EG
This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Mexico City
Dated September 6, 1939
Rec'd 12:02 a.m., Sept. 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

272, September 6, 6 p.m.

We have learned very confidentially from the French Legation that the day after war was declared by France on Germany, Suarez sent for the French Commercial Attache to make him a proposition to have either the French Government or French private interests make extensive purchases of Mexico. At the same time he offered to work out a plan of industrial collaboration with the French. The French Commercial Attache had for some time prior to the declaration of war urged his Government to consider the purchase of Mexican oil in exchange for French exports. He has never received any reply to these suggestions from the French Government and French Legation considers it unlikely that the French Government will at present favorably consider offers of oil from Mexico. They consider the suggestion of industrial collaboration made by Suarez to be impracticable.

We
-2- #272, September 6, 6 p.m. from Mexico City

We learn informally and confidentially from Petroleos Mexicanos that the German Legation and the Mexican Government have reached an understanding to continue shipments of oil to Germany via Italy and to receive German or Italian goods in return via Italy.

DANIELS

JRL:RR
The Secretary of State encloses copies of the telegrams and despatches indicated below.

Since some of this material was transmitted in one of the Department's confidential codes, it would be appreciated if the enclosures could be returned to the Department as soon as convenient for appropriate disposition.

Enclosures:

Telegrams Nos. 272, Mexico City; 521, Chungking.
October 9, 1939.

**French purchases in the United States**

Since the war broke out, the French Air Mission has placed to date the following orders, subject to a contingent clause in case the embargo on arms should not be lifted:

1) **Contracts signed:**

   Not affected by the embargo

   - General Electric (128 searchlights, 384 power plants 640 trucks) $ 5,650,000
   - Sperry Gyroscope (256 searchlights 256 sound locators) 5,950,000
   - United Aircraft (2,250 engines, latest model Pratt Whitney SC4G) 41,000,000
   - Glenn Martin (130 planes, bombers #167) 13,400,000
   - Curtiss (630 planes: 530 P. 36 and 100 P 40 - June delivery) 23,500,000
   - Wright (1440 engines) 28,000,000

2) **Contracts to be signed within a week:**

   - Beechcraft (500 planes) 27,000,000
   - North American (200 planes Model BT9 same as pre war order) 4,400,000
   - Douglas (150 planes DB 7) 10,400,000

   **159,300,000**

The Curtiss, Glenn Martin and Douglas are to be equipped with engines Pratt Whitney SC4G.
The French Air mission contemplates to purchase 100 more Douglas. If the U.S. Army gives the release for the latest Douglas A 20, the additional purchase would be 150 ships. General Arnold's decision will be known in a few days.

Searchlights. The French Government needs very badly the searchlights which are not subject to the embargo, and would be of the utmost value for the anti aircraft defense of the big cities. Under the contracts the deliveries are to start in February but will not be important before April. The U.S. Army has placed a large order for the same searchlights, and the deliveries will start in November. Would it be possible to shift the deliveries from the American to the French contract.
Orders placed in Paris

(Contracts to be signed here)

1) **Machine tools**
   
   Cincinnati Milling - 120 machine tools $ 800,000
   
   Brown & Sharp 350 " " 2,500,000
   
   National Acme 50 " " 400,000

2) **Trucks and motorbicycles**
   
   White 2,500 trucks Price not yet settled
   
   Studebaker 2,500 " "
   
   Indian 5,000 motorbicycles "
October 16, 1939.

French purchases in the United States.

Since October 9, the French Air Commission has placed to date the following orders, subject to a contingent clause in case the embargo on arms should not be lifted:

1). Contracts signed:

North American: 200 planes Model BT9, same as pre-war order, and 40 spare engines............... $5,501,473.20

Douglas: 170 planes DB7 and spare parts.......... 15,838,305.00

United Aircraft: 600 engines and 600 propellers... 7,591,000.00
(option lifted on a previous contract)

Indian Motorcycle Co.: 5000 motorcycles......... 2,409,750.00

2). Contracts to be signed:

Douglas: 100 planes A.20, subject to decision of U.S. Army....... Price not yet settled.

Wright: 455 motors double speed................. "
October 30, 1939.

French purchases in the United States.

Since October 23, the French Missions have placed to date the following orders, subject to a contingent clause in case the arms embargo should not be lifted.

   - spare parts. $100,000.-
   - TOTAL amount of contract. $3,113,470.-

2. **E.W. BLISS CO.**, Brooklyn, N.Y. Contract of October 24, 1939. 3 machine tools (presses) $112,000.-

3. **CHRYSLER CORPN.**, Detroit, Michigan. Contract of October 26, 1939. 1500 trucks type VH48 at $1,134.75; $1,702,125.-

4. **DOUGLAS.** 100 motors DB7. Contract of October 20, 1939: $10,483,200.-

5. **CURTISS WRIGHT.** propellers. Contract of October 31, 1939: $9,158,125.-
My dear Mr. President:

Mr. Mahoney, the Canadian Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, called at the Department on June 12th and left a copy of a telegram dated June 10th from the Canadian Minister in France to the Secretary of State for External Affairs at Ottawa, with the request that this telegram be transmitted to you. I enclose a copy of this telegram.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram dated June 10, 1940.

The President,

The White House.
No. 135. Most Secret and Personal. Military Attache has asked me to send the following message, Begins:

I was received by General Weygand late last night at his G.H.Q. Colonel Horace H. Fuller, United States Military Attache at Paris accompanied me.

General Weygand stated:
(1) Present situation very critical and not hopeful;
(2) Enemy have great numerical superiority in men including fresh divisions;
(3) French have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, men and war material, but French have suffered heavy losses;
(4) French will continue fighting as long as the men have arms; this statement made twice in the course of conversation. As heavy casualties occur on both sides Germany will still have considerable strength when France completely exhausted;
(5) French have no reserve war material having put all available men and armaments into the fight.

French and British armies lost great quantities of equipment of all kinds in northern France. His only hope was to obtain equipment already promised from the United States. He #1/5# mentioned 75 calibre field guns particularly,
particularly, but there is also question of planes and other articles. French Armament Bureau, War ministry informs me only 6 tanks and 12 field pieces available as replacements;

(6) Four divisions are expected to land in France from the British Isles during entire course of the present month. General Weygand expects First Canadian Division in France within two or three days;

(7) General Weygand satisfied that the British are sending as many reinforcements as warranted by available stocks of armaments. Would be necessary French supply guns to some British divisions but have no spare guns;

(8) No greater efforts could possibly be asked of French armies; General Weygand had nothing but hope admiration for his men who are fighting without/of having any rest;

(9) Long resistance impossible unless the United States declares war immediately. Germany would then reconsider her position and such action on the part of the United States would make Allied victory possible;

(10) Doumenc, Chief of Staff to General Weygand, repeated that the French armies will fight as long as arms available.

General Weygand's remarks can be summed up in one way only: Those who can help must do so now. Ends.

CANADIAN MINISTER
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone, (Br)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
15
3, June 24, 5 p.m.

I feel that I should make it entirely clear that the French Government is now faced with only two alternatives namely to sue for peace which would of course have to be unconditional or to move to North Africa and continue the fight. The decision as to which to take will depend on the nature of your reply and the encouragement or lack thereof contained in it.

If the former is chosen it is probable that your mediation will be asked with a view to reducing the harshness of the German terms -- the probable severity of which I believe is too dimly realized even by the Government. Those that advocate surrender stress the very real likelihood of uprising of an enraged people against the masters, both political and industrial, who have so criminally betrayed and deceived them: the innocent will suffer with guilty and much blood will flow.

They
2-#3, June 16, 5 p.m. from (Paris) Bordeaux.

They also point to German vengeance which will be wreaked on France for continuance of the struggle from Africa and loss of the uncaptured fleet. They question the morale of a French evacuated army in Africa whose families are left to Nazi rule.

Those who urge removal of the Government to North Africa foresee that only thus can a free and independent France survive; that only thus can the symbol of a living France be maintained; that only thus can the French fleet be kept afloat for the democracies.

The decision will be taken tomorrow morning.

