

● PSF

Safe: Italy

*BF Safe: Italy*

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC).

Rome

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 9:21 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

127, February 27, 11 a. m.

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE  
SECRETARY FROM WELLES.

I was received yesterday morning by the Minister  
for Foreign Affairs with great cordiality and had a  
conversation with him for about one hour and a half.  
Mussolini received me in a very friendly manner yester-  
day afternoon in the company of the Minister for Foreign  
Affairs and I talked with him for about an hour. The  
Ambassador was present at both conversations.

I emphasized in both conversations that any views  
or suggestions that were communicated to me would be  
regarded as strictly confidential and were solely for  
the information of the President and the Secretary of  
State. I further emphasized that the mission entrusted  
to me by the President was solely for the purpose of  
reporting to him about the present situation in Europe

in

hsm -2- No. 127, February 27, 11 a. m., from Rome (Section 1)

in order that he might determine whether there existed any possibility for a permanent and lasting peace and I made it clear that the Government of the United States was not interested in a precarious or temporary peace. I further emphasized that I was authorized to offer no proposals.

(END SECTION ONE OF SEVEN).

PHILLIPS

CSB

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

In my two conversations I touched first upon the fact that Italy and the United States were today the two most powerful neutrals and that it seemed desirable that cordial and friendly relations should exist between them in the event that at some time in the future the moral influence of the countries could be exerted towards the establishment of that kind of a peace foundation which would tend to insure the maintenance of stable and peaceful international relations. I expressed the hope in this connection that it might be found possible to find a meeting as to policies and principles which might result in the development of greater commercial interchange between both countries on mutually beneficial bases. I found the atmosphere in this regard on the part of the Chief of the Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs cordial and understanding and they both expressed great satisfaction by reason of the personal interest of the President in American participation in the 1942 exposition.

KLP

PHILLIPS

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a. m. (SECTION THREE).

In my conversation with Mussolini I spoke at some length of the purposes of the Government of the United States in suggesting an exchange of views between the neutral powers with a view to ascertaining whether an agreement might be found upon desirable principles of international economic relationship and for the reduction and limitation of armaments. I reminded Mussolini of the address which he had made to the Chamber of Deputies on May 26, 1934, in which he had stressed the fact that no country can be self-contained and that barriers to trade, control of exchanges and other artificial barriers must be abolished in the interest of sane international economic relations.

I said that in response to the request of the Italian Government for an indication of the views of the United States regarding this subject I was glad to hand him a  
brief

hsm -2- No. 127, February 27, 11 a.m. (Section 3) from Rome

brief memorandum which set forth the views of the United States in that regard and I gave him a copy of the document covering international economic relations approved by the Secretary of State shortly before my departure from Washington, omitting the first sentence of numbered paragraph two.

PHILLIPS

HPD

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR)

I said that he would find that the views so set forth coincide very completely with the views which he himself had expounded in his speech of 1934. Mussolini read the paper very attentively and stated that he was completely in concord with the exposition contained therein. He said that he wished to remind me that Italy had been the last country to adopt a system of autarchy and that Italy had only done so after the Ottawa agreement had been enacted, after France had set up many economic barriers particularly the French quota system, and he did not (repeat not) omit a reference to the high tariff policies pursued by the United States prior to the Roosevelt Administration. He said that a poor country like Italy had been forced in self-defense to adopt an autarchic system; that he had always believed and continued to believe that the views set forth in his speech of 1934 represented the only international economic system which could provide for a healthy international relationship.

He

-2- #127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Rome.

He stated, however, that while the Government of Italy shared the views of the Government of the United States with regard to economic policy he did not consider it practical or possible to make any concerted effort to turn to such a system until a just political peace had been found for Europe.

PHILLIPS

KLP

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
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to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION FIVE)

He said further that if and when a just political peace was arrived at, no sound economic system could be agreed upon unless there was simultaneously found a means of obtaining an international agreement upon the limitation of armaments. I naturally stated at this juncture that my Government emphatically concurred in this belief.

