



I N D E X

BOOK I

I. OVERALL STRATEGY

- |            |  |                           |
|------------|--|---------------------------|
|            | (1) JCS 286/1 - Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conference                                  | TAB (A)                   |
|            | (2) JCS 290/1 - Conduct of the War in 1943-44  | TAB (B)                   |
|            | (3) JCS 283/1 - Current British Policy and Strategy in Relationship to that of the United States | TAB (C)                   |
| <i>Rep</i> | (4) JWPC 10/1 - Global Estimate of the Situation, 1943-44  | TAB (D) JCS 8-71          |
| <i>Rep</i> | (5) CCS 199 - Survey of Present Strategic Situation<br>CCS 199/1<br>CCS 199/2                    | TAB (E) }<br>JCS<br>33-71 |
|            | (6) JCS 302 - Collapse or Unconditional Surrender of Italy                                       | TAB (E-1)                 |
|            | (7) JCS 304 - Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44                                  | TAB (E-2)                 |
|            | (8) JCS 311 - Mobility and Utilization of Amphibious Assault Craft                               | TAB (E-3)                 |

BOOK II

II. EUROPEAN - AFRICAN AREA

- |            |   |           |
|------------|---|-----------|
|            | (1) JIC 83/1 - Forecast of Developments on the Russo-German Front<br>(2nd Dr)   | TAB (F)   |
| <i>Rep</i> | (2) JCS 291/1 - Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-44   | TAB (G)   |
|            | (3) JCS 288/1 - Invasion of the European Continent from Bases in the Mediterranean in 1943-44   | TAB (H)   |
|            | (4) JCS 293 - Limited Operations in the Mediterranean in 1943-44  | TAB (I)   |
|            | (5) JCS 294 - Defensive Garrisons Required and Forces Available for Transfer to other Areas or for Limited Offensives in the Mediterranean, 1943-44 | TAB (J)   |
|            | (6) JCS 295/1 - Size of Forces in the United Kingdom if Main Effort is in the Mediterranean   | TAB (J-1) |
|            | (7) CIC 16/1 - German Strategy in 1943<br>(4th Dr)  | TAB (K)   |

██████████

III. PACIFIC - FAR EAST AREA

- |                |   |                  |
|----------------|---|------------------|
| (1)            | JCS 287/1 - Strategic Plan for the<br>Defeat of Japan | TAB (L)          |
| (2)            | JIC 80/1 - Japanese Strategy in 1943<br>(2nd Dr)      | TAB (M)          |
| (3)            | JCS 297 - Operations in Burma 1943-44                 | TAB (M-1)        |
| <i>Rep</i> (4) | CCS 198/1 - Status of "ANAKIM"                        | TAB (N) JCS 33-7 |

BOOKS III and IV

IV. OUTLINE PLANS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

**OVERALL STRATEGY**



~~SECRET~~  
300-11  
(J.C.S. 286/1)

May 8, 1943

Pages 6-10, incl.

COPY NO. 29

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

- 300
- (1) J.C.S. 272
  - (2) J.S.S.C. 14
  - (3) J.C.S. 283
  - (4) J.C.S. 272/1
  - (5) J.P.S. 177
  - (6) J.C.S. 285
  - (7) J.S.S.C. 14/1
  - (8) J.C.S. 286
  - (9) J.C.S. 285/1
  - (10) J.C.S. 283/1

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

RECOMMENDED LINE OF ACTION AT COMING CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a memorandum which was sent to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS 927/495-1

By DBS Date APR 13 1973

ENCLOSURE

May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Recommended line of action at coming conferences.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following line of action be adopted by the United States at the coming conferences and submit it herewith for your approval. Their recommendations are followed by a brief supporting discussion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

I. The agenda must not be limited to 1943, nor to BOLERO as distinguished from ROUNDUP.

II. The close interrelation between strategy against Germany and strategy against Japan must be clearly stated and emphasized early in the conference. It should be intimated that a British course of action in Europe which the United States consider unsound may force the United States to increased attention to the Pacific.

Axis in Europe

III. The United States consider that SICKLE from now on, and ROUNDUP in 1944 constitute the basic strategy against Germany, and must not be delayed or otherwise prejudiced by other undertakings in Europe.

IV. However, they recognize certain advantages in prompt post-HUSKY operations in the Western Mediterranean, and as an alternative or compromise will discuss them with a view to determining the best course of action in that area - provided such

~~SECRET~~

action involves a timely reduction rather than an increase in allied resources committed to that area, tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with ROUNDUP.

V. Subject to discussion and future developments, the occupation of SARDINIA is considered less open to objection than other Mediterranean operations.

VI. The United States will not become involved in operations east of Sicily except possibly for special air operations.

VII. If the British insist on doing so, they do it alone.

VIII. Should the British insist on undertaking commitments in the Mediterranean, which the United States considers prejudicial to the over-all concept of the earliest possible defeat of Germany and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the British will be informed that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific.

Japan

IX. ANAKIM should be undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion.

X. If ANAKIM proves impossible, due to lack of British support or other reasons, and no adequate alternative can be agreed upon, the United States will expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan gains by Allied failure adequately to support China.

DISCUSSION

2. The main subjects of the agenda proposed by the British are:

a. "Post-HUSKY strategy in 1943 against Axis in Europe under following heads:

Further action in Mediterranean  
SICKLE and BOLERO"

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By DB Date APR 13 1973

b. "Action against Japan in Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters."

~~SECRET~~

While these subjects are in general satisfactory, the limiting phrase "in 1943," in item (a) is typical of the British tendency to the immediate and short view, in contrast to our belief that agreed undertakings must be based on the over-all or long view. We should see that the words "in 1943" are omitted from the approved agenda, and that it is changed to read "SICKLE, BOLERO and ROUND-UP."

3. The close interrelation between the two principal subjects - the war in Europe and the war against Japan, should be emphasized in discussing the agenda. Our position should be that, while at the present time we accept a strategy which contemplates the defeat of Germany first, we maintain that any proposed course of action against Germany has a direct relation to our proposed course of action against Japan.

4. After these two points concerning the agenda have been decided, the subject of "Further action in Mediterranean" will come up. It appears that the crux of this question will be whether or not the Allied Nations shall be committed to major operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. We should state that such a commitment is contrary to sound strategy and should firmly maintain that the United States will not become so committed.

a. Such action does not offer adequate contribution to the basic concept of the earliest possible defeat of the Axis in Europe.

b. It will absorb means that are needed for SICKLE, ROUNDUP, and the war against Japan.

c. It will involve longer and more hazardous lines of communication and the application of our effort in an area remote from and having substantially no communications leading to the decisive theater of the war.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By \_\_\_\_\_ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

d. While purporting to support Russia it can hardly fail to arouse Russian suspicions as to the future of the Dardanelles. It should be noted that because of the advent of air power, supplemented by the submarine, British possession of the Dodecanese with the continuance of the control they have consistently exercised over Greece, would serve to bar the transit of the Straits by Russia substantially as effectively as if the British held the shores of the Straits themselves.

e. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain popular acceptance of such action in the United States -- particularly in view of the continuing threat in the Pacific.

f. It assumes an early and complete accomplishment of HUSKY. This assumption seems less likely of realization than the contrary one that this operation will be long drawn-out and costly.

Should the British insist on operations to the east of Sicily, the United States should inform them (1) that they will have to rely entirely on British resources, and (2) that to the extent such employment of resources detracts from the effectiveness of operations directly against Germany, the United States may be forced to increase its commitments in the Pacific.

5. We are firmly of the opinion that sound basic strategy for conducting the war in Europe requires that the major effort against Germany be made from the United Kingdom by SICKLE now and by ROUNDUP in 1944. We realize however that there is some force in the arguments that post-HUSKY operations in the western Mediterranean will --

- a. maintain the momentum of HUSKY.
- b. employ resources available there, which cannot be transferred to the United Kingdom this year.
- c. furnish support to Russia.

- d. tend to knock Italy out of the war.
- e. threaten southern France and Italy.

For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, as an alternative or compromise, consider further operations in the Western Mediterranean. They should strongly maintain, however, that such operations are of an emergency nature, primarily in support of Russia and that the major effort against Germany must remain SICKLE from now on and ROUNDUP in 1944. As between SARDINIA and ITALY as objectives, SARDINIA would detract less from the essential concentration of our resources in the United Kingdom.

6. The British will continue to depreciate the importance of the effort against Japan and the necessity for support of China. They will argue that ANAKIM is impracticable in 1943 and will probably present unsatisfactory alternatives. The United States cannot do ANAKIM alone. A strong position should be taken as regards the Pacific and ANAKIM - namely, that if ANAKIM should be abandoned the United States must expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan would gain by Allied failure adequately to support China.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

APR 13 1973



~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 29

326-2

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

(J.C.S. 290/1)

May 8, 1943

326  
(1) JCS 290

Pages 4 - 6 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944

References: (a) J.C.S. 272  
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg. Min., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The attached study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,  
F. B. ROYAL,  
Joint Secretariat

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By WBS Date APR 13 1973

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-44.

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of the UNITED NATIONS, in conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies, is to bring the war against GERMANY, JAPAN, and ITALY to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. If however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against JAPAN, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN AFRICAN AREAS

a. Secure the lines of communications in the ATLANTIC by defeating the U-Boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European area

(1) Conduct a full scale assault from the UNITED KINGDOM against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

✓ CS 927/495-1  
 By DAJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing GERMANY'S war potential and to making feasible a cross-channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African area

(1) Accomplish HUSKY.

(2) After the completion of HUSKY, or in the event that HUSKY is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from MEDITERRANEAN bases;

(b) To continue support to RUSSIA by the diversion of AXIS forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of AXIS forces in order to facilitate a cross-channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the MEDITERRANEAN area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN east of SICILY.

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the PACIFIC, particularly to AUSTRALIA; to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the PACIFIC, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full scale offensive against JAPAN; and to keep CHINA in the war.

~~SECRET~~

b. For these purposes, U. S. naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC. <sup>With</sup> due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the EUROPEAN AXIS, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943 - 1944 will have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Seizure of BURMA.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to RUSSIA without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

b. Sustain CHINA by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By WBS Date APR 13 1973

TA  
C

300-10  
(J.C.S. 283/1)

May 8, 1943

Pages 11-20 incl.

COPY NO. 29  
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

~~SECRET~~  
(1) J.C.S. 272  
(2) J.S.S.C. 14  
(3) J.C.S. 283  
(4) J.C.S. 272/1  
(5) J.P.S. 177  
(6) J.C.S. 285  
(7) J.S.S.C. 14/1  
(8) J.C.S. 286  
(9) J.C.S. 285/1

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CURRENT BRITISH POLICY AND STRATEGY IN RELATIONSHIP  
TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES

References: a. J.C.S. Supplementary Minutes,  
76th Mtg., Item 1 (a)  
b. J.C.S. 272

Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - May 8, 1943

1. In accordance with the above references, as elaborated in discussion with the Joint Staff Planners, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee submit, as enclosures, their estimate of the current British military policy and strategy, with particular relation to the most probable British proposals, at the next "Casablanca" meeting.
2. In making this estimate, the Committee has examined the record of British action, proposals and announcements, insofar as available to them, and have discussed the subject with appropriate officials of the State Department. The most pertinent sources of available information are the record of General Marshall's visit to London in April, 1942, of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff visit to London in July, 1942, the Casablanca papers, including the recent C.C.S. 199/1, certain dispatches between the Prime Minister and the President, and Mr. Churchill's speech of March 21, 1943.
3. The paper is prepared in two parts -- Enclosures "A" and "B" -- the former a general discussion, the latter a paragraph by paragraph comparison between J.C.S. 243/3 and what is believed to be the British ideas.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

The war aims of the United States and British coincide in respect to the basic objectives of: (a) the imposition upon the Axis nations of a defeat that will render them militarily impotent; and (b) in principle, the defeat of Germany as of first priority.

It is the general nature of the latter objective, which is not susceptible of precise definition, that has given rise to some divergence of views. It is a divergence easily understood. It springs from such fundamental causes as the differences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis the several enemies, and in the marked contrast between the two nations in respect of their territorial structures and the bases of their power.

The threat in the Pacific, the importance of the Mediterranean, do not appeal to them with the same force. To the U. S. the former appears of such a nature and imminence that they view with greater concern than the British an indefinite delay in meeting its challenge. Operations in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, are viewed by the U. S. solely from the military viewpoint of wherein they contribute to winning the war. By the British, restored control of the Mediterranean is regarded as an objective of national policy essential to the maintenance of their present Imperial power, whereas they are confident that the defeat of Japan, no matter how long delayed, nor how completely accomplished by the United States, will restore the British position in the Far East.

In consequence, United States policy indicates adoption of those direct measures that promise the earliest possible defeat of Germany. The British have hitherto regarded successful accomplishment of such measures as being militarily impracticable at present. Furthermore, the decline in their Imperial strength that would result from a heavy loss of British manpower renders them reluctant to undertake major costly operations of

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By DBJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

doubtful success. Having a definitely secondary interest in the Pacific but feeling the political necessity of conducting immediate offensive operations, the British advocate measures that, from the strictly military point of view of the U.S., seem indirect and lacking decisive effect in terminating the war.

It is difficult to assess the relative weight given by the British to the factor of military practicability of direct decisive operations and to their political desire to improve their post-war position. Both factors have undoubtedly played a part. However, unless the British are actually convinced that Mediterranean operations are the best military strategy they must see definite advantages therein, to their post-war position as regards Europe. It would seem that the defeat of the Axis in Europe, however accomplished would restore the pre-war British position in the Mediterranean. Her insistence that war be fought in that area would suggest that the British desire to substantially improve their pre-war position in the Mediterranean and consider that actual occupation of certain areas, will greatly tend to strengthen their case at the peace table.

It is believed that the proposals that will be advanced by the British will include operations involving the occupation of one or more of the following objectives, viz:

- a. In the eastern Mediterranean - Crete, Dodecanese, Greece, Turkey.
- b. In the western Mediterranean - Sardinia, Corsica, Italy.

Each of such proposals should be examined from, inter alia, the point of view not only of the extent to which it will further the prosecution of the war, but of the extent to which it will absorb available means to the detriment of: an intensification of the air effort from the U.K.; the prosecution of the war effort in the Pacific on the scale approved by ANFA; and the build-up of BOLERO.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

To extend operations into the eastern Mediterranean is to project our effort away from the decisive theater of war to a region remote therefrom and having substantially no land communications leading thereto. Such operations would involve longer and more hazardous sea communications, and would impose a strain on available Allied means for objectives that will have little, if any, influence on the outcome of the war.

Such operations, except possibly in the case of Crete, are likely to arouse the suspicions of and be resented by Russia as being a continuation of the historic British policy of their domination of the Straits vis-a-vis Russia.

An Allied occupation of Italy would appear likely to prove more of a liability than an asset. Aside from the maintenance of forces of occupation we would be faced with inescapable demands for supplies, including coal, for the civil population.

Of the various objectives mentioned, the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica would appear to be the least objectionable. The communications thereto will be shorter and less exposed, and the occupation of those islands would facilitate a subsequent operation into Southern France.