BIDDLE

EMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

(Paris)

Bordeaux

Dated June 16, 1940
Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

4, June 16, 1 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

The cabinet unanimously decided to ask for the terms of an armistice. They have asked the British in view of the agreement between the two Allies for their concurrence in this move. They expect to have the British answer tomorrow and this has just been confirmed to me by my British colleague.

Reynaud to whom I delivered your message at 7 and whom I saw again at midnight explained that only by such a move could he show the French people who have kept in utter ignorance of the real gravity of the military situation the severity of German terms and justify a flight of the Government "to Africa or England". ("I only hope they won't be too moderate" he said).

I feel, and the British, I find concur, that the dangers of this move and the shock to the morale of both
-2-#4, June 16, 1 a.m. from (Paris) Bordeaux.

the army and the people will far outweigh the political advantages. I believe furthermore that differences within the Government as to future policy may well endanger such plans as they may have for removal elsewhere. While Mandel and Campinchi favor continuance of the fight Petain and Weygand (who incredible as it may seem appear to feel that a real "negotiated" peace is possible) urge surrender.

(END OF SECTION ONE)
Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
4, June 16, 1 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

I have emphasized throughout my conversations with all the members of the Government with whom I have talked the vital importance of maintaining the freedom of the French fleet. I am relieved to say that tonight I learn that Reynaud obtained, after a real battle in which he threatened to resign, the approval of his Government not repeat not to surrender the fleet at any cost. Of this he, Mandel and Campinchi all assured me tonight.

I of course impressed upon them that to this end the maintenance of a free and untrammeled Government was essential; that without continuance of such a Government the American people might find their continuance of the material aid being rendered the Allies a contribution to democracy which was justified neither by ideal nor utility. This I said was clearly and pointedly brought out in your message of this afternoon.

(END OF MESSAGE)

EMB

BIDDE
GRAY
(Paris)
Bordeaux
Dated June 16, 1940
Rec'd 5:05 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
5, June 16, 2 a.m.

While I do not wish to appear alarmist I am convinced that the Department should immediately take under consideration the probable need for emergency evacuation from France to a nearby neutral port of Americans still remaining in this area. The problem may well (*) itself within a few hours or days and our warships now at Lisbon appear to offer the only feasible solution. It is of course a likelihood as I have pointed out of an early uprising and ensuing conditions of near chaos which compels me to urge you to give immediate consideration to this question.

I shall telegraph an estimate of the approximate number of Americans now in the Bordeaux and Biarritz regions and suggested evacuation points.

BIDDLE

EMB
(*) apparent omission
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (br)

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
6, June 16, 4 p.m.
My telegrams Nos. 3, June 15, 5 p.m. and 4, June 6, 1 a.m.

Differences of opinion continue within the Government. No decision was taken as to course of action at this morning's cabinet meeting pending receipt of the British reply which is expected to be delivered this afternoon. A further Council of Ministers is scheduled to begin at 5 this evening.

BIDDLE

WWM
Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

ll, June 16, midnight

Pétain and a peace cabinet have succeeded Reynaud.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

BIDDLE
HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

(Paris)
Bordeaux

Dated June 16, 1940
Rec'd 10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
11, June 16, midnight (SECTION TWO)

The latter sent for me at eleven tonight. He was calm and entirely himself again—a man relieved of an enormous weight but for the future of France. "I have remained faithful to my word" he said, and loyal to my policy of closest collaboration with Great Britain and the United States. I shall always remain convinced that such is the only policy. The majority felt the sacrifices France is being called to make are too great to continue. I have resigned and the President has appointed Marshal Petain in my place. I am profoundly grateful for what your President has done and I hope you will express my gratitude."

Petain will of course immediately seek an armistice by direct approach, Reynaud thinks to the enemy lines.

His collaborators are Vice President Chautemps (if he accepts); National Defense Weygand; War Colson: Foreign Affairs,
hsm -2- No. 11, June 16, midnight (Section 2) from Bordeaux

Affairs Baudoin; Justice, Laval; Interior, Marquet (Mayor of Bordeaux); Labor, Paul Faure (leader of the pacifist wing of the Socialist Party); Finance Boutill; Public Works, Frossard. The rest said Reynaud are "of no importance". The Ministry of Information (so called) has been abolished.

While it now belongs to history Reynaud referred in glowing terms to Churchill "reply" this afternoon. It was far-reaching in scope: it meant in reality a fusion of the two great empires. It might he said have marked the beginning of a United States of Europe. The chance has now been lost. (END MESSAGE)

BIDDLE

CSB
HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br.)

(Paris)
Bordeaux
Dated June 17, 1940
Rec'd 10:36 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
12, June 17, 2 a.m.
My telegram No. 11, June 16, midnight.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Baudoin sent for me at midnight to inform me that one hour before in the name of the Pétain Government he had requested the Spanish Government to ask the German Government on what terms it would grant an armistice. The communication to the Spanish Ambassador which he later read to me urged that the request be transmitted at the earliest possible moment and that the bombing of French cities might cease immediately.

In his expose of the reasons compelling his Government to take this grave step he said that the French army "is completely smashed"; that slaughter of further thousands must be stopped; that the fight was hopeless. If the terms of surrender received however are "unworthy of the honor or dignity of France" they will be made public and their unacceptability
unacceptability made manifest to the French people. This would give them courage to continue the "moral struggle"; the military battle was over. As to the fleet he assured me formally that it would never be surrendered to Germany: as guarantee Admiral Darlan whose views he said are well known on this subject had been named Minister of Marine. (His appointment to the post is I feel largely for the purpose of reassuring the British and ourselves. The Admiral's new government associates hardly inspire complete (*) that the French fleet will remain a bulwark against Nazi aggression.)

He concluded with repeated assurances of the cardinal policy and ardent desire of the new Government to continue the closest collaboration with the British and ourselves. "Nothing" he said in conclusion, "has changed"--a viewpoint with which many of the sons of France will take serious issue; they will agree with Reynaud's remark to me "The new Government will dare nothing".

BIDDLE

CSB
AS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (0)

(Dated November 12, 1940)
Rec'd 9 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

939, November 12, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE).

The informant mentioned in my telegram No.649, September 27, 2 p.m. called yesterday to tell me the true story of the de Brinon interview (my telegram 902, November 6, 4 p.m.) and German efforts to pin responsibility for France's entry into the war on the United States. Achenbach of the German Embassy at Paris has for some time been working on Daladier's private secretary Mademoiselle Mollet, along the line that Daladier was really, from the German point of view, a man of the best intentions; that the Germans did not hold him responsible for the war; that he was merely duped or misled by the United States and especially by Ambassador Bullitt. When sufficiently indoctrinated she was sent with the connivance of Laval to see Daladier at Chazeron to endeavor to persuade him to base his defense on and issue a statement as to false assurances of support.
support from the United States. Apparently Mademoiselle Mollet was motivated solely by a misguided desire to see her chief released from prison and had received intimations that such a statement would mean the end of the Riom trial as far as he was concerned. She was entirely unsuccessful in her efforts much to the relief of my informant and Daladier's attorney. During this period neither of the latter were permitted to leave the occupied territory to see the former Prime Minister. (I learn from Reynaud's daughter that Mademoiselle Mollet was also sent in vain to try to extract some compromising statement from Reynaud).

MATTHEWS

TFV
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

(Paris)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

939, November 12, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

When this game failed, the Germans through Achenbach told Daladier's lawyer that they must go through the papers which he had for the defense of his client; they would wait several days until Mademoiselle Mollet's return but he must promise in the interim not to touch them. This he finally agreed to do; the search revealed nothing satisfactory from the German point of view. It was then, said my informant, that they decided on the De Brinon interview frankly stating that they wanted to break something to influence our elections. From an American here who talked to De Brinon, I learn that the latter merely received a telephone call stating that he would receive the visit of an American newspaper correspondent and that he should give him an interview in the sense he did. Why the Germans happened to pick the I.N.S. correspondent at Paris for this particular propaganda job I do not know. This whole effort to influence the elections has
has been so clumsily handled and so apparent that it constitutes just one more example of German psychological stupidity. It is however of some interest as showing the importance which they attached to the defeat of the President. Laval's own action, obviously at German instigation, in the sense of a peace offensive (my telegram No. 911, November 7, 6 p.m.) and the obvious German hopes however unfounded that the President's defeat would make this more possible would seem to constitute further straws in the wind that they are not too happy at the prospect of a long war and our active material cooperation with the British--regardless of how often they say that our help will arrive too late to be effective. (END OF MESSAGE)
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

May 14, 1941.

