August 16, 1939.

Dear Joe:

Many thanks for your note. Welcome home!

I do hope you and Mrs. Patterson will come up and lunch with us at Hyde Park some day after August nineteenth. I will get Mac to telephone you.

As ever yours,

Captain Joseph H. Patterson,
New York Daily News,
220 East 42nd Street,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your kind message on the occasion of our marriage, a month ago today.

We went to the British isles. In Dublin by choice I discovered a third cousin, a Dr. Madig, a gynaecologist. He is a Protestant and he finds his prose...
He has suffered and he deplores the Irish new deal. His daughter, aged 17, on the contrary is for it except she, like many other people in Dublin, feels that the compulsory study of Gaelic is a futile.

In England, a number of newspaper editors who feel that the danger of war is decidedly less than it was because England’s rearmament has gone so far, especially in the air. But on this front is an
3/ American expert, Al Williams the former U.S. navy test pilot. He thinks the German single seat fighters are better than anything the British have because they are more manueverable. Also that the German long distance fighters are better because not overloaded with machine guns. For some reason which Al Williams doesn't explain to me, tho' he is an old friend, the German
let him see practically every thing and even let him fly their most recent single seat fighter. He says it's a beauty.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph W. Patterson
12-10-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain Joe Patterson is in town and I have received a message from Steve Early that he would like to come to see you a minute and confess he has been wrong in his isolationist policy. He will be in the city until tomorrow afternoon.

E. M. W.
WILL THE FOUR FREEDOMS FOLLOW THE NEW DEAL OUT THE WINDOW?

The term "New Deal," says President Roosevelt, ought to be scrapped. The inference is that until we have won the war social reforms which will brake the war machine ought to be laid aside. That is only sensible, since if we should lose the war all the "reforming" would be done for us by our victorious enemies.

But it looks to us as if the catchword "New Deal" is not the only current slogan headed for the window. "Four Freedoms" is another of such slogans; and it appears to be doing a fadeout, too. Its exit is being hastened as the Russians crash into Poland.

"In his Christmas Eve fireside chat, Mr. Roosevelt said: The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it."

We may reject it, but we can't repeat it. Any more than we can repeat the attraction of gravity. The strong do dominate the weak; always have, and will do so after this war.

The strong man dominates the weaker planet's in the solar system. A strong mother dominates her weaker children; and after she grows old and weak her stronger grown children usually dominate her. The stronger of two football teams in a game dominates the weaker team.

Can Mr. Roosevelt seriously mean that he expects the strong to continue to dominate the weak after this war? Or that neither the strong nor the weak will attempt to dominate the other? Is it planned to repeat a law which operates not only throughout human and animal affairs but in celestial mechanics as well?

To come down to cases: Russia will be the strongest European and Asiatic nation after the Allied victory. Russia frankly intends to take parts of Poland, Finland and Romania; and all of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Germany will be weak; so will France, at least for a while. Consequently, Russia will dominate Europe; and there will be nothing anybody can do about that.
Germany dominated Europe for years before this war, and early in this war took all of Europe that it wanted, because Germany was strong. We joined the Allies, just as in World War No. 1, to make them stronger than Germany, so that Germany could be dominated.

It is hoped by the western Allies that China after this war may dominate Asia. Maybe; or China may shortly be rendered weak again by its faulty economic system; by a resurgent Japan, by Russia, or by all three.

The strong are going to dominate the weak in any event. The only change after an Allied victory will be that Allied domination will be “good” domination, while Axis domination has been “bad,” from the Allied point of view.

The Four Freedoms, it seems to us, are due to be badly hashed up by these realities of life; and so is the Atlantic Charter.

Spurs to Progress These freedoms are freedom of expression—
and religion, from want and from fear. None of them exists in Mr. Stalin's Russia, and his Communist religion has no use for any of them except possibly, freedom from want.

Yet want and the fear of want have been the sharpest of all the spurs which have prodded the human race up from the animal. Take these spurs away, and progress can be expected to cease.

The Four Freedoms philosophy being a phony, what good can come of it? And why not toss it out the window?

Speaking of the strong dominating the weak—after this war, we shall be the strongest nation in this hemisphere. We should make sure and stay sure that we shall dominate our part of the world—of course in a nice way—just as Russia will dominate Europe and the strongest power in Asia (probably Russia again) will dominate Asia.

We can dominate the Western Hemisphere, primarily, by keeping the world’s finest air force, based on this country and on Pacific and Atlantic island bases which we should be very careful to gather unto ourselves at the peace parley. We shall also need a powerful Navy, and a highly trained skeleton Army of career-man officers and non-coms, which can be blown up to war strength on short notice by drawing on a big reserve schooled in war fundamentals under a universal compulsory military training system.

If we don't act our postwar size and strength—benevolently, of course, but resolutely—our strength will depart from us somehow. There are always little, determined guys hanging around hoping to catch a lazy giant off his guard.
If we can wring only 100 combat divisions out of an Army of 8,200,000, how can the Axis get 546 divisions out of 17,000,000 men—5½ times as many divisions out of only a little more than twice as many men?

We have asked this question before, and have never seen it satisfactorily answered.

The rest of Mr. Stimson's explanation of why the Administration feels this huge force to be necessary was at least not decorated with funny figures. He put his other arguments on grounds of military science.

This Is The Plan

We must be ready to take advantage of opportunities now opening up, he said, to end the war as soon as possible. We must have men ready to keep hitting the enemy after he becomes groggy, rather than let him have time to reorganize and jack up his morale.

He said, too, that our training system is now geared to an Army of 2,200,000 by year's end, and that to cut down that figure materially would throw large and important parts of the soldier-making machine out of whack.

So that is the Administration's plan for this year, and it now seems impossible for Congress to modify it.

The President is plainly determined to have those 4,700,000 armed men dealt around the world at strategic points by the end of 1944, so that he can use them as potent poker chips in the parleys to follow the Allied victory.

For all that and all that, the following facts remain true: In 1917-18, we mobilized a total of 3,355,000 men, and our overseas army was 2,059,629 strong at its peak. Our population at that time was about 101,000,000. This time, we plan to mobilize 11,400,000 men by the end of 1943. Our population is now about 132,000,000. Thus we are undertaking a war effort more than 2½ times as great in this manpower respect alone as our 1917-18 effort, though our population has increased only 30%. We had tough times on the home front in 1917-18—meatless and heatless days, gasless Sundays, etc. World War No. 2's effects on the home front seem therefore bound to be far tougher than last time.