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August 5, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of a supplemental  
Intelligence Report "White Attitudes Toward Negroes"  
prepared for the Director of the Office of War  
Information.

Sincerely yours,

*R. Keith Kane*

R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

WHITE  
ATTITUDES  
TOWARD  
NEGROES

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## SUMMARY

White people are largely unaware of the fact that dissatisfaction is so widespread among Negroes that large numbers of them have no heart for the war. Six whites in ten, out of a national cross-section recently interviewed, felt that Negroes were pretty well satisfied with conditions. Almost as many felt that Negroes are now better off than they were before the war.

More than half of those interviewed with an opinion on the question believed that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. Three out of four respondents in the South and nine out of ten in the rest of the country felt that a Negro should draw the same pay as a white person when he does the same work.

Fifty-five per cent of the sample believed that a Negro makes as good a soldier as a white man. Forty-nine per cent felt that he makes as good an airplane pilot. Respondents were about equally divided on the question of whether Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get ahead in the armed forces.

Whites showed a fairly good knowledge of the hopes and demands of Negroes. They recognized, for example, that what Negroes are most concerned about is improvement in their economic situation. But relatively few whites were willing to make concessions in this area. They were willing, however, to provide better housing facilities for Negroes.

On all of these issues pronounced regional differences were evident. Southerners were more inclined than people in the rest of the country to feel that Negroes are being treated fairly or are themselves to blame for any differentiation in the treatment accorded them. And they were less willing than people in other regions to make concessions to Negroes.

In all parts of the country, however, large numbers of people were unsympathetic to Negroes. Not only were they cold to their aspirations; many evidently felt that rights long since granted to Negroes should be revoked. For example, more than half of all respondents in the Northeast and West believed that there should be separate schools for white and Negro children.

Educational status also affected people's answers. On most questions the better educated were somewhat more realistic and more liberal than the less well educated.

Finally, it was found that people's views on the Negro's role in the war effort were closely linked to their prejudices on segregation and their desire to maintain present caste distinctions.

"I note with satisfaction that the theme of your significant gathering reads 'Victory is Vital to Minorities.' This theme might well be reversed and given to the Nation as a slogan. For today, -as never before in our history, 'Minorities Are Vital to Victory.'"

"We are, in a sense, a Nation of minorities. By race, by religion, by color, by ancestry, each constituent group is a minority when viewed in relation to our total population. But it is the essence of our democracy that our very differences have welded us into a Nation. And the democratic way of life within that Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders."

--Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
Message to the National  
Association for the Advance-  
ment of Colored People Con-  
ference, July 14, 1942

#### WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES


The amount of support Negroes give the war effort--and their very desire to support it--depends to a very large extent upon the attitudes of white people toward them. Negroes cannot put their shoulders to the wheel in the war effort if they are not permitted to do so. And their morale is inevitably affected by the kind of treatment they experience.

It is important, therefore, to see to what extent white Americans share the view of their President that the support of the nation's Negroes is vital to the war effort. To supplement its previous investigations of Negro morale, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted a survey of white attitudes toward Negroes. Interviews were conducted with a representative cross section of white people in all parts of the country between June 22 and July 7.

I. Basic Attitudes Toward Negroes

Perhaps the most surprising finding of the entire investigation was that a majority of white Americans are unaware that there is anything that might be called a "Negro problem." The illustration below shows the range of responses to the question, "Do you think most Negroes are pretty well satisfied with things in this country or do you think most of them are dissatisfied?"

**ARE NEGROES GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH CONDITIONS?**



Previous investigations of Negro morale in Memphis and New York indicate that, in fact, Negroes are far from satisfied. Many of them have grievances. Some of them feel so badly about their present situation, and so discouraged about the future, that they do not think that they would be any worse off if Japan won the war. A few feel they would be no worse off under German domination. Views of Negroes in these two cities cannot be taken as indices of national sentiment, but studies in four other cities suggest that they are not unrepresentative.


The opinion of six white people in ten that Negroes are reasonably well satisfied with their situation must, therefore, be attributed in very large measure to ignorance. But many factors contribute to this ignorance—including the

callous belief that Negroes do not need much to satisfy them. It is in the South, where discrimination is most marked and Negroes constitute a relatively large proportion of the population, that the comforting opinion that Negroes are satisfied is most prevalent.

Opportunities Open to Negroes

The beliefs whites have about Negroes tend to bolster one another. Some light is shed on the opinion that Negroes are relatively well satisfied with conditions by the response of white people to the question, "Do you think Negroes are getting all the opportunities they deserve in this country, or do you think in general they are not being treated fairly?"

**ARE NEGROES GETTING ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES THEY DESERVE?**



The belief that Negroes are getting all the opportunities they deserve is itself a product of ignorance and a disparaging attitude toward Negroes. As the chart shows, the belief is more widespread in the South than in other parts

of the country; it is more frequently expressed by those who did not complete high school than it is by the relatively well educated. But the belief is prevalent in all parts of the country, among the well educated and the poorly educated. Eighty-four per cent of the poorly educated respondents in the South subscribe to it, but so do more than one half of the well-educated respondents in the North who have an opinion on the question.

The extent to which ignorance of the facts contributes to the viewpoint is perhaps suggested by peoples' opinions on a more specific question, "Do Negroes have as good a chance as white people to get a good education?" In the Northeast and in the West eight out of ten respondents felt that Negroes in their own regions have as good a chance as whites to get a good education. And the majority of white Southerners maintained that Negroes enjoy equality of educational opportunity in their region.

Whatever the facts may be about the Northeast and the West, the opinion that Negroes have equal educational opportunities in the South is demonstrably mistaken. Because there are separate schools for the two races, it is possible to make direct statistical comparisons. In a recent year, in ten Southern states where Negroes constituted 28 per cent of the total school enrollment, only 12 per cent of the total expenditures went for Negro schools. The average expenditure per white pupil was \$37.87; per colored pupil, \$13.09. Only 19 per cent of the Negro children of high school age, as contrasted with 55 per cent of the white children, were enrolled in school.

Respondents in the Northeast and in the West, especially the better educated ones, showed some awareness of these inequalities in the southern part of the United States. When asked, "Are there any other parts of the country where

you feel Negroes do not have the same chances as white people do to get a good education?", six respondents in ten in the Northeast and West said, "Yes." It is interesting psychologically that those who acknowledged the existence of inequalities in their own areas were most prone to recognize the failure of other sections of the country to treat Negroes equitably.

#### Views on Negroes' Ability

A low opinion of Negroes' capabilities also probably contributes to the feeling that they are getting all the opportunities they deserve. As the chart on the following page shows, more than a half of all white people in the South and more than a third of all white people in the rest of the country feel that Negroes are primarily responsible for their inferior status in our society. The bottom half of the chart shows the shortcomings attributed to Negroes by those who hold this viewpoint.


Better educated respondents were more inclined than the less well educated to blame white people, or both whites and Negroes, for the fact that Negroes do not have equality of opportunity. Even in the South 43 per cent of the better educated respondents were willing to put all or part of the blame for the plight of Negroes on the shoulders of the white population.

The sample was asked: "In general, do you think Negroes are as intelligent as white people -- that is, can they learn things just as well if they are given the same education and training?" Forty-eight per cent -- a majority of those who expressed an opinion -- replied that Negroes are not as intelligent as whites. As one would expect, this view was far more generally held in the South than in other regions. Surprisingly, it was voiced somewhat more frequently by the well educated than it was by the less well educated.

Whites put a somewhat more favorable appraisal on the potential ability

# WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE FACT THAT NEGROES DON'T HAVE THE SAME CHANCES AS WHITES?


Whites




Negroes




Both



Other causes and don't know




Opinions of whites



Negroes



## IF NEGROES, WHY ARE THEY TO BLAME?



of Negroes as workers. When asked, "If a Negro has the same training as a white person, do you think he can do a particular job just as well?", seven respondents in ten in the Northeast and in the West said, "Yes". But less than 40 per cent of the Southerners interviewed shared this view.

In every region those who had worked with Negroes had more faith in their capabilities than those who had not.

Segregation

The views of whites on the segregation issues are summed up in the table below:

	Northeast		South		West		Total
	Edu- cated*	Unedu- cated	Edu- cated*	Unedu- cated	Edu- cated*	Unedu- cated	
<u>There should be</u>							
Separate residen- tial sections	75%	80%	96%	99%	80%	84%	84%
Separate restau- rants	53	60	96	99	59	67	69
Separate schools	47	55	95	99	54	71	66
Separate sections in street cars and busses	29	37	91	97	41	47	51

The most marked differences of opinion are clearly on a regional basis. But it will be observed that large numbers of people in both the Northeast and the West expressed a preference for arrangements which would keep Negroes and whites separated. The sentiment for separate schools in these regions is especially surprising. Even though children of the two races customarily attend the same schools in the Northeast and West, except as they may be accidentally separated as a result of living in different areas, majority sentiment endorsed segregation.

\* Completed high school or better.

Similarly, large numbers of people in these regions maintained that separate sections should be provided for whites and Negroes in public conveyances, even though this would involve a change in existing arrangements. Rural people were particularly prone to favor separate sections for whites and Negroes.

It would be clearly inaccurate to say that on the issue of segregation a tolerant North and West are arrayed against an intolerant South. Yet on each of the questions the proportion of those who plumped for a policy of segregation was markedly larger in the South. It is probable, too, that Southerners feel more intensely about the issue than people in the rest of the country. The sample was asked, "If a Negro with just as much education and income as you have moved into your block, would it make any difference to you?" Eighty-six per cent of those interviewed in the South, as compared with 54 per cent in the rest of the country, said that it would. The proportion of those who indicated that they would either actively oppose the encroachment of Negroes or else move away was also larger in the South.


On most issues it will be noted that well-educated respondents were somewhat more liberal than the less well educated. But the better educated respondents expressed more concern than those with less education about living in the same block with Negroes. In all probability, however, this difference was due to their superior economic status--to such considerations as fear of a decline in real estate values following Negro infiltration into their neighborhoods.

## II. Negroes in the War Effort

The various attitudes which have been discussed inevitably find reflection in white people's views on the role of Negroes in the war effort and the impact of the war upon them.

Whites' ignorance of conditions among Negroes and their reluctance to see that there is any Negro problem may have something to do with the fact that 55 per cent of all those interviewed believed that Negroes have shared in the war-stimulated economic boom, and are better off than they were before December 7. In any case, as the chart below indicates, whites were significantly more inclined to hold this view than the Negroes in Memphis and New York.

### ARE NEGROES BETTER OFF SINCE THE WAR BEGAN?



Whites are less optimistic than Negroes about the effect of an American victory upon the status of Negroes, but the fact that they believe that Negroes have already improved their position may account for this. If, however, the view of seven white respondents in ten that the war will not change the status of the Negro in American society is based on a reluctance to make concessions, it may point to trouble ahead. For, if the New York and Memphis samples are typical, a sizeable minority of American Negroes believe that victory should and will mean some improvement in their lot.

Willingness to Make Concessions

The divergence between the kind of changes Negroes want made right now and the willingness of whites to make concessions constitute a more immediate source of conflict between the races. The issue about which Negroes feel the keenest resentment today is economic discrimination. They want to have the same opportunities as whites to secure jobs for which they are qualified. And they want to get the same pay as whites when they do the same work. Better economic opportunities are regarded as the key to the improvement of Negro life in all its aspects. About better houses and the abolition of segregation, Negroes show less concern.

As the charts on the opposite page show, on the whole whites assess the grievances of Negroes quite accurately. But despite the fact that they recognize the Negroes' desire for economic equality, there is a pronounced reluctance to make concessions in this area. On the other hand, whites are willing to act to improve Negro housing conditions, although they recognize that this is not the step which Negroes most desire.

The disparity between whites' knowledge of what Negroes want and what they are willing to grant them requires explanation. It may be conjectured that economic concessions are resisted because it is felt that they threaten existing caste barriers. On the other hand, better housing for Negroes fits in with the noblesse oblige tradition, which is particularly strong in the South, of "taking care" of Negroes. It permits the perpetuation of existing segregation. Finally, it is a way of improving the health of Negroes, and many whites have come to realize that the germs of communicable diseases do not obey Jim Crow laws and that Negroes' health is a matter of close personal concern to them.

# WHAT WHITES THINK NEGROES WANT MOST NOW AND WHAT THEY ARE WILLING TO GRANT THEM

## NORTHEAST and WEST


Job equality




Equal wages



Better houses




No segregation




## SOUTH


Job equality




Equal wages



Better houses



No segregation



What whites think Negroes want most

What whites are willing to grant

The Negro in War Production

Almost one-half of the cross section of white people expressed the belief that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. (See chart opposite, page-13.) But the relatively well educated were not so likely to hold this opinion as the less well educated.

Those who believed that Negroes do not have as good a chance as whites to get war jobs were asked to tell who they thought was responsible for the situation. Regional differences sharply influenced their answers. Southerners thought that Negroes themselves deserve most of the blame for whatever difficulties they encounter. A plurality in the Northeast blamed the managers of factories; a plurality in the West blamed labor unions.

Nine out of ten respondents in the Northeast and the West, and three out of four in the South, said that a Negro doing the same work as a white person should draw the same pay. But some people, especially in the South, may have expressed this opinion secure in the knowledge that the issue was remote, since in all probability Negroes could not get the same jobs as whites.

Southerners were far more prone than people in other parts of the country to object violently to Negroes working alongside them. In the Northeast and in the West, only three respondents in ten said that it would make any difference to them if Negroes were hired to work with them. But seven Southerners in ten said that it would make a difference. And far more Southerners than Northerners or Westerners carried their opposition to the point of saying that they would quit their jobs if Negroes were hired to work with them.

There are some grounds for encouragement, however, in the fact that in all parts of the country those who had already worked with Negroes were far more willing to work alongside them than were those who had never had the experience.

## NEGROES IN THE WAR EFFORT

Opinions of whites  
 Upper bar: NORTHEAST and WEST  
 Lower bar: SOUTH

"Do Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get war jobs?"



"Are Negroes as patriotic as whites?"



"Does the Negro make as good a soldier as the white man?"



"Does the Negro make as good an airplane pilot as the white man?"



"Do Negroes have the same chances as whites to get ahead in the armed forces?"



Yes

No

Don't know

The Negro in the Armed Forces

From two-thirds to three-fourths of the people interviewed in the Northeast and in the West believed that Negroes are just as patriotic as whites. But in the South a majority of respondents with an opinion on the subject maintained that they are not as patriotic.

The same regional differences were apparent in views on the Negro's ability as a soldier. Six out of ten respondents in the Northeast and in the West felt that the average Negro makes just as good a soldier as the average white man. But in the South a majority of respondents held the contrary opinion. Throughout the country even fewer people felt that the Negro makes a good airplane pilot. Most of those who were scornful of Negroes' fighting ability maintained that they are cowardly, have less native ability, or are lazy and lack initiative.

Respondents divided up into three groups of almost equal size on the question of who should lead Negro troops. Three in ten believed that they should be led by white officers, and almost the same number were of the opinion they should be led by Negro officers. Four respondents in ten felt that they should be led by both whites and Negroes.

The usual regional variations were apparent. In the Northeast and in the West the most popular view was that Negroes should be led by officers of both races. In these regions the second largest vote was for Negro officers, except in the rural West, where white officers were in second place. In the South the predominant opinion was that Negro troops should be led by white officers. A sizeable group felt that both white and Negro officers should be employed, but the comments volunteered by some of those who expressed this opinion indicated that they felt that the top officers should be whites and the minor officers, who have close contact with the troops, Negroes.

### CONCLUSIONS

The task of making Americans generally see the importance of bringing the nation's Negro minority more fully into the war effort is one of immense difficulty. In part this difficulty stems from the close relationship between views on the Negro's role in the present emergency and deep-seated, stubbornly-held attitudes toward his worth, his ability and his place in society.

The task is national in scope. Although Southerners were more disparaging of Negroes than people in the rest of the country, and more reluctant to make concessions to them, large numbers of people in all regions showed what must be regarded as an illiberal attitude toward Negroes. On some issues, indeed, it appears that rights which have long since been granted to them are still opposed by large numbers of white people.

Despite these difficulties, the situation is by no means hopeless. There are promising possibilities, for example, in the fact that large numbers of white people recognize the need for improving Negro housing conditions.

Many of the attitudes of whites toward Negroes stem in part at least from ignorance. Thus a wide dissemination of information about the accomplishments of Negroes may be expected to do a great deal of good. Perhaps the most fundamental requirement for the solution of the Negro problem is further education of the white population.

Finally, the imperative need of expanding the labor force imposes an obligation on the Federal Government, and provides an opportunity, to encourage the wider employment of Negroes in American industry.

By turning the spotlight on Negro housing conditions and attempting to improve them; by making people aware of the necessity for employing more Negroes and attempting to eliminate employment discrimination; and by publicizing the

accomplishments of Negroes, the Federal Government can simultaneously make progress towards immediate and long-term objectives. It can secure a fuller participation of Negroes in the war effort and raise Negro morale. And over a period of time it can develop greater good will toward Negroes among the white population.

### Sources of the Report

This report is based on the following material:

- "White Attitudes Toward Negroes," (tables), Extensive Surveys Division, Special Report #11
- "The Negro Problem," (comment on tables), Extensive Surveys Division
- "Memphis Negroes and the War," (tables based on interviews with whites in Memphis), Extensive Surveys Division, Special Report #10
- "White Attitudes Toward Negroes," Special Service Division, Report #19
- "Negroes in The War: A Study in Baltimore and Cincinnati," Division of Surveys, Special Report #16
- "Minority Groups in Baltimore and Cincinnati," Special Services Division, Report #18
- Report on statements of private thought leaders and Government spokesmen on Negroes, Sources Division, July 21, 1942
- "Axis Propaganda Intended to Undermine Relations Between Whites and Negroes," Sources Division, July 21, 1942
- "Negroes in A Democracy At War," Survey of Intelligence Materials #25, May 27, 1942
- "Memphis Negroes and The War," Supplement to Survey #25, July 14, 1942

All of the above reports are available to authorized individuals through the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

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August 8, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am sending to you herewith a copy of  
the Intelligence Report No. 35 prepared for the  
Director of the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,

*R. K. Kane*

R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence  
Office of War Information

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



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8-7-42

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

# 35

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## NEWS EMPHASIS

The battle for the Caucasus dominated news pages and radio broadcasts throughout the week. Headlines extracted what hope they could from its ebb and flow; but, in the main, they conveyed to the American public starkly enough the grim tale of Nazi gains.

Editors generally employed communiques from both Russian and German sources — most of them giving preferred position to the Soviet version. Considerable prominence was also accorded feature stories, such as that by Leland Stowe, depicting the desperateness of the United Nations situation. Speculative reports of second front possibilities continued to receive marked attention.

The trial of the Nazi saboteurs zoomed into sudden prominence with the Supreme Court's hearing of their habeas corpus plea. News stories dramatized the court session and gave conspicuous attention to conclusion of the proceedings by the military commission. There has been much advance heralding of the verdict which the President is to announce.