I gathered the impression that Mussolini believed that the initiative taken by the United States in suggesting an exchange of views between the neutral states with regard to economic policies and with regard to limitation of armament implied some form of neutral coalition, and therefore emphasized the fact that the sole purpose of the United States in this regard was to try and find an agreement upon principle so that the neutral powers, when the time arrived for the reestablishment of peace, might work together towards the effective accomplishment of a practical plan for the  
limitation

-2- #127, Feb. 27, 11 a.m., (SEC FIVE) from Rome

limitation of armaments coincident with the creation of a sound international economic system. Mussolini concurred heartily in the opinion I expressed to him in that connection that unless such bases became operative there could be no satisfactory improvement in national standards of living and no hope of obtaining that increase of purchasing power in each country which made for prosperity and stability.

PHILLIPS

NPL

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION SIX)

With regard to the detailed and confidential views which were expressed to me by Mussolini and by Ciano as to whether there was any possibility at this time for the establishment of a constructive and permanent peace, I believe it wiser for me not to telegraph the more secret of the views expressed. Mussolini stated emphatically that he believed that such a possibility existed. He stated equally emphatically that if a "real war" as he phrased it broke out such a possibility would vanish at least for some time to come. He stated with the utmost conviction that in his belief no people now at war desired war and that in that sense there existed a very great difference between the situation in 1914 and the present hostilities.

Mussolini attributed great significance to the speech made by Hitler in Munich two days ago. Upon my asking for his suggestions as to any conversations which I might hold in Berlin he told me that he believed that what I would there be told would be very similar to the opinions which he had expressed to me.

PHILLIPS

NPL

JT  
This telegram must be  
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ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 3:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION SEVEN).

He twice reiterated his belief that it had been a great tragedy that the nations of the world had not been willing in 1934 to agree upon a practical system for the limitation of armaments at a time when Germany had been willing to agree upon a reasonable plan for the limitation of armaments and that the expenditures in money and in services since that period for the construction of armaments and the fantastic number of individuals in all nations now engaged solely in the manufacture of armaments made the problem of a future limitation of armaments and a future return to economic national sanity infinitely more difficult.

At the outset of my interview with Mussolini I gave him the President's autograph letter which evidently greatly gratified him and which he asked me to say he would answer personally. He read aloud the concluding sentence of the President's letter in which the President expressed the hope of seeing him personally soon and smilingly remarked that he himself had hoped for this personal interview for many  
years

-2- #127, Feb. 27, 11 a.m. (SEC SEVEN) from Rome

years but that it seemed that there were too many miles of ocean between the President and himself to permit of the realization of his hope.

(END SECTION SEVEN)

PHILLIPS

JRL:NPL

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 27, 1940

Rec'd 3:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

127, February 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION EIGHT)

I said that of course there was always a half way point.  
He then looked at me very interestedly and added with par-  
ticular emphasis "as well as ships to take us there".

At the conclusion of my interview he said that he and  
the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to receive  
me again when I passed through Italy on my return to  
Washington since he believed that he would receive informa-  
tion which might be of value to the President after my visits  
to Berlin, Paris, and London, and which he would be glad to  
communicate to me for the information of the President.

I shall leave Rome at midnight tonight, proceeding  
through Switzerland so as to arrive in Berlin on the morning  
of March 1.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PHILLIPS

NK:NPL

Myron Taylor

PSF  
Safe: Italy

hsm  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (D).

Rome

Dated February 28, 1940

Rec'd 1:14 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

130, February 28, 2 p. m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
MR. TAYLOR.

"Presentation ceremonies concluded yesterday with highest spiritual dignity and human understanding following which I was accorded an entirely private audience with His Holiness lasting upwards of three-quarters of an hour. The principal points in the order of their discussion in the conversation briefly stated are as follows:

One. That the French and British require continuing security not possible with the present German regime in whose good faith they have no confidence.

Two. That the German people are in fact dissatisfied but so controlled by Gestapo and SS and political groups that being unarmed, unorganized, and under constant surveillance, are for the moment powerless.

Three.

hsm -2- No. 130, February 28, 2 p. m., from Rome

Three. That the army officers in general in Germany do not favor war but are not now prepared to oppose the political head of the state. If ordered to march would at the moment obey.