In lieu of a further extension of operations in the Mediterranean we should propose to the British at the forthcoming conference the implementation of the plan for the combined air offensive against German war industry. An estimate should be made by the planners of the effect upon German war making capacity of successful accomplishment of the four phases of that plan. Based upon this estimate the earliest practicable target date for ROUNDUP should be established. We should press the British for the acceptance of this target date and the utilization of our means to accomplish the maximum practicable buildup in the United Kingdom prior to that date.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

927/495-1

By DBS Date 4/13/23

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "B"

Subject: Apparent British Policy and Strategy with relation to that of the United States.

1. For brevity and clarity in discussing the British strategic concept, the present C.C.S. concept, as interpreted in J.C.S. 243/3 (Clarification of Casablanca Decisions) is taken as a basis, and each paragraph thereof (typed in capitals) is discussed from what is believed to be the British point of view.

I. OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR

(a) IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND THE LESSER ALLIES, TO FORCE AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE.

The British have accepted this over-all concept in public announcements at Casablanca, and it is probable that in making such announcements they were sincere at the moment. However, we cannot overlook the possibility that the British may have some mental reservations as to interpretation of "unconditional surrender." This is indicated by Mr. Churchill's speech of March 21, 1943, in which he says: "Nevertheless, in my opinion, the moment when Hitler is beaten and Germany and Italy are prostrate will mark the climax of the war and that will be the time to make a new declaration upon the task before us." Such reservations would have their basis in the traditional British objection to the development of a dominant military power on the mainland of Europe. It is a possibility that they cannot entirely overlook that as the war in Europe develops, Russia and Germany may exhaust each other. The British will be concerned with the post-war position of France. The British will probably desire a considerably weakened Italy in order to enhance the British control of the Mediterranean.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

- 15 -

JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

(b) SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC POWERS, TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN.

The British probably would be glad to accept this statement with the words "and extend" omitted. However, were they to write it themselves, it would probably read: "Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Powers to prevent further advance by the Japanese." This desire of the British to minimize the war against Japan is a fundamental difference between the British and American concepts.

(c) THEREAFTER, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC POWERS AND IF POSSIBLE WITH RUSSIA, TO COMBINE THE FULL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO FORCE THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN.

This statement has the definite approval of the Prime Minister. However, while at Casablanca, he offered a formal treaty in support of this commitment, in his speech of March 21st he suggests "a new declaration," when "Hitler is beaten." The British are probably sincere in this commitment at the moment. Much can happen, however, between now and the defeat of Germany to blunt the British willingness to undertake an "all-out" war against Japan. The British have consistently indicated a surprising lack of concern about the Far East. They may be counted upon to perform the letter of their commitments in this connection, but they are traditionally expert at meeting the letter while avoiding the spirit of commitments, and such action in regard to British support of the war against Japan should always be kept in mind as a possibility.

## II. BASIC STRATEGY FOR 1943

TO CONDUCT A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, EMPLOYING THE MAXIMUM FORCES CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN, AND WITH MEETING CURRENT ACCEPTED STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

The British would like to have this read as follows:

"To conduct the major strategic offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean Theater with maximum possible forces, while maintaining the strategic defensive in other areas."

The British have consistently indicated that their main interest is the War in Europe, and that all other undertakings should be kept at the minimum with a view to pressing that offensive. They have believed and strongly advocated that the major effort against the Axis in Europe in 1943 should be made in the Mediterranean.

### III. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED TO MEET APPROVED STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS ON A SCALE SUBJECT TO REVIEW FROM TIME TO TIME. RESOURCES AVAILABLE AFTER MEETING CURRENT STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS WILL BE ALLOCATED TO APPROVED STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS, SUBJECT TO ALTERATION IN KEEPING WITH THE CHANGING SITUATION.

This statement would probably be satisfactory to the British, provided that the words "by the Combined Chiefs of Staff" be added after "review" in the first sentence and after "allocated" in the second sentence. This would represent no change in the intent of this paragraph but would relieve the British concern lest such "review" and "alteration" be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff alone.

### IV. EXISTING STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS

#### PRIORITY GROUP 1.

(a) MAINTAIN THE SECURITY, AND WAR-MAKING CAPACITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND BRITISH ISLES.

(b) SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN ALL AREAS TO WHICH COMMITTED.

(c) KEEP ENEMY SUBMARINE EFFORT UNDER INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE CONTROL.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

U CS 927/495-1  
By *WBS* Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY GROUP 2.

(d) MEET REQUIREMENTS OF RUSSIAN PROTOCOL TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN SHIPPING.

(e) SUSTAIN CHINA BY THE GREATEST VOLUME OF SUPPLIES THAT CAN BE GOT INTO CHINA, WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN TRANSPORT.

(f) OTHER FIRM COMMITMENTS, APPROVED FROM TIME TO TIME, FOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY REASONS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

While the British have not definitely accepted the idea of establishing priority on the basis of strategic commitments and strategic undertakings, it is believed they would consider Items (a), (b), (c) and (d) to be satisfactory. Item (e) they would probably accept as a safe statement, while making mutual reservations as to how they would interpret it. There are numerous indications that the British conception of the importance of China in the war is different from ours. They have consistently depreciated such importance and opposed our conception that China is of vital importance in ultimately defeating Japan. The British would probably approve of Item (f) provided it stated affirmatively that such commitments must be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, of course, is the intention.

V. PROJECTED STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS

Priority as between the Axis in Europe and Japan

(a) RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE ALLOCATED ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROVED OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF CONDUCTING A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPE, WHILE MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN.

The British would change this to read " \* \* \* overall strategy of conducting the major offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean Theater with maximum forces, while maintaining the strategic defensive in other areas."

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927495-1  
By DBJ Date APR 13 1973

(b) AS BETWEEN THESE TWO BASIC UNDERTAKINGS, AVAILABLE RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPE - ALL RESOURCES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ALLOCATED FOR USE AGAINST JAPAN.

(2) FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN - RESOURCES ADEQUATE TO INSURE THAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE ARE NOT PREJUDICED BY THE NECESSITY TO DIVERT FORCES THEREFROM, IN ORDER TO RELIEVE AN ADVERSE SITUATION ARISING FROM OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN; THE EXTENT OF SUCH OPERATIONS, HOWEVER, TO BE KEPT WITHIN LIMITS WHICH WILL NOT, IN THE OPINION OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JEOPARDIZE THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEAT GERMANY DECISIVELY IN 1943.

The British would like to have this stated:

"All available resources will be allocated to the offensive in European - Mediterranean Theater, except the minimum necessary to safely maintain the strategic defense against Japan in the Pacific and Burma."

PRIORITY AS AMONG SPECIFIC OPERATIONS.

(a) WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED FOR USE AGAINST JAPAN, THE OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE PACIFIC AND THEIR RELATIVE PRIORITY WILL BE DECIDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The British would like to have added: "subject to the limitation that in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, such operations will be in accord with the general concept of maintaining the strategic defense in that area."

(b) WITHIN THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND TO THE FAR EAST, THE PRIORITY OF MAJOR OPERATIONS IS ESTABLISHED IN THE ORDER: TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE, ANAKIM, BOLERO.

This item the British would like to revise to read: - TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE and further operations in the Mediterranean at least on an equal basis with SICKLE, BOLERO, ANAKIM.

2. At this point our concern with probable British strategy reduces itself to the consideration of "Post-HUSKY" operations. They will undoubtedly propose and press for further operations in the Mediterranean, while maintaining that such operations will

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By DBJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

recognize the equal priority of SICKLE. They will probably advocate extending operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as practicable, and support their proposals on the ground that such operations -

- (a) will maintain momentum of HUSKY
- (b) give timely support to Russia
- (c) tend to knock out Italy
- (d) bring in Turkey
- (e) use resources available in Mediterranean, which otherwise would not be put to immediate use.

They will maintain as before, that the build-up for BOLERO cannot be done in time to support Russia this year, but can continue as rapidly as possible. They will argue that the proposed Mediterranean operations will not seriously interfere with SICKLE. The probable reasons behind the British proposals are:

- (a) They do not want to face what they honestly believe to be the great hazards and the heavy losses of cross-Channel operations.
- (b) They want to end the war with a position in the Mediterranean stronger than their pre-war position.
- (c) They think the outcome of Mediterranean operations is sufficiently promising from a Military point of view, to ultimately lead to the defeat of the Axis.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

By AB

Date

APR 13 1973

JCS 927/495-1

TAB

D

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 32

J.W.P.C. 10/1

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

May 5, 1943

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943 - 44

Note by the Secretaries

1. The attached report is the Global Estimate of the Situation, 1943 - 1944, as revised by the Joint Staff Planners.
2. This paper supersedes J.W.P.C. 10.

C. E. MILLER,  
 C. F. BARBER,  
 Joint Secretaries.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
 REPRODUCTION

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972 RHP

~~SECRET~~

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972 RHP

GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943 - 44

Reference: J.C.S. 272

REPORT BY THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. A Global Estimate of the Situation, 1943 - 44, is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The most probable courses of action of the AXIS powers are as follows:

1943.

a. EUROPEAN AXIS

Intensify the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping and resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

b. JAPAN

(1) Defeat of RUSSIA clearly imminent:

JAPAN will attack SIBERIA.

(2) Defeat of RUSSIA not clearly imminent:

JAPAN will remain on the strategic defensive, exploit and consolidate her gains, intensify the war of attrition against shipping, and undertake limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS area, CHINA, and BURMA, and vigorously counter UNITED STATES offensive action in the WESTERN ALEUTIANS.

1944.

a. EUROPEAN AXIS

(1) If RUSSIA is defeated in EUROPE.

Conduct offensive action toward gaining control of the MEDITERRANEAN and the PERSIAN GULF, while conducting and air and submarine campaign against the UNITED NATIONS, particularly the UNITED KINGDOM.

(2) If RUSSIA is not defeated in EUROPE.

Exploit the areas it controls, consolidate the fortress of EUROPE, and continue the U-boat campaign.

~~SECRET~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
Eleanor Roosevelt Library

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

b. JAPAN

(1) Defeat of RUSSIA is clearly imminent, and CHINA continues in the war.

If the defeat of RUSSIA in EUROPE becomes apparent in 1943, JAPAN will attack SIBERIA and the major part of her offensive effort will be directed toward RUSSIA in 1944.

(2) Defeat of RUSSIA not clearly imminent.

JAPAN will not attack SIBERIA. JAPAN will direct her major efforts toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

3. Recommended UNITED NATIONS courses of action, 1943 - 44, are as follows:

a. That the UNITED NATIONS main effort continue against the EUROPEAN AXIS, with emphasis on the following in 1943:

(1) Defeating the U-boat menace.

(2) Accomplishing HUSKY.

(3) Conducting a bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM with a view to reducing GERMANY'S war potential, and concentrating appropriate forces so that a cross-channel operation and exploitation from lodgements on the Continent will be feasible in 1944.

(4) Conducting limited operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area within the capabilities of the forces finally allocated after providing for the concentration of forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-channel operations and the exploitation of lodgements on the Continent.

(5) Continuing air attacks against ITALY, without detracting from the air offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, with the object of eliminating ITALY from the war.

(6) Furnishing supplies and equipment to RUSSIA.

b. That forces be built up in the UNITED KINGDOM during 1943 and 1944 for:

(1) Conducting a vigorous bomber offensive integrated with current and prospective operations, including an invasion of the Continent.

JCS 8-71  
JAN 20 1972 RHP

~~SECRET~~

(2) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(3) A full-scale assault against the Continent as early as possible in 1944.

c. That in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:

(1) The UNITED NATIONS conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war.

(2) For these purposes, naval forces be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN and that, with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the EUROPEAN AXIS, air and ground forces be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. Naval Forces.

d. That if RUSSIA is defeated in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN area, the basic strategic concept should be reviewed and modified to conform to our then existing capabilities. Based on these capabilities, the UNITED NATIONS should then either:

(1) Reverse their strategic concept and launch all-out operations without delay against JAPAN, while making UNITED NATIONS positions in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN area secure, or

(2) If GERMANY has been sufficiently weakened, continue operations with a view to her ultimate defeat on the Continent of EUROPE.

In either case the UNITED NATIONS air offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM should be continued.

e. That participation of CHINA in the war be assured by continuing to furnish her supplies and air support to the greatest extent practicable.

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972 RHP

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943-1944

EUROPEAN AXIS SITUATION

4. The AXIS campaign against RUSSIA in 1942 failed to attain the territorial objectives set, and resulted in serious losses. AXIS forces are being driven out of AFRICA. There is every indication that future AXIS operations will be directed towards Military (the defeat of Russian armed forces in 1943) rather than territorial objectives. The AXIS submarine campaign against UNITED NATIONS shipping will be intensified.

a. Military. GERMANY is increasing the total number of her divisions to about 330. ITALY may provide 70 divisions and the satellite countries approximately 55 more, making a grand total of 455.

At the end of 1942 the AXIS had a total of some 470 submarines. By the end of 1943, the total may increase to about 600. The strategic position of the Italian Navy has been weakened by increased threat of air attack; it has shown great unwillingness to risk its major units in action, is short of cruisers, and has no aircraft carriers. It is able, however, to contain a substantial UNITED NATIONS naval force in the MEDITERRANEAN in an area in which this force may be subjected to air attack.

The German Navy, though its surface forces are of limited size, contains a large British naval force in the NORTH ATLANTIC.

The German Air Force has an estimated strength of 9200 combat airplanes of which 6000 are assigned to operating squadrons in the combat zones. The rate of production is estimated at 1300 per month. However, by shifting from bombers to fighters, the number of airplanes produced may ultimately be increased. There are some indications that the German Air Force is increasing its fighter strength at the

JCS 8-71  
JAN 20 1972 RHP~~SECRET~~

expense of bombers in order to meet increased requirements for defense against the UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive.

The EUROPEAN AXIS is faced with an air war on three fronts. The combined UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive may reasonably be expected to create favorable conditions for cross-channel operations by midsummer 1944.

It is significant that AXIS air power has not increased in proportion to her ground and sea forces. This may be attributed to:

(1) Production limitations.

(2) Increasing the number of ground force units. This is being done because:

(a) The AXIS cannot expect to move ground forces freely to and from the Eastern Front because of the strategical situation.

(b) Preparations are being made to bolster Italian and satellite resistance.

b. Economic. GERMANY'S military effort was somewhat impaired by air attack in 1942. In 1943 the increasing bombing offensive expected and the greater precision of air attack will bring about further substantial decline in AXIS armament production. For aircraft, destruction of output will be felt almost immediately in first line operations. For other munitions, destruction of facilities will produce a more gradual effect on Military operations. However, except for aircraft, it is probable that the AXIS can increase somewhat in 1943 the scale of Military effort, but only at the expense of an accelerated decline in economic potential.

ITALY and her satellites are dependent on GERMANY for munitions and raw materials. GERMANY depends on the satellites for some strategic raw materials of a high priority.

