

● PSF

State: Hopkins

Pres

Hopkins

BF Safe: Hopkins

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 14, 1941

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

138, January 14, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM MR. HOPKINS:

"Weekend with Churchill. Leaving for tour naval bases with him today. Saw King yesterday. Well and confident. He sends warm regards to you. Your message received well here. Am urging Government here not to create or accentuate differences between us pending passage of Bill. What is your best judgment as to when **Bill** will pass? Hope there will be no major amendments. Can we be informed relative to the Bill from time to time? Going here pretty (BEGIN UNDERLINING) rough (END UNDERLINING). Am seeing everything from bombs to President's cousins. Letter by messenger. All well."

JOHNSON

TFV

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Bof*

June 11, 1941

*Safe: Hopkins*

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

I THINK THE PRESIDENT MIGHT  
LIKE TO GLANCE AT THIS.

H.L.H.

COPY  
TELEGRAM

*BSF  
Safe  
Hopkins*

June 11, 1941

~~TOP SECRET~~

KIRK & HARRIMAN

CAIRO

FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT ARE NOW EN ROUTE TO MIDDLE EAST  
CURTISS TOMAHAWKS 166 TO PORT SUDAN 25 TO ALEXANDRIA  
GLEN MARTIN MARYLAND 5 TO ALEXANDRIA GRUMMON F4P 25  
TO SUEZ TOTAL 171.

FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL PROSPECTIVE SHIPMENTS  
AIRCRAFT TO MIDDLE EAST CURTISS TOMAHAWK JUNE 84  
JULY 100 CURTISS KITTYHAWK JUNE 11 JULY 40 GRUMMON  
MARTLET II JULY 10 DOUGLAS BOSTON III JUNE 40 JULY 40  
TOTAL JUNE 135 JULY 190.

NUMBER AND TYPE OF PLANES SHIPPED ARE AS YOU KNOW  
CONTROLLED FROM LONDON. THEREFORE THESE FIGURES ARE  
SUBJECT TO CHANGE FROM THAT SOURCE.

TWENTY TRANSPORTS ARE BEING FLOWN TO AFRICA.

HOPKINS

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

*hopkins*

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PSF

Safe File  
Hopkins  
Bx 7

PART 20 PAGES 4384 -  
4385

PSF (Safe) Hopkins

*Hopkins*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1941.

~~SECRET~~ VIA NAVY

*w/H 5 4:30 PM PST*

HOPKINS  
LONDON

Welles and I highly approve Moscow trip and assume you would go in a few days. Possibly you could get back to North America by August eighth. I will send you tonight a message for Stalin.

All well here. Tell Former Naval Person our concurrent action in regard to Japan is, I think, bearing fruit. I hear their Government much upset and no conclusive future policy has been determined on. Tell him also in great confidence that I have suggested to Nomura that Indo-China be neutralized by Britain, Dutch, Chinese, Japan and ourselves, placing Indo-China somewhat in status of Switzerland. Japan to get rice and fertilizer but all on condition that Japan withdraw armed forces from Indo-China in toto. I have had no answer yet. When it comes it will probably be unfavorable but we have at least made one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific

ROOSEVELT

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

*Safe: Hopkins*

PART 20 PAGES 4373

*Safe File: Hopkins*

~~SECRET~~

*File secret  
each box*

25 July, 1941

*Bot Hopkins*

For the President only:

When I was in Canada the Government officials stated they hoped that you could go to Ottawa on the seventh of August. I wanted to phone you from Gander but there were no communications there. I am going to remain here a day or two longer for conference with Commander Middle East. His visit here very secret. I am wondering whether you would think it important and useful for me to go to Moscow. Air transportation good and can reach there in twenty four hours. I have a feeling that everything possible should be done to make certain the Russians maintain a permanent front even though they be defeated in this immediate battle. If Stalin could in any way be influenced at a critical time I think it would be worth doing by a direct communication from you through a personal envoy. I think the stakes are so great that it should be done. Stalin would then know in an unmistakable way that we mean business on a long term supply job. I of course have made no moves in regard to this and will await your advice. If you think Moscow trip inadvisable I will leave here not later than Wednesday. Am spending weekend with Prime Minister but message through Navy will reach me quickly. There is no news here about Russia or Japan that you do not already have. Prime Minister does not believe Japan wants war. Russian ambassador told me this morning he did not believe Japan would attack Russia immediately. Long conference last night with military chiefs and our military representatives on the strategic position of the British in the middle east. They are determined to fight it out in that sector

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

and it seems to me they gave every convincing reasons to all of us for that determination. I do hope you are well and am sorry my mission has taken longer than I anticipated. We had news this morning that the Scharnhorst is out. British making very powerful air attacks but bomber losses substantial. Everybody here in good spirits but realize that the Russian business gives them only a temporary breather. Every one here asks about you and are delighted to know that you are in good health.

