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<td>The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Roosevelt, Washington, Dec. 13, 1941 [Published in Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 751.]</td>
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My dear Mr. President:

With the removal of General Weygand from Africa in obedience to a German "dictat", and the beginning of a British offensive in Cyrenaica, which two occurrences are presumably closely related, Thanksgiving Day, 1941, was far from dull in this capital of a captive nation.

Upon hearing that Weygand was to be recalled, at which time we had no information that a British offensive in Africa was about to commence, I arranged on November 19th for an interview with the Marshal who saw me alone and discussed with me at length the matter of Weygand's removal.

I pointed out to him very clearly that the heretofore friendly and sympathetic attitude of the American Government was based on an assumption that he would not in his relations with the Axis powers go beyond the requirements of the Armistice Agreement, and that a removal of General Weygand under German pressure cannot be considered by anybody to be necessitated by the Armistice Agreement.

I told him that in my opinion such an unnecessary surrender to Axis demands, particularly at a time when Germany is so thoroughly involved in Russia, would have a definitely adverse effect on the traditional amity between our two peoples, that it would probably bring about an immediate suspension of the economic assistance that is being given to the French colonies, and that it might very possibly cause America to make a complete readjustment of its attitude toward his Government of France.

I requested that his decision announced to me the preceding evening be reconsidered in view of its certainly adverse effect on the future prospects of France and the French overseas Empire.

He replied that since last December Germany has constantly exerted increasing pressure on him to remove

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Weygand, that he has until now consistently refused, but that now there is nothing for him to do but yield to the demand.

In reply to a question as to how far the Germans have gone in their threats, he replied that their demands included everything, among other things the bases and the fleet, to which he refused to accede. Yesterday however the Germans sent him a "brutal" "dictat" threatening in the event of refusal to occupy all of France, to feed the army of occupation with French foodstuffs, and to permit the native population to die of hunger.

Being himself a prisoner and being concerned primarily with the fate of his people to whom he has dedicated himself he had found it necessary to yield to the German threat and recall General Weygand from Africa. He went on to say that there will be no change in the situation in Africa, that no successor to Weygand will be appointed, that he remains determined to preserve the Empire, and that the general command of African forces will be administered from Vichy.

Command from Vichy to me means only command by Admiral Darlan, Minister of National Defense.

Upon inquiry as to his estimate of the reason for German objection to General Weygand he replied that Weygand was disliked by the Germans first because he had communicated to them the Armistice terms in 1918, and second because he is "undiplomatic" and "indiscreet". In this reply I must assume the Marshal knew he was not telling the whole truth.

While the great inarticulate and leaderless mass of the French people remain hopeful of a British victory and continue to hope that America will in the end rescue them from their present predicament without their doing anything for themselves, the Government of France today headed by a feeble, frightened old man surrounded by self-seeking conspirators is altogether controlled by a group which, probably for its own safety, is devoted to the Axis philosophy.

Leaders of this group are:

Admiral Darlan, Vice President and heir apparent,
M. Pierre Pucheu, Secretary of Interior,
M. Benoist-Méchin, Secretary of State to the Vice President,
M. de Brinon, French Ambassador in Paris,

M. Paul ...
M. Paul Marion, Secretary of Information and Propaganda,
M. Yves Bouthillier, Secretary of Finance; and
M. François Lehideux, Secretary of Industrial Production.

Admiral Darlan, as you know, has been legally designated to succeed the eighty-six year old Marshal.

I am reasonably sure that Darlan sometime ago promised Hitler the use of French African base facilities but in this promise he has until now been blocked by Weygand.

M. Pucheu has recently effected a very great expansion of the secret police which are completely under his control. He is busily engaged now in building up via the Légion des Anciens Combattants what is intended to become an effective Ku-Klux Klan and which is already operating as such to some extent.

Darlan and Pucheu are both said to be ambitious to succeed to the Marshal's office, and while they are at the present time working together it is reasonable to assume that they will be tearing at each others' throats in the reasonably near future.

As a pure gambling chance and in consideration of their form sheets one should place his money on Pucheu.

Both will certainly be eliminated from the political picture if not "liquidated" when and if Germany is defeated.

During my conference with the Marshal he was as always agreeable and friendly in spite of my having to point to several disagreeable prospects for France involved in his surrender to Germany in the matter of Weygand, and upon my departure he expressed a hope that our personal regard for each other would not be injured by the action which he has been forced to take.

In view of his willingness under German and collaborationist pressure to sacrifice Weygand, who is a very close and loyal personal friend, it is not reasonable to expect him in the future to refuse under the same pressure the use of African bases, or the employment of the fleet for the Axis account, or any other demand that Germany may consider of sufficient importance to its military effort.

While ...
While one may be fully justified in looking at the difficulties of the Marshal's ending years with understanding sympathy, it seems necessary to reluctantly relinquish what was perhaps always only a faint hope that it might be possible for me through friendly personal relations and pertinent advice to give some semblance of backbone to a jellyfish.

The pro-Axis, anti-British group which surrounds the aged Marshal is responsive only to positive action. Admiral Darlan is reported by one of our friends, a subordinate in his office, to have said before the event that America would not take any positive action if Weygand should be removed.

It would appear to promise some effect in strengthening the Marshal's opposition to future demands of the Axis and its supporters within his Government if we should now seize the initiative to the extent of directing the American Ambassador to inform him that the United States is seriously concerned in regard to probable future demands of the Axis powers in Africa, and that if the Axis powers are hereafter granted in the colonies or in France any further privileges or assistance, that are not specifically required by the Armistice Agreement and that will be of assistance to their military effort, the United States will recall its Ambassador and will take such action in regard to French possessions in America and in Africa as is considered advantageous to our defensive preparations.

If the Ambassador should be directed to make such a statement to the Marshal, we must be prepared and determined to carry it out. To avoid a reaction contrary to our interests it must not be a bluff.

Most respectfully,

William D. Leahy
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have just received from Dr. Soong which I believe will be of immediate interest to you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
December 12, 1941

Dear Mr. Welles:

In connection with our conversations last Tuesday, I am in receipt of a cable from General Chiang Kai-shek dated Chungking, December 10th, and reporting among other things, "the Chief Soviet Military Advisor expresses his personal opinion when I saw him again today that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan is merely a matter of time and of procedure. The Soviet, he indicates, will make an open declaration of war only after a general coordinated war plan has been arranged between the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet. This differs considerably with the attitude of scepticism and disappointment that he assumed two days ago. I cannot fathom whether the change in his attitude is due to new instructions received from his Government for communication to me."

Hoping that the above may be of interest,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

Honorable Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. Secretary of State,

I enclose herewith a personal message which I have just received and which I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Curtin, to convey to the President.

I also attach copy of an appreciation of the situation regarding the defence of Rabaul and New Caledonia by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, which is referred to in Mr. Curtin's message to the President.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Secretary of State of the United States,

Washington, D.C.
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been asked by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable John Curtin, to convey to you the following personal message:

"On the entry of the United States of America into the war with Germany and Italy as well as with Japan, I desire on behalf of the people of Australia to express to you as representative of the people of America, how greatly we have been heartened and strengthened by the knowledge that the English-speaking world and the majority of mankind are now arrayed against the common foe.

2. We in Australia are firmly resolved, come what may, to do our utmost to defend to the limit of our capacity, the Commonwealth of Australia and adjacent territories of the South West Pacific, and to cooperate in the general plan of the defeat of the enemy. As you are no doubt aware, we have land, sea and air forces in Malaya and in the Netherlands East Indies area.

3. When risks to Australia were not as great as at the present time, we sent some of our naval and air forces as far afield as Britain, and we have three Army Divisions and units of our Air Forces in the Middle East. We have also contributed several thousand men to the Empire Air Training Scheme, and we hope to be able to continue our part in it.

4. As a Nation bordering on the Pacific Ocean, the entry of Japan into the war has brought a new threat near to our country. We deeply deplore the losses sustained by your naval and air forces at Hawaii, and by the British Navy at Malaya. For some time these events will no doubt minimise the otherwise deterrent effect of American and British sea power on Japanese operations.

5. The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia has warmly welcomed the opportunity of cooperating with the United States Forces in the provision of a naval base at Rabaul, and aerodrome facilities in territories under the control of the Commonwealth and in New Caledonia. However, the changed naval situation/
situation has had such repercussions on our local defence position and cooperation in overseas theatres that our military resources are insufficient to meet commitments for defence of Pacific Islands in which you and we are vitally interested. I am forwarding separately to the Australian Minister a review of the position as it has been put to us by our Service advisers, and it would be deeply appreciated if you and your Service authorities could consider what help you may be able to give in providing forces to deny these bases to the enemy.

13th December, 1941.

[Signature]
APPRECIATION OF SITUATION REGARDING DEFENCE OF RABAUL AND NEW CALEDONIA BY AUSTRALIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The following appreciation has been submitted to the Australian Government by the Australian Chiefs of Staff.

(1) Fleet Base at Rabaul.

1. Three courses of action are open in respect of Rabaul, namely,

   (a) to reinforce the existing garrison up to the strength of a brigade group;

   (b) to withdraw the existing garrison and abandon Rabaul;

   (c) to retain the existing garrison.

2. In considering these courses we have had in mind the fact that the existing garrison was originally despatched to Rabaul to protect the air operational base. In recent months a joint United States-Australian project has been agreed to for expanding the defences of Rabaul to make it suitable for use as a fleet base for British and American Naval Forces. Time has not permitted the consummation of this plan, and we are now advised that it is most unlikely that it will be proceeded with in the near future. The function of the present garrison accordingly remains the same as that existing when the garrison was first despatched to Rabaul and on this basis we reject course (a), i.e., reinforcement. An additional reason for this conclusion is the very great difficulties and hazard which would be involved in transporting reinforcements from the mainland to Rabaul and in maintaining increased forces at that place.

3. Dealing with courses (b) and (c) we consider it essential to maintain an advanced observation line to give the earliest possible indication of an enemy move to the South. We must therefore rule out any question of withdrawal. In coming to this conclusion we are also influenced by the difficulties of sea
transport, as withdrawal of our forces could not reasonably be made without giving the white population an opportunity of coming away. The problem of safe sea passage for the garrison and civilians is no less acute than that considered in paragraph 2, above in dealing with the question of reinforcing the garrison. The psychological effect which a voluntary withdrawal would have on the minds of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies must also be borne in mind. We therefore recommend that the existing garrison be retained at Rabaul. In making this recommendation we desire to emphasise the fact that the scale of attack which can be brought against Rabaul from bases in Japanese mandated islands is beyond the capacity of the small garrison to meet successfully. Notwithstanding this we consider it essential to maintain a forward air observation line as long as possible and to make the enemy fight for this line rather than abandon it at the first threat.

4. The situation will be under constant review, and if United States cruisers and destroyers by any chance are obliged to fall back on Darwin (which may be a possibility) sufficient combined naval forces may become available to reinforce and supply Rabaul.

(2) New Caledonia.

Occupation of New Caledonia by the Japanese would deny to the naval and air forces of the Associated Powers a link in a chain of communications and a valuable base for the protection of sea communications. Further, it is most important to deny to Japan the nickel deposits of New Caledonia.
The time factor is an important consideration, but the Chief of the General Staff, who has been granted authority to call up for training a further 114,000 men for the Australian Army in addition to 132,000 already in training, feels unable to recommend provision of the considerable strength necessary for the defence of New Caledonia, in view of Army commitments for local defence, forces despatched to Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Rabaul, and those to be despatched to Port Moresby. The strength of the Australian Imperial Forces abroad is 120,000, together with 30,000 in training in Australia.

