December 14, 1941

My dear Halifax:

Here is a message to General Chiang Kai-Shek and a similar message from me to Mr. Stalin. They are self-explanatory.

I hope you will ask London if they will go ahead with the holding of the Singapore conference and also instruct your people in Chungking and Moscow to take part in the proposed meetings as soon as they are held by Chiang Kai-Shek and Stalin. I assume, of course, that Australia and New Zealand will be represented in Singapore.

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honorable the Viscount Halifax, K. G.,
The British Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferences consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representatives of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

It should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Dutch representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISMO (cont)

British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organisation to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I am working hard on continuing our contribution to your supplies and am trying to increase it.

I send you my very warm personal regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
In my judgment it is of the utmost importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for common action not merely for the next few weeks but also for the permanent defeat of Hitlerism. I very much wish that you and I could meet to talk this over personally. But because that is impossible at the moment I am seeking to initiate three preliminary moves which I hope will be preparatory to a more permanent joint planning.

First, I am suggesting to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek that he call a conference immediately in Chungking consisting of Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and American representatives. This group would meet not later than December seventeenth and report to their respective Governments in the greatest confidence by Saturday, December twentieth. This would give us the preliminary picture of the joint problem from the angle of Chungking.

Second, I am asking the British to assemble a military-naval conference in Singapore, reporting by Saturday the twentieth principally from the operational angle in the Southern zone.

Third, I would be very happy if you personally would talk with American, British and Chinese representatives in Moscow and let me have your suggestions as to the whole picture by Saturday the twentieth.

Fourth, I am during this coming week covering the same ground with British Missions here and will send you the general picture from
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN (cont)

this end.

I have had a good talk with Litvinov and I fully appreciate all of your immediate problems.

Again I want to tell you of the real enthusiasm throughout the United States for the progress your armies are making in the defense of your great nation.

I venture to hope that the preliminary conferences I have outlined for this coming week may lead to the establishment of a more permanent organisation to plan our efforts.

Hopkins and I send our warm personal regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
State Dept. copy
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. IV The Far East
pp. 762.
Telegram to the President
from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Chungking, December 24, 1941

Mr. President:
The Chinese Government and people wish to express their whole-hearted support of your proposed conference of American, British, Chinese and other representatives. We venture to offer the opinion that a Supreme Allied War Council should be established forthwith in Washington for the speedy formulation of comprehensive war plans. This will constitute a concrete step on the part of the nations of the democratic front to coordinate and concert their efforts against the aggressor nations of the Axis, and will be a most effective factor in bringing about the early destruction of our common enemy.

For this purpose I have designated Mr. T. V. Soong, newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Chief Delegate of China to such Conference or Supreme War Council as you contemplate to set up in the immediate future, and request you to be good enough to notify him to participate in your deliberations on all questions relevant to the conduct of the war.
To:  
His Excellency General Chiang Kai Shek,  
Chungking,  
China.

December 29, 1941.

In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater.

The advisability of a similar command of activities of the United Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the United Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the United Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff should function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.
Mr. President Bot.
The attached was returned by the Prime Minister.

Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1942 China
pages 1-2.
FROM CHIANG KAI-SHEK

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

GENERALISSMOS REPLY FOLLOWS:

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Indicate by asterisk Addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

PAGE 2 OF ALUSNA CHUNGKING 021830 CR 0820.

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery.

TEXT

To their resources at home, their communications and their fighting forces on every front. This growing unity has rallied the entire Chinese people behind it. In line with your suggestions I welcome the prompt disposition of American and British representatives to serve on a joint headquarters planning staff. The question of Russian representation can be considered as soon as this staff has assembled and begun its duties. The proposed exchange of liaison with the commander of the British forces in India and the commander of the Southern Pacific Theater can be carried out as soon as the command and headquarters staff of the Chinese theater have been established. In every successive phase of development I would be happy to have your views and suggestions.

President U.S. ....... Act.
Personal File.
Dummy.

SECRET

See Art 76(4) NAV REGS

Make original only, deliver to communication watch officer in person.
February 25, 1942

My dear Mr. President,

General Chiang Kai-shek has sent me a message from Kunming which he asked me to deliver to you in person, and which I am enclosing herewith. As you have been so generous to me in giving me your time in the past, I forbear to impose myself further on you unless you desire to discuss the message with me.