HARRY.

REGRADED  
 UNREGRADED  
 UNCLASSIFIED

CR 0166

REGRADED  
 UNCLASSIFIED



PSF  
Safe: Hopkins  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1941

Dear Mr. President:


This is what this means:

That the Army have agreed that we can export to both Russia and the United Kingdom 1200 tanks per month during the second six months of 1942 and 2000 tanks per month during the first six months of 1943. This is based on the enlarged program which you have authorized. This telegram will require Harriman and Beaverbrook, with their military advisers, to recommend the exact division as between the United Kingdom and Russia, but they surely will far exceed Harriman's request for Russia.

The telegram provides for 3600 combat planes. This is 600 less than Harriman asked for but the Army thinks that our production does not warrant making a commitment in excess of 3600 at this time.

I believe that in view of the fact that we are giving far more tanks than they expect Harriman will be in a good position in dealing with the Russians.

Very sincerely yours,



HARRY L. HOPKINS

The President,  
The White House.

TELEGRAM

~~MOST SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 30, 1941

TO: AMEMBASSY  
MOSCOW

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR HARRIMAN

REPLYING TO YOUR 1720. SUBJECT TO RESERVATIONS  
INHERENT IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD,  
TANKS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR DIVISION BETWEEN USSR AND  
UK AT A MONTHLY AVERAGE OF THREE TIMES THE RATE PROPOSED  
IN YOUR CABLE 1720 BASED ON RATE FOR JUNE IN YOUR CABLE  
4459 OF SEPTEMBER 22 TO HOPKINS FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS AND  
FIVE TIMES FOR SECOND SIX MONTHS. YOU THEREFORE ARE  
INSTRUCTED TO MAKE COMMITMENT FOR A MINIMUM NUMBER OF  
TANKS TO THE USSR AS REQUESTED BY YOU AND ARE FURTHER  
AUTHORIZED TO INCREASE THE COMMITMENT AFTER CONSULTATION  
WITH THE BRITISH, BEARING IN MIND THAT FIGURES I AM  
GIVING YOU ARE FOR TOTAL EXPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES  
INCLUDING BOTH BRITISH AND RUSSIANS.

BASED ON SAME RESERVATIONS AND WITHOUT COMMITMENTS  
AS TO TYPES TO BE ALLOCATED, YOU MAY MAKE COMMITMENTS TO  
PROVIDE RUSSIA WITH AIRPLANES TO A TOTAL BETWEEN  
JULY 1, 1942 AND JULY 1, 1943 OF NINE TIMES RATE  
PROPOSED FOR JUNE IN CABLE 4459 OF SEPTEMBER 22 TO  
HOPKINS. OR ABOUT THREE QUARTERS OF THE RATE PROPOSED  
FOR JUNE MORE OR LESS MONTHLY.

ROOSEVELT UNCLASSIFIED  
REGRADED

*B.F. Safe: Hopkins folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1941

IN THE PACIFIC AREA

*To F.D.R.  
from H.L.H.*

How many planes does it take adequately to reinforce Hawaii and when will those planes be there?

How many planes to reinforce Panama and when will they be there?

What is the exact route proposed to reinforce the Philippine Islands by air? With what type of planes? When can the first planes reach the Philippines? How many planes should we attempt to get into the Philippines and what types?

Have we reached a decision that we should attempt to land men and supplies in the Philippines by ship and under whatever protection the Far Eastern fleet can afford?

Are we going to make an effort to get big bombing planes into China and if so by what route, how many, what type and under whose command?

Has General Brett arrived in China and are volunteers to be called back into our Army forming an American unit in China?

To what extent, if any, are we going to attempt, other than by naval action, to aid in the defense of the Dutch East Indies or Singapore?

How would any or all of these plans be changed in case the Philippines and Singapore should fall?

REGRADEN  
UN REGRADEN  
UNCLASSIFIED

IN THE ATLANTIC

Has the decision been reached to establish a bombing unit in England?

In what other manner should ground troops, particularly technicians, be used in England, if at all?

Has a decision been reached to accelerate the complete occupation of Iceland, thereby relieving British troops?

Are we going to use ground troops in some theater in Africa? Are there divisions ~~and~~ the exact points for debarkation and are they properly equipped? Have arrangements been made with the Maritime Commission for shipping in case an operation should be ordered at once? If we hope to beat Hitler to the West Coast do we not have to begin the operation immediately, or are we taking for granted that he is going to get there first? If he does get there first what do we do about it? If for any reason the West Coast is not a suitable field of land operation, has consideration been given as to the use of one or more armored divisions in the Middle East, joining the existing British Army?

