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NND 804056
By JHGD. 6 Jan. '81

ORGANIZATION
OF
FRENCH RESISTANCE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 July 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached report will
be of interest to the President. Will you
please hand it to him?


Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

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By DRS Date JUN 11 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Here is a copy of a report prepared
for General Marshall's use in connection with
a meeting held with him regarding the organiza-
tion of French Resistance.

Donovan

William J. Donovan
Director

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07622
By DRS Date JUN 11 1973

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
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HND 804056
By JAB D. 6 Jan. '81

SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL

1. Special Force Headquarters, made up of SO Branch of OSS and the corresponding British agency, Secret Operations Executive, has developed facilities for providing planning, organization, direction, communications, air lift and supplies for French resistance. SPHQ was responsible for controlling and directing French resistance under operational control of SHARP until recently when General Koenig was designated Commander in Chief of the French Forces of the Interior. Now General Koenig directs resistance elements in accordance with SHARP directives and PHQ still provides planning and direction, organizers, communications, lift and supplies.

2. American contribution to the joint effort has steadily grown until during May the number of containers and packages dropped to resistance elements and the number of personnel placed in the field exceeded that of the British. With the integration of French officers into SPHQ and the increasingly frequent appearance of American agents and uniformed personnel and of American aircraft in France, the French have become aware and appreciative of the American effort on their behalf.

3. While the effort in support of French resistance has already been well repaid in breaks in railroads and telecommunications, in road blocks, in factory sabotage and in diversion of German forces, the full value of resistance will not be realized until operations penetrate into Brittany and the south



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of France.


4. Despite reprisals, French resistance is growing stronger and it is clear that clandestine operations will be executed and large scale guerrilla operations conducted to the extent that such operations can be supplied. In the North and West supplies exhausted in the execution of D Day missions are being replenished. Daylight supply of large forces of Maquis in southern and western France by large numbers of American bombers under fighter escort has been established as entirely feasible. A decision to conduct supply operations on this scale will achieve strong support of the SHANKY interdiction program and present the enemy with the alternative of diverting several divisions to deal with resistance forces or of losing control over important communications and transport lines in his rear.

5. Although the resistance problem is charged with political implications, all factions are united against the Germans and that unity creates a strong base for a stable and democratic France with little danger of civil war or extremist control.

6. Resistance strength can be expanded in southern and eastern France to provide even greater support for future military operations than that received to date, but the support to be received from resistance should be considered as a valuable bonus and should not be relied upon in planning operations.

William J. Donovan
Director

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12 July 1944

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RND 804056
BY SP8 D. 6 Jan 81

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

I. PROBLEM PRESENTED

To report on the organization of French resistance, its accomplishments, its present position and its potential in support of military operations.

II. DISCUSSION


1. Organization and Direction of Resistance

Special Force Headquarters is composed of the SO Branch of OSS and Secret Operations Executive, the corresponding British agency. This joint headquarters is under the operational control of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

In the field the mass of resistance is made up of Frenchmen organized under many different heads but all combined in the common effort to liquidate the Germans. The French organization in London for controlling this mass of resistance was until recently the Bureau Centrale de Renseignements et d'Action and this in turn was controlled by Special Force Headquarters. Recently that part of Special Force Headquarters pertaining to France has become tripartite. With the advent of D Day, General Koenig was designated by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, as Commander in Chief of the French Forces of the Interior. He has been in a position as a result of this appointment to direct the activities of SPHQ in accordance with the SHAEP policy. In spite of his new appointment, the means in communication, in lift and in supplies to carry out his directives have remained the sole responsibility of SPHQ. As a result of this, General Koenig feels that his title is an empty one and that the means to carry out his responsibility should be provided to him. It is now being decided by the Supreme Commander whether he will have separate facilities in communication to the field or whether the facilities of SPHQ will be placed at his disposal.

It may be expected that General Koenig will receive increasing responsibility and importance and that his position will gain strength no matter which of the above schemes for the execution of his task is decided upon.

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2. Accomplishments of SPMQ

Since early in the war SOE has made serious efforts to organize and to supply French resistance. Schools were established to train not only their own agents but also the French agents. An efficient communication network was built up. Supplies though limited were forthcoming and a small number of aircraft have been constantly employed in the delivery of these supplies. This had developed considerably by the time the United States came into the war and the SO Branch of OSS was in a position to join forces.

The American contribution to the joint effort was slow in getting underway and it was not until the first of this year that it became effective. This was due to lack of supporting aircraft, of supplies and of personnel. Since the first of the year, the contribution has steadily grown until during May the number of containers dropped, the number of packages dropped and the number of personnel placed in the field exceeded that of the British. (See Tabs A and B)


The French have been deeply appreciative of the British effort on their behalf for several years. The British on their part have found supporting resistance a wise political move since it has allowed them unofficially to support DeGaulle who is the symbol of resistance, while in the early days, at the same time officially supporting Giraud. At the present time, the French through their participation in SPMQ are well aware of the American effort. The appearance of American agents and uniformed personnel in the field and of American aircraft have informed the French of the great effort that is being made to help them by the United States.

There have jointly been put into the field British and American agents and radio operators. In addition, Jedburgh teams (three men including either a British or an American officer, a French officer and a radio operator of one of the three nationalities) have been placed into France in uniform and are operating in conjunction with various resistance groups. Jedburgh teams are dispatched to France to provide leadership and direction for resistance elements. Maps, at Tab C, show the location of these Jedburgh teams and the areas in which organizations of the British and American networks are operating.

There can be no doubt that the effort with regard to France has been well repaid. There have been operations conducted against railways, against road movements and against communications which have delayed enemy units moving toward

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1. Political Aspect

the Normandy bridgehead. In addition, a considerable number of German troops have been engaged in guarding rear installations and attempting to prevent the French Forces of the Interior from becoming completely unchecked. There is attached as Tab D an official statement appreciating the value of resistance in direct support of operation Overlord as of July 1. It must be remembered that to date military operations have been in areas in which it is impossible for resistance to become strongly organized. There can be no doubt that the full value of resistance will not be realized until operations are conducted into Brittany and the south of France.

3. The Position of French Resistance Today


As a result of directives from AFHQ the plans that had been prepared for the destruction of all types of communication and transportation were carried out. Today there is a demand on the part of the field for resupply of the materials used in executing these D Day plans. The facilities for this supply are available but it is emphasized that large scaled operations into areas that the enemy occupies in force are impossible and it is only by infrequent, clandestine, night operations that such groups may be reinforced. On the other hand in the more remote sections of France such as Brittany, the Massise Centrale, Vosges, Pyrennes, Savoie, Jura and the Aisne, there have been overt resistance activities and in some of these areas it has been possible to supply by means of large scale daylight operations.

The reprisals that the Germans have recently taken in such areas have been expected and are severe. In one case it was reported that a whole village was destroyed and all of the inhabitants slaughtered. Many reports of mass punishment and execution have been received. This activity on the part of the Germans does not appear to diminish determination of the French for action. The contrary appears to be the case.

To summarize the strength of resistance today, it is clear that resistance elements will continue to execute clandestine operations as rapidly and effectively as they are resupplied. In the overt areas the difficulty is to restrain the Maquis until such a time as they will be of most value in military operations. In these areas supply is progressing rapidly by means of missions of large numbers of daylight bombers of the 8th Air Force. There is attached as Tab E a report of such an operation.

