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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 7, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith No. 9 in the series of secret documents which we have received from Germany. The figures should probably be studied and analyzed by agricultural experts. With that idea in mind I am informally furnishing a copy of this document to the Department of Agriculture with the request that they make a study and report. As soon as the report is received I will send you a copy and correlate it to the attached enclosure.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Document No.9.

The President,

The White House.

9

~~Secret~~ REC UNCLASSIFIED

Berlin, May 16, 1941. We.

Agriculture

1.

The official statistics regarding the operating expenses give a good idea of the technical equipment of German agriculture in the war.

The attached memorandum analyzes the statistical data on the operating expenses in German agriculture for the fiscal year 1939-40.

The provisional figures on the operating expenses for the fiscal year 1940-41, which are drawn up on the same bases as the previous memorandum regarding the fiscal year 1939-40, show that all figures for expenditures indicate an increase. This increase amounts to from 10 to 12 percent on the average. Hence it is sufficient, to get an approximate idea of the operating expenses of the farms in the second year of the war, to raise the figures at hand regarding the fiscal year 1939-40 by some 10 to 12 percent.

This memorandum permits definite conclusions to be drawn regarding the status of the productive capacity of German agriculture under control. Expert opinions can themselves be formed from these data.

2.

In the attached documents, further statistics are added on the figures for agricultural production. The tables

tables include:

a. status of vegetable crops at the end of April 1941;

b. final figures for the cereal crop of 1940;

c. slaughtering and meat supply statistics in March 1941.

3.

The most important points are stated in brief, below, according to the official reports on the requirements and future capacity of agriculture:

a. In agreement with the Office of the Price Commissioner, the Reich Ministry of Food and the Reich Food Office will undertake to raise prices for the fiscal current year, in the interest of further and more rapid increase in agricultural production. This applies to the production of both cereals and feeding-stuffs, and also to the main branches of the cattle business.

A further stimulus to agriculture, in addition to this direct raising of prices, is also said to be aimed at by having the prices of manufactured goods which are directly necessary for carrying on farming operations: farm machinery, tools, etc., lowered within the framework of the general scheme for diminution of profits and reduction of prices.

b. After the releasing of the quotas for the machine industry, technical agricultural apparatus, machinery and

other

other things made for field work and stock raising are to be delivered at an accelerated rate and to a larger extent. The persistent shortage of farm labor is to be counteracted by this mechanization.

c. Lastly, a broad program is being worked out: the improvement of the village, which is to form the basis for a total reorganization of the conduct of farming operations, in collaboration with all governmental, professional, industrial, communications and other organizations concerned. The amount needed for investment for the improvement of the village, that is, from the agricultural standpoint, the erection of dwellings for farm hands, shifting of population and villages, and general improvements, are estimated at from 60 to 75 billion.

Amount of Meat Available from Slaughtering and from Excess Imports of Meat

March 1941	Total 100 kgs.	per head of population - kg.
Horsemeat	39,953	0.05
Beef	846,946	1.05
Veal	214,718	0.27
Pork	2,159,712	2.68
Mutton	21,642	0.03
Goats' meat	15,754	0.02
Total meat	3,298,725	4.10
March 1940		
Horsemeat	28,399	0.05
Beef	803,605	1.01
Veal	224,709	0.28
Pork	2,565,432	3.22
Mutton	22,941	0.03
Goats' meat	12,759	0.01
Total meat	3,654,312	4.59

Statement of Statistics on Slaughter-weight and Meat Supply in the German Reich (Old Reich) including Austria and Sudetenland, in the month of March 1941

Whole German Reich:	March 1941	March 1940
Horses and other ungulates	251	265
Steers over 2 years old	335	335
Steers up to 2 years old	196	228
Bulls over 2 years old	334	343
Bulls up to 2 years old	195	211
Cows	236	247
Heifers	207	221
Horned Cattle, all together	243	254
Calves up to 3 months old	34	38
Hogs: professional slaughtering...	96	96
home slaughtering	114	114
both	--	--
Sheep	22	23
Goats	16	15

Status of Vegetable Crops at end of April 1941

	Early white cabbage	Early red cabbage	Early savoy	Early cauli-flower	Early kohl-rabi	Spring spin-ach	Field let-tuce Lamb's let-tuce	Head let-tuce spring and summer let-tuce	Carrots early Carrots
German Reich	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.9

Ratings: 1 - very good; 2 - good; 3 - medium; 4 - poor; 5 - very poor

Figures from the statistics on slaughtering in the German Reich in the month of March 1941

Ergebnisse der Schlachtungsstatistik im Deutschen Reich im Monat März 1941.

	Horses & other ungulates Pferde und andere Einhufer	Steers over - upto 2 years old Ochsen über bis 2 Jahre alt	Bulls over - up to 2 years old Bullen über bis 2 Jahre alt		Cows Kühe	Heifers Färsen bis zum 1.Kalb	Total horned cattle Rinder zusammen	Calves up to 3 months old Kälber bis zu 3 Monaten alt	Hogs commercial gewerbliche	Hogs domestic Schweine Haus-	Hogs Total zusammen	Sheep Schafe einschl. der nicht-beschauten Lämmer	Goats Ziegen
									Schlachtungen Slaughterings			including uninspected lambs	
			Slaughterings of German animals Schlachtungen von Inlandstieren.						Slaughterings of German animals Schlachtungen von Inlandstieren.				
German animals	16 680	22684	6794	27689	30900	190452	66563	345 082	713099	1038967	1118418	2157385	109 810	146 639
			Slaughterings of Foreign Animals Schlachtungen von Auslandstieren.						Slaughterings of Foreign Animals Schlachtungen von Auslandstieren.				
Foreign animals	941	5582	-	1265	9	11878	1153	19 887	-	64523	-	64523	428	
Slaughterings of both German and foreign animals in March 1941	17 621	28266	6794	28954	30909	202330	67716	364 969	713099	1103490	1118418	2221908	110 238	146 639
February 1941	19 517	32976	7497	28460	30838	212779	68202	380 752	596511	1022596	1407859	2430455	107 136	32 855
January 1941	25 018	46570	9352	31043	32764	246222	77512	443 463	627685	981931	1617528	2599459	160 497	35 761
March 1941 Old Reich including Austria and Sudetenland	15 912	26895	6174	27237	27001	178682	57276	323 265	639463	1004261	1037533	2041794	101 115	145 323
February 1941	17 734	31989	6894	26908	27922	191102	59924	344739	554058	935622	1342863	2278485	98 464	31 616
March 1940	10 701	20992	3983	28246	25767	172957	56861	308 806	591955	1242359	1226243	2468602	103 403	154 827
Of the foreign animals slaughtered in March 1941 there were from:														
Denmark	17	386	-	766	-	9427	214	10 793	-	31820	-	31820	-	-
Holland	-	2	-	10	9	561	39	621	-	24179	-	24179	-	-
USSR (formerly Lithuania)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	218	-	218	-	-
Hungary	84	4889	-	448	-	1882	893	8 112	-	1251	-	1251	428	-
Yugoslavia	596	305	-	41	-	8	7	361	-	7055	-	7055	-	-
Slovakia	244	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
	from the statistics on slaughter weights and meat supply in the German Reich (old Reich) incl. Austria and Sudetenland, in month of March 1941. Aus der Schlachtgewichts- und Fleischversorgungsstatistik in Deutschen Reich (Altreich) einschl. Ostmark und Sudetenland im Monat März 1941													
Whole German Reich	251	335	196	334	195	236	207	243	34	96	114	-	22	16
March 1940 März 1940	265	335	228	343	211	247	221	254	38	96	114	-	23	15

Final Figures for Cereal Crops 1940

States	Winter Rye Area hectares	Winter Rye Yield per hect. 100kg	Winter Rye Yield total tons	Summer Rye Area hectares	Summer Rye Yield per hect. 100kg	Summer Rye Yield total tons	Both Rye Area hectares	Both Rye Yield per hect. 100kg	Both Rye Yield total tons
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Preussen	3447154	15,8	5439412	47755	13,4	64036	3494909	15,7	5503448
Prov.Ostpreussen	734290	14,1	1034196	4327	10,0	4327	738617	14,1	1038523
Stadt Berlin	3049	13,2	4025	190	12,2	232	3239	13,1	4257
Mark Brandenburg	497395	13,8	685510	8119	12,5	10157	505514	13,3	695667
Pommern	559976	15,9	890541	9123	11,3	10336	569099	15,8	900877
Schlesien	523159	13,4	700603	6418	12,8	8225	529577	13,4	708828
Sachsen Prov.	226371	16,8	380 434	4031	14,5	5865	230402	16,8	386299
Schlesw-Holst.	113008	18,6	211929	3160	15,2	4790	116968	18,5	216719
Hannover	342609	18,0	617717	5386	14,7	7909	347995	18,0	625626
Westfalen	175604	19,8	348614	2207	16,3	3601	177891	19,8	352215
Hess.-Nassau	117377	19,9	233453	1047	16,6	1738	118424	19,9	235191
Rheinprov.	153036	21,7	331756	3719	18,3	6822	156755	21,6	338538
Hohenzollerische Lande	400	15,6	624	28	12,2	34	428	15,4	658
Bayern	304727	14,7	447972	36154	14,8	53504	340881	14,7	501476
Sachsen	113164	17,6	198616	6900	15,1	10442	120064	17,4	209058
Württemberg	16163	15,7	25358	2772	14,2	3931	18935	15,5	29289
Baden	28835	16,7	48287	2356	13,4	3165	31191	16,5	51452
Thüringen	53036	18,3	96938	2556	17,2	4396	55592	18,2	101334
Hessen	42034	19,4	82907	548	17,1	938	43582	19,4	83845
Hamburg	2809	18,2	5104	72	14,5	104	2881	18,1	5208
Mecklenburg	196420	19,9	390 348	2873	15,6	3549	199293	19,8	393897
Oldenburg	46311	17,1	79151	376	14,8	555	46687	17,1	79706
Braunschweig	20075	21,6	43306	406	20,2	822	20481	21,5	44129
Bremen	1160	16,0	1756	25	14,5	36	1185	15,9	1792
Anhalt	21942	16,1	35335	128	15,6	200	22070	16,1	35535
Lippe	10037	24,6	24735	60	17,9	107	10097	24,6	24842
Schaumburg-Lippe	3621	26,5	9653	54	23,7	128	3675	26,4	9781
Saarland	6421	16,7	10722	289	14,2	324	6650	16,6	11046
Ostmark	282 009	11,3	319136	20536	10,6	21773	302535	11,3	340909
Sudetenland	153 856	13,2	203563	11413	11,9	13533	165269	13,1	217161
Danzig-Westpr.	434906	14,7	640433	3614	11,5	4145	438520	14,7	644578
Wartheland	1066833	14,4	1537019	5090	10,9	5578	1071931	14,4	1542597
Dtsch.Reich	6252123	15,4	9640391	143515	13,4	191331	6395639	15,4	9831722
Zusgslt.Ermittlung 39	4754602	13,3	9185307	81583	14,2	115861	4836185	13,2	9301240

States	Winter Wheat Area hectares	Winter Wheat Yield per hect. 100kg	Winter Wheat Yield total tons	Summer Wheat Area hectares	Summer Wheat Yield per hect. 100kg	Summer Wheat Yield total tons	Both Wheats Area hectares	Both Wheats Yield per hect. 100kg	Both Wheats Yield total tons
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Preussen	748 844	22,2	1 660 406	288 215	24,2	698 214	1037 059	22,7	2 358 620
Prov.Ostpreussen									
Stadt Berlin	66 215	12,8	85 086	23 239	14,3	33 246	89 454	13,2	119 332
Mark Brandenburg	93	15,0	140	37	12,6	47	130	14,4	187
Pommern	58 795	23,4	125 626	23 508	22,3	52 410	76 303	23,1	176 036
Schlesien	48 852	22,6	110 591	15 188	23,5	35 758	64 040	22,9	146 349
Sachsen Prov.	152 012	19,1	290 336	69 383	21,8	151 023	221 395	19,9	441 359
Schlesw-Holst.	112 263	24,5	275 253	101 214	28,0	283 339	213 477	26,2	558 592
Hannover	47 923	25,1	120 076	2 490	23,9	5 953	50 413	25,0	126 029
Westfalen	58 363	26,0	151 491	20 543	28,0	80 060	86 906	26,6	231 551
Hess.-Nassau	56 380	23,7	133 902	2 845	20,5	5 805	59 225	23,6	139 707
Rheinprov.	61 971	22,5	139 376	5 093	23,0	11 727	67 064	22,5	151 103
Hohenzollerische Lande	83 027	25,5	224 383	16 133	23,6	38 023	104 160	25,2	262 406
Bayern	3 350	15,6	6 146	542	15,2	823	4 492	15,5	6 969
Sachsen	295 495	17,7	524 283	67 392	18,8	126 414	362 887	17,9	650 697
Württemberg	71 768	22,2	159 235	20 108	21,1	42 392	91 876	21,9	201 507
Baden	101 107	18,5	186 779	16 822	18,4	30 978	117 929	18,5	217 757
Thüringen	50 198	18,5	109 453	5 490	18,1	9 934	64 688	18,5	119 387
Hessen	43 428	21,6	93 700	38 119	24,3	94 842	81 547	23,1	188 542
Hamburg	27 418	22,2	60 970	8 034	24,7	19 871	35 452	22,8	80 841
Mecklenburg	555	22,4	1 238	23	17,8	52	564	22,2	1 290
Oldenburg	46 263	24,9	115 531	7 566	23,8	17 974	53 837	24,8	133 505
Braunschweig	1 611	23,8	3 832	335	20,1	669	1 944	23,2	4 501
Bremen	17 827	26,8	47 714	15 736	20,5	44 906	33 563	22,6	92 620
Anhalt	60	10,6	127	25	14,7	37	85	17,6	164
Lippe	12 157	27,5	32 134	7 273	23,6	21 505	19 430	26,2	54 699
Schaumburg-Lippe	5 722	26,0	14 837	188	22,1	415	5 910	25,9	15 312
Saarland	1 862	27,9	5 177	52	24,8	129	1 914	27,8	5 326
Ostmark	2 274	13,9	3 166	101	14,0	267	2 465	13,9	3 433
Sudetenland	206 959	15,2	365 871	26 189	14,5	37 897	227 067	15,4	303 868
Danzig-Westpr.	46 858	15,6	73 021	32 563	17,9	58 319	79 421	16,5	131 340
Wartheland	23 705	15,4	44 366	40 697	17,0	75 934	68 930	17,5	120 300
Dtsch.Reich	1 114 345	17,1	1 909 709	19 354	18,2	35 163	136 299	17,2	234 872
Zusgslt.Ermittlung 39	2709 979	19,7	5 662 458	513 627	22,2	1315 871	2422 905	20,3	4918 329
	2171 [illegible]	22,7	4 929 051	257 160	22,9	589 236	2429 062	22,7	5518 287