Are we going to provide anti-aircraft facilities and regular Army supply units to General Maxwell in Egypt and General Wheeler in Basra? Does our entry into the war warrant changing the decision to use civilian personnel in those areas?

What commitments have we made and should we make for running the Ferry Service from Natal through Africa, maintaining and supporting the various airports required?

Is it possible to use any of our submarines directly against the enemy in ~~Atlantic~~ or Mediterranean waters at an early date?

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1941

FIRST PRIORITY OF MILITARY STRATEGY

THE DEFENSE OF THE ATLANTIC AREA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. How can this be strengthened to make reasonably certain that England cannot be invaded and that supplies can be assured?

- ✓ a. Should we establish at once a bombing unit even of modest proportions in England, which would be the nucleus of a large striking force in the future?
- ✓ b. Is it necessary to put ground troops with equipment in England?
- ✓ c. Are we going to use American forces entirely in Iceland, thereby relieving trained British troops for other services?
- ✓ c. Are we going to discontinue the transfer of American flag ships to the British for use in the Atlantic run and run those ships into England under our own flag?
- ✓ e. Should we take over the Atlantic Ferry Service and the operation and defense of the airport at Prestwick so that this be entirely an American enterprise, thereby relieving British pilots and mechanics?
- ✓ f. Are we going to place any PBV's in Ireland or England as originally planned as a defense against the approaches to England and the North of Ireland?
- ? g. Can we induce the South of Ireland to make bases available?
- ? h. Can we provide airships for transportation between the United States and Foynes?

1. Can we send technicians and members of our armed forces to England for special technical services?

2. What action has been considered upon the coast of Africa to the west coast of Africa?

3. Are we able to take and hold the Cape Verde Islands and have we the men and equipment to do it?

4. Are we prepared to make a landing on the west coast of Africa and what are the most suitable points?

5. What items in our supply list are lacking for either or both of these operations?

6. If we are to make the West Coast is not necessary for land operations has consideration been given to the use of one or more armored divisions in the Middle East during the existing British campaign?

7. Are we going to provide supplementary military units of supplies of orders, for General Marshall in Egypt and General Wheeler in Libya and in what way will directions be secured to them as the result of our entry into the war?

8. Are we prepared fully to run a ferry service of planes from Natal through Africa as a major operation?

9. What type of naval support will be required in the western Atlantic?

10. Can any of our submarines be used directly against the enemy in the Mediterranean?

SECONDARY THEATERS

AFRICA

- ✓ a. What action has been determined upon in event Hitler beats us to the West Coast of Africa?
- ✓ b. Are we able to take and hold the Cape Verde Islands and have we the men and equipment to do it?
- ✓ c. Are we prepared to make a landing on the West Coast of Africa and what are the most suitable points?
- ✓ d. What items in our supply list are lacking for either or both of these enterprises?
- ✓ e. If for any reason the West Coast is not suitable for land or air operations has consideration been given to the use of one or more armored divisions in the Middle East, joining the existing British Army?
- ✓ f. Are we going to provide supplementary military units of supplies, et cetera, for General Maxwell in Egypt and General Wheeler in Basra and in what way will directives be changed to them as the result of our entry into the war?
- ✓ g. Are we prepared fully to run a Ferry Service of planes from Natal through Africa as a major operation?
- ✓ h. What type of naval support will be required in the Southern Atlantic?
- ✓ i. Can any of our submarines be used directly against the enemy in the Mediterranean?

IN THE PACIFIC AREA

- ✓ a. How many planes does it take adequately to reinforce Hawaii and when will those planes be there?
- ✓ b. How many planes to reinforce Panama and when will they be there?
- ✓ c. How many would be required in the whole of the Far Eastern area to afford support sufficient to prevent that area falling into the hands of the enemy?
- ✓ d. Can the British provide any of these planes and if so how many, of what type and when?
- ✓ e. What planes could we supply, by what route and when?
- ✓ f. If we have not adequate ammunition for these combat planes can the British supplement that by loaning us ammunition for a few months?
- ✓ g. More specifically what steps can be taken for the defense of Singapore and the Philappines?
- ✓ h. Are we going to make an effort to get an air unit into China in addition to the planes already there?
- ✓ i. Are we going to order the American fliers there into the Army and are they going to be reinforced by planes, what type, when and how?
- ✓ j. what would be the plan of operations in event of the fall of Singapore?
- ✓ k. Would the Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand be defensible and is there a plan for action in the event of that contingency?