In view of the unsatisfactory response from Marshal Pétain and General Huntziger to my message, what would you think of something along the following line:

For Leahy - Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Pétain in person if possible:

"The President has, as the Marshal well knows, an old and deep affection for him and understands the extreme pressure which is being exercised on the Marshal and his Government by the Germans.

The President feels, however, that insofar as the future of the world and the writing of history is concerned, the time is now at hand for decisions which should not be open to future misconstruction.

France is today operating under the terms of an Armistice and this Armistice agreed, in effect, that the French Colonial Empire would not be violated by the Germans.

This presupposed that it would be defended by Frenchmen in that Colonial Empire against all forms of attack from the outside.

This was in actual fact carried out at Dakar and elsewhere against attempted use of a portion of the Colonial Empire by British armed forces.

It is, in the judgment of the President, equally an matter of honor for Frenchmen to defend that Colonial Empire against any other form of attempted use or occupation by any other nation, including the German."
The President is thinking in terms not only of the present but of future history and he hopes that the Marshal can give him clear-cut assurance that the Marshal and the Government of France has ordered the Colonial Governments in Africa, in Asia Minor and in the Far East to show no discrimination toward the Germans by acquiescence in the use of French territory by the Germans.

The President feels that this would hearten the world, and that as a life-long friend of France and the French people he is entitled to an answer from his old friend the Marshal.

In presenting this to the Marshal, Leahy can say that the assurance from the Marshal that he will not "give any voluntary, active military aid to Germany" means absolutely nothing at all, and that it is no different from giving active military aid on the theory that there is a mental reservation as to the underlying motive. Whatever the underlying motive, the aid goes forward.

F. D. R.
June 17, 1941

My dear General Watson:

The American Ambassador at Vichy has received from a trusted friend and former assistant of M. Paul Reynaud, ex-Premier of France, copies of letters which M. Reynaud recently addressed to Marshal Petain from his prison at Vals.

M. Reynaud has requested that copies of these letters be handed to the President and translations of them are enclosed. In view of the reprisals that may be taken against M. Reynaud's person should it be known that he had caused these letters to leave France, his emissary earnestly requests that they be accorded the most confidential treatment.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosures:
Copies of letters in translation as stated above.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 14172
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972
[TRANSLATION]

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION  

Valéry, April 6, 1941.

Mr. Marshal,

It was already known that you imprisoned me for having refused, last June, to capitulate and conclude an armistice which I deemed incompatible with French honor and interest.

But that will not fail to cause surprise, is that after imprisoning me, seven months later you caused me to be assailed by all the national broadcasting stations, in connection with a polemic with General de Gaulle.

I should not even have thought that I ought to protest if this campaign, which, they say, you are going to give the support of your voice, were not based, in the part concerning me, on a series of allegations contrary to truth.

Here are a few examples.

1. It is inexact that it is the British Government which asked that we prosecute the war in North Africa. You know better than anyone, because you attended the meetings which were held every morning in my office, that this decision had been made by me. It flowed from the engagement contracted by the Allies of not abandoning each other, an engagement of which you knew when you entered my Government and which I have no knowledge of your having ever asked me to denounce.
2. It is inexact that Mr. Charles Reibel was an "eye witness" of anything whatever. He profited from culpable and, for the most part, capricious indiscretions.

3. It is inexact that General Weygand wrote to me, on May 29 and June 7, "more and more pressing letters" asking me to conclude an armistice.

He wrote to me, on the contrary, June 10, that he was "far from having lost all hope", and he stated, June 11, in the evening, at the Supreme Council at Briare at which you were present: "We are in the last quarter hour; there is no saying that we cannot win out in this last quarter hour."

Such a flagrant untruth on such an important point of the history of the war is grievous for the reputation of our country.

It is all the more inexplicable because I had written to you, on September 6, 1940, to point out to you that the national broadcasting [stations] had spread it for the first time. They drew the conclusion therefrom, at the time, that "if one had listened to Weygand, Italy would not have entered the war", which is false, since she declared war on June 10, and denotes, moreover, let it be said en passant, a singular lack of knowledge of the psychology of the Italian leaders. They would not have refrained from sharing in the spoils because we had asked for an armistice from Germany.
4. It is inexact that "the armistice spared French families the hence forth vain sacrifice of their children."

As soon as the [military] command declared that the fight had become purposeless, I proposed to stop it on the soil of metropolitan France, as it had been in the Netherlands, which would have spared us the losses suffered during the long periods which were necessary for the obtaining of the armistice. This would have been the case if I had not been obliged to yield the power, succumbing to the coalition composed of yourself, General Weygand, and the majority of the ministers to whom high military authorities stated: "In three weeks England will have her neck wrung like a chicken."

It is not, therefore, the government of which I was the head nor any of its members which can be accused of having thought that "French blood had not flowed enough."

That is a method of discussion unworthy even of a public meeting.

5. It is inexact to say that the armistice terms "would have been less onerous" if it had been asked for sooner.

When, on June 12 at Cangé, General Weygand asked to conclude an armistice, our armies had succumbed in the home country. Germany showed, and shows every day, that she intends to obtain the maximum results from her victory within the framework and without the framework of the armistice.
6. It is inexact that at the Supreme Council which was held June 11 (and not the 13), at Briare (and not at Tours), Mr. Winston Churchill refused any further assistance of the English air force.

He promised, on the contrary, to study the question as soon as he returned to London.

It is not less inexact that "for weeks, our soldiers had waited in vain for the English pursuit planes", for we received, at my daily instances, important assistance from the R.A.F. In the light of what has happened since, no one can reproach the prime minister for not having engaged in the battle of France the whole of an air force upon which, today, our chance of victory rests.

As for the relation of words exchanged at that Supreme Council, it constitutes a lack of diplomatic correctness. Not long since, France had deportment.

7. It is inexact that President Roosevelt replied "rather evasively" to the message that I had sent to him on June 14.

That is a failure to recognize the importance of his reply and the generosity that inspired it.

In his telegram of June 15, which I read to the Council of Ministers, the President of the United States reminded me that, in response to my appeal, the American Government had, in the course of past weeks, supplied us with airplanes, guns (75's) and munitions of all kinds. He gave me, furthermore,
the assurance that "as long as France continued the struggle, she could count on receiving war matériel and supplies in constantly increasing quantities."

That was to say that America would have been for us - as she has become for England - a non-belligerent ally.

Far from being "rather evasive", this message was, on the contrary, singularly courageous if we bear in mind the date when it was sent.

The judgment passed on it by the national broadcasting [system] is therefore unfair and can bring joy only to the enemies of France.

8. It is inexact that the offer of Franco-British union which was made to us, June 16, 1940, would have "reduced us to the rank of a dominion."

That offer contemplated the principle of a union which I was minded to accept, subject to discussing the modalities of it later. As for me, I prefer to collaborate with my allies rather than with the enemy.

9. It is inexact that the text of this agreement was "telephoned to me from London by General de Gaulle, at Mr. Churchill's dictation."

If it were true, moreover, who would be affronted thereby? General de Gaulle, a member of my government, had been sent by me on a mission to the British Prime Minister. As a matter of fact, General de Gaulle telephoned the text to me and Mr. Winston Churchill telephoned me afterward
to ask me my sentiment. What is there out of the way in all that?

But here is what is more perfidious: "A striking detail, at the other end of the wire, there was, as if by chance, at the side of the French Premier, one General Spears, the chairman of the Franco-British Committee."

Perfidious, in the first place, to me, who appeared as having been wanting in the dignity of my office. I pass that .......

