NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

FROM: AST ALUSNA CHUNGKING
TO: ALUSNA PEIPING
INFO: AST ALUSNA SHANGHAI CINCAF OPNAV
RELEASE COMYANGPAT COMSOPAT

DATE 18 OCT 1939
PRECEDENCE: NTTE
TOR CODE ROOM: 1536/18

THE FRENCH ARMY ADVISERS WHO ARE NOW DEPARTING HAVE PRaised THE FIGHTING ABILITY AND TRAINING OF THE CHINESE TROOPS. THE TIDE HAS BEEN TURNED IN FAVOR OF THE CHINESE ON ALL QUESTIONS AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT VICTORY AT CHENGSHA. THIS MAY WELL BE THE TURNING POINT OF THE ENTIRE WAR AS PROVINCIAL UNREST HAS SUBSIDED, ALL DOUBTERS HAVE BEEN SILENCED AND THE CENTRAL GOVTS HAND HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED X CHIANG KAI CHEK HAS TAKEN THE Szechuan rebels in hand by applying the firmest discipline THE GENERALISSIMO WILL NOT DIVIDE THE STATE INTO 3 PARTS AS HAS BEEN RUMORED X THE POLITICO MILITARY CAMPAIGN OF THE JAPANESE HAS SLOWED UP X I HAVE RECEIVED PERSONAL INFORMATION THAT THE NIPPONese ARE SENDING 3 FRESH DIVISIONS TO TAKE PART IN THE DRIVE ON HUNAN IN ORDER TO REVENGE THEIR SERIOUS SETBACK X Factional STRIFE IS NOW APPARENT AMONG THE JAPS EVEN TO THE CHINESE WHO STATE THAT PEACE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH ANY ONE GROUP WOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE OTHERS X THEIR RENEWAL OF THE OFFENSIVE IN BOMBING HANKOW IS CITED TO PROVE RUSSIAN HELP TO CHINAS CAUSE IS UNDIMINISHED AND MAY EVEN INCREASE 114 X CR

CONFIDENTIAL
December 19, 1941

For the President

The Secretary directed that I send the attached message from Alusna Chungking, to the President.

John H. Dillon
Confidential Assistant
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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**PART 1 OF 4 PARTS; PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.**

THE FOLLOWING IS MY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS AT PRESENT:

MY OWN OBSERVATIONS PLUS "INSIDE INFORMATION" INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO TIME TO LOSE. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS HOLD SINGAPORE; AND TO GAIN THIS END WE CANNOT DEPEND UPON THE BRITISH FACILITIES, THEIR ABILITY, OR THEIR INITIATIVE TO ACT PROMPTLY. FOR THE DEFENSE OF BURMA THEY HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMERICAN VOLUNTEER AIR FORCE AND CHINESE TROOPS, OUR FIGHTER PLANES AND LIGHT BOMBERS WITH ADEQUATE SPARE PARTS AND GROUND STAFF ACCOMPANYING THEM MUST BE SENT IMMEDIATELY BY CARRIERS, CONVOYED IF NEEDED BY OUR ENTIRE FLEET.

WITH THEM SHOULD COME AT LEAST FOUR DIVISIONS OF TROOPS INCLUDING ARMOURED UNITS. THESE ARE FOR ASSIGNMENT AFTER ARRIVAL TO THE FAR EAST THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

(PART 2 FolLOWS IMMEDIATELY)

**ACTION: #2A**

**PERSONAL FILE:**

**SECRET**

SEE ART 76(4)

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON
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19450 CR 2241

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

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Text:

PART 2 OF 4 PARTS; PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

FOR THE CHINESE GROUND FORCES LIGHTER ARMAMENT MUST ALSO COME QUICKLY FROM EXISTING SUPPLIES AND THE CHINESE NOTIFIED, FOR THE ONLY POSSIBLE FIELD FOR FINAL DEFEAT OF JAPANESE ARMY IS IN CHINA. THE PRESENT EXPECTATIONS OF USEFUL ACTIVITY BY THE CHINESE ARE ILL-CONEIVED DUE TO THEIR SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT, POOR CONDITION OF THEIR TROOPS, AND THEIR FEAR OF LOSING WHAT EQUIPMENT REMAINS TO THEM.

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI CHEK'S ORDERS FOR COUNTER-ATTACKS CAN NOT BE EFFECTIVELY EXECUTED, AND THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE BEING SO WIDELY HAILED IN THE PRESS ARE LARGELY ILLUSORY. DUE TO THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK THERE IS A DANGEROUS UNDER-CURRENT IN CERTAIN POWERFUL OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHICH DEPRECATES AMERICAN AND ENGLISH PRESTIGE AND OUR ABILITY TO WIN THIS WAR. THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE IS EVEN BEING SAID BY SOME.

(PART 3 WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY)

ACTION: NO...... PERSONAL FILE....... SECRET

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON
PART 3 OF FOUR PARTS, PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

THERE IS ALSO OCCURRING A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH MAY BECOME ACUTE AND BREAK THE GENERALLISSIMO'S CONTROL IF SINGAPORE FALLS. THERE ARE OTHER INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN CHINA WHICH HAVE LONG OPPOSED CHIANG KAI CHEK'S FAITH IN US AND SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PERMIT THESE TO ATTAIN CONTROL AND ABANDON THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND UTILIZE THE PRESENT JAP DESIRE TO SETTLE THE CHINA WAR TO OBTAIN A TOLERABLE PEACE, THEREBY GIVING THE JAPS FREE ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF CHINA AND THE MANPOWER OF CHINA, THIS FULLY DEVELOPING THE LONG PREDICTED "YELLOW PERIL." INDIA IS AT LEAST AS VULNERABLE TO OUR REVERSAL AS IS CHINA, GERMAN AND JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IS VERY STRONG THERE, AND OURS IS CONSPICUOUS BY IT'S ABSENCE. A CRYING NECESSITY IS A STRONG (PREDOMINANTLY SO) BROADCASTING STATION TO THE FAR EAST; PREFERABLY LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
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**DATE** 19 DECEMBER 1941

**TOR CODEROOM** 0836/19

**DECODED BY** SMITH

**PARAPHRASED BY** TUCKER

**MESSAGE**

**TEXT**

**PART 4. LAST SECTION**

UNLESS WE BREAK JAPAN QUICKLY WE SHALL LOSE FUTURE CHINESE AND INDIAN COOPERATION AND HAVE NO POINT IN FAR EAST FROM WHICH TO OPERATE. WE MUST ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY WHICH MAY NOT LAST LONG. GERMANY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK ELSEWHERE SOON TO PREVENT BRITISH HELP TO FAR EAST THEN STRIKE AGAIN AT RUSSIA IN SPRING WITH JAPAN ALSO INVADING SIBERIA. WE MUST EMPLOY ALL POSSIBLE FORCE WITH SAME DARING THAT ENEMY HAS STRUCK AND WITHOUT THOUGHT OF LOSSES TO MEET THIS CRISIS. OTHERWISE WE SHALL FIND OURSELVES FACING A CONTROLLED AND HOSTILE FAR EAST AS WELL AS EUROPE WITH NO POSSIBLE FOOTHOLD FOR COMEBACK.

**DISTRIBUTION:**

SECRET

SEE ART 76(4) NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: ABC conference in Chungking.

A very puzzling and unsatisfactory cable has just come in from Magruder, which will doubtless be sent to you.

On the joint defense of Burma there are three important issues:

1. The use of lend lease material. There is no mention of any final decision on this in Magruder's cable.

2. The use of the American Volunteer Air Force in Burma. Magruder said there was no decision by the Generalissimo but an apparent disinclination to give any further assistance here.

3. Chinese defense of Burma. Magruder said that the Chinese offered two army corps, but this was declined by Wavell. On the other hand, our consul at Kunming reports the passage through there of 100,000 crack Chinese troops moving southward.

Probably Brett's and Wavell's reports will shed a clearer light on the outcome of the conference. You may wish, however, to avail yourself of the present opportunity to suggest to the Prime Minister the desirability of the British in Burma availing themselves to the full of Chinese offers of cooperation. I have an idea that Chiang Kai-shek would have no objection to the use of lend-lease material and the volunteer air group in Burma if they were used in conjunction with Chinese ground operations.