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Bmf*

February 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

This is a memorandum that the President talked to me about last night.

Will you please give it to him.

H.L.H.

*Safe: Hopkins*

February 16, 1942

PRIORITY OF OBJECTIVES TO JULY 1

LIST OF PRIORITIES - A

1. United States to take primary responsibility for reinforcing the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. The men, materiel and munitions to leave the United States prior to March 31. Supporting supplies of men and material to compensate for attrition rate to follow regularly. The force to include the men and materiel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary.
2. In addition to convoy, the Navy to strike with every means available in that area the supply lines or concentration points of the Japs. The Navy to provide in Australia such naval base materiel as is required.
3. Every effort made to hold Java as well as defending with all means available all further advances of the Japs. Hold the island of Timor.
4. The British to make such supplementary assistance as they

have available in this area in ships and man power.

5. The British to take the primary responsibility for re-inforcing Burma immediately and defending Rangoon. The United States to provide such supplementary aid as is available.

6. The United States to continue to take the primary responsibility for military assistance to China in terms of materiel, but confining that materiel for the present to the urgent munitions of war such as aircraft, ammunition, high octane gasoline and such other weapons of war as can be utilized when they reach the Chinese Army. The volunteer air force now in Rangoon to be considered part of American support of Chiang Kai-shek.

7. Intensification of the campaign against submarines in the Atlantic, including the great extension of the use of smaller ships.

8. The Russian Protocol, the supplies to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the United Kingdom and to selected South American countries.

9. The reinforcement of Hawaii. <sup>10</sup>  
A The increase in our attacking force on the Atlantic Seaboard to 100,000 men and the preparation of shipping for their purposes. The British to increase their special forces from 55,000 to 100,000 men.

10. Carry out the proposed plans for bomber squadrons in England.

11. The strengthening of the Atlantic Ferry Service.

12. Put up in the very top production priorities for the machine tools, the equipment and facilities required for the production of high-octane gasoline plants, of all combat aircraft of the Army and the Navy and merchant ships.

LIST OF PRIORITIES - B

1. The complete occupation by American forces in Iceland and the reaching of our objective in the North of Ireland.

2. A complete plan for striking force in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and pushing that plan as far as possible prior to July 1.

3. The induction and enlistment of \_\_\_\_\_ hundred thousand men for the Army and the Navy and the provision of training and equipment for these men.

~~SECRET~~ Safe: Hopkins folder

*Boif*

SECRET

March 2, 1942.

Memorandum for Mr. Harry Hopkins.

Airplane production for February, according to preliminary figures, was 3,148 planes. This is above the January figure, despite the fact that February was a short month.

134 heavy bombers were delivered -- 75 B-17s and 59 B-24s. This is 24 above estimates.

I do not have the breakdown between tactical planes and training planes.

Robert P. Patterson  
Under Secretary of War.

RPF:er

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl J. Spitzer*

~~SECRET~~

Bob

Safe: Hopkins

PD  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 14, 1942

Rec'd 6:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1820, April 14, noon.

~~VERY SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
HOPKINS.

Serious naval problem developing Indian Ocean.  
Chiefs of Staff here considering message which former  
naval person will send to you later today. I have  
appointment with him six o'clock tonight when he will  
show me draft. I am sure that naval situation Indian  
Ocean requires your most urgent attention. The enemy  
have apparently moved very powerful forces in that  
direction and the implications of this will readily  
occur to you.

Final meeting Chiefs of Staff and Defense Council  
with us will be held late tonight. Very confident of  
outcome. Marshall has made splendid impression here.  
He has presented our case with great force but moderately.  
The result will, I believe, be not only an agreement  
in principle but a real meeting of minds. I cannot

emphasize

-2- #1820, April 14, noon from London

emphasize too strongly the favorable impression Marshall has made here. Everyone regrets that Admiral King could not have been present. Everyone here asks about you. I am feeling extremely well but anxious to get home to tell you what cannot be said by cable.

MATTHEWS

KLP

*Hopkins*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Boh*

April 15, 1942.

HOPKINS  
LONDON

YOUR SUGGESTION BEING STUDIED  
BUT CONCENSUS OF OPINION IS THAT  
ODOR STILL TOO STRONG FOR FAMILY  
OF NATIONS.

ROOSEVELT

JW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 15, 1942

Rec'd 5:48 a.m.,

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1851, April 15, 12 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
HOPKINS.

How about nailing that wood pussy Laval to your  
bern door?