JCS 8-71  
JAN 20 1972 RHP

~~SECRET~~

c. Manpower. If casualties are as high in 1943 as in 1942, GERMANY faces a reduction in the size or an impairment in the quality of her armed forces in 1944.

d. Armaments. The estimated low production of combat planes will probably restrict the German air effort in 1943 to essentially strategic defensive operations. This will not preclude an offensive concentrated against RUSSIA within a limited area, which might give a local air superiority for a limited time. The number of operating submarines will increase. German Military operations are not likely to be restricted by shortages of any other form of armaments. Destruction achieved by the proposed bomber offensive may seriously reduce GERMANY'S production of armaments.

e. Morale. Italian resistance will probably decline at least until the homeland is invaded, when a stronger fighting spirit may be aroused temporarily. The resistance of satellite nations is on the decline. ITALY or one of the satellites may make peace overtures in 1943. German morale probably will not crack in 1943 but will decline considerably as the result of the failure to defeat RUSSIA by the end of 1943, and because of the chaos and destruction inflicted by the UNITED NATIONS air offensive.

EUROPEAN AXIS CAPABILITIES FOR 1943

5. Major courses of action open to the EUROPEAN AXIS in 1943.
  - a. Intensify the war of attrition against shipping.
  - b. Resume the offensive in RUSSIA.
  - c. Withdraw to and defend the MEDITERRANEAN island line.
  - d. Occupy the IBERIAN PENINSULA with a view to closing the STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR and possibly attacking NORTH AFRICA.
  - e. Assume an active defense on all fronts.
  - f. Attack the MIDDLE EAST through ANATOLIA.

JCS 8.71

JAN 20 1942 RHP

~~SECRET~~

6. Most likely course of action. Intensify the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping and resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all other fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

#### JAPANESE SITUATION

7. JAPAN has established control of the WESTERN PACIFIC, the east coast of the Asiatic continent, and SOUTHEASTERN ASIA. She is exploiting the resources and providing for the security of these areas by establishing defensive positions and opposing UNITED NATIONS efforts to penetrate her defensive barrier. She is protecting her northern flank by maintaining neutral relations with RUSSIA.

JAPAN has suffered substantial air and naval losses. The losses to her ground forces have been insignificant.

a. Military. The strength of her army is currently estimated at 72 Japanese divisions, plus about 600,000 Chinese and Manchurian troops. She is making use of such puppet troops to an increasing extent.

Her operational air strength is estimated at 3700 combat aircraft with a production of about 600 combat planes per month, which is presumed to be increasing. The limited size of this force precludes adequate air support for simultaneous extensive operations on two fronts.

The Japanese Navy remains powerful. JAPAN'S limited capacity for naval construction places her at a disadvantage in a war of attrition.

b. Economic. Japanese exploitation of captured resources is limited by shortages in shipping, skilled manpower, and fabricating equipment. It is estimated that her industrial expansion under favorable conditions will be at the rate of 10% to 15% per year. Those essential industrial facilities located in JAPAN proper are concentrated in a few relatively small areas.

JCS 8-71 RNP  
JAN 20 1972

~~SECRET~~

c. Shipping. Losses of Japanese shipping during 1942 and 1943 have exceeded construction. Losses in dry cargo vessels are being partially compensated for by improving railroad transportation in SOUTHEASTERN ASIA, and by a program of wooden shipbuilding. Tanker losses, despite more effective operation made possible by the rehabilitation of oil fields and refineries near the combat zones, if continued at the present rate will seriously interfere with Military operations in the future. Movement of Japanese troops will not be curtailed until the shipping situation becomes more critical.

d. Morale. Japanese morale is of a very high order.

JAPAN'S CAPABILITIES FOR 1943

8. Major courses of action open to JAPAN in 1943.

a. Remain on the strategic defensive and consolidate her gains, undertaking limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area, CHINA, BURMA, the ALEUTIANS, and along the lines of communication between the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and AUSTRALIA.

b. Renew the general attack on CHINA.

c. Attack INDIA.

d. Attack SIBERIA.

e. Renew an offensive in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area.

f. Intensify the war of attrition against shipping.

9. Most likely course of action. JAPAN's most likely course of action will be influenced by the outcome on the Russian Front.

a. Russian defeat clearly imminent.

In all likelihood JAPAN will attack SIBERIA.

b. Russian defeat not imminent.

JAPAN will probably remain on the strategic defensive, exploit and consolidate her gains, intensify the war of attrition against shipping, and undertake limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area, CHINA, and BURMA, and vigorously counter UNITED STATES offensive action in the WESTERN ALEUTIANS.

JCS 8-71 RHP  
JAN 20 1972

~~SECRET~~

JOINT ACTION BY GERMANY AND JAPAN

10. GERMANY and JAPAN are partners in the war only because of self-interest. Joint action by them is founded primarily on coincidence of policy. Each is undoubtedly anxious to see that the UNITED NATIONS power will be deployed increasingly against the other partner. The major opportunity for coordinated German-Japanese action lies in the Japanese capability to attack SIBERIA. The Germans are keenly in favor of such an attack. Joint German-Japanese action with a view to effecting a junction through the MIDDLE EAST is not considered an AXIS capability.

FORECAST FOR 1944, EUROPEAN - AFRICAN AREA

11. General. The determining factor in estimating the Military situation which may exist in 1944 is the status of RUSSIA, i.e., whether or not she is defeated in 1943. AXIS forces will, in either case, be expelled from AFRICA, and UNITED NATIONS lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN will be greatly improved by the latter part of 1943.

12. If RUSSIA is defeated in EUROPE.

a. German ground and service forces will probably be reduced in order to release men for industry and agriculture, and thus relieve the strain on German economy. The extent of the German Military effort, however, may be seriously decreased as a result of the UNITED NATIONS air offensive and of losses sustained in the operations involving the defeat of RUSSIA.

b. SPAIN will remain at least a passive partner of the AXIS. TURKEY will remain neutral, but UNITED NATIONS prestige and influence in TURKEY will be materially decreased.

c. A successful invasion of the UNITED KINGDOM in 1944 is not considered an AXIS capability.

d. The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will become the only effective means for conducting operations against the AXIS in EUROPE.

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

~~SECRET~~

e. The UNITED NATIONS will continue to blockade the EUROPEAN AXIS.

f. The most probable AXIS course of action after the defeat of RUSSIA will be to conduct offensive action toward gaining control of the MEDITERRANEAN and the PERSIAN GULF, while conducting an air and submarine campaign against the UNITED NATIONS, particularly the UNITED KINGDOM.

13. If RUSSIA is not defeated in EUROPE.

a. The scale of German Military effort in 1944 will be below that of 1943.

b. The major part of the AXIS Military forces will be absorbed on the Russian Front.

c. Italian resistance will deteriorate still further.

d. UNITED NATIONS success in the MEDITERRANEAN will force the Germans either to reinforce ITALY, or to withdraw from ITALY and take over Italian commitments in FRANCE and the BALKANS when Italian troops are recalled from those areas to defend the homeland.

e. Turkish resistance to German influence will be strengthened and Spanish neutrality will continue.

f. Defection will increase in the satellite and occupied countries.

g. GERMANY'S goal will probably be to achieve a Military stalemate.

h. A serious, though perhaps not immediately critical, decline in German morale will follow.

i. The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will become an increasingly important factor.

j. Under this assumption (RUSSIA not defeated), GERMANY'S most likely course of action in 1944 will be to exploit the areas she controls, to consolidate the fortress of Europe and to continue the U-boat campaign.

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

~~SECRET~~FORECAST FOR 1944 - PACIFIC AND FAR EAST14. General.

Since the United Nations main effort in 1943 will be made in the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN Area, operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST will continue with the object of maintaining pressure on JAPAN, accomplishing the attrition of enemy forces, retaining the initiative, and attaining a position of readiness for a full scale offensive against JAPAN as soon as GERMANY is defeated.

Though the UNITED NATIONS should have a potential air advantage, the dispositions of air forces will not be such as to permit their decisive application.

The UNITED NATIONS naval forces will be superior to those of JAPAN.

The situation with regard to JAPAN will be strongly influenced by the status of RUSSIA in EUROPE, and of CHINA.

15. If the defeat of RUSSIA is clearly imminent, and CHINA continues in the war.

If the defeat of RUSSIA in EUROPE becomes apparent in 1943 the Japanese will most likely attack SIBERIA.

In such a case:

- a. The major part of the Japanese offensive effort will be directed toward RUSSIA in 1944.
- b. Limited offensives by the UNITED NATIONS against JAPAN in the PACIFIC areas and SOUTHEASTERN ASIA will be facilitated.
- c. Lend-Lease deliveries to RUSSIA will be reduced.
- d. There will be no substantial change in the situation in CHINA.

16. If the defeat of RUSSIA is not clearly imminent.

If the imminence of defeat of RUSSIA is not clear to JAPAN in 1943, an attack against SIBERIA is unlikely. In this case

DECLASSIFIED

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

~~SECRET~~

full-scale Lend-Lease aid to RUSSIA will continue and JAPAN'S major efforts will be directed toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

17. If CHINA is eliminated from the war.

JAPAN may succeed in eliminating CHINA as an active UNITED NATIONS ally, either through Military action or political intrigue. If accomplished, JAPAN will be relieved of many of her Military commitments in CHINA, will be free to employ the forces thus relieved in other areas, and the prospect of bombing attack from CHINA on her homeland will be eliminated.

UNITED NATIONS SITUATION

18. In the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN area, the bulk of the ground forces are engaged on the RUSSIAN Front. The UNITED NATIONS occupy advantageous positions for an air offensive against the EUROPEAN AXIS and for invasion of the continent from their bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and to a lesser degree in AFRICA. At present the principal American and British ground forces in the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN theater are concentrated in NORTH AFRICA. An air offensive is proceeding and will continue at a gradually increasing rate. The initiation of an invasion awaits the build up of essential forces and the logistic requirements for their support. The time that it may be undertaken, the location of the staging area, and the scale of effort required is dependent upon the reduction of GERMANY'S war potential and morale through the UNITED NATIONS air offensive and other means.

19. In the PACIFIC and FAR EAST, the UNITED NATIONS are in contact with the enemy in the ALEUTIANS, the SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA area, BURMA, and CHINA. Limited offensives in these areas are designed to apply pressure on the enemy, to accomplish attrition of enemy forces including shipping, to retain the initiative, to gain positions for a full-scale offensive, and to sustain CHINA as an active ally.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
Roosevelt Library

JCS 8-71

JAN 20 1942

RHP

~~SECRET~~

20. Air Power.

The outstanding feature of the UNITED NATIONS war effort has been the rapidity with which air power has been developed and applied. Air advantage has been gained in practically all areas, and the advantage will increase rapidly in the immediate future. The proposed UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive should gravely effect the AXIS war effort.

21. UNITED STATES.

a. Manpower. Mobilized and trained manpower will reach its optimum in 1944.

b. Military. Current estimates indicate that by the end of 1943 the Army Air Force will have 114 bomber groups (6200 airplanes) and 59 fighter groups (5900 airplanes). Of these, 26 bomber groups and 12 fighter groups will not be deployable outside of the UNITED STATES due either to the status of equipment or training.

The ground forces should consist of 100 combat divisions. Sixty-nine divisions will be in the UNITED STATES, but only 32 of these will have completed training.

Disregarding prospective losses, naval forces available for deployment to the PACIFIC by the end of 1943, will be superior to the Japanese Fleet. Extended naval action against Japanese lines of communication and positions will be possible.

c. Production. Most major items should be in full-scale production by early 1944.

d. Shipping. Considering the scheduled production of shipping and the measures being instituted to combat the submarine, it is expected that adequate shipping will be available to meet transportation requirements.

SECRET

JCS 8.71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

## 22. GREAT BRITAIN.

a. Manpower. Mobilized to capacity; the bulk of the forces in the UNITED KINGDOM should soon be fully trained and equipped for offensive action.

b. Military. It is estimated that by the end of 1943, the Royal Air Force will have 225 bomber squadrons (3825 airplanes) and 342 fighter squadrons (4100 airplanes).

The British Imperial Army will consist of 84 combat divisions, including 65 divisions of British and Dominion troops, 15 divisions of African and Indian troops, and 4 divisions made up of Allied personnel.

British naval strength at the end of 1943 will be adequate for neutralizing enemy surface naval forces in the ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN. British naval forces in the INDIAN OCEAN are adequate only if major Japanese naval forces are contained in the PACIFIC.

c. Economic. The productive capacity of GREAT BRITAIN may be expected to increase only slightly.

## 23. CHINA.

a. As long as Chiang Kai Shek remains in power, Chinese collapse is unlikely. A change in the political regime would reduce the effectiveness of and might eliminate CHINA as an ally. Enemy operations resulting in the isolation of CHINA would curtail and eventually prevent the Military cooperation of CHINA regardless of her political leadership.

b. Manpower. Manpower is not a limitation upon the size of the Chinese Army. The Chinese forces are best adapted to holding operations and guerilla activities.

c. Military. The army now contains fewer Japanese forces than it did in December, 1941. Important battles with Japanese ground forces may be fought on Chinese soil and will require the participation of large Chinese forces.

Jes 8-71  
JAN 20 1972

RHP

~~SECRET~~

d. Economic. Practically all munitions for the Chinese must be supplied by the UNITED NATIONS.

e. Morale. Chinese morale is now depressed but steady. An improvement in Chinese morale reflected in combat power, may be expected in 1943 or 1944 when the Chinese Government is convinced that the United Nations are undertaking decisive operations in the FAR EAST.

24. French Forces in AFRICA.

a. Manpower. It appears that a maximum of 3 armored and 8 infantry divisions with the supporting forces and an air force of some 450 airplanes can eventually be armed by the UNITED NATIONS. Additional manpower is available but could probably not produce combat units suitable for service in EUROPE.

b. Economic. The UNITED NATIONS have agreed to equip and maintain such forces.

25. RUSSIA.

a. RUSSIA is containing the bulk of the German forces. The ability of the UNITED NATIONS to obtain the unconditional surrender of the EUROPEAN AXIS will be influenced to a high degree by the length of time RUSSIA remains effectively in the war and the attrition she will have inflicted on GERMANY'S Military resources.

b. Manpower. The Russian forces can probably be sustained at the current levels if UNITED NATIONS assistance is continued at the current rate.

c. Economic. The Russian economy has probably passed its peak effort and may suffer critical decline during 1944.

26. AXIS occupied countries.

a. Military. The Military benefits which may be expected from the subjugated populations are sabotage, intelligence, and subversive activities, all of which force the AXIS to divert ground forces for police purposes.

~~SECRET~~

b. Economic. The liberation of any AXIS controlled territories will impose commitments of supplies and equipment for economic rehabilitation required to further UNITED NATIONS operations.

UNITED NATIONS CAPABILITIES

27. Air power.

Current estimates indicate that by July, 1943, the UNITED NATIONS will have assembled in the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN area some 5400 bombers and 5600 fighters, the equivalent of about 110 American bomber groups and about 56 fighter groups. This air power will constantly increase and will be made most effective by properly integrating its employment with current and projected operations.