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4. Political Aspect

Although the resistance problem is charged with political implications, all factions are united against the Germans and that unity creates a strong base for a stable and democratic France with little danger of civil war or extremist control. Attached as Tab F is a memorandum prepared by the Western European Section of SPHQ which describes the situation as it exists in France today and evaluates resistance from a political point of view.

5. Future Military Potential

It is felt that the potential of French resistance is best stated in SHAEF/17240/3/ops (c), which is attached as Tab G. This assessment indicates the support of resistance should be continued in the clandestine areas in northeast and eastern France in support of the SHAEF Interdiction Program. In Brittany resistance should be reinforced by the use of SAS troops and the resistance should be mobilized to the extent of 30,500 men by the first of August. In the south central and southeast and southwest of France, resistance should be organized to a figure of 77,000 armed men.

III. CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that the value of resistance in support of military operations has been considerable, but when our future military operations are conducted into areas in which resistance is better able to operate, this assistance will be even greater.

Although much assistance may be expected from resistance groups in direct support of military operations, it is nonetheless dangerous to rely for the success of the operation upon such aid.

The value to be derived from resistance must be carefully assessed and never relied upon. In assessing the value of resistance to future military operations, it must be considered only as a bonus.

William J. Donovan
Director

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



TABLE OF EXHIBITS


- TAB A. -- Charts and tables showing containers and packages dropped by OSS and SOE for the period January-June, 1944.
- TAB B. -- Personnel placed in field as agents and on special missions as of 6 July.
- TAB C. -- Maps showing location of Jedburgh teams and areas in which British and American networks are operating.
- TAB D. -- Official statement appreciating value and resistance in direct support of Overlord as of 1 July.
- TAB E. -- Report of daylight operation of Eighth Air Force bombers in supply of resistance elements.
- TAB F. -- Memorandum of status of resistance in France as to 7 July 1944 and its political implications.
- TAB G. -- SHARP/17240/3/ops (c) under development of resistance in France and potential exploitation of resistance support of future military operations.





A
B
C

E
F

G





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B
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Personnel in the Field as of 6 July

(in the case of F and HF figures* include agents recruited locally)


	<u>Agents and Special Missions</u>			JES	CO	TOTAL
	Section Responsible "F"	Section Responsible "HF"	Section Responsible "H.A."			
American	23**	5**	-	11	30	69
British	61	9	4	8	-	82
French	150	248	68	17	-	483
Other	5	-	-	-	-	5
	239	262	72	36	30	639

*Figures do not include American agents missing, arrested or with whom contact has been lost, nor do they include American agents engaged in clandestine escape line activities.

**The 28 agents listed in F and HF include - 1 - Major, 7 - 1st Lieutenants, 10 - 2nd Lieutenants, 3 - Enlisted Men, 3 - Navy ratings, 4 - Civilians.

In addition to the above, there are also in the field 504 SAS personnel, i.e. 109 British and 395 French.

West. Eur. Section
HQ Branch
London



C

E

G


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
Handwritten text in pink ink, possibly a signature or date.

A speedometer with a needle pointing to 0. The scale has two units: miles (0 to 100) and kilometers (0 to 160). The needle is at 0. The text "FRANCE" is visible in the background.




S P A I N

MAP I
ORGANIZATIONAL AREAS




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FRANCE



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
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MAP 2
AREAS IN WHICH
SOE/SO ORGANIZATIONS
EXIST




With the destruction of the SAUMUR rail bridge, the seal on rail traffic over the River Loire from ORLEANS to the sea is now also complete.

In the absence of continuous cover, it is not possible to estimate accurately the degree to which the PARIS-ORLEANS gap in the Seine-Loire seal is traffic-tight, but the indirect evidence is encouraging. Little rail movement has been observed recently West of PARIS; on the other hand, there have been several reports of military formations from the East detraining short of the PARIS area.

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EFFECTS OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

RAIL COMMUNICATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
RND 804056
BY JAB d. 6 Jan. '81

Reports since D-Day show results from activities of Resistants have exceeded general expectations. While many reports are brief and without detail of damage, due possibly to the difficulties of communication, some results have been verified by aerial reconnaissance movement by rail.

It is claimed that all rail traffic in the LINDSEY Department has been put out of action. Other reports show widespread cuts in rail lines, including the RHONE Valley, TOURS-POitiers, BOURGON-VIENNOIS, TOULOUSE-BORDEAUX-MOULINS, and EAST of NANTES. There has also been considerable dislocation of rail traffic between PARIS and SE of LINDSEY. The situation is in particular affected, since the Germans are very loath to send their heavy tanks long distances by road, even where the telephone and cable lines have been cut, including the PARIS-BORDEAUX underground cable, the PARIS-LINDSEY cable, and telephone lines leading into BORDAUX.

More specifically, the movement of 2 SS Panzer Division was retarded. It is likely that the movement of at least two other divisions were affected. There have been several engagements between the Germans and the Maquis since D-Day. Fighting has been fierce in the LINDSEY and CORSE departments. It is thought that portions of 9 and 11 Panzer Divisions have been diverted to fight the Maquis.

German reprisals in Central and SE FRANCE have been severe. Reports show that towns and structures were burned, hostages taken, and prisoners shot. In BRITANY notices have appeared stating that parachutists and those giving them shelter would be considered traitors and shot. Reports have recently been received of several attacks on rail tracks in the areas of LINDSEY and CORSE.

Although it is difficult to assess specifically the strategic value of the resistants' activities, the cumulative effects over widespread areas have given the enemy cause for grave concern, and have materially affected his rate of reinforcement of the battle field. But elsewhere attacks have been mostly of a sporadic character.

Damage to main lines caused by bombing attacks on Department of LINDSEY in these areas has, in general, been repaired and, with the exception of the LINDSEY-SE LINDSEY line, the main North-South line of the main North-South line is still open. Due to the density of the railway network in this region, alternative routes are nearly always available and, until the destruction of the LINDSEY-SE LINDSEY line, the effect of these attacks has been mostly of a sporadic character.

Rail traffic over the River Seine is still suspended from LINDSEY to the sea and appears likely to remain so.

With the destruction of the SAUMUR rail bridge, the seal on rail traffic over the River Loire from ORLEANS to the sea is now also complete.

In the absence of continuous cover, it is not possible to estimate accurately the degree to which the PARIS-ORLEANS gap in the Seine-Loire seal is traffic-tight, but the indirect evidence is encouraging. Little rail movement has been observed recently West of PARIS; on the other hand, there have been several reports of military formations from the East detraining short of the PARIS area.

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BY JAB d. 6 Jan. '81

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RAIL COMMUNICATIONS.

(From 21 Army Group Intelligence Summary No. 135, dated
23 June 44).

The combined action of resistance groups and the Allied air forces have achieved success beyond expectation in restricting German troop movement by rail.

So long as road movement remains possible, the disruption of the railway system cannot prohibit military movement; it can, however, impose very serious delays and reduce the ability of the German High Command to switch its divisions rapidly from one theatre of operations to another.

The mobility of the Panzer formations is in particular affected, since the Germans are very loath to send their heavy tanks long distances by road, even where those roads are capable of bearing the traffic.

In Southern FRANCE, conditions are already chaotic.

All the principal North-South lines with the exception of the most Westerly routes, BORDEAUX-NANTES, BORDEAUX-SAUMUR, have been cut at numerous points by partisans, while the important rail link with ITALY through MODANE appears to be completely controlled by them. What is no less important, fresh cuts are effected as soon as the original ones have been repaired.

Concrete evidence of the effectiveness of partisan activity is provided by 2 SS Panzer Division which was first reported to be moving from the TOULOUSE area on 8 June. As late as 18 June elements of this Division were reported to be still tied down in the BRIVE area, and some of its heavy tanks may still be delayed in the South.

In Eastern FRANCE, partisan activity has been confined for the most part to the area West of the Vosges Mountains. Reports have recently been received of numerous attacks on rail tracks in the areas EPINAL, NANCY, METZ and THIONVILLE, cutting the three main lines from STRASBOURG to PARIS.

Owing to the less rugged nature of the country, activities of partisans in North-east FRANCE and BELGIUM have been on a smaller scale than in South FRANCE. In South-east BELGIUM and around LILLE partisan activity is strong, but elsewhere attacks have been mostly of a sporadic character.

Damage to main lines caused by bombing attacks on important junctions in these areas has in general been quickly repaired and, with the exception of the AMIENS-LE HAVRE route, with two bridges probably out of commission, none of the main North-east - South-west routes may be reckoned as out of action for more than a few days at a time. Owing to the density of the railway network in this region, alternative routes are nearly always available and, until the destruction of the River Somme bridges no really effective check on movement on these lines can be expected.


Rail traffic over the River Seine is still suspended from CONFLANS ST. HONORINE to the sea and appears likely to remain so.

With the destruction of the SAUMUR rail bridge, the seal on rail traffic over the River Loire from ORLEANS to the sea is now also complete.

In the absence of continuous cover, it is not possible to estimate accurately the degree to which the PARIS-ORLEANS gap in the Seine-Loire seal is traffic-tight, but the indirect evidence is encouraging. Little rail movement has been observed recently West of PARIS; on the other hand, there have been several reports of military formations from the East detraining short of the PARIS area.

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The Germans will, no doubt, continue to do their best to bring tanks and supplies as far forward as possible by rail, but the number of lines they can operate through the gap is strictly limited and the constant attentions of the Air Forces provide little opportunity for easy movement to the battle zone by the thinner-skinned elements of the Wehrmacht.

The main rail routes West of PARIS to the battle area have all been badly knocked about by air attack, in particular the PARIS-EVREUX-MEZIDON route, but owing to the number of single track lines feeding into the lateral routes, it may still be possible for the Germans, by the exercise of patience and ingenuity, to move troops and supplies by rail to within 30 miles of the battle area, if they consider it worth the risk.

Resistance groups reported on 15 June that all rail traffic in South BRITTANY had ceased except for the single track line from NANTES to RENNES.

The important route DINANT-DOL-AVRANCHES has been cut at PONTAUBAULT, where the viaduct is seriously damaged, and at VICOMTE SUR RANCE.

The position on the BREST-RENNES line is not clear. A resistance group has been in action around QUINGAMP, and cuts have been reported near CAULNES, but rail activity was reported on 19 June at MORLAIX, and it is possible that the Germans have now regained control of this route.

The continuation of this route from RENNES through VIRE is probably now open again, but further East blocks were reported at LAVAL and FOUGERES on 17 and 18 June respectively.

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FRENCH RESISTANCE DURING THE FIRST
TEN DAYS OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY.

Introduction.


1. Plans were made before D-Day for the employment of the forces of resistance on four main tasks:-

- (a) Interruption of rail communications.
- (b) Dislocation of telecommunications.
- (c) Interference with the moves of reserve divisions.
- (d) Guerilla warfare.

The first three tasks were to be put into operation throughout France on D-Day and in Belgium at a later date.

Results During First Ten Days.

2. The achievements of resistance groups during the first ten days of the battle have been greater than could reasonably have been expected. Full reports have not yet come in, but evidence so far received shows that the railway system of France has been so dislocated as to make the movement of both troops and supplies by rail, if not impossible, at any rate subject to delays of unpredictable length.
3. This railway sabotage was particularly successful in south-eastern France and in the area of the RHONE valley, where, apart from one or two local trains, movement was at a standstill for some days.
4. Two incidents may be mentioned as of particular interest.
- (a) The interruption of traffic on the main line to Italy through MODANE and the MONT CENIS tunnel by the destruction of a bridge.
 - (b) The derailment of a train in a tunnel to the south-east of PARIS, forming an obstruction which it has taken at least 6 days to clear. Other derailments in tunnels have also been reported.
5. Telecommunications sabotage has also been successful and the following towns were completely cut off:-
- BORDEAUX, DOLE, ORLEANS.
- In addition, the majority of lines out of PARIS were put out of action.
6. A notable achievement in telecommunications sabotage was the cutting of the lines between CAEN - ROUEN, ROUEN - AMIENS, ST. LO - AVRANCHES, AVRANCHES - MINIAC, all of which are close to the battle area.
7. The combined result of rail and telecommunications sabotage has been to make it increasingly difficult for the Germans to co-ordinate or in some cases to effect in any reasonable time the moves of their reserve formations.
8. As an example, the "Das Reich" armoured division, which was reported by air reconnaissance and also by secret sources to be trying to move from the MONTAUBAN area on D+1, has not yet been identified in action. Reports from the Field show that a large number of their heavy tanks were left behind at MONTAUBAN through lack of rail facilities to move them to the north. Further, a great deal of their transport

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which tried to move by road got stuck at PERIGUEUX, from which town it appeared impossible to move the transport in any direction for several days.

Guerilla Warfare.

9. Instructions were sent to groups, which had been so briefed, to commence guerilla activity on D-Day. The resulting activity seems to have contributed to the difficulty of movement inside France, particularly from south to north and in the western half of the country.
10. There is a tendency in several areas for the resistance groups to go beyond guerilla warfare and to become involved in pitched battles, notably in the CANTAL, VERCORS and the AIN. Considerable loss was caused to the Germans, but losses to resistance groups were also high. In one case casualties amounted to 1,200 men. Wherever possible, these groups have now broken off the open engagements and have reverted to more profitable guerilla tactics.

Development of Centres of Open Resistance.

11. Since D-Day, resistance has crystallised in a number of areas into large groups openly resisting the enemy.
12. These groups have mostly formed round previously existing Maquis groups and the people who have flocked to them consist not only of active members of resistance groups but also of many townspeople, who are seeking to avoid being rounded-up by the Germans.
13. A remarkable feature has been the development in BRITTANY, where before D-Day it had not been possible for either the Independent French Section or the Allied French Section to build up a strong and reliable organisation. Parties of S.A.S. troops have been sent to this area, accompanied by JEDBURGHs and a new Delege Militaire for the French. Some 3,000 members of resistance have been found in the eastern half of BRITTANY and a further 3,000 in the area of FINISTERE. A large number of stores operations have been sent to these people and they now constitute a considerable force which, on a short-term policy, may be of great importance to the battle. Two JEDBURGHs were also sent to the INDRE, where, in conjunction with S.A.S. troops, another centre of resistance is being organised.
14. Most of the other centres of open resistance are in eastern and southern France and it is therefore extremely difficult to supply them at this time of the year.

Security.

15. There is no doubt that the German counter measures to resistance on and immediately after D-Day were much less forceful than had been expected. Nevertheless, great credit is due to the organisers in the Field, who kept their organisations in being and carried out the tasks which had been given to them without getting rounded up by the police or the Gestapo.
16. It has been particularly gratifying that wireless communication has been maintained with all parts of France and very few casualties have so far been suffered among W/T operators. This must to some extent be due to the precautions which they have taken for their own security. The amount of W/T traffic from France is approximately the same as before D-Day.
17. From the security point of view it has been most interesting to find organisations active much closer to the actual battle area than was thought possible before operations began.

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Intelligence Appreciation of Resistance.

18. During the first ten days of the battle, there has been a noticeable increase in the attention paid to resistance by the staffs responsible for military operations. 21 Army Group in an Intelligence Appreciation and SHAEF in one of its Intelligence Summaries have stated that resistance has imposed a delay on the movements of enemy formation, particularly from the south of France; at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London last week, it was recorded in the minutes that the Combined Chiefs of Staff took note with approval of the excellent work done by French Resistance.

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ACTION BY FRENCH RESISTANCE IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATIONS IN NORMANDY.

1. The objectives of French Resistance, as approved by SHAEF, were two:-

- (a) To delay the arrival of reinforcements in the bridgehead area and the general moves of troops by the sabotage of railways, roads, and telecommunications.
- (b) To form centres of resistance, based on the Maquis, from which harassing action could be continued indefinitely, and German forces contained.

2. Results achieved by sabotage

(a) Railways

Out of 868 cuts planned, 314 have been reported "successfully attacked", and 211 as "being attacked but results not yet known". Full reports have yet to come in. The disposition of these cuts is shown on attached Map I.

(b) Telecommunications.

Action was aimed at severing communications so as to cut off various centres of the over-all telecommunications system. The results so far reported are shown on Map II attached.

(c) Roads.

Roads have been sabotaged in many places, and ambushes carried out against troops on the move, staff cars, despatch riders, etc.

The results of these controlled sabotage attacks have been considerable. 21 Army Group have stated that, in their opinion, the over-all action of French Resistance has resulted in an average delay of 48 hours being imposed on movement of German formations to the bridgehead area.

These attacks continue wherever demolition materials are available; further supplies have been, and are being, flown in.


3. Results of Maquis Action

Large numbers of Frenchmen are flocking to the known Maquis areas, in some cases in spite of warnings that arms are not yet available for them.

The areas where open Resistance has developed are shown in green on Map III. The numbers in these areas have increased by from 3 to 10 times their previous strength. The following areas have already been strengthened by S.A.S. troops and/or by special S.O.E. missions sent from the U.K., in each case with additional arms for resistance:-

- 1. Brittany
- 2. Indre
- 3. Cantal
- 4. Haute Savoie, Savoie and Isere.

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Casualties on each side have been heavy in certain areas. In reports so far received, which only cover a proportion of the actions that have been fought, the following figures have been given in telegrams from the field, but they must not be taken as necessarily accurate and do not purport to represent the complete picture:-

<u>Region</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Resistance Casualties</u>	<u>German Casualties</u>
CANTAL	12 June	1,200	'considerable'
CANTAL	13 June	200	1,000
CANTAL	14 June	400	400
VOSGES	8 June	unknown	not reported but 300 German prisoners taken.
BELLEGARDE	15 June	60	400

4.. The general picture is the creation of chaotic conditions in large parts of France, generally hampering the German military machine. In limited areas, Resistance is in complete control.

The following extracts from a report by the Mayor of Correze, who has reached our lines in Normandy, is illustrative:-

- (a) Telephones Paris-Lyon, Bordeaux-Calais-Creil blown up.
- (b) Bellegarde controlled by patriots.
- (c) A Maquis formed in Foret de Fontainbleau.
- (d) 1st Regiment of France (Vichy Guard Unit) has gone over to Maquis.
- (e) Entire railway system in West has been disorganised.

The continuation of aggressive offensive action depends largely on supplies by air; all measures are being taken to increase these rapidly.

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2 JUL 1944

Mr. George C. Marshall
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Report on Operation

ZEBRA

Enclosed for you are two copies of the report on
Operation ZEBRA which was the first and only
large scale operation conducted from this country.
It is hoped that your information will be helpful in
making up the rest of the information within.

COLONEL JOSEPH F. HASKELL

I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours very truly,
Colonel Joseph F. Haskell

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SO BRANCH
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

8 July 1944

Mr. Joseph Scribner
Office of Strategic Services
25th and Constitution Aves, NW
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Joe:


I am enclosing a copy of the report on
Operation ZEBRA which was the first mass day-
light operation undertaken from this theater.
It is purely for your information and requires no
action on the part of the Washington office.

Sincerely,


JOSEPH F. HASKELL
Colonel, GSC
Chief, SO Branch

1 Incl. Report on Op ZEBRA

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OPERATIONS "ZEBRA"

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NATURE OF OPERATION

In operation Zebra 5 combat wings of the 3rd Bombardment Division, 8th Air Force were dispatched to drop arms and ammunition to the Maquis in central and southeastern France.

TIME OF OPERATION

The operation was scheduled to take place on Thursday, 22 June, at the earliest. It was postponed, owing to the weather, and actually took place on Sunday, 25 June 1944.

DROPPING AREAS

The areas where the daylight delivery of stores took place were as follows:

Marksmen: Controlled area in Department AIN, bounded by line through

BOUCHOUX - CHESERY - PONT DES PIERRES -
MONTANGES - RUPPIEU - COL DE LA LEBE -
EVOSCES - ABERCEMENT DE VASEY - MERIGNAT -
BORAS - CIZE - THOIRET - DORTAN

Smoke fires were lit at the following points:

- (1) $46^{\circ} 09' 25''$) $3\frac{1}{2}$ Kms. W. of
 $05^{\circ} 33' 51''$ E.) Nantua.
- (11) $46^{\circ} 11' 58''$) $6\frac{1}{2}$ Kms. N.W. of
 $05^{\circ} 33' 38''$ E.) Nantua.


Director: Controlled area in Department JURA bounded by line through

PIERRE - TERRANS - CHARETTE - LAYS


Smoke fire lit at point:

$46^{\circ} 53' 50''$) 30 Kms. S.W. of
 $05^{\circ} 14' 14''$ E.) Dole

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Salesman: Controlled area in parallelogram 9 kms. x 16 kms. between CHATEAUNEUF and VERIGNAC (Mts. Vienne).

Smoke fire lit at point:

$45^{\circ} 38' 35''$ } 2 kms. S.W. of
 $01^{\circ} 48' 54''$ E. } Comps

Trainer: Controlled area consisting of the Plateau of the VERCORS.

Smoke fire lit at point:

$44^{\circ} 53' 13''$ } 9 kms. S.S.W.
 $05^{\circ} 22' 34''$ E. } La Chapelle en Vercors.

It has been hoped to make deliveries at the same time to:

- (a) Maquis at Chaudes-Aigues } both in the
- (b) Maquis at the Barrage de L'Aigle } Cantal area

The Chaudes-Aigues operation had to be cancelled owing to a very heavy attack by the Germans on this Maquis after all arrangements for reception and A/T communications had been completed.


The Barrage de L'Aigle operation could not take place owing to failure the Maquis in this area to reply to our signals instructing them how and where the operation would take place.

PRELIMINARY PLANS

On 13 June 1944 SPHQ submitted to SHAEF a paper entitled "Appreciation of the Potentialities of French Resistance." This paper set down in detail the current status of French resistance and requested immediate additional airlift for the purpose of arming such resistance.

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The Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) SHAEP, on 15 June 1944, wrote the Commanding General USSTAF requesting that there be provided as soon as possible 75 heavy bomber sorties each to the Correse-Haute Loire and the Jura-Haute Savoie areas of France, SPHQ to be responsible for providing acceptable pinpoints in the areas and to be responsible for dispatching loaded supply containers to the required airfields.

Very shortly thereafter USSTAF authorized SPHQ to deal directly with the 8th Air Force in making arrangements for the projected operation.


The 3d Bombardment Division, 8th USAAF being directed to carry out the daylight sorties to France in support of resistance, representatives of SPHQ discussed specific arrangements with Major-General Curtis E. LeMay, Commanding General, 3d Bombardment Division and with Brigadier-General A. W. Kissner, Chief of Staff.

All plans for Operation Zebra were made by the staff of 3d Bombardment Division, 8th USAAF. Smoke bonfires in a 200-yard triangle were determined upon as target markers. Experiments in dropping containers from B-17s were carried out. Routes and methods of approaching targets were decided upon. Aircraft were allotted. Area fighter protection was arranged.

On 18 June there was issued SPHQ D/R Operation Order No. 11, Operation "Zebra".

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On 24 June Operation Zebra was definitely scheduled for the following day, and was duly carried out. Seven representatives of SFHQ accompanied the operation.

CONTAINERS

As soon as a preliminary warning of Operation Zebra was received by SFHQ the War Office was asked if it could provide trucks with appropriate loading parties for the purpose of transporting containers from various depots to 8th Air Force airdromes within 4 days' time. The War Office agreed, and subsequently issued the necessary orders.


On 18 June it was known that the operation had been approved by SHAEF for between 180 and 300 aircraft. The names of the airfields involved were also known and it was stated there would be 36 aircraft on each field. It was immediately decided by SFHQ to supply sufficient containers for 324 aircraft so as to have on hand an adequate supply of containers for the maximum number of aircraft which might be allotted.

Original shipping instructions called for convoy from 5 depots to 9 airdromes. Each airdrome was to receive containers for 36 aircraft. The War Office furnished some 120 3-ton trucks for this work.

While the convoys were en route to the airdromes the 8th USAAF changed its distribution of aircraft so that they were to take off from the airdromes in numbers varying from

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28 to 44. Rerouting instructions were issued immediately by SPHQ giving specific directions for the movement of containers from airdrome to airdrome. To meet the schedule of the 8th USAAF truck drivers were instructed to "move with all speed."

The preliminary plan provided that the containers were to remain on the trucks at the airfields, only to be unloaded at the time when the operation was to be mounted. Urgent demands on the War Office, however, made it necessary to unload the trucks at the airfields and to pile the containers in dumps.

INSTRUCTION FOR LOADING AIRCRAFT


On 16 June 1944 a meeting was held at Bury-St. Edmunds which was attended by representatives of SPHQ, the ordnance officer of the 3d Air Division, 8th USAAF, the ordnance officers of the 9 combat groups which were to carry out the operation.

At this meeting the techniques of bombing up and dropping containers were explained to these officers and their questions were answered. Following the meeting the ordnance officers involved personally bombed up a B-17 with containers.

Liaison officers from SPHQ were despatched to various airfields with instructions to make sure that proper containers were loaded on aircraft, and to perform other

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duties in regard to the reception, storage and security of containers and parachutes.

CHARACTER OF AIRCRAFT LOADS


In each group of 36 aircraft there were two types of loads - 18 of each type as follows:

<u>1st 18 Aircraft</u>		<u>Container Contents - each container</u>
Number	Type	
1	C-1	2 Bren guns with ammunition
2	C-3	9 .303 rifles with ammunition
1	C-8	11 Sten guns with ammunition
2	H-3	5 Stens, 5 pistols, 52 grenades, 18 pounds explosive, ammunition, fuse
1	H-5	10 pistols, 115 pounds high explosive, ammunition, fuse
3	H-23	3168 rounds .303 ammunition, 78 field dressings
2	H-24	6600 rounds 9 mm. ammunition, 72 field dressings

<u>2nd 18 Aircraft</u>		<u>Container Contents - each container</u>
Number	Type	
2	C-1	2 Bren guns with ammunition
2	C-3	9 .303 rifles with ammunition
1	C-8	11 Sten guns with ammunition
1	C-16	2 Bazookas, 28 bazooka rockets
1	H-3	5 Stens, 5 pistols, 52 grenades, 18 pounds explosive, ammunition, fuse
1	H-5	10 pistols, 115 pounds high explosive, ammunition, fuse
3	H-23	3168 rounds .303 ammunition, 78 fld dressings
1	H-24	6600 rounds 9 mm. ammunition, 72 fld dressings

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UNUSED CONTAINERS

Due to the fact that 180 aircraft were used on Operation Zebra rather than the maximum number of 300 and due to the fact that certain aircraft on the operation returned to their fields with containers undropped, there remains a certain reserve of containers on hand at 8th USAAF airfields. The status of these containers is shown in the following tabulation:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Initial Stock</u>	<u>Loaded</u>	<u>Returned</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
94	527	492	60	95
385	525	420	2	107
447	528	492	72	108
95	504	188	18	354
390				
&	762	324	0	438
100				
96	384	192	48	240
388	348	144	0	204
452	384	192	48	240
Totals	3962	2424	248	1786


SIGNALS

In order to insure the success of Operation Zebra it was necessary to make certain arrangements with SFHQ agents in the field by radio. These arrangements were as follows:

A W/T operator was ordered to be permanently on hand at each dropping point in order to give SFHQ immediate contact.

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The Maquis were told over clandestine wireless channels that a large daylight operation would be taking place. In the interests of security they were not told the date, the time, or the number of aircraft.


Each Maquis was given a pre-arranged message which would be broadcast on the BBC on the evening of the day previous to the operation. Arrangements were made to include in the BBC message two figures, the first to indicate the number of containers which would be dropped at each point, the second to indicate the time at which the bonfires should be lit.

Arrangements were made for each dropping point to advise SFHQ by pre-arranged W/T signal immediately after hearing the BBC message either that the reception was still fully prepared or that reception could not be arranged owing to enemy action or any other cause.

On 24th June the BBC messages were broadcast at 1930h. B.D.S.T., each message including the figure representing the number of containers. The figure representing the time at which bonfires were to be lit could not be included as the expected times of arrival over the dropping

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
points were not known in time. The Maquis were therefore instructed to expect this further information on the 2115 h. B.D.S.T. BBC broadcast.

Expected times of arrival were notified in sufficient time for the full BBC messages to be broadcast at 2115 h.: as a precautionary measure they were re-broadcast at 0130 h. B.D.S.T. on 25th June.

Within approximately one hour of the broadcast of the first BBC messages, Marksman, Director and Salesman Maquis all came up with their signals indicating that they were fully prepared for the operation on the following morning. The Trainer Maquis (Vercors) did not transmit its message. SPHQ had good information that the Maquis still held the Vercors Plateau and therefore arranged with the 8th Air Force that the containers should be dropped to this point whether bonfires were alight or not. During the night of 24/25th June a mutilated message was received from Trainer (Vercors Maquis) stating that SPHQ messages were being received very badly interfered with by an enemy jamming station. They confirmed that reception committees were standing by but did not confirm that instructions regarding smoke fires had been received. A most immediate message was therefore sent to Algiers, requesting them to confirm to the Vercors on another W/T line using a different

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frequency that their bonfires should be smoking by 0900h. This message was apparently received free from enemy jamming, since the Vercors Maquis signalled at 0630h. on 25th June that they were fully prepared and had received all instructions.

OPERATION PROPER


Required for the operation were 5 wings of 36 aircraft each from the 3d Bombardment Division, 8th Air Force. These included the 13th and 45th combat wings made up of groups 95, 100, 390, 96, 388, 452. From the 4th combat wing were groups 385 A, B, C; 94 A, B, C; 447 A, B, C.

One wing was ordered to drop on each of three assigned areas - "Trainer", "Director", and "Marksman." Two wings were to drop on "Salesman" with the provision that if, on the penetration, the identifying bonfires were observed on area "Locksmith", one wing was to drop there. (See Map - Appendix B)

On the early morning of 25 June the 5 combat wings, flying in column and separated by 3-minute intervals penetrated the French coast at 17,000 feet. This altitude was maintained until 0300 East where descent to 3,000 feet was started. Three-thousand feet was maintained until the targets were passed over and positively identified. Having observed the wind direction from the bonfire smoke, descent to 500 feet for dropping was

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started, the aircraft turning on to an up-wind head on the dropping run. By placing flaps and wheels in the down position air speed was slowed to approximately 130 miles per hour for dropping.

Containers were dropped from group (12 aircraft) formation using a train interval of 12 feet. The parachutes opened approximately 30 feet below the aircraft. By echeloning the second element of the lead group right on the lead element and by moving the high element slightly back no entangling resulted.

Marksman. 35 aircraft passed over this target at 0945 hours, dropping 420 containers. (See Photographs - Appendix A pp. 10,11)


Director. 35 aircraft dropped 418 containers on the target at 0916 hours.

Trainer. 35 aircraft dropped 420 containers on the target at 0917 hours. (See Photographs - Appendix A pp. 1,2,3)

Salesman. 71 aircraft dropped 851 containers on the target between 1001 and 1006 hours. (Salesman received load of 71 aircraft because reconnaissance of Locksmith revealed no bonfire signals.) (See Photographs - Appendix A pp. 3,4,5,6,7,8,9)

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At each target bundles of identifying armbands were dropped "free" for use by resistance groups (see title page for design of armband).

Immediately after dropping wings were reformed and climbs started to 17,000 feet for withdrawal. (See Map - Appendix B - for routes followed).

Two aircraft were lost on this mission, one to enemy aircraft and one to flak. There is an unconfirmed report that one of the lost aircraft may have landed on a beachhead landing strip. Otherwise there were no difficulties experienced in the operation. It was particularly successful.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

The following statistical summary of Operation Zebra was prepared by the A-2 Report Section, 3d Bombardment Division, 8th Army Air Force:


<u>Targets</u>	<u>A/C Despatched</u>	<u>A/C Dropping</u>	<u>No. of Units Dropped</u>	<u>Group Dropping</u>
Salesman	84	71	851	95;100;390; 96;388;452
Director	38	35	418	385 A,B,C
Trainer	37	35	420	94 A,B,C
Marksman	<u>38</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>420</u>	447 A,B,C
Totals	197	176	2109	

OBSERVATIONS AT TARGETS

Marksman. 3 bonfires were observed and approximately 40 people were seen picking up containers.

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Director. 3 bonfires and an undetermined number of people were observed picking up containers.

Trainer. Men with vehicles were observed picking up containers.

Salesman. 3 bonfires were seen in triangle, with large letter A formed by white rocks on field. From 100 to 300 people were observed picking up 850 containers dropped.

REPORTS FROM TARGET AREAS

The following acknowledgments have been received from SFHQ agents with the Maquis:


Marksman. "Operation successful. Many thanks. Everyone delighted."

Salesman. "All containers retrieved. Roughly 50 lost due chutes failing 24 of which came down from 2 forts in 3d formation with static lines unhooked - repeat - unhooked. Dozen disintegrated in mid-air due assembling rods breaking. Full report tomorrow. The Maquis thanks to U.S. Air Force for damned good show. When is the next?"

It is expected that messages from the remaining two target areas will be received shortly.

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APPENDIX "A"

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OPERATION "ZEBRA"



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25 June 1944

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"TRAINER" - General Target Area

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"TRAINER" (Cont'd) - Signal Bonfires

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"TRAINER" (Cont'd) - Containers in Air and on Ground

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"TRAINER" (Cont'd) - Containers Leave Port

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
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"TRAINER" (Cont'd) - Target Area at Completion of Drop

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"SALESMAN" - Signal Fires

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Containers Fall Toward Signal Fire

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"SALESMAH" (Cont'd) - Parachutes in Air

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) • Air Dropping Progresses

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Seventy-One Planes Have Dropped

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
"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Target Area at Completion of Drop

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Bombs Away

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
"SALESMAN" (cont'd) - Twelve Chutes from One Fortress

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Reception Committee

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Frenchmen Wave to USAAF

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Parachute Failures

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"SALESMAN" (Cont'd) - Detail of Target Area

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"MARKSMAN" - Bonfires on Target Area

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"MARKSMAN" (Cont'd) - Forts Come in at 500 Feet, Wheels and Flaps Down


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"MARKSMAN" (Cont'd) - Road Block (upper center) - Ground Observers (in circle)


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APPENDIX "B"

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
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FRANCE

Administrative Divisions

1943



ENGLISH CHANNEL

BELGIUM

BAY OF BISCAY

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OPERATION
ZEBRA

25 JUNE, 1944

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
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- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- BOUNDARY OF THE REGION
- BOUNDARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
- BOUNDARY OF THE ARRONDISSEMENT
- ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF REGION
- ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF DEPARTMENT
- ADMINISTRATIVE SEAT OF ARRONDISSEMENT

SPAIN

SALESMAN
73 A/C 851 CONTAINERS

LOCKSMITH
NO SIGNAL CONTAINERS
DROPPED ON SALESMAN




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General Koenig is commander of the F.F.I., under the supreme command of General Eisenhower. He maintains liaison with the resistance forces through national, zonal and regional military delegates. The function of these military delegates, who are in constant wireless communication with London, is to

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7 July 1944.

A. Military value of the Resistance.

The number of men who are now mobilized in the French Forces of the Interior probably exceeds 300,000: and it would be very much greater if it were not for the existing shortage of arms. Since 'D' day they have successfully carried out a planned programme of sabotage, which has involved wholesale destruction of enemy communications and has imposed delays upon the movements of his reinforcements which have been of the greatest value to the Allies. They have also engaged upon guerilla warfare on so wide a scale that it is estimated that the Germans are being forced to use considerable strength with artillery support, aeroplanes and tanks, in the effort to wipe them out. In spite of this German pressure, which is sustained by an immense superiority in material, the resistance forces have succeeded in freeing and holding considerable areas in the centre and southeast of France, and responsible leaders have claimed that if they were given the necessary supplies of arms they could establish a bridgehead comprising the whole ten departments of the Lyonnais and Dauphine, and could free the whole Alpine region from Grenoble to the sea. If, on the other hand, the supply of arms is not maintained, the resistance forces will be exposed to savage reprisals which, as experience has already shown, will be extended to the non-combatant population. To abandon these allies to their fate at this stage would not only have disastrous political consequences; it would also rob us of the support of an army, behind the enemy's lines, which has already shown that, if properly equipped, it can play a very great part in facilitating the liberation of France.


B. Organisation of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur.

The F.F.I. represent the fusion of the Maquis with the groupes francs of the resistance movements, including the Communist-controlled France Tireurs et Partisans and the "Giraudist" Organisation de Resistance Armee (or Organisation Militaire Armee) which is an offshoot of the Armistice Army. They are organised on a departmental and regional basis with departmental and regional etats majors consisting of the leaders of whatever resistance groups are most strongly represented in the locality. There is a national etat major, which is subordinate to a Commission d'Action of four, assisted by a Comité Militaire. It is to be emphasized that, with trivial and isolated exceptions, the F.F.I. include all the militant elements of the resistance, including the groups organised by British and American agents, and that they function as an integrated body. There have been a few personal misunderstandings between different leaders, arising chiefly from the suspicion which still attaches to the members of the C.R.A. as late comers to the resistance, but these troubles have not prevented the F.F.I. from functioning as a disciplined army or impaired their military efficiency.

C. Position of General Koenig.

General Koenig is commander of the F.F.I., under the supreme command of General Eisenhower. He maintains liaison with the resistance forces through national, zonal and regional military delegates. The function of these military delegates, who are in constant wireless communication with London, is to

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transmit General Koenig's orders to the resistance leaders, to act as military advisers, and to help in the organization of their areas. Officially they do not exercise military commands; but their authority as representatives of General Koenig and so of the Allied High Command appears to be generally respected by the local commanders or the F.F.I.

D. Political Organization of the Resistance.

According to our information, the Comité Français de Liberation Nationale, with General de Gaulle as its president, is now recognized by all genuine sections of the resistance as the provisional government of France. Under the provisional government, political authority over the resistance is vested in the Conseil National de la Resistance. This Conseil has a membership of 40, of whom 16 represent political parties and trade unions, and the remaining 24 consist of 3 delegates from each of the eight main resistance movements, namely C.G.M. (Organisation Civile et Militaire) Ceux de la Liberation, Ceux de la Resistance, Liberation Zone Nord, and Front National in the formerly Occupied or Northern Zone, and Combat, Liberation Zone Sud and Franc Tireur constituting the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance in the formerly Unoccupied or Southern Zone. The 16 political delegates consist of 3 Socialists, 3 Communists, 2 Radical Socialists, 1 Democrite Populaire, 1 representative of the U.R.D., 1 representative of the Groupe Marin, 3 delegates of the C.G.T. and 2 delegates of the Federation of Christian Trade Unions. For reasons of security, the Conseil very seldom meets in plenary session, and its work is mainly carried on by a bureau of 5. Liaison with Algiers is maintained through a civil delegation of the C.F.L.N. to the C.N.R., consisting of a delegate general, two supplementary delegates, and a secretary for the Northern and a secretary for the Southern Zone.

By agreement between these delegates and the C.N.R. and with the approval of Algiers, Comites de la Liberation have been set up in each department and in all the big towns. These Committees include representatives from all the organizations existing in the town or department which participate in resistance, including political parties, trade unions, youth movements, women's groups, etc., as well as the resistance movements proper. In Paris, for example, 20 such organizations are represented on the Comité de la Liberation. The main work, however, is done by executive sub-committees of five to eight delegates. The Committees are titularly subject to the C.N.R., but, in practice, enjoy considerable autonomy. Their function is to direct the action of the people, in support of the F.F.I., and to help remove the vestiges of Vichy. They will act in an advisory capacity to the regional and departmental Commissaires de la Republique who have been nominated to replace the Vichy prefets and sous-prefets and to control the civilian administration during the transitional period between the liberation of the district and the holding of local elections.

E. Position of the Communists.

Like other political parties, the Communist Party joins as such in the resistance and is represented on the C.N.R. and the Comites de la Liberation. There is no resistance movement that is exclusively Communist, but the Front National may fairly be regarded as Communist-controlled. No information is available that would enable us to assess the membership either of the Communist Party or of the Front National, but we have estimated the strength of the Francs Tireurs et Partisans, who

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constitute the para-military forces of the Front National, at a maximum of 30,000, of whom only a small percentage are likely to be members of the Party. They are in any case now integrated into the F.F.I. Though the Communists are a powerful factor in the resistance, especially in the Northern Zone, and have acquired considerable prestige, partly as the result of the admiration felt for the Russians but mainly because of the proofs they themselves have given of their courage and discipline, they are very far from dominating it. It is to be remembered, moreover, that the Communists owe their influence not to their Communism but to their record in the resistance. They themselves are aware of this, and their present line is primarily nationalist. There is no evidence that they are planning a putsch, in opposition to the other resistance forces, or that they would be successful if they did.

F. Position of General de Gaulle.

A telegram recently sent by 239 senators and deputies in France to Roosevelt and Churchill contained the phrase "Until an election can be held, the President of the Sovereign Government can only be General de Gaulle. Our people would not tolerate anyone else." According to our information, this represents the view not only of the organized resistance but also of the mass of the French people, apart from the remnant that still adheres to Vichy. This does not mean, however, that the F.F.I. are de Gaulle's private army, any more than they are Koenig's, or that he could use them to establish a dictatorial regime. All our evidence goes to show that the resistance leaders in France are determined to re-establish democratic forms of government; and the same has been true of the Consultative Assembly in Algiers. If de Gaulle tried to override that desire, the probability is that the forces of the resistance would turn against him, but there is no reason to believe that he will try to override it. His present declared intention, as expressed in the ordinance on the re-organisation of government, which was promulgated by the National Committee three months ago, is to hold both local and general elections as soon as possible and to abide by their result.

G. Danger of Civil War.

In view of the unity which has been achieved within the resistance, both politically and militarily, the danger of its splitting into warring factions after the liberation is vanishingly small. The strongest single military group is probably the G.R.A., which may comprise 60,000 men, but it has no political programme, and, though its leader General Revers has been involved in some dubious intrigues with radical politicians and big industrialists, there is no evidence that his subordinates have also been involved in them or that he could carry his movement with him into a political adventure. Moreover, a right-wing putsch such as this would be would find the whole of the remaining resistance forces united against it. In a sense indeed a state of civil war already exists in France, since the Maquis has for months been suffering attacks from the Vichy forces "for the maintenance of order". Now, however, a large proportion of the police appears to be going over to the resistance; and the few thousand members of the Milice, the Groupes Mobiles de Reserve, the Waffen S.S. and the various Fascist organisations who are still willing to fight against the Maquis can be regarded as German auxiliaries who will collapse with the defeat of their masters. That there will be

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some reprisals is inevitable; the resistance forces will not allow men whom they regard as traitors to go unpunished; but the experience of Corsica and Normandy indicates that their intention is to carry out the process of reparation with moderation and in due legal form. If events continue in their present course, there is every chance that the provisional government will take over power smoothly, and that the Fourth Republic will be inaugurated without serious bloodshed. It is felt, however, that there will be a grave danger of civil war if the Allies, ignoring de Gaulle and the National Committee, attempt to set up a puppet government in opposition to the wishes of the resistance and the majority of the French people.

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SHAEP/17240/3/Opas(C)

4th July, 1944

DEVELOPMENT OF RESISTANCE IN FRANCE

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OBJECT

1. The object of this paper is to assess the assistance which resistance forces can give to 'OVERLORD' and, in particular, to examine the possible exploitation of the MAQUIS areas in Southern FRANCE.

RESISTANCE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF 'OVERLORD'

Support to the SHAEP interdiction programme

2. The present status of the SHAEP interdiction programme is shown at Map 'MA', together with the areas in which SAS troops and overt resistance are already operating in support of this programme, and where their employment in this role is projected. The object of this plan is to prevent the enemy from bringing reinforcements and supplies to the battle area by rail, and enforcing detrainment gradually further and further from the battlefield. The continued support of SAS and resistance forces employed on this role affords direct assistance to 'OVERLORD'.

3. Clandestine sabotage particularly in Northern FRANCE will provide a continuing threat which will supplement the interdiction programme by making the enemy deploy an undue amount of protective troops and maintenance personnel. The support of the clandestine programme is essential if this threat is to be maintained.

BRITTANY

4. Resistance and SAS operations in BRITTANY are in direct support to 21st Army Group for the expansion of the lodgement area. The planning is in 21st Army Group's hands, while SHAEP acts as the agency for coordinating supply facilities. Planning is not yet firm but the latest estimate envisages the mobilization of 30,500 armed men by 1st August.

RESISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF 'ANVIL'

5. The effective action which the MAQUIS groups can take will consist of coordinated harassing operations against enemy formations and supply routes.

6. The MAQUIS plan must be integrated with SHAEP overall strategy and must be complementary to the plans of Force 163, which are likely to be the control of the ITALIAN frontier, the RHONE Valley and the CARCASSONNE Gap.

7. For the MAQUIS to meet GERMAN field formations successfully, steps must be taken to augment the attributes of the MAQUIS which can compensate for the greater mobility, heavy armament, superior training and communications of the GERMANS. These attributes are:-

- a. Choice of and intimate knowledge of the battlefield.

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b. Superiority in numbers, which, although incapable of a concentration in force quickly in a particular area, can maintain the threat of very wide fronts which will, in turn, provide an elasticity in defence.

c. A potential superiority in small arms fire.

d. Ability to live off the country.

e. The potentiality to expand areas of MAQUIS control immediately as successful operations develop.

8. The requirements for successful offensive action in any one MAQUIS area appear to be:-

a. The greatest possible self-supporting concentration of MAQUIS in its native area.

b. The greatest possible supply of simple small arms.

c. A commander and staff on the spot with adequate communications.

d. A stiffening of trained regular troops which will provide junior leadership and training.

9. Care must be taken to avoid involving ourselves in too great a commitment for air supply.

Initial supply programme

10. The present strength of the resistance forces in the SOUTH of FRANCE is as follows:-

<u>Area</u>	<u>Armed</u>	<u>Unarmed</u>
DROME	6,000 (supplied 25/6/44)	Nil
SAVOIE - ISERE	1,000	2,000 (also assists in
JURA - AIN	4,000 (supplied 25/6/44)	Nil (interdiction
		programmes)
HAUTE Vienne	4,500 (supplied 25/6/44)	Nil
CANTAL - LOZERE	3,500	7,000
PYRENEES	5,000	not known
	<u>24,000</u>	<u>9,000</u>

The initial supply of arms and ammunition for the SAVOIE - ISERE and CANTAL - LOZERE areas has still to be completed, but, owing to the uncertain situation in the CANTAL area, it will not be possible to carry this out immediately in that area. In addition maintenance is required for the HAUTE Vienne, JURA - AIN, DROME and PYRENEES areas. This programme must be complete by the 15th July if sufficient time is to be allowed for the absorption of supplies and for subsequent expansion to be effective by 'ANVIL' D day.

Immediate expansion of resistance to 77,000

11. After completion of this initial programme, all the BLUE areas at Map 'MB', with the possible exception of the CANTAL, will be completely equipped. To ensure offensive MAQUIS action the expansion of these areas to the RED areas will be required, involving the armament of an additional 54,000 men. The total strength will then be 77,000.

12. For the RED areas to be effective by 15th August, these supplies will have to be dropped by 1st August at the latest.

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3.

CONTROL OF THE MAQUIS AREAS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

13. It was agreed between SHAEF and AFHQ before 'OVERLORD' took place that control of resistance throughout FRANCE should be a SHAEF responsibility, although it was recognised that AFHQ had certain reserved rights in a specified area (see Map 'MC'). This agreement was made with the proviso that control of this area would, if required, pass back to SACMED should 'ANVIL' take place. We must therefore make early arrangements for a transfer of control to the MEDITERRANEAN at a time suitable to SACMED, in order that he may have a free hand to run his own battle in the SOUTH. At the same time it will be necessary for SHAEF to remain responsible both for the coordination of policy throughout FRANCE and, in general, for the supply of resistance, because the supply facilities are located in this country. Subject to AFHQ requirements, therefore, supply of resistance in the SOUTH of FRANCE preparatory to 'ANVIL' must in general be carried out from this country, although full use would be made of the lift available in the MEDITERRANEAN.

14. A corresponding delegation of responsibility may have to be made by General Koenig to a FRENCH commander in AIGIERS, whereby the FRENCH military commanders in the MAQUIS areas can be controlled directly in accordance with the wishes of the allied task force commander. The exact organisation of command requires discussion at an early date with AFHQ.

AIR LIMITATIONS

15. The air effort at present assigned to Special Force Headquarters operations would be sufficient to meet the needs of building up resistance as planned but for the range limitation, due to the short nights, of those UK based aircraft.

16. Map 'MD' shows the radius of action of UK based special aircraft. From this it will be seen that UK based aircraft are unable to supply the VOSGES, SAVOIE, DROME and PYRENEES until the August moon period. If resistance is to assist 'OVERLORD' and 'ANVIL' effectively, it must be expanded before 1st August.

17. It will therefore be necessary to call upon a minimum effort from the day strategic heavy bomber air forces to supply those areas which cannot be reached by UK based special aircraft.

18. While it is undesirable as a general principle to divert strategic air effort from bombing enemy communications, offensive action by the MAQUIS will be of major assistance to 'ANVIL'. The small number of heavy day bomber sorties required for the support of Resistance when taken in relation to the overall air effort available will interfere little, if at all, with the strategic air operations.

TOTAL AIR LIFT AVAILABLE

19. The total air lift available is as follows:-

- | | |
|--|---|
| a. 38 Group RAF | 1,200 - 1,500 sorties per month,
provided that no regular airborne operations
take place. |
| b. US and BRITISH
aircraft assigned
to Special Force
Headquarters | 500 sorties per month. |

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c. USSTAF

Effort to be allocated in relation to other commitments.

d. MEDITERRANEAN

300 sorties.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. It is recommended that air lift should be allotted as shown at Appendix 'A'. This requirement may be summarised:-

PHASE I.

735 sorties (of which from 190 to 300 would be day sorties)

PHASE II.

876 sorties (of which about 50% would be day sorties)

21. It is further recommended that:-

a. After Phase II the monthly commitment for MAQUIS maintenance in the SOUTH of FRANCE and the VOSGES shall not exceed 840 sorties.

b. Further expansion beyond Phase II should be avoided unless the progress of 'ANVIL' requires it.

c. That clandestine sabotage, SAS operations and the development of MAQUIS areas in support of the interdiction programme should be taken, for planning purposes, as a monthly commitment of 400 sorties, without prejudice to the exploitation of success where it occurs.

22. Finally it is recommended that control of resistance in the SOUTH of FRANCE should pass back to AFHQ at a time suitable to SACRED, and that staff conversations on the subject of command, supply and coordination are held forthwith in LONDON or ALGIERS, whichever is preferable to General Wilson.


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SAS and RESISTANCE in support of SHAEP Rail Interdiction Programme

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
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- To be demolished
- Areas in which SAS or Resistance now operating successfully
- Areas in which SAS or Resistance might operate



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
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Development of Resistance in Southern France


to SHAW/17240/5/00
dated 14 July



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
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MAP "MC"
to SHAPE/17240/3/0ps(C)
dated 14 July 1944



RANGE LIMITATIONS OF NIGHT FLYING FOR RESISTANCE SUPPLY OPERATIONS

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DATE 6 Jan '81

MAP 1100
to GAF 17240/3/06/G
dated July 1944

BRITTANY

- D+24 - 30 June
- D+35 - 11 July
- D+54 - 30 July
- D+67 - 12 August