We also lack air forces to provide the necessary air cooperation for the military force that would be necessary to defend New Caledonia, while anti-aircraft defences could only be provided by denuding vital centres in Australia.

We think the position as regards New Caledonia should be frankly put to the United States Government so that they may be invited to consider whether they can see their way clear to assist in its defence by providing a garrison or by any other means.

(3) Supplies for American forces which may use Australian bases.

The attention of the Commonwealth Government is also drawn to the information we have received regarding the imminent arrival in Brisbane of a United States convoy containing troops, aircraft and ammunition which has been diverted from the Philippines.

We recommend that the United States Government should be approached with the suggestion that certain ammunition, spare parts, bombs and the like should be sent to Australia at the earliest possible moment for the use of United States warships, aircraft or military forces which may use bases in Australia either for operations or as transit points.
Personal and Secret.

Following from Prime Minister.

Begins:

Part I

I am of course leaving arrangements for forthcoming conference entirely in the hands of the President and his advisers. Nevertheless you might like to have a few suggestions, gist of which you could pass to the President in appropriate form.

2. On first evening (Monday) we should like to comply generally with practice by an exchange of views informally and with the President and Chiefs of Staff with Joint Staff Mission, Chiefs of Staff would be glad of your views and advice early.

3. After hearing views of Joint Staff Mission, Chiefs of Staff will complete Tuesday morning a short paper they have prepared on allied strategy. After tea Tuesday I suggest joint United States and British Staffs confer. We think it essential this should be on highest level with President in the chair. I shall have already given the President my views on general situation and am prepared to develop them at conference.

4. Unless American Chiefs of Staff would prefer to table paper of their own on joint strategy suggest our Chiefs of Staff paper should form basis of our first formal discussion. Joint strategy must be settled and agreed at outset before we can decide dispositions and programme.

Part II follows.

PW
December 13, 1941.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending a draft which may assist you in framing a message to Chiang Kai-shek for such conference in Chungking as you suggested this morning.

Since leaving you I find that there is here already a military mission from Great Britain duly authorized to confer on just such matters as you are suggesting; also that there are fully qualified representatives of Australia, the Dutch East Indies, and China, who could confer with us here on just such matters as you suggested for Singapore. I suggest that such a preliminary conference might be held here instead of at Singapore.

So far as the Moscow conference is concerned, I do not feel that I am in possession of sufficient acquaintance with the addressee or familiarity with what you propose to discuss with him to make any attempt at such a draft by me of very much use to you.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
DEYOU.

Following is part II of my telegram 7105. Begins.

5. Subsequently joint conference might meet daily in the morning. I should hope that we can limit numbers attending as far as possible say to maximum of 8 on our side and 10 on American side.

6. Once strategy has been agreed staffs can get down to dispositions and supply experts can go fully into action.

7. I am attracted by the idea of holding Supreme Allied War Council meeting towards end of conference to which Stalin and General Chiang Kai-shek representatives would be invited.

If the President favours this proposal I should like to sound Moscow and Chungking at once.

Ends.

:HK
In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint conference to take place in Chungking not later than December 17 to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies. I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States, and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder. I venture to hope that such a conference in Chungking may eventually lead to the establishment of a more permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.
December 14, 1941

From the President to the Generalissimo

DRAFT

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth, to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conference consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

It should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Dutch representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GMLSHALIANDO (cont)

British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the
Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally
a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially
that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization
to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I am working hard on continuing our contribution to your supplies
and am trying to increase it.

I send you my very warm personal regards.
14th December, 1941.

My dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of the 14th December with the messages to Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek an hour ago, and the necessary telegram is on its way to London.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.
General Watson says that Lord Halifax read over the phone the following message just received from Anthony Eden: "We welcome the President's initiative. "Huff Cooper at Singapore is doing what the President suggested and calling a conference."

We are also
arranging to be represented at the other two conferences the President suggested.”

Received by telephone.

Respectfully,

L.P. Schuyler
Lt., U.S. Navy
December 16, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

FOR BIDDLE
NETHERLANDS SERIES NO.

Please deliver following message to Her Majesty
Queen Wilhelmina from the President at the earliest possible
moment:

QUOTE. In my judgment it is of the highest importance
that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our
common action against our common enemy. To this end I have
suggested to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek that he call a
joint military conference to take place in Chungking not
later than December 17 to exchange information and to
consider the military and naval action, particularly in
Eastern Asia, which may most effectively be employed to
accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies. I suggested
that the conferences might well consist of representatives of
China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the Netherlands and the United States and I stated that I was prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as the representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John MacGruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December 20; it should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Netherlands representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective governments.

I have also communicated with Mr. Josef Stalin suggesting that he talk with Chinese, American and British representatives in Moscow and have his views from the northern viewpoint.

I have proposed to the British Government that they call a military and naval conference in Singapore, to meet simultaneously with the proposed conference in Chungking and to report operational plans as they see the situation in the southern zone. I have suggested to the British Government
that the Singapore conference include Chinese, American and Netherlands officers as well as representatives of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

The estimates and recommendations of these conferences will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem. It may well be that these preliminary conferences may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I hope that Your Majesty's Government will find it possible to give immediate instructions to the end that the Netherlands will be represented at the Chungking and Singapore meetings.

I send you my warm personal regards. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.
AF  
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)  

Secretary of State,  
Washington.  

TRIPLE PRIORITY  
December 17, 4 p.m.  
NETHERLANDS SERIES 61.  
FROM BIDDLE  
Your 53, December 15, and my 60, December 16.  
Following message for the President from Queen Wilhelmina:

"Mr. Biddle has conveyed your message to me, which I have read with the greatest interest. Instructions have at once been given in order that representatives of my Government attend the conference at Chungking as well as at Singapore. It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that, thanks to your initiative, measures will be concerted to impart to our common war effort its greatest efficacy, and I am happy to send you my warmest wishes for the success of the conversations.  

I send you my very best greetings, Wilhelmina."

Foreign Office states Counsellor of Legation is in Chungking and will attend meeting there.

WINANT
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Will you please show to the President the attached letter received today from Mr. T. V. Soong enclosing copy of telegram from Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
December 16, 1941

Dear Mr. Stimson:

For your information I enclose copy of a telegram Stalin sent to Chiang-Kai-shek, dated Moscow, the 12th of December. A copy of the same has been given to the State Department.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

Enclosure

The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK FROM STALIN

(Translation from Chinese)

"Your telegram only reached me yesterday. I am deeply appreciative of your kind consideration. I am in perfect agreement with you that the long heroic struggle China has put up against Japan, and the present anti-Japanese front in the Pacific are part and parcel of the general anti-Axis front. At the same time the anti-German front assumes special significance in the anti-Axis front, because Germany is the strongest partner of the Axis.

"Soviet Russia today has the principal burden of the war against Germany. And Soviet Russian victory over Germany constitutes a great hope of the other members of the anti-Axis front, Great Britain, the United States and China. It is my opinion that under the circumstances the Soviet today ought not to divert its strength to the Far East, when it is beginning to attack the German armies, for by dispersing our strength the difficulties of the German armies will be lessened. I beg you therefore not to insist that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

"Soviet Russia must fight Japan, for Japan will surely unconditionally break the Neutrality Pact. We are preparing to meet that situation, but it takes time to prepare. Therefore I again implore you not to take the lead in demanding that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

Stalin"

Moscow, December 12, 1941
The Under Secretary of State
Washington

December 17, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith the reply from Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek which I read to you on the telephone.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
Your telegram only reached me yesterday. I am deeply appreciative of your kind consideration. I am in perfect agreement with you that the long heroic struggle China has put up against Japan, and the present anti-Japanese front in the Pacific are part and parcel of the general anti-Axis front. At the same time the anti-German front assumes special significance in the anti-Axis front, because Germany is the strongest partner of the Axis.

Soviet Russia today has the principal burden of the war against Germany. And Soviet Russian victory over Germany constitutes a great hope of the other members of the anti-Axis front, Great Britain, the United States and China. It is my opinion that under the circumstances the Soviet today ought not to divert its strength to the Far East, when it is beginning to attack the German armies, for by dispersing our strength the difficulties of the German armies will be lessened. I beg you therefore not to insist that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

Soviet Russia must fight Japan, for Japan will surely unconditionally break the Neutrality Pact. We are preparing to meet that situation, but it takes time to prepare. Therefore I again implore you not to take the lead in demanding that Soviet Russia at once declare war against Japan.

STALIN
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)
Kulbyshev

Dated December 17, 1941
Rec'd 11:14 a.m.; 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
2070, December 17, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Department's 1284, December 13, 3 p.m.

One. It is not unlikely that Sikorski expressed sentiments similar to those reported from London during his visit to the Soviet Union (as it is probable that from the Polish viewpoint it is preferable that the Soviet war effort against Germany should not be diminished by additional activities in the East), but as he had returned to Moscow prior to the Japanese attack on us he presumably did not address his remarks to Stalin.

Two. The British Ambassador called on me the day of the Japanese attack. In discussing the probable attitude of the Soviet Government he expressed the opinion that it might well be that of neutrality. His statements in this respect did not at the time convey
convey to me the impression that he advocated such a policy. The Chinese Ambassador however, with whom I carefully explored this subject last evening, stated explicitly that Cripps seemed to favor Soviet abstention from war with Japan. Upon Cripps return from Moscow I shall endeavor definitely to ascertain his attitude in this respect.

Three. The Chinese Ambassador has informed me that insofar as he is aware Stalin has not replied to Chiang Kai Shek's note of December 8 (a copy of which he understands was handed to Ambassador Gauss). He believes however from the general attitude of the Soviet officials with whom he has conversed that the Soviet Government will not be disposed to engage in hostilities with Japan at this time if they can be avoided.

Four. With respect to Litvinov's exposition to the Secretary of the decisions arrived at by his government I may say that, as the Department is aware, Soviet foreign policy is superlatively realistic. It may be taken for granted therefore that until the Soviet Government can be convinced of the advantages of entering the war against Japan no other considerations (such as the general wisdom of such action or the help
the help that would thereby be rendered us and the British) will affect its decision. In this connection, it has been reported to me by persons having some association with Soviet citizens, and the same opinion was expressed to me last night by a Soviet official who may be presumed to know the present "party line", that the Soviet Government would be disposed to participate in the War of the Pacific only if Britain establishes a second front with Germany on the continent - the North African campaign being definitely regarded as a minor operation in no way capable of diminishing Germany's effective strength against the Soviet Union.

THURSTON

RR
I received your message on the 16th December. As there was no mention of the object of the suggested conferences in Chunking and Moscow, and that there was only one day left before their opening, I thought I might be able, in conversation with Mr. Eden, who has just arrived in Moscow, to elucidate the question of the objects of the conferences, and to find out whether they could be postponed for some time. It transpired, however, that Mr. Eden has no information on this point, either.

In view of the above, I should be glad to receive from you the necessary details, to ensure that the participation of representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in these conferences should bring results. Allow me to thank you for the feelings you express with regard to the successes of the Soviet army. I wish you all success in your struggle against the aggression in the Pacific. I send you and Mr. Hopkins my warm personal greetings.
December 17th, 1941.

My dear Mr. President,

A message has been received from Mr. Duff Cooper at Singapore on the subject of the proposed naval and military conference there, to the following effect:-

"I have now secured representation for Australia, New Zealand, United States and Netherlands and am arranging that conference shall start December 18th. If we were to await arrival of representative from Chungking there would be much delay and report by December 20th as requested by the President would certainly be impossible."