28. In the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN area, the UNITED NATIONS can in 1943 - 1944:

a. Intensify the anti-submarine campaign.

b. Intensify the bomber offensive against the AXIS war effort, with a view to reducing the AXIS war potential to the extent that cross-channel operations may be initiated as early as possible in 1944.

c. Continue the bombing of ITALY with a view to eliminating ITALY from the war.

d. Furnish munitions to RUSSIA and the combatant French.

e. In 1943, compel dispersion of AXIS ground and air forces and possibly cause diversions from the Russian Front by continued limited offensives in the MEDITERRANEAN.

f. Build up forces in the UNITED KINGDOM to initiate cross-channel operations in 1944.

g. Invade the Continent by:

- (1) Cross-channel operations, or
- (2) Operations from the MEDITERRANEAN.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS 8-71

MAY 20 1972

RHP

[REDACTED]

The latter course of action is the less acceptable because of the unfavorable terrain, logistical difficulties, limitations to furnishing adequate air support, and diversion of air forces from the bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM.

29. In the PACIFIC and FAR EAST, the UNITED NATIONS can in 1943 - 1944:

a. Maintain pressure against JAPAN, retaining the initiative, attaining positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and keeping CHINA in the war, with such forces as are allocated for the purpose.

b. Furnish supplies and limited air support to CHINA.

c. Increase attrition of Japanese shipping, air, and naval resources.

d. Undertake naval operations in the PACIFIC against Japanese shipping and positions at an increasing rate and intensity.

e. Maintain Allied lines of communication.

30. If CHINA is eliminated from the war.

If CHINA is eliminated as an active ally, the UNITED NATIONS will be deprived of the most promising sites from which to conduct an air offensive against JAPAN, the obligation to free CHINA from Japanese control will become an added burden, and the defeat of JAPAN may be delayed for years.

TAB  
E

~~U. S. SECRET~~  
~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

COPY NO. 38

C.C.S. 199

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

April 13, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION  
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The enclosure is a study prepared by the United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and represents clarification of the Casablanca decisions. It is submitted to the Combined Chiefs for their information.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

JCS 33.71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

Distribution:

- |                            |                |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| Gen. Marshall              | Copy No. 1     |
| Adm. King                  | Copy No. 2     |
| Gen. Arnold                | Copy No. 3     |
| Gen. Wedemeyer             | Copy No. 4     |
| Exec OPD War Dept          | Copy No. 5-6   |
| Adm. Cooke                 | Copy No. 7     |
| Gen. Deane                 | Copy No. 8     |
| Capt. Royal                | Copy No. 9     |
| Adm. Leahy                 | Copy No. 10    |
| Gen. Somervell             | Copy No. 11    |
| Adm. Horne                 | Copy No. 12    |
| Secy. J.S.S.C.             | Copy No. 13-14 |
| Secy. J.P.S.               | Copy No. 15    |
| Gen. McNarney              | Copy No. 16    |
| Secy. Security Control     | Copy No. 17    |
| Asst. Secy. Communications | Copy No. 18    |
| Gen. Anderson              | Copy No. 19    |
| Gen. Wood                  | Copy No. 20    |
| British Mission            | Copy No. 21-30 |

JCS  
199

JCS 33-71

ENCLOSURE "A"

RHP  
JAN 20 1972

CLARIFICATION OF CASABLANCA DECISIONS

I. OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR.

(a) In cooperation with Russia and the lesser allies, to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

(b) Simultaneously, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan.

(c) Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

II. BASIC STRATEGY FOR 1943.

To conduct a strategic offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean theater, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining and extending unremitting pressure against Japan, and with meeting current accepted strategic commitments.

III. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

Resources will be allocated to meet approved strategic commitments on a scale subject to review from time to time. Resources available after meeting current strategic commitments will be allocated to approved strategic undertakings, subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation.

IV. STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS.

Priority Group 1

(a) Maintain the security, and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

(b) Support and maintain our forces in all areas to which committed.

(c) Keep enemy submarine effort under increasingly effective control.

Priority Group 2

(d) Meet requirements of Russian protocol to greatest extent possible without prohibitive cost in shipping.

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

JCS 83.71  
JAN 20 1972 RHP

(e) Sustain China by the greatest volume of supplies that can be got into China, without prohibitive cost in transport.

(f) Other firm commitments, approved from time to time, for political or military reasons as essential to the conduct of the war.

V. STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS.

Priority as between the Axis in Europe and Japan.

(a) Resources available for strategic undertakings will be allocated on the basis of the approved over-all strategy of conducting a strategic offensive against the Axis in Europe, while maintaining and extending unremitting pressure against Japan.

(b) As between these two basic undertakings, available resources will be allocated as follows:

(1) For operations against the Axis in Europe - all resources over and above those allocated for use against Japan.

(2) For operations against Japan - resources adequate to ensure that operations in Europe are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces therefrom, in order to relieve an adverse situation arising from operations against Japan; the extent of such operations, however, to be kept within limits which will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the ability of the United Nations to take advantage of a favorable opportunity to defeat Germany decisively in 1943.

Priority as among specific operations.

(a) Within the scope of the resources allocated for use against Japan, the operations to be undertaken in the Pacific and their relative priority will be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Within the resources allocated to the European theater and to the Far East, the priority of major operations is established in the order: TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE, ANAKIM, BOLERO.

~~U. S. SECRET~~  
~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

COPY NO. 36

C.C.S. 199/1

~~SECRET SECURITY~~

April 23, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION  
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the Representatives of the  
British Chiefs of Staff

Enclosed are some comments in detail on Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199, the paper prepared by the United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee and representing clarification of the Casablanca decisions.

These comments are submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

<u>Distribution:</u>	<u>Copy</u>
Gen. Marshall	1
Adm. King	2
Gen. Arnold	3
Gen. Wedemeyer	4-6
Adm. Cooke	7
Gen. Deane	8
Capt. Royal	9
Adm. Leahy	10
Gen. Somervell	11
Adm. Horne	12
Sec. J.S.S.C.	13-14
Sec. J.P.S.	15
Gen. McNarney	16
Sec. Security Control	17
Asst. Sec. Communications	18
Gen. Anderson	19
Gen. Wood	20
British Mission	21-30

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
SECRET

JCS 33-71

JAN 20 1972 RHP

E N C L O S U R E

CLARIFICATION OF CASABLANCA DECISIONS

We have considered in detail Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199, in close consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. In general, we do not understand why a clarification of the Casablanca decisions is required. In our view, C.C.S. 155/1 is a clear, carefully worded document, unanimously approved at Casablanca by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and thereafter also approved by the President and the Prime Minister. We feel that if the U. S. Chiefs of Staff wish to amend C.C.S. 155/1 the proposed amendments should have strict relation to the existing text. Alternatively, if merely interpretation or clarification is required, we feel that it would be better to agree upon such interpretation or clarification again in direct relation, paragraph by paragraph, to the existing text than to try to reach agreement about a fresh paper which cannot but introduce new shades of meaning.

2. Clauses 5 and 6 of C.C.S. 155/1, read in conjunction with the words "with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations" which appear at the end of clause 3, make it abundantly clear that the agreed intention at Casablanca was to limit the forces allocated for use against Japan to those necessary for preventing Japan from creating a situation so adverse to the United Nations that it would have to be retrieved at the expense of operations against Germany. From the information available to us it does not appear that such a situation is imminent nor that the United Nations are in danger of losing the initiative; and we therefore feel that no "extension" of the pressure now being applied to Japan and visualised in

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
JCS 33-71

paragraph 6(c)(11) of C.C.S. 155/1 is necessary or justifiable at the expense of operations against Germany. Indeed, it is clear from paragraph 6(c) that any "extension" of pressure against Japan was to be of a lower order of priority than ANAKIM.

3. With regard to the allocation of resources referred to in paragraph III of C.C.S. 199, we are not clear as to exactly what this paragraph is intended to convey. We feel that it might be interpreted as establishing the right to unilateral modification of agreed programmes and would like to know who will review the scale and who will judge how the changing situation will affect allocations.

4. We feel that clauses 3 and 5 of C.C.S. 155/1 give a clearer and simpler statement of the agreed strategy than that given in paragraph V(b) of C.C.S. 199 and that they should be adhered to.

5. Paragraph VI(b) of C.C.S. 199 sets out a priority as among specific operations. We are not quite happy about this paragraph because we feel that whereas perhaps as regards the Pacific it is not binding enough, as regards the other theatres it is perhaps rather too binding. For instance, it is too early yet to say that after SICKLE should come ANAKIM. Then again, its wording rather rigidly excludes any reference to the possibility, after HUSKY, of such action as that referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of C.C.S. 155/1. The position of BOLERO also needs further examination in relation to commitments in the Pacific. If our policy is to be a strategic offensive against the Axis in Europe, clearly BOLERO must not be starved as otherwise Cross-Channel Operations in 1944 will again be impossible.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFICATION LIBRARY

~~U. S. SECRET~~  
~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

6. A general comment, which we think to be fair, is that C.C.S. 199 by implication would seem to give pride of place to war in the Far East, whereas the clear decision at Casablanca was that the decisive defeat of Germany must come first.

7. We feel, therefore, that there are many important points of difference between C.C.S. 199 and C.C.S. 155/1. If it is felt that a new version of C.C.S. 155/1 is required as distinct from possible amendments to or amplification of C.C.S. 155/1, we consider that it would be a hopeless task to try to arrive at this new version by the interchange of telegrams. C.C.S. 155/1 was the fruit of many days of careful and earnest discussion in an atmosphere in which the various points of view were disclosed with perfect frankness and where the elucidation of any point of view could be obtained immediately. We recommend therefore:

a. That C.C.S. 155/1 should continue to be the accepted paper that it has been ever since Casablanca.

b. That if the U. S. Chiefs of Staff should wish to amend that document, the proposed amendments should have strict relation to the existing text and ample time should be given for their consideration.

8. It is clear that any amendments which may be agreed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

SECRET ASSOCIATED

JCS 33-71  
JAN 20 1942 RHP

C.C.S. 199/2

April 27, 1943

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

JCS 33-71

JAN 20 1972

RHP

SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION  
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the comments submitted by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the clarification of the Casablanca decisions set forth in C.C.S. 199. This clarification was not intended as an attempt to reopen the Casablanca Conference or to rewrite its decisions.

2. Clarification of the Casablanca Decisions was perhaps not the best title. The paper is actually an attempt to bring up to date in one short paper for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U. S. Services the current accepted strategic concept, with particular reference to furnishing an adequate basis for allocation of resources. Such a paper must of necessity include: (a) a consideration of all the pertinent Casablanca papers; (b) matters assumed as generally accepted, and hence omitted at Casablanca (support of British economy for example); (c) information as to available resources in modification of the Casablanca data; (d) action of C.C.S. subsequent to Casablanca; (e) new events and conditions as they have arisen.

3. It should be emphasized that this paper is not considered a "revision" of C.C.S. 155/1, any more than was C.C.S. 170/2 or Part II of the appendix of C.C.S. 183/1. On the other hand, it is our opinion that when another Casablanca document is eventually produced, it might well be prepared in the same general form as C.C.S. 199.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Marshall	Copy 1	Sec., J.S.S.C.	Copy 13-14
Adm. King	Copy 2	Sec., J.F.S.	Copy 15
Gen. Arnold	Copy 3	Gen. McNarney	Copy 16
Gen. Wedemeyer	Copy 4-6	Sec., Security Control	Copy 17
Adm. Cooke	Copy 7	Asst. Sec.,	
Gen. Deane	Copy 8	Communications	Copy 18
Capt. Royal	Copy 9	Gen. Anderson	Copy 19
Adm. Leahy	Copy 10	Gen. Wood	Copy 20
Gen. Somervell	Copy 11	Sec., J.U.S.S.C.	Copy 21
Adm. Horne	Copy 12	British Mission	Copy 22-31

COS  
199/2

TAB

E-1

344-1  
(J.C.S. 302)

May 11, 1943

Pages 1-6, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COPY NO. 51  
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF ITALY

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,  
F. B. ROYAL,  
Joint Secretariat.

**DECLASSIFIED**

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF ITALY

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An examination of the courses of action of the UNITED NATIONS in the event of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action selected are as follows:

a. In the event of civil war in ITALY:

(1) Establish ground and air forces in ITALY for the purpose of supporting the revolutionists only.

(2) Demand as concessions from the revolutionists, upon the successful conclusion of the civil war, bases in Italian possessions, and the immobilization of the Italian fleet.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

b. In the event of the collapse of ITALY:

(1) Occupy a defensive line in northern ITALY.

(2) Establish air bases and continue the air offensive against GERMANY.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

(4) Establish garrisons for the maintenance of order.

c. In the event of the unconditional surrender of ITALY:

(1) Terms of surrender should meet Military requirements, but should be sufficiently liberal to insure a stable government.

(2) Other courses of action should be as in b above.

ENCLOSURE "A"

COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL  
SURRENDER OF ITALY

3. Problem.

To determine the courses of action the UNITED NATIONS should adopt in the event of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY.

4. There are three general conditions which may develop within continental ITALY which may require the establishment of UNITED NATIONS forces on Italian soil. These are:

a. Civil war, resulting from an Anti-Fascist and Anti-German revolution.

b. The "collapse" of ITALY, meaning the disintegration of organized government followed by political chaos.

c. "Unconditional surrender" of ITALY, meaning the orderly compliance with terms of surrender through the control of an organized government.

5. A civil war in ITALY may develop through the rise of an Anti-Fascist and Anti-German revolution. This contingency is most unlikely because, at present, contrary to some opinion, large elements of the populace approve the German alliance, and no individual or group is considered to be strong enough, or to have sufficient prestige, to initiate or lead such a revolution. However, should these unlikely conditions of a civil war develop, it might become necessary, on an appeal for aid by the revolutionists, for the UNITED NATIONS to furnish them Military support.

6. The collapse of ITALY may be brought about by one factor or varying combinations of the following factors: Military reverses, refusal by GERMANY of further Military assistance, destruction caused by the UNITED NATIONS air offensive, subversive

FEB 19 1974

activities, and loss of faith in and repudiation of their present leadership by the Italian people. The disintegration leading to chaos may be a gradual process and there should be sufficient and timely intelligence as to the stages of its development.

7. GERMANY will take steps to prevent the collapse of ITALY, even to the extent of sending some forces there, only as long as GERMANY considers the retention of all or part of ITALY of strategic value. Economically and politically, ITALY is a liability rather than an asset. When TUNISIA is cleared of AXIS forces, SICILY would continue to be of strategic value to GERMANY, and all evidence points to GERMAN assistance in the defense of SICILY. The collapse of ITALY prior to successful completion of HUSKY is therefore unlikely.

8. A successful HUSKY, following the LIBYAN-TUNISIAN debacle, is likely to have serious effects on Italian will to continue to fight. Primarily GERMANY would wish to retain that part of ITALY from which GERMANY could control the ADRIATIC coast (against an invasion of the BALKANS) and SARDINIA and CORSICA (against an invasion of Southern FRANCE), and at the same time deny air bases to the UNITED NATIONS. GERMANY would weigh these objectives against requirements elsewhere, such as on the Russian Front and those resulting from the UNITED NATIONS air offensive. Thus, the German reaction after HUSKY is difficult to predict. For the purpose of the rest of this study, therefore, it is assumed that when ITALY collapses, the German forces will have withdrawn from the greater part of ITALY to a defensive line of their own choosing.