The Canadian Government is making arrangements for me to make a short visit to Canada, leaving tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. and returning in about three days. If necessary, however, I would of course postpone my departure.

With high regard, I am,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

The President
The White House
TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO DR. T. V. SOONG, DATED KUNMING, FEBRUARY 24th.

'I have conveyed to Wellington Koo the following instructions:

"I presume you have seen my farewell message to India. Please take this opportunity to tell Churchill that I am personally shocked by the Indian military and political situation which are in such a state that I could never conceive of before I arrived in India. I am afraid Churchill himself does not know the real situation. It may be best to talk to Cripps first and for him to inform Churchill.

"I have tried to view the colonial problem most objectively. I could not but speak frankly of what I thought. But I feel strongly that if the Indian political problem is not immediately and urgently solved, the danger will be daily increasing. If the British Government should wait until Japanese planes begin to bomb India and the Indian morale collapses, it would already be too late. If the solution is postponed until after the Japanese armies enter India, then it will be certainly too late. If the Japanese should know of the real situation and attack India, they would be virtually unopposed.

"If the political situation in India were to change for the better, this may prevent the enemy from having any ambitions to enter India.

"Please convey the above to Cripps. Also point out that, in my opinion, if the British Government should voluntarily give the Indians real power and do not allow different parties in India to cause confusion, the Indians would change their attitude toward England, forget their hard feelings and become loyal to the British Empire. Only such a policy could halt the Indian trend to part from the British Empire and make it obvious that it is unp politic and disadvantageous to secede from the Empire."

Please convey my views to the President. In a word the danger is extreme. If the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India, it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India. When I think of it I am both worried and alarmed. Besides deluding themselves and deluding the people with the belief that there is no immediate danger, there is no realization that war is on and there is no determined spirit to fight. The defeat in Malaya was so rapid, probably/similar reasons, and as for military preparations, the present Indian military preparedness is very much behind even of that the British had in Malaya.'
February 25, 1942

Dear General Watson,

I enclose a letter for the President, which you have kindly promised to deliver to him.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

General Edwin M. Watson
The White House
February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. T. V. SOONG

Dear T. V.:

Thank you ever so much for the message from the Generalissimo.

I hope you have a good visit in Canada. Let me know when you get back.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS, WHITE HOUSE:

Attached hereto is a suggested draft for a reply by the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Admiral King has not seen this draft, but General Marshall has tentatively approved it.

Will you please revise as you see fit and return to me as soon as possible in order that reply may be dispatched with least practicable delay.

Inc.
Draft of reply.
April 24, 1942.

Dr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Dr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek?

I have just received your special message handed to me by
Dr. Soong and hasten to present to you our position relative to the
matters set forth therein. First, permit me to say that I am more
than grateful to you for sending General Hsuing Shih-Fei, meeting
whom has afforded me personally very special pleasure. His arrival
at this time is not only most opportune, but he brings qualifications
which will insure his being of particular help to our mutual cause.

As you know, I have been, for a long time, resolutely
determined that you and your army are to have every assistance that
we can send and for that reason alone we are straining every resource
to build up with great rapidity an aerial supply line over ten thousand
miles of difficult flying and directly across the British theatres of
operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. There have been
disappointments to you and to me. They have occurred in spite of
anything we could do.
The United States Government is exploiting every possibility to expedite the flow of Lend-Lease materials to your armies.

In a recent instance, we have taken artillery from the small amounts in the hands of our own troops in order to make available those badly needed weapons to your forces. We have commenced the building up of a small but strong air force in India for ultimate employment in the China theater. Because of shipping and communication difficulties still existing and the loss of Rangoon, this force has been concentrated initially in India. Moreover, because of India's strategic importance as the gateway to China, an interim mission has been assigned to this force to operate against enemy naval units threatening India.