News of the fighting fronts, apart from the battle for the Caucasus, was led by the RAF raids on Germany. Toward the end of the week, considerable interest was displayed in American and Australian attacks on Japanese bases in New Guinea. The situation in the Aleutians and fighting in China continued to receive secondary attention. The Libyan campaign was relegated to subordinate status. At the end of the week, conditions in India assumed great importance.

There was continued interest in various phases of the economic situation on the home front. The Government's statement calling for a 48-hour

maximum work week was treated as a major development. The rubber tangle, the meat shortage in Eastern cities and the fuel oil situation continued to evoke warm interest.



## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### Reflection

Editorial commentators have engaged in some sober second thoughts on ideas which they propounded with great vigor a week or 10 days ago. They no longer seem quite so certain that a second front must be opened immediately or that cargo planes should supplant steamships overnight.

Reflection on the second front issue was inaugurated by Walter Lippmann. "It is an interesting question", he observed, "whether current debate about the second front gives information to the enemy.... The risks of speculating about future war plans are, therefore, very considerable." Mr. Lippmann approved "speeches and editorials urging the government to help the Russians and the Chinese, and to reinforce the Middle East, and to bomb Germany, and to open another front somewhere." His colleagues continue very vigorously and in great volume to press for these generalized forms of offensive action. They have become somewhat more cautious, however, in specifying the particular mode and locale of the attacks for which they hope.

The prompt action of administration officials in giving a hearing to Henry J. Kaiser's plan for building giant flying boats appears to have allayed editorial fears that the project would be written off without consideration. The comments respecting it continue to be hopeful, even enthusiastic, but they are now more patient, temperate and realistic.

The press was united in opposition to Senator Lee's bill to take the decision in this matter out of the hands of present war production officials; their leadership appeared to enjoy full confidence. The Baltimore Sun's comment was typical: "Decisions in such matters are for military and production experts, not for amateur strategists in Senatorial seats. We must keep the professionals on their toes, but we cannot submerge their studies and strategy under senatorial impulses."

The pressure for a united command remains considerable. Indeed, isolationist attacks on civilian determination of military strategy have been reinforced significantly by the strongly interventionist New York Times. The Times declares: "Both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, it becomes increasingly clear, have tried to plan and direct too much of the strategy of the war themselves.... The Admiral Leahy appointment, under the conditions announced, does not change this situation. What is needed is not another 'adviser', another man to do 'leg work' and 'index' work, but a commander with the power of making all but the most crucial decisions on his own responsibility."

#### Domestic Affairs\*

A variety of issues made the general subject of labor a leading editorial topic during the week. Almost all commentators approved the Government's plea for limiting the work week to 48 hours. Many of them, however, seized the opportunity to renew their demands for suspension of the 40-hour week provision of the Wage and Hour Law.

A good deal of editorial comment was devoted to indignant insistence that James Petrillo, head of the musicians' union, be curbed. The refusal to permit members of his union to make recordings was commonly described

as tyrannical and frequently employed as a flail with which to whip labor leaders in general.

The War Labor Board came in for a continuing share of editorial ire over its decision in the Remington Rand case. And the Pontiac strike was grasped by a number of commentators as a further occasion for berating labor.

The Supreme Court's hearing of the habeas corpus plea on behalf of the Nazi saboteurs met with warm editorial approval. The New York Herald-Tribune, for example, called it "a stirring demonstration of a democracy's faith in its own laws and convictions." The action taken by the court was anticipated and applauded.

Comment concerning the cost of living decreased somewhat in volume during the week, although there was no sign that dissatisfaction with Government policy in this field had abated. Similarly, the irritation over the rubber and gasoline situations remained apparently unchanged. An overwhelming majority of commentators condemned the Gillette Bill for the establishment of a separate rubber agency as a farm bloc device to create a larger market for grain. But they are insistent upon a thorough investigation of the problem and effective action toward its solution.

#### India

The developing crisis in India became a leading editorial topic toward the end of the week. There is great uneasiness over the decision of the Congress Party to conduct a non-violent rebellion against British rule. In general, comment was hostile to Gandhi and sympathetic toward the British. The Chicago Sun urged that the United States intervene directly in the Indian impasse, but other papers seem to consider it a United Nations problem

in which this country should do no more than furnish leadership.




## POPULAR REACTIONS

### Appraisal of the News

The Bureau of Intelligence asked a small national sample of the American public, "What do you think was the biggest news of the past week?" About one-third of those interviewed named the fighting on the Russian front, which, as reported above, was actually the dominant subject on news pages and in radio broadcasts. Approximately one-tenth of the sample mentioned the trial of the Nazi saboteurs, which was accorded second place by news editors.

Other news topics received scattered mention as having been of prime importance. Among these were fighting in the Pacific, the possibility of a second front, the bombing of German cities and a variety of domestic subjects. One-third of the whole sample had no opinion as to the week's outstanding event.

The Bureau also asked these people, "Do you think the war news, as a whole this past week, has been generally favorable for our side or generally unfavorable?" The distribution of responses to this question was as follows:



Most of those who considered the Russian fighting of prime importance during the week regarded the news in general as unfavorable. And conversely, among all of those who considered the news unfavorable, approximately half selected the battle of the Caucasus as of first importance; among all of those who considered the news in general favorable, only one-fifth gave first place to the Russian fighting.

It should be noted that in response to questions such as these, people almost always answer with the most recent news in mind; they are more clearly aware of the latest headlines and broadcast bulletins than of those of preceding days which may have faded from their memories. The interviewing on these questions was conducted on July 31, a day on which almost all morning newspapers gave top position to the Russian front and second place to the saboteur trial.

#### Confidence in Government Information


Interviewing of the same small sample indicates that a considerable majority of the American public retains satisfaction with Government policies in the handling of war news. Nevertheless, now, as in the past, a sizeable minority believes that the Government is withholding information which it ought to give to the American public.

The sample was asked this question: "Do you think the Government is giving the public as much information as it should about the fighting in this war?" Sixty-five per cent answered yes; 26 per cent answered no; nine per cent said they didn't know.


#### Second Front

Editorial insistence on a second front to relieve the Russians is strongly reflected in public opinion. A decided majority of the sample

interviewed by the Bureau on July 31 answered affirmatively to the question, "Do you think that in the next two or three months the allies should try to land troops somewhere in Europe to attack Germany?" The division of opinion was as follows:



These people were then asked "If the allies do try this attack on Germany in the next two or three months, do you think their chances of success are very good, about 50-50, or that it is more likely to fail than to succeed?" Here are the results:



As was to be expected, those believing that the chances of success are "very good" were most inclined to believe that the attempt should be made; 85 per cent of them advocated an invasion effort. In addition, 61 per cent of those believing that there is a "50-50" chance of success said that the invasion should be tried. And even among those predicting that an invasion

would fail, 20 per cent thought that the effort was worth making anyway.


Conversely, those who believed that we should try a second front were most prone to think that it would be successful; 62 per cent in this group considered the chances very good, while an additional 26 per cent looked upon the venture as a 50-50 gamble.

Among those opposed to making an invasion attempt, there were 16 per cent who believed that it would succeed if tried; and an additional 27 per cent of those opposing the effort thought that it would have a 50-50 possibility of success. Half of this group were of the opinion that an invasion in the next two or three months would be doomed to failure.

#### Cargo Planes

Press and radio interest in the Kaiser plan for mass production of large cargo planes has apparently made a considerable impression on the public mind. Two-thirds of the sample interviewed said that they had heard about the plan; one-third had not heard of it.

The sample was then asked "Do you think it is practical to build airplanes instead of ships to carry troops and supplies overseas?" The answers, which follow, indicate that the scheme is one which appeals strongly to the popular imagination.



It is significant that the plan was approved by some of those who knew nothing about it. Of those who had heard of the Kaiser project, 81 per cent

thought that it would prove practical. In addition, it was considered practical by 59 per cent of those who had not previously heard of it.

#### Advance Ordering of Fuel

The effort to induce early ordering of coal and fuel oil for next winter is evidently meeting with some measure of success. Almost half of a national cross section of home owners recently questioned had already placed their orders. Another 20 per cent planned to put in their orders before the end of summer.

In some cases, of course, "ordering" may mean only making some sort of arrangement with a supplier. Necessarily this is the case with respect to fuel oil. Even when allowance is made for this, the response seems encouraging.



#### DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

##### Opinion toward the United Nations

In an effort to discern trends in American attitudes toward our allies and the problem of post-war international relations, the Bureau of Intelligence in July interviewed a nationwide cross-section of adults. Certain changes of opinion had developed since mid-May, when the Bureau last conducted interviews on the same subject.

American appreciation of the importance of our allies increased slightly. There was also some disposition to be more lenient in exacting payment for Lend Lease shipments. And there were indications that any fear that our principal allies might desert us for a negotiated peace with Hitler is diminishing.

On the other hand, there is a steady suspicion of Russia's post-war cooperativeness and a continuing skepticism of British war efforts -- in

contrast to the belief that the Russians are doing their utmost to win.

In the interval between May and July, there was a widespread Government campaign to publicize the United Nations concept. This campaign culminated in the celebration of June 14 (Flag Day) as United Nations Day. Only one-fourth of the persons interviewed had heard about United Nations Day; one-fifth lived in communities where the celebration was observed. Identical questions asked in May and July give little indication that publicity regarding the United Nations concept appreciably changed people's attitudes toward our allies or increased their knowledge of them.

Only about one-third of the American public has any knowledge of the Four Freedoms as such; no more than two per cent were able to identify all four of them correctly. Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming public approval of the principles which they embody.

Four-fifths of the sample interviewed thought the United States should join in some sort of world organization when the present war is over. Many think the United Nations may become the nucleus of such an organization and there are indications that people would welcome participation by other nations, including the Axis.

Nearly one-half of those interviewed expressed a belief that the United States should have joined the League of Nations after the last war. Nearly all of these people believe that the United Nations should continue their collaboration in the post-war period. In addition, more than three-fourths of those believing that we should not have joined the League of Nations are now ready to forsake isolationism, at least to the extent of continued association with our present allies.

These findings constitute a summary of a Special Intelligence Report, Trends in Opinion toward the United Nations and the Post-War Organization. Copies of the complete report are available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.

#### White Attitudes toward Negroes

A majority of white Americans are unaware that there is any such thing as a "Negro problem." Six whites in ten believe that in general Negroes are pretty well satisfied with existing conditions. This was one of the most surprising findings of a nationwide survey recently completed by the Bureau of Intelligence.

In part, this opinion appears to stem from unrealistic notions of the amount of discrimination which exists. Among those interviewed, more than one-half with an opinion on the question believed that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get jobs in war plants. Almost as many felt that Negroes have as good a chance as whites to get ahead in the armed forces. Most whites also thought that Negroes are generally better off than they were before the war.

Disparaging attitudes toward Negroes contributed to the belief that they are content with their lot. Large numbers of people evidently felt that Negroes need little to keep them happy. Others, who put a low appraisal on Negroes' character and capabilities, took the position that they are getting just about all that they deserve.

On all questions, as might be anticipated, marked regional differences were evident. But while Southerners were most inclined to feel that Negroes have no just cause for complaint, large numbers of people in all parts of the country were unsympathetic, not only toward their aspirations, but even

toward their present rights. Even in the Northeast and in the West, more than half of all respondents felt that white and Negro children should attend separate schools.

Whites appraised the hopes and demands of Negroes with considerable accuracy. They recognized, for example, that what Negroes are most concerned about is improvement in their economic situation. But relatively few whites were willing to make concessions in this area. They were willing, however, to provide better housing facilities for Negroes.

These are some of the significant findings discussed in "White Attitudes Toward Negroes", a special report of the Bureau of Intelligence, dated August 5. Copies of the complete report are available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau.

#### *Rank and File Unrest*

In Detroit and some other industrial centers a number of straws in the wind suggest that many rank and file members of labor unions are growing dissatisfied and restive.

In part, this feeling stems from a belief that the War Labor Board is slow in settling labor disputes and that many firms are deliberately taking advantage of the situation. Workers maintain that these firms are questioning W.L.B.'s jurisdiction and resorting to various legalistic devices with the deliberate intent of stalling off Board decisions on important issues. Workers believe that they are entitled to prompt arbitration of their claims in return for having renounced their most fundamental bargaining weapon, the right to strike. It is up to the W.L.B., they feel, to make whatever arrangements are necessary to clear cases speedily.

Production interruptions which are now occurring in some plants as a result of material shortages add to workers' bitterness. Rightly or wrongly,

they feel that many of these shortages were avoidable, and blame management for their occurrence.

Workers are also resentful over the failure of Congress to do anything about the President's proposal to limit incomes to \$25,000 a year. They feel that some of the concessions they have made, such as the surrender of double pay for Sundays and holidays, and time-and-a-half for work on Saturdays, have simply gone to swell industry's already huge profits. They are sharply critical of the OPA and of Leon Henderson, whom they regard as the spearhead of the attack on wages. Workers are willing to accept wage stabilization, though not wage freezing, but they insist that prices and profits be stabilized simultaneously.

Elements within the United Automobile Workers charge that the failure of other unions to follow the U.A.W.'s lead in relinquishing overtime for Sundays and time-and-a-half for Saturdays, has placed the U.A.W. in a disadvantageous position. A resolution has been introduced in the U.A.W. convention, now in session in Chicago, to rescind the voluntary waiver of double pay unless it is universally applied throughout industry within the next thirty days. Many delegates propose to go further and put teeth in the resolution by abolishing the "no-strike" agreement. The final action of the U.A.W. convention on these proposals will provide a clue to the prevalence of rank and file discontent.

The dangerous possibility exists that if labor dissatisfaction is not reduced, workers will turn to more radical methods and more radical leaders. They may resort to unauthorized strikes, for example, as a way of getting immediate attention paid to their claims. Or they may turn to leaders who emphasize labor's rights, rather than the necessity of making sacrifices for the sake of the war effort. The very threat of this may force their present leaders to take a more extreme stand on many issues.

### Farm Labor Shortage

A nationwide farm labor shortage looms on the 1943 horizon, and it may be aggravated by a serious simultaneous shortage of farm machinery. The resentment local labor shortages have caused wherever they have occurred indicates the need for prompt attention to the situation.

So far most farmers have been able to get the machinery they needed. When they have not, they have managed to get along by patching up, by exchanging equipment with neighbors, and by buying used machinery. Next year the shortage of new machinery may be more acute and harder to get around.

Except in certain areas, farmers have also been able to get all the help they needed, although they have sometimes had to look a little harder to find it. When the war began, there were many people in rural areas who were either unemployed or underemployed. The existence of a more than adequate supply of farm labor was a boon to most farm owners: it insured them a dependable supply of cheap help. Some farm operators unquestionably encouraged the accumulation of more farm workers than were needed in particular areas, in order to be able to get their crops out rapidly and inexpensively and to be in a position to take advantage of market conditions.

The war-stimulated demand for manpower in industry and the armed forces has almost completely soaked up the surplus supply of labor in rural America. There is no immediate cause for alarm, but the situation is daily tightening, and farmers are deeply disturbed about it.

After being questioned about such subjects as rationing, farm machinery, repairs and transportation, a group of farmers interviewed in June was asked what other things they thought the Government ought to be investigating. More than one third mentioned the problem of farm labor. Even in areas

where labor shortages have not been experienced, many farm people complained of the failure of draft boards to give sufficient consideration to the needs of farmers.

If the problem is neglected or mishandled, the present high morale of farm people is almost certain to suffer. The Food for Freedom program may also be upset, both because farmers are unable to produce as much and because they may be tempted to make ill-advised shifts into crops which require relatively little labor.

#### Traveling Salesmen

Traveling salesmen in the eastern states are protesting their present gasoline rationing classification, which permits them only 470 miles of occupational driving a month, or 5,640 miles a year.

There are approximately 500,000 traveling salesmen in the states in which gasoline is now rationed. Beyond any question, an overwhelming majority of them are seriously inconvenienced by rationing. They now travel an average of 15,000 miles a year; a survey shows that more than four out of five of them cannot cover their territory satisfactorily by train or bus.

While well aware of these facts, Joel Dean, Chief of the fuel rationing division of the OPA, has ruled that it is simply not possible under present conditions to permit traveling salesmen an unlimited amount of gasoline. Such a step, he points out, would require an additional 1,300 tank cars.

Traveling salesmen do not represent a particularly powerful group. Many of them will be forced from the road in the near future in any case

because of the impending unavailability of the goods they sell. Their protest is important primarily because it is symptomatic of the kind of complaint which is likely to arise from now on as more and more small businessmen are hit by wartime controls.

The Government cannot, of course, permit the claims of protesting groups to impede the war effort. But it can do a great deal to minimize both the number and intensity of complaints by pursuing a skillful informational policy. The protests of traveling salesmen are based in part upon the erroneous belief that adequate supplies of gasoline and tires are available, or can be made available, to meet their needs. A fuller awareness of the facts would unquestionably help to make them feel somewhat better about their situation.

#### Italian Americans

Anti-fascist Italian-Americans are disheartened by the Federal Government's apparent friendliness toward Italian leaders they deeply mistrust. They were shocked by the presence of representatives of the Justice and Treasury Departments at a recent New York City Defense Bond Rally held under the sponsorship of Generoso Pope.

Many pro-democratic Italian-Americans feel that this event was as great a mistake as would be a Defense Bond Rally among German-Americans under the sponsorship of Fritz Kuhn. They do not rest their case against Pope merely on his pre-Pearl Harbor espousal of Fascism, or their conviction that a leader like Pope maintains his position by exploiting his ignorant fellow countrymen. They maintain that Pope is still covertly pro-fascist. There appears to be no question that he has harbored fascists on the staffs of his newspapers; some of his writers have been arrested by

the F.B.I. Veiled divisionist statements continue to appear in his papers. A recent attack on anti-fascists caused particular bitterness among Italian-Americans with sincere democratic sympathies.

Government recognition of men like Pope as leaders of Italian-Americans carries with it the implication of an official endorsement. The endorsement is employed by such men to strengthen their hold upon alien elements. More effective cooperation with the Federal Government could be secured through the encouragement of alien leadership genuinely sympathetic with democratic purposes.


The impression that the Government is not interested in advancing the leadership of anti-fascist Italians has been fostered by its failure to release loyal Italian-Americans from classification as enemy aliens. The protest against keeping all Italian aliens in this category has now been sponsored by Luigi Scala of Providence, a man believed to be fascist in his sympathies by Americans of Italian origin. It is through the championship of such causes that men like Scala and Pope bolster their power and prestige. They will claim credit for any benefits which may come to the Italian-American colony through a change of Federal policy. By recognizing instead the leadership of men who have demonstrated their opposition to Fascism, the Government can more effectively secure the loyalty of aliens who are real adherents of the democratic cause.

#### Enemy Radio in the American Press

The Germans have consistently been more successful than their Axis partners in making use of American newspapers as vehicles for their propaganda. This success has been accentuated by the recent shift of attention from the Pacific to the European sector of the war.