But the attack on General Spears, who is one of the oldest and most faithful friends of France in the House of Commons and whom it is, at least, strange to treat as a suspect, is as unjustified as it is improper. He was regularly accredited to me, Minister of War, by Mr. Churchill, and he was calling on me that day, in company with his ambassador. His position was therefore, as always, perfectly correct.

I take the liberty of thinking that these old wives' tales are unworthy of a great country.

Nothing is more to be scorned and more contrary to the national interest than these insinuations and these constant attacks upon the leaders of a people whose heroism will assure our salvation.

We know only too well who can rejoice at them.

***

Fr. romans chez la portière - Tr.
All these inexactitudes, however regrettable and damaging they may be, are a small thing beside the affirmation that General de Gaulle had contributed no more than the late General Estienne with respect to the use of tanks. For there we touch upon the essential cause of our defeat. And there, again, I am on trial on the first count.

Do you believe that the people of France will never know that our high military authorities declared that a continuous front, extending from the North Sea to Switzerland, is invulnerable and that the enemy could only cause breaches in it that would be the more dangerous for him the deeper they were?

Do you believe that they will never know that General de Gaulle declared to the contrary, that an armored corps, the composition of which he defined, would be an instrument suited for breaking, at a point, that continuous front?

Do you believe that they will never know:

1. That on March 31, 1935, five years before the German offensive of May 1940, I introduced in the Chamber a counterplan establishing that armored corps?

2. That I announced that the German army would pass through Holland and Belgium, would subdue the Belgian army aside on the Albert Canal, and would attack our northern frontier, which the Higher War Council was refusing to fortify?

3. That we would be invaded by a German army com-
posed of armored divisions supported by combat airplanes if we did not have available an armored corps which alone could enable us to make a victorious counter offensive?

Do you believe that they will never know that my counter plan was rejected, in France, as "contrary to logic and history", but was adopted in Germany?

Do you believe that they will never know that for years, through lectures, books, addresses, newspaper articles, I incessantly called for the adoption of my counter plan?

Do you believe that they will never know that it was the German armored corps that broke out front on the Meuse, in May, 1940, then won the Battle of France and forced the French army out of its positions, preventing it, by its speed, from ever establishing other positions anywhere?

You know, better than any one else, because of the high authority that you exercised on the Higher War Council, of which you were a member, why my counter plan miscarried.

You know better than anyone else to what extent my counter plan was fought, since you offered to the public, just before the war, a book of your opinions, in which it could read, among so many other statements: "As to the tanks that were to bring us back to short war, their failure is striking."

***

To be sure, this is not the time to be starting this debate, when the enemy is in occupation of two-thirds of our
our territory.

But, while awaiting the truth, silence is better than lying, and modesty than provocation. That is what the instructors on the radio and in the newspapers should not forget.

The danger from the lies, the incessant calumnies and petty defamations that have been prevalent for eight months is that the truth is like a gas which explodes with the greater force the more it has been compressed.

I warn you solemnly, the reaction to this will be violent.

It will be dreadful for the country.

I tell you this because I know you to be capable of "dominating" the acclaim of official trips.

Not belonging to any political party, I have always spoken freely.

Seven years ago, I asked an administration of which you formed part to line up the franc with the pound sterling and the dollar, which had been devalued, warning it that that was the only way to avoid social and political disturbances dangerous to our safety.

For years I tried to open the eyes of the high military authorities and the Ministers who were their advocates before the Parliament to the deadly peril that threatened our country.

They
They refused to listen to me. France has paid [for this]. I ask nothing of you for myself.

We collaborated closely when I was in power and, if I refused to associate myself with your policy, I did everything to make your task easier when you succeeded me. I did so for the sake of the country. No one owes me any gratitude for it.

Your attitude towards me has been different.

You put me in prison, in close confinement, seven months ago.

In your name, the weekly publications of defamation were then told: "You see that man, behind bars. You can, if you wish, spit in his face as you pass by".

They did this boldly for months, with the approval of your censors. They even told likes in attempting to reach me. That does not matter in France nowadays.

You had a Keeper of the Seals who told the world, by an official statement, that he is "known by all Frenchmen". On the testimony of a slander sheet, and as if my whole life did not protest against this crack-brained insinuation, he declared that I had undeniably enriched myself dishonestly, since I had brought 50 million to an aircraft company. Now, I made that contribution, in my capacity as Minister of Finance, to a nationalized company! This would merely cause a smile if, strengthened by this certainty
certainty, that successor of Aguessseau had not attempted to justify, after the event, my internment and to dis-
credit the man of resistance by the lowest of political 
maneuvers, by getting you to sign a law just for the 
purpose of taking away the jurisdiction of a judge who 
refused to prosecute me and for that of bringing before 
the Court of Riom such an absurd accusation that it refused 
to legalize my internment. The last signs of his lack of 
balance are the things he is saying about you - which 
scandalize the Midi - who had for a moment drawn him from 
nothingness.

I do not have such a conception of public life. 

I have never thought of having those of my collaborators 
put in prison who, like you, did not share my opinion on 
the armistice. Instead of attempting to dishonor them, 
when I had the opportunity in the past (perhaps you will 
learn this, some day) of preserving the name of a certain 
one of them from any injury, I did so without his knowing it. 

* * *

Keep me in prison, if you see fit.

Our persons count for little.

It will be the [greatest] honor of my life to have 
suffered for having held the word of France very high and 
for not having been willing to diminish the chances of 
victory of the coalition of which she formed part.
But listen to the counsel of a Frenchman whom it would have been to his country's interest to listen to oftener.

Order that this people no longer be told that the word of France does not count, that it should have been broken, towards Poland, on September 3, 1939, that it should have been broken, towards England, on June 16, 1940.

Having lost "everything but honor", what would be left to our people if honor were taken away from it?

Order that our youth no longer be given the ideal of collaborating with an enemy who is annexing Alsace and Lorraine in contempt of the armistice and whose banners are floating over Paris, for we cannot straighten our backs and bend them at the same time.

Order that the stoic people, our ally, on whom our salvation depends, no longer be defamed.

There can be no greater peril for a nation than to see its soul degraded.

Return to what is, surely, at the bottom of your heart as a Frenchman.

Please accept, etc.

PAUL REYNAUD.
Confidential communication.

Val., April 23, 1941.

Marshal:

I regret having to write to you again.

I hope that this letter will be the last one.

The national broadcasts declare (they have just repeated it) that we are responsible for the war, into which England plunged us with the aid of the Jews and the Freemasons. You know, as do all Frenchmen, that that is a historic lie. Those who disseminate it in your name doubtless believe that they are serving the country. History will relate, I believe, that this campaign conducted prior to the treaty of peace constitutes a crime against our native land. But that does not concern me any more than other Frenchmen.

What do concern me are the calumnies which the radio continues to broadcast about me. They tend to cause me to believe that my letter of April 5th was not handed to you, the receipt of which, in violation of an old French tradition, has not been acknowledged to me.

Of these new calumnies, I will speak of only one.

With regard to the request for an armistice made on June 12th, at the first cabinet meeting at Cangé [Cangey?] by General Weygand, after a pathetic picture of
of the sufferings of our army, the radio brought yesterday
the following statement:

"Reynaud, a doile tool in the hands of Churchill,
thought that it was not useless to sacrifice thousands
of French lives in order to allow the English to re-embark
and to destroy their matériel."

In form, that is Fardonnet. Let us pass over that.

In substance, that is one of the gravest accusations
that can be directed against the former head of a French
government.

You know that it is false.

You know that, far from being willing to sacrifice
French lives uselessly while awaiting for the long
periods (a week, in fact) required for the conclusion
of an armistice, I proposed, on the contrary, a surrender
similar to that of the Dutch army and the continuation
of the combat beside our allies, at sea and in our Empire.

You know that, on the first point, I had convinced
you, since at the cabinet meeting held on June 15th at
Bordeaux you left the council chamber, at my request,
to go to General Weygand and try to convince him, and
that you failed, which would have led me to relieve him
of his command if, at that same meeting, the cabinet had
not declared itself for the principle of the armistice.

You know, from having been present at the meetings
of the Supreme Council held in France, that, far from
having
having been "a docile tool in the hands of Mr. Churchill", I was, on the contrary, a loyal but exacting ally.