States	Spelt and Emmer Area hectares	Spelt and Emmer Yield per hect. 100kg	Spelt and Emmer Yield total tons	Wheat and Spelt Area hectares	Wheat and Spelt Yield per hect. 100kg	Wheat and Spelt Yield total tons	Bread Grains Area hectares	Bread Grains Yield per hect. 100kg	Bread Grains Yield total tons
	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Preussen	3 626	14,9	5 416	1040 685	22,7	2364 594	4535 594	17,5	7867 494
Prov.Ostpreussen									
Stadt Berlin	-	-	-	89 454	13,2	118 332	828 071	14,0	1156 855
Mark Brandenburg	-	-	-	130	14,4	187	3 369	13,2	4 444
Pommern	-	-	-	76 303	23,1	176 036	581 817	15,0	871 703
Schlesien	-	-	-	64 040	22,9	146 349	633 139	16,5	1047 226
Sachsen Prov.	-	-	-	221395	19,9	441 972	750 972	15,3	1150 187
Schlesw-Holst.	-	-	-	213 477	26,2	558 592	443 879	21,3	944 891
Hannover	-	-	-	50 413	25,0	126 029	167 381	20,5	342 748
Westfalen	-	-	-	86 906	26,6	231 551	434 901	19,7	857 177
Hess.-Nassau	-	-	-	59 225	23,6	139 707	237 116	20,7	491 922
Rheinprov.	-	-	-	67 064	22,5	151 103	185 498	20,8	386 294
Hohenzollerische Lande	-	-	-	104 276	25,2	262 625	261 031	23,0	601 213
Bayern	-	-	-	8 002	15,2	12 166	8 430	15,2	12 824
Sachsen	1 795	14,5	2 593	364 672	17,9	653 290	705 553	16,4	1154 766
Württemberg	-	-	-	91 876	21,9	201 507	211 940	19,4	410 645
Baden	29 082	16,0	46 549	147 011	18,0	264 306	165 936	17,7	293 595
Hessen	6 517	15,2	9 908	71 205	18,2	129 295	102 396	17,7	180 747
Hamburg	11	12,2	13	81 508	23,1	188 555	137 180	21,1	289 049
Mecklenburg	121	16,7	202	35 573	22,8	81 051	78 755	20,9	164 096
Oldenburg	-	-	-	564	22,9	1 290	3 445	18,7	6 458
Braunschweig	-	-	-	53 837	24,8	133 505	252 535	20,9	527 202
Bremen	21	17,8	37	1 965	23,1	4 538	49 653	17,5	84 194
Anhalt	-	-	-	33 563	27,6	92 620	54 244	25,5	136 748
Lippe	-	-	-	93	17,6	164	1 210	16,1	1 956
Schaumburg-Lippe	-	-	-	19 430	28,2	54 699	41 500	21,7	90 234
Saarland	-	-	-	5 910	25,9	15 312	16 007	25,1	40 154
Ostmark	11	10,0	11	1 925	27,7	5 337	5 600	26,9	15 048
Sudetenland	6	8,7	5	2 471	13,9	3 430	9 121	15,9	14 484
Danzig-Westpr.	284	11,4	324	237 351	13,4	304 032	529 836	12,2	645 001
Wartheland	28	9,9	28	79 449	10,5	131 368	244 718	14,2	348 529
Dtsch.Reich	-	-	-	68 930	17,5	120 300	507 530	15,1	764 878
Zusgslt.Ermittlung 39	-	-	-	136 299	17,2	234 872	1208 230	14,7	1778 269
	41 492	15,7	65 086	2464 397	20,2	4983 415	8859 835	16,7	14815137
	47 [illegible]	16,5	79 076	2477 000	22,6	5597363	7313 185	20,4	14898 611

Final Figures for Cereal Crops 1940 (including corn)

States & Districts	Winter Barley Area hectares	Winter Barley Yield per hect. 100kg.	Winter Barley total tons	Summer Barley Area hectares	Summer Barley Yield per hect. 100kg	Summer Barley total tons	Both Barleys Area hectares	Both Barleys Yield per hect. 100kg	Both Barleys total tons	Oats Area hectares	Oats Yield per hect. 100kg	Oats total tons
	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
Preussen	232558	20.6	479836	709663	20.3	1437650	942221	20.4	1917486	1930 761	20.4	3957174
Ostpreussen	1907	13.7	2618	171997	14.2	244881	173904	14.2	247499	227 810	12.2	278152
Stadt Berlin	20	13.6	27	306	16.6	508	326	16.4	535		858	16.0	1373
Brandenburg	19277	18.5	35579	79170	21.8	172751	98455	21.2	208329	168 714	19.5	328836
Pommern Prov.	19446	20.4	39727	82490	20.2	166422	101936	20.2	206149	279 784	19.2	538463
Schlesien	25770	18.3	47112	158636	20.7	328560	184406	20.4	375672	325 687	19.7	641369
Sachsen Priv.	31205	20.7	64650	124286	20.6	330851	155491	20.4	394909	180 040	25.6	481151
Schleswig.Holst.	23799	22.5	53655	12897	24.3	31327	36696	23.2	84982	119 567	24.0	287100
Hannover	32086	22.7	72844	20067	21.5	43048	52153	22.2	115892	223 063	22.6	503884
Westfalen	33731	20.7	69791	11856	20.1	23830	45581	20.5	93621	130 310	21.6	281535
Hessen-Nassau	14809	19.5	29008	14099	19.8	29434	28788	19.6	58532	109 504	22.1	241489
Rheinprovinz	30304	21.3	64574	27454	20.6	56665	57758	21.0	121239	167 609	22.9	384285
Hohenzollerische Lande	124	12.4	154	3603	17.8	9973	5727	17.7	10127	5 815	16.4	9537
Bayern	15644	16.9	26366	371422	20.5	760717	387066	20.3	787083	393 345	19.2	757075
Sachsen	20519	19.2	39335	27304	22.1	60335	47823	20.8	99670	159 986	23.7	331594
Württemberg	4355	17.1	7464	97637	19.6	191656	101992	19.5	199120	85 277	19.2	163709
Baden	6664	18.8	12542	47049	19.5	91631	53713	19.4	104173	50 115	19.8	99450
Thüringen	5414	18.9	10213	55605	23.3	129705	61019	22.9	139918	76 344	23.1	177966
Hessen	3875	22.4	8672	36439	24.1	87703	40314	23.9	96375	41 636	22.9	95155
Hamburg	212	19.3	409	218	19.1	415	430	19.2	824	2 258	19.6	4425
Mecklenburg	19578	20.4	39924	29301	23.2	68102	48879	22.1	107627	133 576	22.48	343984
Oldenburg	1906	21.1	2757	3862	20.7	7800	5768	20.8	10617	33 224	18.6	61782
Braunschweig	10619	23.0	24467	3890	24.1	9332	14509	23.3	33799	26 917	28.9	77736
Bremen	45	15.0	67	156	18.2	285	201	17.4	350	1 102	18.2	2005
Anhalt	3548	20.9	7427	11645	27.4	31867	15193	25.5	39294	16 476	25.2	41473
Lippe	5303	21.8	11729	229	19.8	453	5532	21.7	12182	9 351	25.8	24109
Schaumburg-Lippe	734	23.7	1742	152	24.9	379	886	23.9	2121	2465	28.6	7047
Saarland	3668	14.9	5468	1758	16.9	2966	5426	16.5	8434	10 516	17.1	18012
Ostmark	12959	13.7	17700	127900	15.7	310069	210859	15.5	327769	172 670	17.8	306577
Sudetenland	1637	15.8	2582	97325	18.9	184214	98962	18.9	186796	274 979	14.1	387931
Danzig-Westpr.	2759	14.2	3905	109305	18.3	200291	112144	18.2	204196	100 401	16.3	169013
Wartheland	8155	16.0	13042	127611	19.6	249837	135766	19.4	262879	204 456	17.2	351 356
Deutsches Reich	350132	19.9	710408	1928481	19.8	3825605	2284625	19.9	4536013	3719 431	19.8	7370367
Endgültige Ermittlung 1939	444850	24.7	1096822	1500456	20.8	2132930	1955306	21.7	4209752	3082 503	20.7	6391468

States & Districts	Winter Intermediate Crops Area hectares	Winter Intermediate Crops Yield per hect. 100kg	Winter Intermediate Crops total tons	Summer Intermediate Crops Area hectares	Summer Intermediate Crops Yield per hect. 100kg	Summer Intermediate Crops total tons	Both Intermediate Crops Area hectares	Both Intermediate Crops Yield per hect. 100kg	Both Intermediate Crops total tons	Corn Area hectares	Corn Yield per hect. 100kg	Corn total tons	Total Cereals Area hectares	Total Cereals Yield per hect. 100kg	Total Cereals total tons
	40	41	42	43	44	45									
Preussen	55 048	19.0	104 824	576 472	17.0	980 724	631 520	17.2	1085 548	19 879	22.2	41 861	8066 975	18.4	14869 553
Ostpreussen	4 915	14.9	7 313	205 601	12.9	264 263	210 516	12.9	271 581	468	21.6	1 012	1440 769	13.6	1955 099
Stadt Berlin	22	11.7	26	275	13.9	358	297	13.9	384	71	19.5	139	4 921	14.0	6 875
Brandenburg	3 423	14.9	5 090	57 814	17.2	99 421	61 237	17.1	104 511	4 649	22.4	10 397	914 872	16.7	1523 776
Pommern Prov.	3 448	15.6	5 387	86 531	18.1	145 403	89 979	18.0	150 790	1 242	2.37	2 938	1100 080	17.7	1945 566
Schlesien	6 147	16.2	9 973	68 125	20.0	136 546	74 267	19.7	146 519	8 885	20.5	18 189	1344 217	17.3	2331 936
Sachsen Priv.	2 913	18.7	5 455	35 116	20.6	70 086	38 029	19.9	75 541	1 279	25.9	3 316	818 718	23.0	1879 802
Schleswig.Holst.	5 192	23.0	11 959	58 127	21.6	125 464	63 319	21.7	137 423	234	25.2	590	387 197	22.0	852 843
Hannover	5 649	18.4	10 415	49 425	18.3	93 327	55 074	18.8	103 742	867	23.5	2 041	766 058	20.7	1582 736
Westfalen	16 235	21.8	35 356	15 144	21.9	33 162	31 379	21.8	68 518	420	27.9	1 172	444 806	21.1	936 768
Hessen-Nassau	1 926	19.6	3 754	3 222	20.6	6 433	5 148	19.8	10 187	146	26.8	392	330 074	21.1	696 894
Rheinprovinz	5 002	19.6	9 810	2 798	20.5	5 651	7 760	19.9	15 461	609	27.2	1 658	494 767	22.7	1123 856
Hohenzollerische Lande	181	15.8	286	334	18.1	605	515	17.3	891	9	26.0	23	20 496	16.3	33 402
Bayern	24 875	16.5	40 935	12 156	18.0	21 882	37 031	17.0	62 817	1 845	27.1	4 855	1524 840	18.1	2766 594
Sachsen	1 532	16.9	2 590	6 464	20.3	13 150	7 996	19.7	15 740	405	23.1	934	408 150	21.0	858 583
Württemberg	5 281	15.0	7 908	4 737	17.0	8 030	10 018	15.9	15 928	892	29.3	2 618	364 115	19.5	674 970
Baden	12 569	17.7	22 293	1 856	16.6	3 081	14 425	17.6	25 374	3 846	25.2	9 683	224 495	18.7	419 435
Thüringen	2 551	17.3	4 412	20 269	21.2	42 966	22 820	20.8	47 478	217	24.1	522	298 100	22.0	655 813
Hessen	1 028	16.8	1 731	536	19.8	1 100	1 584	17.9	2 831	624	28.7	1 788	162 913	22.2	361 045
Hamburg	2 258	19.0	4 277	695	19.0	1 322	703	18.8	1 319	29	20.7	60	6 865	19.1	13 086
Mecklenburg	1 565	20.4	3 195	30 029	21.8	65 329	31 594	21.7	68 524	366	23.2	851	471 739	22.2	1048 190
Oldenburg	1 028	19.1	2 067	1 531	17.0	2 620	2 559	18.0	4 687	122	24.7	301	90 385	19.0	172 279
Braunschweig	588	21.4	1 256	5 313	24.6	8 166	5 901	24.2	9 422	129	25.7	331	99 500	25.9	258 096
Bremen	20	16.1	32	146	15.4	224	166	15.4	256	10	23.2	23	2 697	17.0	4 590
Anhalt	239	18.6	444	1 505	21.8	3 284	1 744	21.4	3 728	168	27.7	466	75 081	23.2	175 201
Schaumburg-Lippe	2 217	23.9	5 293	1 656	24.1	3 979	3 867	24.0	9 272	43	22.7	97	34 880	24.6	85 816
Saarland	60	29.1	169	826	27.3	2 259	886	27.4	2 428	8	45.0	8	9 839	27.1	26 652
Ostmark	445	15.0	664	149	14.7	210	591	14.9	882	15	15.3	23	22 363	16.5	36 915
Sudetenland	6 319	12.3	7 775	10 131	14.0	14 141	16 450	13.3	21 911	72 559	20.0	150 615	1104 733	13.9	1533 205
Danzig-Westpr.	852	12.3	1 041	4 558	15.8	7 190	5 410	15.2	8 242		12.4	706	522 336	16.3	850 850
Wartheland	376	16.6	624	64 992	18.5	120 721	64 968	18.5	120 345		28.3	2 192	795 918	16.1	1261 424
Deutsches Reich	5 879	18.2	8 377	62 342	17.7	111 452	68 221	17.4	119 829	1 939	22.2	4 313	1619 092	15.5	2516 686
	173 238	17.6	216 285	804 436	17.5	1411 014	977 674	17.5	1627 299	103 433	21.5	222 343	15984 996	18.0	28579 059
	107 222	19.6	210 607	599 474	19.8	1110 087	666 696	19.8	1320 694	109 543	21.8	238 186	13325 313	20.6	27488 711

Pack box presents
PSP: Germany

GS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Stockholm

Dated July 27, 1941

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

453, July 27, noon.

Having just returned from a week or so in Germany where travelled a good deal and spent two days at Goering's headquarters, 500 miles East of Berlin, Dahlerus in a long conversation yesterday among other things stated the following

One. Goering told him that Japan had been granted a free hand in east Russia and might be expected to try to take Vladivostok and other coastal places.

Two. Despite German surprise at number, size and strength of armament of Russian tanks Goering now felt that power of Russian armies will be crushed in about six weeks from now.

Three. It is then planned to divide Russia into small states, Goering to be economic dictator and Rosenberg political dictator in conquered areas.

Four. In retreating Russians have effectively put manufacturing establishments out of commission but efforts to destroy crops have not been successful and Germany expects to reap most of coming harvest and has

no

no compunctions at starving Russians if necessary to keep flow of food and raw materials moving to Germany indefinitely.

Five. Dahlerus (*)ep whatever of invasion of British is less and felt it possible it was no longer planned. Hitler is now preparing for a long drawn out war and no peace suggestions will be advanced by Germany at conclusion of Russian campaign as had been predicted in other quarters in Sweden. As soon as German forces are released in case all out effort will bemade by air against England and in battle of Atlantic.

Six. Goering was much perturbed at American occupation of Iceland.

Seven. From his intimate connections in other quarters in Germany I felt that influence of army over prty was somewhat in a (?)ancy.

Eight. He felt as have other visitors that German civilian population was thoroughly war weary.

Nine. Goering is not isolated nor does he seem to have lost favor with Hitler. British propaganda to effect that Goering and Hitler differed over Russian campaign are false.

Ten. Goering is very much annoyed with Sweden for having been so little cooperative in connection with

other

other requests when troop transit to Finland came up. Nevertheless no threats were made because of this.

Eleven. Dahlerus, as Department is aware, has been hoping to be an instrument in bringing about peace even since before war commenced in 1939 now feels less hopeful about it than at any time and expects complete destruction of Europe as inevitable (?) of continued hostilities unless some peace proposal is submitted from neutral sources.

GREENE

EMB

Pres

Lockhart

RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERN

Dated July 29, 1941

Rec'd 6 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

149, July 29, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

My 141, July 2, 3 p.m.

Informant attributing to German General Staff and other reliable sources made following statements: German eastern front losses of men and material and fuel have been collossal, the men including reserves now being completely exhausted physically. Fourteen successive nights of effective bombing of Rumanian oil fields, pipe lines and loading ports would, unless Germany could find substitute oil supplies, terminate war by end of August. Desperate German situation makes absolutely essential that Turks be ready for surprise thrust to Caucasus oil fields. Two German combat divisions have just been added to Bulgarian forces now completing mobilization against Thrace. Italians concentrating in Greece and islands. Turks still seem undecided and to counter Nazi propaganda must be held in line by Russian guarantee backed by parallel American English guarantee of Turkish territorial inviolability in event of Russian victory. Earlier than

expected

expected the decisive psychological moment has now arrived for heavy blow by England against Germany where civilian army and party morale fast declining. Hitler group greatly fears destruction of Rumanian ? army will bring Italy in collapse, stagger Spain, make up Weygand's mind and be disastrous inside Germany. Imports except foods would be cut off as they are shipped to Germany. Spain puts foreign exchange at German disposal.

HARRISON

CSB

PM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Bern

Dated July 29, 1941.

Rec'd 4:50 p.m., 28th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

149, July 29, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Frontal attack by England in France and low countries now preferable to attacks on flanks, since only forty German occupational divisions, all landsturm, plus one panzer division spread thin from Bordeaux to Amsterdam, constitute entire German force in west. Reinforcements at present unavailable. Nearly all anti-tank artillery shipped east. Morale of landsturm is bad. Results of questionnaires among German officer corps and rank and file indicate, firstly that their continued adherence to Hitler and regime solely due to fear of partition Germany and creation thereby of terrain favorable for a future "Hitler" and, secondly, that (coupled with effective offensive by England) a positive declaration by the President that there will be no such partition will destroy last hesitancy of army to abandon Hitler and his regime and also permit creation of confederation under Wittelsback with south and west German sections

balancing

balancing expansionistic Prussia.

Vichy and Japan have formed military alliance for common action against England and China. French commander and troops in Indochina have gone north ostensibly to avoid clashes with Japanese, but actually to prepare attack on Burma. Japan will send half million men to Indochina.

Informant laid greatest stress on assurances from General Staff friends that decisive psychological moment now has arrived for England to break Germany in order to terminate war within weeks rather than perhaps months.

Military Attache requests that War Department be informed. (END MESSAGE).

HARRISON.

CSB

Lock text

RS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

BERN

Dated July 31, 1941

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

152, July 31, 4 p.m.

Your 152, July 30.

Following just received by informant my 149, July 29:

All oil reserves tapped very extensively for east; especially infantry, sometimes whole units incapacitated by new eye inflammation from dust; during past ten days strong replacements, morale low, four motorized and panzer elements sent east; a second Italian division, morale very low, passed through Salzburg on twenty-fifth; new assignment to be given Rommel probably east front as British deemed incapable African offensive now; arms distribution during week ending July 26 to workers in many central and south German factories officially explained as against English parachute troops, but believed actually anticipation internal disorder; repeated that this is psychological moment British offensive and entry United States to end war by September; as Japanese

Nazis

Nazis plan sink ships Panama Canal, recommends exclusion Spanish and Japanese ships.

Source my despatch 1780, July 2 reports that in southwest Germany, Nazis still believe in Russian defeat by year end, others believe war protracted to spring. Slight anxiety and growing uneasiness now noticeable among the people.

Military Attache desires War Department be informed.

HARRISON

LMS

[10-1-41]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

To:

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date:

From:

Subject:

My dear Mr. President –

The attached is much like the information I relayed to you from Soong – 2 months ago – Also it resembles the report from one of "our people" which has come in by way of Istanbul to the Navy – which you may have – if not I'll send it. Donovan

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~MOST CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 1, 1941

TO: Coordinator of Information

FROM: W. D. Whitney

There is attached a detailed memorandum of our talk with Stallforth at 1647-30 St., N.W. on September 30, 1941, at 5:00 p.m. (His name is omitted from the attached memorandum, in which he is referred to as the informant.)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

TO: Coordinator of Information

FROM: W. D. Whitney

This is a memorandum of conference held at 1647-30 St., N. W., September 30, 1941, 5 o'clock p.m., between the informant (whose name is given on a separate memorandum), Colonel Donovan, and W. D. Whitney. The informant's story follows, using the first person singular:

In 1940, about the end of June or early July, I was in Berlin and had a personal conversation with Goering. He proposed a peace plan, after conferring with Hitler. The plan was:

1) British Empire in status quo, except certain colonies for Germany.

2) Political independence for France, Belgium, and Holland (except Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg to Germany).

3) Germany to have free hand in the East, including Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

On August 12 I arrived in the United States and submitted this plan to Wilson of the State Department and to Drury, a British representative. I understand that it came to the attention of the Prime Minister and the President, and was of course turned down.

At the beginning of May, 1941, I was again in Germany, this time on the business of negotiating the sale of ships belonging to Axis-controlled countries in the Western hemisphere, and for which, although the ships were not German owned, German consent was necessary. I inquired for Goering, but this time he refused to see me. I was later advised that this was because Ribbentrop was in complete charge--and that all were confident of complete victory, so that Goering did not dare see me.

In talks with the Army, I was told that the plan to invade Russia had been fully agreed upon in early November and indeed the very day of June 22 had been set. There had been two disappointments:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

1) That Russian tanks were three times as many as expected,

2) That the Russian troops were loyal to Stalin instead of showing the bad moral that had been expected,

but that the German General Staff still expected:

1) To annihilate the Russian armies by the end of October, this representing only a two month's delay beyond their original estimate of the end of August,

2) That the Russian political situation would be fully in hand by the spring of 1942.

Goering had recommended to Hitler that a boundary be put upon the German names in Russia and that an all-out effort to conquer Russia should be abandoned. The next morning he found his home, the Kerinhalle, surrounded by SS men. He could not go out and his telephone wires had been cut. (I was informed of this by Frau Goering, who told me the whole story.) The basis of Goering's ideas on the Russian campaign was that the German people's morale would not stand up to it.

I was also reliably informed that Mussolini asked Hitler to make peace, saying that Italy must have peace. It was believed that Mussolini was the only man that could say this to Hitler without being locked up. But Hitler was merely rather amused by Mussolini, regarding him as sort of a naughty boy.

I also know that Von Pfeffer, who was the organizer of the Nazi party in Prussia, made the same recommendation to Hitler and was immediately arrested and ordered to be shot, but due to the intercession of Frau Von Pfeffer he was reprieved and put in solitary confinement.

Note by Whitney: I know that the informant was intimate with Von Pfeffer as I attended a private luncheon in informant's room with Von Pfeffer in a Berlin hotel in 1936, at which Von Pfeffer outlined the then plans for an ultimate Russian campaign. This is the only corroboration that I can personally give to the informant's story.

I was called in by General Udet, Chief of the Luftwaffe, because I had had a long prior acquaintance with him, and through him I met Brauchitsch and Keitel and through them in turn many other officers. As a consequence I was invited to a rather formal luncheon at which were officers (not the top officers, but the second men) in each of the military establishments,--General Staff, Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe. The course of the conversation ran as follows:

They: We are still confident that we will conquer Russia, but we are anxious at all costs to avoid war with the United States of America and wish to know what the USA wants.

I: We will make no peace with the present German government, and neither would Great Britain.

They: What if Hitler and Goering were to disappear or to resign.

I: That would not be enough. No party member would be accepted by the USA today, but I personally believe that the USA and Great Britain would likely make peace with a new constitutional government in which every private citizen would be recognized and have full normal rights.

They: How about a monarchy?

I: That would do, I think; if it were a constitutional monarchy on the English model.

A few days later, one of them came to me and the following conversation ensued:

He: Suppose,--always suppose--that the army replaces the present regime and offers peace.

I: I think that it is possible that the USA and Great Britain would treat with the army under those circumstances.

He: The army's conditions would then be:

1) No double crossing of Germany, as happened after Germany's acceptance of Wilson's Fourteen Points;
2) The army to remain in control to avoid chaos and thus of course disarmament could not be immediate.

I: I think something could be arranged.

He: Whom would you suggest to meet with you.

I: I suggest Donovan, Willkie, and General Wood. (I thought of these three men to show that America was united, and to negative the idea that Willkie or Wood would not cooperate with the President.)

He further explained to me that they did not even ask who would be the emissary from England as they have full confidence in England, but indicated that they would prefer energetic men like Beaverbrook. They hate us more than the British, because we are spoiling their success; whereas they rather admire the British. He indicated that they would likely send Falkenhansen, Haltner, Stupnagel, and others of that type. They distrust Keitel; they believe that Brauchitsch will come over at the last. As a civilian member, they would probably send Von Hassel, son-in-law of old Tirpitz, and who, as a former ambassador to Rome, claims to be a friend of Phillips.

It was further explained to me that:

1) Everything against Hitler and the regime must originate from Germany. The German people must not get the idea that the disposition of Hitler has been organized from outside, as then they would line up to protect him.

2) If we consider their plan at all, we must do so very promptly, before hatred of the USA gets worse in Germany.

3) But as soon as it becomes plain to the German people that the change means peace, they will let Hitler go, as they put peace first in their affections and Hitler second.

4) The German army fears that the President or Churchill would kill any such plan, as they have been convinced by their own propaganda to the effect that the President and Churchill as individuals have a special and violent animosity against Germany while all the rest of the USA and Great Britain understand them. I of course explained that this was absurd and that the USA and the UK were definitely behind their two chiefs, but mere explainations do not surmount months of skillful propaganda. This does not of course mean that they would not be glad to deal with Churchill and the President, but they think that the President and Churchill would, for reasons of blind hatred, refuse even to consider reasonable solutions.

I showed them the eight points which they had not seen. (I got them from the Embassy in Berlin.) They read them over carefully and said they were satisfactory, except the last point about disarmament. They said there should be an economic union of Europe, but that politically they would be prepared to evacuate all territories, except only Austria. Germany and Austria should remain intact. They suggested the Kaiser's gandson as the new sovreign, because in the legitimate line.