The relative extent to which American newspapers have drawn upon Axis sources for their news is shown in the following chart:

ITEMS CREDITED TO ENEMY SOURCES  
in 16 metropolitan newspapers, March 4 to July 21, 1942



### ENEMY PROPAGANDA

#### Second Front

The possibility of a second front appears to be very much in the minds of German propagandists. Their dominant theme to the United States in dealing with the subject is complete German readiness for an invasion. But, characteristically working all lines, the Nazis attempt to depict a second front as unnecessary, as well as hopeless.

To bolster the impression of readiness for an allied invasion effort, the German navy is described as "prepared day and night". Hundreds of new air fields are said to have been constructed "behind the coastal wall of Western Europe". The Atlantic coast is described in general as "a gigantic fortress studded with the best arms available". Dr. Goebbels attempts to discount the value of a second front for the Russians by claiming that the Nazis have enough troops in the West to meet any invasion, and that no troops will be withdrawn from the East now.

In dealing with the conflict in Russia, Nazi propagandists have shown a pronounced tendency to soft-pedal their successes; they appear to be trying to reduce British and American popular pressure for a second front. Indeed, Nazi commentators accuse British officials of over-pessimistic reports intended to foster second front sentiment in England. The Berlin radio described German soldiers as fully prepared for another winter campaign in Russia -- an outlook echoed in Italy by Virginio Gayda. Claims of great successes on the Russian front are left to the radio and press of Germany's satellites. The German press also follows a policy of caution in reporting the Russian campaign.

Nazi-dominated Europe is being psychologically prepared for a second front. The dominant idea in the campaign is Nazi invincibility. The Swedish newspaper, Dagens Nyheter, reports that the recent parade of the S.S. in Paris took three hours to pass a single point. Many photographs of defense works have been appearing in the daily and periodical press.

In a Das Reich article, Dr. Goebbels assures the German people that

a second front attempt is doomed to disaster. The British and Americans will not come "with puny forces", says Goebbels. "Possibly they may gain one or two illusory successes to be offered up as an ingratiating present to their Bolshevik allies ..... Then slowly but surely our war machine will come into play and one day we shall see the British marching on Berlin not as conquerors but as prisoners of war."

Nazi propaganda intended for European consumption appears to have the two-fold purpose of allaying traditional German fear of a second front and of dampening the ardor of the conquered peoples who are awaiting a United Nations invasion as a signal for revolt. Recently enacted Nazi measures, such as the one applicable to Frenchmen providing the death sentence for all immediate relatives of those resisting Nazi domination, contribute to the Nazi goal of terrorizing the conquered peoples into inaction in order to keep them from coming to the aid of a United Nations invasion force.

#### Olive Branch for Russia

Ever since the appearance of the Voelkischer Beobachter article of July 20, 1942 describing Great Britain and not Bolshevism as the primary enemy of Germany there have been a number of peace feelers directed to Russia via German as well as satellite sources. The French radios have been and continue to be most active in this campaign. This week the Antilles radio (Vichy) broadcast a report attributed to the Swedish paper Social Demokraten, that the Nazis after the capture of Stalingrad will offer a separate peace to Moscow. Refusal of this offer will mean a Japanese attack on Siberia, according to the Vichy broadcast. The official Vichy radio broadcasts a report said to have originated in

the Swiss paper Gazette De Lausanne, that Russia is about to make an "about face", and that Russian demands for a second front are a "pretext for giving up the fight". The Japanese-dominated Manchurian station, Radio Harbin, also has been taking an active part in the peace offensive against the Soviet Union.

Placing a more official stamp on this peace offensive the Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden of July 29 states that "leading personalities in Berlin consider a separate peace with Russia as very desirable". The Nazis may believe that Russian setbacks have made her susceptible to peace offers. Or they may hope to discourage American and British offensive plans by portraying Russia in a weak and untrustworthy light.



#### AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

##### Production

The subjects of ships, steel for ships, and cargo planes to replace ships, continued to gyrate and to give off a spray of contradictions, recriminations and "we-will-study" statements. The key point of confusion seems to be the figure given as the official shipbuilding goal. For 1943, W.P.B. says the goal is 10 million tons, and that there is steel enough. W.S.A. says the goal is 15 million tons and there is not steel enough.

On the cargo plane proposition, Mr. Kaiser had his say before the "Truman Committee" on July 29, and Robert Patterson and Donald Nelson promised full and serious consideration of the plan.

##### Oil

Further warnings on the fuel oil supply in the Northeast have been

issued by the White House and by Secretary Ickes.

#### Sugar

An O.P.A. release of July 29 warns that the supply situation is worse again due to Caribbean shipping difficulties. This should relieve the pressure caused by rumors of glutted warehouses. At the same time it may produce confusion when considered in the light of Navy statements on convoy success in the Caribbean.

#### Finance and Taxation

The anti-inflation front has become comparatively quiet, with the exception of a fluid situation on the tax bill in Senate Committee, and some sporadic comment on wages by W.L.B. and others; meanwhile a study by Mr. Rosenman is awaited, and should precipitate a new drive.

#### Foreign Relations

Mr. Lauchlin Currie made a strong statement in Chungking on July 30, saying in part, that the U. S. Government looks "upon all the Axis powers as a single power and all the United Nations as a single opposing power" and that "victory or defeat of one of the United Nations anywhere in the world today is a victory or defeat for all the United Nations."

Mr. Archibald MacLeish in London, also on July 30, spoke to similar effect, and included a trenchant attack upon isolationists.

#### India

The statement of Gandhi on August 2, warning that India's "hidden discontent may burst forth into welcome for the Japanese...", together with the statement of the Indian Government on August 4, branding Gandhi and the All-India Congress as appeasers, marked the growing crisis in the Indian situation.

United Nations

The outstanding statement of the week was Stalin's order to the Red Army, July 30, calling for a defensive stand. The Moscow radio is calling for a second front. (on August 2, in particular.) Air Marshall Harris spoke on the British radio in German on July 28, promising "to scourge the Third Reich from end to end..."

*file*

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

*file personal*

August 13, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of an Intelligence Report, "War Worker Motivations", which was prepared for the Director of the Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,

*R. Keith Kane*  
R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



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# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

## WAR WORKER MOTIVATIONS

**CONFIDENTIAL**

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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## SUMMARY

War workers have a keen recognition of the importance of their role in the war effort. But certain dissatisfactions inhibit the full utilization of their skill and energy in the production program.

The morale of war workers is conditioned by their views respecting the war, by their satisfaction with wages and working conditions and by their relations with management, fellow workers and the communities in which they live. In a study conducted among war production employees in 19 cities throughout the Nation, the Bureau of Intelligence rated nearly half of them as possessing high morale, about one-third as possessing medium morale and about a quarter as possessing low morale.

Wages appear to be a dominant factor in determining the satisfaction of men with their jobs. When wage problems are adjusted, however, other conditions of employment assume considerable importance in their minds.

In their relations with management, war workers in general do not seek to assume responsibility for planning production. But they desire some voice in plant policies — particularly in relation to lay-offs. They believe that management should give reasonable consideration to suggestions which they may offer for the improvement of production.

Labor-management committees have helped in some situations to promote more cordial understanding between employers and employees. In general, however, workers are unfamiliar with them; their effectiveness suffers from hostility on either side.

Workers are eager for more information about the progress of production and the problems involved in the operation of their particular plants. Most of all they desire to know more about the use made of the products on which they are working. Information of this character is regarded by them as an effective stimulus to their own morale and productivity.

Workers are inclined to blame management for delays or inefficiency in production. But when the production program goes smoothly, they tend to give the credit to the Government. They look toward the Government for protection of their economic interests and for the prevention or mitigation of economic distress in the post-war period.

There is considerable fear among war workers that the present rate of production cannot be maintained. Looking ahead to the post-war era, many workers foresee depression and unemployment. Such misgivings detract from the full application of energies to the job at hand.

The problem of promoting worker morale and, through it the contribution of workers to the war effort, is fundamentally a problem in employer-employee relations. Nevertheless, the Government can assist in the solution of this problem by educating workers respecting issues of the conflict, the need for intense and sustained effort on their part and the possibilities for a happier future which will develop from victory.

"On this Independence Day, the American labor movement dedicates itself to proving that our free workers will outproduce the slave labor of the Axis powers and that this margin of our superiority will be a vital factor in winning the war. -- William Green, July 4, 1942.

## WAR WORKER MOTIVATIONS


### "Morale"

The battle of production embraces human, as well as technical, problems. It calls, not only for the mobilization of manpower, but also for the fullest utilization of individual skills and energies. The earnestness and devotion with which war workers approach their jobs is, therefore, an essential factor in the war on the production front.

War workers live and work in a social context. Their "morale" is consequently a function of what they believe their position in this context to be in relation to what they are seeking out of life. This "morale" is conditioned by the individual worker's views respecting the war, by the degree of satisfaction he finds in the conditions of his employment, by his relations with his employer, with his fellow workers, and with the community of which he is a part.

In an effort to learn the attitudes of men engaged on the production front, the Bureau of Intelligence interviewed a sample of war workers in 19 cities and smaller towns widely distributed throughout the country. As a means of assessing their morale, interviewers applied four criteria, rating

each of those with whom they talked on the basis of their answers to all of the questions posed in the course of detailed conversations. The four criteria and the percentages of war workers rated high or low in regard to them are shown in the chart immediately below:



Workers who were rated high on all four items were considered as of high morale. Those rated high on three or two of the items were considered as of medium morale. Workers rated high on only one or none of the items were classed as possessing low morale. The chart on the opposite page shows the percentages of workers placed in each of these morale categories:



## MORALE RATING OF WAR WORKERS

**HIGH MORALE**  
High on 4 items

42%

**MEDIUM MORALE**  
High on 3 items

15%

High on 2 items

16%

**LOW MORALE**  
High on 1 item

14%

High on no items

13%

### Worker Views Respecting the War

Workers engaged in the weapons production industries are inclined to regard this war as different from any which has been fought in the past. and the factor which, in their minds, most commonly accounts for the difference is that this is a war of machinery, a war of production. More than half of those interviewed expressed their sense of this war's special nature in terms of its industrial aspects.

Most workers feel that the war will be of considerable duration. While one in 20 thinks that it will be ended within six months, three-fifths of

those interviewed expect it to last more than a year, the commonest figure being between two and three years. Many workers feel that the achievement of a satisfactory level of production is tantamount to victory. They have a keen awareness, therefore, of the importance of production in winning the war.

There is, nevertheless, a notable tendency among them to take for granted that, in time, the volume of American production will inevitably overwhelm the Axis. In some measure, this assumption blunts the sense of urgency requisite to high speed output of war material. The war is not yet close enough or real enough to spur workers to their fullest possible contribution to the production program.

Those workers who are satisfied with the way the battle of production is going tend to be somewhat more optimistic about the length of the war than their more critical fellows. Among the former, 58 per cent declare that the conflict will last for more than a year, while in the latter group 69 per cent hold this belief.

Workers themselves rather frequently offer comments to the effect that labor in general fails to view the war with sufficient seriousness. Sometimes the Government is blamed for this failure on the grounds that it has not conveyed an adequate sense of urgency to the men on the production line; more often, however, the failure is attributed to a "business as usual" attitude on the part of management.

### Job Satisfaction

Optimum efficiency can be expected only from men who are content with the circumstances of their employment. Since most men must provide for all their material wants by means of the money they earn, wages are inevitably

of prime importance in determining their satisfaction with employment.

When wages are satisfactory, other circumstances become important elements determining job satisfaction. Men are concerned also with the physical conditions in the plants where they are employed and with the treatment accorded them by supervisors and employers.

But these circumstances assume prime importance in their minds only when their basic need for adequate earnings has been met. The distinction can be observed in the following chart which lists major items mentioned in describing a plant as a good or a poor place in which to work. When men are satisfied, they tend to explain their approval of a plant in terms of the general treatment and working conditions accorded them. But when they are dissatisfied, the wage scale becomes the most important factor in their disapproval.

Good Features	Treatment of men	28%
	Working conditions	27%
	Wages	16%
Bad Features	Wages	14%
	Treatment of men	8%
	Working conditions	6%

In general, there are three factors which determine satisfaction with earnings: (1) the effect of present living costs upon the standard of living to which the worker is accustomed; (2) the prevailing rates of pay for the same type of work in the area where he is employed; and (3) his view of the fairness of the basis of payment within his plant. What constitutes an adequate wage is not, therefore, a simple problem; simply to say that wages are higher at one plant than at another will not necessarily mean that the workers receiving the higher wages are better satisfied with them.

Discontent prevails in factories where wages have not gone up in proportion to the cost of living. When other plants within a given neighborhood


pay higher rates for work of a similar nature, the plant with the lower wage scale almost inevitably has disgruntled employees and a high labor turnover.

In some plants where wages are high, both in relation to the cost of living and in relation to rates of pay within the area, dissatisfaction stems from a belief on the part of employees that the management is profiteering and not sharing profits with them. The extent to which war profits affect worker morale was estimated by analyzing all mentions of profit occurring in the interviews. Slightly more than half of those interviewed made no reference to money profits. A small group, six per cent of the total, were vehement in denunciation of profits in plants with cost plus contracts. Most of the other complaints respecting profits were made in stereotyped terms; where there was satisfaction with the plant's efficiency, the criticism was generally very slight. It appears, therefore, that although concern over managerial gains is a source of irritation in specific situations, it cannot now be considered a deterrent to the morale of the majority of war workers.

About half of the men questioned said that they were satisfied with their present rate of pay. One-fifth expressed satisfaction with some reservations; they wished a raise eventually or thought that they weren't paid quite enough relative to some others. Slightly more than one quarter of the sample voiced outright dissatisfaction.



### MORALE AS RELATED TO WEEKLY WAGES



### Wage Freezing

When workers were asked what they would think of having their wages frozen at present levels, only 13 percent expressed outright approval, but an additional 49 percent expressed approval with certain qualifications. The two chief qualifications were (1) that wages should be adjusted to the cost of living and (2) that wages be equalized before being frozen. The term "wage freezing" is apparently subject to a variety of interpretation.

Among those who disapproved of wage freezing, the most common reason was that the procedure would be unjust because wages are not now equal. Others objected on the grounds that the cost of living is too high in relation to rates of pay, because workers would be deprived of an important incentive to production and because of a fear that management would profit excessively.

### Overtime and the 40-hour Week

A full four-fifths of the workers interviewed expressed approval of the 40-hour basis of the work week, with overtime beginning after this basic work period had been completed. Three-fifths of those interviewed approved of overtime work. The most common reason for approval was financial, although an appreciable group favored overtime because of its contribution to the war effort.

The extra pay for overtime work is an important factor in enabling workers to meet increased living costs, particularly in those industries where rates have not been raised since the general price level began to go up. Very few war workers have, as yet, become imbued with any desire to reduce their standard of living for the war's duration.

### Job Freezing

About one-third of the war workers interviewed expressed outright

approval in answer to the question, "What do you think of freezing workers in their present jobs?" The reason most commonly furnished by the men in this group was that it would serve to increase production.

A little less than a quarter of the whole sample expressed approval with some qualifications. The most common of these was that job freezing would be all right if fair wage standards were established. Men in this group also suggested that the measure would seem to them desirable only if it provided opportunity for adjustments, if it were confined to war plants alone and if it could be shown to contribute to an optimum use of manpower for the war effort. Some said that they thought it would be a good idea for others, but not for themselves.

Two-fifths of the war workers expressed outright disapproval on the job freezing issue. Their dominant reason was that it violated individual rights. A good many felt that it would result in poor work. Some said that management might take advantage of such a situation, while others asserted flatly that there was no necessity for so drastic a step.

The discussion of this subject was undoubtedly colored by the individual worker's concept of job freezing. Some thought of it in terms of being tied to a specific position -- an idea which was extremely disturbing. In general, the idea was regarded as acceptable in proportion to its flexibility. When the plan was understood to be a rigid one, there was opposition; when it was considered to be subject to modification, it was more widely favored.

Interestingly enough, a number of war workers objected to the idea of job freezing on the ground that it might prevent management from firing inefficient employees. Nevertheless, they recognized the usefulness of such

a measure as a means of limiting labor turnover, Approval was related rather closely to satisfaction with existing wages. Among those satisfied with their present pay, 43 per cent were fully in favor of job freezing, while among those dissatisfied with their earnings, only 17 per cent were in favor.

Most workers do not think that an acute labor shortage exists at the present time. They see too many job applicants all about them and are inclined to believe that local shortages can be remedied by training new men or calling into war industries women, youths, older men, and workers engaged in non-essential production.

### Job Security

A sense of security in employment is an essential for the maintenance of worker morale. Insecurity, with its resulting anxiety, distracts the worker from the primary production goal and results in lowered efficiency.

One factor essential to a sense of job security is confidence in the fairness of the hiring and firing policies of management. Among the most common of the complaints encountered by interviewers was that plant curtailments or shutdowns occurred for reasons which seemed to indicate a disregard for the welfare of employees. In plants where speed-ups were instituted, only to be followed by a drastic limitation of working hours due to material shortages, the resentment of workers was extremely bitter.

A substantial group of war workers, about 30 percent of those interviewed, expects a serious depression after the war; an approximately equal number predicts either a mild depression or an alternation between good and bad times when the war is ended. Only about 20 percent of the entire sample look forward to genuine prosperity in the post-war period.

This fear of future unemployment and economic depression does not appear at present to be a major deterrent to morale — in part because of confidence in governmental action to offset post-war dislocations. In general, workers at the lower income levels are more pessimistic about the future than those earning better pay; many of the former complain that they are unable to set anything aside for the future out of their current earnings. Those able to effect savings in the present are inclined to look upon them as a bulwark against the uncertainties which lie ahead.

The nature of the particular industry in which a man is employed has a considerable bearing upon his economic outlook. Shipyard workers, for example, are not as confident as airplane workers that there will be full employment for them when the war is ended.

### Relations with Management

The satisfaction which war workers feel respecting their employers is associated with two main factors — their rate of pay and union membership.

Among those who are satisfied with their present earnings, 63 percent take an attitude of trust and friendliness toward management. Among those dissatisfied over pay, however, only 23 percent regard management with such confidence.

Confidence in management is expressed by 46 percent of the union members interviewed, as compared with 69 percent of those who did not belong to labor organizations. There is a small group of workers which dislikes management and the unions alike. The feeling of these men is that the two are in league with one another.

The sample of war workers interviewed by the Bureau was asked the question, "How anxious do you think the companies which run defense plants

are to win this war quickly?" Those who believed the companies to be genuinely anxious for a speedy victory amounted to 47 percent, while 30 percent of the sample indicated a belief that management is in no hurry to have the war ended. The chief reason for this latter feeling was a suspicion that the companies are primarily interested in maintaining wartime profits.

Responsibility

But management is blamed more frequently for inefficiency than for a willful retarding of the war effort. When the rate of production is not all that workers think that it should be, they tend to hold management responsible. They are less prone, however, to give management credit when the progress of production seems to them satisfactory; in this situation, the tendency is to attribute the success to the Government.

Approximately one-third of the workers voiced no criticism respecting the rate of production. Among those who felt that production was being impeded, however, the following causes were most frequently cited:

Shortage of materials	16%
Lack of skilled workers	11
Poor organization of work	10
Distrust of management's motives (e.g., profits)	9
Poor or inefficient machinery	9
Lack of seriousness about war	8
Time wasted; unwillingness to work hard	8
Discouragement over inefficiency of management	6
Poor use of workers' skills	6
Government indecision and red tape	6

For all of these, including even the shortages of materials and skilled workers, management is held primarily to blame. The prevailing feeling among workers is that efficiency of operation is the boss' job. When they encounter

delays or wastefulness, they experience a sense of frustration. The reactions to the frustration take two forms. One reaction is in the direction of aggressive criticism, the other is in the direction of indifference or cynicism. Generally speaking, the former pattern represents the essential factors of high morale -- a sense of the importance of production and the feeling of participation in the war. But the second pattern reflects the essence of low morale-- apathy.

Although war workers feel that initiative with respect to increasing production is the responsibility of management, they desire some degree of participation in the operation of war plants. Nearly two-thirds of those interviewed expressed the opinion that management and labor should cooperate in solving the problems of production or that management should at least be open to suggestions from its employees. In contrast, about one-fourth of the sample said flatly that management should have complete authority and that workers should mind their own business without interference in managerial problems.

In general, it may be said that workers want a "voice", but they do not wish to assume real managerial responsibility. Their idea of a "voice" is freedom to offer complaints and suggestions and assurance that these will be given reasonable consideration.

A number of companies encourage suggestions from their employees and, in many cases, maintain suggestion boxes into which worker proposals may be dropped. Some companies make a practice of paying for suggestions which are adopted.

About nine-tenths of the workers interviewed said that if they thought of a good idea for increasing production, they would turn it over to the

boss. Only about two-thirds of them, however, felt that it would be put to use. One-tenth of the workers took the attitude that they would keep an idea to themselves, principally because of the belief that management would not use it or would exploit them. A few said that they would talk it over with their fellow workers or try it out themselves before giving it to the boss.

#### Labor-Management Committees

The War Production Board has given some encouragement to Labor-Management committees for the purpose of promoting output through cooperation. It cannot be said, however, that the program has had very widespread application. Only about two-fifths of the workers interviewed knew whether or not a Labor-Management committee existed in their particular plant. An equal percentage had not heard of the plan at all.

Interest in the joint committees does not appear to be very keen. There was practically no outright disapproval of them but, on the other hand, clear approval was also rather slight. Effectiveness of the committees, where they exist, is largely dependent upon the relationship between management and labor unions. Where these have not been cordial, the committees suffer from a lack of confidence on either side. In some plants the labor members of the committees are becoming unpopular among the workers because of the suspicion that they have sold out to management. Nevertheless, many committees are operating as originally planned and performing useful work.

#### Desire for Information

One of the principal grievances voiced by workers is that management fails to take them into its confidence. When there are delays, curtailments or inefficiencies in war production, this grievance is felt with particular force. The tendency of workers to blame their bosses for unsatisfactory

production may be largely due to management's failure to keep them adequately informed.

Two kinds of information seem to be chiefly desired by workers. When men are laid off and production is slowed down, they want to know why. And they also want to know more about how their products are used in the war effort. Workers frequently urge that management give them information of this latter variety for the express purpose of bolstering their sense of participation.

### Relations with Unions and Fellow Workers

Among war workers, approval of unions is twice as prevalent as disapproval. But a large body, approximately one-fourth of the whole sample interviewed expressed no opinion one way or the other on this subject. About 45 percent of the men appeared to be satisfied that the unions are doing what they can to promote production; 15 percent felt dissatisfied with their behavior. Many of the comments indicating approval of union behavior were based on the assumption that the unions are helping to maintain morale by improving wages and working conditions. The actual planning of production is not commonly held to be the union's business.

Certain antagonisms exist among workers themselves. Trained craftsmen are prone to feel a certain superiority toward inexperienced workers. And there is a certain amount of resentment between high paid and low paid employees. Altogether, about one-third of those interviewed expressed criticism of their fellow workers. Their complaints were leveled chiefly against slackers and green hands.

### Relations with the Government

The Government's close supervision of war production has somewhat

affected the relationship of employee to employer. The worker is still working for the particular company which employs him, but he is aware that the company is now working for the Government. The Government is sometimes blamed, therefore, for delays or inefficiencies in production — particularly on the grounds of "red tape" and "brass hat" interference. More often, as has been pointed out, it is awarded the credit when production is satisfactory. A number of workers feel that there should be more stringent governmental control over private management. And, in general, workers look trustfully to the Government for protection of their living standards and working conditions both during and after the war.

### Relations with the Community

The satisfaction which workers feel in their jobs is naturally dependent to a considerable degree upon the living conditions which they encounter in the communities where they are employed. They suffer in some places from hostility toward them as newcomers on the part of established residents. And they are victims, in many of the more recently and rapidly developed war production centers, of inadequate transportation, housing and recreational facilities. Insufficient housing is the complaint most commonly voiced by war workers about the communities in which they are now living.

### Reaction to Production Incentives

Two main types of incentive have been employed in war production plants to enhance the productivity of workers. One type includes posters, speeches, reports on the use made of products and other general inspirational devices — all based on the employment of symbols. The other type embraces wage incentives of various sorts — competition between groups and plants, piece

rates and bonuses.

When war workers were asked whether or not they thought each of the incentives relying upon symbols were effective in stepping up production 61 percent gave answers which supported the use of them without reservation, while an additional 22 percent favored them with certain qualifications. Only seven percent stated that the incentives were ineffective. There was particular eagerness for reports on the combat performance of the products which the men turned out.

There is much less endorsement of incentives based upon competition. Competition between groups within a given plant and piece rates meet with slightly more disapproval than approval. The arguments cited against them are that they create waste or carelessness, that they are impractical, that cooperation is preferable to competition and that the men are now working as hard as possible anyway. A number of men also feel that they are means for employer exploitation of the workers. Some, however, look upon piece rates favorably because they say that they step up production and because they are a way of increasing individual earnings.

Bonuses are viewed with somewhat more approval. The reasons given for and against the bonus as an incentive are very much the same as those respecting piece rates. Bonuses which are given without discrimination to all the workers in the plants when a production goal is surpassed appear to be well received, but bonuses to individuals, and particularly to foremen, seem to occasion considerable disgruntlement among the men not rewarded.

Awards which are given in recognition of successful group cooperation strike the war workers as preferable to those which are based upon intra-group competition. The Navy "E" is a symbolic incentive designed to encourage

production. It has been accepted with considerable satisfaction in plants to which it has been given.

A great many workers have no knowledge of the Navy "E" and, therefore, have no opinion concerning it. Within plants where it was awarded, 85 percent of the men questioned believe that it had a favorable effect on production; approval is tempered in some measure, however, by the fact that it is felt the award goes primarily to management, rather than to the workers. In plants where this symbol of merit has not been conferred, only 44 percent express approval of it as a means of promoting production; actual disapproval is, however, very slight, the bulk of the response being noncommittal.

Significantly, when men were asked to offer their own suggestions for stepping up production, the particular method cited most frequently was that the plant should pay fair wages to its men.

Posters are the only incentive device which has had thoroughly widespread application. The percentages of war workers who have experienced the several forms of incentive are listed in the table below:


Posters	91%
Pep talks	36
Bonuses	35
Competitions	25
Piece rates	24
Reports on products	21
Navy "E"	12
Speeches by men from front	11

It is significant that approval of incentives is much higher among men who have experienced them than among those who have not. The chart on the following page shows the percentages approving various devices in plants where they have been used and in plants where they have not yet been tried.

# WAR WORKERS' APPROVAL OF INCENTIVES

■ in plants where used

□ in plants where not used



## Results Desired from the War

War workers entertain hopes for a better life when the war is ended. They are prone to think of this improvement in economic terms — specifically in terms of their own living standards. When they were asked the question, "What would you like to see come out of this war?", the most common responses referred to better wages, assured employment, better opportunities. One in six desired a return to pre-war conditions. Many workers also expressed their aspirations in idealistic terms — a desire for peace, freedom and world order. These hopes were, however, subordinate to the more practical economic considerations.

## Conclusions

The problem of enhancing the contribution of war workers toward victory is fundamentally a problem in employer-employee relations. Most of the action necessary to correct existing deficiencies must be taken within the war plants themselves. And this action must be centered around the promotion of fair living standards, more satisfactory working conditions for the men on the production lines and more efficient use of available skills and equipment.

External influences, Government information policy in particular, can do no more than assist in the promotion of worker morale. Perhaps the most important service to be rendered by the Government is in the education of workers respecting the issues of the conflict and the need for sustained and intensive effort. The most stimulating appeals to workers in war industries are those which show an individual the significance of his part in the total war program.

The Government can assist in advancing the satisfaction of war workers by efforts to improve the living conditions in war production centers.

There is urgent need in these communities for improved housing, transportation and recreational facilities.

Government information can help also in giving to war workers a greater sense of assurance about the future. They need an understanding that it is possible to maintain a high rate of production when the war is ended and that sound economic policies can avert the disastrous conditions which have succeeded other wars.

The findings of this study point to the conclusion that there is nascent among workers a hope for fresh patterns in the organization of society. They seek, as a product of this conflict, improved economic conditions, assured opportunities for employment, more equitable distribution of the fruits of industry and a world at peace. For the fulfillment of these hopes, they look to their Government. The Government can most effectively enlist their full participation in its program through the assurance that these hopes are recognized and will be realized.

Sources of the Report

This report is based on the following material:

- "Worker Reactions to Incentives Used in War Industries,"  
Division of Surveys, Report #17
- "Worker Motivations in Time of War: Case Studies of  
Six Critical War Plants," Division of Surveys, Report #20
- "The War Worker's Point of View," Division of Surveys,  
Report #21
- "Wartime Labor Problems," Extensive Surveys Division,  
Sections I and II, Reports #27 and #28

All of the above reports are available to authorized individuals  
through the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

*file*

August 20, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of a SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT,  
"Women and the War", which was prepared for the Director of the  
Office of War Information.

Sincerely yours,

*R. Keith Kane*

R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



8-19-42

# WOMEN AND THE WAR

## SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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## SUMMARY

In the past 12 months more than two million women have been recruited into the labor force. In the next 18 months it is estimated that five million women must be induced to accept full time jobs, and be trained and placed.

Women constitute America's most important reservoir of labor. There are now approximately 2½ million single women who are unemployed. Excluding farm women, there are some 13 million married women of all ages who have no children under 16 years of age. Many women with young children will be in a position to accept employment once enough day nurseries are established.

Employers often raise objections to hiring women, and women themselves -- even when they have no theoretical objection to the idea of women working -- often hesitate to seek employment outside the home. The real difficulties in the way of a fuller utilization of women in business and industry are often exaggerated by both management and women.

At present there is a shortage of women willing to accept employment in only a few localities. But it is expected that a shortage will occur in 13 additional labor market areas some time during the next six months. If the proportion of women utilized in industry is increased, as it seems almost certain to be as more men are absorbed in the armed services, a shortage of women workers will be experienced in a still larger group of places, including some of the most important production centers of the country.

The recruitment of women into the labor force may be expected to improve their morale and their knowledge of issues related to the war. Studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence and affiliated organizations suggest that employed women are somewhat better informed and have somewhat better war morale than housewives.

Women and men differ little in their views on war issues. Except on issues closely related to their everyday experience, women are somewhat less prone than men to express any opinion. Many women claim that their housekeeping tasks do not leave them enough time to keep up with the war. Others say that war news makes them nervous. To a somewhat greater extent than men, women turn to the radio, rather than to newspapers, for their war news.

Although the men and women interviewed by the Bureau were not perfectly comparable in educational status, their responses to a number of questions suggest that women are somewhat more prone than men to take a "defensive" view of the war. More women than men think that we should pull our armed forces close to home to protect ourselves, rather than use them offensively against Germany and Japan. Women are slightly more apprehensive than men about the course and final outcome of the war, and more women than men expect that it will last a long time. But the differences are in no case great, and women whose psychology is essentially defensive comprise only a small minority.

"I'm part of something now, I'm helping in the war. I'm working harder but I'm proud of it." — A woman war worker in Illinois.

## WOMEN AND THE WAR

No previous war has so directly challenged women as the present world struggle. Since the last war, American, British and Russian women have won the right to vote; they now exert a direct influence in shaping public policy.

Total war demands the utilization of the energies and abilities of women. The recent organization of the WAAC and the WAVES has dramatized the extent to which women are involved in this war as direct participants. From its very inception women have participated in the war effort in less spectacular but equally important ways. As housewives they have cooperated in such essential activities as rationing, price control and conservation. They have played a leading part in voluntary work—in Red Cross service and OCD activity.

Even more important is the growing contribution of women on the production front. In July, 14.1 million women were gainfully employed in the United States. Two million, one hundred thousand women went to work between July 1941 and July 1942—more than twice as many men as were added to the labor force during the same period.

### I. Women in the Labor Force

As America's productive capacity is stepped up and more men are drawn into the armed services, millions of additional women must be induced

to accept full-time employment. Women constitute the most important reservoir of labor. In the United States there are approximately 2.5 million single, widowed or divorced women between 18 and 44 years of age who are not gainfully employed. Excluding farm women, who are largely unavailable for non-agricultural employment, there are about 13,000,000 married women who have children under sixteen years of age.

By no means all of these women are available for employment -- some are too old or are otherwise incapacitated. On the other hand, many women with young children will become potential candidates for employment once suitable public provision is made for the care of young children, and many rural women will become available for work as the result of continued migration from the country to war production centers. In all, perhaps 10 to 15 million married women will ultimately be in a position to consider accepting employment.

Despite the existence of this relatively large labor supply, the actual recruitment of enough women to meet the demands of the war effort will be a formidable task. Miss Mary Anderson of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor estimates that 2,000,000 more women must be brought into the labor force this year, and that an additional 3,000,000 will be needed by the end of 1943.

If this number of women are to be added to the labor force, some very important obstacles to the employment of women must be broken down. The most important of these obstacles are the reluctance of many women to enter the labor market -- even though they may not object in theory to the idea of women working -- and the prejudices of management against hiring women.

Objective considerations of undeniable validity underlie these attitudes, but in the case of both women and employers the real difficulties have come to assume an exaggerated importance. Any attempt to break down the barriers to the fuller utilization of women must consider both the real obstacles in the way of their accepting employment and psychological resistance to the idea.

### Objections of Employers

Employers hesitate to employ women, among other reasons, because of the necessity of providing new facilities — rest rooms, lounges and chairs — and the necessity of reorganizing their labor arrangements. The use of women often requires new job analyses and different types of job breakdowns. In some cases, as for example in jobs beyond the strength of women, either new machinery must be installed or jobs must be broken down so that men perform the heavy weight lifting and women do the rest of the work.

Complicating matters, some employers overestimate the real differences between men and women in strength and endurance. Or they may exaggerate the extent to which their male workers oppose the employment of women. The employment of women often involves some real difficulties, but the importance of these is nearly always overemphasized because of a reluctance to depart from long-established ways of doing things and tendencies, sometimes unconscious, to disparage the capabilities of women.

## Women's Reservations

Women themselves are likely to have objections and reservations about accepting employment outside the home, although they may not express them or even be fully aware of the factors which keep them from seeking work. Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence show that most women, like most men, approve the idea of women working in war industries. Yet the vast majority of them hesitate to seek employment. Of a group of Pittsburgh and Detroit women -- most of them housewives of working families -- interviewed in March, only one in nine had actually applied for a war job or even made definite plans to do so.

The reasons advanced by the more articulate respondents are probably the ones which cause women in general to hesitate about looking for work. A Pittsburgh welder's wife said: "I have plenty of defense work myself taking care of the nine-months old baby and the five-year old boy." The care of children and other domestic responsibilities are by all means the most important deterrents to women working. In many communities homemaking requires far more time and energy than it did before the war, because of transportation jams, the longer time it takes to shop, and the difficulty of getting household help.

Another common response was, "I'm not qualified for anything. I just keep house." Many women doubt their ability to hold jobs either in war plants or in other fields. They point to their inexperience. A few complain -- sometimes without real justification -- of the unavailability of training courses which are within their means.

Age or poor health also deter a number of women from working outside the home. A scattering of respondents mentioned still other reasons;

ignorance of how to go about looking for work, the need for pull to get employment, the difficulty of finding work if one is not a citizen, the fear that accepting employment would jeopardize the husband's draft status.

Not all of these reasons are to be taken at face value. Like the reasons advanced by employers for not hiring women, they stem in part from valid objective factors, in part from subjective considerations. There are strong prejudices in some social groups against married women working, and the feeling that woman's place is in the home has a deep appeal for most women. Accustomed to the relative security of the home and at least partially subscribing to the view that it is their proper sphere, most women are naturally reluctant to make the plunge into the business and industrial world. And with the breadwinners in most families working and making the best money they have made in a long time, there is relatively little economic pressure on them to do so.

Having experienced one long drawn out depression and fearing that the war will be followed by another one, some women feel that they deserve a brief period in which they can fix up their homes a little and devote themselves to their children.

### Other Reservations

Men, like women, in general endorse the idea of women working, but voice many of the same reservations. They, too, insist that women should not work if it means neglecting family responsibilities. Men also feel strongly that women should not be added to the labor force while men remain unemployed, but this objection is losing its force as the reservoir of unemployed manpower dwindles.

In the past, organized labor also raised certain objections to the employment of women, but these sprang primarily from the fact that women were often hired to do the same work as men for lower pay, so that their employment tended to break down wage scales. The present tendency to give women equal pay for equal work is causing labor to change its stand.

All of the reasons voiced against the employment of women can be successfully combatted. For the most part they are reservations rather than objections; that is, people approve of women working but insist on certain conditions being met. The experience of the last war, during which the proportion of women employed in war industries more than doubled, is proof of the fact that, at least on an emergency basis, women can be persuaded to seek work outside the home and management can be persuaded to hire them.

In this war women would unquestionably have been recruited into industry even more extensively than they have been, had not two other groups been given priority: unemployed men and workers, male and female, temporarily displaced because of the conversion of industry to war production. These groups are now largely absorbed. We are just approaching the point where it will be necessary to recruit large numbers of women into the labor force with great rapidity.

## The Present Situation

It must be emphasized that there is today no general shortage of women who are willing to accept employment. On the contrary, there are well over a million women registered with the U. S. Employment Service for whom jobs cannot immediately be found.

There are, however, shortages in certain localities -- for example, in Baltimore, Maryland, in Washington, D. C., and in Ogden, Utah. In thirteen labor market areas a shortage of women workers is anticipated within the next six months. If the proportion of women utilized in industry is increased, a shortage of women workers will be experienced in a still larger number of areas, including some of the most important production centers of the country. Women will have to be increasingly used in most of these centers as men are absorbed into the armed forces and productive capacity is increased. The only alternative is a heavy in-migration of workers from other areas, and the housing and other facilities in many communities are already strained to the limit.

Furthermore, because women usually require training before they are ready for jobs, efforts to break down the barriers to the employment of women must precede the actual demand for their services. So far as war industries are concerned, it is estimated that 60 per cent of the anticipated jobs for women will require less than six months training; two-thirds of these require a training period of two months or less. But 40 per cent of the jobs require over six months training time; certain skilled professional and managerial jobs in which shortages will arise in 1943 and 1944 require two years or more of training. The most urgent labor shortages exist or impend in the skilled brackets for which few women have thus far been trained.

## Work and Morale

The increasing absorption of women into industry may be expected to improve their morale. Of a group of men and women interviewed last January,

slightly more men than women believed that they were doing something helpful toward the prosecution of the war. The difference was evidently due at least in part to the fact that more of the men felt that their jobs had a direct connection with the war effort.

Women can also get a sense of participation in the war effort, however, from successful homemaking and civilian defense activities. Wives of white collar workers, who are particularly active in civilian defense work, and farm women were particularly prone to believe that some of the things they were doing were helping the United States' war effort. Women were more inclined than men to feel that doing their own job well -- whether it was keeping house or working -- was the best contribution they could make to the war effort.

In general, the morale of housewives was not quite as high as that of employed women. A group of women working in war plants, interviewed in May, were found to have exceptionally fine morale. The women in this sample may have been a superior group: they were young and had been previously employed; the majority were unmarried. Nevertheless, the extreme satisfaction they found in their work is not without significance. In part this satisfaction stemmed from the fact that they were earning far more money than they had in the past. But woman after woman expressed her gratification at being engaged in work which had a vital connection with the winning of the war.

## II. Views on War Issues

With only a very few exceptions, the most notable of which will be discussed, women's views on war issues closely coincided with those expressed by men. Except on issues closely related to their lives, however, women were considerable less prone than men to express any opinion; on almost all questions, "don't know" responses were higher among women than among men.

Asked about the progress of the war, one-fourth of the women in one sample, as compared with one-tenth of the men, confessed that they did not know how it was going. In another study the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research rated six men in ten, but only four women in ten, of a group recently interviewed as well informed.

Bureau of Intelligence interviewers distinguished two types of "don't know" women respondents. First was the apologetic type -- women who said that they ought to be keeping up with the news, but simply didn't have the time, "what with the house and kids." Second was the nervous type -- women who didn't read or listen to news about the war because it upset them too much.

Beyond question, the fact that women lead a comparatively confined life and have only limited opportunities for discussion is responsible for their relative lack of knowledge about issues connected with the war. Women employed outside the home, whether married or single, were in general somewhat better informed than housewives.

### Sources of War News

Women are somewhat more prone than men to depend on the radio, with its brief and easier treatment of the news, as a source of war information. Of a group of people interviewed in March, 66 per cent of the women as compared with 58 per cent of the men said that they got most of their war news

from the radio. Women also expressed more confidence than men in the reliability of the war news on the radio, and, conversely, somewhat less confidence in newspapers as a source of news.

A study of newspaper reading habits conducted by the Advertising Research Foundation reveals marked differences between the news interests of men and women. Women show much greater attention to human interest stories than to war news, lagging behind the men in their reading of dispatches from the fighting fronts.

A study of the readership of the Columbus Dispatch on May 7, for example, shows that eight of the ten best-read stories by women dealt with local or human interest news. The banner story on page 1 of this paper, summing up the fall of Corregidor, was read by 45 per cent of the women interviewed. An illustrated story, headlined "He Puts Spare on Parked Baby," was read by 72 per cent of the women. News stories dealing with rationing or other matters related to household affairs are generally well read by women.

## Men's and Women's Views Compared

The differences between the viewpoints of women and men on war issues must be interpreted with caution. The similarities between the viewpoints of men and women were far more notable than the differences. Differences were evident only in responses to a few questions, and these differences were almost invariably slight.

The differences, furthermore, are not necessarily valid. While the entire group interviewed was a representative cross section of the population, the men and women in the group were not perfectly matched with respect to education and marital status. Most of the interviewers were women, and this

may have influenced the results; it is possible, for example, that women would have given fewer "don't know" replies to male interviewers.

### "Defensive" Attitudes

On the basis of replies to a large number of questions it appears probable that women are somewhat more prone than men to have a "defensive" psychology about the war. Interviewers rated one group of approximately a thousand men and women, with whom they spent considerable time, in accordance with whether they thought primarily in defensive or offensive terms. The following table summarizes the results:

#### Viewpoints on the War

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Thinks in defensive terms . . . .	23%	30%
Thinks in offensive terms . . . .	47	28
Not ascertainable . . . . .	30	42

As the chart on the following page shows, more women than men believed that we should pull our armed forces close to home to protect ourselves, rather than use them offensively against Germany and Japan. It is to be noted, however, that the group of women who favored this policy constituted only a small minority. Women were somewhat less inclined than men to feel that we should increase the amount of lend-lease supplies we are sending to our allies.

Responses to one question suggest that a somewhat larger proportion of women than of men would be willing to accept a peace with Germany which would permit her to keep her present territorial gains, although the groups of men and women who held this viewpoint were so small as to make comparison difficult.

## "DEFENSIVE" PSYCHOLOGY AMONG WOMEN "Yes" answers to questions on war policy



Should we pull our forces close to home and use them to protect our own shores?



Women

Men



Should we send more supplies to our allies?



### Apprehension

The tendency for some women to think defensively may result in part from the greater apprehensiveness of women about the nature of the war and its final outcome. Women were somewhat more prone than men to expect enemy air raids upon the United States. More women than men felt that the war would be a long one. And women were slightly less confident than men that we would win the war so decisively that we would be able to dictate the peace terms. Thirty-four per cent of the women, as compared with 27 per cent of the men, felt that, while we would win the war, the Axis powers would still be strong enough at its termination to force us to make some concessions.

Whether women's views are a product of their convictions about the strength of the enemy, natural fearfulness and the desire for security, or a relative lack of knowledge of the basic issues at stake, it appears certain

that they are somewhat more defensive than men in their outlook. They are probably somewhat more susceptible than men to isolationist and appeasement appeals.

It must not be thought, however, that differences of opinion between men and women are notable or that they are evident on all questions. The attitudes of men and women toward our allies are remarkably homogeneous. Although confidence in Russia appears to be growing among both men and women, women shared the fear of many male respondents that Russia may make a separate peace with Germany and that she cannot be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war. Respondents of both sexes were confident that England would not make a separate peace and that she would cooperate with us after the war. But they put a very low appraisal on her war effort. Neither men nor women tended to regard China as a powerful ally. Whatever reservations they held about our allies, eight out of ten men and women felt that we needed their support to defeat the Axis.

## The Home Front

Women and men saw eye-to-eye on almost all domestic war issues. Perhaps as a result of their relative lack of information, women were somewhat less critical than men toward both management and labor. On issues remote from their everyday experience they were less likely than men to have definite opinions. There were few other differences of significance in the responses of men and women on the home-front war effort.

Like men, women were overwhelmingly in favor of price control and rationing. They were as likely as men to say that the government was right to ration sugar and tires, but fewer women than men voiced an opinion on the question of whether it was necessary to ration tires.

If women are to be treated as a special group in relation to the anti-inflation program, it is not because they think differently from men, but because, as housewives, they are in a position to respond differently.

Women were somewhat less inclined than men to favor limiting wages and abolishing extra pay for all work over forty hours. Employed women were somewhat more in favor of wage limitation than non-employed women; wives of laborers were most opposed.

Fewer women than men voiced an opinion on the question of whether companies with war contracts were making too much profit, and women were somewhat less critical than men. Employed women were more likely to have an opinion on the question and more inclined to believe that profits were too large than were housewives.

## Conclusions

The most important task in connection with the future enlistment of women in the war effort is to pave the way for their employment in business and industry. It is estimated that 5,000,000 women will have to be recruited into the labor market in the next eighteen months to replace men as they are drawn into the armed forces and to augment the labor force as productive capacity expands.

Programs for attracting women into the labor force must be two-sided. They must seek to provide the facilities which will make it possible for women to seek employment, including training courses and day nurseries. And they must attempt to neutralize the attitudes which now impede the hiring of women, whether those attitudes are held by employers, labor unions, men or women themselves.

Efforts to break down the conditions and attitudes which now block the employment of women should be instituted in those localities where shortages exist or impend, rather than in the nation as a whole. England made the mistake of asking for the voluntary registration of women long before jobs were available for them. When jobs were not forthcoming, the morale of the registrants suffered. However, because most women require training to prepare themselves for employment, efforts to enlist them into the labor force must somewhat precede the actual occurrence of a demand for their services.

The recruitment of women into industry will itself help to overcome their relative lack of knowledge of war issues, their apprehensiveness, and their tendency -- slightly greater than men's -- to take a "defensive" view of the war. In part at least, women's comparative lack of knowledge and their war attitudes are a product of their relative isolation in the home and the paucity of their contacts as compared with men. The differences of opinion on war issues between men and women may be expected to diminish as women are more fully drawn into the war effort in paid employment, in civilian defense activity, and in their role as housewives.

Efforts to enlist the actual participation of women in the war effort may be profitably supplemented by some information approaches slanted directly at women, which take into account their interests, their reading and listening habits, and their present beliefs and fears.

Women do not in any basic sense constitute a special group. The objective of governmental policy, with women as with men, is to enlist their full participation in the war effort as workers and as enlightened citizens of a democracy.

### Sources of the Report

This report is based on the following material:

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- "Attitudes of Women Toward the War," Division of Surveys, August 11, 1942
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#### Other Reports

- "The Employment of Women in War Production," Bureau of Employment Security, Social Security Board, Federal Security Agency, May 1942
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- Report on Problems Related to Woman War Labor Supply, Women's Bureau, U. S. Department of Labor
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The Bureau of Intelligence reports are available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal*

August 22, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE REPORT 37  
which was prepared for the Director of the Office of War  
Information.

Sincerely yours,

*R. Keith Kane*  
R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



PSF  
OWI

8-21-42

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

# 37

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OFFICE OF  
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The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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## NEWS EMPHASIS

Good news from the Solomon Islands brought this sector of the war flaring back into banner headlines after a few days of obscurity. Handling of the story, in both press and radio, has been dramatic, yet there was little tendency to minimize American dangers and losses. Rivaling it for attention among the fighting fronts was news of the continuing battle for the Caucasus. In general, the war stories were reported with more hopeful overtones during the past week, although the seriousness of the Russian situation was not disguised. American bombing raids helped to give the headlines a somewhat optimistic tone. And Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Moscow was dramatized hopefully.

News from India dropped to a subordinate position. Emphasis was placed on British statements that violence had been brought under control. Newspapers, indeed, seemed deliberately to play the situation down. Radio commentators were more prone to stress its importance.

On the home front, material shortages remained a subject of prime interest. A number of speculative stories discussed criticism of the WPB in regard to supply allocations and the Kaiser plan. The strike at the Bayonne plant of the General Cable Corporation highlighted the problem of wildcat walk-outs. But news interest died down when the Navy took over.



## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### Military Front

Editorial criticism of military issues evaporated into cheers this week over reports of the American offensive in the Solomons. The action was widely interpreted as a part of global strategy,

a number of commentators suggesting that it may have averted a Japanese thrust at Siberia. Toward the end of the week, there was a tendency to abandon earlier caution and describe the American attack as a major success and the beginning of a great offensive.

Satisfaction over the Solomons was carried over into encouragement respecting the Russian front. Commentators reviewing the situation stressed the gravity of the German conquest of the Maikop oil fields. But there seemed little fear of a Russian collapse. Some insisted, indeed, that the Germans had failed in their main objectives. Major George Fielding Eliot, for example, declared, "The German eruption into the northern Caucasian area is a military operation which must move much farther before it can be considered a permanent success. A stalemate now would be tantamount to German defeat."

Agitation for the opening of a second front all but ceased. Comment on this issue was cautious, generally suggesting that the decision must be left to the United Nations leadership.

The meeting of allied leaders in Moscow was commonly interpreted as a hopeful portent of concerted action. The New York Herald-Tribune said of it: "Short of the announcement of a major victory, it is difficult to imagine better news than that conveyed in the communique reporting Mr. Churchill's visit to Moscow." On the air, Raymond Gram Swing found "the presence of Churchill in Russia ... a symbol of the reality of Britain's concern over what is happening in Russia" and called the meeting "an occasion with the life and civilization of nations at stake."

Despite the paucity of news about India, the volume of comment on the Indian problem has been abundant. By no means all of the discussion remains sympathetic to the British. A number of critics express uneasiness over the

way in which the problem has been handled, particularly over the news that whipping is to be employed. In this connection, the New York Times remarked, "If they mean to recognize the freedom and equality of the Indian people, they must not use against a rebellious minority any measures that they would not use against a similar minority in Britain itself."

Much of the uneasiness about the problem in India arises from a sense that Britain's conduct may not be wholly consistent with the stated ideals of the United Nations. Columnist Raymond Clapper observed: "The first anniversary of the Atlantic Charter should have been an important morale event, but it was muffled under the turbulent news from India. The noble words give off just now a slightly hollow ring against the noise of riots in the Gandhi campaign for immediate independence."

## Production

Discussion of developing shortages of war materials continued heavy in volume, but changed in tone, to some extent, from mere grumbling to more considered concern. A number of commentators rose to the defense of Donald Nelson. Others refrained from charging him with full blame for the shortcomings they saw in the War Production Board. The St. Louis Post Dispatch, for example, declared that "If the present WPB setup can't produce results, then, as Senator Truman says, Donald Nelson 'should exercise his authority and reorganize the iron and steel division' of his organization."

Walter Lippmann loftily reproved the production chief for "his excessively patient way". He declared that Mr. Nelson must "participate in the planning of the war at the level of General Marshall and Admiral King, and of the combined chiefs of staff, and of the British Minister of Production." It is a

common complaint that Mr. Nelson has not been sufficiently tough.

The Scripps-Howard newspapers have been tilting their lance at WPB on behalf of Henry Kaiser and his cargo plane plan. They charge that the West coast shipbuilder was given the "old bureaucratic run-around." Other commentators, too, reveal dissatisfaction with the way in which Kaiser has been treated.

Attention was diverted from the technical to the human problems of production by the strike at the General Cable Corporation plant in Bayonne, New Jersey. The strike was vehemently condemned. And while commentators approved the prompt seizure of the plant by the Navy, they were avid for more drastic punishment of the strikers. Even the relatively liberal Philadelphia Record said: "Draft into the Army, immediately, the leaders of illegal strikes, their aides, and as many more as may be necessary to convince war workers generally that Uncle Sam is not going to allow them to let down their countrymen at the fighting fronts."

## Politics

Comment on the primaries figured among the top editorial topics of the week. The renomination of Hamilton Fish was condemned by most commentators. But a majority also appeared pleased to be able to interpret the renomination of other ex-isolationists as a repudiation of the President's formula for judging candidates by their attitude prior to Pearl Harbor. Like the Detroit Free Press, they argued that any presidential interest in political affairs amounted to "attempted dictation from the outside."

The Chicago Tribune, with its customary restraint, declared in a front page editorial on Mr. Fish's victory that "The outcome of the primary was a

deserved rebuke to a vindictive and unscrupulous administration, determined to punish anyone who had dared to show some independence of mind before Pearl Harbor."



## POPULAR REACTIONS

### War News

There is a natural correspondence between the handling of news by editors and popular appraisal of events. The stories to which newspaper headlines and radio newscasters give prime attention are the stories upon which public interest is focussed. Thus, when the Bureau of Intelligence asked people to name the most important event of the past week, a majority chose the battle of the Solomon Islands. Second in importance, to the man in the street, was the fighting in the Caucasus.

Most people considered the offensive in the Solomon Islands to be good news. Despite continuing reverses on the Russian front and difficulties in India, there was a marked swing of public opinion toward a belief that the week's war news was generally favorable for the United Nations.

The Bureau of Intelligence, on Friday, August 14, asked a small national sample the same question which it had put to a comparable cross section on July 31 -- "Do you think the war news as a whole this past week has been generally favorable for our side or generally unfavorable?" The results for the two interviewing dates are shown in the following table:

	<u>July 31</u>	<u>August 14</u>
Favorable	21%	46%
50-50	14	16
Unfavorable	53	29
Don't know	12	9

## Battle for the Caucasus

Some light is shed on the seriousness with which the American public views the Russian reverses by another question put to the small sample last Friday -- "If Russia doesn't get more help from the allies than she is getting now, do you think Russia will be able to hold out against the Germans until this winter?" The division of opinion on this question was fairly even, with a considerable minority undecided. Thirty-eight per cent answered "Yes"; 43 per cent said "No"; 19 per cent expressed no opinion.

Apparently the plight of the Russians is considered grave when it is called to the attention of respondents in these terms. But spontaneous references to the gravity of the Russian situation are not frequent in response to generalized questions about the progress of the war. The full implications of a Russian defeat for the United Nations cause do not appear to be widely understood.

Public opinion is also split rather evenly as to the way in which Russia can best be aided by her allies. The chart immediately below shows the division of opinion expressed by people in response to a question posed August 14 and designed to discover their preference respecting methods of opening up a second front in Europe.

DURING THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS DO YOU THINK THE ALLIES SHOULD...



Concentrate on increasing their bombing attacks on Germany?

40%



Try to land troops somewhere in Europe to try to attack Germany?

38%



Don't know

22%

## Production

The statement regarding production problems issued by the Office of War Information, together with considerable publicity about raw material shortages, seems to have dampened public optimism concerning our productive effort. People are no longer quite so prone as they were a few weeks ago to feel that our output of war material is all that it should be. The table which follows shows the trend of opinion on this subject:


"In general, do you think that production of war materials in this country is going along very well, only fairly well, or poorly?"

	<u>Early July</u>	<u>Late July</u>	<u>Mid-August</u>
Very well	67%	50%	42%
Only fairly well	23	40	43
Poorly	2	4	10
Don't know	8	6	5

## Prices

About one-third of the public has sufficient confidence in price control to believe that prices will remain at current levels during the year ahead. More than half of those interviewed believe there will be a rise in prices. Among those anticipating increases, a majority expects that they will be considerable; but a sizeable minority thinks they will be only slight.

DO YOU EXPECT THAT IN THE NEXT YEAR PRICES ON MOST THINGS AROUND HERE WILL GO UP STAY ABOUT THE SAME OR GO DOWN?



### The Aftermath of Isolationism\*

Those Americans who, prior to Pearl Harbor, held views which were commonly called "isolationist" show little embarrassment about acknowledging them today. Either they remain convinced that they were right in their earlier opinion or they believe that the errors demonstrated by hindsight are no cause for consternation. The fact is that when they are asked now to recall the attitudes they held before December 7, they show no hesitation in acknowledging that they were opposed at that time to American intervention in the conflict.

A study prepared by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research sheds interesting light on the attitudes of this group. Last November the Princeton research agency asked the following question of a national cross section: "Which of these two things do you think is more important for the United States to try to do: (1) To help Britain even at the risk of getting into the war or (2) To keep out of war ourselves?" The latter alternative was chosen by 28 per cent.

In June of 1942, a comparable sample of the public was asked: "Before the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor a lot of people thought we should try to keep out of war, rather than run the risk of getting in by sending supplies to England and Russia. Were you in favor of risking war by sending supplies to England or were you in favor of trying to keep out of the war?" Thirty-five per cent put themselves in the second category.

The readiness with which people now acknowledge that they were on the isolationist side before American entry into the war lends small

\* Reprinted from Intelligence Report #36

encouragement to those interested in the defeat of "isolationist" Congressmen. Candidates are unlikely to encounter any greater hostility because of their views on war issues today than they would have last November.

An analysis of those who say they preferred avoiding war to aiding Britain, prior to American involvement, shows that they continue to be markedly less in favor of vigorous offensive action than the majority of the public. The chart on the following page illustrates contrasts between the attitudes of those who said that, before Pearl Harbor, they favored risking war (interventionists) and those who said they favored keeping out of war (non-interventionists).

### Nationwide Gas Rationing

The following table summarizes the views of a nationwide cross section on the question of whether gasoline rationing is necessary throughout the country.

	RATIONED AREA			NON-RATIONED AREA		
	<u>Car</u>	<u>No Car</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Car</u>	<u>No car</u>	<u>Total</u>
Necessary	51%	56%	53%	27%	41%	31%
Not necessary	39	24	33	60	38	54
Not ascertainable	10	20	14	13	21	15

Interviews were conducted late in July. In general, they confirmed the findings of two telegraphic polls conducted during the first half of July and reported in Survey No. 33.

The contrast between rationed and non-rationed areas is sharp. A

\* Reprinted from Intelligence Report #36

## CONTRASTING VIEWS ON SOME WAR ISSUES

"YES" ANSWERS ONLY:

 Pre-Pearl Harbor Interventionists

 Pre-Pearl Harbor Non-Interventionists



IF HITLER OFFERED  
PEACE NOW, WOULD  
YOU FAVOR ACCEPT-  
ING IT?



IF GERMAN ARMY  
OVERTHREW HITLER  
AND OFFERED PEACE  
NOW, WOULD YOU  
FAVOR ACCEPTING IT?




ANY DANGER SOUTH  
AMERICA WILL BE  
INVADED?



IS THE GOVERNMENT  
GIVING THE PEOPLE  
AS MUCH INFORMA-  
TION AS IT SHOULD?



SHOULD WE SEND  
MOST OF OUR ARMY  
ABROAD TO FIGHT  
WHEREVER NECES-  
SARY?



WHEN WAR IS OVER,  
SHOULD U.S. TAKE  
ACTIVE PART IN  
WORLD AFFAIRS?



majority of people in areas which now have gasoline rationing believed that a nationwide program should be instituted. People in non-rationed areas, on the other hand, were reluctant to accept rationing. In both areas those who did not own cars were somewhat more likely to approve of gas rationing.

Respondents who felt that nationwide gasoline rationing is necessary were asked to tell why. Almost half of them mentioned the need for conserving gasoline — either to supply the armed forces or for some unspecified use in connection with war effort. The reason given by the next largest group of respondents was the need for conserving rubber. In areas where rationing now prevails many people also stressed the importance of equality of sacrifice; they felt that the entire country, and not simply the East, should bear the burden of gasoline rationing.

Of those who felt that nationwide rationing is unnecessary, the largest single group maintained that there is no real shortage of gas. Especially in non-rationed areas, many respondents took the position that any shortage which does exist is due solely to transportation, so that nationwide rationing is unjustified.

Those interviewed were also asked: "Do you think there is a serious rubber shortage in this country now?" Two-thirds replied in the affirmative, and had the word "now" not been included in the question even more might have done so. People in areas where gasoline rationing is now in effect were a little more prone than people in other parts of the country to feel that there is a serious rubber shortage.

Those respondents who said that nationwide gasoline rationing is unnecessary, or who were doubtful about it, were asked the following question:

"Do you think we may have a rubber shortage which is so serious that we will have to ration gasoline all over the country in order to save tires?" Thus reminded of the interrelationship between gasoline rationing and rubber conservation, half of those questioned modified their previously expressed views and acknowledged that such a course might sometime be necessary. This surprising and significant turnabout suggests that large numbers of people now opposed to nationwide gas rationing can be persuaded to accept it if sufficient emphasis is put on its value in conserving rubber.

(For tables and further details see "Gasoline Rationing," Special Report #11, Extensive Surveys Division, available on request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

### Fear of Sabotage

Americans are inclined to feel that their fellow countrymen are not greatly worried over the danger of sabotage. But they think that there is now greater awareness of this danger and a greater fear of it than there was a few weeks ago.

Shortly after the capture of the eight Nazi saboteurs who landed from submarines on Long Island and in Florida, the Bureau of Intelligence put this question to a national sample: "Are most of the people you know really worried about the chances of sabotage in this country or do they think things are pretty well under control?" The first alternative was chosen by 32 per cent of those interviewed; 57 per cent chose the second alternative; 11 per cent did not know how to answer the question.

Proximity to the scene of the saboteurs' landings seems to have encouraged a belief that people are fearful respecting the sabotage danger. Respondents in East coast communities were most inclined to say that people

are worried, while those on the West coast were least prone to hold this opinion.

The Bureau also asked the sample the following question: "Do you think people are more worried now than they were a couple of weeks ago?" Fifty-nine per cent answered "Yes"; 34 per cent said "No"; seven per cent expressed no opinion. Again the East coast led the rest of the country in thinking the public was "worried", while the West was lowest in this opinion. Indeed, among West coast respondents who expressed opinions, a slight majority felt that the public was no more alarmed than it had been two weeks earlier.

There is a majority feeling among Americans that the Government should make public information concerning the capture of spies or saboteurs. The question asked in this connection did not relate specifically to the recently publicized trial of German saboteurs, but was general in nature -- "Do you think the Government should tell the public when they catch spies and Nazi agents in this country, or do you think they should keep it quiet?" Fifty-five per cent were in favor of telling the public; 35 per cent were in favor of keeping it quiet; 10 per cent left the question unanswered.

The chief reason offered in support of the contention that the Government should release information of this sort was that it would make the public more vigilant. Conversely, the reason most commonly advanced for the contrary opinion was that it would put the enemy on guard and increase the difficulty of capturing other enemy agents.

### Attitudes Toward Aliens

Publicity concerning the recent trial of the Nazi saboteurs appears to have heightened a prevailing feeling that the Germans are the most dangerous

of the alien groups in the United States. The following table illustrates the shift of opinion on this topic between April and July: "Which of these alien groups in the United States do you think is the most dangerous: the Japanese, Germans, or Italians?"

	<u>April</u>	<u>July</u>
Germans	46%	51%
Japanese	35	26
Italians	2	1
All the same	11	15
Not ascertainable	6	7

Despite the fact that a majority of Americans considers the Germans the most dangerous alien group residing here and that no more than one per cent puts the Italians in this category, three-fourths of the public think that all three alien groups should be treated alike. Apparently the belief that Italians are less dangerous than Germans does not remove the fear that they are, nevertheless, a real threat to our security.

In an earlier study, conducted during the first part of June, a similar disinclination to consider Italians as menacing as Germans was apparent. At that time the sample was asked separately about treatment of German aliens and treatment of Italian aliens. A cross tabulation showed that 75 per cent recommended identical treatment for the two groups, 19 per cent favored more lenient treatment for Italians than for Germans; three per cent recommended more lenient treatment for Germans than for Italians. These findings appear to indicate that distrust of the Italian aliens, while less intense than that for Germans, is still sufficient to create widespread opposition to proposals for giving the Italians special consideration.

## Attitudes Toward the Anti-Inflation Program\*

Most leaders of farm, labor and business groups recognize that inflation constitutes a real threat to the people they represent. They are prepared to support a strong and uncompromising anti-inflation program. Each of them insists, however, that the program should not disadvantage his particular group. Absolute equity is demanded in the imposition of necessary restrictions.

These opinions were secured through more than 600 off-the-record interviews, conducted by the Bureau of Public Inquiry, with leaders of the principal occupational groups in all sections of the country.

The dominant feeling among these group leaders is that the general public has forgotten the President's anti-inflation speech and never possessed any clear understanding of it. The term "inflation" is generally feared, but there is no clear picture of what it means or how it can be prevented. Various phases of the program are opposed by different group interests.

Leaders among these groups are jockeying for preferential positions. None wants that portion of the anti-inflation program affecting his group to be the first undertaken. He would prefer it to be the last, but he will support an over-all program imposed simultaneously and justly.

The view prevails among group leaders that there is urgent need for an effective informational campaign to promote general understanding of two points:

- (1) That sacrifice is necessary today to forestall disaster tomorrow
- (2) That the sacrifices will be imposed simultaneously and equitably upon all, with no privileges and no needless hardships.

\* Reprinted from Intelligence Report #36



## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### Detroit

Serious tensions are fermenting in the overcrowded industrial city of Detroit, one of the most important centers of the American production effort. Labor unrest, a desperate housing shortage, racial antagonisms and unscrupulous agitation combine to create a situation which may become explosive and which clearly detracts from the morale and productivity of this community. There is now some public awareness of the problems which plague the city as a result of the candid picture story on Detroit which appeared in the August 17th issue of Life and subsequent newspaper articles quoting prominent Detroiters.

The restlessness and resentment of Detroit's workers, particularly within the United Automobile Workers Union, was depicted in Intelligence Report #35 and is given additional detail in the following item of this issue. Union leadership may be overridden by the rank and file. Small wildcat strikes are already extremely frequent.

The housing situation is critical. While it is true that the Sojourner Truth housing riots reflected instigated race friction, the need for housing for whites, as well as Negroes, has been desperate. In Willow Run, where Henry Ford is opposing a Federal housing project, people are living in tents, trailers and shacks. It is hoped that about 75,000 local women can be recruited for Detroit's industries. But it is estimated that about 96,000 new workers from outside the area will be needed to meet 1943 production requirements. At the time of the last WPA vacancy survey in April, it was estimated that no more than 5,040 dwelling units were available for rent. An influx of

new residents will overtax not only existing housing, but also the city's water supply, sewerage, health, recreation and transportation facilities.

Negroes constitute about 10 per cent of Detroit's population, foreign-born whites about 20 per cent. Within the past twenty years 200,000 whites have moved to Detroit from southern or border states, and many of the newcomers will be drawn from the same regions. They bring with them deep-seated antagonisms toward aliens and the colored elements of the population. Detroit has been the scene of most of the strikes caused by the employment of Negroes at skilled and semi-skilled work.

Influential groups are at work to inflame unrest and widen existing cleavages. The Ku Klux Klan, attempting to stage a comeback, is trying to gain control of the U.A.W. and has already penetrated into a number of locals. Gerald L. K. Smith is recruiting members for his ambitiously titled "Committee of One Million." The organization's publication, the Cross and Flag, which picked up the baton when Social Justice was forced to suspend publication, sedulously follows the Axis line. Charles Coughlin's "Christian Front" and the pro-Axis "National Workers League" contribute to the discord and discontent.

Smith is campaigning for the Republican nomination for Senator. While he will probably not be elected, it may be expected that he will miss no opportunity to exploit group hatreds. Complicating the political situation is a German bloc which tends to vote as a unit.

The enemy appears to realize that tensions in the Detroit area threaten the attainment of war production goals, and pays the city a great deal of attention in its propaganda. Vigorous federal action, both on the administrative and informational levels, is urgently needed to restore health and

harmony to this seething center of unrest. Only the national Government possesses the prestige and power to overcome the disturbing influences now at work in Detroit.

### Labor Grievance\*

Last week's Intelligence Report (#35), states that final action of the United Automobile Workers Convention on proposals to rescind the voluntary waiver of Saturday and Sunday overtime pay would provide a clue to the prevalence of rank and file discontent. When the proposal was introduced on the Convention floor pandemonium followed. For nearly three hours delegates argued that the Committee's resolution was too mild a measure. They wanted to add to it the threat to abolish the "no strike agreement".

When the vote came, more than half of the 1700 delegates present sent the resolution back to the Committee for "more teeth". As finally adopted, it provided that UAW would regard itself as released from its commitment, waiving premium pay for overtime work, unless the Administration within 30 days developed an effective anti-inflation program based on 10 specified points.

The turbulence was extreme. Leadership was quite unable to control the resentment of members over the belief that management and rival unions were taking advantage of their sacrifice. Effective administrative and informational measures seem urgently needed to prevent intemperate action by the rank and file of the automobile workers.

\* Reprinted from Intelligence Report #36

## Women and the War

Women are playing an increasingly important part on the nation's production front. In July more than 14,000,000 American women were gainfully employed. More than 2,000,000 of them had been added to the labor force in the preceding 12 months.

Women constitute our most important source of additional workers. There are approximately 2,500,000 unemployed single women. Excluding farm women, there are some 13,000,000 married women who have no children under 16 years of age. Many women with young children will be in a position to accept employment once enough day nurseries are established.

Despite the existence of this large supply of potential workers, bringing enough women into the labor force to meet the demands of the war effort will be a formidable task. It is estimated that 5,000,000 women must be recruited, trained and placed within the next 18 months to replace men drawn into the armed forces and to augment the labor force as production capacity expands. Although there is now a shortage of women workers in only a few localities, shortages impend in a number of additional places and will be experienced in many of the most important production centers of the country as the proportion of women workers needed in industry increases.

Many employers have objections and reservations about hiring women, and large numbers of women — even though they may theoretically approve of women working — hesitate to seek employment outside of the home. The real difficulties in the way of a fuller utilization of women in business and industry are sometimes exaggerated by both management and by women. Efforts to pave the way for the wider employment of women must both provide the

facilities which will make it possible for women to seek work outside the home, including training courses and day nurseries, and neutralize the attitudes which now inhibit their employment.

The recruitment of women into the labor force may be expected to improve their morale and their knowledge of issues related to the war. Studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence suggest that employed women are somewhat better informed and have higher morale than housewives.

Women and men see eye-to-eye on most war issues. But, except on issues closely related to their everyday experience, women are less likely than men to express any opinion. Many women complain that their housekeeping tasks do not leave them enough time to keep up with the war.

Women appear to be somewhat more prone than men to take a "defensive" view of the war. For example, more women than men think that we should pull our armed forces close to home to protect ourselves, rather than use them offensively against Germany and Japan. Women also tend to be slightly more apprehensive than men about the course of the war and its final outcome. But the differences are not great, and the women who think about the war in defensive terms comprise only a small minority.

These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, Women and the War, issued August 19, and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.

### War Worker Motivations\*

Interviews conducted among war workers in 19 cities and small towns throughout the country indicate that the men engaged on the production front

\* Reprinted from Intelligence Report #36

have a keen, perhaps exaggerated, recognition of the importance of their role in the war effort. They are prone to feel that production alone will win the war and to be over-optimistic in their reactions to current military events.

On the basis of their answers to a number of questions, the Bureau of Intelligence rated slightly less than half of this group as of high morale; about one-third as possessing medium morale; a quarter were judged to be of low morale.

The morale of these men is affected by certain dissatisfactions which detract from the full utilization of their skill and energy in the production program. Their satisfaction with their jobs is affected by the wages they receive, by the conditions under which they work, by their relations with employers, with the Government and with the communities in which they live. Wages are the dominant factor. About half of the men interviewed said they were satisfied with their present rate of pay.

Workers are prone to blame management for delays or inefficiency in production. They desire a greater voice in the planning of production and wider information respecting production difficulties and the use made of their products. Labor-Management committees have helped in some situations to promote cooperation between employers and employees. In general, however, workers are unfamiliar with them.

Workers look confidently toward the Government for the protection of their economic interests, both at present and when the war is over. But they are fearful that the war may be followed by depression and unemployment and are kept from full absorption in their present jobs by this uncertainty.

The problem of promoting worker morale is a problem in employer-employee relations. The solution can be helped, however, by Government information policy which will educate workers in respect to the need for all-out effort and the possibilities for social security which lie ahead with victory.

These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, War Worker Motivations, issued August 12 and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.



## ENEMY PROPAGANDA

### Enemy Version of the Military Situation

Nazi propaganda treatment of the Dieppe commando raid followed expected lines. The raid was described as a genuine invasion attempt turned into a "Dunkirk" by strong German defenses. The suicidal character of the attempt is said to reflect the desperateness of the Soviet military position. Vichy is quoted by Berlin as describing the action as the "First U. S. reverse on European soil" and that "American blood has been spilled in Europe by order of Stalin."

A new stage in the Nazi "peace offensive" against Britain and the United States is reflected in the first explicit German propaganda claim of final victory. Broadcasting to the United States on August 15, a German news analyst declared, "Germany and her allies, the Axis powers, the new Europe, have won this war." Dr. Goebbels is now permitting exaggeration in broadcasts outside of Germany, although he seeks to avoid extremes of optimism and pessimism within Germany by a more cautious domestic propaganda policy.

The original Japanese version of the Solomon Islands battle has been

revised from claims of complete Japanese victory to an admission that fierce fighting with United States Marines is still going on. In home broadcasts, the Japanese people are prepared for news of a set-back by a broadcast asserting that, while the first American offensive has been turned into a disastrous defeat, "we.... must tighten our helmet strings against their plans to carry out a second and third offensive, which they boast will be supported by reinforcements of warships and air power."

### German Home Front

There are evidences of Nazi concern over German morale. The German press and radio now give a more prominent place to the contributions of Germany's allies on the Russian front. An effort is evidently being made to convince the German people that they are not fighting alone against the United Nations. The Nazis are seeking also to persuade the German people that this war is not like the last one. The latest issue of Das Schwarze Korps states: "Today we are thoroughly prepared for war. We have adapted ourselves and stored peace in a mothproof cupboard. To make comparisons with the last war would mean doing the enemy a favor."

A recent speaking tour by Dr. Goebbels through western Europe reflects particular concern for the population of this bombed area. Goebbels stressed that the war is not being fought for ideals, but for more grain fields and oil wells. "We want bread and do not care how we get it. The war is not being waged for certain privileged classes but for the masses; for a well-laden breakfast, lunch and dinner table; for better living accommodations; for people's cars and tractors; cinemas and theatres in every village; for raw materials, oil and iron; in short, for a dignified existence. The past

winter was critical but," said Goebbels quoting Nietzsche, "What does not kill us makes us stronger."

It is also noteworthy that a particular effort is being made to disparage the United States. The Berliner Boersen Zeitung of August 12 says that Anglo-Saxon morale is nearing collapse. Goebbels devotes an entire article to "God's Own Country", in which he describes Americans with savage irony as a people without culture and originality.

### Appeals for Listeners

For the first time Radio Roma has devoted as much as five per cent of her broadcast time, employing prominent Fascist party speakers, to strengthen Fascist ties with Italian-Americans. The talks, in Italian, are directed to the more recent Italian immigrants. Italians are urged to resent Anglo-Saxon discrimination and to avoid naturalization.

The German propaganda ministry, in its efforts to build up an American radio audience, has broadcast for the first time a series of messages allegedly from American seamen, captured from a Murmansk convoy, and a casualty list of American airmen, allegedly shot down on July 13.



### AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

Beginning with the recent OWI release on the progress of the war, there has been a new tone of clarity and precision in official statements. Outstanding have been Secretary Stimson's announcement that he will eliminate three quarters of the Army's publicity officers; Secretary Wickard's address of August 19 calling on farmers to lead the anti-inflation front and flatly favoring repeal of the 110 per cent parity provision; Mr. Henderson's speech at Norfolk on August 20

calling for a new offensive against inflation; and Mr. Nelson's statement of August 19 that "from now on anyone who crosses my path is going to have his head taken off... I'm going to get tough enough to get this job done... There'll be no more alibis."

The period covered by this report is the week of August 12 through August 18, except where otherwise specifically stated

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON


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August 27, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of an INTELLIGENCE  
REPORT on "Mobilizing Manpower for War" which was  
prepared for the Director of the Office of War  
Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



PSF  
OWI  
97C

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT 8-26-42

## MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR WAR

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Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.

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#### SUMMARY

In part because people have adapted themselves to the inevitability of conscription, the Selective Service System has aroused a minimum of dissatisfaction. Of a cross section of the public interviewed in early July, only nine people out of every hundred felt that it was unfair in its operation. Even fewer respondents felt that they, or their closest relative or friend, had been classified unfairly.

Only about one person in ten had any criticism to make with regard to the general administration of Selective Service or present policies and practices with regard to occupational, dependency, and physical disability deferments. Many of the criticisms made cancelled out; some thought that standards were too strict, others that they were too lax. Few people felt there was much draft dodging.

In contrast, the need for manpower mobilization is not generally recognized. Continued unemployment during recent years has made it difficult for people to appreciate the existence of labor shortages. Only one respondent in four had given any serious thought to the impending manpower crisis. Only two people in ten felt that it is necessary to resort to compulsory mobilization of manpower. A very large number of those who regarded such a step as unnecessary believed that a large labor supply is still available.

Despite their unawareness of the labor shortage, four people in ten were willing to give up their present jobs to do war work. Almost as many were willing to be shifted into war work by the Government. A large group of respondents would be willing to change jobs if they were convinced that such a step is necessary and if certain reasonable conditions are fulfilled. Only one person in four was definitely unwilling to shift jobs.

The most important determinant of readiness to shift into war work was the present situation of the respondent. People who were poorly paid and dissatisfied with their work were more willing to change jobs than those who were well-paid and contented.

People expressed some preference for a voluntary system of mobilizing manpower. This does not mean, however, that a compulsory system would be resisted if it were regarded as necessary. A sizable group already favors compulsory mobilization, and there was a general disposition to accept whatever measures the country's wartime Government deems best.

## MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR WAR

The American people have accepted, almost without reservation, the necessity of mobilizing the nation's manpower for military service and they overwhelmingly approve the system which has been established for effecting it. In contrast, they are largely unaware of the fact that a civilian manpower crisis impends and are only partially ready for a mobilization of manpower for war production.

Yet mobilizing men for the fighting front and mobilizing men and women for the production front are not only analogous; they are two aspects of a single problem -- marshalling the nation's manpower to meet the demands of the war effort. As a preliminary to developing better public understanding of the manpower problem as a whole, it is important to understand the divergence in public attitudes with regard to these two phases of the problem.

### Tradition

Tradition unquestionably has a great deal to do with the sharp contrast which exists. To draft the most eligible males for service with the armed forces when danger threatens is such an established practice that it is accepted by most people almost without thought; an interviewer commented that the draft seemed as inevitable to many people as death and taxes.

In contrast, the idea of directed mobilization of workers for civilian employment seems either vaguely or sharply at variance with American traditions. While most people do not have a theoretical understanding of the close relationship between a free labor market and our form of economic and political system, they probably do recognize that any system under which the Government

would allocate the available supply of manpower would threaten their customary freedom of action.

### Unawareness of Problem

The difference in the extent to which there is an appreciation of the need for additional manpower in the fighting forces and on the production front also contributes importantly to the divergence in viewpoint toward the two types of mobilization. Even before America was at war people felt sufficiently threatened by the continuing aggressions of the Axis powers to appreciate the necessity for expanding the nation's Army and Navy.

While the world situation was a constant reminder of the need for expanding our armed forces, the domestic economic situation made it difficult for people to appreciate the present need for augmenting the labor force. In the thirties people became inured to the idea of unemployment; today they can scarcely credit the existence of labor shortages.

People are aware of the fact that unemployment persists in some fields. In various parts of the country, including New York City, they note that there are still large numbers of people out of work. And in such important production centers as Detroit, people are acutely aware of the layoffs and loss of jobs caused by the conversion of plants to war production and by material shortages.

Thus many people are actually misled by the evidence they obtain from first-hand observation. The oversupply of workers in some fields obscures the fact that severe shortages exist in others; by September it is estimated that shortages will exist in 138 of 491 skilled and semi-skilled occupations essential to war industries. Similarly, people in areas where

there is a plethora of workers may forget that in other sections of the country the labor situation is already critical. In July there were already shortages of male workers in 35 of the 160 major labor market areas of the country, and shortages were anticipated in 81 additional areas. People aware of conversion unemployment and unemployment caused by shortages of materials tend to forget the temporary nature of these situations.

People who point to the existence of unemployment may also forget that there are many persons who, because of permanent disabilities, chronic illness or psychological factors, cannot be readily absorbed into the labor force. The Social Security Board estimates the number of persons with permanent disabilities and chronic illness at more than 2,000,000. While England's war labor experience indicates that many people who are regarded as unemployable can ultimately be absorbed in industry, in part-time if not full-time employment, the process promises to be a slow one.

### The Problem Ahead

People generally are unaware of the rapidity with which new plants are being built and productive capacity expanded. As of July 1942, approximately 12,500,000 workers were making material for the fighting fronts of the United States and its allies. By 1943 it is estimated that 18 million workers will be needed for war production; by 1944, 20 million. Simultaneously, we must find the manpower to more than double our armed forces and to expand farm production. The contraction of many businesses and industries not connected with the war will free millions of workers to meet these demands, and between now and 1943 perhaps a million additional workers can be recruited from the ranks of those now in the labor force but unemployed. When full allowance is

made for these possibilities, it is estimated that five million additional people must be recruited into the labor force by 1943, if war production goals are to be met. An almost incalculable amount of shifting from peace to war industries will be necessary. What the War Manpower Commission rightly calls "the biggest personnel job in history" looms ahead.

### Attitudes toward Selective Service

The Selective Service System has aroused a minimum of dissatisfaction. As the chart on the opposite page shows, only nine people out of every 100, of a cross section interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in early July, feel that it is unfair in its operation. Even fewer feel that they — or their brothers, sons, relatives or friends, if they themselves have not been classified — have been classified unfairly.


In view of the direct effect of the decisions of draft boards on people's personal security, and the security of their loved ones, this response is little short of amazing. But it does not mean that the public feels that the Selective Service System has been perfect in its operation. The view that "they have made some mistakes" is widespread. The response indicates rather that people have adapted themselves to the inevitability of conscription and feel that, in general, the Selective Service Boards have done as well as could be expected, considering the size and complexity of the job which confronted them. There is little disposition to find fault.

Few people criticized the general administration of the draft. The most frequent criticism was that deferments are too easy to obtain, and it was voiced by only eight per cent of those interviewed, most of them men who expected to be drafted themselves and were naturally eager to see that no




# SATISFACTION WITH SELECTIVE SERVICE


IS THE DRAFT BEING FAIRLY HANDLED AROUND HERE?



WERE YOU (OR WAS YOUR CLOSEST RELATIVE  
OR FRIEND) CLASSIFIED FAIRLY?



ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT.....



eligible person on the list ahead of them escaped being called. There were scattered additional complaints -- about inefficiency, contradictory policy, discrimination and politics -- but they were seldom made with any real heat. Many who were critical added comments to the effect that perfection could not be expected in so vast an operation as the draft.

### Occupational Deferments

Respondents were also asked to give their views about the fairness with which occupational, dependency, and physical disability deferments were being granted. As the chart shows, there were few complaints about the practice of draft boards with respect to any of these types of deferment. It is significant, too, that, in the case of both occupational deferments and physical disability deferments, about the same proportion felt that standards are too lax as felt that they are too strict; evidently, boards are succeeding well in striking a happy medium.

A small group of respondents felt that there is some ambiguity in Selective Service policy with respect to the deferment of vital workers. Their criticisms did not appear to reflect any dissatisfaction with the policy of making decisions on the merits of individual cases; but they were puzzled by what appeared to them to be inconsistencies in the practice of local boards with regard to occupational deferments. While they evidently feel that clearer directives should be issued as to what constitutes an "essential occupation", they are content for the Government to make the decision, and seek no change in the present flexible type of system.

More than half of all those interviewed favored the deferment of vital defense workers, and two people in ten believed that all defense workers should be deferred. Twenty-three per cent favored the deferment of farmers.

On the other hand, 12 per cent of the sample believed that no occupational deferments should be granted.

### Dependency and Disability Deferments

About the same number who complained about occupational deferments were critical of current dependency deferment practices. Two complaints predominated. About seven per cent of those interviewed felt that there had been injustices and inconsistencies in the classification of men with dependents, resulting in inequality of sacrifice. In some cases the decisions questioned were attributed to inadequate review. There was no disposition to criticize the basic system under which decisions are based on the merits of individual cases.

Five per cent of the group complained that the draft had broken up families unnecessarily. It should be pointed out that both these complaints, and complaints about inconsistency of policy, are likely to increase as more married men have to be called. The fact that different draft boards will exhaust their list of single registrants at different times is particularly likely to give rise to complaints.

Forty-four per cent of those interviewed favored deferring men with wives and children. Another 16 per cent felt that men with wives unable to support themselves should be deferred; nine per cent favored deferment for all married men. But no matter what position they took, most respondents made it clear that they realized that dependency deferments were practicable and desirable only so long as military exigencies permit.

Only about ten per cent of the group criticized present practices of granting deferments for physical disabilities. Two per cent complained about inconsistencies of policy. Four per cent felt that the army's physical

standards are too high; they were matched by another group, of equal size, who felt that they are too low.

### Draft Dodging

Another index to the nation's satisfaction with the draft is the absence of any widespread suspicion about the prevalence of draft dodging. Only one respondent in ten felt that there is a good deal of draft dodging. Fifty-seven per cent felt that there is little or none.

This satisfaction was also reflected in the refusal of three respondents in four to specify any group as being particularly prone to try to escape the provisions of the draft. There was little tendency to find scapegoats, as there would be if there were a great deal of resentment about the operation of Selective Service. No one group of supposed draft dodgers was named by more than four per cent of the respondents, and the groups were rather vague in composition ("lazy good for nothings", "money grabbers and big shots", etc.) The rumors which have arisen in certain places about draft dodging by various minority groups -- notably the Jews -- are not manifest in spontaneous responses.

### Determinants of Complaints

The amount of complaining about the draft was directly related to people's closeness to it. Those who were eligible for service, or who had members of their immediate families eligible, were most inclined to be ~~critical~~ critical -- chiefly out of the natural fear that others more eligible for service might be unjustly deferred.

A small group of those who find fault with Selective Service are people who question our war aims, are critical of the President, and carp at our

allies. And those few respondents who believe that America should concern herself primarily with production were more critical of Selective Service than those who recognize the necessity of expanding our armed forces.

A realization of the seriousness of the war influenced the kind of complaint respondents made. Those who took a grave and even pessimistic view of the position of the United Nations were most impatient with procedures which seemed to them to postpone our all-out participation in the war.

### The Draft and Anxiety

While the operation of Selective Service has given rise to relatively few complaints, it does not follow that the draft has not generated a great deal of anxiety. Anything which threatens personal security as directly as conscription for military service inevitably arouses a great deal of fear and concern on the part of both eligible men and their families.

Men who expected to be drafted expressed most concern about the effect upon their families; frequently they mentioned financial worries. Few showed evidence of considering the hardships and dangers of the battlefield. In contrast, the danger to which the draftee would be subjected was mentioned far more frequently by their families than any other factor.

To some extent the responses of both draft eligibles and their families were undoubtedly influenced by what it is socially acceptable to say. Many men may be reluctant to confess a fear of death, but one is supposed to be concerned with the welfare of one's family. It may be assumed that the anxieties of draft-eligibles and their families are not as different as they appear to be, and that both groups have more fears than they are likely to confide to interviewers.

This survey showed, as have many previous ones, that large numbers of Americans expect a post-war depression. Members of the families of men likely to be drafted were somewhat more inclined to be apprehensive than the men themselves. Possibly the men were more concerned about the more pressing danger of being drafted. On the other hand, the prospect of the breadwinner or a contributor to the support of the family being drafted may have intensified his relatives' fears about the remote, as well as the immediate, future.

### **The Press and Selective Service**

The satisfaction the public feels with the operation of Selective Service has been reflected in the press. Selective Service has received relatively little criticism in the nation's newspapers, although there has been considerable discussion of deferment and exemption provisions.

What criticism has been expressed has been directed largely at the inefficiency of local boards. The national administration of the draft has not been criticized with any volume or severity. The July 14 directive stressing the need for local boards to take into consideration both the economic relationship of a man to his family and his work status received almost universal approval. The decision to utilize men with minor physical defects for limited military service was also well received.


### **The Home-Front Manpower Problem**

As the chart on the opposite page shows, only one person in four has given any serious thought to the impending manpower crisis. Some of the reasons which explain this situation have already been discussed.

As the chart also shows, only two people in ten felt that it is necessary to mobilise manpower by compulsory means. Most of those who opposed such a step believed that there is a large labor supply still available.

### AWARENESS OF THE MANPOWER PROBLEM

#### THOUGHT GIVEN TO MANPOWER PROBLEM (INTERVIEWERS' RATINGS)



#### DO YOU THINK IT'S NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO DRAFT WORKERS FOR INDUSTRY?



It should perhaps be added that, though people were unaware of the manpower problem, they showed by their responses to many questions that they were keenly conscious of the importance of production. Some respondents, indeed, appeared to have an exaggerated faith in the part which production can play in the winning of the war.

## Willingness to Accept War Work

Despite the general lack of appreciation of the seriousness of the labor shortage, four people in ten expressed a willingness to quit their present jobs for work in connection with the war. Almost as many were willing to be shifted into war work by the Government. Only one person in four was definitely unwilling to shift jobs.

A large group of respondents expressed a willingness to change jobs, or to comply with a compulsory mobilization scheme, under certain conditions. They want to be sure they will be placed in the sort of work for which they are suited; that they will have opportunities to get training; that wages and working conditions will be satisfactory; and that provisions will be made for the care of their children.

By all means the most important determinant of readiness to shift into war work was the present situation of the respondent. The individuals who were unhappy in their present work -- who were not earning enough to meet their needs and who recognized the opportunities in war work for better pay and pleasanter working conditions -- were most willing to shift jobs. Low income workers, unemployed, Negroes and subsistence farmers had a high level of readiness for war work. People whose job security was threatened by material shortages or other economic repercussions of the war were also willing, in many cases, to shift into war work.

On the other hand, people who were earning good money in their present jobs, who had high seniority, and were happy and secure in their work, were naturally reluctant to have the pleasant web of their lives broken by a shift into war work. They seldom opposed the principle of mobilizing the country's manpower for the war effort, but gave reasons of a personal nature for not being able to change jobs themselves. Many pointed to the immediate or

ultimate economic loss, or to the loss of status, which such a change would entail.


A number of respondents maintained that their present jobs were important, even if they were not directly related to the war effort. Others felt that they were not in a position to shift into other work because of their age, the necessity of caring for children, or the fear that they could not be trained for war work.

While of primary importance, such personal considerations were not the only determinants of people's willingness to enter into war jobs. The amount of thought they had given to the manpower problem and their realization of the gravity of the war also exerted a certain amount of influence.

### Compulsory vs. Voluntary Mobilization

Those interviewed were told "It was announced in Washington the other day that we've got to have ten million workers for war industries this year." They were then asked to tell what they regarded as the fairest method of getting that many workers. The chart below summarizes their responses.

#### WHAT IS THE FAIREST WAY TO GET THE ADDITIONAL WORKERS NEEDED FOR WAR INDUSTRIES?



The replies to this and other questions indicate that people have a slight preference for mobilizing the nation's manpower through voluntary means. Some respondents expressed the belief that voluntary mobilization is more in accordance with democratic principles. But an even larger number of the proponents of voluntary mobilization defended their position on the ground that the compulsory allocation of workers isn't necessary -- an opinion they might change if given additional information. It is to be noted, too, that three respondents in ten explicitly stated that they would be willing to accept compulsory mobilization if it appears to be necessary. Thus the present division of opinion by no means indicates that the imposition of a compulsory system of mobilization would encounter strong opposition. People showed a marked disposition to accept whatever measures their wartime Government felt to be best.

A sizable group already favors compulsory mobilization. Proponents of a compulsory system argued that it offers the quickest way of getting needed manpower, that drastic steps are necessary now, and that a compulsory system provides the best guarantee of equality of sacrifice.

### Augmenting the Labor Force

Whatever method of manpower mobilization is employed, millions of additional people must be recruited into the labor force. Those interviewed were asked to give their views about the employment of women and the wider utilization of older workers.

As in previous surveys, half of the sample approved, without qualification, of the employment of women in war industry. Only five per cent disapproved. The remaining respondents expressed qualified approval, the two

reservations most frequently mentioned being that women should not be asked to do work beyond their strength and that family life should not be disrupted.

The suggestion that women work on farms encountered more resistance. Only one-third of the sample endorsed the idea, and two respondents in ten vehemently rejected it.

The necessity for women accepting jobs in war plants is not generally appreciated. Less than half of those interviewed believed that it is now necessary. Thirteen per cent were convinced that it is unnecessary. Many people had not formed any opinion on the question.

The idea of utilizing older workers more extensively, to replace young men drafted into the Army, met with general approval. But the possibilities in this direction are distinctly limited. As of June 1942 there were only a half million unemployed workers 55 years of age and over in the labor force.

## Conclusions

The problem of keeping people satisfied with the operation of the Selective Service System appears to present no special difficulties. As married men and, ultimately, even men with children are drawn into the armed forces in greater numbers, more resistance to the draft may be encountered. Particularly if some draft boards are dipping into these groups before others have exhausted their lists of single men, special informational efforts may become necessary. But these problems are remote, and their solution will be facilitated by the confidence people now feel in the essential fairness of the Selective Service procedure.