MATTHEWS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

*Safe: Hopkins*

April 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETT:

You remember some time ago the Army took 25 planes from the airlines. As I recall you put those directly into the Army service and sent to the African Ferry Service 25 planes belonging to the Army in their stead.

Today I have a memorandum dated April 22 stating that the total number of planes in the transport service in the African-Asiatic Ferry routes are 37, of which 10 are in China, 17 in India, 2 en route and 4 scheduled to leave.

I don't quite understand these figures because I assumed you had a substantial number of transports in Africa itself going back and forth between Cairo and Takoradi.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-25-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

April 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

With reference to your memorandum of April 24 on the subject of the number of planes in the African-Asiatic ferry routes, our records here indicate a considerably larger figure than the 37 mentioned by you. Since our records show shipment and initial allocation, we are not absolutely sure of the present position of all of these planes, but we are wiring out to the locality to get more accurate information and I shall communicate this to you as soon as it is received.

At the present time, excluding 37 transport type aircraft delivered to the British in Africa under Lend-Lease, there are 53 planes carried on our records as being in Africa and India on ferrying services.

China National Airways is charged with 8, of which 6 are known to be in India East of Karachi and with 2 C-53's somewhere around Basra en route to them.

For the 10th Air Force in India, four planes have been turned over to them East of Karachi. For the Burma Road replacement operation 13 of the 25 planes are on the way and were last reported somewhere in the Natal Division with 12 at West Palm Beach, 9 of which are ready to go as of April 25 with 3 held up with difficulties in the extra-range tanks.

On the trans-Africa British-PAA operation between Bathhurst and Cairo, there are 14 transports.

On the Lagos-Karachi run, the Ferrying Command-PAA, there are 14 planes. I am informed that some of these have been shot through to India and China on a special secret mission, after the completion of which they will return to their regular Division run.

General Stilwell's headquarters have recently advised us that the condition of the fields is such that 25 planes on the Burma Road operation is the present maximum which he can effectively handle. Operations in that district appear to be seriously interfered with by the Japanese advance in Burma and air attacks on all fields in that general district. A report just received indicates that a

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 10-25-66


Signature - Carl S. Spicer

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

China National Airways plane landed at Lasho to find the field deserted and at once took off for Kunming. However, General George reports that he intends to bring the number of aircraft destined for the Burma Road operation up to 35 within the next few weeks by sending additional C-53's and C-47's out of Army production (these have stiffened bellies and wide doors to permit cargo carrying).

In addition to the aircraft shown above there are, of course, the Boeing 307's (4-engined stratoliners) used in the through express service. These are generally used for emergency requirements and are, therefore, not charged especially to this operation.



ROBERT A. LOVETT  
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-25-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

PSF (Safe): Hopkins

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Hopkins, Marshall and King  
London -

Your two messages of July 22 do not wholly take me by surprise and I agree that ~~the~~ mere acquiescence on <sup>the</sup> part of our friends is not sufficient.

I therefore repeat the directive that some other offensive be worked out for American ground forces in 1942.

Such an offensive ~~ought~~ <sup>ought not to</sup> be at such a distance as to require

very long sea trip. Therefore I ask study of following in the order of what I regard as best chance of success combined with political and military usefulness and combined with speed.

- a. A new form of attack on Algiers and or Morocco.
- b. The old gymnast but confined in beginning to American troops only.
- c. Northern Norway
- d. Egypt.
- e. Persia to Caucasus.

I have just received message

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

From Harrison in Bern  
of which following is  
paraphrase:

Quote



Unquote.

Tell our friends we must  
have speed in a decision.

Roosevelt

For Hopkins -

Sir Winston my best and  
tell him not even to <sup>can</sup> that stop <sup>F.L. see</sup>  
that wedding. ~~Tom~~ Randolph  
lunched with me and he is in  
fine form and the back continues  
to improve. All well. will see  
you at White House very  
soon

Roosevelt

*Saf: Hopkins*

July 15, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS**

**SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR BONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.**

**1. O.K.**

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along the lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

**3.**

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

July 10, 1942.

- (5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- (6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- (7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
- (8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:
- (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
  - (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.
- (9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa beginning in 1942. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.
- (10) Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone.
- (11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

July 15, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS**

**SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.**

**1. O.K.**

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

**3.**

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

(1) Loss of Syria.

(2) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(3) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing BLEDDENHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. BLEDDENHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russlanzshktnz collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, BLEDDENHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of BLEDDENHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that BLEDDENHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If BLEDDENHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

- (5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- (6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- (7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
- (8) You will           the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:
- (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
- (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algeria intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.
- (9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa beginning in 1942. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1948 or in 1945 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theaters and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.
- (10) Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone.
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COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF