in other industries. And they strenuously object to keeping the wages of workers receiving substandard pay where they are today—to putting a ceiling where they feel the floor should be. Many workers and labor leaders feel that the President's wage proposal has been deliberately distorted. They emphasize the distinction between wage freezing and wage stabilization.

#### The \$25,000 Income Limitation

Although it has received little support, except in the labor press, the President's proposal to limit individual incomes to \$25,000 a year has won widespread approval. Sixty-four per cent of all respondents okayed the idea, and another 11 per cent had not made up their minds. Only one in four of those interviewed opposed the proposal.

To many workers the \$25,000 income limitation has evidently become a symbol of the idea of equality of sacrifice. Approval of the proposal increased as one progressed down the income ladder. The poorly educated were more prone to approve this proposal than the well educated. But it may be significant that well-educated young people were more inclined to favor the limitation than older people

on the same educational level.

The national sample was not questioned on the subject of profit limitations. But a group of war workers who were questioned voiced strong approval of the idea. Only one in ten disapproved or expressed any qualification.

#### The 40-Hour Week

The 40-hour week is now a dormant issue, but agitation for its abandonment is likely to reappear at any time. As the man power shortage becomes more acute, for example, and plants now working 40 hours a week see the need to work longer, they may launch a campaign against it in an effort to limit their labor costs.

It is reassuring to find that, except in rural areas, there is now widespread understanding of the true meaning of the 40-hour week. Understanding of the concept has increased perceptibly in the last two or three months as a result of official announcements, newspaper publicity and the explanations of labor unions.


Understanding, however, has not produced uniformity of opinion. When asked whether workers in war industries who are now working 48 hours a week and being paid overtime for all hours over 40 should continue on this basis, only 53 per cent of the sample said that they should. 37 per cent of the respondents were opposed to overtime pay for all hours over 40; 10 per cent had no opinion.

The chart on the following page shows the sharp difference of opinion on this question by occupational status:



## SHOULD WAR WORKERS CONTINUE TO BE PAID OVERTIME FOR WORK OVER FORTY HOURS ?

"Yes" responses



Views are evidently related to people's conception of their economic interests. The opposition of many executives to the 40-hour week probably reflects not only their belief that a longer basic work week is necessary to the attainment of top production, but also their desire to keep down labor costs. Farmers are opposed to the idea in large numbers not only because they are accustomed to working long hours, but also because prevailing wage scales in

war industries make it hard for them to get good help.

The overwhelming majority of war workers, particularly among those with union affiliations, feel strongly that the basic 40-hour work week is satisfactory and should be maintained. They regard it as one of the most precious of labor's hard-won gains, and they are fearful of not getting it back if they accept a longer basic work week now. They feel that the overtime pay they get is needed to bolster their earnings, which they regard as low in relation to the present cost of living. The overtime rate of pay, they point out, provides an incentive for giving up week ends and other time they want for themselves. Finally, they feel that the present arrangement discourages employers from working men excessive hours, and that management would be the only one to profit from any change.

A small minority of workers are reconciled to abandoning the 40-hour week. Most of those who have come around to this position feel that a change is required by the war situation. Among workers employed in plants which now make it a policy to work only 40 hours, there are some who favor some other arrangement because they feel that it might mean more money for them.

By no means all representatives of management favor meddling with the 40-hour week. A number of executives emphasized the fact that wage rates are now adjusted to a 40-hour week, and would be thrown out of line by any change. It was pointed out, too, that the 40-hour week provides an element of flexibility in the wage structure; when the volume of business falls, wages are automatically reduced by the termination of overtime pay. More important than these economic arguments was the widespread fear among executives that any forced change in the present arrangement would have a detrimental effect on worker's morale.

This fear appears to be justified. Of a group of workers who were drawn out at some length on the 40-hour week issue, many expressed the opinion

that workers would feel bitter resentment about any change. A few predicted that there would be at least sporadic violence. It is certain that at the present time the abolition of the 40-hour week would be interpreted by workers as a defeat for the administration or a deliberate sell-out. Some loss of confidence in the government, which they now regard as a champion of their rights, would inevitably ensue.

#### Compulsory Bond Purchases

Six respondents out of ten said they would welcome an arrangement whereby the Government would require all employed people to take a portion of their pay in war bonds. War workers were more favorably disposed toward such an arrangement than any other occupational group.

In general, however, approval varied in accordance with economic status, with the prosperous most in favor of the plan, and the poor least in favor of it. Some of the opposition to the plan may have resulted from the fear that the amount to be deducted would be too large.

#### Expanding the Labor Force

With the nation's industrial machine being used with unprecedented intensity and millions of men being drawn into the armed services, the necessity of expanding the country's labor supply is urgent. People were therefore asked to give their views on the employment of three groups which constitute important reservoirs of additional workers -- married women, Negroes, and aliens.

#### Married Women

Six out of ten of those interviewed favored the employment of married women in war industries. An additional 25 per cent gave contingent approval to the idea. The most frequently mentioned qualification was that women should not work if it meant the neglect of their family responsibilities. Others said they

avored the employment of married women only if there was a real shortage of labor or in cases where the husband's income was inadequate.

The small minority (13 per cent) opposed to the employment of women also stressed family considerations and the need to protect men and unemployed single women from additional competition. The objections of some of this group and of some of those who qualify their answers could probably be overcome by greater stress on the need for women in war work and by the establishment of day nurseries and other facilities that would make it easier for women with children to accept employment.

Women are more prone than men to favor the use of married women in war industries; and, as might be expected, women who are now working approve the idea more frequently than housewives and unemployed women. Among respondents of both sexes the young are more inclined to accept the idea of women working than are the old. The better educated are more in favor of the idea than are the less well educated.

#### Negroes

Only half of those interviewed worked in plants which now hire Negroes, but a somewhat larger number felt that their plants should employ them. It is not certain, however, that these people favored throwing all kinds of jobs open to Negroes, and some of them may simply have been giving lip service to democratic doctrine. It is impossible to say to what extent employee sentiment in favor of the employment of Negroes outruns employer practice.

Those who are accustomed to working with Negroes are far more prone to favor their employment than those who are not. Nine out of ten of those respondents whose firms hire Negroes favored their employment; among other workers only three in ten voiced approval of the more extensive use of Negroes.

Sentiment in favor of the employment of Negroes is highest in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific states, lowest in the south. But even in the south it is higher among respondents who now work with Negroes than it is among those who do not.

Aliens

Eight in ten of all employed persons interviewed were opposed to the hiring of aliens. War workers were particularly prone to believe that citizenship should be a necessary prerequisite for employment.

Respondents in plants which now hire aliens were more inclined to approve their employment than respondents in plants where workers have to be citizens. But even among the former group the majority were opposed to the employment of aliens. Interviewing was completed before the President's recent statement advocating the fuller utilization of loyal aliens.

CONCLUSIONS

Deep-seated attitudes and economic status may unquestionably affect people's views toward workers and labor issues. Yet the Government has numerous opportunities to clarify and influence opinion in this field.

The increase in public understanding of the meaning of the 40-hour week is one example of what can be accomplished. The issue of wage ceilings appears to be in particular need of clarification at this time.

In connection with some issues, one informational approach will suffice for both workers and the general public. For example, there is need for allaying the fears of large numbers of people in both groups about the inevitability of a post-war depression. Similarly, the American people generally need to be educated to the necessity of employing more married women, Negroes, and aliens in order to

meet the present demand for workers.

In connection with other issues, separate approaches are indicated for workers and the general public. Workers are much more apprehensive than the public about the prospects of getting back gains relinquished now. As a result, they are somewhat reluctant to make certain sacrifices even when they half perceive that they are required by the present situation. They should be given adequate guarantees that the gains they give up will be restored to them as rapidly as possible after the war.

A fundamental objective of Governmental policy should be to reduce the divergence of viewpoint between workers and the public on controversial issues. Admittedly, the task is not an easy one. Large numbers of people now feel that the Government is partial to labor. On the other hand, any sudden change of policy, such as the abandonment of the 40-hour week, would cost the Administration the confidence of labor and lower worker's morale.

Despite the difficulties, there are opportunities for reconciling the views of different economic groups. Everyone concerned is eager to do whatever is necessary to win the war, providing only that sacrifices are fairly imposed. Patient and persistent explanations of the need for indicated adjustments and painstaking efforts to be equitable are the prime requirements of Governmental labor policy today.

CURRENT OPINION

News Emphasis

More than in any recent week, the headlines have been devoted to the fighting fronts, with Egypt and Russia getting almost equal attention. The dismay of Tobruk quickly disappeared, as stalemate in Egypt brought back the good news headlines. But the Russian retreat had a sobering effect, leading to increased demand for immediate counter-measures in the west.

With plenty of bad news to talk about, the Nation's editors have gradually reduced their criticisms of the Government's information policy, which they had long complained, bitterly and masochistically, was keeping the bad news from them.

On the domestic scene, the big news was the Nazi spy trial. Since little actual news of the trial was forthcoming, reporters and editors alike tended to treat the story as an information battle between OWI and the Army, with the press lined up solidly on the side of OWI. In this atmosphere Mr. Davis' statement of policy received widespread attention and approval.

Criticism of Information Policy

Criticism of information policy now takes two major forms. Foremost is the assertion that the Army and Navy withhold too much news. Though the general public, whenever questioned, appears to believe that the suppression of news for security reasons is justifiable, editors complain that the armed forces withhold information which would be of no value to the enemy, but which would be of value to the American people.

Another major criticism is that a number of Federal agencies are issuing more news releases than papers want or can possibly use. To test the justice

of this criticism, the Bureau of Intelligence compared the press release output of various agencies with the actual use of their material in two bellwether newspapers, the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune. The following table compares the number of items released in two weeks by the agencies with the number of items appearing in the two newspapers combined. Although some stories are, of course, from other sources, if the number of stories is twice the number of releases, it may be inferred that all, or most, releases were used by both papers.

	<u>Releases</u>	<u>Newspaper Stories</u>		<u>Releases</u>	<u>Newspaper Stories</u>
White House	11	29	War	60	34
Navy	34	68	State	28	15
Treasury	18	30	OPA	135	60
Justice	14	19	SEC	79	27
Commerce	30	31	Agriculture	52	13
WFB	107	102	Interior	44	4
ODT	15	14			

#### Editorial Trends

Up to the middle of May post-war planning was given very little attention in the nation's editorial columns. Since the Wallace-Perkins-Walles team went into action, it has become the third most important topic. Since mid-May only civilian restrictions and military operations have been given more space.

In the four weeks from April 19 to May 23, the biggest editorial topic was production. In the next four weeks, as the feeling grew that the conversion job was completed, volume of comment on production problems declined to one-third of its previous total. In the same period comment on civilian restrictions more than doubled.

The shift of emphasis from the battle of production to restriction and inflation is accompanied by danger of greater group dissensions. The metropolitan press is anxious for farmers and labor to sacrifice; labor editors want to be sure that management isn't unduly profiting; farmers want to make sure that neither

labor or capital is getting away with anything.

#### Newsreels

After a famine period during which they were able to show very little war material, newsreels in June devoted increased attention to the fighting fronts and the United Nations. But the stories on actual land and sea engagements were necessarily belated, and those on our allies lacked news value. The informational possibilities of the newsreel have still not been fully exploited.

#### Developing Situations

##### Organized Middle Class

B. C. Forbes, Hearst columnist and editor of Forbes Magazine, has given up his newspaper column, and with the blessing of Hearst newspapers is forming an Investors Fairplay League. His object will be to organize the unorganized middle class, which he characterizes as stockholders, insurance policyholders and savings bank depositors, as a pressure group to counteract labor and farm groups.

##### Rent Ceilings

Led by a group in Seattle, big and little property owners in several cities are reported to be organizing a united front for higher rent ceilings. They may try to stage a national protest meeting in Chicago. If the real estate interests succeed in breaking through the rent ceilings, there is a definite threat of a rent strike among the CIO unions in Detroit. Workers in other cities might join the protest.

##### The Post-War Line of the N.A.M.

A recent address by William Wilson Cumberland may give a clue to the post-war line of the National Association of Manufacturers. Mr. Cumberland is a member of the Economic Advisory Commission of the National Industrial Con-

Conference Board, an N.A.M. affiliate. He took the position that post-war prosperity depends on "getting rid of planners, government control, high taxes, and all the other paraphernalia of statism, which stifle the individual and waste the product of industry." Any post-war depression, he maintained, would be the fault of economic planners.

#### Wisconsin Politics

In Wisconsin a group of Democrats and Progressives have formed a Committee for United Political Action, patterned after the Union for Democratic Action. Its stated purpose is the defeat of congressmen with isolationist voting records.

#### Add Negroes

A memorial-to-Waller meeting in Washington spent considerable time discussing the Eklund escape, calling it a manifestation of the callous attitude of officials in cases involving the health and safety of Negroes. Eklund was alleged to have killed four Negroes for no other reason than that he hated colored people. His second degree sentence, coming on top of Waller's execution, may be cause for future recriminations.

Delegates of 29 organizations have voted to name the Washington Bureau of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People their spokesman on such matters as poll taxes, Negro employment and vocational training.

#### Anti-British

Several studies have shown that about 20 per cent of the people in this country can be characterized as definitely anti-British. The quality of this feeling is brought out in an intensive study conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research.

On some issues, criticism of the British is voiced by a majority, for

example, over half of those interviewed disapprove of British colonial policy. About four Americans in ten still believe that the British were largely responsible for getting us into World War No. 1.

Respondents assign a number of personality traits, good and bad, to the British. Over one half of them regard the British as snobbish and aristocratic, and a smaller number complain about their arrogance and selfishness. But most respondents believe that the British have many admirable characteristics. More than one half of those interviewed regard them as courageous and loyal, and they are also praised for their honesty and sportsmanship.

The allegation that England is turning into a socialist state during the war is believed by only three people in ten, and three-fourths of those who do believe it think it would be a good thing for England. Of those who don't feel that England is doing all she can to win the war, two-thirds maintain she should be doing more on the military fronts. About one person in seven feels that England would do all right if the Tories were thrown out of the British Government.

#### Rubber and Gas

During the rubber salvage campaign the Bureau of Intelligence conducted two series of interviews, one the day after the campaign was originally supposed to end and one when it did end. The results show that the campaign was well publicized. Almost everybody had heard of it. At the end of the first two weeks 59 per cent, and at the end of the campaign 68 per cent, had actually turned in some rubber. But at the end of the campaign one person in six acknowledged that there were some old rubber things around the house which should have been turned in.

Over three quarters of the people interviewed felt that the rubber collection would bring in enough scrap to help the war effort. Two thirds

indicated that they felt the rubber shortage was a serious one.

Two questions included in the interviewing, and a pre-drive Gallup poll, are useful in showing a trend:

1. "Do you think gasoline rationing is the best way to save tires?"

	<u>Before the Drive</u>	<u>July 1</u>	<u>July 11</u> <u>(Preliminary)</u>
Yes	62%	68%	70%
No	28%	22%	19%
Don't Know	10%	10%	11%

2. "Do you think gasoline rationing throughout the nation is necessary?"

	<u>Before the Drive</u>	<u>July 1</u>	<u>July 11</u> <u>(Preliminary)</u>
Yes	32%	39%	40%
No	52%	44%	43%
Don't Know	16%	18%	17%

#### Horror Spot

Las Vegas, Nevada, was not noted for its respectability when it had a normal population of 8,500. Today 46,000 people live there -- including many service men and thousands of war workers attracted by wages of \$10 a day and up in a nearby plant. Negroes are pouring into the town at the rate of 1,000 a week, replacing whites in unskilled jobs.

Living in trailers, tents, shacks or merely sleeping in parks, the workers face a winter of impossible housing conditions. Because of the housing shortage there is no red light district; vice is literally and flagrantly in the open.

Rents have gone up 55 per cent to 155 per cent. Two-thirds of the retailers have failed to post their ceiling prices. Las Vegas is having a local inflation spiral all its own.

Sanitation facilities in the town are non-existent and epidemics are

a definite threat. Serious race trouble is also brewing. Some divisionist newspaper is almost certain to make public a scandal which is now a private one. Local authorities are trying hard but are unable to cope with conditions. Swift Federal help is indicated, and it is reported that it would be welcomed by many authorities at both the local and state levels.

Sources of the Survey

The report on "War Time Labor Problems" is based upon the following material:

- "War Time Labor Problems", Extensive Surveys Division, Report #27
- "Control of Wages, Hours and Profits in the Furthering of War Production", Division of Surveys, Report #18
- "How Long is the 40-Hour Week?", Special Services Division, Report #15
- "Anti-Labor and Anti-Union Activities", Special Services Division, Report #16
- "Widespread Understanding of 40-Hour Week Except in Rural Areas", Special Services Division, Report #17
- "Government Statements on Labor (May 30-July 5)", Source Materials Division
- "Statements of Labor, Business and Miscellaneous Leaders on Labor Problems", Source Materials Division
- Weekly Media Report #22, especially the section on "The Labor Press", Division of Information Channels

All of the above reports are available to authorized individuals through the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION


WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *File Confidential* July 29, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of  
the Intelligence Report No. 34 prepared for the  
Director of the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence  
Office of War Information

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



PSF  
OWI

7-29-42

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

# 34

The document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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7-29-42

## NEWS EMPHASIS

Public attention during the week was focused upon the fighting fronts of the war. The news editors of both press and radio consistently treated the struggle along the Don River as the prime subject of interest. Throughout the week, it dominated front pages and news broadcasts.

The news from Russia was presented with alarm and a good deal of pessimism. Accounts of the Red army's retreat were supplemented by a variety of reports concerning the need for a second front and by think-pieces on the possibility that the United Nations might soon undertake an invasion of Europe.

In the Pacific, the situation around the Japanese-occupied Aleutians held chief attention. Considerable emphasis was placed upon the statements of Senator Brewster and the delegate from Alaska, Anthony J. Dimond. For a day at least, American submarine successes against Japanese shipping were dramatized.

The fighting in North Africa received only secondary attention. Toward the end of the week, indeed, it was relegated, in many instances, to inside pages. So, too, was news of RAF activities over Western Europe, with an occasional spurt of excitement over American participation in these raids.

At home, various aspects of the cost of living program remained important news topics. Congressional action on the production of synthetic rubber was given special stress. Interest sagged pronouncedly in the trial of the eight Nazi saboteurs; but the FBI hunt for the three German agents still at large was widely highlighted.

Perhaps the outstanding single domestic topic was the proposal broached by Henry J. Kaiser for the mass production of transport planes. This, in conjunction with the cancellation of the Higgins shipbuilding contracts, occasioned a number

of speculative stories.

Treatment of news was, on the whole, rather feverish. Few of the week's events gave cause for celebration. And neither newspapers nor radio sought to avoid the ominous implications of the war's progress.

## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### discontent

Commentators have watched these events of the past week with a growing sense of frustration. They have an uneasy conviction that we are losing on important battlefronts of the war -- along the Atlantic coast, on the Russian front, perhaps even in the Aleutians. They feel that momentous opportunities are slipping away from us and may never recur.

They have reacted to frustration with anger, or at least with irritation. These feelings are directed now to almost all phases of the Government's conduct of the war. Underlying them, there appears to be a nebulous suspicion that the men who guide the United Nations war effort are deficient in essential resourcefulness and imagination.

The notion that our leaders are shackled by outworn concepts of warfare was brought into sharp focus by Henry Kaiser's proposal to build a large fleet of flying transports as a means of overcoming the submarine menace. There has been a good deal of grumbling over the Navy's failure to reduce ship losses in the Caribbean and the western Atlantic. Isolationist commentators have been most vehement in their complaints on this score, denouncing Secretary Knox and sometimes the President himself as complacent or incompetent. Mr. Kaiser's novel

scheme for by-passing the enemy submarines has crystallized the general discontent.

It may be inferred, indeed, that the very radicalism of the plan has been largely responsible for capturing the imagination of critics who confess that they do not know its feasibility. Almost all comments on the plan are of a hopeful nature, yet the common assumption is that the project will be shelved — and shelved because it conflicts with the conventional ideas of marine-minded men. Walter Lippmann, for example, delivers an annoyed admonition: "Before anyone settles down to prove that the difficulties of the Kaiser plan render it impossible, let us be assured that the proposal is in the hands of men whose only interest is how the difficulties can be overcome."

And the Christian Science Monitor suggests that "the people can insist that his proposal shall not be cast aside or delayed just because 'it never has been done.' They can see to it that worthy but hide-bound officials or rival commercial interests do not block a trial of this hopeful plan."

Impatience with the Government is manifested equally and in large volume on the economic front. Comments on the anti-inflation program continue to berate the President, as well as Congress, for inadequate measures to check a real danger. The Treasury's tax program is disliked chiefly because of its failure to propose a sales levy. And wage increases are attributed by irate commentators to a lack of firm leadership on the part of the President.

For the first time since he took over the reins of the production program there has been a considerable volume of criticism directed at Donald Nelson. He, too, is now accused of insufficient vision and realism. Although there was general disapproval of congressional passage of the Gillette bill, Nelson himself has been widely blamed for failing to straighten out the rubber tangle.

In addition, critics seized peevishly upon the President's interest in the New York State gubernatorial election to charge that he is putting politics ahead of the war effort. One of the harshest comments was made over the air by H. V. Kaltenborn: "The President's favorite game is politics. He plays it extremely well. So let's not be too censorious when he seeks a little change and relaxation in the all-absorbing problems of the war."

The subject about which editorial dissatisfaction has been most acute, however, is the continued presence of Japanese troops in the western Aleutians. Recent statements by Senator Brewster and by the Alaskan delegate, Mr. Dimond, have brought editorial attention back to this sore spot. There is a pronounced impatience on the part of commentators over the failure to dislodge the Japanese.

"This is not a 'token' invasion, or a 'face-saving' invasion designed to please the Japanese masses", observes the New York Times. "It is a business invasion in force, an invasion designed to cut the lines of communication between North America and Siberia and prepare the ground for an attack on Continental Alaska."

Other commentators consider the occupation a prelude to Japanese action against Siberia. There is almost universal agreement that the situation contains dangerous possibilities and should be remedied by immediate and drastic measures. Again there is a considerable tendency to blame the Government for a lack of imagination in grasping the full significance of the Japanese landings in the Aleutian Islands. A good many commentators indulge in heavily sarcastic references to the "fog" which veils activities there.

#### **united command**

In much of the criticism directed at the administration's conduct of military and naval phases of the war, there appears to be a basic assumption that the fault

lies in a failure to achieve united command. Disunity of command is often blamed for ship losses along the East coast and even more frequently for the situation in the Aleutians.

The appointment last week of Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief was widely hailed as a step in the direction of achieving a united command. Few commentators, however, accepted it as more than a partial and tentative move toward the desired goal. They applaud the Admiral and rejoice that he will be able to spare the President some of the burdens of consultation with military and naval chiefs. But there is considerable demand at present for the delegation to some military or naval officer of authority in his own right to carry out the constitutional duties of the President as Commander in Chief. Many commentators suggest, indeed, that this officer should have undisputed charge of all of the forces of the United Nations.

The divisionist press has urged such a command with especial vigor. The McCormick and Patterson newspapers insist redundantly that the President is not qualified by experience and education for the determination of military strategy and that he fails to give sufficient heed to the advice of properly qualified officers. They blame British reverses on a similarly unwarranted assumption of authority by Prime Minister Churchill. Now and then, less hostile editorial pages also question the wisdom of entrusting the direction of military and naval affairs to civilian leaders.

### **second front**

The week's dismay has produced a thunderous revival of demand for what is commonly called a second front -- that is, invasion of western Europe by British and American forces. There is a genuinely angry impatience over the failure of

Britain and the United States to relieve the Russians in what appears to be a time of desperate need.

Some commentators would be satisfied with a large scale aerial assault on Germany. The Scripps-Howard newspapers insist that this is the pattern for victory. They urge that American bomber production be concentrated for this purpose, shipped to England and sent in tremendous mass raids over German industrial cities night after night. "The war cannot be lost by such an air offensive", their editorials insist. "It might be won that way."

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch is representative of those newspapers which feel that nothing less than a full-fledged invasion will suffice for the current crisis. "No matter how hard it is to start a second front now", this newspaper queries, "how much harder will it be if Russia falls and the victorious seasoned German armies return to the West?"

On July 24, the Washington Post devoted a feature editorial to an "all-out" plea for the immediate opening of a second front.

"Only the bold should now be in control of United Nations' strategy. For it is only the bold who can make decisions, and the crying need in the leadership of the United Nations is decisions to match the enemy's.

"Russia's extremity in the face of the Nazi onslaught provides the latest -- perhaps the last -- clarion call for decisions.... The people, of course, know nothing about high strategy. But they do realize that even if a second front would entail a heavy toll in blood and material, that would be as nothing compared with the fearful slaughter which would be the price of waiting around for extermination."

The demand for vigorous offensive action against Germany voiced by the nation's outstanding commentators appears to stem from a real and terrible sense of urgency. There is a fever of anxiety among almost all of them. They believe that the war may be lost or won this summer. And they are in terror of losing it by default. The compelling cry everywhere is for action.

## POPULAR REACTIONS

### direction of military strategy

There appears to be considerable popular susceptibility to the isolationist argument that war strategy should be determined exclusively by military and naval leaders.

During the first week of July, the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a national cross-section the question, "Do you think that Roosevelt and Churchill should have final decision over the military and naval plans of the war, or do you think these plans should be decided by the military and naval leaders of the United Nations?" The results were as follows:

Roosevelt and Churchill	21%
Military and Naval Leaders	66
Both	1
No Opinion	12

The implication contained in the question, that the courses are mutually exclusive, was, no doubt, in large part responsible for the nature of the responses; clearly, it accounts for the fact that only one percent of the total gave the obvious answer "both". Nevertheless, the responses do suggest the inference that a large portion of the public fails to understand the responsibilities of the President and the Prime Minister and is distrustful of civilian determination of military and naval affairs.

This inference is supported by the answers to another question asked by Dr. Gallup at the same time -- "Should the President, as Commander in Chief of the

armed forces of the country, name a military leader to direct both the Army and the Navy?" The results were:

Yes	49%
No	36
No Opinion	15

This question, too, may invite an affirmative response through its implication that the President is now making insufficient use of expert military and naval counsel. The attitude is a dangerous one which divisionist critics are sedulously fostering. For the most part, however, the responses probably suggest only popular eagerness for a united command.

### second front

There is also extensive public enthusiasm for the opening of a second front. This may be either responsive to or responsible for the recent wave of editorial sentiment in the same direction.

Early in July, the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a national sample this question: "Would you like to see England and the United States attempt a large scale attack on Germany and Western Europe in the near future, or do you think they should wait until they are stronger?" The results were:

Attempt Attack	48%
Wait	34
No Opinion	18

It should be noted that the interviewing on this question was conducted prior to the recent Nazi successes around Rostov and also prior to the revived editorial fervor for an invasion effort.

Interest in a second European front is also indicated by answers given to a multiple-choice question which the Bureau has posed to national samples from time to time: "Which one of these do you think the United States ought to

do now in the war against Germany and Japan?" The answers given to interviewers early in July constituted a complete reversal of those secured in response to the same question when it was asked in May. The results in the two interviewing periods were as follows:

	<u>May</u>	<u>July</u>
(a) Fight Japan with most of our forces and send just enough help to Europe to keep Hitler from making more gains	33%	22%
(b) Fight Germany with most of our forces and send just enough help to the Pacific to keep the Japanese from making more gains	22	34
(c) Attack Germany and Japan with equal force	27	28
(d) Pull our forces close to home and use them to protect our own shores	7	7
Not ascertainable	11	9

These results illustrate clearly the drift of popular attention from the Pacific to the European sector of the war. The reasons most commonly given by those who now urge that our strength be concentrated against the Nazis are that they are stronger than the Japanese, that they are the main threat to our welfare and that the defeat of Japan can be easily accomplished once Germany is beaten.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### living conditions in war production areas

The influx of new workers to war plants has created serious community problems. Existing housing, health, recreational and transportation facilities in some cities are pitifully inadequate. They pose difficulties for the community in general and for the immigrant workers in particular. Studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence in 15 war production centers revealed living conditions which seriously impair the morale and productivity of workers.

#### housing

In June a small national sample of war workers was asked the question, "Would you say that housing conditions for defense workers around here are satisfactory, only fair or poor?" Only three out of ten regarded housing conditions as "satisfactory"; an equal number called them "only fair", and one quarter complained that they were "poor".

Interviewers found that the concentration of workers had created living conditions for some of them which were clearly detrimental to their health and to their ability to carry on their jobs. In several of the cities studied, many day shift and night shift workers share rooms and sometimes use the same beds. It is not unusual to find 10 to 12 men crowded into a single room -- sometimes with beds arranged in decks and with inadequate light, ventilation and sanitation.

In Hartford, for example, an interviewer reports that one woman rents space on the basis of three shifts a day, so that a man who has finished work has no place to go until it is his turn to sleep.

An interviewer in Seattle reports that housing officials expect an influx of more than 6,000 women war workers within the next few weeks, yet they know of only 100 rooms available.

Workers are often subject to grievous rent extortion. Rent ceilings have operated in some communities to impede the construction of new housing facilities by private means. In other places, the rent ceilings are flagrantly disregarded.

An interviewer in Birmingham submits the following account of observations made by one of the town's richest and most prominent citizens, a banker:

"Rents? Why, they're high, just like they ought to be. I got some houses here in town I used to rent for \$9 a month. I'm getting \$40 for them now and they ain't nothing but nigger houses at that. A fellow came in here the other day and asked me if I had a house for rent. I told him I had one at \$40 a month. He went out to see it and came back in a little while. He said, 'You mean to tell me that shack is worth \$40 a month?' Sure, it ain't worth that much, but I can get that for it, and if you don't want it at that price, stand aside, for there's fellows ten deep wanting it at that price."

transportation, recreation and other services

The housing shortage has, in many cases, required workers to live at some distance from the plants in which they are employed. Men working in Mobile, for example, drive to their jobs from Pensacola — 50 miles away. When their tires wear out, these workers may have no means of getting to their jobs. Long trips of this sort add two or three hours to the working time of men who put in 10 or 12-hour shifts at a plant.

Public transportation facilities within communities are, of course, heavily overstrained. The routes of crowded streetcar and bus lines sometimes fail to take workers anywhere near newly constructed factories.

Other community services are similarly inadequate. In some communities, doctors, dentists, nurses and hospitals are too few to care for the suddenly

increased populations. Water and sewerage facilities are sometimes unequal to the needs of a community which may have doubled in size. The health commissioner of Hartford, Connecticut, made the following admission to an interviewer:

"Hartford is building up an intolerable condition and it will require only a spark to set it off. I am expecting something to happen any day. It is as touchy as hell. It would be very easy for an epidemic to spread like wildfire through this city."

Similarly, recreational facilities have failed to meet the needs of the newcomers. There are insufficient playgrounds for the children and too few healthy places of amusement for workers who have left their families behind them.

#### negroes

In all of these communities, the severest hardships are imposed upon Negroes. For they are generally confined to black ghettos in which the dwelling shortage is most acute and in which housing and sanitation facilities are at their very worst. Landlords show little compunction over gouging fantastic rentals out of Negroes for quarters scarcely fit for human habitation.

#### consequences

Perhaps the most damaging effect of the overcrowding in war production centers is that many workers are obliged to leave their families in the communities from which they have migrated. They are thus forced to undergo the expense of maintaining two establishments and are deprived of the satisfaction of family associations.

The communities to which they move, moreover, are not, in general, friendly to the newcomers. Themselves subject to the discomforts of overcrowding, the older residents of war production centers are inclined to look upon immigrant workers with hostility and resentment. They are unsympathetic to the novel

customs and accents which outlanders bring along with them. The result is that new workers are made to feel that they are aliens and unwanted.

Many become discouraged and return to the friendlier places from which they were drawn. Recruitment and retraining of new men is consequently necessary, involving inevitably a diminution of production.

An even more serious result lies in the effect of these conditions upon the morale of workers. They react to community hostility, rent extortion and the discomforts to which they are subjected by resentment toward the Government charged with the conduct of the war effort. Their own patriotism is corroded by the profiteering they see about them. Dissatisfied and deprived of rest, relaxation and family association, these men become unable or unwilling to work long hours under the speed and tension required for war production.

### **farmers' attitudes toward workers**

A recent investigation of the views of farm people in twenty-four counties throughout the country disclosed comparatively little of the hostility towards labor and the marked envy of war workers which has been reported in previous Surveys. The greater satisfaction farm people feel about their own situation evidently makes them less prone to criticize workers and labor leaders.

Almost half of the farmers interviewed in the course of the recent investigation feel that city workers are better off now than farm people. But not many would trade places with them all the same. One in four of those who think that city workers are better off at present express the view that they will be worse off after the war. Others feel that even though workers make more money than farmers -- particularly when the farmers' property investment and long hours are considered -- their lot is still not enviable. Workers, many farmers feel, can't call their souls their own. They can't experience the

enjoyment and satisfaction which come from living in the country. As one Ohio farmer says:

"I wouldn't want to change places with a worker in any factory. Not even if I could make more money than I'm making now. I like to be out here in the country. It gets in your blood, I guess."

With farm people relatively well content with their own situation, there are evidently excellent opportunities for cultivating greater sympathy among them for workers. In one Iowa county, the farmers interviewed showed an unusual understanding of workers' problems. It turned out that the county agent there had recently held a debate in the course of which he had presented a great deal of information about workers' economic situations and their everyday worries.

other findings in the study

With a favorable price relationship, prospects of a fine harvest, and satisfaction in supplying "food for victory", farmers are in the happiest state of mind they have been in for some years. Their biggest anxiety is farm labor shortage; the problems of tires, machinery, repairs, storage, transportation to market are generally viewed as future problems rather than as things to worry about now.

(For details of this study, see "Farmer's Machinery and Transportation Problems", Report #19, Division of Surveys, available on request)

**mexican workers**

In the far West powerful employer groups are demanding that Mexican laborers be imported to meet an acute demand for additional workers. The large growers of California, led by the Associated Farmers, want Mexicans brought in to help with the summer and fall harvests. The Southern Pacific Railroad

wants to import Mexican track laborers to fill a shortage in its maintenance-of-way forces.

The Mexican Government is reluctant to permit its citizens to enter the United States to work, because it feels that they are badly treated here. It has turned back a large number of workers who sought to enter the United States in response to advertisements broadcast over Mexican radio stations. The Government has unofficially indicated that if workers are really needed to harvest the California crops it will withdraw its objections, but it insists on guaranties of adequate living conditions and return transportation for all workers.

The Mexican Consul General in Los Angeles emphasizes the importance of overcoming discrimination against Mexicans in all types of employment. The Mexicans now in California, he points out, have little opportunity for employment in highly paid industrial jobs, and he blames this discrimination in part on the influence of large growers, who are eager to keep the Mexicans on as agricultural hands.

In addition to affecting the Good Neighbor policy and complicating the industrial discrimination problem in California, any mishandling of the present situation might give the United States a black eye throughout the hemisphere. Hearings, scheduled for July 24-25, on employment discrimination against Mexicans now in the United States have been postponed until mid-August at the request of the State Department, which believes that the airing of their grievances will injure our country's prestige throughout Latin America. Lawrence Cramer, Secretary of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, takes the position that Mexicans, at least, are already well aware of the discrimination against their countrymen in the Southwest, and will be heartened

by the news that the United States Government is taking cognizance of it in order to combat it.

The dilemma the situation presents underscores the need for close Federal supervision of the treatment of any additional Mexican workers who may be imported at this time and activity to discourage discrimination against those already here. The problem is essentially one of War Information policy — whether or not to publicize a delicate situation for the purpose of effecting a reform.

### **sore spot**

Newspaper and radio commentators have been almost unanimous in criticizing the Government's handling of the rubber shortage. Their most common complaint is that a confused picture has been presented to the public. More recently, however, some of them have undertaken enthusiastic support of one or another of the devices for synthetic rubber production — not infrequently with the hopeful implication that the whole problem can be solved.

This notion that an easy way can be found out of the rubber shortage is encouraged by a plan recently presented by rubber manufacturers. Divisionist newspapers reported the plan dramatically and made obvious editorial efforts to create a belief that the entire rubber problem is due to governmental ineptitude.

Misunderstanding of the problem and of the possibilities inherent in synthetic production appears to be so widespread as to require prompt official clarification. Lack of rubber enters so intimately into the average citizen's life that it can become, if the causes for it are misconceived, a major source of discontent.