You know, for you were there, how, at the Supreme Council meeting held at Paris on May 31, 1940, I got the English to embark from then on, at Dunkirk, a larger proportion of French soldiers, "the English troops remaining in the rear guard as much as possible".

You know the telegram, the text of which was recently given by the French radio, that I sent to Mr. Winston Churchill on May 24th, when the English army abandoned its movement toward the South, in the direction of the Somme, for reasons to which History alone will be able to apply an impartial judgment. It would have been more fitting, besides, to give Mr. Churchill's reply also.

You know, for you were there, that at the meeting of the Supreme Council held at Briare on June 11th and 12th, I spoke to our allies with a rough frankness, since the radio recently had the impropriety, moreover, to reproduce one of the speeches which I made there.

You know that Mr. Churchill having asked of me on June 12th that the French Government could not make any decision without having heard him, the Cabinet asked me to request him to come the next day. Foreseeing the danger of a break between France and England in case the request for an armistice supported by you and General Weygand should gain
gain a majority in the Cabinet and should lead to my resignation, I called to mind the saying of the Due d'Aumale: "France was left." I presented to Mr. Churchill, Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook, who had come to Tours, such a picture of the sufferings of France and the services rendered to the coalition by her that Mr. Churchill, with tears in his eyes, gave me his promise that if France asked for an armistice some day and if England were victorious, France would be restored "in her power and her dignity." This promise was repeated by him several times after that. After that interview, I again went to combat the armistice with all my strength at the second meeting of the Cabinet, held at Cangey[?]. It was not due to me that France was the only one of the eight countries at war against Germany that capitulated, although she had the second navy in Europe and the second colonial empire in the world.

In acting thus, did I show myself "a docile tool in the hands of Churchill?" The truth is that, contrary to the repeated affirmations of the radio, Mr. Winston Churchill did not have to ask me not to conclude an armistice, because he knew that I was against it and that, as long as I should be head of the French government, it would not be asked for.
You know that, a few days after my resignation, I telegraphed to him, in my own name, to ask him not to continue a public polemic against you which could only delight the enemy.

You know all that, and yet the despicable work of which I have spoken is being carried on under cover of your name.

If I am writing to you about this, it is because I believe this work detrimental to the country.

But if you were informed of this you would think also, as I do, that to have your predecessor calumniated publicly is not in keeping with French traditions.

I simply wish to say, in closing, that when I was at the head of the government, the national broadcasting system was employed for other purposes than daily inciting Frenchmen to hate each other.

Please accept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAUL REYNAUD

Tr:JWP:H3F
June 17, 1941

Strictly confidential

My dear General Watson:

The American Ambassador at Vichy has received from a trusted friend and former assistant of M. Paul Reynaud, ex-Premier of France, copies of letters which M. Reynaud recently addressed to Marshal Pétain from his prison at Vals.

M. Reynaud has requested that copies of these letters be handed to the President and translations of them are enclosed. In view of the reprisals that may be taken against M. Reynaud's person should it be known that he had caused these letters to leave France, his emissary earnestly requests that they be accorded the most confidential treatment.

Sincerely yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosures:
Copies of letters in translation as stated above.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
August 1, 1941

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

My dear General Watson:

With reference to my letter of June 17, 1941, I enclose a copy in translation of a further communication addressed to Marshal Petain by Monsieur Reynaud from his prison at Vals.

Upon delivering copies of this letter to the Embassy Monsieur Reynaud's emissary again earnestly requested that the most confidential treatment be accorded these letters since were it known that Monsieur Reynaud had caused these copies to leave France, serious reprisals might be taken against him.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Copy of letter in translation, as stated above.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
[TRANSLATION]

Confidential communication.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 232 of June 19, 1941 from the Embassy at Vichy.

Vals, May 18, 1941.

Mr. Marshal:

A year ago I assumed the responsibility of asking you to enter my government.

When I resigned my office I assumed the responsibility of advising the President of the Republic to designate you as my successor.

If it were true that after having concluded an armistice with the enemy, in violation of your pledged word, you were preparing now to reverse our foreign policy without consulting the people of France, which has constantly approved it, without any citizen having the right to express an opinion, as if they were a nation of helots;

If it were true that your policy has the effect of striking in the back our ally who, left alone in the combat, is fighting heroically in Egypt, in Ethiopia, in Irak, on the Mediterranean, over England, on the Atlantic, 750,000 of whose sons fell in the last war while defending the soil of France, and only whose victory can give us back our lost independence;

If
If it were true that it [your policy] is breaking the precious friendship which, for a century and a half, joined France to the greatest people in the world, whose ideal is ours;

If it were true that it should have for its inevitable consequence the enslavement of France, thus, isolated, to a people whose ideal and faith are violently opposed to ours, even though the war is not finished and even though, after a hundred days of trials, the final victory of the allies will appear in the distance;

If it were true that you contemplated making a Brest-Litovsk peace;

If that were true, I should not deny the responsibilities that I assumed, but I should beg the forgiveness of France for having done so.

Please accept, ... 

PAUL REYNAUD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

RS

(Paris)

Vichy

Dated August 1, 1941
Rec'd 4:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

970, August 1, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

Department's telegram 612, July 31, noon.

I discussed this morning with Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan together French policy in Indochina and set forth to them the views contained in the telegram under reference. Darlan was much annoyed. When he first told us of the Japanese plans with respect to Indochina (my telegram 888, July 16, 5 p.m.), he said, he had hoped we would act immediately but we did nothing. He had hoped that a squadron of our ships from Manila would steam into Saigon harbor and anchor. Such action he believed would have prevented further Japanese pressure and he would have been glad to have given authorization for such a visit of our ships had we so asked. He could not of course, he said, give us any such indication at that time. He further "resented bitterly" our present criticism of French policy when we ourselves have done nothing to restrain the Japanese even though it is to our interest. "It is always the same
same story" he went on, "the United States is too late. When we asked for help last year, first in July and then at the time of the Thailand aggression, we got none. Without any direct evidence in support thereof it is my opinion that a decision had been made to admit Japan to French Indochina before Admiral Darlan on June 16 informed me of the demand.

LEAHY
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

When we tried to rearm to defend our Colony it was the British who stopped us. We were faced in the light of these Japanese demands with three possible solutions: One, to fight. We could not, because we are at the end of our resources and have no means of fighting after Syria. Secondly, merely to accept the Japanese demands. This I did not wish to do as it would have put us in the Axis. Third, to adopt the formula which we have of common defense of the Empire. The Japanese have for the past year treated us with perfect correctness and have now agreed to recognize our sovereignty over the Colony. This is in marked contrast to the British whose sole aim, as has been amply demonstrated in Equatorial Africa, in New Caledonia and in Syria, is to take parts of the French Empire. They talk about giving the Syrians liberty, but there are difficulties in their way and already
already we hear reports of an impending revolt there against them. They do not recognize our sovereignty when they take our territory and as to Indochina, if they had gone there, they would not give it back."

LEAHY

ALC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy
Dated August 1, 1941
Rec'd 7:01 a.m.; 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I pointed out to the Marshal, (who gave no indication of his feelings other than an occasional nod during Darlan's at times bitter denunciation of the British) the existence of the danger of an attack against the United States territory launched from Indochinese bases should the situation grow worse. He admitted that but said that France is helpless and that he himself "is not a free agent," occupied as the country is. To my inquiry as to whether he thought the Japanese would keep their promise to respect French sovereignty in Indochina, the Marshal replied, "We had to take a chance on that." Darlan added, "I do not know. But Churchill promised on June 12, 1940, and the Marshal heard him, that if we had to seek an armistice he would understand our position and his friendship toward France would undergo no change. The sequel of this was Mers-El-Kébir. At least
970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Vichy.

least there is a possibility of saving something for France in Indochina, whereas to fight, without outside help, would have meant the certain loss of the colony."

LEAHY

PEG
KD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy
Dated August 1, 1941
Rec’d. 7:22 a.m., 2d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I asked them if they had no fears that when the Russian campaign has progressed further the Germans may turn toward Africa. Darlan replied, "Everyone is interested in Africa ourselves, the German, the British and the United States. But as I have told the Marshal for the past year, it will be the Germans who will get there first. They can close the Straits and land in Spanish Morocco. We have means of defending ourselves against a landing from the sea but we cannot prevent, with our lack of equipment, a land operation from the Spanish Zone. My son has just returned from Spain and counted 120 batteries of artillery directed against Gibraltar and they did not look to him like Spanish guns. It would be simple enough for the Germans to take a force across to Morocco, but they are not interested themselves in that area. What they fear is a British, American or Gaullist move. They did not even send a control commission to Africa until the
Édouard de Gaulle radio started up their fears that the area might fall into the enemy's hands.

LEAHY.

ALC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated August 1, 1941
Rec'd. 6:46 a.m., 2d

970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION 5)

The Marshal then stated, glancing at a paper which had been prepared for him, that he understands our press is becoming very critical of France and that it is urging either an American or British attack on Dakar, or a Gaullist move "so that France could not say the Colony was being taken from her." "That," said the Marshal, "we cannot, of course, accept."

As to the Russian campaign about which they talked later, the Admiral said that we must recognize that Germany has rendered a great service to Europe; that the Russian Army has proved much stronger than anyone, including the Germans had thought, both as to quantities of material and the qualities of its General Staff. That Army would have swept over the entire Europe had the Germans not attacked them and one only had to look at the faces of Russian soldiers to guess what would be left of the Continent. Russian losses were
-2- #970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO), from (Paris).

were terrific and the German soldiers are worn out
shooting down the masses of men thrown against them.

LEAHY.

ALC
LET
This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be­
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy
Dated August 1, 1941
Rec'd. 7:33 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

970, August 1, 4 p.m. (SECTION SIX)
The Germans would not tell him, he said, the figures
of their losses but admitted that both in planes and
manpower they were "high". Furthermore, their pro­
gress was slow! They had told him they would finish
in three weeks and they had not done so. Now, how­
ever, they were through the strongest areas of Russian
defence and everyone knows that the Russian engineers
are the best in the world for building defence works.
From now on German progress should be quicker. "There
will, however, be famine for Europe and the plague is
already breaking out," the Marshal interjected.

Turning once more to the United States and com­
plaining that we are quite ready with criticism but
slow in action, Darlan said: "When you have three
thousand tanks, six thousand planes and five hundred
thousand men to bring to Marseilles, let me know.
Then we shall welcome you. But neither side can win
the war and Europe will be exhausted. It is to your
interest, as well as to ours, that there be an early
peace".

Repeated to Algiers. (END OF MESSAGE)

HPD          LEAHY
My dear Mr. President:

I am bringing this telegram from Murphy in Algiers to your personal attention since I believe you will find it as satisfactory as it can be, granted present conditions.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
Telegram 428,
Algiers

The President,

The White House.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.  (SC)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

428, August 24, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE).

Your 219, August 18, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY FROM MURPHY.

Weygand was pleased over the suggestion that General Requin would be acceptable, should the French Government indicate that it wished to make a change in mission. He said he would urge the Marshal and Darlan to make this change as soon as possible. He also said that he had suggested the replacement of Henri-Hay by Charles Roux during his visit to Vichy last June stating to the Marshal and Darlan that it would be better to have no representation in Washington rather than the present one. Furthermore, he considers Charles Roux, who resigned as Secretary General of the Foreign Office rather than accept Laval's policy of collaboration, the best qualified French diplomat today. Darlan, however, states that Charles Roux's nomination
-2- No. 428, August 24, 1941, 10 a.m. (Soc. I) from Algiers.

nomination would be impossible; that it would cause an open rupture with the Germans who "he knew" would be violently opposed.

COLE.

HTM
PM
This telegram must be

closely paraphrased be-

fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated August 24, 1941.

Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

428, August 24, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

Weygand said he did not know whether the French
Government could persuade the Germans that Requin
would be satisfactory.

General Weygand, you know, follows American
policy as closely as he can. He is, of course,
exceedingly interested in the future of our relations
with the German Government and what effect any change
of those relations might have on Franco-American
relations. I am convinced that he has long since
made up his mind that the American card is the one
to play. During the course of our last conversation
he inquired again whether there might be a possibility
of the United States assuming the role of a belligerent
in the war with Germany. I replied that I had no
further news on this subject other than the President's
public statements, but that I often wondered whether
relations between the United States and Germany might
be broken off.

COLE.

HTM
PM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

428.
August 24, 10 a.m. (SECTION THREE).
I asked the General if by chance that would happen whether in his personal and unofficial opinion Admiral Darlan would seize that opportunity or have the authority to effect the rupture of relations between the French Government and mine. He pondered the question for a long moment, then replied that "Admiral Darlan has evolved a great deal lately in respect of the United States." He would not say more. I hope to refer again to the question.

Repeated to Vichy.

(END OF MESSAGE).

COLE.

WWC
August 25, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am bringing this telegram from Murphy in Algiers to your personal attention since I believe you will find it as satisfactory as it can be, granted present conditions.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.
Telegram 428,
Algiers

The President,
The White House.
PRIME MINISTER

St. Pierre Miquelon.

1. On December 16th we had a telegram from the Foreign Office in which, after setting out the prospects of successful action in the Islands, they say:

"We are therefore informing the Free French Headquarters that we see no objection to their undertaking this operation."

In the same telegram they asked me to be sure that this action did not embarrass the United States Government and to give time for this said that they were asking de Gaulle to postpone the issue of orders for 36 hours.

2. The matter was put to the State Department the same day who referred it to the President, who said that he was strongly opposed to the suggested action.

3. On the 17th December, the Foreign Office telegraphed to say that the President's view had been reported to de Gaulle who agreed that the proposed action should not now be undertaken.

-1-
4. A telegram from the Foreign Office on December 19th said that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff nothing short of the occupation of the Islands "would be satisfactory from Military point of view. This course however now seems to be ruled out by United States attitude."

5. We received this morning a message despatched from the Admiralty to the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, as follows: -

"Following has been received from Admiral Muselier. BEGINS:

"I have the honour to inform you that in compliance with order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and request of inhabitants I have proceeded this morning to Island Saint Pierre and rallied people to Free France and Allied cause with enthusiastic reception. ENDS.

"2. Please inform His Majesty's Ambassador urgently. This action has come as a complete surprise to us."

6. From this it appears quite clear:
(a) that the Foreign Office knew and approved the general authority given to the Free French headquarters
to try their luck with the islands, but that
(b) they held up the operation while the United
States Government were being consulted, and that
(c) on receipt of information about the President's
feeling they secured de Gaulle's agreement that the
operation should not now be undertaken, and that
finally
(d) Messier has gone off on his own with or
without de Gaulle's knowledge and assent.

7. An alternative plan to ensure control of the
wireless station at St. Pierre has been under discussion
between the Canadian and the United States Governments for
some weeks. On December 16th Mr. Welles said that he
hoped the Canadian Government would give immediate effect
of
to this plan, which involved the use/force if the
Administrator of the islands did not agree to Canadian
supervision of the station.

Our Chiefs of Staff in London commented on this
as set out in paragraph 4 above.

8. Since dictating the above I have just seen F.O.
telegram 7243 (Flag "A"), which tells the complete story,
and seems to place the blame very squarely on de Gaulle,
who I see has issued a congratulatory telegram in London
to Admiral Muselier and announced that a plebiscite is being held to-day.

9. I attach a note (Flag "B") giving all the information in possession of the F.O. on the agreement between the United States Government and Admiral Robert.

10. I am seeing Hull at six o'clock, and will let you know if anything of importance emerges.

As our information was complete on both points you raised I did not think it necessary to telephone to the F.O.

H.

25th December, 1941
COPY

No: 7243
Dec. 25, 1941. FROM: MR. EDEN.
TO: VISCOUNT HALIFAX.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 7243 of December 25th, repeated to Ottawa No. 2256.
My telegram No. 7008.

