

● PGF

Safc! India

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1942.

[REDACTED]
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RUDOLPH FORSTER:

The attached paper was prepared by Field Marshal Sir John Dill for the President's information. He has sent it with a note to General Marshall for transmission and as General Marshall is not here today I am forwarding it direct. Will you please see that the President gets it.

W. B. S.
W. B. S.

Incl.
5-page mimeo. with map,
"Appreciation of the
Japanese threat to
India."

MAR 10 1942

OUT



OUT

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

10th March, 1942.

Dear Marshall

The President asked to be informed as to the scale of a Japanese attack against India in the event of the loss of Burma, and also as to the British forces available to meet it.

Attached hereto is a note along these lines.

Yours truly
J. E. Dill

General George C. Marshall,
Room 2030,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Ref: Sate:
India

APPRECIATION OF THE JAPANESE THREAT TO INDIA.

INVASION BY LAND.

1. The only line of invasion by land is from BURMA through ASSAM, such an invasion being combined with air and sea borne attack in the area of the GANGES DELTA.
2. Unless they over-run BURMA the Japanese cannot invade INDIA by land. Assuming, however, that they do over-run BURMA, the scale of attack is limited by the over-riding factor of communications, which will therefor be considered first.

Communications. (See Sketch map attached).

3. The communications from French INDO-CHINA through YUNNAN to the Northern ASSAM rail-head at LEDO are so difficult that a threat from this direction can be disregarded. Similarly even if the Japanese over-run the MANDALAY Area, communications beyond MYITKYNIA are such that an advance beyond that point in any strength is most unlikely.

4. There are only two other lines of advance.

- (a) From MANDALAY via KALEMA - MANIPUR ROAD and BRAPMAPUTRA VALLEY; This is served by only one Road of which the Southern Section will be incomplete until April at the earliest and of which the northern-most section is liable to interruption during the summer rainy season. This latter section is, however, also served by a single-line railway from MANIPUR ROAD to INDIA.

- (3) From CHITTAGONG across the GANGES - BRAHMAPUTRA DELTA; this consists chiefly of tracks or very poor roads all of which are subject to interruption in the summer rainy season, but it is also served by fairly good railway communications to INDIA. Communications from Southern BURMA to CHITTAGONG are extremely poor, but the Japanese could build up their forces there by the use of small coastal craft which could then be used for landings along the BENGAL Coast. Air cover can also be provided from landing grounds along the BURMA Coast.

Estimation of Japanese Scale of Attack by Land.

5. Japan would have no difficulty in making available the necessary land forces together with strong air forces. It is estimated that they could concentrate, deploy and maintain :-
- (a) One or possibly two Divisions advancing from MANDALAY by the route to the BRAHMAPUTRA VALLEY.
 - (b) About two Divisions from the CHITTAGONG Area advancing by land and sea against the GANGES DELTA Area.

INVASION BY SEA.

6. The success of a sea borne expedition against INDIA depends on the defeat or neutralisation of British naval forces based on CEYLON. The modern section of this fleet consists only of a striking force of one battleship and two aircraft carriers until April/May when it will be reinforced by a second battleship and a third carrier.

The four old "R" class battleships now on or near the INDIAN OCEAN can only be considered as suitable for convoy escorts. For early warning of any large-scale expedition approaching INDIA, we shall depend upon our ability to maintain sufficient submarine and air patrols.

7. In view of the distance of their nearest repair base, such an operation by the Japanese would be risky and difficult, but the strategical advantage of early attack would be immense and this possibility, therefore, cannot be disregarded. If such an operation were attempted, it is very probable that the initial stroke would consist of a surprise bombing attack on TRINCOMALEE, the defences of which are still relatively weak, and if success were achieved it could be followed up by the immediate invasion of CEYLON with a probable secondary invasion in the MADRAS area.

Scale of Japanese Attack by Sea.

8. In spite of their present commitments, the Japanese still have available sufficient forces and shipping for a seaborne expedition now by two divisions. The provision of garrisons for the Netherlands East Indies is unlikely to prove a heavy commitment and provided therefore that they do not at the same time undertake major operations against Australia, Japan can collect forces for operations against INDIA and CEYLON at a greater rate than we can reinforce those places.

ARMY AND AIR FORCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THESE THREATS.

9. Taking into consideration the need to provide adequate defence of the NORTHWEST FRONTIER, of internal security and the low state of training and equipment of field formations now in INDIA, it is estimated that the following ground forces could be made available to meet these threats.

(a) CEYLON.

The forces in CEYLON must be considered as fortress troops which cannot be used to reinforce INDIA should the attack develop against INDIA and not CEYLON. They consist of:-

<u>Now.</u>	<u>Reinforcements due</u>	
	<u>by Mid-March</u>	<u>by April/May</u>
34th Ind. Div. (less one Bde).	One British Bde. Gp.	6th Australian Div. (less one Bde. Gp)
One CEYLON Territorial Bde.	One East African Bde.	One Indian Armd Car Regt.
One Fd. Arty Bty.		
Heavy A.A. 48 guns.		
Light A.A. 52 guns		
Three Fighter Sqns.	Two Fleet Air Arm Fighter Sqns.	One Flying Boat Sqn.
One Torpedo Bomber Sqn.		
One Light Bomber Sqn.		
One G.R. Sqn.		
One Flying Boat Sqn.		

(b) INDIA.

The forces in INDIA must be disposed to meet both the threat by sea to the MADRAS area and the threat by land and sea to BENGAL. The whole strength of the forces in INDIA cannot therefore be concentrated against an attack against either of these places. They consist of:-

<u>Mid-March</u>	<u>Reinforcements due.</u>	
	<u>by April/May</u>	<u>by June/July</u>
Two Indian Inf. Divs.	Heavy A.A. 192 guns	5th British Div.
70th British Div. less one Bde. Group	Light A.A. 286 guns	Two Indian Armd Bdes.
Heavy A.A. guns 88		
Light A.A. guns 87		
Four Fighter Sqns.	Three Fighter Sqns.	
Two Light Bomber Sqns.	Two Light Bomber Sqns.	
Five Miscellaneous Sqns (obsolescent types)	Two Medium Bomber Sqns.	

CONCLUSIONS.

10. After the Japanese have occupied Burma, the two chief dangers in the INDIAN OCEAN, in our view, will be as follows:-

(a) Sea-borne expedition to occupy CEYLON.

This would have a dual object first to deny to us the main British fleet base, and second to enable the Japanese directly to threaten sea communications with the MIDDLE EAST and with RUSSIA via the PERSIAN GULF.

(b) Occupation of the CALCUTTA Area by means of combined sea-borne and overland attacks. This operation would have as an important object the complete cutting off of CHINA from outside assistance except by air transport methods.

11. Defence against either of the above attacks will be primarily by sea and air forces, naval forces playing a predominant part round CEYLON, and air forces in the CALCUTTA Area.

12. The crux of the situation is the rate at which we can provide air reinforcements for INDIA and CEYLON. The British air strength in the MIDDLE EAST has already been seriously depleted by transference of air squadrons to INDIA, BURMA and the FAR EAST.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
10th March, 1942.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL ARNOLD

I do not know whether you have seen this -- nor do I quite know whether this calls for a reply on my part or not. What do you think?

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 7, 1942

The attached is a
complete copy of No. 155
from New Delhi.

The one previously sent
at 10:35 this morning did not
contain Section three.

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 6, 1942

Rec'd 9:03 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

155, April 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND

ACTING SECRETARY:

Wavell supplements his personal appeal (See
my 145, April 4, 8 p.m.) through me to the President
by a secret letter as follows.

JOHNSON,
President's Representative

AIC

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

DM
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi
Dated April 6, 1942
Rec'd 8:55 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

155, April 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

"PERSONAL ~~SECRET~~

When we met on Saturday, you asked me my most
immediate need and I replied 'aircraft.'

The Japanese attacks now in progress against
Colombo and our shipping and India generally emphasize
the vital urgency of this requirement. It is not
too much to say that our whole position in India
during the next few months depends on whether we
can receive an adequate supply of aircraft.

The figures I give you below do not in any way
represent our ultimate requirements but are the
numbers of aircraft for which I estimate that we
can find crews if we can receive them during or before
June, the earlier the better of course: Fighters:
120 P-40's; Bombers 120 B-25's; General Reconnaissance:
80 Hudsons; Bomber Transport: 40 DC-3's.

If you could do anything to obtain us these
aircraft

-2- #155, April 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from New Delhi

aircraft as an urgent and vital requirement I
shall be most grateful. (Signed) A.P. Wavell."

JOHNSON
President's Representative

EDA

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 6, 1942

Rec'd 8:59 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH.

155, April 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE).

Wavell says holding India depends upon the
approximate number above set forth over and above
Royal and our own air force. He authorizes me to
say to the President that if we can furnish these
planes he will hold India. British gradual with-
drawal in Burma adding to confusion so I hope I
may be able to answer Wavell at earliest date.

(END OF MESSAGE).

JOHNSON
President's Representative

EDA

file
Boy

London

PSF

Safe: India

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Request for Additional Airplanes
in India.

In connection with request made by General Wavell of Mr. Louis Johnson for additional airplanes in India, it is my opinion that we should handle this matter with care.

India is in the war theatre for which the British have full responsibility. When this same matter was brought up before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British members stated that it was a British responsibility and that they would handle it. Accordingly the document concerning additional airplanes to India is now being considered by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff in London.

In view of the above, I recommend that no further action be taken on this request.


H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Conf. ltr. to Gen. Arnold
frm. the President, 4/7/42,
re attached complete copy
of telegram #155 frm. New
Delhi.

Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States,

1942, volume 1, pp. 629-630.

PSF; Safe - India

MEV
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated April 9, 1942

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Box

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1721, April 9, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

██████████ AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
HOPKINS.

There is an unfortunate impression here that
Louis Johnson is acting as your personal represen-
tative and under your instructions mediating between
the British and the Indian Congress. Within the
past few hours Cripps apparently in cooperation
with Johnson has submitted a new proposal relative
to the control of defenses in India. This proposal
was made to the Indian Congress without consultation
with the Governor General or with Wavell and with
no knowledge of the British Government here. I
have a feeling that Cripps very naturally is using
Johnson who in turn uses your name very freely.
I have told the Prime Minister and Eden that Johnson
is not acting as a mediator on your behalf but what-
ever he is doing he is doing at the specific request
of Cripps.

MATTHEWS

JMH

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RS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (HC)

London

Dated April 9, 1942

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1721, April 9, 5 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The Governor General of India has the distinct feeling that all of Johnson's moves are being directed by you. I believe it important that Johnson's part in this be played down because of the danger of a proposal being made to the British Government which they might reject and which the public might think comes from you. I lunched with Eden today and he is not too encouraged about the outcome in India but it may break favorably before the day is over. I am seeing the Prime Minister again at six o'clock and will cable you the latest news at once. I have found Eden and Lyttelton very sympathetic today to our main proposal.

(END OF MESSAGE.)

HEATHENS

117

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

From:

Amelhi

Number:

170

Dated:

4/11/42

Code:

SC

Caption:

Boy

This telegram has been distributed to:

S

Please advise the Division of Communications and Records if further distribution should be made.

Safe: India

Inc

WWM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 11, 1942

Rec'd 3:53 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING
SECRETARY

The Congress delivered its rejection of Cripps' proposals at 7:00 o'clock Friday night, Nehru sending me a copy. The rejection is a masterpiece and will appeal to free men everywhere.

My substitute defense amendment was informally agreed to at conference between Cripps, Nehru, and Congress President Thursday night but then after they disagreed on giving any authority to new Nationalist Government proposed by Cripps, Cripps said my formula meant same thing as his original amendment which was quite untrue and denied his earlier press remarks that Nationalist Government any more real self government now.

JOHNSON

HTM

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

ELP
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 11, 1942.

Rec'd 3:47 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m., (SECTION TWO)

Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in five minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain, with unimportant concession, Cripps with embarrassment told me that he could not change original draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill has cabled him that he will give no approval unless Wavell and Viceroy separately send their own code cables unqualifiedly endorsing any change Cripps wants.

JOHNSON

EMB

FD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 11, 1942

Rec'd 6:28 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

' MOST IMMEDIATE.

RUSH.

170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

I never lost confidence until then. London wanted a Congress refusal. Why? Cripps' original offer contained little more than the unkept promise of the First World War. Does England prefer to lose India to enemy retaining claim of title at peace table rather than lose it by giving freedom now? I have my own opinion about it.

The Indian Ocean is controlled by enemy; British shipping from India has been suspended; according to plan determined many days ago, British are retiring from Burma going north while fighting Chinese go south; Wavell is worn out and defeated; the hour has arrived when we should consider a replotting of our policy in this section of the world. Association with British here is bound to adversely affect morale of our own officers. Only the best should be sent and those who
have failed

-2- #170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION THREE) from New Delhi

have failed elsewhere should not (repeat not) be
dumped here as many have been in recent past. In
so dumping here men like General Adler (whose failure
in Egypt I know personally) we follow the policy
which brought Wavell here and which has been utterly
demoralizing to all British who really want to
resist enemy.

JOHNSON

EMB

AS
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 11, 1942

Rec'd 7:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

RUSH

170, April 11, 9 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Nehru has been magnificent in his cooperation with me. The President would like him and on most things they agree. I have his personal promise to proceed to Calcutta immediately in effort to allay fear, settle general motors and steel strikes, and keep industry operating there. I shall have his complete help; he is our hope here. I trust him.

Of the 1,350,000 kilowatts of installed electric generator capacity in all India, 1,100,000 kilowatts is located east of the line Bombay-Cawnpore. In the area west of this line, the only area in which additional industrial capacity may be located with reasonable safety, electric power supply is limited to 250,000 kilowatts of which no surplus is available. Therefore landing or bombing in present industrial area will mean the end of India's ability to aid herself materially industrialwise.

JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVE

NWN

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

New Delhi

Dated April 11, 1942

Rec'd. 7:02 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

170, April 11, 9 a.m., (SECTION FIVE).

America's effort therefore must be toward direct aid.
There is little opportunity for India to aid herself--
particularly since Cripps, through no fault of his
own, has failed.

Halifax's speech added the finishing touch to
the sabotage of Cripps. It is believed here it was
so intended and timed and I am told pleased Wavell
and the Viceroy greatly. (END OF MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

RDS

Safe: India

India

February 25, 1942.

11.40 P.M.

AMBASSADOR WINANT
LONDON

As you may guess, I am somewhat concerned over the situation in India, especially in view of the possibility of the necessity of a slow retirement through Burma into India itself. From all I can gather the British defense will not have sufficiently enthusiastic support from the people of India themselves.

In the greatest confidence could you or Harriman or both let me have a slant on what the Prime Minister thinks about new relationships between Britain and India? I hesitate to send him a direct message because, in a strict sense, it is not our business. It is, however, of great interest to us from the point of view of the conduct of the war.

ROOSEVELT

India
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
box

FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG

KAI-SHEK TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

May 31, 1942

RECENT RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM INDIA SHOWS INTERNAL SITUATION WORSENING. MAHATMA GANDHI LAUNCHING AROUND MIDDLE JUNE NON-VIOLENT NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT AIMING AT COMPLETE BREAKDOWN ALL COMMUNICATIONS RAILWAYS PUBLIC UTILITIES TO OUST BRITISH RULE. MOVEMENT WILL BE STRONGER THAN ALL PREVIOUS ONES AND MORE THAN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. IF INDIA GOVERNMENT PUT GANDHI UNDER ARREST THIS WILL AROUSE ANGER OF WHOLE COUNTRY. HE WILL NOT HESITATE TO GO INTO FAST UNTO DEATH CAMPAIGN TO ATTAIN OBJECTIVE. IF HE DIES WHOLE INDIA WHICH WORSHIPS HIM AS GOD WILL PROBABLY RISE IN REVOLT. AT HIS WORD ALL VILLAGES ESPECIALLY CENTRAL INDIA WILL BE IN POSITION FRUSTRATE EXISTING WAR PLANS ACTIVITIES AND THUS AFFECT ENTIRE CAUSE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS PART ASIA.

RECENT LETTERS FROM NEHRU SHOW THAT DESPITE ALL HE CAN DO INTERNAL REVOLUTION BREWING AS ANTI-BRITISH FEELING GAINING MOMENTUM. HE THINKS ONLY WAY GAIN INDIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WAR IS DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS OF INDIA INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION. HE WRITES "TIME IS PAST NOW WHEN SOME CLEVER FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO BRITISH AND INDIA CAN BE DEVISED. POPULAR AS I AM WITH MY PEOPLE THERE IS SO MUCH ANTI-BRITISH FEELING NOW THAT I CANNOT POSSIBLY GET ANYTHING DONE WHICH IGNORES INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE SELF-DETERMINATION.

~~SECRET~~

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FEB 4 1972

~~SECRET~~

-2-


"BRITISH HAVE MADE LOT OF JINNAH AND HIS SEPARATIST TENDENCIES. IF THIS ATTITUDE CONTINUES SOLUTION IMPOSSIBLE. AT SAME TIME NO ONE WANTS BRITISH GOVERNMENT THROW JINNAH COMPLETELY OVERBOARD. LET THEM SAY THEY RECOGNIZE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE SELF-DETERMINATION AND LEAVE IT TO US SETTLE WITH EACH OTHER WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM THEM. REAL PROBLEM IS HOW TO MAKE OUR PEOPLE ENTHUSIASTIC FOR CAUSE. NO VAGUE PROMISES ASSURANCE POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC PHRASIOLOGY IS GOOD ENOUGH BUT SOMETHING THAT STRIKES AT ROOT OF PROBLEM."

PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM NEHRU DATED MAY 26 CONFIRMS THAT MAHATMA GANDHI INCREASINGLY BITTER AND DEMANDS BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM INDIA. CONGRESS ATTITUDE TOWARD GANDHI UNCERTAIN BUT MAHATMA GANDHI HIMSELF CAN POWERFULLY INFLUENCE MASS OPINION AND ANY STEP HE TAKES WILL HAVE FAR REACHING CONSEQUENCES. MAHATMA GANDHI'S ACTION MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT INTERNAL AND WAR SITUATION BUT MAHATMA GANDHI SEEMS RESOLVED. NEHRU SEEING MAHATMA GANDHI TO CLARIFY SITUATION.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

FEB 4 1972



MADRAS

CEYLON

Scale 1:17,000,000 (160 miles = 1")
Statute Miles



- +++++ Railways
- Roads
- Unconquered