They emphasized to me that I should make plain that they are making these suggestions, not because of fear, but to save the white race from further destruction

9/30/41

The following are certain statements made by Dr. Hans Thomsen on Monday night to a friend of his:

He said he expected that the United States would sever all diplomatic relations with Germany by the end of this year. When that happens, he said he would charter a Swedish ship for the trip home. He said the reports they had were that their consuls and their families were ill-treated on the American ship which returned them to Europe. He wants to purchase a large electric ice-box and take it back home with him.

When asked about what he thought the Japanese would do, he said they could not tell yet what they would do; that they were very unsatisfactory Allies; that they were too self-centered and selfish. He said certainly they were watching the Russian situation like a hawk and any break there would make them feel freer from pressure than they do now.

When asked what he thought the German military plans would be after the Russian campaign, he said that the High Command is ready to move in several directions; that they are the world's best opportunists; that unless peace with Britain would follow the collapse of Russia, the next move would be made at the place most vulnerable at that time, and where a defeat of Britain would most vitally affect the war as a whole. He said he could not guess where that would be and doubted if the High Command would be willing to guess; that it was ready to move in several different directions.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Bat.

October 3, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Here are certain notes excerpted from information obtained by the British, and in which I thought you might be interested.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

GERMAN NAVY

Progress in construction of German Aircraft Carrier "Graf Zeppelin"

The "Graf Zeppelin" was located at STETTIN on 8th September and air photographs were obtained.

Information from photographs

A preliminary interpretation of these photographs stated that the ship was completed, but further examination shows that:-

(a) No work is at present in progress on the ship, neither is she in a position where work can be commenced.

(b) The control tower is not in place, but the base may be prepared to receive it.

(c) The funnel is in place and has a searchlight platform.

(d) No mast is stepped.

(e) The flight deck appears complete but there are some workmen's huts on it still.

(f) No guns can be seen, although the turret bases appear to be in position. The broadside casemate guns cannot be seen, but might be concealed by the overhang of the flight deck.

(g) Careful measurements show this vessel to be about 870' in length overall. The flight deck itself being 830' long, and about 100' wide, but abreast of the superstructure the width is about 80'.

Previous history

The 'Graf Zeppelin' was on steaming trials in April 1940. Left KIEL in July 1940. (A.1) (Air reconnaissance).

Was reported at GDYNIA in December 1940. (C.3).

Was reported at GDYNIA completing in May 1941. (C.2).

Was reported at STETTIN 26th June 1941. (B.2).

(Note: Germany commenced hostilities with Russia on 22nd June 1941).

There is evidence that a decision had been reached in March 1940 as to the type of aircraft which the ship was to carry, but no reports of the training of pilots preparatory to deck landing.

CONCLUSION

That the "Graf Zeppelin" has not been completed and that from the time work on her is resumed at least six months must elapse before she is ready to operate as an aircraft carrier.

The British Admiral Miles reported from Moscow:

Russian scorched earth policy is everywhere being carried out with great thoroughness and relentlessly. Removal of unfinished hulls and machinery from Nikolaev and the destruction of immovable gear showed that the Soviet Navy could do their share.

Leningrad is the only Baltic Russian Naval repair base.

Kronstadt is too small to base the entire Russian Baltic Fleet, and, although very strongly fortified, is vulnerable to attack from the main land.

Should Leningrad fall the Russians are faced with the four following courses of action for their Baltic Fleet:-

1. To scuttle.
2. To suffer capture by the enemy.
3. To sail through the Baltic to the North Sea.
4. To surrender for internment to the Swedes.

The Russian Fleet to our knowledge has not so far shown the same determination as their Army, except for the destruction at Nikolaev when incompleted ships were destroyed.

The Russians are notorious for their dislike of the sea.

The arrival of the Russian Fleet, although expected, would be highly distasteful to the Swedes, and, swollen by this unwieldy gift, Sweden's neutrality would not remain inviolate for long.

AXIS SHIPPING

Eastern Mediterranean

Practically the whole of the Axis shipping between Italy, the Aegean and the Black Sea has been engaged in the carrying of war material and supplies, particularly oil from the Roumanian oil fields.

Recently it was reported that they intended running a regular service between Trieste and Istanbul with three ships:- "CAPO ARMA" (3,175 tons), "ALBA JULIA" (5,701 tons) and "BALCIC" (3,600 tons). The first is Italian and the other two Roumanian. They left Istanbul in company on the 2nd of August and arrived at Trieste on the 15/16th with cargoes of oil cakes, oil seeds, olive oil, skins, valonea and aero engines.

During the months of June, July and August, the total tonnage from the Black Sea to the Aegean was approximately 100,000 tons, representing 26 sailings. Of the ships engaged (23) it is claimed three were sunk by British submarines in the Aegean whilst another was sunk by submarine in the Black Sea. The four ships sunk represented a tonnage of 17,616 tons. The majority of the ships were oil tankers.

The following extracts are from the Report of Ministry of Economic Warfare:

OIL

Germany's overland transport routes are not thought at present to be capable of handling more than the current Roumanian oil export surplus of some 350,000 tons a month. In order to carry on the Russian campaign Germany has to draw heavily upon her stocks, which are at present inconveniently situated in that some 1,000,000 tons, or half of her free reserves, are in Roumania. Although these are to some extent available to the southern sector of her army, they cannot be made available in the North by a direct route until considerable repairs and alterations to rail communications in Western Russia have been effected. Unless, therefore, Germany can increase the rate of output from Roumania, free stocks in Western Europe may become exhausted, while there are still considerable reserves in Roumania. Unless some cure can be found this may result in a severe limitation in Germany's future strategy. The only cure that is available is the removal by the sea route of Roumanian stocks through the Dardanelles.

It seems reasonable to assume that Russian naval activity will decline in the Black Sea as the German advance proceeds and that as the result of this the tanker traffic through the Dardanelles will be speeded up. The importance of the successful interception of tankers proceeding towards the Black Sea cannot be over-emphasized. Not only will the lifting of stocks from Constanza and the supplies to Axis forces in the Mediterranean be retarded, but also the enemy will be deprived of a tanker reserve within the Black Sea which would be of the greatest importance to him not only in carrying Roumanian oil forward during the period of his advance but also for carrying back Caucasian oil if he succeeds in capturing these oil fields.

Commodities other than oil.

With the close blockade in the west, Germany had done her best to exploit the resources of Turkey and Asia Minor to the fullest. Up till the time of the Greek campaign goods from this area had passed to Germany either by rail on the Orient line from Istanbul or by steamer from Turkish Black Sea ports to Bulgarian and Roumanian ports and thence by rail. The main Orient rail communications were cut during the Greek campaign and coasting traffic in the Black Sea was brought to an end by the outbreak of the Russian hostilities. At a time, therefore, when Russian goods and goods from the Far East were denied to her, the Axis was also faced with the loss of supplies from Asia Minor which she had taken great trouble to develop. It was not surprising, therefore, to learn that a service between Trieste and Istanbul was being organized as a matter of urgency. So long as the Black Sea is closed it must be assumed that the Axis will do their utmost to develop this service, which is their only transport link with the Near East. There is every indication that this will, in fact, happen, and the road lorry system is being built up in Anatolia to act as a feeder service. The commodities to be carried by this route are principally wool, cotton, oilseeds and tanning materials, all vitally important to Germany's war effort.

PSF
Safe: Germany

KEY

The translation of the German writing on the map appears to be as follows:

On the right: - "Fuel reserves for Trans-Atlantic traffic -

(a) with what capacity,

(b) Whom to interest for installation,

(c) Estimate."

On the left: - "(1) Is a fuel monopoly planned?

(2) Can private capital participate in expansion?
Under what conditions?

(3) To what extent will Mexico F participate in installation and expansion F as furnisher of fuel? Lacks fuel reserves."

Safe File; Germany

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Germany

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MONOGRAPH No. 3

THE GERMAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POSITION

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

DECEMBER 12, 1941

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COPY No. Over
The President

[redacted]

THE GERMAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POSITION DECEMBER 1941

Summary and Conclusion

A. GERMAN MILITARY POSITION

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, in 1939, the German armed forces totaled about 2 million men. In June 1941 they totaled 9 million, of whom about half have been engaged on the Eastern front. A tentative estimate places German battle casualties in the war against Russia at 1,500,000 killed, wounded, and missing to December 10. This figure excludes what is probably a considerable loss due to disease, exposure, and other nonbattle causes. To some extent these losses have been filled by new recruits.

The following table summarizes the limited available data on the German position with respect to materiel.

	On hand, June 1941	Production rate (monthly)	Estimated losses (June-December 1941)
Airplanes (combat)	24, 000	1, 960	4, 500
Tanks	30, 000	1, 000–1, 700	(1)
Artillery:			
Antiaircraft	9, 000	150	(1)
Other	13, 500	235	(1)
Trucks	(1)	10, 000	(1)

(1) No estimate.

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The most serious consequences of the Russian war for the German position have been the following:

1. Manpower losses, especially within the age group 21–28.
2. The strain on transport, especially the railways.
3. The reduction of petroleum stocks, as a result of the high military consumption rate on the Eastern front.

B. GERMAN ECONOMIC POSITION

Prior to June 1941 the German industrial machine exhibited few signs of strain, having been bolstered by the stocks and resources acquired in the campaigns of 1940. These minimized the consequences of the Allied blockade.

The large scale and prolonged operations in the East, however, have evoked three types of strain on the German economic system. First, pressure on total manpower and transport resources has been measurably increased, causing further incursions into the supply of civilian goods and services and some net decrease in the efficiency of the industrial machine. Second, the continuance of the war at its present level of intensity has accentuated the problem of depreciation, with respect to the railways, industrial equipment, and durable consumer's goods. Third, the large demands of the present campaign have exposed and accentuated certain specific German weaknesses:

1. The further withdrawal of manpower of military age, from agriculture and industry, has necessitated the substitution of less efficient over-age workers, women, foreigners, and war prisoners. In addition to this general dilution of the labor supply, shortages exist for special types of workers, notably industrial technicians, railway workers, and administrators of all types.
2. The large foodstuff demands of the Army have accentuated somewhat the underlying German weaknesses with respect to meats, fats, and oils; although the consequences of that weakness will be greater in 1942–43 than in the current harvest year.
3. The necessity for maintaining military production at a maximum level has caused withdrawals from stockpiles in the following instances: Tin, copper, antimony, and the steel-hardening alloys taken as a whole.

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4. The current rate of petroleum consumption is being maintained out of stocks; and there is some evidence, although the data are inadequate, that the petroleum stock-pile may be exhausted within the year 1942. On the whole, this seems unlikely.
5. The present transport situation has caused local shortages in civilian and some industrial supplies. The present strain would be markedly accentuated if the current winter is severe, and the internal water-ways frozen for prolonged periods.
6. German morale has been somewhat impaired by the prolongation of the Russian war. Heavy manpower losses and the increasing remoteness of ultimate victory have necessitated a defensive shift in the nature of official German propaganda.

C. CONCLUSIONS.

The data are inadequate to assess these weaknesses fully. The following tentative conclusions, however, appear justified:

1. The strains induced by the Russian war have reduced the absolute strength of the German military machine and economic machine; and further limited the supplies at the disposal of civilians.
2. Some of these strains, such as those in manpower and transport facilities, can perhaps be alleviated by a period of respite from military operations on the present scale. Others, however, reflect the gradual exhaustion of stock-piles of strategic raw materials—a process which is not greatly affected by the scale of military operations, except in the case of petroleum.
3. German leadership is thus faced with a dilemma in timing: whether to hold military operations down to a defensive minimum, while maximizing preparations for new offensives next spring; or to push on during the winter into areas possessing supplies of needed raw materials in order to strengthen immediately the basic position. Many facts unknown to us, or known imprecisely, will influence the decision. It seems likely, however, that in the coming months German military operations, whether directed towards strategic or economic goals, will be on a much reduced scale.

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THE GERMAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POSITION DECEMBER 1941[1]

I. *Military Manpower and Materiel Position of Germany, June 22, 1941*

A. MANPOWER

Roughly 9,000,000 men were organized in German military and semimilitary formations at the outbreak of the Russian war. This excludes the troops of Italy, Finland, Rumania, and other allies, totaling roughly 44 divisions.

Ground forces totaled 7,500,000 organized in 300 divisions of which 25 were armored and 35 were motorized.

The German air force personnel totals about 1,200,000 including pilots, signal corps, antiaircraft forces, parachute troops, and other attached services.

It is estimated that 179 divisions has been the maximum engaged at one time in the Russian campaign. This may have amounted, including all supporting and service forces behind the combat areas, to 4,500,000 men.

[1] The purpose of this study is to consider the fragmentary information available concerning German military gains and losses in the Russian campaign in relation to the German economic position as of December 1941. Its conclusions are subject to revision in the light of a special report, now being prepared by the Eastern European Section, on German gains in the Russian campaign.

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B. MATERIEL

1. Combat planes. It is estimated that Germany had approximately 24,000 combat planes available at the outbreak of the Russian war, as follows:

	First Line	Reserve	Total
Bombers, heavy (including long-range reconnaissance)	220	220	440
Bombers, medium (including reconnaissance)	4, 250	4, 250	8, 500
Bombers, light (Stukas)	1, 190	1, 190	2, 380
Pursuit, single engine	2, 400	2, 400	4, 800
Pursuit, twin engine	2, 250	2, 250	4, 500
Observation and cooperative	900	900	1, 800
Flying boats, navy fighters and amphibians	(?)	(?)	(?)
Total	11, 660	11, 660	23, 320

Approximately 50 percent of the German first line plane strength has been employed on the Russian front; i. e., about 6,000 planes.

2. *Tanks.*—It is estimated that Germany had 30,000 tanks on hand at the opening of hostilities. It is to be noted that Germany is favoring the use of medium and heavy types of tanks.

3. *Artillery.*—An average estimate of 13,500 guns is submitted as between a British estimate of 15,000 and an American of 12,000. Heavy antiaircraft guns amounted to an additional 9,000. The number of antiaircraft (47 mm.) on hand is not known, but it is to be noted that these are employed for antitank purposes as well.

4. The percentage of total equipment used on the eastern front is approximately in proportion to the number of divisions operating there.

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C. MILITARY MATERIEL PRODUCTION RATES

1. *Planes.*—The present estimated monthly production rate of German combat airplanes by types is as follows:

Bombers (including heavy, medium and long-range reconnaissance)	770
Light bombers	230
Pursuit	730
Army cooperation, coastal, etc	230
Total	1,960

2. *Tanks.*—Monthly production rate is estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,700 tanks, with heavy and medium types predominating.

3. *Artillery, light, heavy and antiaircraft.*—It is estimated that field guns and howitzers were being produced in April 1941 at the rate of 235 per month; while heavy antiaircraft guns were produced at a rate of 150 per month.

4. *Trucks.*—Production in Germany and occupied countries may amount to 10,000 per month.

II. *German Military Losses in the Russian War*

A. MANPOWER.

Two announcements have come from German official sources regarding German casualties in the Russian war. The first, emanating from the High Command, estimated losses to August 31; the second, made by Hitler, December 11, presented figures up to December 1. These estimates, together with a derived estimate of the losses from August 31, to December 1, are presented in the following table:

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
June 22–Aug. 31	85, 896	296, 770	20, 299	402, 965
June 22–Dec. 1	162, 314	577, 767	33, 334	773, 515
Aug. 31–Dec. 1	76, 418	280, 997	13, 035	370, 550

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The two official estimates are roughly consistent, in that the proportions among killed, wounded, and missing are similar. They would indicate, however, a much lower casualty rate for the latter three than for the first two months of the campaign. Average daily casualties, from these official German figures, would be roughly 5,750 to August 31, only 4,072 from August 31 to December 1. While it is certainly true that with lengthened supply lines and weakened Russian resistance, the numbers of German troops actually engaged has decreased, it must be remembered that in the period August 31 to December 1 the following actions against heavy resistance have taken place: capture of Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Rostov, the Crimean campaign, the closing of the ring around Leningrad, the Dnieper crossing and two major drives on Moscow, the first of which (Vyasma-Bryansk) was announced by Hitler as the "greatest military onslaught in history."

Various arguments, nevertheless, have been advanced in favor of accepting the German published figures as accurate. It is said (a) that since the war against Russian communism is popular in Germany the army has no particular inducement to understate losses; (b) that a gross understatement would be too easily detected by the German people; (c) that in the case of earlier statements by the High Command which can be checked, the statements have proved to be accurate; (d) that the German figures are not unreasonable from what is known of German tactical methods, making due allowance for the character of the engagements and the size of the forces involved.

None of these arguments is conclusive. If losses are heavy there is always a strong inducement to understatement; nor is detection of such understatement an easy matter. The accuracy of past statements of losses *may* be explained by the fact that these losses were small. Though there is every evidence that German tactical methods have been designed to minimize manpower losses, this does not necessarily mean that losses in fact have been small.

The only alternative, however, to an acceptance of the German figures appears to be a choice among the estimates of a number of official and unofficial "observers". These range all the way from

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an estimate of 800,000 in the first 5 months of war to the Russian "estimate" of 6,000,000 as of early December. None of these estimates appear to be based on a method of calculation which commands respect. Any estimate of German losses in excess of 3,000,000 for the first 6 months of the Russian war would have been incompatible with the magnitude of the German effort in this area, up to the time that the German offensive was broken off. On the other hand, a figure considerably in excess of the German reported losses is probably compatible with this effort.

A calculation based on German losses in the Polish campaign may afford a clue. Germany officially admitted 665 killed per day in the Polish campaign of 1939. Five armies were involved as against 13 on the Russian front. Assuming the same rate of loss for all armies, over a period of 170 days (i. e. to December 10) yields a figure of 294,000 killed. Using a World War ratio of 1 killed to 4 wounded indicates total casualties of approximately 1,500,000.[1] Resistance on the Russian front has undoubtedly been more serious than in Poland. On the other hand, with lengthening supply lines, the German forces engaged in combat have declined. In view of these considerations a figure of 1,500,000 total battle casualties to December 10 seems not unreasonable.

If the figures on plane losses given below are correct, the loss of pilots in the 5 months ending November 22 may be well over 2,000.

[1] This calculation represents total battle injuries; and makes no allowance for possible losses due to other causes. The following statement from the Office of the Surgeon General is revealing: "It may be presumed that the type of warfare in Russia affected by tanks, motorized infantry, aviation, excessive cold, rapid movements, supply difficulties, fatigue, etc., will produce high mortality rates. Typhus fever, always endemic in this area, is probably running wild, as there is little opportunity for delousing and bathing. Dysenteries may be taking a heavy toll and pneumonia, meningitis and other respiratory borne infections are probably on the increase. Without definite figures, it may be presumed that mortality rates for specific age groups of German males are higher in the Russian front than they would be for same groups at home during normal conditions. As to German soldiers in quiet areas the rates should not be higher than normal."

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B. MATÉRIEL LOSSES

Losses include both matériel destroyed in battle and the considerable percentage which must be replaced under the hard conditions of active service.

1. Best available reports seem to indicate that the German Air Force lost approximately 1,500 planes in the first two months of the Russian campaign. If subsequent losses have been proportionate, then total losses in the first six months of war have probably been about 4,500 planes of all types. It is estimated that perhaps 10–15% of this equipment could be made serviceable through repairs. It will be noted that the monthly rate of loss appears to be less than the monthly plane production rate, for all types; although a considerable additional loss has undoubtedly been suffered due to accidents, break-downs, and other non-combat causes.

2. Estimates of loss of other types of equipment are not available. Military advice is to the effect that matériel losses, from all causes, can be replaced from existing stocks and current production. German losses have been mitigated, as well, by the fact that Germany has gained control of most of the battle fields, and thus held a good part of its own and Russian damaged equipment.

3. Total military petroleum consumption since the outbreak of the Russian war is considered to be in the neighborhood of 620,000 tons per month of which approximately 75,000 tons are consumed by the air service. This rate of consumption involves some incursion into petroleum stocks.

OTHER FACTORS

Reflection on the fragmentary material available concerning German losses suggests that although replacement of lost manpower and equipment has not presented serious difficulties to date, the following considerations may be important:

1. If German casualties are concentrated in the age group 21–33 (but particularly in the age group 21–28), replacements of losses by soldiers drawn from the same age group may become difficult, due

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1941 GERMAN POPULATION

age groups	MEN	WOMEN
46-65	7.9 MILLION	9.4 MILLION
28-45	11.9 MILLION	12.2 MILLION
23-27	2.5 MILLION	2.5 MILLION
16-22	4.5 MILLION	4.4 MILLION
2-15	8.7 MILLION	8.4 MILLION

out of 9 million men in the German armed forces

TOTAL MEN 38,800000

TOTAL WOMEN 40,600000

GRAND TOTAL 79,400,000 PEOPLE

Greater Germany

Germany
Austria
Sudetenland

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to the unnaturally small size of that group within the German population.

2. The extension and maintenance of a 2,000-mile front, at increasing distances from German centers of production, has created a disproportionate demand for railway equipment and other transport facilities.

3. Since German plane losses have been principally in bombers, they are somewhat more serious than the over-all figures would indicate. In view of reserves and the current production rate, however, plane losses are not to be regarded as a major German cost in the present campaign.

4. The magnitude of oil consumption in Germany and occupied countries when combined with military consumption, seems definitely to create, at least temporarily, a situation in which consumption is at a greater rate than production.

III. *The German Economic Position*

A. GERMAN MANPOWER RESOURCES

1. As early as 1935 the present regime in Germany began to extend a system of controls over employment; by 1936 a large-scale plan for the control of employment and the inventory, training, re-training, and allocation of labor was in effect. As a result of the carrying out of this plan Germany is in an extremely good position to make the most flexible and efficient use of her labor supplies.

2. At the outbreak of the war in 1939 the potential manpower resources of Greater Germany were already utilized to an extraordinarily high degree. It is estimated that employment in 1939 was 20 percent higher than in the prosperous year 1929.

3. Before the outbreak of the war in 1939, 2,500,000 men were withdrawn from employment into the armed services. At the outbreak of the Russian campaign this number had been increased by approximately 7 million.

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4. Estimates based on German sources indicate that, in partial replacement of the 7 million withdrawn from employment, Germany since 1939 has made the following additions to its labor force:

Foreign civilians	1,600,000
Prisoners of war	1,500,000
Women	500,000
Men	500,000
Volksdeutsche	150,000
	4,250,000

5. Qualitative impairment of the labor force has been as important as the net reduction in numbers. Prisoners of war, Polish and Italian civilian workers, men called back from retirement, and women workers do not provide adequate replacement for the men of active age drawn into military service.

6. Industrial output per hour worked showed no net increase between 1933 and 1939, and has undoubtedly declined since 1939, even among those employed in their normal occupations. This decline has been accentuated by the qualitative impairment of the labor force. The decline in average productivity per man-hour has been only partially offset by an increase in the number of hours worked per week.

7. As a result of the reduction and dilution of the labor force, together with some material shortages and transportation difficulties, there has occurred a decline in the volume of industrial output in Germany since 1939 which has been estimated by the BMEW to be as much as 20 percent. While evidence is lacking to support this figure, it is clear that total output has fallen. This decline was concentrated in the goods and services available to civilian consumers, while production of war materials probably increased.

8. Previous to 1939 the shift in production from civilian to military output had been such as to reduce per capita production and consumption of civilian goods by 10–15 percent below the 1929 level. Since 1939 this shift has been accentuated. Perhaps the most illuminating evidence of the concentration of effort in war production is the increase in employment in the metal trades by approximately 2,200,000, an increase of roughly 50 percent.

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GERMAN LABOR SHORTAGES

MAY 1939 Before the outbreak of the war in 1939 the 40 million workers in Greater Germany were practically all employed.

There were 2 million men in the armed forces

FALL 1941 The number employed had fallen to about 37 million in spite of recruitment of about 4 million new workers.



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9. Judgment as to the existence of a general manpower shortage in Germany is a matter of definition. It is obvious that manpower resources under German control are not sufficient for the maintenance of normal output for German civilians plus the requirements of the present war effort. A more reasonable criterion would be the maintenance of the present war effort plus a tolerable level of civilian output. There are evidences that this standard is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in Germany, especially since the outbreak of the Russian war, despite the exploitation of Continental manpower and other economic resources.

It is, however, impossible to allocate exactly the extent to which a manpower shortage, as opposed to shortages in transport, raw materials, and productive capacity, is responsible for present strains. Specific evidences of manpower shortage, by this definition are the extraordinarily long hours of work demanded of German labor; and the extreme efforts made to employ special types of foreign labor; e. g., Polish miners, Belgian and Dutch engineers, etc. A general manpower shortage, however, must be regarded as one of several over-all limits to German output, rather than as a bottleneck capable, in itself, of precipitating crisis.

10. Germany's most decisive and least manageable manpower problem is the shortage of men suitable for active combat troops. Here foreign manpower can be used to a strictly limited extent, and war prisoners are useless.

Due to the great fall in the number of births in 1914–18, Germany has only 2,244,000 men between the ages of 23 and 28—about 1,500,000 fewer than if the pre-war birth rate had been maintained. Even including those now 21 to 23, and those 28 to 33, there are only 7.2 million men from 21 to 33, and this is the best age group for active combat.

Losses from this group, undoubtedly heavy already, are virtually irreplaceable. This shortage may prove serious in the face of protracted Russian resistance and may be decisive should the manpower resources of hitherto noncombatant areas ever be fully mobilized against Germany.

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B. THE GERMAN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POSITION

1. Except in meats (rations for which were reduced 20 percent in June 1941) German food rations have remained about unchanged since early spring 1940. In order to assure most efficient use of available supplies, the German rationing system makes allowance for the differing requirements of various classes of consumers. They are largest for soldiers in active combat, and are larger for workers performing arduous labor than for other civilians.

2. Present German food rations can be most readily compared with pre-war consumption in the three important food groups—flour, meats, and fats and oils. For front-line soldiers, the rations of each of these items are somewhat larger than in 1936–37. For civilians as a whole, average flour rations have been reduced by 6 percent, fats and oils by 33 percent, and meats by 46 percent. The June 1941 cut in meat rations was announced as temporary. Restoration of the pre-June allotments would still leave consumer rations one-third below pre-war. German potato production is far in excess of human requirements, even though this consumption—which is not rationed—has increased by at least 50 percent for the old Reich as a whole. These increased shipments have further aggravated a transport situation which has, from time to time, created acute shortages of potatoes in some districts.

3. In terms of caloric, or energy, intake, present German diets appear adequate or nearly so; in terms of longer-run nutritional requirements for vitamins and calcium, diets are deficient. Besides lowering resistance to infection, these shortages will, if they persist, result eventually in deficiency diseases such as pellagra and rickets.

4. Without drawing on the Ukraine and without significant encroachment on existing stocks, Germany can maintain present flour rations during the crop year 1941–42. The 1941 grain crop appears to have been normal in Germany, and larger exports than in 1940–41 can be expected from the Danubian countries.

5. Present low meat rations can be maintained in Germany during the crop year 1941–42 without reduction in German livestock herds. This will involve, however, continued drastic restrictions on meat

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consumption in German dominated countries as well as additional slaughter of herds in Denmark and the Netherlands. Supplies of animal feedstuffs are, in any event, inadequate to maintain livestock population in these countries. Restoration of German meat rations to the pre-June level would necessitate a reduction in German livestock numbers.

6. Fats and oils are the weakest element in Germany's food position. In the year 1940–41, the German fats and oil stockpile had to supply over 20 percent of her domestic human utilization of such foods. Stocks on August 1, 1941, were estimated at little more than one month's consumption. Domestic production can supply only about 60 percent of requirements at the current level of rationing. Further curtailment of consumption during the coming winter and spring is definitely called for, unless additional supplies not now in prospect can be obtained. The present supply position, however, permits a level of consumption above that of 1916–18.

7. The German standard of living in items other than food has undergone substantial curtailment since the outbreak of war. New clothing rations have been introduced in October which involve a reduction of 50 percent from those previously in effect. Leather has virtually ceased to be a civilian consumers good. Fuel for domestic heating has been available only in limited amounts. Most durable consumer goods, already sharply curtailed before the outbreak of war, have become unavailable. In general, however, these shortages are not as dangerous, potentially, as those in nutritional foodstuffs.

8. Only the German position with respect to meats, fats, and oils emerges, as of possible strategic importance in the area of the economy examined here. Supplies for the 1941–42 year, however, may not present any insuperable difficulties. But, Germany will enter the 1942–43 year with depleted stocks of these commodities. Her present sources of imports will be able to provide less than in the current year, and it is unlikely that a victory in Russia can appreciably add to her prospects. Germany will have to depend more upon home production, particularly of livestock—which supplies the bulk of domestic fats and oils, as well as meats.

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

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9. Allotments of phosphate fertilizers in 1940–41 were about 40 percent of those in 1937–38. Crop yields in Germany may be adversely affected if increased supplies do not become available for next year's crops.

C. THE GERMAN MINERAL SUPPLY POSITION

1. In the period 1933–39 Germany prepared for a major war by taking the following types of action with respect to minerals in which her domestic supply was deficient:

(a) Large scale imports for stockpiling.

(b) Rigid controls and, later, restrictions on civilian consumption.

(c) The provision of facilities for the manufacture of substitutes on a large scale (notably oil).

(d) The substitution of abundant for scarce materials (notably the light metals and zinc for copper).

The German mineral position was materially strengthened as a result of the campaigns of 1940 by the acquisition of additional stocks and of new mineral resources.

2. Deficiencies in certain commodities have, nevertheless, persisted, and the Russian campaign has probably accentuated them, insofar as it calls for increased output in the aircraft and armament industries. Excluding the steel-hardening alloys, examined below, the present position of the German mineral supply may be summarized as follows:

German Position Secure: Bauxite and magnesite, coal and lignite, iron ore, manganese (assuming Nikopol mines available), zinc ore, lead ore, and mercury.

German Position Strained But Not Yet Critical: Copper, tin, antimony, phosphates, and coke.

3. A shortage in the steel hardening alloys has persisted, despite extreme efforts at conservation and substitution. Wherever possible the alloys have been eliminated and the percentages used, reduced. In general, molybdenum and, to a lesser extent, vanadium have been substituted for the more scarce nickel and tungsten. A sum-

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mary of the German position with respect to each of the major alloys follows:

Tungsten.—Portuguese output being expanded and going increasingly to Germany. Despite this development and extensive substitution of molybdenum, the German stockpile is probably being reduced, since the Russian war cut off the Chinese supply.

Molybdenum.—Yugoslavia, Norway, French Morocco and other areas probably yield about 15% of world output to Germany. Extreme effort being made to expand Continental output. Stockpile position probably better than for tungsten, but being slowly reduced.

Nickel.—Perhaps most serious of all alloy shortages. Stockpile probably being reduced quickly. Limited crisis may develop unless Petsamo mines can be set to work in Finland. This seems unlikely in near future.

Chrome.—Conflicting evidence on amount of Balkan supply coming to Germany. Stockpile probably being reduced, although full exploitation of Balkan resources might check trend.

Cobalt.—Necessary for both steel and hydrogenation. French Morocco only major source of supply. Probably sufficient if freely exploited and transport made available.

Vanadium.—Probably sufficient supply to be drawn from steel slag and burnt oil residue.

Manganese.—Ample supply, if Nikopol production successfully mined and transported from Ukraine.

4. It is impossible to evaluate precisely the net significance of the various shortages within the German mineral supply position. There is no reliable evidence that either the quality or the quantity of German military production has yet suffered in consequence of such shortages; although it should be borne in mind that output could be maintained for a considerable period out of stockpiles. Stockpiles are being reduced in the case of copper, tin, antimony, nickel, chrome, and tungsten. The moment of their exhaustion can not be deduced from available evidence, although crises have been predicted by the British in copper and chrome in the course of 1942.

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D. THE GERMAN PETROLEUM POSITION

1. To ensure an adequate petroleum supply in case of a major war has been a prime objective of German policy since 1933. Between 1933 and 1939 the following types of action were pursued:

(a) Large stocks were accumulated from abroad.

(b) The domestic output of crude oil was sharply increased.

(c) Large plant facilities were provided for the manufacture of synthetic petroleum products.

(d) Less essential uses were curtailed.

2. The acquisition through conquest of the prime oil producing areas of Europe has probably constituted a net accretion to Germany's petroleum supply, although that accretion was limited by the simultaneous acquisition of responsibility for satisfying the minimum petroleum needs of Italy and the occupied areas.

Quantitative appraisals are subject to a wide margin of error, but the situation in the year between the end of the campaign in the West and the beginning of the campaign in Russia appears to have been roughly as follows:

(a) With the completion of the Western campaign in 1940 and with the Continent-wide application of stringent economies, it would appear that the relation between consumption and production was such as to permit at least a balance, at a level of 14–16 million tons annually, and probably some accretion to military stocks.

(b) This relatively secure situation, however, depended not only upon widespread use of substitute fuels and stringent economies but also upon the fact that the German armies were not used actively and on a large scale in the year following June 1940.

(c) Within the rough equilibrium or surplus that appears to have existed, there may have been shortages of particular products, notably Diesel fuel and lubricants; and some surplus, under existing economies, of certain types of gasoline. Some observers hold, however, that there is almost complete flexibility as regards the proportion of particular products available to Germany, provided the total basic petroleum supplies are adequate.

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3. The Russian campaign has altered this situation in the following respects:

(a) Total consumption of petroleum has undoubtedly increased substantially, despite further curtailment in less essential uses.

(b) Difficulties of oil transport from Rumania to Germany, which had inhibited the effectiveness of this area as a source of supply, are reported to have been somewhat alleviated; and it has proved possible to send Rumanian oil directly North and East, to the Axis armies in the field.

(c) Russian petroleum supplies, previously available at the rate of about a million tons a year, have been cut off and this has been only partly offset by the acquisition of the Galician fields.

(d) Heavier R. A. F. bombings have probably impaired the operating efficiency of refineries and synthetic plants in Western Europe and destroyed some oil stocks.

Almost all estimates of current consumption indicate that Germany is at present maintaining its war machine partly out of petroleum stocks, accumulated before June 1941. Estimates of the rate at which depletion is proceeding vary; the extreme calculations, chiefly British, indicate that the present rate, if maintained, would exhaust German petroleum resources within the next calendar year.

4. The following factors make complete exhaustion unlikely within the next year:

(a) More moderate estimates of continental consumption suggest that the drain on stocks may be as little as 10 percent per year.

(b) The intensity of warfare, and therefore the oil consumption rate, will probably not remain steadily at its present high level.

(c) The possibility that Germany will gain control of the fairly accessible oil fields of the Northern Caucasus. In that case, substantial quantities of oil will probably be obtained, regardless of Russian sabotage and the difficulties of transport.

(d) There is still a small margin by which civilian consumption can be reduced; and the possibility of using producer and bottle gas equipment in motor vehicles and other industrial and commercial uses has not been fully exploited.

(e) New synthetic oil plants may be brought into production.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

(f) The Rumanian oil fields may be exploited more fully.

5. On the basis of present evidence, therefore, it cannot be predicted that Germany will suffer a critical petroleum shortage in 1942.

E. THE GERMAN TRANSPORT SITUATION

1. Upon the outbreak of war in 1939 the German transport system was probably in good physical condition. At that time, however, the limit of intensive utilization of rolling stock had about been reached; subsequent transport demands have been met largely by curtailing civilian services.

2. From 1939 the traffic burden of the railways has been increased by the reduction in coastwise shipping and in trucking, due to the gasoline shortage. The relocation of industry and the increased use of coal, wood pulp, bauxite, and potatoes in the development of substitutes have also increased the transport load. The acquisition of transport responsibilities in east and southeast Europe has probably involved some net liability to the German transport system. France and the Low countries, on the other hand, probably contributed an important accretion of rolling stock and locomotives.

3. Until the Russian campaign the transport facilities under German control proved adequate generally for the requirements of the war economy. This rough equilibrium was achieved by curtailing civilian services, by avoiding coincidence between the harvest peak load and large scale military movements, and through the above-mentioned accretion of rolling stock. The greatest period of strain occurred during the winter of 1939–40, when the unusually severe freeze immobilized the inland waterways (which carry 25 percent of all freight).

4. The additional burden imposed by the Russian campaign has been sufficient to cause symptoms of a transport shortage, potentially capable of reducing the total efficiency of the German war economy; coal has accumulated at pitheads in Silesia, crop movements have been delayed, measures to increase the use of waterways have been taken, and efforts have been made to speed the loading and unloading of trains. Local shortages of consumers goods have accentuated

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

an already difficult civilian position, both in Germany and in occupied areas.

5. The significance of the present transport shortage is difficult to evaluate on the basis of present limited information. Thus far civilians have largely borne the impact of the new strains induced by the Russian war. Coal shipments to Italy and Sweden have been reduced and shortages of supplies for German war industries have been reported. The extent and the rate at which the output of military equipment and their supply to the fighting fronts may be affected can not be stated. The immediate seriousness of the situation can readily be exaggerated, but at the very least, the shortage means that organizational and material resources, which are vitally needed in uses that contribute more directly to military success, must be devoted to the alleviation of the transport difficulties. It may be possible to measure the degree of strain more closely during the coming winter, when pressure on the German transport system would, in any case, be expected to increase.

F. THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMAN MORALE

1. From 1933, and even before, German morale was prepared for the responsibilities and hardships of offensive military action. The advent of the National Socialist regime was accompanied by the institution of elaborate efforts to control and direct public opinion to this end.

2. Nazi propaganda theorists have realized that during a modern total war efforts to control public opinion work within narrow limits: The real underlying factors remain, as elsewhere, the success, actual and prospective, of military operations and the hardships and discomforts borne by the people.

3. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 until June 1941 the strength of German morale was unquestioned. This may be regarded essentially as a consequence of the great German victories and, perhaps more important, the feeling that total victory was certain and within sight.

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4. The prolonged and difficult campaign in the East has affected German morale in the following respects:

(a) Civilian supplies of all kinds have been diminished due, in part, to the pressure on transport facilities and on the labor supply.

(b) British bombing has been intensified.

(c) Manpower losses have been sufficiently heavy to impress themselves upon the public.

(d) Perhaps most important, total victory has ceased to be an immediate prospect for Germany.

5. The official response of the propaganda ministry to this situation has been to present total victory against total annihilation as the only real alternatives for the German people.

6. This suggests that the necessary condition for a "collapse of German morale" is the universal realization, as a result of serious military set-backs, that ultimate defeat is inevitable. Further drastic reductions in the civilian standard of life are capable of weakening morale in such a way as to make it more susceptible to military reverses and to collapse.

7. Another possibility must be recognized, however. Should the tide of the war run strongly against Germany it is possible that German public opinion will shift from its present offensive attitude to one of last-ditch defense; and the full power of the propaganda ministry will be directed to that end. In that case, a distinct "collapse of morale" may not occur. But even this possibility is contingent upon a belief in some chance of German victory, coupled with a conviction that Allied victory would bring vengeance and disaster to the German people rather than peace and better living.

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PSF
Safe: Germany

AF

PLAIN

Bern

Dated December 27, 1941

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

452, twenty-seventh.

German press twenty-sixth devoted to American participation in war and Japanese successes, without mentioning Axis reverses, Eastern Front, North Africa; all newspapers give prominence to Hitler's decree death penalty for misuse winter clothing collected for Front soldiers. VOLKISCHER BEOBACHTER calls for enlistment noncommissioned officers for air force schools. Beginning April 1, 1942, applicants seventeen to eighteen years old enlist for twelve years. Same paper states "before Winston Churchill entered White House he was faced with fait accompli in contrast to his prototype Woodrow Wilson. Roosevelt has shown himself to be a good business man. Roosevelt stated with air of dictator that agreement had been concluded between United States and Canada, head of which still remains George VI, which entirely subordinates Canada's war production United States. This agreement, advantageous

to United

to United States, is another proof of steady bleeding to death British possessions and colonies, whereby Roosevelt makes England pay for America's help. This is only reason for Churchill's visit to Washington." Christmas number FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG quotes Ribbentrop interview with Spanish newspapermen thus "Mister Roosevelt is entirely responsible for extension of this war; he wanted to cut Japan off from its natural supplies of raw materials in Far East and wished to subject Japanese to laws of Wall Street millionaires. He wanted to strangle Japan just as Mister Churchill and Mister Roosevelt attempted to strangle Germany and Italy in Europe. Mister Roosevelt's method was so aggressive, insulting and meaningless that normal person must ask whether this crazy attitude could have been dictated by a sane mind". Ribbentrop stated he had been told that for some time past Mister Roosevelt has suffered from ever increasing hallucinations. Ribbentrop denied cooperation between Axis powers for attack on democracies had been planned long in advance affirming original idea of Tripartite Pact had been front against Bolshevism. When he was German Ambassador in London he had made every effort to persuade Great Britain to join Anti-Commintern Alliance. If

Mister

Mister Roosevelt now claimed Tripartite Pact had been signed purpose conquering world, this could only be considered statement of psychopath suffering from persecution mania; actually such statement but thinly veils intentions of a megalomaniac who himself wishes to conquer world and to camouflage his intentions, accuses Tripartite partners of what he himself is striving to attain. Ribbentrop statement commenting on Washington conference ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG states conference between two statesmen is proof of catastrophic position in which two powers find themselves result destruction American Pacific fleet and threatened loss Singapore. In Berlin little interest shown in outcome of conference but symptomatic significance under present military developments strongly emphasized. Certain controversies between British and American press have already led to differences regarding tactical and strategic leadership joint campaign as remarkably revealed Washington conference. British radio comments are considered remarkably interesting giving unmistakable proof that American fleet which according to declaration Secretary Knox was seeking Japanese fleet has not hurried to rescue Philippines or Singapore.

DD HUDDLE

Post

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

July 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached cable from Harrison at Bern, while, of course, without confirmation, is of such possible importance that I wish to be sure that you see it.

S CH:ARK

C.H.

Bern - Russo-German Peace Talks PSF Safe: Germany

MEC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Bern
Dated July 27, 1942
Rec'd 6:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3467, July 27, 6 p.m.

My 3184, July 8. Same source has obtained following from informant he considers sure.

Some time prior offensive Russia this summer Germans asked Japs sound out Soviets view separate peace. When Hitler discovered Japs using mission their own advantage administered rebuke and started offensive. Boris, knowing Hitler interested in effecting deal with Soviets, sent his brother-in-law to meet Hitler's personal physician in Switzerland while he contacted Soviets who showed willingness to talk. Exchange of views took place in Geneva. No information available how far talks have got but are continuing. Endeavoring confirm. Will report further.

HARRISON

WWC

Dec. 14.

Dear Miss Tully:

Will you try to get me some kind of an answer on this?

J.F.C.

Bot

PSF
Safe
Germany

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 14, 1942.

REPORT ON KEY NAZIS.

Henry Field and I have the attached list of 400 key Nazis, and expect to have a total of 4,000 such Nazi officials in the near future, on whom we are getting brief, essential biographical data. We thought that you might be interested in having the files, as they are completed, to supplement those already supplied to you by O.S.S. The entire cost of this project will be about $1,000 and I am prepared to pay it out of the funds already assigned for this Unit, but before making any commitments I wanted to know whether such a file would be of any practical value or interest to you.

J.F.C.

December 10, 1942

LIST OF KEY NAZIS

A

ADAM, Wilhelm	Generalleutnant
ADANCZYK, Joseph Joachim	Landeshauptmann der Provinz Oberschlesien Untergauleiter der NSDAP Oberschlesien
ALBRECHT, Conrad	Vizeadmiral
ALBRECHT, Herbert	Ph.D. agr. Reichsredner Gauleiter
ALLWOERDEN, Wilhelm von	Senator in Hamburg Obergauleiter in Altona
ALPERS, Friedrich	Staatsminister in Braunschweig
d'ALQUEN, Gunter	Schriftleiter des Voelkischen Beobachter SS Obersturmfuehrer
ALTEN, Karl Wilhelm Victor von	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Gau 15
AMANN, Max	Verlagsdirektor Praesident der Reichspressekammer
AMEND, Otto	Rechtsanwalt Gaufuehrer im Stab der Rechtsabteilung der Reichsleitung
AMMERLAHN, Gotthart	Obergebietsfuehrer der H.J.
ARAUNER, Richard	Diplomlandwirt, Siegelbewahrer des Deutschen Reichsbauernrates
ARNDT, Guenther	Gaufuehrer des Arbeitsgaues II
ARNOLD, Alfred	Landesbauernfuehrer in Wuerttemberg
AUTRUM, Otto	Leiter der Oberpostdirektion

B

BACKE, Herbert	Reichslandwirtschafts-minister
BALLARIN, Hans-Georg	Abteilungsleiter im Amt fuer Volkswohlfahrt
BANGERT, Heinrich	Gaubetriebszellenobmann, Duesseldorf
BANNEMANN, Emil	Senator Kreisamtsleiter der NSV fuer Luebeck
BARTELS, Friedrich Georg Christian	Dr. med. Ministerialrat im Reichsministerium des Innern
BAUER, Arthur Emil	PH.D. Hauptabteilungsleiter IV der Landesbauerns schaft, Sachsen
BAUER, Robert	Beauftragter der Parteileitung
BAUMANN, Hans	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Gau 30
BEERMANN, Johannes	Evangl. Bischof van Danzig
BEINTKER, Paul	Referent im Aufklaerungs und Presseamt bei der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes
BEINZGER, Walter	Landesobmann fuer die baeuerliche Selbstver-waltung Weimar
BELDING, Robert	Reichsbetriebsgruppen-leiter Textil der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
BENNINGHOFF, Wilhelm	Direktor Technisches Vorstandsmitglied der BVG
BENZE, Rudolf	Ph.D Ministerialrat im Preussischen Kultusministerium

BERNDT, Alfred-Ingemar	Hauptschriftleiter des Deutschen Nachrichtenbureaus
BERNHARDT, Otto H.	Konsul von Siam a.D. Senator in Bremen
BERTRAM, Kurt	Braunschweigischer Staatsrat
BESOLD, Andreas, Wilhelm Otto	Praesident der Reichspostdirektion Nuernberg
BEST, Werner	Dr. jur. Gesandter in Daenemark
BIALLAS, Hans	Hauptschriftleiter des Fachpresseamtes der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Berlin
BEIBER, Rudolf	Adjutant des Generals Loerzer, Berlin
BISCHOFF, Willi	Fuehrer des Reichsverbandes Deutsche Zeitschriften
BLANK, Max	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Duesseldorf
BLUME, Hermann	Sonderbeauftragter des Reichsarbeitsministers fuer Musikwesen, Berlin
BOCK, Fedor von	Generalfeldmarschall
BODMANN, Franz	Praesident der Industrie- und Handelskammer fuer Suedhannover, Goettingen
BOENOLD, Otto	Reichsfachschaftsleiter des NS-Lehrerbundes, Berlin
BOERGER, Wilhelm Heinrich	Treuhaender der Arbeit Preussischer Staatsrat, Koeln
BOHLE, Ernst Wilhelm	Gauleiter, Staatssekretaer im Auswaertigen Amt Leiter der NSDAP im Stabe des Stellvetreters des Fuehrers
BOLLMANN, Hans	PH.D. Hauptschriftleiter im Deutschen Nachrichtenbureau, Berlin
BOLTZ, Wilhelm	Polizeipraesident von Hamburg

BONGARD, Oscar	Militaerintendant Referent im Reichsministerium des Innern
BONSEN, Rudolf zur	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesident Stettin
BOUHLER, Philipp	Reichsleiter, Muenchen
BRAUCHITSCH, Walter von	Generalfeldmarschall
BREDOW, Reinhard	Landesbauernfuehrer im Reichsbauernamt
BRESGEN, Hermann	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesident Schneidemuehl
BRETZLER, Joseph	Dr. rer.pol. Stabsleiter des Generalsekretariats beim Reichsstand des Deutschen Handwerks, Berlin
BRILL, Justin	Dr. rer.pol. Referent des Fuehrer des Reichsbundes des deutschen Beamten, Berlin
BRINCKMANN, Paul A.	Schatzmeister der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
BRINKMANN, Edgar F.H.	Verlagsdirektor Amtsleiter der Reichsleitung der NSDAP
BRIX, Emil	Oberbuergermeister der Stadt Altona
BRUCKER, Ludwig	Leiter des Amtes fuer Sozialversicherung in der Deutschen Arbeitsfront Beauftragter des Reichsarbeitsministers zur Fuehrung des Reichsverbandes der Ortskrankenkassen, Berlin
BRUECKNER, Friedrich Wilhelm	Adjutant des Reichskanzlers und Ober - Gruppenfuehrer der SA
BRUECKNER, Helmuth	Oberpraesident van Schlesien Gauleiter, Breslau
BUCH, Walter	Reichsleiter des Obersten Parteigerichts

BUERCKEL, Joseph . . . . . Gauleiter

BURCHARD-MOTZ, Wilhelm . . . . . Dr. jur. Senator
2. Buergermeister in Hamburg

BURGSTALLER, Ulrich . . . . . Senator Luebeck

BUSCH, Karl . . . . . Hauptschriftleiter des
"Deutschen" und Amtsleiter
der Obersten Leitung der
PO der NSDAP

BUSCH, Walther . . . . . Dr.Jur. Oberbuergermeister,
Meissen

C

CARIUS, Karl . . . . . Gaubetriebszellenobmann
Suedhannover,Braunschweig

CERFF, Karl . . . . . Gebietsfuehrer
Abteilungsleiter Rundfunk
in der Reichsjugendfuehrung
Beauftragter des
Reichsjugendfuehrers in der
Reichssendeleitung, Berlin

CHRIST, Ludwig . . . . . Oberbuergermeister der
Stadt Trier

CHRISTIANSEN, Carl Friedrich . . . . . Polizeipraesident von
Harburg-Wilhelmsburg

CHRISTIANSEN, Friedrich . . . . . General der Flieger;
Militaergovernor von Holland

CLASSEN, Franz . . . . . Treuhaender der Arbeit
Wirtschaftsgebiet Pommern
Stettin

CONTI, Leonardo . . . . . M.D. Staatsrat
Ministerialrat im Preussischen
Ministerium des Innern,
Berlin

COSSEL, Maximilian von . . . . . Adjutant des
Reichskriegsopferfuehrers,
Berlin

CSAKI, Richard . . . . . PH.D. Leiter des Deutschen
Auslandsinstitutes, Stuttgart

D

DAITZ, Werner	Gesandter Leiter der Abteilung Aussenhandel im Aussenpolitischen Amt der NSDAP, Berlin
DALUEGE, Kurt	Ministerialdirektor im Reichsinnenministerium; General der Preussischen Landespolizei now: Heydrichs successor in Prague
DAMRAU, Hans	Dr. Jur. Kommissarischer Oberbuergermeister, Iserlohn
DAUSER, Hans	Staatssekretaer, Obermenzing b. Muenchen
DEECKE, Karl	Landwirt und Domaenenpaechter, Landesobmann
DEWITZ, Hermann von	Hauptgeschaeftsfuehrer im Reichsstand des Deutschen Handels, Berlin
DIECKELMANN, Bruno	Gaubetriebszellenleiter Reichsbetriebsgruppenleiter, Oldenburg
DIETRICH, Hans Albert	Prof. Dr. med. Landesobermedizianalrat Direktor der Landesfrauenklinik
DIETRICH, Otto	Dr. rer.pol. Reichspressechef der NSDAP, Berlin; Staatssekretaer im Propagandaministerium
DIETZE, Paul	Landesgruppenfuehrer im Reichsluftschutzbund, Berlin
DOEHLA, Heinrich	Polizeigeneral und Inspektor der uniformierten Staatspolizei, Muenchen
DOENECKE, Werner	Dr.jur. Buergermeister, Blankenburg
Drechsler, Otto Heinrich	Buergermeister Luebeck
DREIER, Karl	Landespraesident, Bueckeburg
DRESSLER - ANDRESS, Horst	Ministerialrat Leiter des gesamten deutschen Rundfunkwesens, Berlin

DREYER, Otto	Landeshauptabteilungsleiter III, Gollenberg
DUENNEBIER, Helmuth	Polizeidirektor von Zwickau
DUNKEL, Hermann	Hauptabteilungsleiter II der Landesbauernschaft Westfalen
DUSCHOEN, Ernest	Landesobmann der NSBO Bezirksleiter der DAF, Koenigsberg

E

EBERT, Karl Wilhelm	Praesident des Landesfinanzamtes Leipzig
EGGELING, Joachim Albrecht	Landesbauernfuehrer Sachsen-Anhalt Staatsrat
EHLERS, Hans	Praeses der Gewerbekammer Bremen
EICHINGER, Friedrich	Reichsstabsleiter der Reichshauptabteilung IV des Reichsnaehrstandes Berlin
EISENBECK, Martin B.	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Frankfurt/O.
ELTZ-RUEBENACH, Kuno	Reichsfreiherr Landesbauernfuehrer der Rheinprovinz, Burg Wahn
ELTZ-RUEBENACH, Paul	Freiherr von Reichsminister fuer Post und Verkehr
ENGEL, Fritz Karl	Polizeipraesident, Stettin SS-Oberfuehrer
ENGEL, Johannes	Bezirksleiter der Deutschen Arbeitsfront Stadtrat fuer das Volkschulwesen, Berlin
ENGELBRECHT, Otto	Leiter des Organizationsamtes der Nationalsozialistischen Kriegsopferversorgung, Berlin

ENGELKEN, Dietrich, Windelar	Senator, Hamburg
EPP, Ritter von	Reichsstatthalter von Bayern, Muenchen
ERBERSDOBLER, Otto	Praesident der niederbayerischen Handelskammer Passau. Regensburg
ERDMANN, Walter	Landesobmann der Landesbauernschaft Sachsen
ERNST, Robert	Dr. rer.pol. Bundesfuehrer des Deutschen Schutzbundes, Berlin
ESSER, Hermann	Bayerischer Wirtschaftsminister, Muenchen
ETTERICH, Arthur	Gauarbeitsfuehrer, Koblenz
EVERS, Emil	Landrat, Koethen
EXSS, Ernst	Polizeihauptmann, Stettin
F	
FAATZ, Fr. Wilhelm	Gauarbeitsfuehrer Wiesbaden
FABRICIUS, Hans Eugen Stephan	Dr. Jur. Oberregierungsrat Berlin
FIEBING, Hermann	Landeshauptmann der Provinz Grenzmark-Posen-Westpreussen, Schneidemuehl
FIEHLER, Karl	Oberbuergermeister, Muenchen
FISCHER, Hugo	Stellvertretender Reichspropagandaleiter der NSDAP Reichsfachschaftsfuehrer der NSRDW, Muenchen
FISCHER, Ludwig	Dr.jur.Reichsamtsleiter stellvertretender Leiter der Rechtsabteilung Reichsleitung der NSDAP SA Standartenfuehrer