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
"impossible. Should representative from Chungking arrive in time we shall of course be delighted to receive him."

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Halifax
AP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Kuibyshev)
Dated December 17, 1941
Rec'd 10:36 a.m.; 18th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2075, December 17, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
Department's 1289, December 17, 9 p.m.

One. The Counselor of the British Embassy states that he believes Eden and Cripps will remain in Moscow for several days. I informed him of the reason for my inquiry.

Two. I plan to leave in the morning by air, taking Edwin Smith with me and sets of the (?)-1 and D-1 codes, of which sets I also will remain in Kuibyshev.

Three. I informed Vyshinski this evening of the purpose of my visit to Moscow. After requesting me to explain which I regarded my mission as "observer" to signify

THURSTON

WSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Kuibyshev
Dated December 17, 1941
Rec'd 10:48 a.m., 18th

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

2075, December 17, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

(To which I replied that I would venture to hope that Molotov and Eden and Cripps would find it possible to inform me of any phases of their discussions which might concern or be of interest to the United States but that I had of course no intention of intruding otherwise.) He expressed his approval.

Four. Should I fail to reach Moscow in time, I shall endeavor to obtain information regarding the conference from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Cripps.

Five. I informed the correspondents last week that I planned to go to Moscow shortly to visit Thompson.

Six. Dickerson will be in charge of Kuibyshev during my absence.

(EEND OF MESSAGE)

THURSTON

RR
December 18, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of December eighteenth relative to the important question of a meeting with the British and the Dutch concerning raw materials.

In accord with your request I am glad to assign Mr. Thomas K. Finletter as a member of the group and have advised him accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,

The White House.
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE

Following message has been received from

1. It is hoped to reach agreement to following main points during conference.
   (i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
   (ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate military measures, including re-distribution of forces.
   (iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise with (i).
   (iv) Long term programme based on (i), including forces to be raised and equipped required for victory.
   (v) Set up joint machinery for implementing (ii), (iii) and (iv).

2. Under the direction of Prime Minister Chiefs of Staff are preparing short general review as a basis for discussion under paragraph 1 (i) above, to be followed by paper on (ii), (iii) and (iv).

3. Chiefs of Staff are giving much thought to machinery for post conference joint collaborations.
IMMEDIATE.

Following message has been received from H.M.S. Duke of York, 18.12.41.

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   (i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
   (ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate Military measures, including re-distribution of forces.
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FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

TO THE PRESIDENT

12/18/41
FROM CHUNGKING

TO ADJUTANT GENERAL

AMMISCA #109 SEVENTEENTH

THE COMMUNICATION WHICH WAS THE MESSAGE THAT THE PRESIDENT WROTE FOR CHIANG KAI SHEK ON THE 14TH WAS DELIVERED BY ME TO CHIANG KAI SHEK AT 1:30 THE 16TH OF THIS MONTH.

THE GENERALISSIMO STATED HE WILL ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL AND WILL PROCEED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION AS WAS SUGGESTED.

EXPECT THAT GENERAL BRETT WILL ARRIVE HERE ON THE 17TH OF THE MONTH.

MAGRUDER.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached papers show the situation in regard to Torpedo Bombers, Armor Piercing Bombs, and Aircraft Torpedoes.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS  
WASHINGTON  

16 December 1941  

MEMORANDUM for Captain Beardall.  

SUBJECT: Situation regarding Torpedo Planes and Armor Piercing Bombs.  

Torpedo Bombers - The Navy has on hand an even 100 Douglas torpedo bombers known as TBD (DEVASTATOR). This number is barely sufficient to meet minimum operating requirements. The present shortage was anticipated as far back as two years ago and every practicable effort has been made to cope with the situation. To save time I took the risk of going into production on a new type, the Grumman TBF (AVENGER), without waiting for completion of samples. Despite this action, a shortage will persist for the next several months. There is attached a table showing estimated production from facilities now available. Further expansion of facilities is now being arranged. This expansion can not be expected to be reflected in production before a minimum of nine months to a year.  

Armor Piercing Bombs. The Navy has on order 17,500 armor piercing bombs of the 1600 lb. variety. These bombs are of approximately the same weight as those used by the Japanese in the attack at Pearl Harbor. Tests have shown they should be capable of penetrating the heaviest deck from around altitudes of 12,000 ft. They carry a much higher proportion of explosive than any comparable armor piercing projectile. Delivery of completely loaded and fused bombs will commence in February 1942 at the rate of about 300 per month, which rate will build up to 1,000 a month by April 1942.  

J. H. Towers
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

To: Admiral Towers  
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics

SUBJECT: Torpedo Planes — The following is the status of Torpedo Planes:

1. On hand — 100 TBD's.

2. Production schedule of the new Grumman torpedo plane:

<table>
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<th>Month</th>
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<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Nov.</td>
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<td>Jan. 1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
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<td>Mar.</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
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</table>

3. There is in addition to the foregoing a limited production of torpedo planes in the United Kingdom estimated to total 86 a month now building up to 125 by Dec '43.

S.W.A.
Memorandum for Captain Beardall:

Subject: Aircraft Torpedo Situation.

1. On November 30, 1941, the Navy had 768 aircraft torpedoes. Production at Newport will continue on this type until next month, bringing the total at that time up to 972, except of course for expenditures and losses.

2. After next month, no more aircraft torpedoes are due to come off the assembly lines until June, though we hope to cut this gap shorter if possible. The reason for this hiatus is that the Navy has three distinct types of torpedoes, as follows:

   Mark 13 - for aircraft
   Mark 14 - for submarines
   Mark 15 - for destroyers and cruisers, and for a few of the later submarines especially designed to carry them.

Until the last six months, the Newport Torpedo Station was the only source of production for torpedoes. It has been found most economical, both in time and money, to produce only one type at a time. Hence the Station makes a long run on one type and then shifts to another. At present, Newport is manufacturing parts for the Mark 15 destroyer torpedo, while finishing up assembly of aircraft torpedoes. As soon as sufficient castings, forgings, etc., are available from outside sources, machining of parts for the Mark 13 will be resumed and assembly will start again in the late spring. The Naval Torpedo Station at Alexandria, Va., is now making the Mark 14 submarine torpedo.

3. Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a universal torpedo, suitable for use by all naval craft. The requirements vary widely, and a universal torpedo would be a "jack of all trades and master of none." We have been experimenting for some time at Newport with launching the Mark 14 and Mark 15 types from patrol planes, but with little success to date.
In addition to increasing the machining capacity, at both Newport and Alexandria, Newport has already done a great deal of subcontracting for torpedo parts, which will be assembled at both stations. Also, a new Government torpedo plant is being erected in Chicago for operation by the American Can Company, but this factory will not be in production until the end of 1942. The maximum production which we hope to reach from all sources will be 30 torpedoes per day, or 750 per month, based on a 6-day week. This figure includes all three types. It might be interesting to note that the British plan to produce in England only 300 per month. Their present rate is 200 per month, which is the same as our current rate. They have one contract in this country for submarine torpedoes, ten per week, and we are handling a lend-lease contract for them for aircraft torpedoes at ten per week, but neither of these companies has produced any torpedoes yet. They have recently placed another requisition for 2,000 aircraft torpedoes, and we are negotiating with a third company for that job.

The distribution of our existing aircraft torpedoes is shown on the enclosure.
(Enclosure)
S75-1(85)(A)

**AIRCRAFT TORPEDO DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SHIP OR STATION</th>
<th>ON HAND</th>
<th>ENROUTE</th>
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<td>USS LEXINGTON</td>
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<td>USS YORKTOWN</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>USS ENTERPRISE</td>
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<td>USS HORNET</td>
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<td>USS POCOMOKE</td>
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<td>USS ALBEMARLE</td>
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<td>SS &quot;President Taylor&quot;, in</td>
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<td>San Francisco, under shipment</td>
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**NOTE:** Distribution listed above is as of December 12.
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<th>Types of Airplanes</th>
<th>WEST COAST THEATER</th>
<th>APCG LESS W.C. THEATER</th>
<th>OTHERS in U.S.</th>
<th>ATLANTIC BASES</th>
<th>CARIBBEAN (Panama) Puerto R. Br. Guiana etc.</th>
<th>ASIA</th>
<th>HAWAII</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>ESTIMATED Production to 12/31/41</th>
<th>Enroute or Being Prepared for Shipment to X Grt.</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</table>

1/ Airplanes which have been "accepted" but are "not deliverable" have been deducted from the col. 2/

2/ (See below)

3/ 23 are on way.

4/ 8 of these left on night of 17th. Remaining 10 will leave as soon as weather permits.

2/9 scheduled to leave after 18 leave for Copper. Those for Copper scheduled to leave when weather permits.

The Air Staff

Statistics Section
Seattle Area
3 regiments defending Boeing Plant and 14 Misc. Air Fields with:
- 36 3" Guns
- 22 37-mm. Guns
- 78 .50-Cal. Guns
- 18 268 Sets

Portland Area
1 regiment defending Power System Airports with:
- 12 3" Guns
- 24 37-mm. Guns
- 24 .50-Cal. Guns
- 6 268 Sets

San Francisco Area
3 regiments defending Mare Island Navy Yard, SF Bridges, oil storage, shipyards, airports with:
- 36 3" Guns
- 50 37-mm. Guns
- 62 .50-Cal. Guns
- 18 268 Sets

Los Angeles Area
4 regiments (less 4 Btries), 2 Sep Gun Bns, and 1 Prov SL Bn defending Douglas Plants, Camp Haan Air Field, Lockheed Vega, North America & Northrup and Vultee Plant with:
- 64 3" Guns
- 66 37-mm. Guns
- 82 .50-Cal. Guns
- 32 268 Sets

San Diego Area
2 regiments defending Consolidated and North Island Nav Air & MD with:
- 24 3" Guns
- 12 37-mm. Guns
- 54 .50-Cal. Guns
- 12 268 Sets
December 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT:

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

I.

1. With a view to the more effective prosecution of warfare against Germany, Italy and Japan, a Supreme War Council is created composed of H. R. H. Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, the President of the United States of America, the President of the Executive Yuan and Generalissimo of the Armies of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the President of the Soviet of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in respect of warfare against those countries with which the Soviet Union is at war. They may designate a member of their government with full power to represent them.

2. The Chiefs of State or of government above named pledge themselves not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement.

3. The function of the Supreme War Council is
to supervise and coordinate the general conduct of the war and to provide for its successful prosecution.

4. The Supreme War Council may determine theatres of war and may provide for representation of any other government actively engaged in war against a common enemy in such theatres.

5. The Council will be responsible for coordinating distribution of available resources of all categories between various theatres of war.

6. The Supreme War Council shall be charged with effecting unified command in any theatre of war determined by it.

II.

1. The Supreme War Council will create a Staff responsible to it and consisting of representatives of the armed forces of each of the members of the Council, who may be the highest ranking officers of the different branches of the respective armed forces.

2. The
2. The Staff may draw up general war plans, and shall review general war plans drawn up by the competent authorities of each country. It shall follow the execution by each country of the part allotted to it in any general operation or undertaking, but shall not exercise any of the powers of the commanders-in-chief in the field. It shall perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Council.

3. The members of the Staff shall receive from the government and the competent authorities of their respective countries all proposals, information and documents relating to the conduct of the war. They shall watch, day by day, the situation of the armed forces and the means of all kinds of which the armed forces and the enemy armed forces dispose.

4. By direction of the Supreme War Council, the Staff may designate a Staff Division to serve in respect of any theatre of war and may provide for representation of
of the armed forces of any other power engaged in active
war against any of the common enemies in such theatre.

5. The general staffs and military, naval and
air commands of the armed forces of each power charged
with the conduct of military operations remain responsible
to their respective governments, subject to the creation
of any unified command which may be agreed upon.

6. The Staff shall sit continuously and shall
establish headquarters for itself or for any Staff
Division at such place or places, or in any region,
as may be approved by the Supreme War Council.
GRAY

(Moscow)
Kuibyshev

Dated December 19, 1941

Rec'd. 3:48 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2085, December 19, 6 p.m.

VOLSKAYA KOMNUNA today publishes without comment a Tass despatch from Tokyo dated yesterday and briefly summarizing the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister before the special session of Parliament. Togo is quoted as stating in respect of Soviet-Japanese relations that Japan has not altered its policy of assuring security in the north and that the Soviet Government has also repeatedly declared its intention of adhering to its neutrality pact with Japan.

DICKERSON

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2086, December 19, 7 p.m.

VOSLZHSKAYA KOMIUNA of December 17 contains an article by Troyanovsky, former Soviet Ambassador to the United States, which begins by stating that while the war in the Pacific is of extreme importance it nevertheless does not transfer the full weight of the second World War to that area.

"Germany is the main force of the Axis powers. The Soviet-German front remains the chief front". Troyanovsky mentions the solidarity proclaimed by the Axis against the United States, Great Britain, and compares Japan's attack upon American and British possessions with that of Germany upon the Soviet Union. He predicts that the struggle in the Pacific will be long and difficult, but concludes that "because of American indignation energy, inventive power, and productive potentialities there can be no doubt that the United States will inflict a crushing defeat upon the Japanese."

DICIERSON

NPL
AMT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 19, 1941
Rec'd 8 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
6147, December 19, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

Your 6885 deeply appreciated. Eden's cables which I am forwarding in a summary statement confirm your judgment. The following is a summary of a four hour conversation that Eden had with Stalin:

It began with a full survey of the political situation when Stalin produced draft projects of two treaties, one to cover mutual military assistance irrespective of the war and the other political collaboration now and after the war. The terms do not greatly differ from those which Eden had fore-shadowed and the latter gave Stalin a draft prepared on the approved basis. A further meeting was to take place on the following day to evolve an agreed text which Eden thought would not present any insuperable difficulty.

Stalin then suggested the signature of a secret protocol
protocol embodying the joint views of the British Government and the Soviet Government for a settlement of postwar frontiers and outlined in detail his conception of such a settlement for Europe as a whole which was drastic and severe upon Germany. Eden told him that for many reasons it was impossible for him to enter into a secret agreement; he was pledged to the United States Government not to do so; the British Government's own discussion of a peace settlement had not advanced to this point and he would have to consult his colleagues. He would, however, take back a full account to London where the proposal would be studied and the matter could then be taken up through diplomatic channels.

WINANT

GW
BS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated December 19, 1941
Rec'd. 8:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Stalin agreed to this and also to the proposals being communicated to the United States Government. His desire was to establish that our war aims were identical as then our alliance would be stronger. If our war aims were different then, he said, there was no true alliance.

The war situation was then discussed. Stalin said his military advisors believed Germany had given Japan about 1500 aircraft. Eden urged the difficulties of transit but Stalin said he had come to believe that this was not a Japanese war in the Far East. He thought that some of the Japanese pilots had been trained in Germany and that others were Germans.

Eden gave Stalin some account of the British Government's military objectives in Africa and he fully endorsed these. Hitherto the war policy of the Soviet Union had been to fight rear guard actions with the object of gradually wearing down the German forces.

Now
Now the latter were beginning to feel the tension. German soldiers were tired and their commanders had not prepared for a winter campaign. The arrival of new Soviet reinforcements had made possible the change seen in the last two weeks. The Germans had tried to dig in but they had not made very strong fortifications. Soviet troops had been able to hold their own and were now able to attack. Counterattacks were gradually being developed into counter-offensives. The Germans were reorganizing their forces and creating new formations but he did not think that these would be ready before two months. In any case his army would continue to keep up the offensive all winter. He thought Russia had now slight superiority in the air but emphasized that the Germans had great superiority in tanks. He said that the position in the South was satisfactory and that the arrival of fresh Russian reinforcements had resulted in the recent successes.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated December 19, 1941
Rec'd. 10:48 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

There was some discussion about Turkey, Persia and other matters on which Eden will report later.
Stalin seemed reasonably satisfied with the position in these countries.

As regards the Far East, Stalin said he was sorry that in the present circumstances he was not now in a position to help us there.

Eden accepted a suggestion by Stalin that the British military mission should come to Moscow where contact could more easily kept with the Russian commanders.

Eden reported that the conversation throughout was most cordial and was to be resumed the next day. The contents of the treaties in their final form would generally accord with the basis approved by the Cabinet. The Russians attach importance to the term "treaty" and Eden thinks it essential that his visit should be marked by some agreement which will convince the Russians of the sincerity of our collaboration both now and in the future.

(End Summary)
(End Summary)

There was a military reference in a detailed section of Eden's report which I think is important because I have understood that the army air service has held a contrary view. The reference reads as follows: "As regards rocket bomb, Stalin stated that this had not turned out to be very useful against tanks, though it was useful against troops. Russians had found that airplanes fitted with cannon were better against tanks than those fitted with rocket bombs."

Would you please see that General Arnold gets this information but make sure that Eden is protected as conversations were informal and confidential in character.

Eden sent an additional special note today which reads as follows:

"Stalin's attitude about the Far East is perfectly loyal and in fact he stated that he would be in a position to help us there in the spring. He is, however, clearly determined not to provoke Japan at present and considers that he is not in a position to do so. In these circumstances I felt that it would not only be useless but also unwise to speak to him about the United States use of air bases in Siberia.

Please
#6147, December 19, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London

Please explain the position to Mr. Winant who spoke to me about this just before I left England and say how sorry I am not to have been able to do more."

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

KLP
BS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT.

Stanley Bruce, High Commissioner of Australia, has consistently been friendly to the United States and has always been in support of collaboration with us. I see him often. He has been helping me get support for the text of the new draft of Article seven of the Lend-Lease Agreement. Today he gave me the text of a confidential memorandum he was sending his own Government. I asked him if he would give me a copy and allow me to forward it to you both. He said he would be glad to have me do so but would like to be protected. The text follows:

WINANT

GR:
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH (Section Two)

6148, December 19, 8 p.m.

The entry of the United States of America and Japan into the war means an alignment of the great powers of the world in a fight to a finish. The British Empire, the United States of America, Russia and China on one side and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other. In this struggle Germany and Italy are really subject to one direction owing to the overwhelming dominance of Germany. Japan is far distant and in a sense is operating separately but we have seen enough of German methods to know that she will insist on the closest coordination of plans with Japan and will exercise a considerable control over their execution.

To meet this combination it is essential that the four great powers opposing the Axis should have an agreed plan of cooperation which will enable their combined forces, supplies and resources to be pooled and utilized.
and utilized in whatever manner is best designed to achieve the common purpose namely the defeat of the enemy.

The first essential is that there should be leadership and that there should be a definite policy. The leadership should come from President Roosevelt with his unrivaled prestige and authority. The policy should be formulated between the President and the Prime Minister between whom the closest contact should be maintained in its development in the light of events. The policy should cover the military, political and economic fields. It should deal both with our immediate problems and our long range planning. It should visualize the war as a whole and should provide for the allocation and utilization of the total land, sea and air forces and the resources and supplies of the allies in whatever manner is necessary to achieve the common objective.

Having determined the policy it will then be the task of leadership to persuade the powers associated with us to accept and implement it.

This implementation would involve the acceptance of the allocation and utilization of the allies for the time being limited resources in the carrying out of the policy agreed upon.

In order
In order to arrive at such a policy it is necessary to visualize the great issues that confront us and determine our line with regard to them. In a first attempt to do this I set out below some of the major questions which we now have to face.

WINANT

WWC
BS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

One. The Far East.

The initial success which Japan has achieved at sea has altered the whole balance of power in the Pacific and has, for the time being, rendered any United Kingdom—United States naval combination inadequate to deal with Japanese naval strength impossible.

The question has to be faced of what our strategy in the immediate future should be in the Far East.

It would appear to be of a defensive character at sea, aimed at harassing the enemy, interrupting her communications and denying her the benefit, so far as possible, of any new sources of supply she may obtain, e.g., rubber and rice from Thailand.

The best method of achieving this would be by the largest possible concentration of submarines and aircraft based upon the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Singapore.

With regard to submarines, the Dutch have a certain number available but their reinforcement would have to come
-2- #6148, December 19, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London
to come from the United States of America and if Russia
were at war with Japan from the USSR which has some
90 submarines based on Vladivostok.

With regard to the air, reinforcements would have
to come from the United States of America and the United
Kingdom and the determination of what can be sent would
necessitate a review of the requirements of all theaters
of operation and a determination as to the degree of
priority to be accorded to each.

The provision of submarines and aircraft which
has been suggested above is for the defensive side of
the war in the Far East. A defensive strategy, how-
ever, is not sufficient as it would probably only re-
sult in the consolidation of her gains, the replenish-
ment of her vital supplies and the strengthening of the
position of Japan.

Our strategy must, therefore, contemplate the offen-
sive also. Offensive action on the sea would appear to
be postponed for some considerable time.

WINLNT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

6140, December 19, midnight. (SECTION FOUR)

China, with her almost unlimited manpower, would appear to present the most promising opportunity for offensive action.

The intensification of operations in China would seriously embarrass the Japanese, weary by four years of war; would relieve Japanese pressure in other directions and if successful, e.g., the driving of the Japanese out of southeast China, might have very far reaching results.

In order to stage a successful offensive, however, the Chinese would have to be substantially reinforced in the air and with munitions and supplies. The two questions in relation to reinforcing China in these directions are--

(one) Where would the reinforcements come from, and

(two) How would they be got to China?

With regard to (one), notwithstanding the protestations of aid to China she has received relatively little
little and her priority has been extremely low. If the decision of the Allies was that China was the instrument through which Japan was to be attacked, her priority would become very high and the United Kingdom, United States and Russia might well be prepared to make sacrifices to ensure China obtaining what was necessary.

With regard to Russia, her own interests might well be served by affording the maximum possible assistance to China as a great offensive by China would go far to remove any menace that Japan presents to Russia in Siberia.

With regard to (two) as long as the Burma Road remains open supplies can go in over this route and I understand they could also be brought in over the Turkestan route from Russia.

Maximum help to China by Russia and through Russia would probably lead to war with Japan. This result would require examination from the angle of the effect upon Russia in her war with Germany of involvement in war with Japan at the same time.

VINANT

EMB
EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (5)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

6149, December 19, midnight. (SECTION FIVE)

One point in this connection is clear namely that if it suited Japan's interests she would immediately declare war on Russia and the fact that she has not done so has considerable significance. It has also to be borne in mind that she will declare war just so soon as it suits her. What has to be examined is whether it is equally in Russia's interests to avoid war with Japan. The fact that Russia's entry into war with Japan would make available the 90 submarines in the Far East as well as enabling air bombardment of Japan to be undertaken from Vladivostok are of great importance.

Two. Russia.

The fact that the Germans have abandoned their offensive is of the greatest significance. It is of paramount importance, however, to determine whether this is due to the Germans being in serious difficulties as to which there is considerable evidence or
whether it is due to a decision to withdraw troops from Russia with a view to an offensive elsewhere, E. G. the Iberian Peninsula or North Africa.

If it is due to a setback then the question of whether the Russians can effectively exploit the position has to be determined and if the decision is that she can then all other considerations would have to be waived in favor of giving her every ounce of assistance that can be afforded in order to enable her to do so.

WINANT

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (E)

London

Dated December 19, 1941
Rec'd 7:40 a.m., 20th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION SIX)

On the other hand, if the finding were that the Germans have not suffered a serious setback but have stabilized the Russian line with a view to an offensive elsewhere, e.g., attack on the Iberian Peninsula or a substantial move into North Africa, the possibility of counter action by combined British and United States of America forces has to be considered.

If the finding on the Russian situation were that the Germans have suffered a substantial reverse and have been compelled to stabilize the line in order to withdraw, rest, and reorganize divisions but that it is not possible for the Russians during the winter substantially to exploit the position consideration has to be given to the possibility of any Anglo-American action which would divert German forces and prevent their utilization against Russia when active operations recommence in the spring.

Three. Middle East.

(·) Libya, and westward.

Immediate Anglo-American consideration has to be given
given to the policy to be pursued with regard to French North Africa including the possibility of steps to forestall German-Italian domination and control following on recent conversations with Petain and Ciano.

(B) Eastern Section.

This area involves consideration of both political and strategical problems. The outstanding political one is the position of and policy to be pursued toward Turkey.

WINANT

Ed.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH.

6146, December 19, midnight. (SECTION SEVEN)

The strategical problems have to be considered in the light of the Germans either reaching the great oil supplies through the Caucasus or failing to do so. In the latter event the German oil situation will quite possibly become serious and the staging of a great offensive through Turkey unlikely.

In the former event such an offensive in the spring would appear probable and it is imperative that the Allies' plans to meet it should be fully prepared and coordinated.

In addition to the coordination of the Allies' plans for the prosecution of the war militarily using the word in its widest significance it is essential that the Allies' plans for the conduct of the war in the political sphere should also be coordinated.

To Hitler's "new order in Europe" and Japan's "Asian co-prosperity" we must put forward in clear terms
-2-#6148, December 19, midnight (SECTION SEVEN) From
London
terms our own policy for the new world we propose
to create after the war.

Such a policy would be the basis of our political
warfare which may well be as important as military
warfare. Backed by intelligent propaganda it will do
much to weaken the will to resist of the German
people and will strengthen the determination of the
people of the occupied countries passively for the
time being and later actively to continue the struggle.

Without cooperation and direction on the highest
plans in the conduct of war both in the strategic
and political spheres the powers opposing the Axis
will be seriously handicapped and the period of hos-
tilities prolonged.

"What steps are being taken to bring about this
coordination and direction".

(END OF MESSAGE).

WINANT
NPL
For The President

from the Secretary of War
RADIOGRAM

AG 381 (12-22-41)MSC

FROM MANILA

TO THE ADJT GENL

* * * * *

NO. 40 DECEMBER TWENTY SECOND

ONE OF THE MAIN FEATURED OF OUR ATTEMPT AT AIR REINFORCEMENT

HERE WAS THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN MY RADIOS OF DECEMBER

THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN REGARDING PURSUIT AND DIVE BOMBER REINFORCEMENT BY MEANS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER STOP PRESENT ENEMY AIR ENCIRCLEMENT PERMITS INTERRUPTION OF FERRY ROUTE TO SOUTH DUE TO DAY

BOMBARDMENT MINDANAO FIELDS STOP EARLY REINFORCEMENT BY CARRIER

WOUlD SOLVe PROBLEM STOP YOUR RADIOS MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THIS

FEATURE STOP CAN I EXPECT ANYTHING ALONG THAT LINE QUERY QUERY

IN THIS GENERAL CONNECTION CAN YOU GIVE ME ANY INKLING OF STRATEGIC

PLANS PACIFIC FLEET QUERY

MACARTHUR

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: A. C. of S., WPD, Copy No. 1.

EXACT INFORMATION COPIES TO: Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 2.

Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 3.

SECRET
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
Subject: Transportation of short range aircraft to the Philippines.

References: (a) General MacArthur’s secret radiogram of December 23, 1941.
(b) Asst. Chief of Staff, WPD, U. S. Army, secret memorandum of December 23, 1941.

1. In the existing strategic situation delivery of aircraft to the Philippines over the direct route from the Hawaiian area is not practicable in any type of ship.

2. Diversion of aircraft carriers from their necessary functions as fighting ships for the purpose of movement of short range aircraft to the Philippines via the southern route is likewise impracticable in the existing strategic situation.

3. As agreed after extensive consideration of previous proposals of a similar nature, the best way to move Army pursuit and dive bombers to the Far East at the present time is by shipment in cargo vessels, including those converted for use as aircraft transports. It is recommended that no change be made in our present plans for movement of aircraft to the Far East by cargo vessels.

4. The question raised concerning the strategic plans of the Pacific Fleet will be covered separately.
ARMY RADIOGRAM
PARAPHRASED COPY

FROM: CHUNGKING
20 DECEMBER 1941

GENERALISSIMO ASKED THAT I INFORM YOU THAT HE IS SORRY HE IS UNABLE TO
REPORT RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS OF JOINT PRELIMINARY MILITARY CONFERENCE
BY THE PARTICULAR TIME REQUESTED X IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT GENERAL WAVELL
WILL ARRIVE PRIOR TO TWENTY-SECOND OR TWENTY-THIRD X ON DECEMBER TWENTY-
FIRST GENERAL BRETT WILL ARRIVE FROM RANGOON X IT HAS BEEN REQUESTED OF
THE GOVERNOR OF DUTCH EAST INDIES THAT HE SEND SOMEONE TO REPRESENT HIM X
THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT IN LONDON HAS GIVEN AUTHORITY TO THE HEAD OF ITS
MISSION TO ACT UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF THE REGULARLY APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE
X NO ORDERS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE MILITARY MISSION FROM RUSSIA X DIFFICULTIES IN COMMUNICATIONS HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO NOTIFY GENERAL BRETT
THE EXACT CONTENT OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT HE HAS BEEN URGENTLY REQUESTED
TO ARRIVE IN CHUNGKING AS SOON AS HE CAN GET HERE X THE SECRETARY OF WAR
AND CHIEF OF STAFF HAVE BEEN FURNISHED WITH THE ABOVE INFORMATION X

MAGRUDER.

2230, 21 December 1941.
TRIPLE PRIORITY
12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL

My 10, December 19, 6 p.m.

Eden confirmed the statements made to me yesterday by Molotov and expressed the fear that Soviet insistence that a commitment be entered into at this time recognizing the Soviet frontiers of 1941 may make it impossible for him to reach an understanding with respect to post war, i.e., construction. In this connection he stated that the Soviet demands not only embrace the Baltic states and Bessarabia but also seem to imply some expansion to the west, presumably by advancing the Lithuanian borders into East Prussia. It also appears to be desired by the Soviets that in addition to the reestablishment of the Finnish frontier certain additional naval and air bases in Finland must be obtained. Eden said that he had based his opposition to the Soviet desire for an
for an agreement on frontiers at this time not only on the general inadvisability and impropriety of such action by Great Britain independently of its commonwealth associates but also on his intention to be guided by the message transmitted to Churchill by the President through Hopkins some months ago in which the hope was expressed that no commitments regarding post war settlements should be reached without consultation with the United States. He said he had every intention of holding to this course. Stalin's position was, Eden said, that the Soviet Government would be quite prepared to acquiesce in and support any plans the British Government might have with respect to post war rearrangements such as, for example, the establishment of British bases in Holland or elsewhere on the Atlantic Coast of Europe but that for its part it expects full recognition of its own frontiers and security problems.

With respect to the "Pact of Mutual Assistance," Eden stated that the arrangement contemplated is merely the implementation of the existing war cooperation and that the scope of any agreement of this nature would be confined to the war against Germany - and would not envisage any eventual hostilities elsewhere.
-3- #12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow.

elsewhere, as, for example, in the Orient.

As to the attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to the war in the Pacific, he said that the subject had been discussed of course and that Stalin had said that the Soviet Government considers that it is not now in a position to take action in this area - but that by next spring the situation may have changed.

Eden said that had brought up the question of the situation in the Near East and that Stalin had indicated that the Soviet Government is satisfied with the position in Iran and has no uneasiness with regard to Turkey.

I mentioned the President's desire to have conversations take place in Moscow on the general war effort and Colonel Faymonville's presence here for that purpose.

THOMPSON

KLP
BS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Moscow)
Kuibyshev

Dated December 20, 1941
Rec'd. 11:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

12, December 20, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
Eden stated that he was, of course, aware of this proposal but that he was without specific instructions regarding it. He added that the British military mission is to remain in Moscow and will consequently be in a position to participate in such conversations when they take place.

With respect to the manner in which the American Government is to be kept informed by the British of the results of the conversations being held in Moscow, Eden stated that he had instructed the Foreign Office to show to Ambassador Winant all his telegrams from Moscow.

The British Ambassador at Ankara and the British Minister at Tehran have been so delayed by bad weather that the plan to have them come to Moscow has been abandoned. Eden plans to leave Moscow on his return journey tomorrow night. Thurston.

(END OF MESSAGE)
The following received from Military Attaché, Singapore.

Complete report Singapore conference forwarded via British Cipher purpose speed and secrecy. WD representative presented President’s and MacArthurs views far east situation and insisted they be used as guide in developing plan. All measures suggested by MacArthur adopted definite air and sea communication routes for air and land reinforcements to Philippines and Malaya have been designated and critical points along these routes are to be given special protection. Movement of L S air from Australia to Philippines to be expedited Singapore Conference clearly indicates an immediate need for one supreme head over a combined allied staff for detailed co-ordination of USA British Australian and Dutch measures for movements to their designated locations, institution and maintenance of air and sea lines of communication and the strategic direction of all operations in Pacific area. For example, any projected convoy movement thru this area requires coordinated employment of British Dutch and Australian air for protection of such convoys, British Dutch and Australian Naval escorts and the establishment of striking forces for operation against Japanese units which may attack such convoys. The employment of protective air forces will frequently call for displacement air units to designated air dromes of other countries along the convoy route. Such unified command is necessary to meet both the immediate defensive situation and to originate plans for and conduct of the subsequent offensive operations necessary for expelling Japanese from the area. The logical location of such an allied command headquarters appears to be Eandoeng. At present control is loosely exercised over British Dutch Australian and New Zealand units by CINC Far East and CINC Eastern Fleet requiring usually specific consent of country concerned to requests for employment of its major units. Necessity for communication between the various countries invariably results in delayed execution which would not occur were command to be exercised over an allied staff in one location. Believe Chinese should be included. Unofficial opinions expressed here indicate USA Commander acquainted with the Pacific area would not only be acceptable but desirable.

BRINK
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is suggested that as soon as a preliminary decision is reached as to the delimitation of the Southwest Pacific Theater, and in agreement with the British and Dutch authorities, a communication in substance as follows, be dispatched to Chiang Kai-shek:

1. In order to insure coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a Supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater, which includes Burma.

2. The advisability of a similar coordination and control of activities of the Associated Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch governments, I desire to suggest that you should exercise such coordinating control of all forces of the Associated Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such coordination effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, Dutch, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might well be included.
This staff would function under your supervising control.