Admiralty received a telegram from Admiral Muselier dated December 24th in which he stated that "in compliance with the order quite recently received from General de Gaulle and the request of the inhabitants" he had proceeded on the morning of December 24th to St. Pierre and rallied the people to Free France and the Allied Cause with an enthusiastic reception.

2. This was a complete surprise to us since General de Gaulle had authorized an assurance to be given to us on December 17th that no orders for the operation had been issued and that it would not be carried out by the Free French Naval forces. You were informed accordingly in my telegram under reference.

3. Free French Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was at once summoned to the Foreign Office and asked for an explanation. He admitted General de Gaulle had in fact
given orders for the operation to be effected. His reason for doing so had been that when he gave the assurance mentioned in the second paragraph above he did not know the Canadian Government intended with the approval of the United States Government to send certain personnel to St. Pierre in order to secure control of the wireless station by peaceful means and if this failed by force. On learning this General de Gaulle had addressed a letter to the Foreign Secretary in which he protested against such a decision being taken without consultation with him and had declared the National Committee would lose its reasons for Existence if it agreed to forceful action being taken by the Allied forces on French Territory. General de Gaulle had asked that his views should be brought to the notice of the Canadian Government. This was done by telegram on December 24th. Free French Delegation in the United States had been already instructed to inform the State Department. A summary of this letter went to you in my telegram No. 7216.

4. It was pointed out to Mons. Dejean that General de Gaulle in his letter had not withdrawn his
assurance of December 17th which His Majesty's Government had conveyed to Washington and Ottawa. H.M. Government were now placed in an embarrassing position and they would have to inform the Canadian and United States Government that General de Gaulle had without consulting them decided to cancel the assurance which he had given in a matter affecting American Defence Zone. Mons. Dejean admitted that this was correct.

Please inform the United States Government of above and also the Prime Minister.
United States Government made an agreement
with Admiral Robert in August 1940 under which
Robert gave assurances about French warships,
etc., in return for United States Government
assurances about finance and essential supplies
for Martinique and Guadeloupe.

This agreement was renewed on December 15th,
1941, but we have never been shown the text. So
far as we have been informed, the agreement was not
concerned with St. Pierre and Miquelon.
January 8, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

After giving careful consideration to all of the circumstances in connection with the St. Pierre Miquelon situation and with a view to arriving at an acceptable solution I have drafted the enclosed suggested telegram to Admiral Leahy setting forth a formula for the settlement of the matter. My suggestion would be that before sending this telegram in the event you approve it the telegram be submitted to the British and Canadian Governments for their concurrence.

Without specifically stating so this would amount to a trusteeship. It seems to me advisable to steer away from any specific statement implying a trusteeship, or an administration by the three Governments for the reason that we are likely to run counter to provisions in the Habana Convention which as you know provides for the administration of regions of this hemisphere under certain circumstances by the American Republics. I do not

The President

The White House.
not think that we should give the other Republics occasion to feel that we are circumventing the Convention through the establishment by the United States, Great Britain and Canada of an administration of the Islands.

On the question of bringing about the removal of DeGaulle's forces from the Islands I am sure that you have in mind our commitments to Vichy and Admiral Robert on which they have been and are now counting and to which they have referred. In your message of December 13 to Marshal Petain which Admiral Leahy transmitted textually to Marshal Petain you stated that

"You may rest assured that the Government of the United States under present circumstances and in view of the instructions which you have issued to Admiral Robert will continue to give full recognition to the agreement reached by our two governments involving the maintenance of the status quo of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere."

Moreover in the letter which you handed to Mr. Mathews for transmission to Marshal Petain you stated

"I again repeat that as long as French sovereign control remains in reality purely French, subject solely to the limitations of the Armistice Agreement, the Government of the United States has no desire to see existing French sovereignty over French North Africa or over any of French colonies pass to the control of any other nation."

Admiral Robert has already referred in connection with
with the St. Pierre Miquelon incident to your communication of December 13 and has stated that he regards this Government "as obligated to obtain the reestablishment of French sovereignty over St. Pierre Miquelon".

We have already discussed the application of the Habana Convention to this situation and I do not need to go into that here. I am confident, however, that the American Republics are watching the matter and will not be loathe to view our action with circumspection.

If the proposed telegram meets with your approval I shall at once take it up with the British and Canadian Governments.

 Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
January 8, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY

VICHY (FRANCE).

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Your 15, January 5, 7 p.m.

In consultation with the British and Canadian Governments, we have given very careful study and consideration to the situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre-Miquelon, which was accomplished without the consent or knowledge of any of these three Governments. With a view to reaching a solution satisfactory to the governments concerned, and with the concurrence of the British and Canadian Governments, we have worked out the following formula:

QUOTE Suggested arrangement with regard to St. Pierre-Miquelon:

1. The islands are French and will remain French.

2. To avoid any potential threat to the shipping of the Governments concerned, the use of the wireless stations on the islands will be subject to supervision.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19
and control by observers appointed by the American and Canadian Governments and attached to their respective consulates.

3. The islands shall be neutralized and demilitarized and shall be considered out of the war.

4. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn for the period of the war; the appointment of an Administrator shall be withheld for the same period, and the administration of the islands shall be left in the hands of the Consultative Council.

5. All armed forces will be withdrawn.

6. The Canadian and American Governments agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands and the respective consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the nature of the assistance to be given.

UNQUOTE
This formula is in conformity with the commitments given by this Government.

We fully realize the concern and anxiety of the French Government in maintaining the integrity of its colonial
Department of State

Washington,

-3-

possession. We feel that the formula submitted, with its guarantee that the islands shall remain French, and with the undertaking to continue economic assistance to St. Pierre and Miquelon, will fully safeguard the French Government's concern about these islands during the war.

You should see Marshall Petain at the earliest possible moment and impress upon him the importance of reaching a solution along these lines which maintains the purely French tradition of these islands for the future. You may, in your discretion, point out that time is of the essence, since the longer the matter remains in its present status the more likely it is to become crystallized and the more difficult it will be to bring about a satisfactory solution.

We have shown this telegram to the Canadian and British Governments and it has their full concurrence.

Until we receive an expression of opinion from the French Government regarding this formula, the matter will not be discussed with Admiral Robert or the French Ambassador.

S:CH: PA/D Le Eu

Enciphered by ________________________

Sent by operator _________________ M., _______________ 19 ____________________

CH
Retired for preservation. There is a copytron copy of this document in the open file.
VICHY AFRICA SAID TO PIN HOPES ON US

Free French Believe 'Token Force' Could Win North and West Colonies to Allies

GROUND HELD PREPARED

Our Mission at Brazzaville Cited—Officers Say Move Would Hasten War's End

By A. C. SEDGWICK

 Witness to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 9 (Delayed) — The course that French North Africa and French West Africa will take at the crucial moment of decision, believed here soon to arrive, will not be determined either by Britain or the Free French—that is, if bloodshed and the ensuing complications are to be avoided—but by the United States alone, it is said here.

This is the opinion of a number of high ranking French officers who profess familiarity with the conditions of thought at present prevailing in the French African possessions, particularly among the army chiefs there. It is held certain that an American token force that need not exceed two battalions, acting, so to speak, as ambassadors could win over the vitally needed African territory by hardly more than their mere presence.

The lesson was learned in the Syrian campaign, it is stated, from which the Allies should profit. Bitterness was and still is fairly characteristic of the attitude of many Frenchmen toward the British and more particularly toward the de Gaulle elements while no feelings except those of friendliness exist to any appreciable extent toward the United States.

The bonds of former friendship between France and the New World power are unimpaired by historical or present jealousies which, it is said, makes France psychologically prepared to accede to American demands.

It is also pointed out that Vichy would be able to offer no excuse for non-resistance on the grounds that it was impossible to take on a third enemy and that Germany would have no other course than to be satisfied.

The need for what is described as "polite aggressiveness and tactical firmness" is felt urgent. It is believed that advantage could be taken of the now well-advanced preparations of Free French Equatorial Africa which, for several months, have been largely under the supervision of an American mission at Brazzaville.