FLECK, Wolfgang	General
FLORIAN, Friedrich Karl	Gauleiter der NSDAP, Duesseldorf
FOERSTER, Friedrich	Oberbuergermeister, Ulm
FOERSTER, Richard	Admiral
FORSTER, Albert	Preussischer Staatsrat Gauleiter Danzig
FRANK, Hans	Reichsjustizkommissar; Generalgouverneur von Polen; Staatsminister der Justiz Praesident der Akademie fuer Deutsches Recht Fuehrer des Bundes Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juristen, Berlin
FRANZ, Hermann Friedrich	Polizeidirektor, Plauen
FREISLER, Roland	Justiz-minister Preussischer Staatsrat, Berlin
FREY, Kurt	Treuhaender der Arbeit fuer Bayern, Muenchen
FREYTACH-LORINGHOVEN, Axel	Freiherr von, Dr. jur. Universitaetsprofessor Preussischer Staatsrat
FRICK, Wilhelm	Dr. jur. Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin
FRITSCH, Karl	Saechsicher Staatsminister des In ern und stellvertretender Gauleiter, Dresden
FRITSCH, Theodor, Frohmund Herbert .	Obergruppenleiter der NSDAP, Leipzig
FRITSCHE, Hanns	Dr. jur. Ordentliches Mitglied der Akademie des Deutschen Rechts
FROMM, Ernst	Dr. jur. Regierungspraesident des Regierungsbezirks Potsdam

FROMM, Fritz . . . . . General

FUNK, Walther . . . . . Reichswirtschaftsminister

G

GAREIS, Hanns . . . . . Dr. rer.pol. Diplomlandwirt Reichsnaehrstand, Berlin

GELBERG, Wilhelm Eberhard..... Polizeipraesident, Krefeld
Sturmbannfuehrer

GERCKE, Achim ..... Der Sachverstaendige fuer
Rassenforschung beim
Reichsministerium des Innern,
Berlin

GIESECKE, Gustav..... Landesbauernfuehrer,
Braunschweig

GOEBBELS, Joseph ..... Ph.D. Reichsminister fuer
Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda,
Berlin

GOERDELER, Carl Friedrich ..... Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeister,
Leipzig

GOERLACH, Richard Wilhelm Dietrich .. Oberlandwirtschaftsrat
Reichskommissar Reichsministerium
fuer Ernaehrung, Berlin

GOERING, Hermann ..... Ministerpraesident
Reichsminister der Luftfahrt,
Berlin; etc.

GOERLITZER, Artur ..... Stellvertretender Gauleiter,
Berlin

GOHDES, Otto..... Reichsschulungsleiter der
NSDAP und DAF Leiter des
Amtes Ausbildung der NS-
Gemeinschaft "Kraft durch
Freude"

GOLTZ, Ruediger..... Graf von der, Generalmajor a.D.

GOLTZ, Ruediger..... Graf von der, Dr. jur.
Preussischer Staatsrat
Stellvertreter des Fuehrers
der Gesamt - organisation der
Wirtschaft, Stettin

GREINER, Erich ..... Dr. jur. Ministerialdirektor
im Reichs-ministerium fuer
Volksaufklaerung und Propa-
ganda, Berlin

GRIMM, Wilhelm .....Reichsleiter der NSDAP, Muenchen

GRIMME, Hans .....Generalleutnant a.D. Praesident des Reichs-luftschutzbundes, Berlin

GROHE, Josef.....Gauleiter des Gaues Koeln-Aachen Preussischer Staatsrat

GROSS, Hermann .....Diplomlandwirt, Gruender der Bauernschaft Saar

GRUNERT, Richard.....Polizeipraesident Muenchen-Gladbach, Rheydt

GUETT, Arthur ..... M.D. Ministerialdirektor Leiter der Abteilung Volksgesundheit im Reichsministerium des Innern

GUNZER, Karl .....Leiter der Landesstelle Schlesien des Reichsministeriums fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda, Breslau

GUTSMIEDL, Franz.....Reichsbetriebsgruppenleiter Landwirtschaft der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, Berlin

H

HAAKE, Heinrich .....Landeshauptmann, Rheinprovinz, Duesseldorf

HABBES, Wilhelm.....Landesbauernobmann der Provinz Westfalen, Muenster

HADAMOVSKY, Eugen.....Reichssendeleiter Direktor der Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft, Berlin

HAID, August .....Fuehrer der Deutschen Angestelltenschaft, Berlin

HAMANN, Erhardt.....M.D. Vorsitzender der Aerztekammer Sachsen, Halle

HANKE, Karl.....Staatssekretaer im Reichsministerium fuer Volksaufklaerung und Propaganda, Berlin

HARDT, Otto .....Generalstaatsanwalt Koenigsberg/Pr.

HASSELMAYR, Friedrich....SA Gruppenfuehrer, Muenchen

HAUSHOFER, Karl.....Universitaetsprofessor, Muenchen; General a.D.

HAYLER, Franz .....Reichsbeauftragter fuer den Deutschen Einzelhandel, Muenchen

HEINKEL, Ernst .....Flugzeugkonstrukteur

HEINZE, Bruno,Otto,Hermann...Gauarbeitsfuehrer Oberschlesien, Oppeln

HELLDORF, Wolf .....Graf von, Polizeipraesident von Berlin

HERRMANN, Fritz .....Polizeipraesident von Hagen

HESS, Fritz .....Bauer und Buergermeister, Dannenfels

HESS, Rudolf Walter Richard..Stellvertreter des Fuehrers a.D. now Prisoner-of-War in England

HESSE, Wilhelm ..... Ph.D. Oberbuergermeister, Braunschweig

HIERL, Constantin .....Staatssekretaer fuer den Arbeitsdienst

HILDEBRANDT, Richard ....SS - Brigadefuehrer, Goerlitz

HILGENFELDT, Erich.....Amtsleiter im Amt fuer Volkswohlfahrt bei der Obersten Leitung der PO der NSDAP, Berlin

HILLEBRANDT, Albert.....Oberbuergermeister, Muenster

HILLMER, Theodor.....Dr. jur. Praesident des Landesfinanzamtes Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel

HIMMLER, Heinrich ..... Reischsfuehrer der SS Kommandeur der gesamten deutschen Polizei

HINKLER, Paul ..... Polizeipraesident bon Altona-Wandsbeck

HOFFMANN, Heinrich ..... Reichsbildberichterstatter der NSDAP, Berlin

HOFFMANN, Hans Georg.....Regierungspraesident von Ober- und Mittelfranken Obergruppenfuehrer der SA Suedost, Ansbach

HOSSFELDT, Johannes .....Landesfinanzamtspraesident, Breslau

J

JAGOW, Hans-Georg von .....Regierungspraesident Magdeburg

JARMER, Ernst.....Landeshauptmann der Provinz Pommern, Stettin

JOEL, Georg.....Ministerpraesident, Oldenburg

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JUNACK, Rudolf..... Ph.D. Referent im Aufklaerungs- und Presseamt der Reichsleitung des Arbeitsdienstes, Berlin

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KLAIBER, Rudolf.....Polizeipraesident Stuttgart

KLEMM, Kurt.....Polizeipraesident Recklinghausen

KNOFE, Oskar Paul.....Polizeipraesident Leipzig

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KOEHLER, Walter.....Ministerpraesident Baden

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KRAUSE, Albert..... Gauarbeitsfuehrer Koenigsberg/ Pr.

KREBS, Fritz..... Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeister Staatsrat, Frankfurt/M.

KRUPP von Bohlen und Halbach, Gustav.... Dr. jur. ausserordentlicher Gesandter und bevollmaechtigter Minister

L

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LETTOW-VORBECK, Paul von ..... Bremer Staatsrat, Bremen

LEVETZOW, Magnus von ..... Polizeipraesident a.D

LEY, Robert ..... Fuehrer der Deutschen Arbeitsfront Reichsleiter der NSDAP

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LIPPERT, Julius ..... Oberbuergermeister in Berlin

LIST, Wilhelm ..... Generalfeldmarschall

LOEBLICH, Otto ..... Bremer Staatsrat Kriminalkommissar, Bremen

LOEPER, Wilhelm Friedrich..... Reichsstatthalter von Braunschweig und Anhalt, Dessau

LUTZE, Viktor ..... Stabschef der SA Staatsrat

M

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MARSCHLER, Willi Ministerpraesident, Weimar

MATTHAI, Kurt ..... Regierungspraesident, Muenster

MEERWALD, Willy ..... Dr. jur. Oberregierungsrat
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MILCH, Erhard ..... Generalfeldmarschall

MUELLER, Ludwig ..... Reichsbischof, Berlin

MURR, Wilhelm ..... Gauleiter
Reichsstatthalter in Wuerttemberg,
Stuttgart

MUTSCHMANN, Hugo Georg ..... Gewerbekammerpraesident
Kreisamtsleiter, Plauen

N

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NEURATH, Constantin ..... Freiherr von

NICOLAI, Helmut ..... Dr. jur. Ministerialdirektor im
Reichsministerium des Innern

NIEDERHOFF, Friedrich Karl ..... Polizeipraesident Oberhausen

NIEHOFF, Heinrich ..... Polizeigeneral Breslau

ORTLEPP, Walter ..... Polizeipraesident, Weimar

OTTO, Helmut ..... Dr. med Oberbuergermeister Solingen

OTTO, Kurt ..... Landeshauptmann Sachsen, Merseburg

P

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POSSE, Hans Ernst ..... Dr. jur. 2. Staatssekretaer im
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R

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RECHENBACH, Horst.....SS

REEDER, Eggert.....Regierungspraesident Aachen

REINHARDT, Fritz .....Staatssekretaer im Reichsfinanzministerium Berlin

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RIBBENTROP, Joachim von	Aussenminister
RICKERT, Ludwig	Oberbuergermeister der Stadt Bonn
ROMBACH, Wolfram	Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeis-ter Kreisleiter, Offenburg
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S	
SAUCKEL, Fritz	Reichsstatthalter in Thuringen, Weimar
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SCHIRACH, Baldur von	Reichsjugendfuehrer
SCHMID, Carl Christian	Staatssekretaer Regierungspraesident Duesseldorf
SCHWEDE, Franz	Oberpraesident Gauleiter, Stettin
SCHWARZ, Franz Xaver	Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP

SIEVERS, Wilhelm	Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeister, Flensburg
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STICHTENOTH, Fritz	Dr. rer.pol. Staatsminister, Neustrelitz
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T	
TELSCHOW, Otto	Preussischer Staatsrat Gauleiter Ost-Hannover, Buchholz
TROTHA, Adolf von	Preussischer Staatsrat, Glienicke Admiral a.D.
TSCHAMMER - OSTEN, Hans von	Reichssportfuehrer
TSCHISCHWITZ, Erich von	General der Infanterie a.D.
W	
WAGENFUEHR, Hans	Dr. jur. Oberbuergermeister, Duesseldorf
WAGNER, Adolf	Staatsminister des Innern in Bayern
WAGNER, Robert	Gauleiter Reichsstatthalter, Karlsruhe

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE PRESIDENT

ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

Lock Box

FROM: Lt. Comdr. Earle
TO: Mr. Harry Hopkins

DATE: 2 October 1943

REFERENCE MY LAST TELEGRAM REGARDING POSSIBLE GERMAN REPRISALS. MAVROUDI TURKISH CITIZEN OF GREEK BLOOD CORRESPONDENT HERE LONDON TIMES GIVES ME FOLLOWING: GERMAN WOMAN CONSIDERED RELIABLE TELLS HIM SHE PERSONALLY SAW 3 WEEKS AGO LETTER ADDRESSED TO ALL HIGH GERMAN OFFICIALS FROM BERLIN TELLING THEM TO HAVE NO WORRY ABOUT MILITARY SITUATION AS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME AN ATTACK SO TERRIBLE WOULD BE MADE ON ENGLAND THAT FEW BRITISH INHABITANTS WOULD SURVIVE. THE NATURE OF THE ATTACK WAS NOT GIVEN. MAVROUDI WITH ME BELIEVES THIS IS GERMAN PROPAGANDA BUT HE AND I ARE NOT SO SURE. I ASK MYSELF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: FIRST WOULD HITLER, GOERING, GOEBBELS REPEATEDLY PROMISE TO GERMAN PEOPLE TERRIBLE REPRISALS FOR SO CALLED BRITISH TERROR RAIDS REALIZING FAILURE OF THESE REPRISALS TO MATERIALIZE WOULD INTENSIFY ALREADY BAD GERMAN MORALE AND COMPLETELY DISCREDIT THEMSELVES. SECOND ARE THE NAZI LEADERS TO STUPID AS TO BELIEVE CIRCULATION OF VAGUE AND OMINOUS WHISPERS OF IMPENDING DOOM WOULD MODIFY UNITED NATIONS TERMS OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THIRD IS COMPARATIVE INACTIVITY OF LUFTWAFFE AN INDICATION OF PREPARATIONS FOR SOME GREAT BLITZ.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 904901
By HRM/SG, NARA, Date 2/15/91

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

COPY

FROM: ALUSNA, BEYOGLU, TURKEY

TO: MR HARRY HOPKINS

DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1943

ITALIAN AIR ATTACHE CALLED TODAY TO ANNOUNCE READINESS COOPERATE. HE SAYS RELATIVE INACTIVITY OF LUFTWAFFE DUE FUEL SHORTAGE AND GIVES NO CREDENCE TO GERMAN THREAT DESCRIBED IN MY 231313.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By EMM, NARS Date 3/22/55

SECRET

Jock Boy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1944.

This is a very rough suggestion made by me -- among others -- for a subdivision of Germany after the peace.

F.D.R.

GERMANY

No. 221



GOODE'S SERIES OF BASE MAPS
HENRY M. LEPPARD, EDITOR

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