The supreme commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters and your joint planning staff. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable. Such liaison would make possible the quick movement of suitable forces from one theater to another in case of an emergency, as well as provide an agency for long-term planning. Your view of this matter will be greatly appreciated by the American, British and Dutch Governments.
From: Special Naval Observer, London.

(Paraphrased by Leahey)

The Far Eastern Situation was extensively discussed on 15 December by the originator, the British Assistant Chief of Staff, Naval, Foreign Section; the Dutch Minister of Marine, and the Plans Division of the Admiralty.

It was stated by the Assistant Chief of Staff that (a) security of communications around the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East and the Persian oil fields, and (b) support of the defense of Australia and New Zealand are commitments of Britain in the Far East.

These commitments will be met by the British concentrating in the Indian Ocean a force of four aircraft carriers and four battleships of the "R" class which are now escorting troop convoys around the Cape of Good Hope. The troop convoy now in the Indian Ocean has already been diverted from the Middle East to Bombay.

Britain would defend Australia and New Zealand if a choice were forced. Apprehension is felt at the present time that the enemy forces now attacking the Malay Peninsula might close communications to Singapore through the Malacca Straits by seizing the northern end of Sumatra. This would be a stepping stone to the southeast for aircraft operations. Japanese establishment in northern Malaya will constitute a menace from air, mines and submarines in the Malacca Straits even though they do not attack Northern Sumatra.

The most secure lines of communications to Singapore in either case would be through Sundra Strait (between southern Sumatra and Java), via Banka (an island off the southeast coast of Sumatra).

The ability of the Allies to deny the Davao, Waigui and Natuna Islands lines to the enemy governed in a large measure the defense of the Malay barrier. (NOTE: Waigui (Waigeo) Island is approximately 30 miles N.W. of A.W. end of New Guinea. Natuna Island is approximately 270 miles N.E. of Singapore) The Dutch now believe that the next point of attack will probably be at Tarakan or Sangkilaran Bay on the East Coast of Borneo. The Japanese have had concessions here.

It was pointed out by the British that destruction of the oil fields in Borneo and Sumatra would necessitate the use of about fifty tankers to supply Australia and New Zealand from the Persian fields. These ships can be spared only with difficulty.

Page 1 of 2
The Dutch Minister of Marine declared that Dutch are now patrolling Davao-Waigui line and that very little Dutch land and air strength was available for defense of Northern Sumatra since it was now employed in Java and around the Java Sea. They have about two hundred fighter planes around the Java Sea.

The British stated that the immediate need in Malaya Peninsula is for fighters and medium bombers, and emphasized the necessity of fighter umbrellas.

A staff representative from British War Office said that the indications from the Malaya front seemed to indicate that the Japs had driven two wedges through the three brigades defending the Kedar sector.

He stated that Kota Bharu did not present any particular difficulties; that at present there were no signs of enemy landings further down the eastern coast of Malaya, nor had any further information been received of the reported presence of large Japanese convoy off Indo-Chinese Coast.

All parties to the conference agree that if practicable an Allied Naval and Air offensive delivered promptly and unexpectedly at this time would upset Japanese present plans and prove of great benefit.

Spennovo recommends that a vigorous attack by Russian planes and submarines and by U.S. planes basing on Russian fields would be of great assistance if such action by Russia would not reduce their European strength.
KD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (30)

(Moscow)
Kuibyshev

Dated December 21, 1941
Rec'd. 9:39 a.m., 22d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

13, December 21, 11 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

My 12, December 20, 9 p. m.

Sir Alexander Cadogan informed me this evening that it became apparent at the most recent meetings between Eden and Stalin that it would be impossible to reconcile the British and Soviet drafts of the proposed pacts on the joint war effort and European post-war problems, in view of the Soviet attitude with respect to the recognition of the 1941 frontiers. It was accordingly agreed that the project to conclude pacts on these two points should be abandoned and that a joint communique on the Moscow conversations should be issued instead. This communique is to be released Monday December 29.

Although Cadogan did not permit me to read the communique (a copy of which he said would be handed to Ambassador Winant) he informed me that it asserts that as a result
(Moscow)

-2- #13, December 21, 11 p. m., from Molvishev.

that as a result of the Moscow conversations between the delegation headed by Eden and the Soviet representatives he added by Stalin full agreement was found to exist with respect to the joint conduct of the War which is to be prosecuted until Hitlerite Germany shall have been definitively vanquished. Thereafter steps will be taken to prevent the recurrence of German aggression. It also states that insofar as post war reconstruction is concerned the conversations have brought about an understanding between the parties which will facilitate further discussion of the subject.

When I asked Cadogan whether the reference to further discussion meant that the conversations just ended would be resumed in the near future he replied that the next step to be taken by his Government will be to consult with the Government of the United States. He expressed the opinion that it might be found advisable for the American and British Governments to agree as to their attitude toward post war problems and to present their agreement jointly for the consideration of the Soviet Government.

In the course of our general conversation I again inquired with respect to Stalin's attitude toward the
(Moscow)

-3- #13, December 21, 11 p.m., from Kuibyshev.

toward the establishment of a second front against Hitler in Europe. Cadogan confirmed Eden's statement that while the subject had been explored Stalin had recognized the validity of the British argument against such a course at this time and had displayed no inclination to press the matter.

With respect to Soviet participation in the War against Japan he also confirmed Eden's statement that Stalin had indicated that the Soviet Union is not in a position to engage in hostilities with Japan at present but that it may be by next spring.

He also informed me that Stalin appears to be most optimistic with respect to the present military situation and that he had expressed the belief that Germany will be defeated within one year and Japan possibly within six months.

Probably because General Nye and other members of the Mission are visiting the front today Eden's departure has been postponed until tomorrow.

THURSTON

ALC
PD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated December 21, 1941
Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET TO THE SECRETARY AND

THE PRESIDENT.

Following up my number 6147 December 19, 11 p.m.

This afternoon I went down to the Foreign Office

Sir John Anderson, who has been anonymously acting as Secretary of State during Eden's absence, the ranking civil servant, Sir Orme Sargent, and Richard

Levy, the Parliamentary Secretary, were absent because it was Sunday. I took advantage of Eden's instructions to his Private Secretary, who was present, that I

should see all messages from him from Russia and was given them to read.

The negotiations did not continue on the same easy basis at the first meeting (see my telegram under reference) but they concluded on a cordial note and ended in a banquet given by Stalin to Eden.

It was mutually agreed to postpone an actual agreement
[Redacted] #6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London

agreement but a communique is to be issued instead and released by wireless on midnight December 28-29 Greenwich meantime. It will state identity of views in regard to the conduct of the war especially as regards defeat of Hitlerite Germany and prevention of future German aggression. It will also state that there was an exchange of views on post war problems relating to peace and security which it will be said have provided useful material for future collaboration of concrete principles.

VINANT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

I am attaching at the end of this message the draft memorandum given to Eden and approved by the Cabinet on his departure from London. His messages do not indicate to what extent he made use of the memorandum but I felt you would be interested in its content.

During the early phase of the discussion Stalin told Eden he had a message from President Roosevelt asking that Russia be represented by an observer at a conference to be called at Chungking the following day. He further asked Eden if he knew anything about the object of the conference. Eden said that a similar message had reached the British Foreign Office and gave him the gist of the telegram forwarded by the British Government in reply to the President. Stalin then told him that the Soviet Government was prepared to attend any number of
any number of conferences if it would be helpful but that they could do nothing about the conference at Chungking as they had had no information about its subject matter.

I was told that Stalin had been informed about the conference to be held in Washington but this information did not appear in any of Eden's cables which were shown to me. I personally believe it is important in the days immediately ahead to keep Stalin sufficiently informed through Litvinov to give him a sense of being included in war and peace plans. You of course will have information on this phase of the Washington negotiations that I am not acquainted with here.

WINANT

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

(Begin memorandum) "His majesty's Government are anxious for early consultation with the Soviet Government in order to determine the best means of uniting their efforts for the winning on the war and for devising and maintaining a durable peace.

Two. The conduct of the war must be the subject of a confidential exchange of views, the result of which clearly cannot be given out to the workers.

Three. Plans for the peace settlement, on which the views of the United States Government will, of course, be essential, should perhaps in great part remain known only to the three Governments.

Four. But it seems highly desirable that the Soviet Government and His majesty's Government should forthwith mark their association in a public declaration in the same way as the United States Government and His Majesty's Government have already, by the Atlantic charter, together subscribed to certain guiding principles.

Thus
Thus would be manifested the determination of the three great powers to strive together for the utter defeat of totalitarian aggression, and for the restoration and maintenance of peace.

Five. Plainly, the first objective is the total defeat of Germany and it is suggested that the two Governments might pledge themselves not to lay down their arms until the German military power has been so broken as to render it incapable of further threatening the peace of the world, and not to make peace with any government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.

Six. Secondly, as regards the after war period, it will be desirable to plan to keep Germany deprived of the military means of aggression against other countries.

Seven. As regards the peace settlement and the planning of postwar reconstruction, the Atlantic charter, of which the Soviet Government has already intimated their acceptance, might be taken as a starting point.

Eight. His Majesty's Government for their part would
De:ce:mbEr 21, 1 0 p.m. from London

would wish to associate themselves with the statement made by M. Stalin on the 6th November when he defined the war aims of the Soviet Government and their attitude towards other countries. M. Stalin's statement ran as follows:

"We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territory, the subjugation of foreign peoples, whether it concerns the peoples and territories of Europe, or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Persia. Our first aim consists in liberating our territories and our peoples from the German Fascist yoke.

WINANT

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (B)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

T. I. P. E. L.
6166, December 21, 10 p.m. (SECTION FOUR.)

"We have not, and we cannot have, such war aims as the forcing of our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or any other enslaved European peoples, who are expecting our assistance. Our aim consists in helping these peoples in their struggle for liberation against Hitlerite tyranny, and later permitting them freely to settle their own destiny in their own land. No interference in the internal affairs of other people."

Nine. At this moment it will probably be found premature to attempt to reach any conclusions as regards the post-war territorial settlement, having regard to Clause 2 of the Atlantic Charter, which deprecates any territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government recognize the need in any eventual settlement to strengthen the smaller countries of Europe so as to put them, both economically and strategically, in a position
position to resist successfully pressure by Germany. For this purpose they welcome the negotiations between the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments for a con-
federation. They would hope that this federal system might be extended so as to include other states of Central Europe. It is understood, moreover, that this is the intention of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments. His Majesty's Government also hope that the various Balkan states may combine to form a simi-
lar system. Such confederations should contribute to the establishment of such a permanent system of general security as is foreshadowed in the 8th clause of the Atlantic Charter.

Ten. In the matter of economic reconstruction His Majesty's Government hope that the Soviet Govern-
ment will participate in the coordination of post-war economic policy generally, and His Majesty's Government trust that the Soviet Government will be ready at the appropriate moment to participate in discussions on the various aspects of this far-reaching (?)

Eleven. His Majesty's Government recognize the justice of requiring Germany to make restitution as far as is possible for the spoliation of which she has been guilty during the period of the war. This is a subject, however,
however, which His Majesty's Government would desire to examine and discuss further with the Soviet Government at a later stage when circumstances will make it easier than at present to reach definite conclusions.

Twelve. His Majesty's Government will for their part be prepared to assist, in so far as lies in their power, in the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union after the war.

Thirteen. On all of the above matters the association of the United States Government is essential and the Soviet Government will no doubt agree with His Majesty's Government that, with this end in view, the United States Government should be kept fully informed of their discussions.

Fourteen. It is, of course, recognized that there are many other questions affecting the peace settlement which will have to be discussed between the British and Soviet Governments in consultation with the other Allies and the United States when the elements of appreciation are sufficient to make it possible to reach conclusion."

End memorandum.

END OF MESSAGE.
Memorandum for the President:

Dec. 22, 1941

Herewith is a redraft of our views on the subject of the British memorandum of December 18, in accordance, so far as I understand, with your directions.

Chief of Staff.

Tentative U.S. Views on Subjects of British Memorandum, Dec. 18

(i) The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers is the defeat of Germany and her Allies. While initially maintaining the strategic defensive, conduct local offensives in appropriate theatres. Ultimately conduct an all-out offensive (1) against Germany and her European Allies, (2) against Japan. Since a successful air offensive must precede any other form of decisive offensive action, the early development of the required air forces, their logistic support and the ground forces necessary to secure their bases must be assured. The first consideration to each of the Associated Powers, Russia, the British Commonwealth, China and the United States, is its own national security. The common purpose demands maintenance of essential communications, especially sea communications via the North Atlantic and air communications via the trans-African Far East route.

(ii) The British Commonwealth is operating offensively against the Axis in the Middle East and with air power in Germany. The United States lacks defensive equipment against air raids on
exposed critical production and naval facilities - the only type of attack that is presently indicated against our mainland. Russia is devoting her entire resources to the destruction of the German army, thereby compelling large-scale diversions of German manpower and materiel from other fronts. China is near complete isolation and needs military materiel. She is conducting limited offensives to assist in defense of Malaysia. The maintenance of adequate air and sea communications and the safety of China demand the defense of the Singapore - Philippine - Dutch Indies area. It follows that Malaysia is a theater of present urgent importance.

The following immediate military measures should be undertaken by:

**China**: Defend China, assist in defense of Burma, and provide facilities for air operations against Japanese homeland.

**Russia**: Continue offensive operations against Germany.

**British Commonwealth**:

a. In cooperation with United States maintain sea communications in Atlantic and to Middle and Far East.

b. Strengthen Singapore, Burma and Dutch East Indies to secure those areas and reduce the threat to China.
c. Assist the United States in providing land and air equipment to Russia and China.

d. Defend present occupied areas and additional areas that might further the ultimate objective.

United States:

a. Cooperate with British Commonwealth in maintaining sea and air communications, and in establishing any additional bases necessary to this purpose.

b. Reinforce Philippines, Dutch East Indies and Australia to further the security of China and Southwest Pacific.

c. Supply Russia, China and the British Commonwealth with such ground and air equipment as can be made available.

d. Establish air and antiaircraft defenses to protect coastal military production and naval and shipping installations in the United States.

e. Equip and dispose forces necessary to secure outposts and vital sources of supply in the Western Hemisphere.

f. Strengthen naval power in Central Pacific including strong reinforcement of Hawaiian garrison.

g. Attain maximum scale in all military, air, shipping and naval production.
All Associated Powers: Initiate preparations immediately to raise and equip forces and provide shipping for later large scale offensive operations.

(iii) Allocation of Joint Forces to harmonize with (i)

Only the British Commonwealth and the United States possess troops sufficiently free of enemy pressure or threat to permit of redistribution. Only such forces of the British Commonwealth and the United States are subject to redistribution as are not actively engaged with the enemy or required for immediate security tasks heretofore indicated for these Governments.

The following dispositions should be immediately initiated:

The United States to reinforce the Philippine Islands and Dutch East Indies with ground and air forces with particular emphasis on aviation. The principal operating bases to be established in Australia.

The British Commonwealth to reinforce with land and air elements the forces in Singapore, Dutch East Indies and Burma.

Further detailed allocations cannot be indicated until missions enumerated herein are jointly agreed upon, and operations necessary to their accomplishment have been jointly planned.

(iv) In joint conference make necessary adjustments in the Victory Program to initiate the production of equipment and the creation of military forces contemplated in that program.
Create a Supreme Allied War Council to study joint problems and to recommend to the Associated Powers applicable policies, plans, programs and allocations.

Create at once a Military Joint Planning Committee and a Joint Supply Committee to propose the plans and take the actions necessary to implement approved recommendations of the Supreme War Council.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Supplementing my suggestions regarding a Supreme War Council, I give you this additional outline of organizations that might function under it:

Military Council
Naval Council
Aviation Council
Shipping Council
Economic Council
  Food Committee
  Munitions Committee
  Raw Materials Committee
  Petroleum Committee

These auxiliary organizations were contemplated by the provisions in draft of the Supreme War Council wherein it was given responsibility for "coordinating distribution of available resources of all categories between various theatres of war".
December 17, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

In view of the experience of the United States and the Allies during the first World War, and in view of the circumstances of the present war, there is set out below a suggested outline for a Supreme War Council designed to provide for the most effective use of available human and material resources in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers.

Supreme War Council
Military Council
Naval Council
Aviation Council
Shipping Council
Economic Council
Food Committee
Munitions Committee
Raw Materials Committee
Petroleum Committee

Some of the principal problems in connection with the establishment and operation of a Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies are listed below with a suggested solution.

1. **Representation:** The Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be composed of representatives of the United States, British Empire, Soviet Union, China, and possibly the Netherlands. The Soviet Union, in view of its neutrality agreement with Japan, would be announced
announced as participating only in discussions of problems relating to the conduct of the war against Germany and Italy; however, in actual practice it would probably work out that most of the problems would relate directly or indirectly to this aspect of the war. Representation on the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies would be limited to four or five powers because an organization composed of representatives of all the nations arrayed against Germany would be too large to be effective.

2. Decisions: The decisions of the Supreme War Council and the various subordinate bodies would be unanimous.

3. Seat of Council: The circumstances of this war would seem to make it desirable that the Supreme War Council and subordinate bodies be located at Washington.

4. Unity of Command: There would be no general unity of command of the armed forces throughout the world which are pitted against the Axis powers, except in so far as the Supreme Council itself would constitute a unity of command. However, the Supreme War Council, with the approval of the represented governments, might decide on unity of command in certain theatres of war as for example in the Far East or in the Near East.

Carlton Savage

A-L:CS:AMH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring further to your personal inquiry of me at Cabinet as to whether I considered legal and valid that provision of the Supreme War Council draft to the effect that the President can pledge himself as a member of the War Council "not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement", I herewith enclose opinion by Mr. Hackworth prepared at my request which, in my judgment, makes clear the legal and constitutional validity of this provision. I hope you may have a chance to glance over it.
TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

The Secretary:

I do not feel that there is the slightest question regarding an undertaking by the President "not to cease hostilities against or conclude a separate armistice with the common enemies or any of them, except by common agreement".

The Constitution declares that the President "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States". (Art. 2, sec. 2.) The Supreme Court in United States v. Sweeney stated that the object of this provision is "evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over all the military forces,—such supreme and undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war." [Underscoring supplied.] (157 U.S. (1895) 281, 284.)

The power of the President as Commander in Chief and his duty to prosecute a war to a "successful" conclusion are no less extensive than those of the Congress "To declare war . . .; To raise and support Armies . . .; To provide and maintain a Navy", etc. (Art. 1, sec. 8.)

The Constitution itself contains no specific grant of power to any branch of the Government to make peace.
The matter was discussed, however, at the Constitutional Convention, on August 17, 1787, in connection with the granting of power to Congress to make war. A motion was made to add the words "and peace" after the word "war", so as to give Congress the power to declare both war and peace. The motion was unanimously rejected. (II Journal of the Constitutional Convention (Hunt's ed., 1908) 188, 189.)

While Congress has authority under the Constitution to declare war, once it is declared it is for the President to determine when peace may be concluded. He may conclude an armistice or negotiate a treaty of peace, or both. The armistice is wholly a function of the President but a treaty of peace requires senatorial approval.

Hare, in his work on the Constitution, says that "it is the right of the President, and not of Congress, to determine whether the terms [of peace] are advantageous, and if he refuses to make peace, the war must go on." (I Hare, American Constitutional Law (1889) 171-172.)

In the report of the Judiciary committee to the Forty-ninth Congress on the treaty power, it is stated that "Congress cannot create the status of peace by repealing its declaration of war, because the former requires the concurrence of two wills, the latter but the action of one." (H. Rept. 4177, 49th Cong., 3d

* Article IX of the Articles of Confederation had given Congress sole and exclusive power to determine on peace and war.
In August 1919 Senator Fall of New Mexico presented the following question to President Wilson: "In your judgment, have you not the power and authority, by proclamation, to declare in appropriate words that peace exists and thus restore the status of peace between the Governments and peoples of this country and those with whom we declared war?" The President replied: "I feel constrained to say . . . not only that in my judgment I have not the power by proclamation to declare that peace exists, but that I could in no circumstances consent to take such a course prior to the ratification of a formal treaty of peace." (58 Cong. Rec. Pt. 4, pp. 4176, 4177.)

The question of the procedure for terminating war was raised by House Joint Resolution 327 of May 21, 1920 the intended to repeal Joint Resolution of April 6, 1917 declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and Germany, and the Joint Resolution of December 7, 1917 declaring a state of war to exist between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to declare a state of peace. (59 Cong. Rec. Pt. 7, p. 7423.)

The resolution was vetoed by President Wilson on May 27 on the ground that it did not "accomplish any of these objects" for which the United States had entered the war. He stated:
I have not felt at liberty to sign this joint resolution because I cannot bring myself to become party to an action which would place an ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States. The resolution seeks to establish peace with the German Empire without exacting from the German Government any action by way of setting right the infinite wrongs which it did to the peoples whom it attacked and whom we professed it our purpose to assist when we entered the war. Have we sacrificed the lives of more than 100,000 Americans and ruined the lives of thousands of others and brought upon thousands of American families an unhappiness that can never end for purposes which we do not now care to state or take further steps to attain?

But the treaty as signed at Versailles has been rejected by the Senate of the United States, though it has been ratified by Germany. By that rejection and by its method we have in effect declared that we wish to draw apart and pursue objects and interests of our own, unhampered by any connections of interest or of purpose with other Governments and peoples." (59 Cong. Rec. Pt. 9, pp. 7747, 7748.)

However, on July 2, 1921, President Harding signed a Joint Resolution declaring "at an end" the state of war "declared to exist between the Imperial German Government and the United States of America by the Joint Resolution of Congress approved April 6, 1917". It also declared
declared to be at an end the war between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government. (42 Stat. 105.) A joint resolution of Congress announcing the termination of war is undoubtedly valid so far as domestic law is concerned but so far as concerns the international situation, the attitude of the enemy must be taken into account. Peace between the United States and Germany, for example, was not formally restored until the exchange on November 11, 1921 of ratifications of the Treaty of Berlin. President Harding in proclaiming the treaty stated that the war terminated on July 2, 1921. His action in so doing is probably explainable by the fact that the treaty incorporated inextricable parts of the Joint Resolution of that date.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declared in a decision in 1930 that —

"The joint resolution of Congress of July 2, 1921, did not terminate the war. This resolution was not legally binding on Austria, and regardless of its political effect, it was not a legal restoration of peace as that can be accomplished only by a bilateral treaty of peace. . . ." (First Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Anglo-Oesterreichische Bank, for Use of Anglo-Austrian Bank, Limited, for Use of Grouf, 37 F. (2d) 584, 587-588.)