Developing an awareness of the serious manpower shortage in prospect

on the production front, and preparing people for the drastic measures which may be necessary to meet the problem, is a more difficult and pressing task. The statements issued thus far by Government spokesmen have not succeeded in arousing the country to the urgency of the manpower problem.

There are, however, several encouraging factors. People are well aware of the importance of production. The urgency of the manpower shortage can perhaps be effectively conveyed if it is closely and continually linked with the task of meeting production goals.

Secondly, in addition to the substantial minority of Americans who are now willing to accept war jobs or to be shifted into war work, there is a large in-between group of people who are ready to accept such measures as soon as they are persuaded that they are necessary. Many of these people insist on certain conditions being met, but these conditions seem eminently reasonable.

A final encouraging factor is that, in the Selective Service System, an acceptable model already exists for any machinery which it may be necessary to establish to handle the manpower problem. The Selective Service System is accepted because it is a vitally necessary part of the war effort; because it scrupulously respects traditional American attitudes toward the family; and because, through its combination of a national policy and decentralized boards with the power to make decisions on the merits of individual cases, it achieves a maximum of fairness and flexibility. These same characteristics will spell the success of any system which may be needed to deal with the manpower problem on the home front.

### Sources of the Report

This report is based on the following material:

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#### Other Reports

- "Labor Supply and Demand in Selected War Occupations,  
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- "Estimates of Manpower Requirements," Revised, August  
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
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1942

My dear Miss Tully:

I am enclosing a copy of INTELLIGENCE REPORT 38  
which was prepared for the Director of the Office of War  
Information.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



PSF  
OWI

8-28-42

**38**

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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## NEWS EMPHASIS

The great commando raid on Dieppe was the week's most dramatic event. For two days, it splashed across the Nation's front pages, embellished by eye witness accounts and vivid pictures of the raiders in action or returning to England. The abundance of detail which British information offices supplied regarding this action was in marked contrast to the paucity of news released by the U. S. Navy about the fighting in the Solomons.

The Pacific sector returned to great prominence at the tail end of the week with reports of a great air-naval battle in progress around the Solomon Islands. Neither this nor the landing at Dieppe, however, diverted attention from the continuing Nazi advance into the Caucasus. Both press and radio depicted the Russian situation in ominous tones.

Brazil's entrance into the war was highlighted for a day or two by all media — generally in congratulatory contexts. Considerable speculation was devoted to the possibility of similar action by other South American republics.

Domestic events continued to receive conspicuous attention. Production problems, shortages, the Eastern fuel oil crisis and the President's order putting a quietus on administrative quarrels were all prominently reported by press and radio. A new point of domestic friction appeared this week in stories regarding an impending aluminum strike.

The developing political campaign was given important notice — especially in isolationist newspapers which boomed it as a portrait of defeat for the Administration.

[Comparisons made over successive weeks by the Bureau of Intelligence show that there is a close and consistent correspondence between the relative headline emphasis placed upon news by editors and public appraisal of the significance of events. The news stressed by the media, obviously, is the news considered most important by the public. The section of these reports devoted to news emphasis may be taken, therefore, as a reliable index to the topics on which public attention has been focused during the preceding week.]



## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### Production

To editorial minds, domestic problems relating to the battle of production took precedence during the week, even over the dramatic events on the fighting fronts. The War Production Board and its boss, Donald Nelson, were the storm center of discussion.

Mr. Nelson's announcement that he intends to "get tough" seems to have stemmed the tide of criticism which has risen against the WPB in recent weeks. The tendency among commentators has been to reaffirm confidence in the production chief. A comment by Ernest Lindley probably states with accuracy their dominant purpose: "Current criticism of Donald Nelson should not be interpreted as a campaign to drive him out of his post as chief of war production ... The criticism has been intended mainly to prod Nelson into fighting for the things he knows ought to be done...."

Mr. Nelson's statement evoked general editorial applause. "The tougher he gets", observed the Philadelphia Bulletin, "the better the country will like it." Some commentators look forward to an administrative overhauling of the production agency. Some exhort Mr. Nelson to a drastic housecleaning of WPB's top ranks. "Get the chopping block ready", says the Chicago Sun. "There will be use for it."

The President's directive to silence official quarrels did not enjoy universal approval. Many commentators called it a welcome and sensible step. But the New York Herald-Tribune found in it "a characteristic but unhappy suggestion that all disagreements be referred to him." And the St. Louis Post-Dispatch regarded it as a "request for more censorship."

### Combat

The raid on Dieppe provided relief for the tension of many weeks over the problem of second front action in Western Europe. It was accepted as an immensely heartening indication of developing allied offensive strength.

Commentators generally interpreted the raid as a rehearsal for a future invasion effort. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, splattered all over its editorial page the slug -- "Dieppe -- just batting practice!" The bulk of editorial comment, while acknowledging that the attackers suffered serious casualties, considered the raid a success as a practice operation. None concluded that it proved the feasibility of an invasion effort; some suggested that it may have demonstrated that a second front is out of the question for the time being. In general, there was jubilation over the fact that the raiders were able to return almost precisely on schedule and over the belief that the Germans had revealed aerial weakness in the West.

There is the keenest editorial anxiety over the progress of events in Russia. The New York Herald-Tribune, for example, declares that "Whatever ultimate promise they may have held, Dieppe and the Solomons together were negligible by comparison with the one great and critical battle in Russia, now surging to an ominous climax."

The prevailing opinion appears to be that Russian losses have thinned the margin of time during which Russia can be expected to hold out unaided. But there remains considerable hope, especially among military commentators, that the Russians may yet save Stalingrad, or at least stave off a Nazi crossing of the Caucasus. Little fear is expressed that the Russians will succumb entirely.

The renewed sense of urgency provoked by Russian reverses has revived editorial insistence upon the need for a united command. "It is obvious", says the Washington Post, "without a supreme commander at the head of the existing war organization that that organization would condemn the United Nations to a perpetual defensive against Hitlerism. For the allies cannot go on the offensive without a plan. And there is no plan in sight because there is no planner.... Nor is it possible to have a master production plan without a concurrent master strategic plan." And the Post, like a number of other newspapers, recommends General Marshall as Generalissimo of the United Nations.

The Brazilian declaration of war was roundly applauded by all commentators. Most of them think it an important gain for the allies, even though they acknowledge that Brazil is militarily weak. They foresee the isolation of Argentina and the promotion of general Western Hemisphere unity.

## Politics

Commentators in general, the Eastern press in particular, paid considerable attention to the Democratic nomination of John Bennett for the Governorship of New York. All of them regarded it as a defeat for President Roosevelt, and few revealed any symptoms of distress on this account. There is no inclination

on the part of the press to carry its support of Administration foreign policies over into the field of domestic politics.

The McCormick and Patterson papers made what capital they could out of the New York situation and other primary results. In news stories, as well as in editorial pages, they baldly interpret these developments -- to quote the Chicago Tribune -- as a rebuke to "the Roosevelt Administration, the Willkieites and the Communists in their campaign to purge Congress of its pre-war non-interventionists and anti-New Dealers."

Failure of a grand jury to indict the Chicago Tribune for its disclosures about the Midway battle has encouraged this newspaper to fresh flights of invective in its attacks upon the Administration. Other newspapers were cautious in commenting on the grand jury action. Some regretted that the Administration charges had not been based on firmer ground. A few suggested that "freedom of the press" had been vindicated by the Tribune's victory.



## POPULAR REACTIONS


### Effects of a Russian Defeat

About two-thirds of the American people feel that a complete defeat of Russia this summer would not make any difference in the ultimate outcome of the war. A substantial minority, however, believes that our chances of winning would be poorer without Russia. And a full half of the population thinks that a Russian defeat would seriously prolong the war.

These findings were obtained through a nationwide cross-section interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in July. The chart on the following page summarizes the shift of sentiment on the probable outcome of the war in

the event of a complete Russian defeat:

## PROSPECTS OF VICTORY



Those respondents who felt that the defeat of Russia would change the outcome of the war tended to become one degree more pessimistic; for example, those who felt that, as things are now, the allies would win and write the peace terms were likely to say that without Russia's help the allies would win but would have to make some concessions.


Although comparatively few respondents felt that Russia's elimination would mean the difference between victory and defeat, half of the sample -- two-thirds of those with an opinion on the question -- believed that her defeat would spell a longer and, presumably, a harder, bloodier and costlier war.

The median estimate for the length of the war as things are now was 22 months; the median estimate of its length if we have to fight without Russia's help was 40 months.

Among people who were certain of a United Nations victory, very few

thought that the loss of Russia would shorten the war. A small group, however, which was defeatist in the first place, tended to feel that the elimination of Russia would bring the end of the war closer -- presumably by advancing victory for the Axis or a negotiated peace. The chart below summarizes these opinions:

## IF RUSSIA IS KNOCKED OUT



It is among those people who believe that the elimination of Russia will cause the war to end in a draw that the real seeds of appeasement lie. These people, although not necessarily pro-Axis in their sympathies, seem peculiarly susceptible to the blandishments of negotiated peace or negotiated victory propagandists.

(For tables and further details see "Effect of a Russian Defeat on the Progress of the War," Special Report #16, Extensive Surveys Division, available on request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

### India

A recent poll by the American Institute of Public Opinion asked a

national sample the question, "Should England grant India complete independence?" The question was answered affirmatively by 42 per cent of those interviewed. An equal percentage gave responses which were qualified or indecisive. And 16 per cent said "No".

Those who answered the question affirmatively were asked, "Should India be granted complete independence now or after the war?" These divided as follows:

Grant independence now	22%
Grant independence after the war	17
Grant independence at some unspecified time	3


## Peace Terms

A majority of the American public believes that the determination of peace terms should be preceded by a cooling off period when the war is ended. This majority also favors an allied occupation of the defeated enemy countries. There is a good deal of difference of opinion, however, as to the length of time which ought to elapse before a final settlement is concluded. People of better education are more prone to urge delay than those with inferior schooling.

In July, the Denver University National Opinion Research Center posed the following question to a nationwide sample: "Some people say it would be a better peace if the allies make the peace terms with Germany, Italy and Japan as soon as possible after the fighting is over. Others say it will be a better peace if the allies stay in Germany, Italy and Japan for a few years and then make the peace terms. Which side do you agree with?"

The length of the cooling off period most frequently advocated was one to two years. But a considerable number felt that the Axis countries should be occupied by the United Nations for an even longer time before a final settlement. The range of opinion on this topic is illustrated in the chart on the opposite page.

## OPINION RESPECTING DELAY IN THE FORMULATION OF PEACE TERMS



### Youth

Newspaper columnists and editorial writers have devoted considerable space to discussion of the possibility that the Selective Service Law may be broadened to embrace youths 18 and 19 years of age. It is commonly assumed by the press that such a revision of the draft system will be left until after the Fall elections. Frequent comments berate the Administration and Congress for this delay. The prevailing editorial opinion appears to be that 18- and 19-year olds are among our prime fighting material and should be brought into the armed services.

Two questions asked recently by the American Institute of Public Opinion shed some light on popular feeling on this subject. In the latter part

of July, the Institute asked, "If the Government has to choose between drafting 18-and 19-year olds or married men without children, which should it choose?" The results were as follows:

18-and 19-year olds	44%
Married men without children	47
Don't know	9

This solicitude for young men, manifested by nearly half of the American public, diminishes greatly when the choice is between selective service for the 18-and 19-year olds and married men with children. Early in August, the Institute asked, "If the Government has to choose between 18-and 19-year olds or married men with children, which should it choose?" The following results were obtained:

18-and 19-year olds	78%
Married men with children	10
Don't know	12

There are approximately 2,500,000 youths in the United States 18 or 19 years of age. Presumably, a bias on the part of their families in favor of exempting them from military service is reflected in these polls. In the opposite direction, there is the bias of approximately 4,800,000 married men 18 - 44 years of age without children under 18, and of the approximately 12 million married men 18 - 44 years of age who have one child or more under 18.



## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### Mobilizing Manpower for War

In part because people have adapted themselves to the inevitability of conscription, the Selective Service System has aroused a minimum of dissatisfaction. Of a cross section of the public interviewed in early July, only nine people out of every

hundred felt that it was unfair in its operation. Even fewer respondents felt that they, or their closest relative or friend, had been classified unfairly.

Only about one person in ten had any criticism to make of the general administration of Selective Service or of present policies and practices with regard to occupational, dependency, and physical disability deferments. Many of the criticisms made cancelled out; some thought that standards were too strict, others that they were too lax. Few people thought there was much draft dodging.

People are only partly ready for whatever machinery it may be necessary to set up for the general mobilization and allocation of manpower. Only one-fourth of the people interviewed had given any serious thought to the manpower problem. Only two respondents in ten felt that it is necessary to resort to compulsory mobilization of manpower. A very large number of those who regarded such a step as unnecessary believed that a large labor supply is still available.

Despite their unawareness of the labor shortage, four people in ten were willing to give up their present jobs to do war work. Almost as many were willing to be shifted into war work by the Government. A large group of respondents would be willing to change jobs if they were convinced that such a step is necessary and if certain reasonable conditions are fulfilled. Only one person in four was definitely unwilling to shift jobs. As might be expected, workers who were well paid and well satisfied with their jobs were in general the ones who were mostly reluctant to shift into war employment.

People expressed some preference for a voluntary system of mobilizing manpower. It does not follow, however, that a compulsory system would be resisted if it were regarded as necessary. A sizable group already favors compulsory mobilization, and there was a general disposition to accept whatever measures the country's wartime Government deems best.

These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, Mobilizing Manpower for War, issued August 26, and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.

### Eastern Resentment

The shortages which have developed in gasoline, fuel oil and meat have struck the people living in eastern states with particular severity. Newspapers along the Atlantic seaboard are beginning to complain, some rather vehemently, that the East is getting a raw deal. They tend to advocate nationwide gas rationing and to blame the other difficulties upon bad Government planning. The Boston Post observes, for example, in connection with the fuel oil shortage, that "If the rest of the country is ready to do its share, the problem can be licked... New England is a little tired of taking the short end of the deal every time."

This sort of comment is encouraging a feeling among easterners that they are bearing more than their fair share of the war's burdens. If administrative measures cannot correct the inequality, informational action seems needed to promote public understanding of the necessity for this condition.

### Pressure

Trade associations, which exist for the purpose of promoting the economic interests of their members, are jockeying for preferential positions

in resistance to anti-inflation measures. Two recent attempts to advance special group interests are reported here by way of illustration. Developments of this sort may seriously affect the President's 7-point economic program.

- (1) The National Association of Real Estate Boards, through its Washington committee, has taken steps to organize property owners in industrial areas into a pressure group to act on problems of rent control, taxation, maintenance of buildings under priority restrictions and anticipated restriction of the use of fuel for heating purposes.
- (2) A resolution adopted at a general meeting of the United States Wholesale Grocers Association in Memphis, August 14, urged greater allotments of gasoline for wholesale food salesmen. Wholesale grocers have since been advised that "a copy of the gasoline resolution is being placed in the hands of every member of Congress..." Wholesale grocers on the Eastern seaboard have been urged to follow up this move by individually approaching their Congressmen.

The U.S.W.G.A. has taken pains to keep secret their part in an expected wave of unsolicited mail to Congressmen. A bulletin to all wholesalers urged:

"RECITE TO THESE CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS without reference to our resolution just how this situation is affecting YOUR OWN INDIVIDUAL BUSINESS, making clear the disadvantage and loss which is being suffered both by THE RURAL RETAIL GROCER AND HIS CONSUMER CUSTOMERS." (underlining ours)

## Future Veterans

At the Massachusetts State Convention of the American Legion on August 20, a motion was passed to ask the National Convention which will be held in Kansas City from September 19 - 21, to vote \$1,000,000 to organize within the Legion the Veterans of this War.



## ENEMY PROPAGANDA

### The Dieppe Raid

Striking at the second front hopes of the United Nations and Occupied Europe, enemy propaganda in the past week pointed to the Dieppe raid as proof of European invulnerability. BBC warnings to the French people that August 20 was not "the day" were ridiculed as efforts to "cover" the failure of the attack. Sanguine speculations in the American and British press and premature remarks of American public figures were cited by the Nazi radio as proof that they had defeated a large-scale invasion attempt and not a Commando raid. The German, French, Norwegian, Danish and Low Countries radios and the newspapers of all these nations attempted to drive the alleged lesson of Dieppe home upon those elements in their populations "still foolish enough to believe in Anglo-Saxon victory." The populations of Occupied and Unoccupied France, and even the people of Dieppe, were described as having remained quiet and loyal throughout the period of the attack. The Norwegian transmitter Radio Jelcoey described a column of captured Canadian soldiers passing a French wedding procession, and marching among laughing Frenchmen.

To North Americans, the Dieppe raid is represented as a "senseless enterprise". Lord Haw Haw laments the death of the "poor Canadians"; and Americans are portrayed as shocked by the number of casualties. The fact that the raiding party was mainly made up of Canadians is stressed to North America in an effort to discredit Great Britain.

### **Willkie's Trip**

Soon after the announcement of Wendell Willkie's trip, Axis propaganda undertook to discredit him in the United States and the countries on his itinerary. Recognizing that the use by the President of the leader of the opposition party for an important mission might give a general impression of American solidarity, enemy interpretations describe President Roosevelt and Willkie as members of the same Masonic lodge, and the election of 1940 as a sham allegedly peculiar to American politics. Willkie is described, not as an opponent, but as a sycophantic torch-bearer for the Roosevelt Administration.

### **Brazil**

"Yankee imperialism," and Brazil's economic dependence upon the United States are the factors reported by Axis propaganda as responsible for Brazil's entry into the war. The responsibility for the sinking of Brazilian ships "has not been established beyond a doubt." Therefore Brazil had no legitimate cause for war. To Latin America, it is said that Brazil's joining of the United Nations will result in the undermining of the Catholic religion because of Communist infiltration. To the United States, the point of Brazilian economic and military weakness is stressed, the inference being that she will be a burden upon the United States rather than a support.

### **Enemy Version of the Military Situation**

With German operations on the Russian front still admittedly incomplete, enemy reports continue to stress the favorable progress of their troops but

avoid specific predictions of the outcome of the battles in the Caucasus, around Stalingrad and on the Russian Central front.

Continuing the pattern of Japanese propaganda followed in reporting previous battles between the Japanese and American Navies, Tokyo issued its version of the current Solomon Islands battle after the U. S. naval communique had appeared. Japanese claims of American losses are more modest than in the case of the Coral Sea, Midway and the first Solomon Islands battles and they admit greater losses of their own than they usually do.



## AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENTS

8-28-42

The tone of realism noted in official statements last week was pointed up by President Roosevelt's order to department and agency heads on August 21, calling for elimination of contradictions. A specific indication of this tendency was the President's statement in his press conference on August 25, recognizing the gravity of the inflation problem and announcing projected executive action to meet it.

On the other hand a new source of confusion may arise from General Hershey's statement of August 21 on drafting married men and war workers, especially in contrast to Mr. McNutt's reported policy of keeping essential men in industry.

The period covered by this report is the week of August 19 through August 25, except where otherwise specifically stated