Lauchlin Currie
From: CHUNGKING

To: AMMISCA

Date: 10-24-41

PART ONE FOR PRESIDENT INFORMATION COPIES FOR SEC. WAR AND CHIEF

STAFF REFERENCE WD NUMBER SIXTY NINE AND OUR NUMBER ONE ONE TWO

STOP EXPLORATORY TALKS OF PRELIMINARY JOINT MILITARY CONFERENCE

WITH CHINESE BRITISH AND US MEMBERS PRESENT WERE HELD HOME

GENERALISSIMO EIGHT DECEMBER TWENTY TWO AND AT GENERALISSIMOS

REQUEST WITH WAR MINISTER HOYINGCHIN MORNING DECEMBER TWENTY THREE X

NEITHER USSR NOR NEI REPRESENTED X FORMAL CONFERENCE OPENED BY

GENERALISSIMO AFTERNOON DEC TWENTY THREE CONTINUING INTO MORNING

OF TWENTY FOURTH STOP FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF FIVE POINTS ADOPTED

COLON ONE DEFENSE OF BURMA IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE WITH LATER

EXTENSION OF JOINT ACTION FROM CHINA COMMA MEANWHILE INITIATION OF

AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST ENEMY BASES FULLEST N

PART TWO EXTENT PRESENT RESOURCES PERMIT SEMICOLON TWO MAINTAIN

CHINESE RESISTANCE BY CONTINUANCE SUPPLIES TO PREPARE CHINESE ARMIES

FOR FUTURE OFFENSIVE ACTION SEMICOLON THREE CHINESE TO CONTAIN ENEMY

FORCES ON THEIR FRONT BY PRESSURE AND ATTACKS OR THREAT OF SAME

UPON VULNERABLE COMMUNICATIONS SEMICOLON FOUR ASSUME OFFENSIVE

WITH ALL BRITISH CHINESE AND AMERICAN MEANS AVAILABLE AS SOON AS

RESOURCES PERMIT SEMICOLON FIVE A JOINT MILITARY COUNCIL SITTING IN

CHUNGKING TO SUBMIT INFORMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING

STRATEGY IN EAST ASIA FOR CONSIDERATION BY SUPREME WAR COUNCIL WHICH

RADIOGRAM
EXACT COPY
REPRESENTATIVES OF CONFERENCE HOPE WILL SOON BE ESTABLISHED AS PERMANENT ORGANIZATION INVS PARA

PART THREE IT WAS THE SENSE OF THE CONFERENCE COLON ONE THAT FOR THE PRESENT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF A CONTINUING COUNCIL IN CHUNGKING SHOULD CONSIST OF HOYINGCHIN AND CHIEFS OF BRITISH AND US MILITARY MISSIONS SEMICOLON TWO THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL SECRETARIATE BE AN AMERICAN APPOINTED BY THE CHIEF OF US MILITARY MISSION PARA UNTIL THEIR ARRIVAL IN CHUNGKING WAVELL AND BRETT WERE WITHOUT ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PRESIDENTS TERMS OF REFERENCE TO THE CONFERENCE STOP WAVELL HAD THREE THINGS IN MIND COLON ONE TO OBTAIN CONTROL CHINESE LEND LEASE MATERIAL IN BURMA SEMICOLON TWO TO PERSUADE GENERALISSIMO TO ASSIGN AT LEAST TWO OF THREE AVG SQUADRONS FOR DEFENSE BURMA SEMICOLON THREE TO DISCUSS PARTICIPATION CHINESE TROOPS DEFENSE BURMA X PART FOUR REFERENCE LEND LEASE MATERIAL IN BURMA MY PERSONAL EFFORT WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE WAVELL ABANDON APPARENT INTENTION TO MAKE BLANKET DEMANDS ON CHINESE RATHER THAN REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC ITEMS DEFENSE MATERIALS X I HAD REPEATEDLY TO IMPRESS WAVELL WITH MY INSTRUCTIONS THAT CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE WAS A PREREQUISITE TO RETRANSFER OF LEND LEASE MATERIAL PARA THE CHINESE OFFER OF TWO ARMY CORPS FOR DEFENSE OF NORTHERN BURMA WAS DECLINED BY WAVELL UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES SOMewhat DISPLEASING TO GENERALISSIMO AND INCONSISTENT IN VIEW OF PICTURE PRESENTED OF BURMAS DEFENSELESSNESS DURING BRITISH PLEAS FOR AIR ASSISTANCE AND TRANSFER OF LEND LEASE MATERIAL X PART FIVE NO DECISION WAS ELEcITED FROM GENERALISSIMO RELATIVE STATIONING ADDITIONAL AVG SQUADRONS IN BURMA X HIS ANNOUNCED REASON
FOR AVOIDANCE OF DECISION WAS IN SUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING WARNING NETS SEMICOLON HIS REAL REASONS BELIEVED TO BE OBJECTION OF AVG TO SERVE OUTSIDE CHINA COMMA DESIRE FOR STRONG DEFENSE KUNMING AND ADVERSE CHINESE POLITICAL REACTION TO RELINQUISHING ONLY EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE AVAILABLE PARA WAVELL AND BRETT DEPARTED FOR RANGOON NIGHT DEC TWENTY FOURTH

MAGRUDER

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: A. C. of S., WPD. Cy No. 1

EXACT INFORMATION Copies TO: Missions Cy No. 2
Secretary of War Cy No. 3
Chief, Army Air Forces, Cy No. 4
A. C. of S., G-2 Cy No. 5
Secretary, General Staff Cy No. 6
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
98, December 29, 11 a.m.
FOR SECRETARY WAR FROM (*)

Situation Rangoon becoming most acute; ships lying in harbor cannot be unloaded, equipment of docks not being moved. Shops, stores, hotels and postoffice closed, most critical military and air situation. Communications with Chungking most impossible for quick action. Chinese are urgently requesting action and steamer captains are at loss what to do. They are already applying to Twitty for action. Strongly urge that Colonel Twitty in collaboration with British Governor and General Yu Feipeng be given full authority to act for the United States Government on all transportation receipt storage allocation and safeguarding of matters pertaining to Lease Lend material and equipment, action to take form of military control. Hagruder has been informed. Again repeat situation most critical for both Chinese and British and urge immediate action."

SCHIARE

WSB
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE:

Subject: Military and Political Situation in Burma.

1. Present Military Situation. (See map). The Japanese have occupied Tavoy and are probably in possession of all of Burma south of that point. Another penetration has been made by a considerable force through Mesawt toward Moulmein, on the east coast of the Gulf of Martaran. Concentrations of Japanese forces around Chingmai make possible a thrust toward Toungoo or Kengtung. The Japanese will probably invade Burma in the near future, advancing via Mesawt and Moulmein to capture Rangoon or cut the Burma Road. It is estimated that they can capture Rangoon in not to exceed five weeks thereafter unless Burma receives heavy ground and air reinforcements.

2. Political Situation. The recent arrest of the Premier of Burma is indicative of the serious internal situation existing in that country. Burmese opinion is reported to be anti-British, anti-Hindu and anti-Chinese, antagonisms based upon various forms of alleged economic exploitation. Where there is widespread civilian unrest, a force of 35,000 will find it difficult to police a population of 15,000,000. Possible fifth columns, sabotage or large-scale revolt cannot be overlooked. The press on January 20, 1942, quoted British sources to the effect that the Burmese are loyal and quiet. Sir Paw Tun, the new Premier, was formerly home minister (with supervision of police) and has the confidence of the British Government. The strength of his present influence with the Burmese is not known.

3. Military Forces.

a. British forces. The British have approximately 35,000 troops in Burma. Of these, there are not more than 4,000 British and 7,000 Indians, the remaining forces consisting of Burmese troops with British officers. The Burmese units vary in quality, ranging from excellent troops only slightly inferior to Indian units to irregulars of negligible military value. Known dispositions are indicated on the map enclosed herewith.

b. Chinese forces. The 5th and 6th Chinese Corps are on the Burma-Chinese border. Their combat value is unknown.

c. Japanese forces. The Japanese have an estimated
four divisions of infantry and two regiments of tanks in position to attack Burma. (See map for distribution). These troops probably total 80,000. Japanese forces are believed to have a unit for unit superiority over British troops in Burma.

d. Air. The Japanese have the strategic air initiative in this area. Their effective air strength in Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya totals approximately 720 operating combat planes. Of these, approximately 468 could be used against Burma if desired. Favorable lines of communication afford Japan access to a considerable number of reserves.

The British are on the defensive and are opposing the Japanese with a numerically inferior air force. Favorable lines of communication still exist from the west to Burma.

Japan's offensive has been successful due to air superiority. Should this be denied her, the entire offensive would collapse. Indo-China appears to be the key to the whole situation. Japanese lines of communication are over-extended and their entire western flank is open to attack. In order to protect this flank, it is likely that the Japanese will launch an offensive against Burma. This would secure their position as far as Indo-China is concerned and at the same time would close the Burma Road, thereby making it extremely difficult to supply any air action that might be launched against their lines of communication from bases in China or against Japan proper.

Strong air and ground action against the Japanese in Indo-China from Burma would serve two purposes:

(1) Defensive - protect Burma.

(2) Offensie - might result in driving the Japanese from Indo-China. This would cut their lines of communication, force a withdrawal from all points south of Indo-China with a resultant loss of the offensive. With Allied bombers based in Indo-China, the Japanese Navy could not operate - their units could not be supplied. The least result from an offensive would be to relieve the pressure in southern Malaya and the Dutch Indies.

4. Malaya. In southern Malaya, five Japanese divisions are attacking successfully a British, Indian and Malay force of about four divisions. The rate of Japanese advance is expected to drop as British lines are narrowed and reinforced.

For the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

[Signature]

HAYES A. KRONER,
Colonel, General Staff.
THE THREAT TO BURMA

1. Probability of Attack.

There are a number of most compelling reasons why, as soon as the effort can be undertaken, an attack in force on Burma is to be expected. To cut off China as a present fighting force and as a future base for the Allies, to protect the flank against land and air attack, to operate in the Indian Ocean, to seize oil, rice and lend-lease goods in Burma -- for these and other reasons, the Japs must attempt to occupy Burma.

There are probably from 3 to 4 Japanese divisions now in Thailand and evidence is increasing that they are getting poised to strike through the three invasion routes into Burma (See G-2 and Schnare dispatches).

2. Ability to Resist Attack.

Burma cannot be defended with present forces against an attack in force. Ground troops number some 30,000-35,000 British, Indian and Burmese troops (mostly Burmese) together with 3 regiments of Chinese. Moreover, these cannot be easily shifted from one sector to another. The Burma Railway is vulnerable. Equipment appears to be meager, especially in the mechanized and heavy ordnance branches. Fighter planes, both A.V.G. and R.A.F., probably do not number over 50. There may be one squadron of bombers.

3. Possible Reinforcements, other than Chinese.

Contrary to general impression, few troops would be available from India to reinforce Burma. About 100,000 troops are in training in India, but their equipment is inadequate and there would be resistance to sending all of them out of India. No forces can be spared from Australia and the N.E.I. It is not known whether any equipment can be spared or whether
facilities are available for the transport of any large number of troops and equipment from the Middle East. Aircraft reinforcements cannot reach Burma from here in less than 5 weeks.


China has repeatedly offered to put three Army Corps in Burma. This offer has repeatedly been declined. Three regiments have been accepted, apparently grudgingly. Our military representatives report Wavell's disinclination to accept Chinese help.

Chinese units have less firing power than Japanese. The Chinese seek to compensate for this by endeavoring, so far as possible, to face the Japs with three times as many troops. For this reason, they feel that three Army Corps in Burma would be necessary to check any Jap attack in force.

5. Indicated Action.

The only possibility of holding Burma against any attack in the near future appears to be to accept Chiang Kai-shek's offer of three army corps and to rush the disposition of these troops.

While we may understand and sympathize with British reluctance to invoke large scale Chinese assistance, we cannot afford to acquiesce in this action. The eventual job of defeating Japan must be largely American. This job will be made infinitely more difficult by the loss of Burma and the resulting diminution of Chinese resistance. American lives and billions of dollars of American war effort are at stake. We must insist that this consideration is controlling. Immediate action is essential. Not a day must be lost in making a vigorous presentation of America's and China's interest.
If Burma falls before full advantage is taken of China's offer, the Chinese will most certainly make the facts and responsibility known. Churchill's position, both in England and here, will be gravely weakened, and the Administration itself will be subject to severe criticism. Hence, it is not too much to say that upon our prompt and effective action depends not only weighty military considerations, but also the maintenance of mutual confidence among the United Nations.

[Signature]

[End of text]
The United Kingdom is buying up rice in order to save the rice owners from ruin, because the collapse of trade has destroyed the market. After the first two raids on Rangoon, 300,000 Burmese and Indians decamped and some 50,000 went as far as Prome on foot hoping to escape to India, but were turned back.

Schnare
PARAPHRASE
of Telegram No. 45, January 17, 1942,
from Rangoon

FOR MID OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FROM MERRILL

"No. 4, 17th. There are weak defenses on the Tavoy-Mergui Moulmein Peninsula where there are about four ENS. They are distributed as follows: There is one at Dalwan, one at Mergui, one at Tavoy, and one at Moulmein. Activities on the part of the Japanese provide indications that an advance is probable on the Bangkok-Moulmein axis, and that this advance will be coordinated with another advance to the north on the Toungou-Mawchi-Chiengmai axis. However, there is not sufficient information at the present time to permit judgments to be made of either the direction or the time of the principal effort.

SCHNARE
A small percentage of Americans residing in Burma are departing from the country at present. A much greater problem will be presented subsequently in case of an evacuation of a major character. Observers who are well informed have expectations of an attack by the Japanese on Burma by sea and by land from the south, and on land from the east at the same time. They are doubtful that the defense forces available will be able to carry on resistance very long. The closing of the port of Rangoon will result. The sole avenue for escape then will be a difficult journey overland fraught with danger by launches on the river and by trail over to India (no highway exists here), or by airplane. Japanese forces are now making an advance in some degree of force in Tavoy, Mergui, and to the east of Moulmein. Probably a stronger attack is not very far in the future.

Schnare
January 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In connection with Mr. Currie's memorandum on the Chinese situation, which I am returning herewith, I believe you will be interested in the attached copies of two radios. One of these, which I sent personally to General Wavell, is self-explanatory. No reply has been received as yet but as General Wavell left Java for Rangoon the day following this message, we hope there will be some positive result.

The other is a message received today from Magruder. It is rather encouraging in tone and indicates that some of the rough spots are being smoothed out.

encls.
PERSONAL FROM GENERAL MARSHALL TO GENERAL WAVELL.

THE FOLLOWING IS PASSED ON TO YOU AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST: THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION WHICH HE CONSIDERS RELIABLE THAT THERE HAS RECENTLY OCCURRED DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN CHINESE MORALE AT CHUNGKING. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE GENERALISSIMO HAS COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENSE OF THE MALAY BARRIER IS VITAL TO THE SECURITY AND WELFARE OF CHINA ITSELF. THIS SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GENERALISSIMO MIGHT WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY OF RENDERING SUCH COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE AS LIES WITHIN HIS POWER TOWARD SECURING YOUR LEFT FLANK.

I ASSURE YOU THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NO INTENTION EITHER OF SUGGESTING ANY SPECIFIC ACTION IN YOUR CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS OR OF OCCASIONING TO YOU THE SLIGHTEST EMBARRASSMENT. HIS SOLE PURPOSE IS TO PASS ON TO YOU THIS INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT PROVE USEFUL AND WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE NOT COME TO YOUR ATTENTION.

VERY PERSONALLY FROM ME TO YOU: WE ARE FAIRLY FAMILIAR WITH THE DELICATE SITUATION IN BURMA RESULTING FROM RESENTMENT OF INHABITANTS TO CHINESE DUE TO INFILTRATION AND SUCCESS OF SMALL CHINESE SHOP-KEEPERS AND AS TO AGITATIONS BEING PROMOTED BY ENEMY AMONG BURMESE AGAINST BRITISH RULE. TO BE COMPLETELY FRANK THERE REACHES US HERE THROUGH MANY CHANNELS THE RESENTMENT OF CHINESE TO BRITISH OFFICIALDOM AND THEY APPEAL TO US ACCORDINGLY. OUR SECRET INFORMATION INDICATES A TREMENDOUS PROPAGANDA DRIVE BY JAPANESE THROUGHOUT CHINA, CAPITALIZING ON THE LOSS OF PRESTIGE BY THE WHITE RACE THROUGH THE FALL OF HONGKONG AND MANILA TO BRING ABOUT A COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF CHINESE RESISTANCE, RELEASE JAPANESE TROOPS IN THAT AREA AND OPEN WIDE ALL THE RESOURCES OF CHINA TO JAPAN. IN VIEW OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS WE ARE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN ANY MOVES WHICH BUILD UP IN THE GENERALISSIMO'S ORGANIZATION FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN BRITISH-AMERICAN joint PURPOSES IN THE FAR EAST.

MARSHALL
FROM CHUNGKING

FOR CHIEF OF STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR ONE THREE THREE CONCERNING AVG ACKNOWLEDGED. REFERENCE MOVEMENT LEND LEASE MATERIALS FROM RANGOON. GREAT IMPETUS WAS GIVEN THIS MOVEMENT BY LEND LEASE CONTROVERSY. SINCE THEN ALL EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO THIS END. EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN UNDER DIRECTION GENERAL YU-FEI-PENG INITIATED JANUARY TWENTY FOUR. CHINESE DRIVERS, COOLIES AND ALL AVAILABLE TRUCKS FROM CHEFANG SOUTHWARD BEING CONCENTRATED IN RANGOON IMMEDIATELY. MATERIAL WILL BE TRUCKED ON TWENTY FOUR HOUR SCHEDULE TO MANDALAY AND DUMPED. SHUTTLE SERVICE WITH SPECIAL GROUP TRUCKS ARRANGED MANDALAY TO LASHIO FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT INTO CHINA. RAILROAD HAS PRACTICALLY CEASED OPERATION LAST FOUR DAYS SUPPOSEDLY FOR LACK OF FUEL. WILL USE RAILROAD ALSO IF IT RESUMES OPERATION. ALL AVAILABLE AMERICAN PERSONNEL ASSISTING INCLUDING ELEVEN BURMA ROAD MECHANICS JUST ARRIVED FROM CALCUTTA. ST JOHN DIRECTED BY METO COOPERATE WITH CHINESE PLAN WHICH WAS PREPARED BY MAJOR WILSON. BELIEVE PLAN FEASIBLE AND THAT CHINESE WILL CARRY IT OUT ENERGETICALLY. FURTHER REPORT LATER.

I HAVE RECOMMENDED TO GENERALISSMO CHINAS AGREEMENT TO DIVERSION OF FUTURE SHIPS FIRST TO CALCUTTA AND SHOULD SINGAPORE FALL TO BOMBAY. WILL RADIO REACTION TOMORROW.

MAGRUDER

Date- 10- 24- 46

Signature- Carl S. Spencer
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

CHIEF OF STAFF:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
RETURN.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Chinese Situation.

A number of incidents have contributed to worsen Chinese relations with Britain and the United States recently. These include (a) the confiscation of lend-lease cargoes, (b) the reverses in the Pacific, (c) the refusal to accept substantial aid from the Chinese in the defense of Burma, (d) the small amount of ordnance and aircraft shipped to China, (e) the present closing of the Burma Railroad to lend-lease shipments (because of troop movements), (f) the niggardly offer of financial assistance by the British, and the misunderstanding of the nature of our offer.

Against this background the fall of Rangoon, which appears likely, will probably set off a wave of recriminations. I think we should be preparing some counter-measures now. In addition to urging the British to accept substantial Chinese military help, there are a number of things we could do and which I am exploring:

(a) The inclusion in the third lend-lease bill of an appropriation of $500 million for the assistance either explicitly of China or generally for countries whose war effort is being seriously impaired by the difficulty of internal financing, to be granted under such terms and conditions as you may prescribe.

(b) the establishment of an air freight service from Calcutta to northern Burma and China to maintain air and other operations in China.

(c) the construction of a road through Assam into northern Burma.

I hope to have something on all these matters for your consideration next week.

Lauchlin Currie
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In reply to your recent inquiry please permit me to advise you that there is no present means of operating heavy bombardment aircraft from Outer Mongolia, viz., east of Urga, and between Urga and the Outer Mongolia-Manchukuo border without the definite cooperation of the Russian Government.

The Chinese Government has had no effective control of Outer Mongolia for the past several years, and no control is attempted by the Chungking Government to any important extent beyond Lanchow in Kansu province; the Gobi Desert north of Kansu forming a fairly effective natural barrier.

For this reason I feel that the plan, which is now in progress, for carrying out an attack upon the Japanese enemy's center of gravity, by making use of facilities for which the Chinese Government can guarantee us a reasonable degree of security on the Eastern Asiatic mainland, is the logical and most effective plan.

H. H. Arnold
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 30th, 1942.

Secret and Personal

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a telegram containing a message for you from the Prime Minister. This was received at the Embassy late last night.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
I am informed that there is a danger that fighter squadrons of American volunteer group now helping so effectively in the defence of Rangoon may be withdrawn by Chiang Kai-shek to China after January 31st. Clearly the security of Rangoon is as important to Chiang Kai-shek as to us, and withdrawal of these squadrons before the arrival of Hurricanes, due the 15th to 20th February, might be disastrous. I understand that General Magruder has instructions to represent this to Generalissimo, but I think the matter is sufficiently serious for you to know about it personally.
February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Withdrawal of American Volunteer Group to China.

Attached herewith is proposed reply to Lord Halifax.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

Incl: Draft of Ltr. to Lord Halifax.
Ltr to the Pres. frm. Lord Halifax 1/30/42 /w/ Secret tele. to the Pres. frm. the Prime Minister dated 1/29/42.
Memo for Gen. Arnold frm. the Pres. 2/3/42
February 4, 1942

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
The Viscount Halifax, K.G.
British Ambassador

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

In connection with your note of January 30th, covering withdrawal of American Volunteer Group to China after January 31st, you are informed that agreement was reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make proper representation to Chiang Kai-shek to hold this Group in the Burma area until the arrival of the Hurricane airplane units from England. This we understand will be about the 15th or 20th of February.

It must be borne in mind in connection with this movement, however, that the present strength of this Group is only 20 planes and by the 15th or 20th of February they will probably be reduced to 5 or 10, a number which will not provide very much protection. The reinforcements now scheduled to this Group cannot possibly reach them until the latter part of February at the earliest.

Very sincerely yours,
MEMORANDUM FOR

GEN. H. H. ARNOLD
Chief, Army Air Force

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR ME TO SEND.

F.D.R.
Very sincerely yours,

At the earliest possible moment, reach them until the letter part of February
The reinforcements now scheduled to the group cannot
a number which will not provide very much protection.
of February they will probably be reached to 5 or 10.
the group is only 20 planes and by the 15th or 20th
of February, however, that the present strength of
the movement, however, that the present strength of
It must be borne in mind in connection with

about the 15th or 20th of February.
plane units from England. That we understand will be
the time until the arrival of the reinforcements.
representation to Chapman to make the group
in connection with the command of units from Britain to make proper
reached by the command of units from Britain to make proper
agreement that the agreement was
after January 30th, you are informed the agreement was
covering withdrawal of American volunteer group to China
In connection with your note of January 20th,

By dear Mr. Ambassador:

British Ambassador
The Right Honorable
The Right Honorable

February 4, 1942
His Excellency
The Right Honorable
The Viscount Halifax, K.G.
British Ambassador
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:

To do the necessary. I have not signed it.

F.D.R.

MEMORANDUM:

I telephoned the substance of the letter which General Arnold prepared for the President's signature to Lord Halifax, so it will not be necessary to send the letter to Halifax. These papers can therefore be filed.

H.L.H.
ACM
NPM 2109
12/04/44

PRIORITY

March 12, 1942
529 A.M.

AG 371 (3-11-42)

From CHUNGKING

To

No. 351 AMSCGA March 11

Leaving for Chinese Army Headquarters in Burma today. Announcement by Generalissimo March 10 of appointment as Chief of Staff. Join staff. Staff organization now under consideration. No action can be expected from Chinese in Burma until cooperation can be arranged with British and situation in South Burma as to Jap intentions is cleared up.

STILWELL

EXACT ACTION COPY TO A C OF S WPD CY No. 1

EXACT INFORMATION COPIES TO A C OF S G-2 CY No. 2
MISSIONS CY No. 3
SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF CY No. 4

SECRET RADIO

RETURN ALL COPIES TO ROOM 1702 AGO IN COMP WITH PAR 40 C AR 380-5

Sent 1:09 PM
3/12/42 MDR

CMS 1606

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Data MAR 28 1973
From CHUNGKING

To ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR AMMISCA

No. 350 AMMISCA March 11

For Chief of Staff, attention Secretary of War. Conference with Generalissimo and Madame evening March 10. I am to command 5th and 6th Armies under considerable restrictions. Feeling my way. Made plea for more cooperation with British. Personal message of greeting from Generalissimo to Secretary of War.

STILWELL

EXACT ACTION COPY TO
A C OF S WP

CY No. 1

EXACT INFORMATION COPIES TO
A C OF S C-2
SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF
MISSIONS

CY No. 2
CY No. 3
CY No. 4

SECRET RADIOGRAM

RETURN ALL COPIES TO ROOM 1702 AGO IN COMP WITH PAR 40 C AR 380-5

Sent 1:35 P.M.
3/12/42 MDR
CMS 1613
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Situation in Burma.

Herewith are summaries of three radiograms received from General Stilwell. They were all filed in Chungking at 11:30 A.M. March 19, which was 11:30 P.M. March 18, Washington time.

DIVISION OF COMMAND

Stilwell acknowledges receipt of suggested plan to divide Burma theater into two commands; British in South and Chinese in North. Says plan is not feasible. British cannot hold without strong Chinese help. Six Chinese divisions already in South with the British. Japanese expected to attack North soon. Stilwell and Alexander (British General) have plans which can be followed regardless of command question.

NEED FOR AIRPLANES IN INDIA


SUPPLY

Trying to organize medical and evacuation services. Shortage of doctors, medicine, instruments, transportation and planes. Hopes to fly supplies from Calcutta. Malaria and Blackwater Fever have started. Health in general good. Malaria malignant type not expected until May. Supply working so far due entirely to British help. Rice stocks will be moved from South Burma if possible. Definite limit to number of
troops which can be subsisted in Burma. The vital point is gas refinery north of Prome; no other source except Digboi to which there is no road connection yet. Problem of gas serious. Stocks in China small.

Chief of Staff.
Message from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Lauchlin Currie

Chungking, Mar. 20, 1942

Stillwell just returned from Burma. So long as question of command joint forces not satisfactorily settled future will be very difficult. Fifth and Sixth armies now there. Burmese population actively assisting Japanese against British and whole territory honeycombed with Fifth Columnists. Pity when Generalissimo offered in December to send troops which could have done liaison work Wavell rejected offer. Our visit to India very satisfactory. Writing details.
From: Chungking
To: Agwar for Ammisca

No. 432, Ammisca, April 1st.

Attention Sec War and Chief Staff.

1. Arrived Chungking two AM today. Operations around Youngoo hampered by breakdowns in transport, delays in supply, rotten communications, sabotage by natives, and politics in the Army. These troubles fade into insignificance compared to the incompetence, lethargy and disregard of orders amounting to disobedience on part of Division and Army Commanders. Unfortunately my powers stop far short of shooting. A fine opportunity for good slap at the Japs has been ruined by the craven obstruction of above mentioned Commanders. Have done my best to hold them to their work and had just enough luck to make me optimistic about at least a local success. They let me down completely by chickenhearted imitation of an attack, by promising which to the British I got latter to make a general attack. Am afraid that now my face is completely lost with British. Have come to Chungking to have showdown with High Command. Under existing conditions cannot continue in Command of Fifth and Sixth Armies without being stooge for Chinese, who can bypass me for anything they want to do and then blame me for the result.

2. Supply of rations satisfactory. British doing good job on this. Also did good job in rail transportation. Medical service functioning. For first time in this War wounded getting treatment same day they are hit. Ammunition very scanty. Gasoline and truck transport serious problems, but not yet critical. Retain all my confidence in Chinese
soldier who requires only equipment and leadership to be equal of anyone.

3. Failure to report recently has been due to my presence with the Troops over sixteen hundred air miles from Chungking, and very bad communications. Situation here extremely complicated by suspicion of British and Chinese methods of long range command. Conferring with Generalissimo in hope of arriving at some satisfactory solution. Acceptance by Chinese of British High Command in Burma does not cure the situation, although it would work if I could get a free hand in conduct of operations.

Stilwell.
From: F Chungking  
To: Adjutant General  

No. 448 Ammisa, April 3rd, 1942.

Further conferences with General Issimo, who supports my stand and is giving me Lo Cho Ying as executive. Lo is strong character with good reputation and has explicit instructions to have my orders carried out. This should settle 1 fundamental point, and I hope clear the situation generally. Anyway it is all I can expect for present. (Attention SECWAR and Chief Staff). My position would be greatly strengthened by presence of an American Division in India even if it could not be brought to Burma at once. I strongly recommend this. Japs have reinforced their Burma front and started to Bomb our Back Areas. Front quiet. Gissimo has agreed to my use of 3 mixed Guerrilla Battalions, British trained and Led, now in Kiangsi, about 2500 men. 66th Army of 3 Small Divisions also on way to Burma. I leave tomorrow Saturday for Pyawbwe repeat Pyawbwe, 5th Army Headquarters

Stilwell

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: SGS
G-2
TAG
File

CM-IN-0772 (4/3/42)
April 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I should like, if you have no objection, to follow up this request for additional planes with Generals Arnold and Eisenhower.

Lauchlin Currie
CABLEGRAM FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO LAUGHLIN CURRIE
APRIL 12, 1942

THE GENERALISSIMO AND I RETURNED YESTERDAY FROM THE BURMA FRONT. THE SITUATION THERE IS UNSPEAKABLY DANGEROUS WITH COMPLETE DISORGANIZATION OF BOTH FRONT AND REAR, COLLAPSE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND POPULATION PANICKY RESULTING IN UTMOST CONFUSION AND INEFFICIENCY EVERYWHERE. NO FIGHTING MORALE IS APPARENT ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT OR PEOPLE. BRITISH SEEM HOPELESS AND HELPLESS, WHILE BURMESE PEOPLE ARE ANTAGONISTIC AND THE COUNTRYSIDE IS HONEYCOMBED WITH FIFTH COLUMNISTS. WHEREEVER BOMBING OCCURRED, CORPSES OF MEN AND ANIMALS ARE UNREMOVED AND EXPOSED TO Hordes OF FLIES. WITH EXTREME HEAT PREVAILING, I GREATLY FEAR CHOLERA OR OTHER EPIDEMICS FOR OUR TROOPS NOW ENTERING DISTRICTS. RAILWAYS CONGESTED BY BOMBED CARS, DEBRIS, ETC., CAUSED DELAY IN OUR REINFORCEMENTS REACHING TOUNGOO, NECESSITATING OUR WITHDRAWAL THERE. CUT WIRES REMAIN UNEPARED FOR DAYS. GENERALISSIMO TOLD ALEXANDER IF SUCH CONDITIONS OBTAINED IN CHINA HEADS WOULD HAVE BEEN CHOPPED OFF. CHINESE ARMY FIGHTING GALLANTLY AGAINST OVERWHELMING OBSTACLES BUT MUST HAVE IMMEDIATE LARGE SCALE AIR SUPPORT OF HUNDREDS OF PLANES OTHERWISE OUR SACRIFICES ARE USELESS AND IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD ON. ON RETURN TRIP FROM LASHIO WE RECEIVED RADIO MESSAGES THAT ENEMY SENT EIGHTEEN PLANES SCOUTING IN ALL DIRECTIONS TO ATTACK US IN AIR.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: First Special Bombing Mission (China).

General Stilwell, prior to his departure from the United States for China, was informed by General Arnold concerning a projected bombing mission which, for convenience is known as the First Special Bombing Mission. We have assumed that the Generalissimo was acquainted with the purposes and details of this mission, but it was not mentioned in dispatches prior to receipt of a radio from General Bissell dated April 11, in which the Generalissimo voiced his objection to the project. His reason was that Chuchow was not protected by his Ground Forces, and he feared loss of the field by enemy action. At the time of receipt of this message it was thought here that the reference was to a second project, known as "Halpro".

On April 13, General Bissell was informed that the First Special Mission was too far advanced for cancellation. He was informed that the second mission, to take place at a later date, would come under the control of General Stilwell upon its arrival in his area and would be coordinated in accordance with the Generalissimo's desires.

The Generalissimo's opposition to the First Special Mission was again voiced in a radio of April 15.

On April 16 a message was received saying that the Generalissimo had reluctantly agreed to the carrying out of the First Special Mission. He stated that fields at Yushan, Lishui, Kian, Keweilin, and Henyang might be used. This does not include Chuchow, as in the original plan, which he definitely objects to being used.

By telephone from Mobile, General Arnold informed us this morning that the First Special Mission would probably not be executed for three or four days. He recommended that a memorandum of facts be sent to you at once.
April 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I quote below a message which has just come in from Stilwell, which will be of interest to you. Attached is a map labeling the important points noted:

"Withdrawal to Mandalay position between mountains tonight. 38th Division to be west of Irrawaddy astride Shwebo Road. British west of 38th along north bank of river. 22d and 96th on north bank of Myinge River. One regiment 28th in reserve. Remainder of 21st enroute and blocking off on roads south of Hsipaw and Lashio. 200th division wiped out a Jap Battalion at Taunggyi and is working toward Loilem again.

Jap force that went north from Loilem over half way to Hsipaw. Japs strong on Pyinman-Mandalay Road and are attacking Pyawbwe. 96th has been roughly handled — over 60 per cent casualties.

British Headquarters gone to Shwebo. We will set up there also. Very difficult to get withdrawal coordinated but hope it will go off satisfactorily.

Chinese staff work pretty sad. British rear guard from Mekti lax. 1 Brigade Indian Division plus tank Brigade half way. Bottle-neck at Ava Brigade — only bridge over Irrawaddy. Japs trying to bomb it. Considerable transport already on north side. Future moves uncertain. Rains have not begun yet. We are all keeping busy. Regret losing Colonel Brown from Mission but approve release."

Signature - Carl L. Spaatz
April 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Situation in China.

I quote herewith the gist of a telegram just received from General Stilwell:

"Generalissimo about ready to accept a plan to take the Chinese to the weapons since we cannot take the weapons to the Chinese. He will give me 100,000 men. We march them to India train and equip them under my complete control and come back to Burma after the rains. I assume my original instructions cover the case but want definite W.D. okay to show British. Also assurance that necessary equipment, arms, ammunition, transport, and technical services will be dispatched promptly. Otherwise British help will be necessary which would be fatal. Chinese will positively not work under British Command. This plan to be started as soon as possible. No intention however for having Chinese troops now in Burma leave unless we are chased out. We will retire only as we have to. Lashio situation easier today. Prompt answer requested."

There has either already arrived at Karachi or will reach there within the next two weeks a sufficient quantity of U. S. equipment, consigned to China, to permit initiation of the training program recommended by General Stilwell and to arm a roughly balanced force of 100,000 men for combat in China. Some shortage will exist in rifles, which item could be supplied by substituting the submachine gun, of which we have a number available. Probably we would have to ship additional amounts of motor transport. Our records show that in India, or soon to arrive there, are 217 artillery pieces, 20,000 rifles, 1430 machine guns, 11,000 sub-machine guns, 200 mortars of 60 mm caliber, 174 anti-tank weapons of various calibers, 104 scout cars and 1342 motor vehicles of assorted types. All the weapons are accompanied by reasonable amounts of ammunition. You are already familiar with plans for giving China some air support. About 189 airplanes have now arrived in India or enroute, and, including all types earmarked for China, the total is 454.
General Stilwell's request for "necessary technical services" raises questions of greater complexity, chiefly because of shipping involved.

The project, recommended by General Stilwell, if carried out, would undoubtedly involve an area in Northeast India, probably in the vicinity of Sadiya and to the southwest thereof. The rainy season is starting and the rainfall in that region is extremely heavy. While the region indicated is a long distance from the port of Karachi, rail communications exist and the necessary munitions could be forwarded to General Stilwell. The problems of quarters and rations would have to be solved locally.

Determination of the feasibility of the project would therefore seem to hinge on the following questions:

1. The feasibility of the transfer of this number of troops through the difficult country involved. General Stilwell and other local authorities will have to determine this point.

2. Concurrence of General Wavell in making available the selected training area to the Chinese forces.

3. U.S. ability to ship immediately to China whatever additional transportation and technical equipment might be necessary. The critical point in this last question would be in shipping, rather than in provision of the items involved.

I believe that until this matter is disposed of, it would be inappropriate to raise the question of higher command in Burma, as suggested by Mr. Currie.
May 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I refer to Ambassador Gauss' telegram of May 20 in regard to the gravity of the Chinese situation. A paraphrase is enclosed for convenience of reference.

I have sent paraphrases of the telegram to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

The last paragraph of the telegram impresses me as containing a very sound and timely recommendation. I venture to hope that it may be given special consideration.

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of telegram, May 20, 1942, from Embassy, Chungking.
Department of State

BUREAU

ENCFOLURE

DIVISION

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADRESSED TO

The President
PARAPHRASE

A telegram of May 20, 1942 from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

On May 19, speaking as government spokesman, T. F. Tsiang told newspapermen that China's immediate future is very grave, that the Japanese seem to be beginning an all-out effort to dispose of China now, and that China needs all the assistance which her friends can send and that such assistance must be sent with the greatest haste as otherwise the United Nations may find it necessary to pay a double or threefold price for recovery in the future. Tsiang emphasized that China needs bombers and pursuits, first and last, within the next three months. This was the first official public expression of concern in regard to China's present military situation.

It must be admitted that the situation is fraught with serious possibilities. A decision to undertake a major offensive in China may have been reached by the Japanese. However, so far, the Embassy sees no sign of lack of determination on the part of the Chinese to meet the threat; neither has there been an increase in influence of potential defeatist elements. There is an absence of clarity in the military situation in Yunnan Province. Many factors exist which would seem to rule out the likelihood of a major Japanese offensive in that province. These factors include military logistics, weather, terrain, and what has seemed to be broad military policy and objective on the part of the Japanese. On the other hand, that possibility must not be dismissed as the Japanese have undertaken the unexpected frequently. The Embassy is of the opinion, however, that the Chinese National Government will not disintegrate or collapse or that the Japanese will be able to destroy it even if they should be successful in an invasion of Yunnan Province and should advance on other fronts such as Chekiang-Hunan and in a northwesterly direction.

The Ambassador recommends that if at all practicable increased American air support as asked for by the Chinese should be given, not only because of the practical effect upon the course of military operations against the Japanese, but also because of the psychological effect of such aid from the United States upon the Chinese Government and the Chinese people. We should give the Chinese proof at an early date that China is looked upon as a vital theater of war by our Government.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I refer to Ambassador Gauss' telegram of May 20 in regard to the gravity of the Chinese situation. A paraphrase is enclosed for convenience of reference.

I have sent paraphrases of the telegram to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.

The last paragraph of the telegram impresses me as containing a very sound and timely recommendation. I venture to hope that it may be given special consideration.

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of telegram,
May 20, 1942, from
Embassy, Chungking.

GA
FE:MMH/GA:HEE

May 21, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Lieutenant General Arnold's memorandum, attached, was read by the President, who directed Captain McCrea to show it to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, but with the admonition that the information contained therein could not be used. This has been done.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM TO: Captain John L. McGrea,
Naval Aide to the President.

SUBJECT: Movement of Freight into Burma and China.

1. With reference to your memorandum of April 23, 1942, concerning
the amount of freight currently being carried into Burma and China, the
following is all the information the War Department has on the subject:

   a. In February: Movement of supplies over the Burma Road
      totaled just over 13,700 tons or an average of 490 tons a day.

   b. In March: First two weeks' tonnage haulage was approximately
      the same average as February.

   c. In March: Last two weeks, there was sharp decrease. This
      decrease is ascribed to the fact that trucks normally employed in
      carrying supplies were diverted for other military purposes.

   d. It should be borne in mind that the February and March move-
      ment of supplies along the Burma Road undoubtedly represents
      supplies evacuated from Rangoon just before its occupation by
      the Japanese. Temporary supply bases were established at various
      points along the railway south and northeast of Mandalay, as well
      as at Lashio, the railway terminus in eastern Burma.

   e. We have had no information in regard to any fresh supplies
      reaching Burma or China other than airborne supplies.

   f. Estimated total capacity (which has never been even nearly
      approached) of the Burma Road is 1,000 tons a day.

   g. With equipment presently available, Colonel Osman expects to
      move from India to China, by air during April, 100 tons of aviation
      gasoline. In May and June, when additional transports arrive, he
      expects to step up this figure to 1,000 tons and 1,500 tons respect-
      ively.

   h. Movement of supplies by the all-weather Southern Route road
      from the bisection of the ASSAM--BENGAL Railway at Manipur to Dalewa
      via Imphal cannot be arranged until the Imphal - Kalewa section is
finished. It is estimated that this section (115 miles) will not be ready until November, and then only provided Indian labor employed on the Indian section is utilized. This has been arranged.

1. Admiral Standley, in a dispatch dated April 10, from Kuibyshev, stated that the Chinese Ambassador had expressed apprehension that the movement of supplies along the Burma Road might prove impossible and he suggested as an alternate route that supplies for China should be sent to Bandarshahr, thence across Persia to Bandarsharpur on the Caspian, and then by sea to Krasnovodsk. Supplies could be trans-shipped at this point and railed across southern Russia to Alma Ata or Sargiopol via Tashkent. The China supply road from Alma Ata to Chungking, under existing conditions, is not capable, according to the Chinese Ambassador, of transporting more than 4,000 tons per month.

2. The Operations Division of the General Staff has sent a cable to General Brereton asking specifically what supplies are currently being sent into Burma and China by all routes including air routes.

2. If above information is not complete I do not know where you can get any more except from General Stilwell.

[Signature]

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date: 10-34-46
Signature: Carl S. Spicer
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPT. McCREA:

Will you dig out the correct statistics on this and speak to me about it?

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Progress of China's air transport program.

I have been endeavoring to check on Louis Johnson's cable to you on this matter. I have not been able to find out anything definite about the amount of freight currently being carried into Burma and China. According to General George, however, the situation with reference to planes is as follows.

There should be at General Stilwell's disposal, either for operation by CNAC or by the Army, 11 transport planes. This includes 3 owned by CNAC. There are 16 transport planes en route, all of which, if all goes well, should arrive within ten days. Nine additional are scheduled to leave within the next week. This would make 36 planes in all. Although General Naiden has advised that he does not feel that he can handle more than 25 initially, General George has decided to send 50 to India as soon as possible.

He has despatched a picked ground crew to handle the line and is despatching two crews per plane for the first 25 planes, and initially one crew per plane for the second 25. He hopes to increase this later, but he is relying, in the initial operations, on some help from CNAC and Pan American Airways.

Before General Bissell left for China the relative merits of Army and Pan-Am operations were thoroughly canvassed. The decision finally turned on the fact that Pan-Am could not undertake to recruit the necessary number of civilian pilots and ground personnel in any reasonable period. The delay in getting the Army program under way is largely attributable to the fact that most of the planes available were taken from the domestic airlines, and were in need of extensive alterations for the China service. The program should step up rapidly from now on.

Lauchlin Currie

DECLASSIFIED
May 5, 1942

My dear General Arnold:

I gather that the air ferry route to China is seriously endangered. The only way we can get certain supplies into China is by air.

I wish you and Mr. Lovett would confer immediately with Dr. Soong and General Shen on alternative air routes.

I want you to explore every possibility, both as to airplanes and routes. It is essential that our route be kept open, no matter how difficult.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

151 Franklin D. Roosevelt

Lt. General H. H. Arnold,
Chief, Army Air Forces,
War Department.
Subject: Supply Routes to China via Karachi and Turkestan.

1. In April 1942, the Chinese Ambassador to Russia asked that his country be sent supplies by this route, but added that he would not ask for more than 4,000 tons a month.

2. The first difficulty of this project lies in Karachi itself. Karachi is an important port which can accommodate 21 10,000 ton ships of 26' to 30' draft simultaneously. In December 1941 the combined incoming and outgoing railroad capacity at Karachi was 4,000 tons per day and it was estimated that this could be increased to 10,000 tons; however, Karachi is now being used almost to capacity for supplies going to British forces in the Middle East.

3. There are three supply routes from Karachi to the Russian-Turk.-Sib. Railroad; two via Afghanistan and one via Iran.

4. The first route is from Karachi to the Khyber Pass by rail, via Peshawar; across Afghanistan by motor road, via Kabul to the Russian railroad at Termez. From Termez, north by rail to Kagan, on the main line of the Turk.-Sib. Railroad. The motor road from the Indian frontier to Kabul is "very poor". Difficulty exists in crossing the Oxus River at the Afghan-Soviet frontier. No bridge exists, but a ferry is used. The road approaching Termez is "impassable" for a distance of about 20 miles, and would have to be completely rebuilt. The remainder of this road across Afghanistan is "fair", and presents no insurmountable difficulties. The exact tonnage capacity of this route is not known, but it is estimated that if improvements were made on it, its capacity could be built up to that of the Burma Road (17,000 tons a month).

5. The second route would be to go north from Karachi to the Chaman Pass, on the Afghan border, by rail through Sukkur and Quetta and by motor road from the Chaman Pass to Kushka, the Russian railroad on the Afghan border; this road is far better than the road from the Khyber Pass to Termez; it is less used; is over a flatter terrain, and 75 miles shorter. During the springtime, however, floods are apt to occur along it; its exact tonnage capacity is not known, but "reliable sources" estimate that it could handle approximately the same amount as the Khyber Pass-Termez Road. From Kushka, supplies could be sent.
north by rail to Merry, on the main line of the Russian-Turk.-Sib. Railroad.

6. The third route is to Zahedan, in southeastern Iran, (by rail via Sukkur and Quetta), and thence north by motor road to Ashkhabad, on the Russian-Turk.-Sib. Railroad. This motor road as far north as Meshed is fairly good, and can handle in the neighborhood of 10,000 tons per month; but the road north of Meshed, (especially between Quchan and Ashkhabad), is "very bad." This portion of the road would probably limit the tonnage capacity of the entire route to about 2,000 tons a month. The chief difficulty in using this route is that the British are already using the majority of its facilities to supply their forces in the Middle East.

7. The Turk.-Sib. Railroad is single-tracked throughout, but this presents no difficulty, as it can easily carry all tonnage delivered to it by the connecting motor roads.

8. There are four possible routes from the Turk.-Sib. Railroad to Chungking; the first three meet at, or farther west than, Urumchi, and for the remaining distance (some 2,300 miles) all supplies going to China over these routes would have to be sent over a single motor road. The exact tonnage capacity of this road is not known, but not more than 2,000 tons have as yet been transported over it in any one month. The Chinese Government hopes to receive 4,000 tons a month by this route; this may be possible if certain improvements are made.

9. The first of these roads starts at the Russian railhead, a few miles east of Emalyl Abad; it follows the age-old caravan trail through the precipitous Pamir Mountains and across Sinkiang to Urumchi by way of Kashgar. The second road leaves the Turk.-Sib. Railroad at Alma Ata and goes to Dzharant and on to Shikho (about 100 miles west of Urumchi) where it meets the third road. The third road leaves the Turk.-Sib. Railroad at Sergiopol and goes to Shikho by way of Chuguchak.

10. The last two mentioned roads are known as the Northwestern Route, Red Route. At the present time, the road from Sergiopol is the chief one used, because it crosses neither the Pamir Mountains, as does the Kashgar Route; nor the swampy terrain encountered along the Dzharant Route.

11. There is a fourth route from the Turk.-Sib. Railroad to Chungking. It starts at Semipalatinsk and goes through Outer and Inner Mongolia, connecting with other three roads at Lanchow. No definite information is available at the present time as to the tonnage capacity of this road, but it is considerably longer than the other three routes.

Conclusion: The British are already using the port facilities of Karachi and the railroad inland almost to capacity in order to supply their Middle Eastern forces; the primitive state of the roads from the Russian-Chinese frontier to the Chinese-Japanese front further limit the present capacities of the route. In order to send supplies to China by this route, either the British would have to curtail their utilization of the existing facilities, or these facilities would have to be augmented; the Northwestern Chinese Road would also have to be improved.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: (The White House)

Subject: India-Burma-China Ferry Route.

The ferry route from India to China now goes through Karachi, Delhi, Allahabad, Tezpur, Sadiya, thence to Myitkina in Burma, and then to Yunnanyi. An alternate route has been established from Sadiya to Likiang, thence north to Pihsien near Chengtu. Due to the fact that the Japanese have now pushed north in Burma to the vicinity of Mandalay and Lashio, it is probable that the use of the airport at Myitkina will very shortly be denied us, as it is within 200 miles of the present Japanese front and will be subject to continued bombing. This means, therefore, that the alternate route from Sadiya to Likiang will have to be used. Mountain ranges and peaks on this route up to about 21,000 feet will make navigation hazardous, even during periods of good weather. During the period from May 15th to October 15th, air travel through this area will in all probability be very sketchy due to the heavy rains, coupled with the high elevation of the mountains. So far as is known, there is no other route available from India to China than the one described above.

This information is furnished you to show what we may expect from now until October 15th in the matter of air transportation from India to China. Should the Japanese during this period push farther north and interdict the route in India in the vicinity of Tezpur, the route will be permanently put out of commission, even after the monsoon season, until the Japanese have been removed from this area.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: (The White House)

Subject: India-Burma-China Ferry Route

In a memorandum dated May 4, 1942, I invited attention to the threat to the ferry route from India to China. All possible alternate routes have been considered and the three most practicable are discussed briefly herein.

**ROUTES**

**Route A**

Karachi - Delhi - Allahabad - Tezpur - Sadiya - China

This route must be considered dangerous east of Allahabad because of the threat of the Japanese advance. In order to continue transport of supplies to China, it may become necessary at any time to operate from bases in India which are beyond the threat of Japanese bombardment. In order to do this, longer range aircraft will be essential.

**Route B**

Basra or Bushire to Ashkabad by air - Ashkabad to Alma Ata by rail - Alma Ata to Lanchow and Chungking by air or road

This route is largely through Russian territory and would require the use of Russian facilities. Gasoline and other supplies needed for an intermediate stop on the air trip from Alma Ata to Lanchow offer some difficulties but this problem should be capable of solution.

**Route C**

Alaska - Markova - Olmekon - Yakutsk - Bodaibo - Irkutsk - Urga - Lanchow - Chungking
As far as Lanchow, this route is almost entirely through Russian or Russian-controlled territory and its use would require the full cooperation of the Russian Government. Because of the necessity for development of landing fields and installation of gasoline and supplies, this route cannot be considered for immediate use. It is, however, of great strategic value to the United States.

Tab A describes these routes in greater detail. Tab B shows the routes plotted on a map, scale 1:15,000,000.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend:

1. That the existing route, Route A, be continued, using the transports now allocated to the maximum extent as long as possible.

2. That plans be made for continuation of Route A without using the airports at Sadiya and Tezpur, should their use be denied us due to enemy interference.

That for this purpose a decision be made as to the relative value of 50 B-24 type aircraft used as transports moving goods into China as against the same number of B-24's used to drop bombs in Germany. (It will take about 10 days to modify each one of these bombers for this purpose, but when they are completed 50 may be expected to carry approximately 1200 tons per month.)

3. That if it is decided to use B-24's for this purpose, 25 be diverted from British allocations and 25 from United States allocations, and that these airplanes be modified for this purpose immediately and delivered to India as early as possible.

4. That General Stilwell be directed to investigate air drome facilities between Allahabad and Sadiya in an effort to develop bases which are protected as much as possible from the threat of Japanese bombing attack.

5. That the strategic importance of the Alaska - Eastern Siberia Route is so great that appropriate action be initiated to develop this route with the least possible delay.
Description of Routes

ROUTE A

Route A is the existing route. The danger of losing the advanced base at Sardes may be considered imminent. This would necessitate a direct flight to China from bases in the general vicinity of Allahabad.

ROUTE B

Proposed Route B can be started at Basra, about 60 miles northwest from the Persian Gulf, now employed by the British as a port of disembarkation in the Middle East. Facilities at Basra are now heavily taxed, and they must be increased before the port can be put to any extensive use by our forces. As an alternative, Bushire, in Southern Persia, 200 miles Southwest from the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates may be established as the Western terminus of proposed Route B. Harbor facilities at Bushire are now limited and must undergo extensive improvement before the port will be serviceable.

From Basra (or alternatively Bushire) aircraft can fly without difficulty to Ashkabad, a distance from either port of about 800 miles. Ashkabad, capital of Turkmen, is about 50 miles North of the Persian border and is on the Transcaucasian Railroad, which lies wholly within the U.S.S.R. Gasoline can be made readily available from Baku, a distance of about 550 miles.

From Ashkabad supplies can be carried by rail to Alma Ata, the Eastern terminus of the Transcaucasian Railroad, passing immediately through Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent. The distance between Ashkabad and Alma Ata by rail is about 1200 miles. There are no railroad facilities East of Alma Ata.

From Alma Ata supplies can be transported by truck or air along the established caravan route well to the North of the Taklamakan desert, passing through Urumchi, Sula Ans, Yaomo Shan and Lanchow. In large part this road is hardly more than a trail, and will require considerable improvement before trucks can be used to full advantage. The distance from Alma Ata to Lanchow is about 1700 miles and from Lanchow southeast to Chungking about 500 miles.

Proposed Route B lies North of the Monsoon area and is relatively free of mountains, lakes and other barriers. The climate is favorable for air or motor transportation. A stretch of desert in the
vicinity of Sula Ansi connecting the Gobi Desert to the East and the Taklamakan Desert in the West is perhaps the most difficult part of the route to cover. This route is reported to have been used by a Soviet airline and landing fields are known to exist along it.

ROUTE C

Proposed Route C can be developed from Alaska through Northeast Siberia to China. Certain landing areas in this region are known to exist but the extent of their development is uncertain. Markova is within flying distance of Alaskan bases, a distance of about 720 miles. From Markova it is believed possible to develop an airline to Irkutsk, a distance of about 2500 miles along the general route of Oimekon (or Verkhne, Kolymak) Yakutsk and Bodaibo where the terrain is suitable for development of landing areas.

From Irkutsk supplies may be carried by truck or air to Lanchow, a distance of about 1300 miles, and from Lanchow to Chungking by truck or air to Chungking, a distance of about 500 miles.

The weather in Eastern Siberia is generally favorable for flying, except for storms with considerable precipitation in April and May, and in September and October. The winters are marked by extreme cold with prevailing dryness. The snowfall is light, seldom being sufficient to cover the ground. Fogs are reported to be prevalent along the coast, but inland the weather is suitable for flying. It is believed practicable to continue operations even in mid-winter.

Gasoline and supplies present a problem of major importance. Railroads and other transportation are almost entirely lacking, which will necessitate the development of air or water transportation. It has been reported that the Lena and Kolyma Rivers, emptying into the Arctic Ocean are navigable for considerable distances inland, but only for a limited period in the summer months.

The difficulties of developing proposed Route C are relatively great, but its strategical value to the United States, when established, makes this development a matter for serious consideration.
NOTES ON ROUTES TO CHINA

1. Of the three possible routes, Route A is in operation now. Routes B and C are completely dependent upon the attitude of Russia and involve immediate organizational difficulties.

2. Using 20 B-24's of which 40 probably could be kept in continuous operation making the 2800 mile round trip every third day and transporting an average of 2 tons per trip, approximately 1200 tons per month could be carried without gassing in China.

3. Taking aircraft off the assembly line first article can be delivered one week after order and deliveries of 2 to 3 per day thereafter. This would be faster than returning available aircraft to factory for conversion.

4. Mileages:

   Route A - By air, Allahabad to Chengtu - 1400 miles.

   Route B - By air, Basra to Ashkabad - 800 miles
   By rail, Ashkabad to Alma Ata - 1200 miles
   By air or road, Alma Ata to Chungking - 2200 miles
   TOTAL - 4200 miles

   Route C - By air, Alaska to Irkutz - 3200 miles
   By air or road Irkutz to Chungking - 1800 miles
   TOTAL - 5000 miles
May 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Dr. Soong's proposal re Shanghai.

In connection with the Dr. Soong proposal for bombing the Shanghai power plant, a study is being made in my office.

Preliminary study indicates that it may be possible to bomb this power plant from bases in India, stopping long enough, either enroute or returning, at some airport in China for refueling.

Upon completion of the formal study, you will be informed of what action is practicable.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Attached are carbon copies of a memorandum which Mr. Currie left with the President yesterday.

Frances McConnell
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I am attaching a proposed plan of operations by British, American and Chinese troops against Burma, together with an Aide Memoire handed Lauchlin Currie by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I understand that the plan has been approved in principle by both General Stilwell and the Generalissimo. Mr. Currie tells me that the Generalissimo's approval, so far as the use of Chinese troops is concerned, is conditioned upon the dispatch of at least one American division, and rapid progress being attained toward a goal of 500 planes and 5,000 tons of air freight a month. He no longer insists on 500 planes within the short period of three months. He has also expressed a willingness to dispatch more troops by air to India for training and equipping.

Since the plan contemplates joint military and naval action, I suggest you secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Staff.
August 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I am attaching a proposed plan of operations by British, American and Chinese troops against Burma, together with an Aide Memoire handed Lauchlin Currie by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. I understand that the plan has been approved in principle by both General Stilwell and the Generalissimo. Mr. Currie tells me that the Generalissimo's approval, so far as the use of Chinese troops is concerned, is conditioned upon the dispatch of at least one American division, and rapid progress being attained toward a goal of 500 planes and 5,000 tons of air freight a month. He no longer insists on 500 planes within the short period of three months. He has also expressed a willingness to dispatch more troops by air to India for training and equipping.

Since the plan contemplates joint military and naval action, I suggest you secure the comments and recommendations of the Joint Staff.

(FDR)
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, 14TH U. S. AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

Date - 10-34-44
Signature - Carl Spencer

26 January, 1944.

SUBJECT: Matterhorn Project

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. With the arrival in China of Brigadier General K. B. Wolfe and members of his staff, it can be said that the Matterhorn Project is rapidly taking shape. Thousands of workers are now engaged in building the required bases for the operation of the transports and then the B-29 Bomber aircraft in the selected China Base area near Chengtu, China. It has been my privilege to discuss thoroughly with Brigadier General Wolfe, the proposed plans for his operations. As a result of these discussions and after careful thought and study, I am impressed with the necessity for reporting to you, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, certain serious defects in the plans as they now exist. What I have to say herein is based upon seven years of practical experience in air operations in China against the Japanese. I submit them to you at this time in the sincere hope that action will be taken at once to correct these defects.

2. The main operating bases in China have been selected in the Chengtu area, work has now started on these bases and they will be completed in time to meet the target dates. The Chengtu area is far removed from Japan and is well protected. It is a suitable area for operations against targets in Manchuria or Korea or as a base for maintenance and supply operations against Japan proper, but, operations from this area against targets in Japan without the use of staging fields is fraught with many grave tactical problems, some of which I desire to point out:

(1) Our B-29's must fly over approximately 350 miles of enemy held territory before reaching the east coast of China.

(2) These aircraft will be heavily laden and to be effective at this great range, will be required to fly at comparatively low altitude during their first few hours of flight.

(3) While traversing the enemy held territory north of the Yangtze River, they will be within range of at least fifteen Japanese airfields, many of which are equipped with Radar for early warning.

(4) The mainland of Japan proper will be alerted.
(5) It is reasonable to expect that this threat to the Japanese mainland will meet a concerted fighter defense, capable of subjecting our bombardment aircraft to successive waves of attack over a considerable time and distance. After making due allowances for the powerful armament of the B-29 and with a full knowledge of the impracticability of furnishing fighter escort, I am convinced that the cost of such an operation against Japan from bases in the Chengtu area will be prohibitive.

b. Staging fields have been recommended in Eastern China for the Matterhorn Project to give added flexibility and security of operations. Use of these staging fields will overcome the grave risks outlined in $a$ above, and will permit of greater efficiency in operations due to greater and more effective bomb loads possible. The importance of these eastern staging fields has not been sufficiently emphasized up to the present time, with the result that delays can be expected in completion of necessary extensions to existing airfields to make them fully operational for B-29 type aircraft, unless prompt demands are made upon the Chinese Government and unless ways and means of financing such projects are solved.

c. It is not possible to over emphasize the importance of heavy bombardment attacks against Japan proper, but, at the same time, we must realize that it is not feasible at this time to schedule more than three (3) such missions monthly and that the efforts of the Fourteenth Air Force during this interim must continue without ceasing against Japanese shipping and to secure and maintain air supremacy. Both of these highly important objectives are particularly vulnerable from China bases and both will assist our own forces and our allies in the South-west Pacific and in the South East Asia Command in the accomplishment of their final objectives. In addition to the two missions enumerated above, the Fourteenth Air Force must protect the eastern terminals of the Air Ferry Route, its air bases in China, and furnish air support to the Chinese ground forces. All of these missions and responsibilities demand that there should be the closest coordination between our tactical and strategical air forces and our supply agencies. There can be only one solution for the success of the many tasks at hand and that is a unified air command to consist of all Air Forces and supporting services operating in China.

2. In conclusion it is desired to emphasize that none of the many problems listed above is insurmountable, in fact, they can be easily solved. The tasks can be made less onerous and complicated with the resulting delays and disappointments and expense or they can be simplified with increased efficiency and success. The Commander of the Air Forces in China must be given complete command and control of all such Air Forces and supporting services as are based in or are operating from China.

C. L. CHENNAULT
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding.
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THAILAND - INDO CHINA

Advance edition Subject to correction

BRITISH FORCES

XXX 1 (BURMA)
XXX 16
RANGOON
7 BNs FRONTIER FORCE
7 BNs AUXILIARY & TERRITORIAL
2 BNs TRAINING
5 BNs MILITARY POLICE
TOTAL: 35,000