In order to tide over until ground routes are complete from India to China, American pilots are now flying a total of thirty-four transport airplanes fourteen thousand miles for use on the air freight route into China. We are extremely short of air transports at this time, but are making them available at the expense of our own forces, and in spite of acute shortages all along the world-wide battle front. We are planning to provide approximately one hundred such planes when facilities are adequately prepared for their operation. We have withdrawn pursuit airplanes from our own defenses for dispatch to China.
Prior to our entry into the War, a number of Missions were established in Washington by democratic governments all over the world which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requisitions presented by these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to war purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only meager training allotments.

On December 7, we were at War. We were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theatres and to begin equipping our own forces to ready them for the enormous battles that must come. This created a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great Britain for her own use, even while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since the United States insisted that all supplies should be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation. We now had as much interest in British supplies as they had in U. S. production.

I fear that there may exist a rather general misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary bodies including the Munitions
Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers who are in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated and properly balanced between the United States and the United Kingdom according to our respective capacities. The existence of these combined bodies does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. Quite the contrary. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Material Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific-War Council, on which all nations bordering on the Pacific are represented. Its members have the task of studying political-strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters, representatives of the particular power concerned, whether it is China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and not only present their special points of view,
but participate in formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your great country and its participation in this War will be acted upon, even on the technical level, without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on a completely equal basis.

On the political level I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I have been deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has been to us through his constant readiness to supply information and advice.

I tell you without reservation that our sole aim in this war is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your magnificent nation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
April 25, 1942

Dr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Dr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

I have just received your special message handed to me by Dr. Soong and hasten to present to you our position relative to the matters set forth therein. First, permit me to say that I am more than grateful to you for sending General Hauing Shih-Fei, meeting whom has afforded me personally very special pleasure. His arrival at this time is not only most opportune, but he brings qualifications which will insure his being of particular help to our mutual cause.

As you know, I have been, for a long time, resolutely determined that you and your army are to have every assistance that we can send and for that reason alone we are straining every resource to build up with great rapidity an aerial supply line over ten thousand miles of difficult flying and directly across the British theatres of operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

The United States Government is exploiting every possibility to expedite the flow of Lend-Lease materials to your armies. In a recent instance, we have taken artillery from the small amounts
in the hands of our own troops in order to make available those badly needed weapons to your forces.

In order to tide over until ground routes are complete from India to China, American pilots are now flying a total of thirty-four transport airplanes fourteen thousand miles for use on the air freight route into China. We are extremely short of air transports at this time, but are making them available at the expense of our own forces, and in spite of acute shortages all along the world-wide battle front. We are planning to provide approximately one hundred such planes when facilities are adequately prepared for their operation. We have withdrawn pursuit airplanes from our own defenses for dispatch to China.

Prior to our entry into the War, a number of Missions were established in Washington by democratic governments all over the world which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requisitions presented by these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to war purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only meager training allotments. On December 7, we were at war. We were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theatres and to begin equipping our own forces to ready them for the enormous battles that must come. This created a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great
Britain for her own use, even while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since the United States insisted that all supplies should be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation. We now had as much interest in British supplies as they had in U.S. production.

I fear that there may exist a rather general misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary bodies including the Munitions Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers who are in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated and properly balanced between the United States and the United Kingdom according to our respective capacities. The existence of these combined bodies does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. Quite the contrary. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Material Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific War Council, on which all nations bordering on the Pacific are represented. Its members have the task of studying political-
strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters, representatives of the particular power concerned, whether it is China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and not only present their special points of view, but participate in formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your great country and its participation in this war will be acted upon, even on the technical level, without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on a completely equal basis.

On the political level I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I have been deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has been to us through his constant readiness to supply information and advice.

I tell you without reservation that our sole aim in this war is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your magnificent nation.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972

Franklin D. Roosevelt
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date 5-7-42

From: Miss Amerson (Secretary to General Malony)

To: Miss Tully

I am enclosing the drafts about which I talked to you on the telephone this afternoon.

P. A.

Reminder—To take up with Harry Sat. night
May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

In view of the changed military situation, I do not think the message should go in its present form. The message from the Generalissimo, however, does seem to require an answer. I have taken a shot at a re-draft of the attached message in case you desire to use it. I have talked to General Eisenhower about it.

HARRY J. MALONY
Dr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Dr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

"I have received your special message handed to me by Dr. Soong which I have given my careful consideration.