Clearing up Africa, it is argued, is perhaps the swift means of bringing the war to an end. Without danger of possible attack from that quarter the Eighth Army, supplemented by the Ninth, would effectively hinder any new scheme that Reichsfuehrer Hitler might entertain for spreading his power to the Mediterranean, Ruse and the Middle East and thereby deprive him of Caucasian oil and the almost equally needed stocks of wool, cotton, mohair and leather.

That Herr Hitler is planning some new aggression in this part of the world appears to be indicated by reliable reports of new air commands being established in Bulgaria as well as in Southern Italy. Recently there has been a large increase of supplies sent to Greece and Bulgaria.
DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTED
BY GENERAL DE GAULLE.

1. The islands are French and will remain French.

2. The present Administrator shall be withdrawn; the Administration of the islands shall be exercised by the Consultative Council.

3. The above-mentioned Council will agree to the appointment of Canadian and United States' officials to assist them in the operation of the wireless stations on the islands in the common interest of the Allies.

4. The Free French National Committee inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that they never intended that ships of the Free French Naval forces should remain in the islands, and that these ships will shortly resume their normal duties of attacking the enemy wherever they may find him.

5. The Canadian and American Government agree and undertake to continue economic assistance to the inhabitants of the islands, and the respective Consuls of those countries will confer with the local authorities as to the
nature of the assistance to be given. Arrangements are being made both to continue the supplies from the United States and Canada on which the islands are dependent, and to provide the seasonal supply of fish to the French inhabitants of Martinique.
General de Gaulle would agree to the draft Communiqué on the understanding (which would not be mentioned in the Communiqué) that all parties agree:-

1. That the Free French Administrator will remain but will be merged in the Consultative Council.

2. That the Marines remain. (This is return to the pre-Armistice status quo; the islands must have some defence against the enemy.)

3. The Council will be under the orders of the National Committee.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Let me call your attention to the attached telegram No. 1099, of July 28, 5 p.m., from our Charge d'Affaires in Vichy, Mr. Tuck. This telegram refers to the telegram from Bern which reported, among other things, that Darlan was inclined to favor giving some French submarines to Germany to be operated by the German naval forces.

In accordance with your suggestion, a telegram was sent to Tuck last night asking if he would endeavor to ascertain from friendly sources in Vichy Darlan's attitude toward turning over French submarines to the Germans. The attached telegram is, of course, not a reply to our telegram of last night, but is a voluntary report from Tuck of his comment on the Bern telegram.

Enclosure:
Telegram No. 1099, of July 28, 5 p.m., from Vichy.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1099, July 28, 5 p.m.
Bern's 3431, July 25, 11 a.m.

We have endeavored thus far without success to obtain confirmation of the visit of a German Naval Commission to Toulon on July 14. Both the military and Naval Attaches have been given categorical denials of this information by reliable official contacts. While it is always possible (since presumably it would have been undertaken with greatest secrecy) that such a visit may have occurred unknown to our informants, it does not seem likely that it could have been carried out without the knowledge of some of our reliable sources of information. The statement attributed to the informant mentioned in Bern's telegram that "France now has 106 submarines" does not coincide with our best information which indicates that the French have only about half this number. We shall continue, however, to follow this closely.

In so far as Darlan is concerned, a member of his staff states that while he is still as anti-British as ever,
ever, he is nevertheless smarting from the fact that the Germans aided Laval in ousting him and that his vindicative nature has aroused in him an intense anti-German reaction. We are told by reliable officials, who classify him as a "mental eunuch", that he is still as ambitious as ever and that while he therefore might not be averse to playing the German game if convinced that the Nazis are winning, he is content for the present not to be mixed up in the political jockeying now occurring. He is reported in fact to be deriving considerable pleasure from Laval's present difficulties.

While I have not seen him personally for some time if the reaction of his subordinates is correct, it would appear that he does not wish for the moment at least to have trouble with United States or to be considered anti-American. A possible straw in the wind is the fact that when I sent him a translation of the Navy Department's communique on the Midway battle, he replied with a most cordial note in which he "rendered the homage which is due to the tenacity and the brilliant courage of the American aviators".

Repeated to Bern.

TUCK

LMS
Retired for preservation. There is a copytron copy of this document in the open file.
For Ensign Berry:

Following message from Admiral Stark to Secretary of the Navy should be shown to the President. Admiral Leahy asks that he be advised as to the President's wishes. Message follows:

"Reference Admiral Leahy message 252035 General DeGaulle informed me personally of his plan to visit Washington after my 241656 was sent. General has requested that arrangements be made for travel for himself and four associates to permit arrival Washington before December 10th. Ambassador Wiant informs me DeGaulle's visit will be on his own initiative and not by invitation of the President. Despatches from French Delegation Washington indicated that President and Assistant Secretary of State Welles expressed desire or willingness to see DeGaulle of sufficient warmth to constitute invitation. Wiant has requested censorship on any announcement of an invitation. DeGaulle will be accompanied by Colonel Lombard, former French military attache Washington, by two aides, and by a military leader possibly General Catroux. Arrangements can be made for passage in fast transport about December 1st. Alternative would be departure by clipper via southern route about same date. This would indicate arrival USA about 6th December. Is this satisfactory? General DeGaulle in visit to me yesterday
extended personal greetings to President Roosevelt, members of Cabinet and military and naval chiefs of staff on occasion of Thanksgiving. He expressed great appreciation for American war effort and stressed that fundamental unity of purpose of French and Americas must not be confused by irritations resulting from differences as to method and strategy. Winant joined me in preparing this message and asks that it be shown the President and would appreciate Mr. Hull's seeing."

For instance — The President says that General de Gaulle came to Washington about Dec 6. — The President will be very glad to see him. The President of France arrives to stay at the White House Dec 8. — That a visit from General de Gaulle can be swiftly accomplished. Very urgent.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached are the papers on equipment for French divisions which are returned for your file. I will keep in close touch with this situation.

Chief of Staff.
October 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

When I saw Bedle Smith the other day I raised the question of sending further equipment to fit out the new French divisions. Just as a matter of interest, I dictated the enclosed to the Prime Minister on September seventh last but did not send it.

I think a showdown will come soon but it is a matter which, in a sense, relates a good deal more to Eisenhower than to Bob Murphy.

I hope you will keep in close touch with the situation.

Please return enclosures for my files.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

W.S.C.

Please read and speak to me about this. I have very distinct feelings that we should not send further equipment or munitions to the French Army in North Africa if our prima donna is to seize control of it from the old gentleman.

F.D.R.
The following is a telegram from Mr. Murphy in Algiers to the State Department, dated September 3, 1943.

De Gaulle has raised the issue regarding the control by the Committee over military affairs, following recognition by the Allied Governments and the ensuing clarification of the Committee's position. He has sent to Giraud a very confidential memorandum asking the latter to approve a more clearly defined control of the Committee over the CINC and military activities and the limitation of military power to operations against the enemy and armed force organization. Continuing, the memorandum states that the powers exercised by the CINC in accordance with French law establishing a "state of siege" should be turned over to the responsible civil administrators and that the Committee should control all secret services, amalgated under one direction.

It is requested that the existence of the memorandum in question not be divulged as it was reported to me in the greatest secrecy.

Further along this line, the possibility of having only one President of the Committee, which in this case would be De Gaulle, and the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested. With respect to military authority, the divergence is being further emphasized by the insistence of Giraud that alone, he has the authority to speak for the army, and that in his personal capacity the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him.

The authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated and the question of the organization and control of resistance movements have been brought to the fore in the discussions of the Committee. The extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have, it seems clear, decided that the time has come
to make a further effort to lessen Giraud's power as the CINC as well as to strengthen De Gaulle's own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the Committee. The discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the Committee meetings have led to no solution as yet, it is understood.

Whatever solution is reached, the moderate element of the Committee insist, the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is the basis of its recognition by the Allied Governments.

The fear is beginning to be expressed as discussions of this nature continue, that unless the Committee is able to rid themselves of the personal differences and devote more attention to the prosecution of the war the French people when liberated will have lost respect for the Committee, and the Committee itself will lose the possibility of speaking for them when the time comes. However, it is likely, the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters until the French Army is able to participate more actively in the prosecution of the war.