9. The unconditional surrender of ITALY will be brought about primarily by Military action aided by varying combinations of the factors listed in paragraphs 6 and 7 as contributing to her collapse. She will not surrender unconditionally as long as GERMANY dominates the Italian government and maintains forces in ITALY.

[REDACTED]

10. GERMANY'S decision to abandon ITALY will be a calculated measure designed to injure the UNITED NATIONS as well as to benefit herself. ITALY will be compelled to pay a high price to GERMANY for the privilege of seeking peace with the UNITED NATIONS. GERMANY will be unconcerned with the resulting conditions in ITALY or the terms of peace ITALY is able to reach.

11. To insure that GERMANY may gain the economic advantages she desires and may provide for her own security, GERMANY will denude ITALY of such economic assets as can be moved or destroyed in the short time available. These measures will impose upon the UNITED NATIONS the burden of furnishing economic support to ITALY, and thus impose a further drain on UNITED NATIONS resources. Italian units returned from occupied countries would be of value to the UNITED NATIONS in stabilizing the situation in ITALY. However, in order to deny the use of Italian forces and equipment to the UNITED NATIONS, GERMANY will not assist in the return of Italian troops and materiel to the Homeland, and will insist at least upon the scuttling of the Italian surface fleet.

12. The severe measures which GERMANY may impose as the price for permitting ITALY to withdraw from the war might bring about the conditions of collapse rather than conditions leading to unconditional surrender.

13. It appears unlikely that ITALY will submit to terms of surrender which fail to provide for the stability of her government. If terms of surrender are imposed that fail to provide this stability, collapse is likely to follow. It is most desirable, therefore, that the terms be sufficiently liberal to permit a stable Italian government to survive. The alternative would be the obligations resulting from a collapse.

[REDACTED]

14. The courses of action which should be undertaken by the UNITED NATIONS are:

a. In the event of civil war in ITALY:

(1) Establish ground and air forces in ITALY for the purpose of supporting the revolutionists only. The establishment of forces in continental ITALY for other purposes would alienate sentiment favorable to the revolution.

(2) Demand as concessions from the revolutionists, upon the successful conclusion of the civil war, bases in SICILY, SARDINIA, and the DODECANESE; the immobilization of the Italian Fleet; and, if deemed expedient at the time, the withdrawal of Italian forces from non-Italian territory.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

b. In the event of the collapse of ITALY:

(1) Occupy and defend with minimum forces a readily defensible line in northern ITALY, and only such coastal positions within the occupied area as are of strategic importance.

(2) Establish air bases in the occupied area and continue the air offensive against GERMANY.

(3) Undertake economic assistance to the Italian people.

(4) Garrison centers of population with minimum forces for the maintenance of order. Establish a Military government making maximum use of any existing civil agencies, and gradually restore Italian control of the civil administration.

c. In the event of unconditional surrender of ITALY:

(1) Surrender terms should meet Military requirements, but be sufficiently liberal to insure the continued existence of a stable government.

[REDACTED]

(2) Other courses of action should be as in b, except that forces required to insure the stability of the government would be considerably smaller.

15. The strength of UNITED NATIONS forces to be established in ITALY will depend upon whether the occupation will be the result of civil war, a collapse, or an unconditional surrender, and upon the nature of defense required. It is impossible to predict the circumstances which will control the strength of these forces. It appears likely that fifteen divisions would be the minimum required. A force of this size might be made available from the garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN area, otherwise they would have to be built up gradually from other areas.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974



~~SECRET~~ SECURITY

COPY NO. 40

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

~~SECRET~~  
355-1  
(J.C.S. 304)

May 12, 1943

Pages 1-32 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,  
F. B. ROYAL,  
Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

SECRET

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis has been made of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 290/1. The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern theater

(1) ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM

Retained as suitable. Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN and to keeping CHINA in the war.

(2) Air operations in and from CHINA

Retained. Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

(3) Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA

Retained for implementation subsequent to the recapture of BURMA as a vital part of the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. PACIFIC theater

(1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

Retained. Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on JAPAN, and the defense of AUSTRALIA.

(2) Operations in NEW GUINEA

Retained. The capture of NEW GUINEA will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the CELEBES SEA and contribute to the defense of AUSTRALIA.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

✓ CS 927/495-1  
By MSJ Date APR 13 1973

(3) Operations in eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Retained. Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of NEW GUINEA.

(4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS

Retained. Shortens line of communications to SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and CELEBES SEA.

(5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS

Retained. Necessary to gain control of central PACIFIC, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to CELEBES SEA. Will enable UNITED NATIONS forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC, after the ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS

Rejected. Not in accordance with strategic concept.

3. Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Seizure of BURMA.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

By WBL

Date

JCS 927/495-1  
APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

4. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944, in conformity with UNITED NATIONS strategy.

ASSUMPTIONS

5. It is assumed that:

- a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN.
- b. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to RUSSIA, and before GERMANY is defeated.

6. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made, it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:

a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war.

b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES naval forces should be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European AXIS, air and ground forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED STATES naval forces.

7. J.C.S. 287/1 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. Based on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN, the following courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS:

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
APR 13 1973  
By WJL Date \_\_\_\_\_

a. In the Asiatic theater:

- (1) Operations ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM.
- (2) Air operations in and from CHINA.
- (3) Initiation of operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

b. In the PACIFIC theater:

- (1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.
- (2) Operations in NEW GUINEA.
- (3) Operations in the eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
- (4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS.
- (5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC.

PART I

OPERATIONS IN ASIA

8. The operation ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM

This operation is discussed in J.C.S. 303.

9. Air operations in and from CHINA

a. General examination of this course of action.

- (1) This course of action is suitable.
- (2) The feasibility of the current plan for air operations in CHINA is limited by the problem of supply. Air transport is the only route of supply leading into CHINA and air operations in CHINA during 1943 and 1944 will expand in size and scope of operations, in direct proportion to the increase in the amount of supplies made available to the air force in CHINA.

b. In the event that the operation ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM is successful, it is estimated that supplies to CHINA will begin to move by land routes in approximately six months. A rapid expansion of the capacity of the air route will be

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

immediately practicable, due to the added facilities available at the western terminus, and the existence of more favorable operating conditions.

c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA contemplate that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. Due to physical limitations imposed by the area in which this line operates, it is doubtful whether this latter figure can be exceeded until ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM has been accomplished.

d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows:

4 Fighter Groups	300	airplanes
2 Medium Bomber Groups	114	"
1 Heavy Bomber Group	35	"
1 Recon. Squadron	24	"
TOTAL	473	airplanes

e. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that this force can be operated on a monthly supply of 7,128 tons. This is only possible by cutting the ground echelon T/O approximately in half and utilizing local sources of supply to the utmost.

f. It is believed that the operation of this force will accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Subject the Japanese Air Force to a very costly attrition.

(2) Permit sustained and damaging attacks against Japanese shipping on the YANGTSE RIVER, along the CHINA coast, and out to sea to include all of the islands of FORMOSA and HAINAN and the sea lane between JAPAN and SHANGHAI.

(3) Permit damaging air attack on Japanese industrial targets as far north as SHAN-HAI-KWAN and east to include NANKING, SHANGHAI, and the island of FORMOSA.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By DBJ Date APR 13

~~SECRET~~

(4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland of JAPAN.

(5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual operation of large air forces to be used in the air offensive against JAPAN proper.

(6) Give support to Chinese ground forces.

g. Air operations in and from CHINA are considered a vital and necessary step in the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN," J.C.S. 287/1. The scale and tempo of the air operations must be carefully gauged as they progress, in the light of probable Japanese reaction. If advanced too rapidly they might precipitate a large scale land offensive by the Japanese in CHINA, at an earlier date than we consider desirable.

h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, sustained air offensive against JAPAN proper becomes feasible when supply routes to CHINA are developed to the point where the forces involved can be logistically maintained. This latter phase will undoubtedly require logistic support through a CHINA port in order that it may be conducted on the scale we contemplate.

10. Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

a. After the recapture of BURMA, operations should be initiated to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Such operations will compel JAPAN to disperse her forces and will provide an additional front in which Japanese forces may be engaged. These operations probably will extend from the RANGOON area down the KRA PENINSULA towards SINGAPORE and to SUMATRA.

b. The operations should be undertaken by British Commonwealth Forces because the area is one of British strategic

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_  
JCS 927/495-1  
By NBI APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~  
responsibility. These operations should be undertaken after the recapture of BURMA and should commence in 1944.

PART II

OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC

11. Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

a. Operations now directed.

(1) Operations for the seizure of the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO have been under way since July, 1942 (about nine months). The tasks prescribed by the latest directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (March 28, 1943) are quoted below:

"TASKS

4. (a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS.

(b) Seize LAE - SALAMAUA - FINSCHAFEN - MADANG area and occupy western NEW BRITAIN.

(c) Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern portion of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. Purposes. To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to JAPAN, to contain Japanese forces in the PACIFIC Theater by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare for the ultimate seizure of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO."

b. Present status of operations.

(1) General.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, gives June 15, 1943, as the target date for the occupation of KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS. No date is indicated for subsequent phases of the entire operation.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By DBJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

(2) Forces required.

It is estimated that on July 1, 1943, UNITED NATIONS forces in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas will total 14 offensive divisions and 2,106 combat aircraft. These forces, together with naval forces in the area, are considered adequate for the operations directed.

(3) Time of completion.

The exact timing of the successive operations is impracticable at this time to predict, since the enemy reaction to the plans is indeterminate, and limited topographical intelligence may result in unexpected hindrances. The operations may run well into 1944.

c. Subsequent operations.

(1) Capture BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(a) General.

UNITED NATIONS strategic plans envisage the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (including ADMIRALTY ISLANDS) following the completion of tasks indicated in paragraph a above.

The existing concept of operations provides initially for the capture of KAVIENG, in order to isolate sea communications to RABAU. After the establishment of airdromes in NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND, the defenses of RABAU will be heavily attacked by land-based aviation. When the enemy defenses are softened up, capture of the area will be made by two amphibious forces. One force will be mounted from the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and one from the SOUTH PACIFIC.

After the seizure of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area, the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS can be neutralized by land-based aviation operating from NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN. Seizure will be made by amphibious forces.

(b) Forces required.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, estimates that 7 infantry divisions, 5 of which are amphibious, will be required to seize KAVIENG and capture RABAU. It is believed, however, that with effective air neutralization of the RABAU area, the foregoing estimate may be reduced to 5 divisions, 3 of which would be amphibious.

The timing of the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO will determine to a great extent the availability of ground forces. Provided there is sufficient time for reorganization and recuperation of units, it appears the 5 divisions can be provided from the 18 offensive divisions allocated to the area as of January 1, 1944. This figure will be subject to revision after the operations now projected for the area get under way. The ground forces required for the successive operations in the BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA area must take into account the losses from malaria and battle casualties which necessitate withdrawal of troops to rear areas for rehabilitation after four to six months.

It appears that 2,579 combat aircraft allocated to the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, will be sufficient to complete the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(c) Time required for operation.

Assuming the UNITED NATIONS establish positions in western NEW BRITAIN and southern BOUGAINVILLE by December 1, 1943, it is estimated that, exclusive of medical rehabilitation of personnel, at least two months will be required to reorganize amphibious units, develop the advance air bases, and make the complete preparations

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/496-1

By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

for the amphibious attack on the RABAU area. It is estimated that a minimum of two months will be required to complete the operations subsequent to the landing attack on RABAU. From the foregoing, it appears that the most optimistic estimates indicate that the BISMARCK operations cannot be completed before April 1, 1944.

12. Operations in NEW GUINEA.

a. Capture NEW GUINEA.

After the seizure of the HUON PENINSULA and the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, our strategic plans contemplate operations to extend our line of communications through the PACIFIC to the HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES area. The control of NEW GUINEA to include the VOGELKOP area is obviously essential to accomplishing this objective.

The concept of operations for the seizure of NEW GUINEA envisages the projection of our line of communications to the VOGELKOP region by the successive seizure of air bases along the north and southwest coasts.

The initial phases of operations along the north coast consist primarily of air-ground action, covered by air and fleet operations to prevent interference by enemy counter-attacks. Ground forces will be employed in the seizure of air bases by shore-to-shore amphibious operations.

In order to gain control of the ARAFURA-BANDA seas and of the south coast of NEW GUINEA, it will be necessary to seize AROE, KEI, and possibly TANIMBAR Island.

b. The operations to capture NEW GUINEA will consist of two phases as follows:

PHASE I

(1) Seizure of north coast of NEW GUINEA to include CAPE D'URVILLE.

(2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of NEW GUINEA as a preliminary to seizure of the AROE Islands. Possible occupation of TANIMBAR Island.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 20 1973

SECRET

PHASE II

(1) Capture of the VOGELKOP area to include the Island of WAIGEO.

This phase will be accomplished by the seizure of SCHOUTEN and JAPEN Islands on the north coast. The southern and western portion of the VOGELKOP will be seized after we have established positions in McCLUER GULF and AMBONIA.

c. The capture of NEW GUINEA envisages a movement along the coast line 1,200 miles in length. The forces required for this operation, so distant in the future, cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. After the loss of the HUON PENINSULA and the RABAU area, the enemy may decide to withdraw to a more advantageous defensive position in the CELEBES SEA area. On the other hand, he may be able to build up his defenses in depth along the entire north coast.

The extent of our control of the sea to the north of NEW GUINEA will in a great measure determine the ease with which we eject him from the area.

d. Estimate of enemy forces.

(1) Ground forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 5 divisions deployed in the area. It is assumed that this force could be augmented to a total of 8 divisions. Port facilities and enemy shipping will be limiting factors.

(2) Air forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 807 operative aircraft deployed in this area (SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC). It is assumed that the Japanese could reinforce to a total of 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft, depending on the state of their activity and requirements on other fronts.

e. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

(1) Ground forces (assault units)

- 2 air-borne divisions
- 16 infantry divisions (including 5 amphibious)
- 2 parachute regiments

(2) Air forces

(a) Assault

Type	Groups	Aircraft		
BH	7	245		
BM	6	321		
L/DB	6	321		
Fighters	9	720		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	5	260		
Troop Carrier	10	390		
Total	44	2309	Groups	Aircraft
			44	2309

(b) Area defense

BH	3	105		
BM	3	171		
L/DB	3	171		
Fighters	3	240		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	-	--		
Troop Carrier	-	--		
Total	13	739	13	739
TOTAL			57	3048

(3) Naval forces

Sufficient forces to

- (a) Cover advances along the north and south coasts of NEW GUINEA.
- (b) Protect line of communications.
- (c) Provide naval defense in ARAFURA-BANDA Seas.

13. Further operations to eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

a. Paragraph 12 discussed the implications of a campaign through the ARAFURA-BANDA sea area for the purpose of seizing the VOGELKOP region. If those operations are not conducted, other offensive-defensive operations should be undertaken in the TIMOR-CELEBES-CERAM area in order to maintain the security of AUSTRALIA and subject enemy forces to attrition.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

✓CS 927/495-1  
By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

b. These operations will consist of air and amphibious action. In view of other operations more pressing in attaining our strategic objectives, it is considered that the availability of forces will limit our activity primarily to air action.

14. Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS

a. The capture and occupation of the MARSHALL ISLANDS is a preliminary objective in establishing a line of communications to the CELEBES SEA. It also secures and shortens the line of communications to the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. The occupation of these islands extends our control of the sea two thousand miles into the central PACIFIC. Land-based aircraft from bases in the MARSHALLS will facilitate the operation of naval surface craft against enemy lines of communication. Operations in this area will force attritional losses on enemy aircraft and shipping. It may also compel the Japanese Fleet to accept battle. It is in conformity with the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. Operations against enemy positions in the MARSHALLS consist of amphibious operations initially supported by carrier aircraft. The success of the operation will be greatly enhanced by the use of amphibious tractors which are capable of crossing coral reefs.

c. To control the MARSHALLS it will be necessary to occupy or neutralize all of the major atolls in the group and WAKE ISLAND. The amphibious troops will have to be relieved by garrison troops, and then reorganized and trained for the CAROLINE operations. A minimum estimate of the periods required are as follows:

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_  
JCS 927/495-1  
By NSA Date \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Control of the MARSHALLS	3.0 months
Relief by garrison force	1.5 "
Rehabilitation in HAWAII	.75 "
Training new replacements and rehearsals for CAROLINES	1.0 "
Movement, HAWAII to MARSHALLS and preparation for assault on PONAPE	<u>.5</u> "
TOTAL	6.75 months

d. It is estimated that forces required for capture of the MARSHALLS are as follows:

(1) Ground

2 Infantry Amphibious Divisions, reinforced

(2) Air

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)  
2 Groups, Fighter  
Carrier-based aircraft in 4 CVs and 4 ACVs  
(72 VT, 192 VSB, 156 VF)

(3) Naval

4 BB, 4 CV, 7 ACV, 8 CA, 8 CL, 63 DD,  
24 APA, 44 LST, plus landing craft.

e. The following forces will be required to garrison the islands:

(1) Ground

1 Infantry Division, reinforced  
10 Defense Battalions

(2) Air

	B (H)	B(M)	VF	VSB	VT	Total
Land-based	72	72	221	108	72	545
Seaplanes	72 VP 24 VSO					

(3) Naval

18 PT, miscellaneous craft.

~~SECRET~~

15. Operations in the CAROLINES

a. Purpose

Operations in the CAROLINES will be for the purpose of wresting control of the central PACIFIC from the Japanese. The establishment of a mainfleet base at TRUK, adequately protected by outlying air bases, is required in order to maintain control, and thus be in a position to continue westward across the PACIFIC or directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

b. Operations required

The following operations are required in a campaign to capture the CAROLINES:

TASK ONE. To capture PONAPE and TRUK, and to establish air and garrison forces thereon.

(1) Operations

- (a) Capture PONAPE.
- (b) Destroy or neutralize enemy air on atolls within radius of 250 miles and as far west as WOLEAI.
- (c) Prevent interference with landing operations by major naval forces.
- (d) Prevent strong reinforcement of TRUK garrison after landing operations have been initiated.
- (e) Capture TRUK, by attack launched from the MARSHALLS and PONAPE, in three phases with several days elapsing between initial landing and final assault and capture, during which time considerable naval support must remain in the vicinity. The capture should not be envisaged as placing a landing force ashore and then a departure of naval forces.
- (f) Movement of garrison forces to TRUK.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

By JCS 927/196-1 Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

TASK TWO. To secure control of the western CAROLINES.

(1) Operations

(a) Neutralization of enemy air establishments in the western CAROLINES in which there are five probable seaplane bases.

(b) Aerial raids against GUAM and SAIPAN.

(c) Aerial raids against KAPINGAMARINGI, if enemy occupies RABAU.

(d) Establishment of air and garrison forces on NOMOI, WOLEAI, and GAFERUT.

TASK THREE. To establish a main fleet operating base on TRUK.

(1) Availability of mobile operating and repair facilities such as LIONS, CUBS, and ACORNS must be assured prior to execution of TASK TWO.

(2) Operations

(a) Assembly of this material at PEARL HARBOR and western coast of the UNITED STATES.

(b) Movement of this material to TRUK and assembly thereof.

c. Factors influencing the campaign

(1) The campaign should be launched from the MARSHALLS even though we hold RABAU. It should follow the capture of the MARSHALLS as quickly as possible. It appears that the controlling factors in this respect will be:

(a) Length of time the two amphibious divisions which captured the MARSHALLS are held thereon before being relieved by the garrison division.

(b) The availability of a third amphibious division and its transports.

(2) A study of the time required to complete the operations enumerated in Tasks One, Two, and Three, above, clearly indicates that the capture of the CAROLINES will require a campaign of several months duration.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

d. Estimate of forces required

(1) In determining forces required, estimates are based on tasks to be performed and a considerable increase of the Japanese garrisons. At TRUK, the garrison is estimated to be one reinforced division.

(2) For the capture of the CAROLINES

(a) Ground

3 Inf. Amph. Divs., reinf.

(b) Air

Land-based

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)

Carrier-based (10 CV's ENTERPRISE-ESSEX Class and 7 ACV's)

VF Sq.	VSB Sq.	VT Sq.	VSTB Sq.
23-1/2	23	7	4-1/2

(c) Naval

4 BB, 9 OBB, 10 CV, 7 ACV, 3 CA, 10 CA or CL,  
18 CL, 108 DD, 20 SS, 45 APA, 15 AKA, 6 LSD,  
3 Hq. Ships, Misc. aux.

(3) For garrisoning the CAROLINES

(a) Ground

2 Infantry Divisions, reinforced

3 Defense Battalions

(b) Air

Land-based

1 VP Wing

3 VSO (Naval) Squadrons

1 Group, Bombardment (H)

1 Group, Bombardment (M)

1 Group, Bombardment (L and D)

2 Groups, Pursuit

(c) Naval

Misc. Harbor and Local Defense Craft

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By APB Date APR 13 1977

~~SECRET~~

16. Operations in the north PACIFIC

a. General

Operations are now in progress for the capture of ATTU and the occupation of SHEMYA. These operations envisage cutting the enemy line of communications from JAPAN to KISKA. The seizure of this area will provide additional bases for the air offensive against KISKA and will enable us to base our submarine operations further to the westward.

Until the Japanese are driven out of KISKA, the UNITED STATES must keep large air and ground forces in the ALEUTIANS and is forced to disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled from KISKA. It may be that the air offensive and blockade will force them to evacuate or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial offensive which has been in progress for several months past, it is probable that landing operations will be required.

The Japanese reaction to our seizure of ATTU will determine the strength of forces and length of time required for operations in the north PACIFIC.

b. U. S. forces now engaged

(1) Ground

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced

1 Engineer Regiment

(2) Air

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment

2 Sq. Medium Bombardment

6 Sq. Pursuit

54 Patrol planes

(3) Naval

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL, 19 DD, 3 DM, 11 OSS, 1 ACV,

4 APA, 1 APD, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP, 3 XAK, 3 XAPc,

6 AO, 2 AD, 11 MTB, 1 AVP, 2 DE, 1 PG, 3 AM,

4 LST.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By MBJ Date APR 13 1977

~~SECRET~~

16. Operations in the north PACIFIC

a. General

Operations are now in progress for the capture of ATTU and the occupation of SHEMYA. These operations envisage cutting the enemy line of communications from JAPAN to KISKA. The seizure of this area will provide additional bases for the air offensive against KISKA and will enable us to base our submarine operations further to the westward.

Until the Japanese are driven out of KISKA, the UNITED STATES must keep large air and ground forces in the ALEUTIANS and is forced to disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled from KISKA. It may be that the air offensive and blockade will force them to evacuate or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial offensive which has been in progress for several months past, it is probable that landing operations will be required.

The Japanese reaction to our seizure of ATTU will determine the strength of forces and length of time required for operations in the north PACIFIC.

b. U. S. forces now engaged

(1) Ground

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced  
1 Engineer Regiment

(2) Air

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment  
2 Sq. Medium Bombardment  
6 Sq. Pursuit  
54 Patrol planes

(3) Naval

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL, 19 DD, 3 DM, 11 OSS, 1 ACV,  
4 APA, 1 APD, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP, 3 XAK, 3 XAPc,  
6 AO, 2 AD, 11 MTB, 1 AVP, 2 DE, 1 PG, 3 AM,  
4 LST.

~~SECRET~~

c. Our present strategic concept does not contemplate further amphibious operations west of the ALEUTIANS. Our forces there will assume a defensive role until conditions are favorable to operations in support of RUSSIA in the KAMCHATKA PENINSULA-Siberian area.

17. Naval operations in the PACIFIC

Both ANAKIM (discussed in J.C.S. 297) and the Revised ANAKIM Plan (J.C.S. 303) provide for naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold Japanese naval forces in those waters. A positive naval operation in the fall of 1943 will have to be undertaken for this purpose. It is unlikely that operations in the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA area will have the desired effect. Probably a carrier-based air attack on JAPAN will be required.

Availability as to Means

18. General

One of the controlling factors for the operations discussed above is the availability of amphibious divisions and amphibious equipment.

a. Amphibious divisions

The only amphibious divisions available in May 1943 are two Marine Corps divisions in the SOUTH PACIFIC and one in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. Readiness for action dates are:

1st Marine Division, (Southwest Pac)	June 1
2d Marine Division, (SoPac)	June 1
3d Marine Division, (less 1 Regt.) (SoPac)	June 1
1 Regt., 3d Marine Division	July 15

Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC has set June 15 as target date for commencing operations designed to continue as far as MADANG (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE, and has stated that sequence and timing is subject to fluctuation of tactical circumstances. Three amphibious divisions are required in these operations.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 18 1973

~~SECRET~~

A most optimistic view, excluding the capture of RABAU, can not envisage relief of amphibious divisions from the SOLOMON - BISMARCK - NEW GUINEA area before February, 1944. Any division relieved will require four to six months for rehabilitation.

The 4th Marine Division is scheduled to depart UNITED STATES in December, 1943. It could be earmarked as one of the two amphibious divisions required for the capture of the MARSHALLS, provided excessive losses are not encountered in SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations prior to the completion of the MADANG (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE campaign.

Therefore, for the capture of the MARSHALLS there is available one Marine Corps amphibious division from the UNITED STATES in December, 1943, while the other must be provided from the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC or by training an Army division in the UNITED STATES.

(1) Summary of availability of amphibious divisions

<u>Campaign number</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Divisions required</u>	<u>Possible sources of divisions required</u>
1	MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE (See par 11 a)	3	3 Marine Corps Divisions in SOUTH PACIFIC and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
2	BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (See par. 11 c)	5 (possibly reduced to three)	3 Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 1, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation. 1 Marine Corps Division from U. S. in Dec., 1943. 1 Army Division must be trained.
3	NEW GUINEA (See par. 12)	5	<u>CASE I</u> Army and Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 2, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/496-1

WBS APR 13 1973

or

CASE II  
Train 5 Army Divisions during Campaign No. 2.



~~SECRET~~

2 Marine Corps divisions - making a total of 6  
Marine Corps divisions.

2 Army divisions.

b. Amphibious craft (See Appendices "A" and "B")

(1) It is estimated that 26 APAs and 7 AKAs will be in service in the PACIFIC on January 1, 1944. This will be sufficient to lift two amphibious divisions. Assuming that all APAs and AKAs becoming available for assignment in 1944 are assigned to the PACIFIC, and allowing no attrition after January 1, 1944, the following table indicates the number available to meet all of the requirements in the PACIFIC theater:

	April 1, 1944	July 1, 1944	October 1, 1944	January 1, 1945
APAs	31	43	55	63
AKAs	8	20	32	40

The CAROLINE operations alone will require 45 APAs.

(2) It is estimated that under proposed allocations (Appendix "A"), sufficient LSTs, LCI (L)s, and LCT (5)s will be available for one division to operate in shore to shore movement. A general discussion of losses from attrition is contained in Appendix "B".

NOTE: Amphibious craft figures are subject to adjustment if incompatible with operations determined upon in BURMA and EUROPE.

c. Ground (less amphibious), air, and naval forces

The UNITED NATIONS have 14 offensive divisions in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Theaters. The deployment of these divisions cannot be determined far in advance of an actual operation. The requirements for the defense of important bases in the line of communications, and the necessity for rehabilitation of units greatly reduces the number of units actually available at any one time for offensive action.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

Experiences to date in NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMON ISLANDS indicate that combat units can carry on offensive operations for approximately 3 months, after which they must be withdrawn to <sup>rear</sup> ~~rear~~ positions for recuperation. For each division (or similar combat unit) actually engaged with the enemy, it is essential that an additional division be located in the combat zone in order to insure the availability of combat units to meet counter-attacks or recoup an unfavorable situation. Due to the distances involved, the recuperative period will be about 6 months. It follows that one-third the combat units will at all times be in, or enroute to, recuperative bases too far from the combat zone to be available for an emergency. For planning purposes, it can therefore be assumed that not over one-third of the offensive divisions actually in the area will be available for operations at any given date. The foregoing estimate is substantiated by experiences thus far in the PACIFIC Theater.

Estimates of requirements for subsequent operations are therefore based on the foregoing analysis.

19. Operations in CHINA

a. Air

The estimated aircraft requirements for CHINA as listed in paragraph 9 d above, totals 473 airplanes.

Present deployments indicate the following total aircraft available, and shortages, not classified by types:

	<u>Aircraft available</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
Present	209	264
July 1, 1943	209	264
Jan 1, 1944	209	264
July 1, 1944	279	194
Jan 1, 1945	279	194

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By WBS Date APR 1973

~~SECRET~~

20. Operations in BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

a. Ground

It was noted in paragraph 11 c (1) (b) that a minimum of 5 divisions will be required for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. Assuming the occupation of the MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE area is accomplished with the forces now planned, it is estimated there will be sufficient infantry divisions available in the area to complete the BISMARCK operation. The availability of amphibious forces has been discussed in paragraph 18 a, above.

b. Air

2579 combat airplanes are estimated to be required in the area. This number will be available as of January 1, 1944. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. Some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

Sufficient naval forces will be made available for this operation.

21. Operations in NEW GUINEA

a. Ground

It is estimated that 18 offensive divisions will be required to capture NEW GUINEA. In addition a minimum of 5 divisions will be required to secure vital bases on the line of communications, making a total of 23 divisions. Tentative deployments as of January 1, 1944 indicate that the UNITED NATIONS will have 18 divisions in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. This number is exclusive of Australian and NEW ZEALAND defense divisions.

It would appear, therefore, that a minimum of 5 additional offensive divisions will be required to provide the necessary divisions to capture NEW GUINEA.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_  
JCS 927/495-1  
By ADJ Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

It should be pointed out that the 18 divisions include 3 U. S. Marine Divisions. The withdrawal of these units to the central PACIFIC would require their replacement with 3 Army Divisions.

The status of the availability of the amphibious equipment for this operation cannot be determined until after the RABAUl campaign.

b. Air

A total of 3048 combat aircraft are estimated to be required for this operation. As of January 1, 1944, 2579 will be available. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft. In addition some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

In view of the other operations which may be conducted in the PACIFIC, such as the BISMARCK, CAROLINE, or MARSHALLS operations, the requirements and availability of naval forces for the capture of NEW GUINEA cannot be determined.

22. Operations in the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS

a. Ground

The defense of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require 3 Army Divisions. One division may be obtained from HAWAII by reducing the strength of the garrison to 2 divisions. The remaining 2 divisions must come from the UNITED STATES.

b. Air (MARSHALLS)

(less carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
B (H)	96	72
B (M)	0	72
B (L/D)	0	180
Ftr	<u>200</u>	<u>221</u>
	296	545

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
APR 1 1973

~~SECRET~~

As of January 1, 1944 the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based), deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. Required aircraft should be available for this operation.

c. Naval (MARSHALLS)

The situation in cruisers to mount the MARSHALL ISLANDS operation (<sup>12</sup> CL plus <sup>16</sup> CA) will be tight until early in 1944. As of January 1, 1944, there will be 9 CA, 12 CL, and 4 OCL in the PACIFIC. If all cruisers which become available for assignment in the first quarter of 1944 (1 CA and 4 CL) are assigned to the PACIFIC and, assuming no attrition after January 1, 1944, there would be available on April 1, 1944, 10 CA 12 CL, and 4 OCL. After meeting the requirements for this operation 2 CA, 4 CL, and 4 OCL would be available to meet all other requirements in the PACIFIC. One CL and one CA become available for assignment during the second quarter of 1944.

d. Air (CAROLINES)

(exclusive of carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
VSO	0	36
B (H)	96	48
B (M)	0	64
B (L/D)	0	96
Ftr	<u>0</u>	<u>200</u>
	96	444

As of January 1, 1944, the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based) deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. No deployments have been made for later dates, but it is assumed that this figure of 714 will be increased after January 1, 1944, and that the CAROLINE operation is not likely to occur until

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927495-1

by MBJ Date APR 12 1973

~~SECRET~~

after this date. It therefore appears that sufficient aircraft will be available for this operation.

e. Naval (CAROLINES)

The CAROLINES operation requires 4 BB and 9 OBB, total 13. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 6 BB and 8 OBB, total 14. One additional BB becomes available for assignment in the 3rd quarter of 1944.

Thirty-one cruisers are required for this operation. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 9 CA, 12 CL, 4 OCL, a total of 25. Assuming the 2 CA and 5 CL which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, there will be 32 cruisers in the PACIFIC on July 1, 1944, available to meet all the requirements of that area.

Ten CV are required for the CAROLINES. Nine will be available for the PACIFIC on January 1, 1944. Assuming the 5 which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, on July 1, 1944 there will be 14 CV available to meet all the requirements of that area. Seven ACV will be required and will be available.

It is estimated that destroyers and other types can be made available.

25. Summary as to availability of means

a. Ground

From the above, it is estimated that the capture of NEW GUINEA, and the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require the shipment of 7 additional Army divisions to the PACIFIC.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1

By NBS Date APR 13 1973

b. Air

Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft as shown in paragraph 19 a above.

Air deployments to SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (2579 aircraft), January 1, 1944, have been made in accordance with requests for forces by the Commander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, to perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of RABAUL. •

It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit the taking of RABAUL and completion of subsequent operations in NEW GUINEA, with the forces allocated.

However, for planning purposes, and assuming JAPAN has not been evicted from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for operations to complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including defense forces, 3048 aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft as of January 1, 1944.

There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to CINCPAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES during 1944.

c. Naval

It is concluded that there are not sufficient naval forces to carry on a major operation in the central PACIFIC and a major operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44. Preceding discussions of the naval requirements for individual operations make it apparent that consideration must be given to the sequence of assigned tasks.

d. Logistics

The logistical implications for supporting major operations such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not been assessed in this paper. Among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the line of communications, such as from HAWAII to the MARSHALLS, the MARSHALLS to the CAROLINES, or from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA.

~~SECRET~~

26. Sequence of operations in the PACIFIC

Operations in the northern PACIFIC are in progress.

The MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE campaign will commence about June 15, and will probably take the remainder of 1943 to complete.

Prior to the completion of the above campaign, a decision must be made whether to launch the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign. The MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign cannot be launched before early 1944.

The relative value, as well as the magnitude, of further operations in NEW GUINEA with respect to operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS must be assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the progress of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, depending on which had been previously selected.

When the direction of the main effort has been determined, a firm decision on the sequence of operations can be made.

COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS  
IN THE PACIFIC WITH OPERATIONS IN ASIA

27. Coordination and timing of all Military operations in the PACIFIC-Asiatic Theater must be directed and controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in some instances by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in order that each operation will not be considered as an independent operation, but as a part of a larger picture. This is particularly important in our war against JAPAN where the enemy is operating on interior lines.

28. Specifically, coordination should be prescribed for operations in the PACIFIC with those projected for the INDIA - CHINA Theater. In addition, all raids by naval task forces should be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with other current operations in order that maximum benefit may be achieved. Such coordination can be accomplished without infringing on the prerogative of

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS 927/495-1  
By *WBJ* Date APR 13 1972

~~SECRET~~

theater commanders to plan, organize, and execute such operations. The necessity for such coordination will become increasingly apparent as the war progresses.

29. A definite policy as to the timing of any bombing offensive or bombing raid against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA should be announced at once, because of the probability of a premature raid jeopardizing the success of the desired diversionary effect in connection with some other operation at a later date, such as the MARSHALL ISLANDS operations. Again the initiation of bomber raids against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA before sufficient means to make a sustained bomber offensive are available may result in JAPAN making intensified efforts to end Chinese resistance, such as an attack on KUNMING from HANOI.

#### CONCLUSIONS

30. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the objectives in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 should be:

- a. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- b. Seizure of BURMA.
- c. Ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- d. Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- e. Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

VC 927/495-1

*WBJ*

APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX "A"

AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT

	IN SERVICE 1 January 1944		Additional becoming available for assignment by quarters in 1944.			
	ATLANTIC	PACIFIC	1st Qtr. 1944	2nd Qtr. 1944	3rd Qtr. 1944	4th Qtr. 1944
A G C	2	2	0	0	0	0
A P A	17	26	5	12	12	8
A K A	7	7	1	12	12	8
A P D	6	13	0	0	0	0
L S D	1	6	1	0	0	0
L S T	89	123	10	10	6	0
L C I (L)	80	102	36	36	0	0
L C T (5&6)	120	183	30	30	10	0

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By WBS Date APR 13 1973

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX "E"

ATTRITION LOSSES OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT


Plans which involve using landing craft for successive operations must take account of losses. In planning for HUSKY, the British are assuming 20% of those initially assigned will be unavailable for the assault due to operational and training attrition; the UNITED STATES is assuming 10% operational and training loss prior to assault. Both the British and UNITED STATES are assuming 30% loss in the attack. On basis of UNITED STATES assumed loss figures, out of 100 landing craft assigned to an operation, 90 will be available for the initial assault and 63 will be available for assignment to a second operation. Of these 63, fifty-seven will be available for the second assault and 40 will remain after the second assault. After a third operation, 25 out of the original 100 will remain.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

JCS 927/495-1

By DBP Date APR 13 1973



[REDACTED] - SECURITY

COPY NO. 44

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

[REDACTED]  
379-1  
(J.C.S. 311)

15 May 1943

Pages 1 - 23, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS  
ASSAULT CRAFT

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,  
F. B. ROYAL,  
Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS  
ASSAULT CRAFT

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis has been made to determine a scheme of optimum use of amphibious assault craft for operations in 1943-44. This analysis is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The conclusions derived from the Enclosure are as follows:

a. U. S. landing craft remaining after HUSKY can be shifted to:

(1) ROUNDUP to meet target date.

(2) ANAKIM to meet target date.

b. U. S. landing craft remaining after any other limited operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can be shifted to:

(1) ROUNDUP to meet target date provided they are released:

(a) From eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943

(b) From western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943

c. Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC (See J.C.S. 291/1).

d. Amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC can be ready at PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALLS campaign:

(1) By 1 April 1944, if the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS campaign is completed about 1 January 1944.

(2) By 1 July 1944, if the BISMARCK campaign is completed about 1 April 1944.

e. Diversion from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to ANAKIM must be effected by mid-August; however, this will jeopardize the operations in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

f. The most logical source of craft for ANAKIM is from U. S. production.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

**g.** Only LCT(5)'s and smaller types can at this time be sent to the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to replace similar types moved from that area to ANAKIM.

**h.** Based on landing craft availability, extended amphibious operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY would have the following implications:

(1) EITHER:

(a) Continue ROUNDUP build-up, and

(b) Defer ANAKIM and all PACIFIC amphibious operations.

(2) OR:

(a) Defer ROUNDUP, and

(b) Mount ANAKIM and amphibious operations presently directed in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC,

(3) OR:

(a) Limited build-up for ROUNDUP, and

(b) Limited amphibious operations in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, and

(c) Defer ANAKIM.

(4) OR:

(a) Limited build-up for ROUNDUP, and

(b) Mount ANAKIM, and

(c) Defer all PACIFIC amphibious operations.

**i.** In the event that the main effort is directed against JAPAN after HUSKY, landing craft in the ATLANTIC-European Theater can be made available for PACIFIC operations by mid-January, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

ENCLOSURE "A"

MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT

ASSUMPTIONS

1. It is assumed that:

a. HUSKY will be successfully completed by mid-August 1943.

b. HUSKY will be followed by (a) further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN (b) no further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

c. Landing craft will be assembled in the UNITED KINGDOM for an assault on the Continent with target date 1 April 1944.

d. Objectives in the PACIFIC will be:

(1) Ejection of Japanese from ALEUTIANS.

(2) Seizure of MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(3) Seizure of SOLOMONS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

e. ANAKIM will be executed beginning 1 November 1943.

2. For basic data see Appendix "D".

DISCUSSION

3. The necessity for a detailed tactical plan of the operation and its planned logistical support is a basic factor of primary importance in any study concerned with a determination of numbers and types of landing craft required for a given operation. One of the principal reasons that there are various types in existence is the fact that certain types are more efficient under a given set of circumstances than others. It does not follow, however, that one type can be substituted for another simply because there are a variety of types available. While it is true that a given operation may call for certain types and, lacking those types, others can be substituted, this substitution should never be made unless two factors are known, namely (1) hydrographic conditions, and (2) the use intended. It should always

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

[REDACTED]

be borne in mind that, although there are many combinations that can be used to lift a combat team and its supporting elements, there is always one best method, and possibly a few other acceptable methods. The decision must be based on the tactical scheme of maneuver and detailed information on hydrographical conditions.

4. Some of the factors that determine the number of landing craft remaining after an operation and available for use elsewhere are:

a. The loss rate. Little data exists upon which to base an estimate of any value. Operations against several types of defense such as strong or weak enemy air opposition (even types of enemy aircraft have an influence), coast defenses, beach defenses, mines, underwater obstacles, and anti-boat guns must be conducted before estimates can be based upon valuable data. In this connection there is not even agreement on the loss rate for operational training as evidenced by planning for HUSKY wherein the planners estimated 20%, the Navy Department recommended about 5%, and the U. S. Army used 10% as a compromise.


Reports received 12 May 1943 indicate following training loss rates:

	LST	LCI(L)	LCT	LCM(3)	LCVP
Camp Edwards, Mass. (U. S. Army Base)	Nil	Nil	16%	20%	33% (1)
Amphibforlant (Norfolk)	For all types - 30% (2)				

(1) Reduced to 20% with experienced personnel.

(2) Norfolk has less experienced personnel than Camp Edwards.

b. Use for logistic support. Immediately after an amphibious attack, landing craft are required to land supplies across the beach. The length of time landing craft of

  
practically every type except LCI(L)'s are retained for purely logistical support depends upon:

(1) Availability of a port and port facilities.

(2) The possibility from an equipment and hydrographical viewpoint of constructing a pier.

(3) The feasibility and desirability of using seagoing types of landing craft to transport supplies from the base to the operating area.

c. Availability of salvage and repair facilities. A good percentage of the landing craft will probably require salvage and a large percentage overhaul after an operation. The availability of spare parts and assistance by shore establishments or tenders in providing mechanics and machinery will determine the time interval for overhaul. It takes more time to repair many landing craft than it does to repair a few. This is because of docking facilities, repair crews, time for shifting berth under own power or by towing, etc. All of these factors must be considered in determining time required for salvage and repairs.

5. Examination of capabilities of moving landing craft from one theater to another.

Bearing in mind the varying types required and the governing factors discussed in the preceding paragraph, an examination will be made of the possibility of moving landing craft from one theater to another (or from one campaign to another) for the purpose of determining availability at a certain time and place.

6. There are three main sources from which landing craft may be obtained, namely the ATLANTIC, the PACIFIC, and new production in the UNITED STATES. For convenience, these have been designated "Atlantic Pool", "Pacific Pool", and "Production Pool", and are discussed in Appendices "A", "B", and "C". Pertinent factors from these studies are set forth below.

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

ATLANTIC POOL  
(See Appendix "A")

7. Upon completion of HUSKY, the great majority of the landing craft in the ATLANTIC POOL will be in the vicinity of TUNISIA.

8. Problem: To determine the implications of moving landing craft subsequent to HUSKY.

- a. To ROUNDUP.
- b. To ANAKIM.
- c. To PACIFIC.

9. To ROUNDUP.

a. If no further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, seagoing types can arrive in U. K. about mid-November, and shipborne types can arrive with the last echelon of the troops about 1 January 1944.

b. If further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN, it is probable that shipping other than that used for the transfer of combat troop divisions to U. K. must be made available to transport the shipborne types of landing craft. If the shipping is made available, landing craft can be used without prejudice to the 1 April 1944 target date provided they are released for ROUNDUP as follows:

- (1) Eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943
- (2) Western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943

c. Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC or ROUNDUP (See J.C.S. 291/1).

10. To ANAKIM.

a. If no further operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, following are estimated dates of availability for ANAKIM at CALCUTTA.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

- [REDACTED]
- (1) Seagoing types - late October 1943
  - (2) LCT(5) - end of October 1943
  - (3) Other shipborne types - mid-October to early November 1943.

b. If the mounting of ANAKIM is predicated on using landing craft from HUSKY, a target date of early November can be met.

c. It is obvious that landing craft committed to ANAKIM can not be used in a ROUNDUP launched 1 April 1944. At the earliest, these craft can arrive in U. K. early in August, 1944.

11. To PACIFIC.

a. On the assumption that the main effort will be directed against JAPAN after HUSKY, landing craft from the MEDITERRANEAN can arrive at BRISBANE as follows:

- (1) Seagoing types - early January, 1944
- (2) Shipborne types - mid-January, 1944.

PACIFIC POOL

(See Appendix "B")

12. The greatest concentration of landing craft in the PACIFIC is now in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area.

13. Problem:

To determine the implications of moving amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area.

a. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign prior to the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign subsequent to the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

c. To ANAKIM.

14. TO PEARL for MARSHALLS prior to the BISMARCK CAMPAIGN.

a. On the assumptions that the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS operations are completed about 1 January 1944, amphibious assault

[REDACTED]

shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 April 1944.

b. If this diversion is made, no ship-to-shore operations can be conducted in the SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until completion of the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, but operations with a portion of one shore-to-shore division can probably be conducted.

