Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.
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ATTENTION FOCUS
The war was presented to the American public this week in an extremely encouraging light. Resistance at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, American initiative in the Aleutians, Australian advances in New Guinea and action in the Solomons were all optimistically reported.

The only damper on the week's good cheer came through signs of controversy with Russia over the second front issue.

At home, enactment of the anti-inflation bill, together with the President's swift action to implement it, occasioned dramatic headlines. Mr. Roosevelt's heartening report about the spirit of the American public was offset, to some extent, by a tendency in the press to portray his trip as a horrid instance of censorship.

Even the World Series baseball games, by no means ignored in the stress of war developments, contributed to the hopeful atmosphere.

EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

CENSORSHIP

Editorial reaction to the President's cross-country tour seemed to reflect an underlying antagonism on the part of the press toward Mr. Roosevelt. Many commentators grasped the secrecy surrounding the trip as a flail with which to flagellate themselves into a frenzy over censorship.

Journalistic impatience with Government information policy is not new.
But the excitement over this particular application of it seemed out of all proportion to its real significance. Criticism of the censorship was widespread and generally along the lines enunciated in a front-page editorial of the Washington Post:

"This newspaper feels a solemn obligation to protest a policy that is (1) unnecessary and inadvisable; (2) stimulating to malicious rumor and distrust, and (3) a step that can easily lead to abuse endangering a fundamental guarantee of our Bill of Rights."

A few newspapers defended the secrecy as necessary to safeguard the President. A larger number approved of the trip itself, reasoning that it would have beneficial effects on morale.

Editorial ire was aggravated by the President's animadversions on the press when he returned. His dilution of the "tough" statements made recently by Administration spokesmen increased the irritation. A number of comments argued that Mr. Roosevelt could blame no one but himself if Washington lags behind the people of the United States in its thinking about the war.

**ECONOMIC PROBLEMS**

Newspapers in all parts of the country expressed strong dissatisfaction with the compromise anti-inflation measure which finally emerged from Congress. They viewed it as a partial victory for the farm bloc and feared it would not effectively check inflation.

The discontent was markedly relieved, however, by the swift action which President Roosevelt took to implement the legislative effort. The scope and
vigor of the anti-inflation controls which he put into operation greatly reassured the critics.

There was almost universal praise, in addition, for the selection of Supreme Court Justice Byrnes as Director of the economic program. Most comments on the appointment reasoned that he possessed the tact, patience, fairness and knowledge of Government procedure requisite for the job. Considerable satisfaction was expressed, besides, over the President's delegation to Mr. Byrnes of broad powers for the execution of his functions.

With action on the inflation front satisfactorily under way, the manpower problem is now emerging as the dominant concern of editorial analysts. There is a majority feeling that Government policy, or rather an absence of Government policy, is responsible for national confusion in this field; it is widely believed that the conflict between the Army and the war industries has stymied decisive action in regard to manpower. An over-all manpower draft action appears to be generally favored.

The shortage of labor on the farms of the nation is the particular aspect of the manpower problem which excited most attention during the past week. Discussion of this subject is commonly based on an assumption that a farm labor shortage now actually exists. Many commentators blame the Administration for this assumed condition on the grounds that it has "pampered" labor to a point where high wages inevitably lure workers from rural areas to industrial centers.

**PROGRESS OF THE WAR**

Interpretation of the events on the fighting fronts was tinged with an optimism which the commentators only partially concealed behind admonitions to
the public against overconfidence. American action in the Aleutians was hailed enthusiastically as the beginning of a full-fledged drive which would oust the Japanese invaders. Air successes in the Solomons and the continued land drive in New Guinea evoked a flurry of optimistic comment. Most observers took these events as indications that our strength has grown to such an extent that we are now able to take the offensive at both ends of the Pacific. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, said: "We have started to come back. That is the one sign to which we can pin our faith in the future victory."

Hitler's speech, followed by that of Goebbels, stimulated considerable discussion about Nazi power. The prevailing view was that the Hitler pronouncement showed unmistakable signs of strain and placed Germany definitely on the defensive. But this interpretation was generally accompanied by a warning against under-rating the enemy's strength.

One development of the week, Stalin's letter to a correspondent of the Associated Press, served as a sobering influence to news interpreters. They are distinctly uneasy about relations between the Soviet Union and the western members of the United Nations. The New York Times refers to the Stalin statement as a demand for "payment on a promissory note" and contends somewhat impatiently that "nothing he can say can prod his allies more than they are prodded by their own vital interest to strike."

There are indications that prodding from such a source will not sit well with commentators here. A number of them have already expressed annoyance over espousal of second front action by domestic Communists. Some now go so far as to lump together Communists and all other proponents of such a venture.
The Pittsburgh Sun Telegram, for example, remarked that "Mr. Browder and Mr. Willkie have added nothing to the second front discussion but dissension and confusion." The Detroit News quipped: "More spectacular even than the leap from log cabin to White House is Brother Willkie's — from Commonwealth and Southern to the Kremlin in four years."

Great respect for the Russian stand at Stalingrad, and equally great impatience with current democratic aid to the Soviet Union, continue to find expression in the press. The overwhelming view about a second front is that the question at issue is not its desirability, but its feasibility.

**POPULAR REACTIONS**

**SPIRIT**

There are abundant indications in public opinion to support President Roosevelt's recent observation that the people of the United States are well ahead of the Government in their thinking about the war. Americans show virtually no tendency to grouch at the hardships which the war has imposed upon them. On the contrary, an overwhelming majority of them would like to make greater contributions to the national effort than they have had an opportunity to make thus far.

Such complaints as have come from the people concerning economic restrictions have been confined almost entirely to the manner in which these restrictions have been imposed. Sometimes the necessity, the equity or the efficacy of economic measures have been questioned. But only rarely have there been complaints that the Government has asked too much of its citizens.
Interviewing of a national sample conducted in late August and early September indicates that people all over the country feel that the Government has not made adequate demands upon them. Only a tiny minority of two per cent said that they had been required to give up too much. The prevailing spirit among the American people is attested by a majority of 70 per cent, who asserted that not enough sacrifice has yet been asked of them.

There is, moreover, a general feeling that hardships have, in the main, been distributed equitably. Most people think that they have made sacrifices about equal to those of their neighbors. But it is noteworthy that nearly a quarter of the whole public feel, not that they have had to sacrifice more than their fellow-Americans, but that they have had to sacrifice less. The questions offered to the national sample and the division of responses are shown in the chart below:

---

**DO YOU THINK THE PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE TOO MANY SACRIFICES OR NOT ENOUGH?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Too many</th>
<th>About the right amount</th>
<th>Not enough</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SO FAR IN THE WAR, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU PERSONALLY HAVE HAD TO MAKE MORE SACRIFICES OR LESS SACRIFICES THAN OTHER PEOPLE IN THIS COMMUNITY?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further evidence of the popular eagerness for full participation in the war effort is evidenced by the answers to another question asked of the same national cross section: "As the war goes on, will you be willing to make more sacrifices, even though other people are not making as many as you?" The responses, no doubt, were motivated, in part, by a desire to appear patriotic. It seems significant, nevertheless, that 94 per cent of the American people expressed a willingness to accept even greater burdens than their fellow-citizens.

**Pride**

Americans, naturally enough, have a high regard for the importance of their country in the United Nations war effort. They are inclined to feel that their armed forces are superior to those of any other nation. And many of them think that the American industrial machine is the prime source of allied strength. Such sentiments undoubtedly reflect patriotism and a healthy national pride, but they seem to be tinged to some extent with chauvinism and may indicate a failure to appreciate the contributions which other members of the United Nations are making to the common cause. In addition, they suggest rather more patriotism than realism.

In September, the Bureau of Intelligence posed to a national sample several questions about the merits of America's fighting forces as compared with those of other countries. The questions and the distribution of answers are shown in the chart on the following page.

The only one of these questions in respect to which a majority failed to give first place to the United States was about the Army. A plurality
acknowledged that the strongest Army among the countries mentioned belongs to Germany. But this recognition of Germany's military might is somewhat offset by the prevailing belief that America has smarter generals, better equipment and superior fighting spirit.

QUALITY OF AMERICAN FIGHTING FORCES COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which one of these countries would you say has...</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the strongest navy</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the strongest army</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the strongest air force</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the smartest generals</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the best army equipment</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the best fighting spirit</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When this question is broached in somewhat different terms, the tendency to rate America's military strength as unchallengeable becomes even more apparent. In August, the Bureau of Intelligence asked, "From what you know or have heard, would you say the all-around fighting ability of the
American armed forces is better, about the same or poorer than Germany's (Russia's)? Only 15 per cent admitted that the Germans' fighting ability is greater than that of our own men, while no more than five per cent made a like acknowledgment respecting the Red army. Fifty-seven per cent said that our all-around fighting ability is greater than that of the Germans; 65 per cent asserted that it is greater than the Russians.

The concept of America as the arsenal of democracy appears to have taken a very firm hold upon the imaginations of the American people. Half of them feel that this country is the major source of supplies for the United Nations. Eighteen per cent believe that virtually all of the allied war material is made in the U. S. A. Such estimates of America's share in the production job of the allied war effort may reflect an ignorance of the great productive efforts which are being made by other members of the United Nations. The chart below shows the division of opinions expressed by the national sample interviewed in August.

FROM WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD, WOULD YOU SAY THE UNITED STATES IS PRODUCING LESS THAN HALF OR MORE THAN HALF OF THE WAR MATERIAL USED BY THE ALLIES?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than half</th>
<th>About half</th>
<th>More than half</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(If more than half) Would you say the United States is producing practically all of it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIEWS ABOUT THE ARMY

The identification of the average American with the United States Army has been growing at a rapid pace. There are now 63 per cent of the people in America who have members of their immediate families or relatives in the armed forces. And 75 per cent of the public say that they have close friends in some branch of the service.

Although most of the American public believe that the Army chooses its officers on a merit basis, there remains a considerable minority — nearly a quarter of the whole population — which believes that Army commissions can be obtained by "inside influence." The national sample interviewed by the Bureau in September was asked, "Do you think a person has to have pull or influence to become an officer in the American Army?" The answers were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>23%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also a minority which feels dissatisfied about the training given to American troops. The same sample was asked, "Do you think the American soldiers are getting enough training before they go into battle?" Opinion was divided as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>67%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an overwhelming belief, however, that the Government is pursuing the proper policy in sending our troops abroad. The question asked was, "As
things are now, do you think we are doing the right thing in sending our men overseas to fight?" The following results were obtained:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most Americans are also satisfied that the rank and file spirit in the United States Army is thoroughly healthy. The sample interviewed in September was asked, "Have you heard of any cases of discontent among soldiers in the camps here in the United States?" Four-fifths answered negatively, while one-fifth gave an affirmative response. The one-fifth who had heard of discontent among enlisted men were asked, "Do you think this discontent is serious enough to hurt the fighting spirit of our Army as a whole, or do you think it doesn't amount to much?" Only three per cent thought it was serious enough to hurt; 15 per cent said that it didn't amount to much and two per cent said that they didn't know.

ALEUTIANS

Despite considerable clamor in the press over Japanese occupation of American territory in the Aleutian Islands, a surprisingly large proportion of the people interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence in September did not know that the Japanese had established bases on these outposts west of Alaska. It is possible that some of those interviewed misunderstood the question and answered negatively on the assumption that it referred only to those Aleutian Islands close to the Alaskan mainland — rather than to the westernmost tip of the Aleutian chain.
Among those who were aware of the Japanese occupation, there was a prevailing belief that the invaders could not easily be ousted. When questioned in September shortly before the recent announcement of the joint Army-Navy drive to destroy the enemy's establishments at Attu, Agattu and Kiska, the sample divided about three to two over the question of whether eviction of the Japanese would be a hard or an easy job. The chart below shows the degree of public ignorance about conditions in the Aleutians and the divisions of opinion as to the difficulty involved in recapturing these island bases.

![Chart showing public opinion on Japanese occupation](image)

**FROM WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD OR READ, HAVE THE JAPANESE SUCCEEDED IN OCCUPYING ANY OF THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS — THAT IS, OUR ISLANDS NEAR ALASKA?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes, they have</th>
<th>No, they haven't</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(If "Yes") Do you think we can drive them out fairly easily, or that it will be a pretty hard job to get them out of there?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fairly easy</th>
<th>Hard job</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SALARY LIMITATIONS**

The President's imposition this week of a $25,000 ceiling on individual salaries has the support of an overwhelming popular belief that wages and salaries should be limited for the duration of the war. In August, the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample the question, "Do you think there should be any limit on how high wages and salaries should go during..."
the war?" More than four-fifths answered affirmatively.

This does not mean, however, that the public favors the rigid freezing of individual earnings at their current levels. The following chart shows that, while there is extremely strong sentiment for the imposition of a ceiling at some unspecified point, a full half of the public feels that adjustments are necessary.

![Chart](image)

DO YOU THINK THERE SHOULD BE ANY LIMIT ON HOW HIGH WAGES AND SALARIES SHOULD GO DURING THE WAR?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(If "Yes") Do you think all wages and salaries should be kept where they are or do you think some should be allowed to go higher?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kept where they are</th>
<th>Some go higher</th>
<th>Some go lower</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proposal twice advanced by the President that individual income from all sources be restricted to $25,000 has been largely ignored by daily newspapers. Editorial commentators, in general, have tended to treat it as a political gesture too fantastic to merit serious consideration. The labor press, however, has taken the proposition very seriously indeed, regarding it as an important, integral part of the seven-point anti-inflation program.

To labor commentators, the $25,000 ceiling constitutes a symbol of the Government's willingness to require sacrifices from wage payers, as well as from wage earners.
DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

THE WAR AND FAMILY LIFE

Wartime conditions have an inevitable impact upon the everyday life of the American family. Case histories furnished the Bureau of Intelligence by social workers, psychiatrists and ministers show that the mobilization of millions of men into the armed forces and the transformation of the nation's economy to a war basis tend to disrupt the normal patterns of family association.

Migration is one of the most powerful forces at work. Many families have followed service men to camp areas or moved to new localities to accept war work. These uprooted families face the task of establishing ties and a new pattern of life under extremely difficult conditions. Old residents of their new communities often regard them with suspicion or active hostility. As brought out in previous Intelligence Reports, housing conditions in most war centers are deplorable.

Migrating families represent only a fraction of those whose lives have been transformed by the war. Many families have been disrupted by the absence of service men from their homes or the employment of women. The absence of the head of the family means the loss of an important integrative influence. As one Negro recently interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence put it: "Those kids are not the same without the old man around in spite of how good a mother they may have."

Working women may not be able to give their children, their husbands or their homes as much attention as they would like. Because of the operation
of the shift system, the members of the family who work may not even be home at the same time, so that all usual living arrangements become disorganized. Marital ties may be weakened by separation or the psychological repercussions of the wife's financial independence.

Family disorganization, and the tensions and anxieties generated by war, have led to an increase in juvenile delinquency and a relaxation of moral standards. Families living near Army or Navy stations in particular have to reckon with the attraction men in uniform have for their adolescent daughters and for young women in general.

Economic conditions may contribute to personal demoralization. Many people are making more money than they are accustomed to, and there is a growing shortage of goods for which their money may be spent. The "tomorrow-we-may-die" spirit bred by war tempts some of them to squander their surplus dollars on drinking, gambling and other personal indulgences. In some cases the fear of inflation provides a justification for careless spending. Many young people with large earnings are breaking away from parental control.

Economic conditions and fears sometimes operate in the opposite direction. The low pay of service men often poses serious problems for their families. The decreased buying power of those workers whose pay has not increased as rapidly as prices usually leads to scrimping and a sacrifice of many prized satisfactions. War prosperity is a mockery in certain areas where priorities have forced the shutdown of numerous civilian consumption industries. The widespread fear that the war will be followed by a deep depression everywhere impairs morale.
By no means all of the effects of war are deleterious to family relationships. If increased earnings and the employment of women have created problems in some cases, they have eased matters in others by bringing family incomes to a more satisfactory level. In many instances, formerly undisciplined youths have been sobered down and given a new sense of responsibility as a result of being in the armed services. In many — possibly in most — cases, the prospect of war service strengthens family ties and gives new value to accustomed relationships. Many families have been absorbed more fully into community life as a result of their participation in civilian defense activities.

The process of orientation to changed conditions and novel surroundings can be eased in some measure by governmental assistance, particularly at the community level. Communities must accept responsibility for integrating newcomers into their war activities and their social and cultural life; this integration is, indeed, of itself an essential war activity. Federal information efforts can usefully be directed toward promoting awareness of the need for simplicity and self-discipline in living habits and toward relieving unjustified anxieties about the future.

(These findings summarize Report #29 of the Special Services Division, "Impact of the War on the American Family," available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence)

**CONGRESS**

Public aspersions upon Congress, as well as sharp editorial criticism, have been rather prevalent in recent months. In addition, there have been signs
of strain between the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government. Some elements in and out of Congress have shown serious concern about it. Several recent statements indicate the development of the situation, and imply real efforts to meet it.

The speech of Senator Prentiss Brown of Michigan in the Senate on September 21 opened with the warning,

"...in my judgment the Congress of the United States and the President are headed toward a bitter conflict."

The thesis of his speech was indicated in the statement:

"...I have felt that it was my duty and the duty of all of us who have had anything to do with the pending legislation to exert to the utmost our efforts to avoid the impending crisis."

Senator Tom Connally spoke on the same issue in another connection on October 1, when he warned the Senate against speeches on our relations with Vichy, or other topics legitimately within executive responsibility:

"...I hope that Senators and Members of the other House will be content to allow the President and the Secretary State, who have vastly more information and more knowledge and more intimate contact than Members of the Congress can possibly have, to deal with this situation unhampered and untied by congressional or senatorial efforts to mold or shape their opinions or to direct their course."

"So, Mr. President, realizing that this is a field into which Congress cannot safely enter, in which the Senate cannot with any degree of wisdom or authority intervene, I trust that Senators and Members of the other House will be content to trust the President of the United States, who has daily information of the most intimate character with relation to all aspects of this matter. Amidst his other burdens, amidst the other pressing loads which bear him down, I hope that Senators and Representatives will not add to his burdens, and will not add to his vexations, and will not increase the harassment under
which he suffers, by pressing here in the Senate or in the House of Representatives these delicate, or these dangerous, if I may use the term, references to foreign relations and to foreign nations."

Hostility between the President and Congress, accompanied by popular impatience with or distrust of legislative action, can have serious consequences for representative government. Anti-parliamentarism has been one of the familiar symptoms of democratic decay in other countries. Signs of its development in the United States call for careful scrutiny and preventive action.

RUBBER AND NATIONWIDE GASOLINE RATIONING

Despite the good reception accorded the Baruch report, a formidable informational job looms ahead to persuade Americans of the necessity for nationwide gas rationing. Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence show that the number of people who see the need for such a measure increased sharply between mid-July and mid-September. Nevertheless, as of the latter date, more than half of the people in areas which do not now have gasoline rationing were unwilling to admit that nationwide rationing is necessary. Even in areas which now have rationing, a substantial minority did not recognize the need for extending the program to the rest of the country.

To a considerable extent these attitudes are a heritage of the confusion with which the facts about rubber have been presented to the American public prior to the time of the Baruch report. In part because so many agencies were dealing with the rubber problem, even the statements of Government officials were often fragmentary and contradictory. Representatives
of the rubber and petroleum industries issued statements which were at
variance with those of Government spokesmen and one another. Confusion
was confounded by the frequent misinterpretations of these statements in
the press and the publicity given the pronouncements of an assorted group
of crackpots, each with his own panacea for the rubber crisis.

The Baruch report undertook to terminate the confusion and controversy about
the rubber situation, and was accepted with relief. It received widespread
publicity in various media and editorial approval even from many newspapers
which had opposed nationwide gas rationing. It gave those people it reached a
clearer realization of the seriousness of the rubber shortage. Following its
issuance, people generally expressed a willingness to restrict their mileage
and their driving speed. At least in part as a result of the report, in
mid-September there was a greater awareness than there had been two months
earlier that gas rationing was the best way to save tires and that a nation-
wide rationing program was imperative.

The fact that, in September, many people were still unwilling to accept
rationing as a means of conserving the nation's meagre rubber supply
emphasizes the need for wider dissemination of the findings of the Baruch
Committee. To combat the reluctance of people to make sacrifices they
do not recognize as necessary, continued emphasis has to be put on the
facts of America's rubber situation, and special efforts must be made to
overcome the resistance to rationing in areas where gasoline is plentiful.
If such an informational program is not undertaken, compliance with the
rationing program may be half-hearted, and a black market in gasoline, com-
parable to the bootleg traffic in liquor during the prohibition era, may
become a dangerous possibility.

(The findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, "Rubber and Nationwide Gasoline Rationing," issued October 5, and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

**RUMORS IN WARTIME**

Rumors develop out of situations in which information is inadequate to satisfy public interest. People tend to invent and circulate explanations which reflect their individual emotional biases.

Rumors may be classified, therefore, on the basis of their psychological motivation: Hostility rumors are those which give expression to prejudices and animosities. Anxiety rumors are those which reflect underlying uneasiness and fear. Escape rumors are those which tend to deny reality and minimize problems on a wishful basis.

In a nation at war, the conditions which promote rumor are intensified. The focus of public interest is sharper and more homogeneous, while censorship clogs the formal channels of information. Wartime dislocations foster frustrations and fears.

Rumors have a contagious influence, spreading the emotional weaknesses they reflect. Hostility rumors act to disrupt national unity, widening cleavages between elements of the population. Anxiety rumors promote defeatism and dismay. Escape rumors encourage complacency.

For this reason, enemy propaganda gives impetus, if not inspiration, to rumor-mongering. Many current rumors are paralleled by Axis radio broadcasts.
The danger of rumors lies, not, as popularly believed, in the information which they may give to the enemy, but in the misinformation they disseminate among the American people. Official denials provide an inadequate means of combating them. Such underlying psychological factors as tension and prejudice cannot be removed through direct negation. Positive information, designed to overcome the tension and prejudice, affords a more effective means of minimizing rumor.

(These findings summarize a Special Intelligence Report, "Rumors in Wartime," issued September 30, and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

**ENEMY PROPAGANDA**

**SHIFT**

The announced shift in German military operations from the offensive to the defensive is being accompanied by sharp changes in Germany's propaganda approach to her own people, as well as to neutral countries.

**Nazi Home Front Propaganda**

Nazi leaders have taken a number of significant steps designed to distract the attention of the German people from the fact that the war has not been won this year as promised, and to keep them from being discouraged by the prospective shift to a strategy of consolidation and defense.

**First:** The Germans have been given bribes and have been promised more for the future. Bread and meat rations have been increased. Additional Christmas rations have been promised. Soldiers on furlough are to be
given food packages to be taken to their relatives. The Germans have been promised that they will be the first in Europe to eat, and the last to starve.

Second: The Germans have been given a version of the military situation calculated to support their expectations of victory. Russia is represented as cut off from the greatest portion of its population, its industrial plant, and its raw materials, all of which are now available to Germany. Russian resistance, it is promised, will become less and less effective. The United States is portrayed as an impotent foe, despite its economic strength, because it lacks experience in armament manufacture and because its soldiers have little taste for war. The first attempt at a second front is said to have failed, and Germans are assured that future attempts will meet a similar fate. Europe is invulnerable. British air raids are dismissed as not affecting the German military potential.

Third: A special effort is being made to prevent Germans from drawing parallels to 1918. The Germany of 1942, it is insisted, is utterly different from the Germany of 1918, because of the accomplishments of National Socialism. The Nazis maintain that it is England which is being blockaded this time, not Germany. Shortages in Germany are attributed, not to the blockade, but to poor harvests or transportation difficulties. Fears that Germany may be the inevitable loser in a war of attrition, as she was in 1918, are counteracted by the new slogan, "Time works for Germany." The slogan is supported by statements stressing the tremendous raw material resources, manpower and industrial plant which Germany controls in Europe.

Fourth: Two threats are used to discourage defeatism and disloyalty:
(1) the alleged official threat of the United Nations to exterminate Germany, and (2) the threat, stressed by Hitler, that the Nazis will deal ruthlessly with "saboteurs of the German community."

The Nazis to Conquered and Neutral Europe

Germany is also stepping up her efforts to persuade the conquered and neutral countries of Europe that she is invulnerable, despite her shift to a strategy of defense. One of the main goals of Nazi policy is to consolidate and convert the whole of Europe into a German arsenal. Propaganda is used to supplement diplomatic pressure.

Threats are freely employed. The Germans threaten to employ force if they encounter resistance or disloyalty, to withhold food if countries fail to collaborate. Goebbels proclaims that in the future victorious "New Europe" the " neutrals will need Europe more than Europe needs them."

A recent Goebbels article in Das Reich attempts to bolster this pistolpoint propaganda with a more palatable type of appeal. The "New Europe," says Goebbels, is an inevitable historical development, which is threatened by England, Russia and the United States. All parts of Europe have common material, political and spiritual interests, he argues, and should join in the defense of the continent. The governments in exile and "misguided" leaders in neutral countries are portrayed as representatives of a replaced social class which does not understand the "New Europe" and is a tool of Europe's enemies.

The Nazis to the United States

A logical final component of Germany's shift to the defensive would be an
attempt to convince the United Nations of the desirability of a negotiated peace. The foundation for such a campaign has already been laid. But the military situation does not seem to permit Hitler to proceed with a full-fledged peace offensive at this time. Russian resistance at Stalingrad may be delaying a propaganda attack, as well as further military operations. Hitler cannot now say with any hope of being believed that Russia is substantially defeated; that the whole weight of a Wehrmacht is available to defend the continent against invasion; or that Germany is now a satisfied, "have" power, and that therefore the only sound policy is to negotiate a peace with her.

Radio Debunk, and, occasionally, official German commentators take this line, but these propaganda channels do not commit Nazi leaders to any particular position. Much as they would like to, these leaders probably dare not bid explicitely for peace, because of the fear that their offer would accomplish nothing and would be interpreted throughout the world as a sign of weakness. Should Stalingrad fall, however, full-fledged peace offerings may be anticipated. There is need for domestic preparedness against them.
Such recommendations and suggestions as may appear in this report have not been cleared in advance with the Director of the Office of War Information and do not necessarily reflect his views or those of the Office of War Information. Recommendations and suggestions, if they do appear, are only submitted by individuals in the Bureau of Intelligence who have assembled the data and they are offered for the consideration of appropriate authorities.

The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.
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The period covered by this report is the week of October 8 through October 14, except where otherwise specifically stated.
ATTENTION FOCUS

Only the Navy's announcement that three United States cruisers were lost in the August attack on the Solomon Islands and fresh Nazi attacks in the Caucasus checked the week's flow of optimistic news from the fighting fronts. Press and radio kept public attention riveted on the successful defense of Stalingrad. American military action in New Guinea, the Aleutians, the Solomons, and the raid on Lille by Flying Fortresses, were all reported prominently and encouragingly.

The President's speech of Monday evening was the big domestic news of the week. Most reports emphasized its call for the drafting of 18- and 19-year olds. It is estimated that the speech was heard by 58.9 per cent of all radio homes in the United States, comprising some 45,685,000 adult individuals -- an audience larger by approximately eight and one-quarter million than that which listened to his Labor Day address on inflation. Congressional tax action and the scrap metal drive were also major home topics.

Sumner Welles' charges against Argentina and Chile and the postponement of President Rios' visit to this country were treated dramatically, though not as of first rate importance.

Wendell Willkie's Far Eastern visit received only secondary headlines.
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

To most editorial commentators, the President's fireside talk of Monday evening reflected strong leadership and a buoyantly hopeful attitude toward the progress of the war. Their discussion of it reflected a clearer sense of direction than they have exhibited at any time in recent weeks.

There was very little specific criticism of the address. Commentators applauded Mr. Roosevelt's generous commendation of Congress. A few objected to his verbal spanking of "typewriter strategists," but avoided inflating this into an issue.

The speech was discussed, for the most part, in terms of its delineation of the manpower problem. There was general satisfaction over the President's proposal to solve this problem by voluntary methods if possible. The New York Times, in a representative comment, said: "He is certain, and with good reason, that the country will accept a compulsory draft of manpower, if that is the best way or the only way to solve the problem; but his preference is wisely for a thorough trial of the voluntary method before that stage is reached."

On every hand, there was praise for the President's decision to bring 18- and 19-year old men into the armed forces. Even the New York Daily News remarked in this connection: "The question is not whether the younger men have finished their schooling, or whether their mothers do or don't want them to go to war. The question is what age group yields the best fighting
material; and the answer is as stated by Mr. Roosevelt."

**ECONOMIC CONTROLS**

Editorial comment about fiscal problems centered around opposition to the Treasury's proposed methods of collecting higher taxes, disappointment over the amount of revenue to be provided by the Senate Finance Committee's bill, dissatisfaction with specific levies, such as the "victory tax," and agitation for a sales tax as the panacea of all tax troubles.

Attacks on the Treasury, in large part, took the form of protests against the announcement that a new tax bill to raise additional billions will soon be offered. "It is not so much the extra burden proposed by the Treasury as the prolongation of uncertainty that is regretted," said the Philadelphia Bulletin in an editorial typical of press reaction.

Criticism of the Senate Finance Committee -- much milder than that directed at the Treasury -- was based chiefly on the argument that its bill will not raise enough revenue to prevent inflation. The Hartford Courant, for example, observed: "Nine billions taken out of the pockets of the people is not enough to close the gap between goods available and money on hand."

There was little comment and even less enthusiasm respecting the "victory tax." The Rum plan received some support, but not in any considerable volume. In general, newspapers want a sales tax or some other form of taxation which will impose heavier burdens on the lower income groups.

Comment on the initial acts taken by Mr. Byrnes as Economic Coordinator was generally sympathetic. The one aspect of the President's directives in
respect to inflation control about which commentators were somewhat critical was the matter of wage stabilization.

The new Rubber Administrator, William Jeffers, evoked a round of editorial applause by his first appearance before a congressional committee. His "tough talk" in insisting that he would not be influenced by pressure groups was taken by most of the press as a good omen for the future. The appointment to responsible posts of such men as Jeffers, Wilson, Byrnes and Eberstadt has produced a mild wave of editorial comment that the Government is now buckling down to firm administration of its economic program.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Continued Russian resistance at Stalingrad has awakened a restrained jubilation among the news analysts. They warned readers that German strength must not be underrated and that the campaign in the Caucasus is still menacing. The Berlin announcement that German tactics at Stalingrad had been changed was generally viewed with skepticism.

A number of commentators, however, suggested that the successful defense of Russia's key industrial city may mark a genuine turning point in the war. The Hartford Courant, for example, thought it likely that the "Russian defenders of Stalingrad may have put Hitler on the road to his Waterloo."

The Daily Oklahoman declared: "It is altogether possible that this global war may be decided by Russian soldiers...."

Hopefulness about the war against Japan was somewhat modified by the Navy's disclosure that occupation of the Solomons had been accomplished only at
the cost of three United States cruisers. For the most part, the Navy's explanation of its delay in making this announcement was somewhat grudgingly accepted as valid. The original reports, observed the Washington Star, were "intended to mislead the enemy concerning the extent of the damage he had done. If, incidentally, the American people also were misled, it must be assumed that the necessity of protecting the men remaining in the Solomons area was sufficient justification."

Commentators pointed to the loss of the three warships as further evidence of the strength and resourcefulness of the Japanese. There is growing uneasiness, moreover, concerning the continued Japanese landings in the Solomons. The Dallas News remarked, for example, that "Our forces there are not large and it is possible that they might be dislodged by a much larger enemy attack force." On the whole, editorial commentators have been giving the public a fairly sober and realistic view of developments in the Pacific sector.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

POST-WAR PLANNING

Recent statements by President Roosevelt and by other Government leaders have encouraged the American people to look forward to an improved social and economic organization of the world when the war is ended. Nevertheless, public thinking about post-war problems is wholly uncrystallized. Interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence has shown that only a very small minority of Americans has any clear or concrete hopes about the nature of the post-war
Little has been done by media of information to promote thinking about post-war problems. A study of editorial comments in a nationwide sample of 125 newspapers during the months of August and September reveals a high degree of apathy concerning war aims and post-war planning. An overwhelming majority of these newspapers has refrained from endorsing any definite pattern of future international collaboration.

Some newspapers and editorial commentators, it is true, have urged that the Government undertake planning for the post-war world. But they have done little to explain its importance and have confined themselves largely to vague endorsements of the Atlantic Charter and the principles of the Four Freedoms. They argue that we must cooperate in the future with the rest of the world, but attempt no definition of the form which such cooperation ought to take.

Those who advocate preparation for post-war conditions are almost counterbalanced by a group of newspapers and commentators which argues that any consideration of the future is likely to detract from the war effort, must necessarily be visionary and impractical and may endanger the system of private enterprise. Prominent among these opponents of post-war planning are the Hearst and McCormick-Patterson newspapers, together with such columnists as Benjamin DeCasseres and Westbrook Pegler.

The need for current consideration of post-war problems has been strongly emphasized of late by authoritative Government spokesmen. In his broadcast of October 12, the President said: "It is useless to win a war unless
it stays won... We are united in seeking the kind of victory that will guarantee that our grandchildren can grow and, under God, may live their lives free from the constant threat of invasion, destruction, slavery and violent death."

Speaking in Boston on October 8, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles declared: "One hears it said that no thought should be given to the problems of the peace, nor to the problems of the transitional period between war and established peace, until after the war has been won. The shallowness of such thinking, whether sincere or sinister, is apparent...."

Earlier, Secretary Hull gave the clearest impetus to post-war planning. He said in his address of July 23: "Without impediment to the fullest prosecution of the war — indeed, for its most effective prosecution — the United Nations should from time to time, as they did in adopting the Atlantic Charter, formulate and proclaim their common views regarding fundamental policies which will chart for mankind a wise course based on enduring spiritual values."

But others in the Administration and in Congress have decried present consideration of future problems. Representative Clare Hoffman of Michigan, for example, asked just recently, "Why not wait until the war has been won before dividing the earth's surface and people among the victors and determining the form of government which shall be given to all?"

In a speech at Cleveland on October 6, Senator Harold H. Burton stated: "We must not as a nation attempt to discuss the details of post-war conditions because we cannot know the detailed premises on which to plan them."
We must not as a nation spend our precious fighting time on preparing detailed terms of peace before we have won that peace."

In testifying before the Senate Agricultural Committee on October 12, the Rubber Administrator, William M. Jeffers, gave some encouragement, probably unintentionally, to the opponents of post-war planning. When Senator Bankhead of Alabama expressed fear that rayon producing plants might control the tire manufacturing business after the war, Mr. Jeffers said: "Our job now is to win the war. Let's quit talking about what's going to happen after the war."

Such concrete proposals as have been advanced for the post-war period have been largely in the sterile framework of autarchy and armament. Secretary of the Navy Knox, for example, told the American Legion convention that "adequate preparedness for war is the best possible guarantee against war" and advised them to "see to it that our nation never again is left without weapons in a world where he who would be free must be strong."

The indifference of press and public to post-war problems must be attributed, at least in large measure, to a failure on the part of governmental information policy to present clear-cut concepts of the post-war world. Perhaps clear-cut concepts can evolve only from the sort of specific action suggested by Secretary Hull. China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, T. V. Soong, made this point recently in urging that an executive council of the United Nations be established now as a means of evolving "a workable world order, an international instrument fully capable of dispensing justice and
enforcing law and order among nations during, as well as after, the war."
The structure of the future can scarcely fail to be influenced by the
foundations laid in the present.

In his address to the Foreign Policy Association on October 3, Elmer Davis
said: "We in the information field are charged with a task which, if
rightly done, may make easier a more extensive and more intensive military
and diplomatic collaboration, for we believe that the more that is known
about the compelling reasons for continued cooperation of the United
Nations, the more surely that cooperation will be perfected and maintained."
But little has yet been done to clarify and publicize either the "com-
pelling reasons" or the nature of practical measures toward cooperation,
such as Lend-Lease agreements, which have already been undertaken.

As things stand now, Americans have no positive specific goals to fight
for. Nor have the United Nations any concrete, realistic program to
which the neutrals and the conquered can be rallied. They fight as people
who prefer to win rather than lose a war — not as people inspired by a
hope and a faith in the future.

FOREIGN-BORN GROUPS IN MANHATTAN
Almost three million people born in Germany and Italy are living in the
United States. One million of these have been in the legal status of
"enemy aliens" but all, in some way or other, feel the special effects
of having been born in one of these countries with which we are now waging
war. Among them are some 90,000 refugees, most of them anti-Fascists,
but sharing with German and Italian aliens the restrictions imposed by
the United States on "enemy aliens," due to their having been born in one of these countries.

The Italian-Born
A study recently conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence among foreign-born groups in New York City supports the thesis of Attorney General Biddle that most Italian-Americans are loyal. Even among those Italian-born people who feel a strong sentimental attachment for their homeland, there are relatively few who lack a sense of loyalty to the United States. The majority of the Italian-born people interviewed think of themselves as Americans; another large group think of themselves as both Americans and Italians.

Perhaps a third of the Italian-born people in the sample have vague or clearly defined pro-Fascist tendencies, and are therefore susceptible to Fascist propaganda. The most common complaint among the people in this group is that they have been made to feel like "second class" immigrants.

Even these people, however, must be sharply distinguished from those with pro-Nazi leanings among the German-born. Their tendency to approve many of the policies of their mother country is seldom the result of a systematic indoctrination with Fascist ideology and is rarely developed into a definite structure of beliefs. It stems rather from a nostalgic attachment to the particular region in which they were born, where, in many cases, they still have relatives and friends.

The contrast between the Italian-born and the German-born was one of
the most notable which emerged from the study. Because the sample was small and not altogether representative, the quantitative findings of the study are not believed to be altogether trustworthy, although its general conclusions are significant. Interviewing was completed before the recent announcement that most Italians will be removed from the enemy alien classification on October 19. It may be confidently expected that this step will strengthen the identification of aliens and citizens of Italian origin, wherever their present sympathies lie, with the United States. And it will weaken their identification with the present government of Italy, which they are already inclined to regard as an involuntary partner and semi-captive of Nazi Germany.

The Italian-born people interviewed are, in general, extremely confused in their thinking about the war. They disapprove strongly of America's major allies, Britain and Russia. But, although they have great confidence in the German military machine, they have no love for the Nazis. They are dissatisfied with America's conduct of the war. Nevertheless, the majority is confident that America will win. They are confused about our war aims and inclined to feel that this is not America's war.

Economically, the Italians have suffered a great deal as a result of the war. A number complain that they were barred from jobs because of their classification as enemy aliens. The increase in unemployment among New York's textile workers earlier this year hit the Italian group especially hard.

A majority of the Italian-born people interviewed are participating in
the war effort through buying war bonds, acting as blood donors, or engaging in civilian defense activities. While there is some correlation between participation in such activities and a feeling of devotion to the United States, participation is not an altogether reliable index of loyalty. Many of those who do not engage in civilian defense have a positive attitude towards it; some have been excluded from participation because they are not citizens. On the other hand, some pro-Fascists make patriotic gestures as a way of covering up their true sentiments.

The German-Born

The minority of German-born residents with Nazi tendencies, although they do not admit being pro-Hitler, are much more vehement than the Italians in revealing their viewpoints. Many of them justify their Nazi convictions with facts and arguments. And Germans are bound to their mother country not so much by a nostalgic attachment to a particular locality as by an intense nationalistic pride.

There is a difference, too, in the way in which the Germans and Italians feel bound to their respective homelands and to America. The Germans feel at least as well integrated as the Italians in American society. As many as two-thirds of those interviewed regard themselves primarily as Americans, and another sixth think of themselves as both Germans and Americans. The interviews revealed, however, that a number of people in both of these groups are definitely pro-Nazi. These individuals do not see any inconsistency in their pattern of allegiance; they maintain that America should be Nazified, and that only true Germans can be true Americans.
The Germans share the anti-British and anti-Russian feeling of the Italians, but put a somewhat higher appraisal upon the military prowess of these anti-Axis powers. They have no more use for the Italians than the Italians have for them. They are sharply critical of America's conduct of the war, both at home and on the fighting fronts, although a majority believe that the United States will ultimately be victorious. About a quarter of those interviewed -- including some worried anti-Nazis as well as some pro-Nazis -- are doubtful about the outcome of the war. A somewhat smaller group expressed the belief that the war would end in a negotiated peace or an outright Axis victory; and it must be remembered that other respondents may have concealed such opinions. There was a pronounced tendency to maintain that this war is no business of this country's and to blame the war on the United States, on England or on the existence of economic inequality.

In view of the prevalence of such beliefs, it is not surprising to find that many of the German-born group refrain from taking an active part in the war effort. As among the Italians, some of those who do participate in civilian defense activities evidently do so to conceal their anti-democratic leanings. Unlike the Italians, the Germans have not been adversely affected economically by the war, because of their concentration in occupations which are in great demand. Nor has lack of citizenship been a factor, since most of the Germans interviewed, both loyal and disloyal, have become citizens.

Refugees
A group of refugees, including both Jews and non-Jews, was also studied. Because of the short time these refugees had been in this country, only a
minority regard themselves as Americans. Only six per cent of the refugees had attained citizenship. But they have had enough first-hand experience with Fascism to understand why America is waging a war against it. They are better informed about war issues than any of the other groups studied. The older and better educated refugees show a notable interest in post-war problems and in plans for the reconstruction of Europe.

The flaws in the morale of the refugee group grow out of their very eagerness to win the war. Filled with anxiety as a result of their experiences in Europe, many of them succumb to defeatist psychology or become hypercritical of the nation's war effort. Many refugees are disturbed by the loss of status they have suffered as a result of having to start life over in a strange land.

As non-citizens, many refugees are excluded by local practices from participating in civilian defense activities. Participation in the war effort through bond buying, blood donations and similar activities is high.

**Attitude Toward Alien Regulations**

Considerable criticism of America’s alien regulations was voiced by respondents in all groups. Most of those interviewed agreed that some alien regulations are necessary. But there was a general belief that existing rules, which will be changed October 19 for certain classes of Italians, are unjust and ineffectual. The most common argument was that disloyal individuals are usually naturalized citizens or, when they are aliens, clever enough to evade the operation of the regulations. Thus in practice, it is believed, these regulations affect the innocent -- and often the ardent anti-Fascists -- more severely than they do the disloyal.
Those opinions may exaggerate the defects of present alien regulations, but the study suggests that there is no necessary correlation between loyalty and citizenship status. Loyalty depends upon the degree to which the immigrant is integrated into American society and the extent to which he accepts American values and purposes.

DAYS-CARE OF CHILDREN

Delays in providing community facilities for the day-care of children continue to retard the recruitment of women into the labor force. In some places, too, the lack of such facilities is resulting in numerous absences and a rapid labor turnover among married women workers.

Here and there war plants have stepped into the breach by establishing day-care centers for children of their own workers. Such centers, however, entail undesirable paternalism and are likely to create employer-employee difficulties. Furthermore, few individual companies are in a position to furnish well-rounded programs. In addition to providing nursery schools, it is necessary to arrange for the care of small children within homes, either through placement with foster families or homemaker helpers; to provide supervision for somewhat older children before and after school hours; and to make counselling service available to mothers. The conception of what day-care must include is constantly expanding as new needs become apparent.

Experience to date suggests that adequate programs require the utilization of welfare facilities, schools and other community resources. The War Manpower Commission specifically recommends that programs be developed on
a community basis, not "under the auspices of individual employers or em-
ployer groups."

Federal funds have been provided for the upkeep of a coordinating office to
expedite the establishment of such community programs. Money has also been
appropriated for the expansion of the WPA nursery school program. The funds
for the actual operation of all but the WPA nurseries must be sought within
local communities, however, although federal grants-in-aid may later become
available. Field work and vigorous informational efforts appear to be needed
to make communities aware of the WMC policy respecting this problem and
of the need for inaugurating programs.

**JIM CROW ABROAD**

Negro newspapers assert that the U. S. Army is carrying patterns of racial
segregation into countries where color barriers have not previously existed.

Resentment on this score was recently given formal expression in a demand
presented by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
that the War Department "take steps to eliminate the friction in the
American Expeditionary Forces caused by Southern white soldiers who desire
to establish Jim Crow traditions in England." It is charged that Negro
troops were at first cordially received in England, but that white soldiers
protested against British friendliness to them.

In Hawaii, where racial prejudice receives no sanction in laws and little
in public customs, people of many different colors mingle together freely.
Aware of this, Negro troops are hurt more deeply than at home by the
discrimination they encounter from their white fellow-Americans. They feel that white service men and war workers fraternize more or less indiscriminately with the non-white residents of the islands — Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Koreans, and others — and draw the color line only against them.

It is reported that the USO is considering the establishment of a special center for colored troops in Hawaii. If separate facilities are provided for whites and Negroes, it will be one of the first instances when patterns of racial segregation have been institutionalized in Hawaii.

The discrimination Negro troops suffer, particularly in areas where it is not sanctioned by custom, inevitably weakens Negroes' identification with their fellow Americans and strengthens their identification with dark-skinned peoples. Some of the Negroes interviewed in a recent Bureau of Intelligence survey exhibited a marked tendency to align themselves with the people of India in their effort to secure freedom and expressed strong anti-British feelings. A number indicated that they felt the Indians were justified in resorting to violence to liberate themselves.

Intelligent Negro leaders understand that the Army is engaged in fighting a war, not in carrying on a program of social amelioration. But they feel that there is no justification for transporting social customs involving segregation overseas. Such a course, they argue, is bound to impair the morale of American Negroes. Additionally, it may undermine the confidence of colonial people and people of color throughout the world in the sincerity of the proclaimed war objectives of the United Nations. There is clear need for cooperation between appropriate OWI officials abroad and the military.
authorities in areas where such tensions have developed.

(These findings are based upon "Anti-British Attitudes of Negroes," Special Report #27, Division of Surveys, and "Morale in the Territory of Hawaii," Report #33, Special Services Division.)

**ENEMY PROPAGANDA**

**THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH**

Axis propagandists resorted to belittling, ridicule, exaggeration, denunciation and distortion in their efforts to depreciate the President's Columbus Day address. The Nazis call F. D. R. the greatest "typewriter strategist" of them all and find evidence in his speech that he planned the war two years ago. His references to Axis weakness, they report, were met with "guffaws." Germany, the Nazis boast, can repel an invasion at any point on the continent.

Radio Tokyo claims the speech reveals a marked labor shortage, betraying the weakness of the American economy. Roosevelt's manpower proposals, say the Japs, mean the virtual enslavement of the American workers. The Japs paint a doleful picture of a United States whose schools are closed and whose factories are manned by oldsters.

**THE BIDDLE SPEECH**

Axis reaction to Attorney General Biddle's speech was delayed until October 18, evidently because their propagandists did not know how to deal with it. Finally, Radio Rome reacted (in Italian, to North America) with the charge that Italians were removed from the enemy alien category to win the good
will of Italian-Americans for the coming election. Home attempts to minimize
the step by stating that it will have no effect anyhow. A portion of the
broadcast is devoted to a resume of the alleged persecution of Italians in
this country, in an attempt to offset the effect of the U. S. move.

WEDGE DRIVING

Goebbels and Co. seized upon a number of events this past week for the
familiar Axis propaganda device of wedge driving. Stalin's letter to
associated press correspondent Cassidy was made the spearpoint of an attempt
to alienate the Anglo-Americans and Russia. In broadcast after broadcast
Goebbels' heart bleeds for the Russians, left in the lurch by their Anglo-
american allies. American and English officials are presented as embarrassed
and disturbed by the supposed deterioration of relationships among the
United Nations. Ambassador Standley is pictured as returning to the United
States because of a desperate need to reduce the tension between Russia and
her Anglo-American allies.

Discord between the United States and Great Britain is also emphasized.
Life's letter to the people of England furnishes ammunition for divergent
broadcasts to the United States and Great Britain. Americans are told that
the letter indicates that England planned this war in order to maintain her
empire; the rest of the world is told that England has responded to the
letter with criticisms of U. S. war aid. Berlin tells England that the
American soldiers quartered there are paid more than the British soldiers,
live much better, and sneer at the British while enjoying their hospitality.
Radio Tokyo chimes in with the claim that an American submarine sank the
Liebon Naru while she was carrying British prisoners. In alleged interviews with the survivors, they express great bitterness toward the United States. Germany capitalizes the supposed dissension among the United Nations domestically as well as internationally, to prove that there can be no second front.

To demonstrate and heighten inter-American conflict Axis propagandists use Welles' speech and the hostile reactions of Chile and Argentina to it. The reason for Welles' "insulting" remarks about the two South American countries, the Axis alleges, is his desire to "blackmail" them into the service of the United States. Chile and Argentina are portrayed as resentful and irritated at Welles' "impudence." Rome played upon these themes in many broadcasts to Latin America, scoring Welles for his "lack of tact and diplomacy."

**TAILOR-MAKING GOERING'S SPEECH**

A study of the manipulation of Goering's speech in commentaries and newscasts for American listeners gives insight into Nazi propaganda strategy. It was necessary for Goebbels to deal with many of the fears of the German people — about British air raids, the German fuel situation, etc. — in order to allay them. But since these themes suggest German weakness, they are not dealt with in broadcasts to North America. To impress Americans with Germany's strength, such themes as the ineffectiveness of the blockade and the satisfactory nature of Germany's food situation are given more emphasis in broadcasts to America than they received in the speech. Comments comparing the economic plight of Britain and Russia to Germany's "excellent position" also receive more stress.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
REALISM AND THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT

CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
COPY No. 1
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The Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information uses a variety of procedures and techniques to obtain its data on the attitudes of people and on what is brought to their attention. These procedures and techniques have been found reliable after extensive experimentation over a period of years.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPORT

Confidence in American military strength and a prevailing recognition that the war can be won only through offensive action have promoted a general expectation that the United Nations will soon be able to wrest the initiative from the enemy. Many Americans believe that the war can be won within a period of two years. This hopefulness, together with the belief that American military might is far superior to that of the enemy, may lead to dangerous complacency.

The pronounced inclination among Americans to consider Germany a more formidable and dangerous foe than Japan may reflect an unhealthy tendency to underrate the military potency of the Japanese. It seems probable that the focusing of interest in recent weeks upon the problem of opening a second front in Europe has diverted attention from the seriousness of the war in the Pacific.

Confidence in production and shipping appears to be on the increase, although the public does seem to have a fairly clear realization of the serious shipping problem we now face. The belief held by a majority of the public that America is now the major source of supply for the United Nations war effort suggests a need for informational efforts to promote understanding of the contributions made to the common cause by other members of the United Nations.

In general, the public shows a high degree of satisfaction with the Army's treatment and training of its troops. Few feel that there is any serious discontent among enlisted men; only a small minority is critical of Army training.

A need for greater understanding of the war's problems is especially pronounced among people on the lower educational levels. These people are peculiarly susceptible to the over-confidence which derives from blind patriotic fervor. They are more prone than persons of superior educational background to think that American military strength is greater than that of our allies or our enemies. And they also tend, in much greater degree, to anticipate a war of short duration.

Information policy should be designed to place national pride and confidence on a basis of solid realism. There is need for fuller explanation of the magnitude and complexity of the military task ahead in order to promote full public recognition that strategic decisions must be left in the hands of qualified military and naval authorities.
"We cannot wage this war in a defensive spirit. As our power and our resources are fully mobilized, we shall carry the attack against the enemy — we shall hit him and hit him again wherever and whenever we can reach him." — President Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 6, 1942.

REALISM AND THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT

INTRODUCTION

Americans have been taught that the road to victory must be opened by offensive action. They have watched their growing military strength move to strategic positions all over the globe. Each fresh convoy of troops and shipment of supplies has sharpened their hope that the time for American seizure of the initiative is close at hand. Recently, the blunt demands of Josef Stalin, the exhortations of Wendell Willkie, have focussed their thoughts upon the possibility of attack on specific fronts.

Military strategy cannot, of course, be determined by public opinion. But a shift from defensive to offensive action must be accompanied and supported by a healthily balanced civilian outlook. Such an outlook will be characterized, on the one hand, by a genuine desire to take offensive action; on the other hand, by a sober appreciation of the manifold problems involved which will leave to the properly constituted military authorities the decisions as to when and where to strike.

Along with the careful weighing of military capacity to undertake any such move, then, should go an equally objective assessment of civilian attitudes. For only through such an information policy which encourages a realistic public
appraisal of the task presented can the proper cushion be provided against
the shock of high casualties attendant upon full-scale attack.

The evidence here is not presented as a complete examination of public sen-
timent on all the problems connected with the launching of an offensive;
it does, however, represent findings of the Bureau of Intelligence on a
number of the most vital issues involved.

**TIMING OF THE OFFENSIVE**

In considering public reactions to any future opening of new fronts, it is
in point to note how people characterized the strategy we have employed
thus far. In early September, half of the American public described the
fighting we were engaged in at that time as largely defensive rather than
offensive in nature. About a third believed we were fighting "mainly on
the offensive."

However, practically all of those who described our fighting as defensive
were convinced that another year would find us on the offensive, and al-
most a third of them expected such action before the close of 1942.

"Would you say the United States is now fighting mainly on the offensive
or mainly on the defensive?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asked of those who said "defensive":*

"About how much longer do you think it will be before we really start
taking the offensive?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 2 -
in view of enemy attacks throughout the summer in Russia, North Africa and the Pacific, these responses suggest that a considerable body of Americans have an unrealistic appraisal of the military situation. Even in May, before the first important American offensive action was launched in the Solomons, the same question evoked very similar results. At that time, 30 per cent said, "Offensive," 46 per cent, "Defensive," and 24 per cent, "Don't know."

The general approval which will greet the anticipated switch to the offensive is perhaps indicated by the fact that in September nine out of ten Americans thought we were "doing the right thing" in sending our men overseas to fight. Very little isolationist or purely defensive sentiment was evidenced.

Intimately bound up with people's hopes and desires as to the kind of war to fight must be their estimates of how long it will be before victory is achieved. In the face of much expert opinion to the contrary, half the population believed in September that the war would be over within two years or less. This figure represented the highest tide of confidence reached since May and early June. During the spring, the bombing of Tokyo, the 1,000-plane attack on Cologne, and the success of the Midway battle had bolstered public opinion to a point which was widely considered overconfident and complacent. Optimism which waned during the summer appears to be on the rise again, and millions of Americans are obviously not psychologically prepared for a long war.

EUROPEAN SECOND FRONT

Naturally there is greater resistance to the undertaking of specific
offensive action than to the general idea of offensive strategy. When the
national sample interviewed in September was asked about the desirability
of attempting a second front invasion of Europe within the near future, a
majority expressed approval. But a quarter of the public indicated opposi-
tion to such a venture. The findings illustrated below reflect attitudes
measured after the Dieppe raid on the continent — but before a full ac-
ccount of Canadian losses there had been released.

"Do you think in the next two or three months the Allies should try to land
an army on the continent of Europe for a real invasion?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>57%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>18%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Don't Know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One reason for the strong minority opposition to a second front venture at
this time may lie in the fact that invasion of Europe has been tied, in the
public mind, to the issue of "saving Russia in order to save ourselves."
A third of the American people is not convinced that we would lose the war
even if Russia, China and England were all defeated.

A majority of the public, moreover, believed in September that Russia could
hold out against Germany until winter, even without increased assistance
from her allies. Varying estimates of Russian endurance clearly influence
attitudes toward the necessity for an immediate second front invasion:

70 per cent of those who believe Russia will not be
able to hold out until winter unless saved by an
allied invasion, as compared with

56 per cent of those who believe Russia will be able
to hold out against Germany until winter, are in
favor of an invasion of the continent within the next
two or three months.

-4-
As the following chart indicates, most of the skeptics who doubted Russia's ability to hold out were, however, certain that the Soviets could be saved if the Allies should land an army in Europe in the next two or three months:

"If Russia does not get more help from the Allies than she is getting now, do you think Russia will be able to hold out against Germany until this winter?"

57% Yes 32% No 11% Don't know

Asked of those who answered "No" or "Don't know"

"Do you think Russia would be saved if the Allies should land an army in Europe in the next two or three months?"

26% Yes 4% No 13% Don't know

EXPECTATION OF SECOND FRONT

The majority who favored an early second front in Europe was matched by a majority of slightly greater size which expected that such an attack would be launched before winter. Quite naturally, those who favored a second front were much more certain that it would be opened this fall than were those opposed to a European invasion.

Over half of the whole sample felt that the chances of success in such an attempt were "pretty good," while eight out of ten were convinced that the odds on success were at least even. Those who considered such an attempt likely to fail — only 10 per cent of the whole sample — were overwhelmingly against the move. On the other hand, a majority of the people who thought the chances of success "fifty-fifty" were willing to have the Allies take the risk.
"Do you think that in the next two or three months the Allies should try to land an army on the continent of Europe for a real invasion?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Of those who feel that</th>
<th>73% should invade</th>
<th>12% should not invade</th>
<th>15% don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pretty good</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more likely to fail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems significant that persons with relatives and friends in the service, or about to go in, voted just as strongly in favor of an early invasion of Europe as those who had no close relationship with the service.

Better educated groups showed a greater belief that the United States needs support to win the war, but curiously enough were more cautious in recommending a second front and more pessimistic about its chances of success than were less educated groups — perhaps because of a greater appreciation of the magnitude of the job. Acceptance of the imminence of an invasion of Europe was, however, greatest on the upper educational levels. They were more prone than others to expect an invasion in spite of the fact that they advocated it less strongly.

These expressions of opinion about a second front in the future are by no means intended as a measurement of popular reaction in the event that an actual invasion of Europe should be attempted. Public opinion is, in large part, a response to leadership and to action. Much of the current opposition to an invasion effort may be based on nothing more than an assumption that

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military leaders have failed thus far to undertake the effort because they consider it impractical. There is good reason to believe that action launched by trusted and competent authorities would, as in the past, be supported by overwhelming popular approval.

CONFIDENCE IN OUR ARMED FORCES

Any shift to an all-out offensive strategy will be regarded by the people in the light of their confidence in our military establishment. In September, this confidence appeared to be on a very high level. The quality of our leadership, the fighting spirit of our men, our military equipment and the strength of our Navy and Air Force were all considered far superior to those of Germany and Japan. A healthy national pride is undoubtedly reflected by these sentiments. They may, however, connote more patriotism than realism.

As the chart on the following page illustrates, Americans overwhelmingly rated their own armed forces higher than those of the other major powers on all points of comparison save one; four out of ten gave Germany credit for having the strongest army in the world. But, despite the numerical superiority of the German army, and despite the actual combat experience which it has had, three out of every ten Americans still felt that our own Army was stronger. It is fairly plain, moreover, that even those who gave first place to the Wehrmacht thought that our own Army was potentially superior. Many of them held that we have smarter generals than the Germans, better fighting spirit and the best Army equipment in the world.

This confidence that total American military strength is unchallengeable,
QUALITY OF AMERICAN FIGHTING FORCES COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

Which one of these countries would you say has...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the strongest army?</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the strongest air force?</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the strongest navy?</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the smartest generals?</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best fighting spirit?</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the best army equipment?</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
even by the Germans, was evidenced by the answers given to a somewhat simi-
lar question asked of a national sample in August: "From what you know or
have heard, would you say the all-around fighting ability of the American
armed forces is better, about the same or poorer than Germany's?" Fifty-
seven per cent said that our all-around fighting ability was greater than
Germany's, while only 15 per cent confessed that they considered it inferior.

Nevertheless, respect for the Nazi army -- the army which will face Ameri-
can troops invading the continent -- has some influence upon civilian sen-
timent in regard to the opening of a second front:

64 per cent of those who think the United States
has the strongest Army, but only

54 per cent who believe Germany's army strongest,
favored the invasion of Europe this fall.

EVALUATION OF THE JAPANESE

The comparative rating of military capacities gives added emphasis to other
indications that Americans consider the Germans a more dangerous and more
formidable foe than the Japanese. It seems significant that this relative
disregard for Japanese military strength was registered at about the time
when Assistant Secretary Bard and ex-Ambassador Grew were warning that
Japanese ferocity and might must not be underrated.

This tendency to regard Japan as a subordinate foe may stem from a lack of
information among large sectors of the American public. A surprisingly
large proportion of the population -- almost half -- manifested ignorance
of the fact that the Japanese had occupied American territory in the
Aleutian Islands. It is possible that some of those interviewed

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misunderstood the question and answered negatively on the assumption that it referred only to those Aleutian Islands close to the Alaskan mainland -- rather than to the westernmost tip of the Aleutian chain.

There is a direct relation between education and awareness that the Japanese have landed troops on American soil in the Aleutians. Among persons at the lowest educational level, two out of three were ignorant of this fact. Even among people who had gone to college, two out of ten had no knowledge of the Japanese footholds. The following chart illustrates the extent of ignorance and the relationship between education and information on this particular subject.

"From what you have heard or read, have the Japanese succeeded in occupying any of the Aleutian Islands -- that is, our islands near Alaska?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Yes, they have</th>
<th>No, they haven't</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College graduates</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar school graduates</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some grammar school or less</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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EFFECT OF INFORMATIONAL LEVEL ON CONFIDENCE

There are other signs that the high confidence in our armed forces rests more upon national pride than upon a sound foundation of information and realism. On every phase of our military strength tested, the less educated groups showed the most overwhelming confidence.

As the following chart shows, college graduates were seven to one in rating the strength of Germany's army over that of our own; in addition, they tended to credit the Nazis with more able generalship than their own country — and they were about equally divided on the relative strength of the American and British air forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College graduates</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>105%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>195%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>275%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>355%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar school graduates</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>375%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some grammar school or less</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>425%</td>
<td>115%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respect for our allies and enemies was reflected in greater force among the more educated groups — with one exception: Evaluation of the power of the Russian army held practically constant on all educational levels.

Even among the most educated, however — though by a relatively small
margin -- the United States was considered to be the strongest naval power, to have the best equipment for its army, and to possess the outstanding fighting spirit among the great world powers.

**SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF THE ARMY**

There was little evidence of any particular civilian criticism of the army which might be influencing evaluation of our might and ability to launch an offensive. Although a fifth of the American public had heard of instances of discontent in the army camps in this country, only three percent considered this discontent serious enough to hurt the fighting spirit of the army. Such instances as were recalled may have been conventional grumbling or mere rumor.

"Have you heard of any cases of discontent among soldiers in the army camps here in the United States?"

![Bar Chart]

As the number who had heard of discontent:

"Do you think this discontent is serious enough to hurt the fighting spirit of our army as a whole, or do you think it doesn't amount to much?"

![Bar Chart]

Less than a quarter of the people interviewed expressed any conviction that pull or influence is necessary for a person to become an officer in our army. Only about one out of five persons expressed any dissatisfaction
with the amount of training our soldiers are receiving before being dispatched to foreign posts.

Even among those with immediate relatives in the armed forces, 79 per cent had not heard of any discontent among our soldiers at home. This group was no more critical of politics in the choice of officers than were persons who had no close connection with soldiers. And they were even somewhat more inclined than others to feel that our fighting men were getting ample training before being sent into battle.

68 per cent of those with friends or relatives in the armed forces, as compared with

55 per cent of those with no such connection with the military, felt that American soldiers were getting enough training before they go into battle.

Women were slightly more critical than men of the adequacy of army training. There was not more than six or eight percentage points difference between the sexes, but it may furnish evidence of some need for greater reassurance among women regarding the preparation given to soldiers.

Not only did suspicion of the merit system within the army seem to be confined to a relatively small group, but the people who did have these doubts apparently did not look on the matter as affecting the army seriously. At least, they did not differ from other civilians in their estimates of either the strength of the army or the ability of United States generals. However, impressions of discontent among our soldiers, though certainly not widespread at present, are a factor to be reckoned with.
68 per cent of those who had not heard stories of "discontent" in army camps, while only
50 per cent of those who had heard of such grumbling, rated the United States first among world powers in fighting spirit.

CONFIDENCE IN PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING

The behind-the-lines task of supplying and transporting war materials is vital to any serious consideration of a successful offensive. And the people's judgments of our progress in this direction will be a part of their total attitude toward the subject.

The public's evaluation of our war production as measured in September was a mixture of strong confidence in the future, some reservations regarding present achievements, and a good deal of ignorance concerning the actual situation.

Production in General

Almost half of the American public (44 per cent) felt in September that our over-all production of war materials was progressing "only fairly well" or "poorly." This, however, represented a decided gain in confidence over the previous month when, apparently, news of WPB shufflings and the cancellation of war contracts for lack of materials had raised this critical group from 25 per cent in June to 54 per cent in August.

In short, from June to August, there had been a marked increase in critical thinking on the production picture, so that September showed the public to be more pessimistic than they were earlier in the summer, but not as
pessimistic as they were in mid-August.

Americans appear to be imbued with the concept of their nation as the arsenal of democracy. Even in August fifty-one per cent of them believed that the United States was providing "more than half of the war materials used by the allies." Eighteen per cent thought that "practically all" of the United Nations' war equipment was made in the U.S.A. In view of the great productive efforts which are being carried on in Britain and Russia, these opinions seem somewhat unrealistic and perhaps reflect a widespread failure to appreciate the contributions other members of the United Nations are making to the common cause.

"From what you have heard, would you say the United States is producing less than half or more than half of the war material used by the Allies?"

12% Less than half 18% About half 51% More than half 19% Don't know

Asked of those who answered "more than half"

"Would you say the United States is producing practically all of it?"

18% Yes 29% No 4% Don't know

EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Criticism of production was distinctly a mark of the more educated groups, however, for 55 per cent of the college graduates as compared with only 30 per cent of those who had never completed grammar school said production was going only fairly well or poorly.
"In general, do you think that production of war materials in this country is going along very well, only fairly well, or poorly?"
(Based on educational levels of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total who said fairly well or poorly</th>
<th>449</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College graduates</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar school graduates</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some grammar school 30% or less</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Steel Shortage

In September, the Bureau asked its national sample the question: "From what you have read or heard, would you say we have enough steel on hand to build the ships and other war materials we need?" Half of the sample answered the question affirmatively. Only a third indicated an awareness of the steel shortage inhibiting production at that time.

Quite naturally, those who were unaware of any steel shortage were better satisfied with the general progress of production:

56 per cent of those who were unaware of the steel shortage, but only

46 per cent of those who realized a shortage existed, felt that the production of war materials was going very well.
Paradoxically, there was a striking inverse relationship between education and awareness of the urgent need for steel:

57 per cent of the college graduates, as compared with

45 per cent of those who had never completed grammar school, were of the opinion that we had enough steel on hand to build the ships and other war materials we need.

Awareness of the steel shortage has undoubtedly been greatly advanced during the past weeks by the emphasis given by newspapers and radio broadcasts to the campaign for the collection of steel scrap. The American Institute of Public Opinion reported early in October that 94 per cent of the American people said they have read about the scrap collection drive in their newspapers. But it is significant that, on the eve of the scrap campaign, such widespread lack of appreciation of the steel shortage should have existed.

Shipping

Seven in ten persons -- perhaps conditioned by stories of Kaiser record-smashing and the launching of 174 ships on Labor Day -- believed that production of ships was up to schedule or even ahead of schedule. On the other hand, most of them were aware that shipping is a major war problem today, for only about a quarter of the population maintained that we now have enough ships to carry our war materials to the fighting lines. And while only 14 per cent of them felt we could be doing more than we are to meet the submarine menace, a little more than half were unwilling to say we would have Atlantic shipping under control within the next few months.
Furthermore, a Gallup poll published in early August reported that people named shipping more than anything else (36%) when asked what constituted the most important problem the United States faces today in winning the war.

Nevertheless, there was a slight but consistent increase in optimism from August to September on all of the questions pertaining to shipping. Considered individually, no one of them would be significant but taken together they probably indicate a distinct trend.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We do not have enough ships to carry our war materials to the fighting lines</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of ships is not up to schedule</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are not doing all we possibly can to prevent submarine sinkings in Atlantic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will be over six months before the submarine menace will be under control</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The direct bearing which shipping has upon the launching of a major offensive may be inadequately understood.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The American public desires offensive action and believes it can be undertaken soon. But its expectation appears to be based, in part, upon unrealistic appraisals of our armed strength compared with that of our enemies and upon overconfidence about the progress of the war.
2. Lack of realism is especially prevalent among persons on the lower educational levels.

3. Americans tend to overestimate their country's contribution to the production efforts of the United Nations. Moreover, they are not fully aware of the shortages and other difficulties which impede production.

4. Sound informational measures are needed to temper the eagerness for offensive action with realism and to provide a healthy public appreciation of the price which must be paid for victory.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 46

CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE

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The period covered by this report is the week of October 18 through October 21, except where otherwise specifically stated.
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

SWING

The news of mounting enemy strength in the Solomons prompted a sudden swing away from the optimism which characterized editorial comment during the preceding week. A major battle for Guadalcanal is expected. Press and radio are waiting grimly for word as to its outcome.

Commentators are decidedly uneasy about the South Pacific situation. While they do not concede victory to the enemy, they are by no means optimistic in regard to the pending engagement. Like Major George Fielding Eliot, they feel that "the present Japanese operations in the Solomons represent a full-dress attack intended to expel us from the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area at any risk and regardless of cost." Our recently reported naval losses, together with admissions that the Japanese have repeatedly landed reinforcements and have been able to employ surface craft against our shore installations, have had a thoroughly disheartening effect.

Some commentators, viewing the situation darkly, tend to blame American military and naval leaders for putting our forces into an untenable position; a few reproach Secretary Knox and Admiral Nimitz for their optimistic statements. Others, however, point out that we are doing the best we can with the men and munitions at our disposal in the Pacific and that the taking of risks is essential to sound strategy.

In many observations about the Solomons, there is an undercurrent of feeling, inspired perhaps by the belated announcement of our losses in the
original attack, that the full facts about the situation are not being disclosed. Fletcher Pratt, for example, discussing the loss of our three cruisers, raises the question: "Must every victory or gain, every achievement we have, end in a sour note of doubt whether we are being given the whole story and given it accurately?"

DIPLOMACY

Editorial analysts continue to discuss our relations with Argentina and Chile. Most of them have expressed approval of the rebuke administered to these republics by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. The prevailing view is that the attitude of Argentina, and to a lesser extent Chile, imperils the safety of their neighbors in the Western Hemisphere and that it is necessary to prod them off the fence.

Nevertheless, a critical minority feels that we have no right to force other nations into a decision. Some fear that the Welles statement may carry implications of North American imperialism to our neighbor republics. The Detroit Free Press, for example, observed that the Welles speech had "grossly and unnecessarily offended the very peoples whose good will and cooperation we have been trying to win."

The open letter to the British people by the editors of Life focussed editorial attention once more upon Anglo-American relations. Overwhelmingly, newspaper commentators condemned the Life letter. The objection most frequently raised regarding it was representatively expressed by William L. Shirer, who pointed out that it gave the Nazi propagandists useful ammunition to hurl over the airwaves to Britain.

- 2 -
The letter was also assailed vehemently as unfair to the British people. Indeed, it evoked the warmest expressions of esteem and admiration for England which have been expressed by American commentators since the mass German air attacks on London.

Wendell Willkie's return from his round-the-world cruise was greeted by a burst of applause. Even the Scripps-Howard papers, heretofore extremely caustic, had a good word to say about him this week because of his support of a unified command. Most commentators agreed that Willkie had given expression to the hopes and aspirations of the common people of the world. "It is probable," observed the Portland (Maine) Press Herald, "that Mr. Willkie's visit did more to make the United Nations really united than all the official, cautious exchanges that have been made by ambassadors and legates in the last ten months."

HOME FRONT

Taking a cue, apparently, from the President's recent praise of Congress, commentators who, until very recently, were harshly critical of the legislative branch began referring to it in much more friendly fashion. Ernest Lindley, for example, observed that the recent behavior of Congress "is restoring the prestige of the legislative branch and confidence in our political system." He attributed the change to "the President's reassertion of leadership" and to the prodding of press and radio.

The dominant current issue in editorial minds continues to be the manpower problem. Response to the President's call for voluntary rationing of manpower in industry was rather lukewarm and somewhat confused.
While commentators were glad that he elected to postpone compulsion, they tended to feel that voluntary measures will prove ineffectual.

There was general satisfaction with the statement issued by Secretary Stimson as to the size of the United States Army. Mark Sullivan called it a "tonic for the country's morale." According to the Chicago Sun, it has "laid at rest the alarming, and in our opinion, nonsensical reports that the army might reach from 10 million to 13 million in 1943...."

A good many comments, however, questioned the wisdom of raising an Army as large as 7,500,000. Some suggested that it would be wiser to put more of our manpower into arming and equipping our allies. The New York Times argued that economic and industrial experts must have an equal voice with the military in deciding the size of the Army.

INFORMATION

Commentators gave warm praise to the Office of War Information report on American military and naval aircraft and to Elmer Davis' speech in Canada. But they employed these as occasions for renewed attacks on Government information policy.

The New York Times cited the Office of War Information report as a model for future Government statements on the progress of the war and the New York Herald Tribune called it "an example of the effective way in which to provide information, in times when ballyhoo is not wanted or needed, to a public which is sufficiently adult to understand and respect the
facts." In most comments, there was a plain implication that this sort of reporting is considered entirely atypical.

Mr. Davis' compliments to Canada on the "candor and common sense" of its information policy seemed to the Washington Post to be an "indictment of our own policy for the lack of both qualities." Commentators continue to insist angrily that war news in general is being spoon-fed to the American people.

POPULAR REACTIONS

CIVILIAN DEFENSE

Public confidence in the management of civilian defense activities has increased appreciably since the period last winter when OCD was under vigorous attack in the newspapers. Interviewing in October showed that more than half the people throughout the United States think that civilian defense is being run "very well" in their communities. An additional quarter of the public say at least that it is being conducted "fairly well." A small minority of eight per cent continues to feel that local civilian defense activities are "poorly" handled. A like percentage expressed this disapproval when questioned on the subject last February. It is significant, however, that, while in February nearly a third of the public said they didn't know if these civilian efforts were being managed satisfactorily, only half as many express such doubt today.
The following chart presents a comparison of opinions registered in response to an identical question posed to national samples in February and in October:

**How do you think Civilian Defense in your community is being run?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Poorly</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENEMY AIR ATTACKS**

Public interest in one phase of civilian defense activity has waned considerably. The fear of enemy bombing attacks which prompted energetic air raid precaution efforts early in the year has strikingly decreased.

Today, less than half the public thinks there is much likelihood that the enemy will bomb our West coast cities any time in the near future. Only about a third of the public sees any immediate probability of bombing raids along our Atlantic coast.

The development of opinion about enemy air raids on our shores is indicated in the chart on the opposite page, which shows the responses given by national samples to identical questions asked in January, in March and in October.
How much chance do you think there is of an enemy air raid within the next few weeks...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Very Probable</th>
<th>Fairly Probable</th>
<th>Not Probable</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on the PACIFIC COAST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Very Probable</th>
<th>Fairly Probable</th>
<th>Not Probable</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on the ATLANTIC COAST

Road to Victory

Americans tend to doubt the efficacy of air attack as a means of overcoming Germany's hold upon the continent of Europe. Three-fifths of them believe that the road to victory must be opened through a land invasion by the allies. The following chart shows the division of responses to a question on this subject asked early in October.
To beat Germany, do you think the Allies will have to invade the continent of Europe, or do you think we can defeat her by just increasing our air attacks?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invade continent</th>
<th>Strong air attacks</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This belief that the Nazis can be conquered only through the comparatively hard, slow advances of ground troops seems a great deal more realistic than a concurrent feeling now widespread in America that the German people are out of sympathy with Hitler and may revolt against him in the near future. As is indicated below, only a minority of the public is convinced that the enemy is strongly united. Almost as many take the optimistic view that the German people themselves will contribute to a United Nations victory by overthrowing their Government. These opinions suggest strongly that informational measures are needed to promote greater popular awareness of the difficulty of the military task ahead.

The way things look now, do you think there is a good chance of the German people revolting against Hitler in the next year?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Depends</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PRODUCTION SHORTCOMINGS

American confidence in the efficiency of our production program has mounted slightly since mid-summer, although it is not now at the high level of last spring. In September, 53 per cent of the public said they thought the production of war materials was progressing "very well." An additional 11 per cent said they thought production was going "only fairly well." Only three per cent declared that production is going "poorly."

Despite the emphasis which has been placed lately on difficulties in the way of production arising from raw material shortages, Americans tend to put the chief blame for production shortcomings upon labor. When they were asked in September, "What do you think is the chief reason why war production is not going as well as it might?" the explanations most frequently offered centered around labor difficulties, strikes and the self-interest of workers.

This tendency of the public to find fault with labor is indicated by the answers to another question asked in October, "Do you think strikes are holding back war production now?" There was an almost precisely even division of opinion on this topic: 46 per cent answered "Yes"; 45 per cent answered "No"; nine per cent had no opinion.

When the same question was asked in June, however, only 38 per cent said "Yes," while 53 per cent said "No." Apparently public confidence in labor is waning, in spite of the general adherence of workers to their no-strike pledge — perhaps because newspapers have focussed attention upon occasional work stoppages.
DRAFTING YOUTH

As previously reported, eight out of ten people interviewed in September, said they thought that the Government should draft 18- and 19-year olds before drafting married men with children. Further analysis shows, naturally, that people were influenced in this choice by the presence of an 18- or 19-year old boy in the home. Women over 40 who had 18- and 19-year olds in their families (presumably mothers) voiced the greatest opposition to this proposal. But even in this group, almost two-thirds preferred the drafting of young boys to married men with children.

The boys themselves, according to a Gallup release this week, are overwhelmingly in favor of the new draft.

LOOSE TALK

There is widespread recognition throughout the United States that careless conversations on certain subjects should be avoided in war time. Americans are not accustomed to guarding their words. They have always lived in an atmosphere of freedom, and the current necessity for caution is probably not fully understood. But interviewing conducted with a small national sample during the second week of October indicates a prevailing recognition that loose talk is dangerous, at least in regard to military, shipping and production topics.

Interviews on this subject were introduced by the assertion, "The Government is trying to get people not to talk about certain things that will get back to the enemy." Each respondent was then asked, "What sort of things do you think people should be careful not to talk about?" Only 13 per cent
showed complete unawareness of what topics ought to be avoided.

The topics most frequently mentioned as taboo centered around military affairs. Production problems were also cited by many members of the sample. Multiple answers were permitted. The following table shows the percentages which recommended caution against careless conversations in regard to several broad, general subjects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should not discuss</th>
<th>Per cent of people mentioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military matters</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and supplies</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping affairs</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low morale</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous mentions</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems significant that most people put their emphasis on the kind of loose talk which might give information of strategic value to the enemy.

There was much less awareness of the danger involved in loose talk in the form of rumors and idle gossip. This latter consideration may have been in the minds of the 13 per cent who urged the avoidance of careless talk about matters of morale.

Most of the responses, however, referred to such things as

- Information about battleships
- Troop train movements
- Debarkation of soldiers
- Location of troops
- Production of war plants
- New inventions and patents
- Materials used in war work
- Ship departures
- Movement of war materials

Among those who stressed the avoidance of discussion about morale, typical
strictures suggested were, in contrast:

Stories about Government inefficiency
Arguments about the second front
Criticism of the Government's handling of defense work
Criticism of our allies

It is evident, of course, that the statement with which these interviews were introduced encouraged responses about the type of loose talk which might give information to the enemy. The question asked does not reveal the degree to which people realize the danger lurking in their own words nor give any measure of their actual behavior in a conversational situation.

Apparently, however, the public has an appreciation of a large number of things which should not be discussed and is receptive to further reminders that "loose talk costs lives." There seems to be a special need, in addition, for informational efforts to promote an understanding that loose talk of a sort which does not involve information of interest to the enemy may have injurious effects upon national unity and public confidence in the Government.

REALISM AND THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT

Confidence in American military strength and a prevailing recognition that the war can be won only through offensive action have promoted a general expectation that the United Nations will soon be able to wrest the initiative from the enemy. Many Americans believe that the war can be won within a period of two years. This hopefulness, together with the belief that American military might is far superior to that of the enemy, may lead to dangerous complacency.
The pronounced inclination among Americans to consider Germany a more formidable foe than Japan may reflect an unhealthy tendency to underrate the military potency of the Japanese. It seems probable that the focussing of interest in recent weeks upon the problem of opening a second front in Europe has diverted attention from the seriousness of the war in the Pacific.

Confidence in production and shipping appears to be on the increase, although the public does seem to have a fairly clear realization of the serious shipping problem we now face. The belief held by a majority that America is now the chief source of supply for the United Nations war effort suggests a need for informational efforts to promote understanding of the contributions made to the common cause by other members of the United Nations.

In general, the public shows a high degree of satisfaction with the Army's treatment and training of its troops. Few feel that there is any serious discontent among enlisted men; only a small minority is critical of Army training.

A need for greater understanding of the war's problems is especially pronounced among people on the lower educational levels. These people are peculiarly susceptible to the overconfidence which derives from blind patriotic fervor. They are more prone than persons of superior educational background to think that American military strength is greater than that of our allies or our enemies. And they also tend, in much greater degree, to anticipate a war of short duration.
Information policy should be designed to place national pride and confidence on a basis of solid realism. There is need for fuller explanation of the magnitude and complexity of the military task ahead in order to promote full public recognition that strategic decisions must be left in the hands of qualified military and naval authorities.

(These findings summarize the principal implications of a Special Intelligence Report, Realism and the Offensive Spirit, issued October 21 and available to authorized individuals upon request to the Bureau of Intelligence.)

**ENEMY PROPAGANDA**

**ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES**

Axis propagandists are paying growing attention to the United States. In the past week the proportion of broadcast time devoted to attacks on America increased significantly.

The basic nature of the attacks remains unchanged. The week's broadcasts were aimed at two perennial Axis propaganda objectives: defeatism and divisionism. The draft of 18-19-year olds was treated in such a way as to serve both purposes. The Germans grieved that "young, ill-trained men" would have to be pitted against seasoned Axis troops. To heighten controversy about the measure lowering the draft age, the Axis contended that it represented a fresh betrayal of President Roosevelt's promise not to sacrifice American youth.

The Navy's delay in announcing the loss of three cruisers during the occupation of the Solomons was given somewhat similar treatment. The Axis attempted to prove the superior truthfulness of its military reporting and charged that
the United States habitually conceals its losses. To increase dissension within the United States, the Axis attacked the "cheaply sensationalistic" American press, claiming that it is manipulated by Roosevelt and the Jews.

Axis broadcasts also made much of troubles in the United States on the economic front. Again a defeatist note was struck: it was claimed that stringent restrictions loom ahead and that war production cannot proceed because of lack of material. Criticism of domestic economic policies from American sources was used in distorted fashion in order to appeal to the Roosevelt haters.

The Axis also attacked Communists and Willkie as a means of widening cleavages. To arouse anxiety and prove America's immorality, Radio Debunk and Radio Manila both attempted to show that promiscuity, prostitution and venereal disease abound in Army camp regions and in port cities.

**GOEBBELS TAKES THE DEFENSIVE**

The primary purpose of Goebbels' Munich speech of October 18 was evidently to deal with the complaints which are arising in Germany over the difficulties of daily life. Goebbels asserted that the Germans are not fighting "for regional interests...for Socialism, and for National Socialism; for questions of proletariat and bourgeoisie...today it is for more important things we are fighting: for coal, for iron, for petroleum, and above all, for wheat for our daily bread." The claim that the Nazis are not fighting for territorial, ideological and political ends is, of course, not to be taken seriously. It is significant, however, that Goebbels felt that emphasis had to be placed at this time on those war objectives most likely to
still the swelling volume of complaints within the Reich. In effect, Goebbels attempted to show the German people that victory would preclude the possibility of Germany's suffering in the future as she is suffering today.

**ENEMY VERSIONS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION**

Nazi short-wave broadcasts and German domestic media this week emphasized German submarine "successes" to the neglect of the Russian front. The Germans claimed to have extended submarine operations to the Western and Southern coasts of Africa and to have sunk British troop transports off Capetown. Since the "destruction" of the recent United Nations' Arctic convoy, America and England have not dared to send more supplies to Russia by the Northern route, the Nazis boast.

Following its usual policy of silence during the early stages of a campaign, Tokyo has not made any mention of Guadalcanal since the beginning of its strenuous attempt to retake the island. The Japanese-controlled station at Saigon made a laconic statement on October 18 to the effect that the Japanese have landed on Guadalcanal but that no important land battles have occurred. It should be remembered that the Japanese have never acknowledged the loss of the Guadalcanal air field.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT 47

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE

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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer Cuts</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Chiseling</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition Sentiment</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>Devaluation of America</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>Short-Wave Broadcasts</td>
<td>17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The period covered by this report is the week of October 22 through October 28, except where otherwise specifically stated.
EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

INFORMATION

Editorial ire at Government information policy, simmering throughout the past fortnight, has now reached a boiling point. Commentators are openly skeptical about the news granted to them of the Pacific fighting.

The Chicago Tribune, placing the worst construction upon the Government's release of information, gies: "The circumstances suggest that there is a budget of bad news piling up in the Solomons and that the censorship is being used to keep it from the people until after the election." But newspapers friendlier to the Administration are almost as caustic. The Washington Post observes, for example, "Unless we are very much mistaken, the announced sinking of the carrier Wasp means that we have suffered the loss of still another carrier, as yet unannounced... It should not surprise anyone if the carrier reported severely damaged is actually sunk."

Editorial irritation was given especial impetus by the War Department's belated admission that some of our Tokyo raiders are, in fact, prisoners of the Japanese. The Daily Oklahoman had this to say about the matter in a fairly representative comment: "Twice in recent months the American people have found Japanese reports more reliable than the reports of our own Government. They found that to be true in the case of the Japanese claim that some of our cruisers had been sunk among the Solomon Islands. Now they find that to be true in the case of the raiders who bombed Tokyo. And never since the tragedy of Pearl Harbor has a realisation so humiliating come to the American people."
OWI endorsement of the War Department's handling of news about the Tokyo raid mollified some commentators. According to the New York Herald-Tribune "It at once establishes a complete public confidence in the correctness of the policy followed..." The press, in general, takes the view that OWI is free from blame for the concealment practiced by Army and Navy brass hats and that it merits all credit for whatever candor they may exhibit.

COMBAT

Press and radio continue to watch news from the Solomons anxiously and unhappily — and to interpret it with caution. Most commentators are plainly pessimistic. And many of them suggest, at least obliquely, that the situation in the south Pacific is a product of naval ineptitude.

The replacement of Admiral Ghormley by Admiral Halsey strengthened suspicions that the strategy at Guadacanal had been blundering. Some attributed the fault directly to an alleged lack of unified command in the South Pacific. The St. Louis Post Dispatch expressed this point of view in a declaration that "The old Army-Navy rivalry is not only outmoded in this war, but is acutely dangerous." Other critics suggested that the difficulty lay in an inability among tradition-steeped admirals and generals to understand contemporary warfare — especially in a failure to appreciate the tremendous power of aviation.

The defense of Stalingrad continued to afford counterbalancing encouragement. And the inauguration of a British offensive in Africa was treated with restrained optimism. Commentators found consolation for their disheartenment over the Solomons in the fact that American forces are playing
some part in the drive against Rommel. They placed a good deal of stress on the United Nations character of the allied attack.

PROHIBITION

The defeat of Senator Josh Lee's attempt to tack a prohibition rider on the new Selective Service bill met with almost unanimous approval in the press and on the radio. The prevailing view was expressed by the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which stated that "Lee's proposal was a brazen attempt to impose prohibition, with its attendant evils of bootlegging and corruption, upon the large civilian populations which reside in the vicinity of army camps and naval stations, under the hypocritical pretext of protecting the men in the armed services from the evils of Demon Rum."

Senator O'Daniel's amendment requiring a year's training for 18-19-year-olds also came in for general, though less vigorous, condemnation. A typical expression of opinion was the Milwaukee Journal injunction, "Don't hamstring the Army again."

WILLKIE

Wendell Willkie's radio address over the four major networks on Monday evening had an estimated audience of 48 per cent of all radio families throughout the United States. This compared not unfavorably with the 59 per cent rating estimated for the President's fireside talk on Columbus Day.

The press gave enthusiastic praise to Mr. Willkie's report. Even the Scripps-Howard papers, which criticized him vehemently throughout his
tour, admitted that "Willkie spoke wisely and well last night. Occasionally he was less than fair to the President's conduct of the war, and to the British position. But, on the whole, his criticism was just and constructive."

The relatively liberal New York Post indulged in a panegyric. It found Mr. Willkie's words "the common earthy talk of men around the world, which has at long last found its way into the council-chamber, rapped for order, and has said its say." There was equal applause, naturally, from newspapers which had supported Mr. Willkie in the last election campaign. Apparently he has found a formula for opposition to Mr. Roosevelt which can be adhered to by those who have been consistently opposed to the Administration in domestic affairs, yet sympathetic to its foreign policy.

POPULAR REACTIONS

CONSUMER CUTS

Half the people in the United States believe that they have reduced their buying habits since last year.

Early in October, the Bureau of Intelligence asked a national sample: "Considering everything you are buying now, does it seem this year that you and your family are buying more things than you bought last year or fewer things?" The answers divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More things</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same amount</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer things</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clothing was the item on which the largest number of people said that
they were economizing: 34 per cent of the whole sample declared that they were buying less clothing than last year.

The following table shows the various types of economy observed by the people who said that they were buying fewer things this year:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home improvements</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxuries and entertainment</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General living</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas, tires, car</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business improvements</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Multiple answers were permissible. Persons answering "buying fewer things" amounted to 50 per cent of the sample.

In the face of increased incomes, the statements of so many people that they are buying fewer things may reflect both a belief that they are getting less for their money and an awareness of scarcity. Taxation appears to be only subordinately responsible so far. Three-fourths of the public have not felt their incomes seriously pinched by taxes during the last year. The same sample was asked: "Has it been a real hardship for you to pay the total amount of taxes you have had to pay over the past year or not?" Opinion divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't pay taxes</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHISELING**

Studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence have repeatedly confirmed the thesis that public endorsement of any program involving economic
restriction depends, in very large measure, upon a conviction that it is
equitably administered. Americans have insisted overwhelmingly that all
phases of the anti-inflation program be imposed in like fashion upon
groups and interests throughout the country.

Apparently, however, despite overwhelming approval of the principle of
rationing, there exists a widespread doubt as to the fairness and effici-
ency with which rationing programs are being administered. Only about
half of the sample interviewed in October indicated a belief that racion-
ing in general was affecting all people alike.

The Bureau asked: "At the present time, do you think a lot of people are
getting more than their share of the things that are rationed?"

38% said "Yes"
52% said "No"
10% didn't know

There is, moreover, a great deal of skepticism about the application of
rationing programs which may be undertaken in the future. Half the public
thinks that some people will get more than their fair share of the scarce
articles.

"If we ration a lot more things, do you think there will
be much chiseling — that is, people getting more than
their share of these things?"

Yes, chiseling 49%
No 43
Don't know 8

PROHIBITION SENTIMENT

The congressional vote on Senator Lee's proposed amendment to the bill ex-
tending Selective Service to 18- and 19-year olds afforded a test of
prohibition strength in the United States. The issue, bedecked with special moral considerations in connection with the welfare of young draftees, may have had a rather widespread appeal. But all available indices to public opinion support the belief that national prohibition is desired by only a minority in the United States today.

A Gallup poll, conducted in September on the issue of prohibition in general, reported 38 per cent in favor and 62 per cent opposed. Reports received from 48 nationally distributed correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence support the Gallup findings.

The Bureau's correspondents reported on sentiment in their districts respecting the Lee amendment. Everywhere it was interpreted as an attempt to resurrect prohibition. Its connection with military problems was generally regarded as incidental. Many, even among those sympathetic to prohibition, resented the treatment of the issue as a mere rider to a draft bill. With the possible exception of the "Bible belt," majority support for the proposal was found in no portion of the country.

Knowledge about the Lee amendment was confined to a minority of the American people. And even among these people, the division of opinion was estimated at roughly six to four against the proposal. Prohibitionist efforts to mobilize group support for the measure were only partially successful. A number of Baptist and Methodist officials gave it their endorsement. So, naturally, did the WCTU and some Parent-Teacher Associations. Businessmen's groups, on the other hand, were almost solidly opposed. Among church influences, the Roman Catholics were also against the measure.
Sentiment in favor of the Lee amendment was found largely among farmers, but most industrial workers were opposed. People living in small rural communities, particularly in the South and Southwest, were the strongest supporters. The most vigorous opposition was drawn from larger cities, particularly along the East and West coasts.

The prohibition issue has important informational implications because it is potentially disruptive of national unity. Concentration on the war effort may be impaired and serious domestic cleavages may develop if the nation becomes embroiled in a bitter struggle over a subject so unrelated to the war as liquor.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

MANPOWER

Reports from field offices of the Bureau of Public Inquiry indicate nationwide dissatisfaction with the handling of the manpower problem. The country is said to be bewildered by contradictory and acrimonious discussions of the subject on the part of public officials.

The widely proclaimed shortage of farm labor has been relieved by the recent War Manpower Commission "freezing" of necessary workers on the nation's cattle, poultry and dairy farms. But if some similar action is not taken with respect to other types of farming, farm publications and leaders believe that agricultural production will be sharply lower in 1943. Some city newspapers are alarmed enough to predict a serious food shortage. One influential group of papers is agitating for the appointment
of a food administrator. Without the assurance of an adequate labor supply for next year, many farmers will tend to curtail production to an amount they are sure they can handle.

Scattered reports from many points suggest the acuteness of the situation. In Utah, it is feared that the 1943 wool-clip may drop as much as 40 per cent, in large part because of the shortage of shepherders. Wisconsin agricultural leaders predict a cut of as much as 25 or 30 per cent in that state's farm production. Farm auctions are being held daily and many dairy herds are being liquidated. In Indiana, a survey made by a farm publication revealed labor shortages in 67 of the state's 92 counties. In New England, farm operators as well as farm laborers are being attracted to nearby cities in large numbers by the high wages paid in war plants.

The tight labor situation is by no means confined to rural areas. Mining, and in some areas war work, are reported to be falling behind because of shortages of skilled workers. Innumerable small businessmen complain that it is difficult to find help and voice resentment at the "outrageously high" wages paid by war plants.

The tightness of the labor situation has given rise to a growing realization that Selective Service is set up to meet the needs of the armed services, rather than to give attention to the nation's total manpower problem. Local boards give first consideration to the needs of the army. Moreover, in small communities, where everyone knows everyone else, workers are often reluctant to ask for deferment because of the fear of being regarded as draft dodgers.
The labor situation makes people even more critical than they might otherwise be about the lack of clear-cut and consistent Selective Service policies governing the order in which people will be called. Numerous complaints have been made about the uncertain status of married men. The transfer of men from non-war to war employment is frequently impeded by their doubts as to whether they will be in civilian life long enough to make it worthwhile to switch jobs. Employers hesitate to hire men whose draft status is uncertain, knowing that if they are soon called up their training will have to be written off as a loss.

Dissatisfaction with the chaotic manpower situation has created a widespread public demand for an over-all manpower authority, charged with coordinating the requirements of the armed services, war industries and agriculture. Many newspapers and magazines also demand a labor draft. Only workers and the labor press appear to be lukewarm to proposals of stricter Governmental control of manpower.

Workers believe that compulsory means of solving the manpower problem are certain to bear down on them more heavily than on any one else. They are afraid that their rights as workers and citizens may not be protected when they are shifted around from job to job, and that the privileges they renounce now may not be restored after the war. There is some disposition, also, to question the need for Government allocation of manpower at this time. They ask, "Why not close down on all non-essential industry first?" "Why not use all the Negro labor available?" "Why not take up the unemployment slack in New York and other recession areas?"

A panel of correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence made up largely
of labor editors and social workers, together with some members of the clergy and businessmen, agree that the following conditions must be met if American workers are to be reconciled to manpower control:

1. Equality of sacrifice — limitation of high incomes and regulation of management, as well as labor, in the interest of efficiency.

2. An administrator in whom labor can trust — Ernest Bevin is frequently offered as a standard.

3. Labor representation in the administering agency.

4. AFL and CIO endorsement of the manpower measure.

5. Protection of seniority rights, wage standards and working conditions.

6. Assurance that the control is temporary.

7. Flexibility to permit adjustment of individual problems.

As in all situations involving governmental regulation, the basic prerequisites to popular cooperation are, first, an understanding of the genuine need for action and, second, confidence that the action will be taken fairly, firmly and efficiently.

The correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence agree that, despite doubts and fears, labor will acquiesce in manpower control — provided Government information satisfies it on these counts.

HEALTH

Serious health problems are arising in many parts of the country as a result of the draining of doctors from civilian life. Increases in communicable diseases have already been noted in a few places. In crowded communities, including important war production centers, it is feared that
epidemics may be experienced this winter.

Field offices of the Bureau of Public Inquiry report that in numerous communities throughout the country it is now difficult to secure medical care. Alabama, for example, has only one doctor for every 2,900 people—half the low wartime national average. Many counties in Colorado have no doctors, while others have too few. A recent survey in Indiana shows that 84 of the state's 92 counties cannot safely spare another physician. Rural areas in general, according to a report of the Senate subcommittee on manpower, have been almost stripped of their doctors.

A shortage of hospital facilities is also reported in many places. Philadelphia hospitals are badly overcrowded. Hospital facilities around Madison, Wisconsin, an important medical center, are badly overtaxed. Kansas City's large Municipal Hospital has been unable to admit all the patients who have applied to it. In addition, the sanitation and public health facilities of some war production centers are wholly inadequate to swollen populations.

The shortage of doctors is one of the more disturbing aspects of the general manpower problem. There is widespread criticism that the methods used to obtain doctors for the armed forces disregard the needs of civilian life. The uncertainty which surrounds the induction of doctors is also criticized. Resentment is occasionally voiced that skilled physicians are placed in purely administrative jobs. And there is suspicion that medical commissions are granted on the basis of "pull," rather than on skill and reputation.

Present conditions in many areas jeopardize the success of the war effort.
In addition to cooperating with state and local authorities and the medical profession in the improvement of those conditions, the Government might profitably put increased informational emphasis on the special wartime importance of safeguarding health through common-sense home precautions.

Clearly, civilian needs must be taken into account in the selection of doctors and nurses for the armed forces. Closer federal regulation, as a part of general manpower allocation, may be necessary to secure effective distribution of available medical facilities. Above all, in this, as in other comparable situations, the public needs to be assured of the necessity, equity and efficiency of whatever restrictions may be imposed.

**FUEL OIL**

Inadequate information in regard to therationing of fuel oil has placed a weapon in the hands of bitter opponents of the Administration. They have sought, in an atmosphere of public ignorance about the facts, to report the fuel rationing program as needless, unfair, incompetent and dictatorial.

Correspondence received by the Bureau of Intelligence from Middle Western states indicates that the ground there is fertile for the spread of righteous indignation. Led by the Chicago Tribune, critics of the Government have persuaded many people in this area that restrictions on their consumption of fuel oil result from bureaucratic bungling.

According to the Tribune, "rationing has been fastened on Chicago by a crowd of New Dealers who like to order people around for the pure pleasure of exerting authority. No doubt the demands of Mayor La Guardia and other easterners that their own discomforts be inflicted needlessly on others have been a factor. These fakers in Washington are going to continue their bungling and their infliction of needless
hardships until the people send representatives to the capital who will insist on a restoration of sanity."

People in Chicago, aware that the city receives its oil supply through pipe lines delivering to refineries in the metropolitan area, fail to understand the need for applying fuel oil rationing to them. They have not been adequately informed of the fact that other areas in the Middle West -- Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota and the Dakotas -- must secure their supplies of fuel oil from Chicago as a distribution point. The Tribune has distorted the situation by telling them that the scarcity of tank cars can have no relation to their fuel oil problem.

Rationing of this particular commodity requires the most careful informational background. In the absence of comprehensive explanations, the application of fuel oil restrictions is peculiarly susceptible to charges, not only of regional injustice, but also of individual inequities. Tenants in multiple housing units may be especially bitter; those whose landlords failed to convert their furnaces to coal may become innocent sufferers. Some private home owners who tried to convert but found the cost beyond their means, or discovered that there were priorities on grates, may feel victimized. The small number of home owners who needed OPA warnings and converted to coal at considerable cost during the summer are liable to be resentful, on the other hand, if they fare no better than those who let the warning go unobserved.

As temperatures drop and oil supplies dwindle, there is likely to be a rising fever of resentment against fuel oil rationing, especially among mid-Westerners. Divisionist influences can be counted upon to aggravate
this fever. It can be counteracted only by vigorous informational measures designed to make people aware of the realities behind the hardships they may be called upon to endure.

**RUBBER**

An OWI release concerning the Idle Tire Purchasing Plan carried the concluding statement: "To motorists OPA offers the assurance that if the nation's 27,000,000 car-owners join promptly in the plan and other factors work out as scheduled, it is believed there will be 'Tires for All' who drive on essential business under a democratic, share-and-share-alike ration system."

While this statement had special reference to existing tires and therefore did not specifically involve new rubber, it is noteworthy that rubber in its chlorinated, crude, latex, reclaimed and synthetic forms is classified by the Conservation Division of WPB among "materials of which the supplies are inadequate for war and most essential uses."

Since the word "essential" means all things to all men and has no definition other than that given to it by administrative action in WPB, this statement led Mr. Jeffers to emphasize that "Under any set of foreseeable circumstances rigid conservation of rubber by every car driver is an absolute and vital necessity."

Such occasions might be avoided by a uniform rule requiring all statements of supply to be in the form, "All non-essentials must be cut out," instead of, "There is enough for all essentials."
ENEMY PROPAGANDA
DEVALUATION OF AMERICA

Last week the Nazis gave the United States increased attention in their short-wave broadcasts. This week America is in the spotlight of German domestic propaganda. Evidently, to relieve apprehension among the German people over increasing American participation in the war, the Nazis are making an all-out effort to disparage America's strength.

To reassure Germans that the United States is weak militarily, exaggerated claims are made about America's losses of men and ships in the Solomon Islands. General Eisenhower is alleged to have confirmed the sinking of three American troop transports bound for Britain. American merchant shipping disasters are presented to the German people as enormous. Elmer Davis' warning that the United States may experience shattering defeats is quoted out of context.

The United States is pictured as being in bitter conflict with Britain over such issues as India, Africa, war debts, and relative contributions to the war. Mrs. Roosevelt's visit to England is interpreted as an attempt to reduce Anglo-American tension.

In his weekly political review, Fritz Theil uses Mr. Roosevelt's change of quota figures to prove that American production goals cannot be met, and adds the claim that American armaments are of poor quality. Theil contrasts "American failures" with the achievements and quality of European armament production. Washington is pictured as full of inefficient officials and competing agencies.
BRITAIN

Nazi propaganda is also concerned with reassuring the German people about Germany's strength vis-a-vis England. Goebbels makes a strenuous attempt to turn England's "Time is on our side" theme against her. In three years of war, he argues, Britain has "lost strength and vitality," while Germany has conquered valuable territory whose exploitation can spell victory.

Germany continues to fume about Anglo-American atrocities. This campaign probably has a number of objectives. Goebbels wants to bolster his argument that if the Germans lose the war, they will be destroyed. He may be under the necessity of deflecting popular resentment about the successful air raids on Germany from the Nazi Government to the British and the Americans. Finally, he may be paving the way for some retaliatory move.

SHORT-WAVE BROADCASTS

Germany's foreign propaganda this past week attempts to correct the slip Goering made when he talked about Germany's priority on Europe's food supply. The line taken is that German economic reorganization has not only strengthened Germany but has materially benefitted all of Europe. Germany's strength and benevolence are stressed.

Two themes dominate Rome's short-wave broadcasts: (1) denials of an Italian-German rift and of weak Italian morale; and (2) denunciation of the "barbarism" of the British air raiders.