In the case of Arnold et al. v. Ellison et al., Appellants, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the war between the United States and Germany ended on November 14, 1921, the date when the President proclaimed the treaty of peace between the United States and Germany. The court said:
"Nor can we give our assent to appellants' contention that the war was terminated by the joint resolution of Congress, passed July 2, 1921, (42 Stat. at L. 105, Sec. 1). A state of war cannot be terminated by a mere declaration by one of the belligerents that there is no longer any reason for its continuation. The actual termination of a war is a mutual matter evidenced by a treaty, duly ratified by both parties, and it cannot properly be said that a war has ended until the ratifications have been exchanged. True, the section of the Trading with the Enemy Act which we have quoted, after fixing 'the date of proclamation of exchange of ratifications' as the 'end of the war' added 'unless the President shall by proclamation declare a prior date.' This seems to contemplate, for the purposes of that act, the possibility of a proclamation declaring the war ended prior to the exchange of ratifications. No such proclamation was made. The only proclamation was that of November 14, 1921, reciting the exchange of ratifications and declaring the war to have terminated on July 2, 1921. We are not persuaded that this proclamation should be given the retroactive effect contended for; to do so would be equivalent to saying that a right of action, to which the statute would have been a bar within a few days after the end of the war, may, by a proclamation made three days later, be set back more than four months, with the effect that it could never be enforced." (96 Pa. Superior Ct. 118, 124 (1929).)

In the case of Kotzias v. Tyser, the Court of King's Bench held -

"the authorities show that, in the absence of any specific statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the general rule of international law is that as between civilized Powers who have been at war, peace is not concluded until a treaty of Peace is finally binding upon the belligerents, and that that stage is not reached until ratifications of the treaty of peace have been exchanged between them." [1920] 2 K.B. 69, 77.

Furthermore,
Furthermore, whatever may be said of the effect of the Joint Resolution of July 2, 1921, it is to be borne in mind that it was the joint act of the Congress and the President. If in the present situation Congress should pass a resolution with the President's commitment regarding hostilities still outstanding, he could veto it as President Wilson did in 1920 and it would not become operative even domestically unless passed over his veto.

The only way by which Congress could compel the President to "cease hostilities" would be by cutting off the appropriations. Even in such a situation he could do as President Theodore Roosevelt is said to have threatened to do when the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs reportedly announced that Congress would refuse to appropriate money to send the fleet around the world. In referring to the incident he stated:

"... However, I announced in response that I had enough money to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There was no further difficulty about the money." (Roosevelt, An Autobiography (1913) 592, 598.)

The resolutions of Congress declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Japan, Germany and Italy pledge "all of the resources of the country" to bring the conflict to "a successful termination."
Both by the resolutions of Congress and by the Constitution the President is to be the judge as to how best to prosecute the war. Its successful termination may depend upon the ability of the President to make certain that Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and China shall continue in the struggle until the enemies are defeated. The best way to be sure that this situation shall obtain is through a pledge by them not to cease fighting except by common agreement of all four Powers. The President could not obtain such a pledge from the other Powers without making one himself. He is justified in doing so by reason of his responsibility as Commander in Chief and his broad powers in the conduct of foreign relations. As stated by the Supreme Court regarding this latter prerogative:

"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, and delicate and manifest problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it." (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).

Green H. Hackworth

Le GHH: AD
Green shaded area = present approximate proposals for boundaries of "SOUTH WESTERN PACIFIC THEATRE" as I understand it.

(Stg) R.G.CASEY

Blue shaded area = area excluded from S.W. Pacific Theatre and from area for which U.S. Pacific Fleet responsible.
37mm AA Guns
Bns. available

Sufficient equipment for 2 Bns. allocated to the Navy.
AA Ammunition *
Cal. 50 AP

* Caliber 50 AP Ammunition may also be used in ground, combat vehicle, and aircraft machine guns.
(No Deductions Made For D.A. & Navy)
Cal. 50 AA Machine Guns and Mounts

Bns. available

Total Guns in Bn.
AA Regt. (Mobile)
(12 Cal. 50 AA Machine
Guns Each Bn.)

1941 1942 1943
Dec. 1 Jan. 1 Feb. 1 Mar. 1 Apr. 1 May 1 June 1 July 1 Aug. 1 Sept. 1 Oct. 1 Nov. 1 Dec. 1

Bns. 2,000 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0

(1,018)
(98)
(1,823)
(1958)

Sufficient Guns for 243 Bns.
allocated to D.A. and the Navy.
Sufficient Mounts for 171 Bns.
allocated to D.A. and the Navy.

LEGEND

- Guns
- Mounts
Total Guns in Bn.
AA Regt. (Mobile)
32 40mm AA Guns
Each Bn.

1941
Dec. 1
Jan. 1
Feb. 1
Mar. 1
Apr. 1
May 1
June 1
July 1
Aug. 1
Sept. 1
Oct. 1
Nov. 1
Dec. 1
Jan. 1

1942

1943

Bns.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

(0)
(64)

Sufficient Guns to equip
47 Bns. allocated to D.A.
3" and 90 mm AA Guns
Bns. available

Total Guns in Bn.
AA Regt. (Mobile)
(12 3" or 12 90mm Guns Each Bn.)

1941
Dec. 1
Bns.

1942
Jan. 1
Feb. 1
March 1
April 1
May 1
June 1
July 1
Aug. 1
Sept. 1
Oct. 1
Nov. 1
Dec. 1

1943
Jan. 1

1942
Jan. 1
Feb. 1
March 1
April 1
May 1
June 1
July 1
Aug. 1
Sept. 1
Oct. 1
Nov. 1
Dec. 1

LEGEND

Sufficient equipment for 8 Bns. allocated to D.A. and the Navy.

--- 3" Gun Bns.
--- 90mm Gun Bns.

(6)--- (47)--- (47)--- (84)---
40mm AA Ammunition — HE

Thousands of Rounds

1941
Dec. 1  1942
Jan. 1  Feb. 1  March 1  Apr. 1  May 1  June 1  July 1  Aug. 1  Sept. 1  Oct. 1  Nov. 1  Dec. 1

(6,475)

No deductions made for D.A.
AP not included — No production until September 1942
REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
January 2, 1941.

U. S. Serial ABC-4/6
British Serial WW 6 (Approved)
Supersedes ABC-4/6, British WW 3 (Final)

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF
AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area.

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially
all land and sea areas included in the general region Burma - Malaya -
Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in
Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces.

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the
ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air, of
the ABDA Governments which are or will be:

a. Stationed in the Area;

b. Located in Australian territory when such
forces have been allotted by the respective
governments for services in or in support
of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the
ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of
the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and, if required, a commander
of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces
will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces as-
signed to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its
forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to
you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy.

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the
conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to
maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at
the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive
against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority
at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated
air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized.
Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for
the offensive.

-1-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
6. The general strategic policy will therefore be:

a. To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities, and Authority of the Supreme Commander.

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the international administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in Paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations.

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly appointed by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force, except in the case of urgent necessity.
In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments.

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land, and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method, and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command.

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in Paragraph 16.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority.

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.
BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 145° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 140° East, thence north-westward to latitude 15° South, longitude 92° East.

On the west: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX 2

January 2, 1942

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:
   a. The provision of reinforcements.
   b. A major change in policy.
   c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:
   a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.
   b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.
   c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegram to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.
TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

Preliminary summary Halsey's attack.

Many ships auxiliary and merchant type, sunk and damaged in Kwajelein atoll by torpedo and bomb attack. Several merchant type sunk beached and damaged: Kotjy by bombing and bombardment. Taroa island air base heavily bombed and bombarded extensive damage. Watje island believed severely damaged by bombardment. Roi and Kwajelein islands bombed and strafed intermediate damage. Many enemy planes destroyed on ground and in air. Fletcher reports heavily damaging two auxiliary type vessels in Jaluit.

Our damage Chester one bomb hit well deck can make thirty knots. Enterprise intermediate damage believed to be slight caused by near misses. Still under attack. Six planes failed to return.

USS Wakefield ex SS Manhattan damaged in Singapore area by bomb hit, eleven men killed three wounded no underwater damage.

Will keep you advised.  

MCCREA.

Feb 1 1942.
February 18, 1942

Dear Jerry:

I have read your memorandum of the 17th relative to
the ships for the ABDA area.

I approve your proposal for the particular use of ships,
except I do not approve the taking of ships from Russia which
are necessary to meet our Protocol requirements. I wish you
would find some other ships than the ones ticketed for Russia,
unless you have alternate plans for meeting the Russian
Protocol.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Admiral Emory S. Land,
Chairman,
United States Maritime Commission.

HLH/1mb
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference (a): Conference with Honorable Harry Hopkins, General Somervell, Colonel Gross and Rear Admiral Land on February 14, 1942.

The War Department has submitted the request for the immediate assignment by the Maritime Commission of the following four (4) passenger vessels required for military movement:

URUGUAY, SANTA LUCIA, SANTA CLARA and SANTA PAULA.

The War Department proposes to furnish three (3) passenger vessels (making a total of 7), as follows:

PANAMA, PRESIDENT MONROE and QUEEN ELIZABETH (British).

The military movement also contemplates the assignment of approximately 16 cargo vessels.

We have also received a request from the Department of State looking to the assignment of two passenger vessels for the transportation of various Axis officials and non-officials from Latin American countries to the United States, and a third passenger vessel for the transportation of these officials to Lisbon. The same vessel would return to the United States, American officials now awaiting transportation. The same vessel would subsequently perform similar voyage to and from Lourenco Marques (American and Japanese interchange).

For this interchange of diplomats, etc. the War Department proposes to furnish two of the three vessels required; namely, the ETOLIN (Army Transport) and the ACADIA (Maritime Commission charter assigned to Army). The third ship is the S.S. BRAZIL which it is proposed should make the trip from the United States to Lisbon and upon completion of that trip make a second trip from the United States to Lourenco Marques.
The two vessels furnished by the War Department would make the West Coast of South America trip to the United States.

Assignment of the passenger vessels will have the following effect:

1. The discontinuance of American passenger service to the East Coast of South America formerly performed by the SSs URUGUAY, BRAZIL and ARGENTINA. (The ARGENTINA is now in the southwestern Pacific.)

2. Complete discontinuance of American passenger service to Venezuela and to the West Coast of South America. These services were formerly performed by the SSs SANTA ROSA, SANTA PAULA and SANTA ELENA (all three are now in military service) and by the SANTA LUCIA and SANTA CLARA, now required by the War Department.

   (The only remaining American passenger service to the East Coast of South America will be four vessels operated from the Gulf by the Mississippi Shipping Company, each vessel having a capacity of approximately 45 passengers.)

3. The SANTA PAULA, now included in the new military movement, was about to perform a military mission to the Red Sea which would have to be postponed.

The assignment of approximately 16 cargo vessels for the proposed military movement would have the following effect:

1. It would involve the employment of 13 EC-2 vessels scheduled for delivery on the Pacific Coast during February and March. The remaining three vessels can undoubtedly be supplied from tonnage already allocated to the War Department.

2. The 13 vessels are suitable for the Russian service, are so intended, and their assignment for other purposes will further jeopardize the fulfillment of this commitment.

3. The maintenance of the contemplated movement would require the furnishing, beginning in April, of approximately four vessels monthly.
It is my understanding that the Army contemplates obtaining Navy clearance for the foregoing with respect to convoy, etc.

In view of the effects outlined above with regard to South America, diplomatic interchange and Russia, I am not prepared to approve these assignments without a directive from you.

There are forwarded herewith a copy of this memorandum for the Honorable Harry Hopkins, Admiral King and General Marshall, attention General Somervell.

Jerry Land

E. S. Land
Chairman