15. TO PEARL for MARSHALLS subsequent to the BISMARCK CAMPAIGN.

a. On the assumption that operations for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO are projected immediately subsequent to the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS operations, and that their capture will be completed about 1 April 1944, amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 July 1944.

16. To ANAKIM.

a. In order to arrive in CALCUTTA and be available at the target date of ANAKIM, assault shipping must be released from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by mid-August. The diversion of the above craft will occur at the peak of operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D, and will place operations in that area in jeopardy.

PRODUCTION POOL  
(See Appendix "C")

17. The sailing port for LST's is NEW ORLEANS. The sailing port for LCI(L)'s is HAMPTON ROADS. LCT(5)'s and smaller types are assembled at various East and West Coast ports. The flow of shipborne types from the United States depends entirely on shipping available.

18. Problem:

To determine the implications of moving landing craft from the production pool:

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

- [REDACTED]
- a. To ROUNDUP.
  - b. To NORTH PACIFIC.
  - c. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.
  - d. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
  - e. To ANAKIM.

19. To ROUNDUP.

a. The latest dates allocations from the production pool can be made in order to meet ROUNDUP target date are:

- (1) LST - late December 1943
- (2) LCI(L) - mid-January 1944
- (3) LCT(5) and other shipborne craft\* - mid-February 1944

\*NOTE: Assumes shipping is immediately available.

20. To NORTH PACIFIC.

a. On the assumption that an operation to capture KISKA will be undertaken, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST - 16-1/2 weeks prior to mounting.
- (2) LCI(L) - 13 weeks prior to mounting.
- (3) LCT(5) and smaller - 5-1/2 weeks prior to mounting.

NOTE: Decision has not been made as to types required.

21. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.

If the target date for landing craft to be available and ready to move from PEARL against the MARSHALLS is 1 April 1944, the latest date allocations of LST's can be made from the production pool is mid-December, 1943.

22. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

a. If replacement landing craft must be in the area by the time those diverted to ANAKIM depart, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST's should have been made in mid-April, 1943.
- (2) LCI(L)'s should have been made in early May, 1943.
- (3) LCT's and smaller types - must be made by late


June, 1943.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

  
23. To ANAKIM

a. In order to meet the ANAKIM target date, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST's - late June, 1943.
- (2) LCI(L)'s - late July, 1943.
- (3) LCT's and smaller types - late August, 1943.

24. See Appendix "E" for graphic presentation of transit time for amphibious assault craft.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

APPENDIX "A"

ATLANTIC POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving landing craft subsequent to HUSKY.

a. To ROUNDUP.

b. To ANAKIM.

c. To PACIFIC.

2. Upon the completion of HUSKY, the great majority of landing craft in the ATLANTIC Pool will be in the vicinity of TUNISIA.

3. To ROUNDUP.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of landing craft from operations in the MEDITERRANEAN until they become available in the UNITED KINGDOM.

TYPE	Time Required in Weeks						TB-
	Salvage(1)	Repair(2)	Knockdown(3)	Trans(4)	Assem.(5)	Train(6):tal	
LST	2	6	-	1	-	3	12
LCI(L)	2	5	-	1	-	3	11
LCT(5)	1	4	2	1	3	3	14

NOTES: (1) Average time required for salvage and reassembling at a North African repair base.

(2) Repair of battle damage and overhaul, considering facilities available.

(3) Disassembly and stowage on board ship.

(4) Transit time from NORTH AFRICA to U. K.

(5) Assembly, repair of shipping damage, and tuning up.

(6) Three weeks are required for training and rehearsal, after arrival in theater.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~

b. In addition to LCT's, there will be a large number of shipborne types which must be moved from the MEDITERRANEAN to the U.K. If it is decided that about 6 divisions of troops will be moved from AFRICA to U.K. and their heavy equipment left for French troops or other forces in NORTH AFRICA, it will be possible to move these shipborne types on the vessels used for the movement.

c. Conclusions.

(1) If no further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, seagoing types can arrive in U.K. about mid-November, and shipborne types can arrive with the last echelon of the troops, about 1 January 1944.

(2) If further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN, it is probable that shipping, other than that used for the transfer of combat troop divisions to U.K., must be made available to transport the shipborne types of landing craft. If the shipping is made available, landing craft can be used without prejudice to the 1 April 1944 target date provided they are released for ROUNDUP as follows:

Eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943

Western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943

(3) Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC or ROUNDUP (See J.C.S. 291/1).

4. To ANAKIM.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of landing craft from operations in the MEDITERRANEAN until they become available at CALCUTTA.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

TYPE	(7) (2) (3) (4) (5)						
	Salvage:	Repair:	Knockdown:	Trans.:	Assem.:	Train:	Total
LST	0 (1)	2	-	4	-	3	9
LCI(L)	0 (1)	2	-	3	-	3	8
LCT(5)	0 (1)	2	1/2	4 (6)	1/2	3	10
Shipborne	1	2-4	-	4 (6)	-	3	10-12

- NOTES: (1) No salvage and a minimum repair period has been allowed in view of the relatively small number required in relation to the number used in HUSKY. It is estimated that a sufficient number of these types to meet ANAKIM requirements will be on hand in good running order.
- (2) Disassembly, and stowage aboard ship.
- (3) Transit time from BIZERTE to CALCUTTA.
- (4) Assembly, repair of shipping damage, and tuning up.
- (5) Three weeks required for training and rehearsal, after arrival in the theater.
- (6) Convoy speed of advance - 9 knots.
- (7) Considering number involved and facilities available.

b. Shipping must be provided for LCT(5) and other shipborne types.

c. Conclusions.

(1) If no further operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, the following are estimated dates of availability for ANAKIM at CALCUTTA.

- (a) Seagoing types - late October 1943
- (b) LCT(5) - end of October 1943
- (c) Other shipborne types - mid-October to early November, 1943

(2) If the mounting of ANAKIM is predicated on using landing craft from HUSKY, a target date of early November can be met.

(3) It is obvious that landing craft committed to ANAKIM can not be used in a ROUNDUP launched on 1 April 1944. At the earliest, these craft can arrive in U.K. early in August, 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

[REDACTED]

5. To PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

After HUSKY, the main effort will be directed against JAPAN.

b. Conclusion.

Using data shown in the table under ANAKIM, but increasing transit time, landing craft can arrive at BRISBANE as follows:

- (1) Seagoing types - early January 1944
- (2) Shipborne types - mid-January 1944.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

APPENDIX "B"

PACIFIC POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area:

a. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, prior to capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, subsequent to capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

c. To ANAKIM.

2. To PEARL for MARSHALLS, prior to BISMARCK campaign.

a. Basic data.

(1) Three amphibious divisions involved in the initial SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations.

2 equipped for ship-to-shore landing.

1 equipped for shore-to-shore landing.

(2) Two amphibious divisions required for MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign.

APA's, AKA's, steaming time @ 14 knots NOUMEA-PEARL 10 days.

LST's steaming time @ 9 knots NOUMEA-PEARL 16 days

b. Assumptions.

(1) The operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D (NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS) will be completed about 1 January 1944.

(2) Three tenders or equivalent can be made available in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC for overhaul of LST's.

(3) No major losses in APA's and AKA's assigned to the PACIFIC.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

**[REDACTED]**

c. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of craft from operations in the SOUTH PACIFIC until they become available at PEARL HARBOR.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>Salvage</u>	<u>Repair</u> <sup>(4)</sup>	<u>Transit(1)</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Total</u>
APA (2)		3	1.5	3	7.5
AKA (2)		3	1.5	3	7.5
LST	2	4 (3)	2.5	3	11.5

- NOTES: (1) NOUMEA to PEARL HARBOR.  
(2) Assumed to have full allowance of LCVP's and LCM(3)'s in good repair.  
(3) Assumed that spare parts are available in SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.  
(4) Considering number involved and facilities available.

d. Conclusions.

(1) Based on assumption (1), amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 April 1944.

(2) If this diversion is made, no ship-to-shore operations can be conducted in the SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until completion of MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, but operations with a portion of one shore-to-shore division can probably be conducted.

3. To PEARL for MARSHALLS, subsequent to BISMARCK campaign.

a. Basic data.

5 amphibious divisions, involved in BISMARCK campaign. For steaming time, see paragraph 2 a. (2).

b. Assumptions.

(1) Operations for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO will be projected immediately subsequent to those directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D and said capture will be completed about 1 April 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

(2) Three tenders or the equivalent can be made available in SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC for overhaul of LST's.

(3) No major losses in APA's and AKA's assigned to the PACIFIC.

c. Conclusion.

Based on assumption (1), amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 July 1944.

4. To ANAKIM.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of craft from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until they become available at CALCUTTA.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Assembly and Repair</u>	<u>Transit (3)</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Total</u>
APA (1)	3	3	3	9
AKA (1)	3	3	3	9
LST	3 (2)	5	3	11
LCI (L)	3 (2)	4.5	3	10.5

NOTES: (1) Assumed to have full allowance LCVF, LCM(3).

(2) Assumed spare parts available in SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, and considering number involved and facilities available.

(3) NOUMEA-CALCUTTA.

b. Conclusion.

In order to arrive in CALCUTTA and be available for target date of ANAKIM the above craft must be released from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by mid-August. The diversion of the above craft will occur at the peak of operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D and will place operations in that area in jeopardy.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

APPENDIX "C"

PRODUCTION POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving landing craft from the Production Pool:

- a. To ROUNDUP.
- b. To NORTH PACIFIC.
- c. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.
- d. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
- e. To ANAKIM.

2. Basic data.

- a. LST's require 50 days fitting out and shakedown; sailing port - NEW ORLEANS.
- b. LCI(L)'s require 35 days fitting out and shakedown; sailing port -HAMPTON ROADS.
- c. LCT(5)'s and smaller types are assembled at various East and West Coast ports. Their flow from U. S. depends entirely on shipping available.

3. To ROUNDUP.

a. Time required in weeks.

<u>Type</u>	<u>F/O &amp; Shakedown</u>	<u>Transit</u>	<u>Assembly</u>	<u>Train(1)</u>	<u>Total</u>
LST	7	4 (2)	-	3	14
LCI(L)	5	2	-	3	10
LCT(5)	-	2	1	3	6
Shipborne	-	2	1	3	6

- NOTES: (1) Training time allowed after arrival destination.  
(2) One 3-day stop enroute for fuel and provision.

b. Conclusion.

Latest dates of allocation which will meet ROUNDUP target date are:

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

LST - late December 1943  
 LCI(L) - mid-January 1944  
 LCT(5) and other shipborne craft\* - mid-February 1944

\* Assuming shipping is immediately available.

4. To NORTH PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

An operation to capture KISKA will be undertaken.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit(2)	Assembly	Train (1)	Total
LST	7	6.5	-	3	16.5
LCI(L)	5	5	-	3	13
LCT(5)	-	1.5 (3)	1	3	5.5
Shipborne	-	1.5 (3)	1	3	5.5

- NOTES: (1) Training to be conducted on West Coast, U. S.  
 (2) NEW ORLEANS-SAN FRANCISCO-DUTCH HARBOR, includes 1 week for assembly of convoy on West Coast.  
 (3) Assuming departure SAN FRANCISCO and shipping immediately available.

c. Conclusion.

To meet any target date selected, allocations of types of craft shown above must be made as indicated in the table. Decision has not been made as to types required.

5. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

(1) LST's for MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign must be provided from Production Pool.

(2) Target date for departure from PEARL HARBOR to execute MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign is 1 April 1944.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O	Shakedown	Transit (1)	Train	Total
LST		7	5	3	15

- NOTE: (1) NEW ORLEANS-SAN DIEGO-PEARL HARBOR, includes one 3-day period for fuel and provisions.

c. Conclusion.

If LST's are to be used from Production Pool, they must be allocated in mid-December 1943.

6. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

Replacement landing craft must be in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by the time landing craft diverted to ANAKIM departs.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit (1)	Assembly	Train	Total
LST	7	7 (1)	-	3	17
LCI(L)	5	6 (2)	-	3	14
LCT(5)	-	3.5 (3)	1	3	7.5
Shipborne	-	3.5 (3)	1	3	7.5

- NOTES: (1) NEW ORLEANS-PANAMA-BORA BORA-NOUMEA, includes two 3-day periods for fuel and provision.  
(2) HAMPTON ROADS-PANAMA-BORA BORA-NOUMEA, includes two 3-day periods for fuel and provision.  
(3) SAN FRANCISCO-NOUMEA and shipping is immediately available.

c. Conclusion.

Landing craft from the Production Pool to replace any diverted from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to ANAKIM must be allocated as follows:

- LST - should have been made in mid-April, 1943  
LCI(L) - should have been made in early May, 1943  
LCT(5) and Shipborne - must be made in late June, 1943

7. To ANAKIM.

a. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit	Assembly	Train	Total
LST	7	8 (1)		3	18
LCI(L)	5	6 (2)		3	14
LCT(5)	-	6 (2,3)		3	9
Shipborne	-	6 (2,3)		3	9

- [REDACTED]
- NOTES: (1) NEW ORLEANS-BIZERTE-CALCUTTA.  
(2) HAMPTON ROADS-BIZERTE-CALCUTTA.  
(3) Assuming shipping is immediately available.

b. Conclusions.

Landing craft from the Production Pool for use in ANAKIM  
must be allocated as follows:

LST	- late June, 1943
LCI(L)	- late July, 1943
LCT(5) and shipborne	- late August, 1943

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

APPENDIX "D"

BASIC DATA

1. Transit times calculated by assuming a speed of advance of 9 knots for LST's, and 11 knots for LCI(L)'s.

2. Each landing craft will require one week overhaul, with base or tender assistance, after an ocean voyage; it is estimated that 6 LST's and 12 LCI(L)'s can be overhauled by an AD, AS, AR, or ARL in one week provided spare parts are available.

3. LST's and LCI(L)'s should not be assigned to the same convoy as this would require the LCI(L)'s running at critical engine speed.

4. LCT(5) crew can knock down one LCT(5) in:

8 hours after practice

24 hours without practice

Crew can assemble one LCT(5) in:

48 hours without practice

5. LCT(5)'s heaviest weight when knocked down is 50 tons, which usually requires a dock crane for unloading.

6. Data on transportation of shipborne types of landing craft in cargo vessels and LST cargo vessels.

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>Capacity of landing craft</u>
U. S. Cargo Vessel (EC-2, C-1, C-2, C-3)	12 - 36' Personnel landing boats (LCVP, LCP(R), LCP) <u>or</u> * 3 - LCM(3)
U. S. Cargo Vessels (EC-2, C-1, C-2, C-3)	12 - 36' Personnel landing boats <u>or</u> ** 6 - LCM(3)

\* Can be handled by booms normally installed in the cargo vessel.

\*\* The additional 3 LCM(3) can be loaded if movement is made from base-to-base with dock cranes to lift the 22 L. Ton LCM(3).

[REDACTED]

LST

---

The following combinations can be lifted:

a. 1 - LCT(5), 1 - LCM(3), 3 - LCVP

b. 1 - LCT(5), 7 - LCVP

c. 15 LCVP

d. 4 LCM(3), 3 LCVP

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