First permit me to tell you that I am very grateful to you for having sent General Hsuing Shih-Fei. The exceptional qualifications which he possesses make him particularly valuable to our mutual cause.

As you well know, we have attempted to our utmost power to build an aerial supply line to you directly across British theaters of operation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. This we have done in the face of an extreme shortage of air transports badly needed by our own troops. We have taken pursuit aircraft and artillery from our own forces for supply to you.

The recent changes brought about by enemy action have made it necessary that our plans be revised to meet the rapidly changing situation as to your supply from us. We are working with the aid of Dr. Soong to estimate the supply possibilities and to effect necessary changes.

Prior to our entry into the War, a number of missions were established in Washington by the Democratic governments of the world..."
which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requirements of these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to War purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only very meager training allotments.

Upon the out-break of War, we were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theaters and to equip our troops for the severe fighting that must follow. This brought about a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and supplies and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great Britain for her own use, while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since, upon our insistence, all supplies were to be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation.

I fear that there may have grown up some misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary boards including the Munitions Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers now in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated between the United States and the United Kingdom according to their respective capacities for production.
existence of this Staff does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. It operates quite contrary to such a conception. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Materiel Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific War Council with representation from all nations bordering on the Pacific. Its members have the task of studying political-strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters representatives of the particular powers concerned, whether it be China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and present their special points of view and participate in the formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your illustrious country and its participation in this War will be acted upon without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on an equal basis.

I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I am deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has given us and his constant readiness with information and advice.

I assure you without reservation that our sole aim in this War is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your glorious nation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt.
May 13, 1942.

Thank you for your letter of April 1st, which has just been received. Your ardent interest and always vigorous support of all matters connected with China help us to realize how closely connected Chungking and Washington are.

The AVG yesterday attacked the Gialome airdrome at Hanoi, burning fifteen Japanese planes, damaging many others, and killing many personnel. We lost one pilot.

I appreciate deeply the President's kind offer to facilitate my coming. The date of departure is uncertain, as I must first tie up many loose strings here.
Chinese Originated Items,

Photostats,
Joint Chiefs Investigatory Memos, etc.

Not for use by researchers.
蔣用委員軍府政民國

先生來華不僅我中國軍事與經濟建設獲益良多而於我中美兩國今後軍事
經濟與政治上之合作亦將奠立堅實之基礎

餘對閣下派遣彼二人來華甚表感謝

交換彼此之意見並命余之同僚與彼

等切實商洽余雖在百忙之中亦必需
職用會員委事軍府政民國

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進行中凡足以增強對日軍事力量之一切
規劃余必不失時間與郝將軍充分商洽並
將迅付實施以副閣下之期望餘托納爾
遜先生面達一切不贅敬問

蒋中正

中華民國三十三年

九月吉日
僉用會員委事軍府政务民國

羅斯福總統閣下，兹乗魏德邁將軍回

事之改進獲得其不少寶貴之協助，於豁

達爽直之熱誠與切實而詳密之工作，神

實為余所罕覩者，余得與彼合作，殊覺

非常愉快；余之同僚與彼感情，相極融洽

故現時中國軍事上之設施，已因此而日見
貳用會員委事軍府政民國

羅斯福總統閣下，赫爾利將軍奉派來華充閣下之私人代表，繼復被任為大使於遠東整個戰局之改善實有莫大關係。於遠東兩國之邦交因之更趨親密而赫爾利將軍自到華以來，余個人與彼時常晤談，獲益非淺，彼之廣博的政治見解及正確的判斷與不傍煩勞之精神使彼對吾人之共同目標有甚大之貢獻。閣下選
政府措施之方針以及個人政治上之意見均託其向閣下詳陳諒聞之必感安慰而更有以見教也此次克里米亞會議之成就皆由閣下偉大明智之精神所感召殊為欽佩會計中涉及東方問題之決定甚願獲知其詳餘甚望聆
賛用會員委事軍府政民國

爾利將軍能役遠返華以期提早達成

其任務謹頌

健康

蔣中正

中華民國三十四年二月十七日

(手寫文字)
魏德邁將軍面呈
國民政府軍事委員會
羅斯福總統閣下