Four. That Germany has not sufficient resources to carry on a long war but can do so for a year or more.

Five. That His Holiness is not in contact with Mussolini but his information is that Ciano is opposed to war as are the Italian people of all classes and that Mussolini is wavering and undecided. (My own opinion is that Mussolini's attitude is at least in part that of a trader depending on events to land ultimately on the right side with the greatest concessions to and benefits for his country. There is no doubt that his demands will be substantial in any event.)

PHILLIPS

CSB

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (D).

Rome

Dated February 28, 1940

Rec'd 1:27 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

131, February 28, 3 p. m.

Continuing my 130.

"Six. The British and French will demand recon-  
struction of Poland and Czechoslovakia on a probable  
compromise basis and that a plebiscite in Austria per-  
mitting the public to determine its future would not  
be opposed by Great Britain and France.

Seven. That an open offer to act as mediator by  
any great power at the present moment is in His Holiness'  
opinion untimely.

Eight. Closest collaboration with the President  
through me and daily access to the Holy Father whenever  
desired day or night was freely and voluntarily offered  
to me. I shall remain in Rome until the end of March  
and have arranged with Under Secretary Welles to meet  
him on his return before his departure for America.

While in the interim I shall communicate by cable any  
useful

hsm -2- No. 131, February 28, 3 p. m., from Rome

useful information received I will undertake to have prepared a complete confidential summary with if possible the collaboration and concurrence of the Pope for delivery to the President by Welles on his return. Meantime I am also carrying out as the President's representative the necessary formalities prescribed by Vatican protocol.

Tittmann has arrived and is rendering satisfactory assistance. Miss Viterbo is also with me."

PHILLIPS

CSB

*PSF Safe: Italy Pres.*

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
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to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 28, 1940

Rec'd 3:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

132, February 28, 5 p.m.

Welles' brief visit to Rome has been exceedingly helpful. As the Department is aware the Chief of Government has refused to receive any Americans since February 1938 and this was the first opportunity therefore since that date in which our views on various matters could be presented to him personally as a responsible American. I have always been in doubt whether my opinions given from time to time to Ciano have reached the Duce, nor in my frequent contacts with the Foreign Minister has the latter ever attempted to explain the views of his Chief on international trends or events.

This total absence of contact with the Chief of Government as well as the continued uncertainty of his opinions make it very difficult to report with any degree of certainty the Italian Government's position on matters of interest and concern to us.

Welles' visit and the autograph letter from the President have afforded a needed occasion to sound Mussolini on various matters. (END OF SECTION ONE)

PHILLIPS

EMB

JRL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated February 28, 1940

Rec'd 6:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

132, February 28, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

But in addition to the information which Welles obtained his friendly approach to the subjects touched upon during both conversations seemed to strike a responsive chord which Hitler too has been lacking especially on the part of Mussolini.

It is probable that Mussolini and Ciano will interpret the cordial sentiments expressed as an indication of our desire to let "bygones be bygones" and for a closer collaboration hereafter between the two countries.

I would welcome such an interpretation and at the same time I venture to express the hope that we on our part will not let occasions pass when we could properly convert friendly sentiments into mutual beneficial actions.

While it is clear that the Italian Government has gone out of its way to extend to Mr. Welles all courtesies including elaborate floral decorations at the stations in Naples and Rome, private car from Naples to Rome and then to the Swiss frontier and official automobiles

during

JRL -2- 132, February 28, 5 p.m. (Section Two) from Rome.

during his stay in Rome, the Italian press has been reserved in discussing the visit. Such articles as have appeared have come from Italian correspondents in other European capitals.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PHILLIPS

JRL

*Pine*  
*PSF Safe: Italy*

EDA  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone (D)

ROME

Dated March 2, 1940

Received noon

Secretary of State

Washington

UNCLASSIFIED  
REGRADED

144, March 2, 1 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MYRON  
TAYLOR.

"March 1. Preceding my audience with the Pope on Tuesday I had on Monday a long interview with the Papal Secretary of State Cardinal Naglione. I have already reported upon my interview with His Holiness. This morning, Friday, I had separate interviews with Monsignor Tardini and Monsignor Montini first and second assistant Secretaries of State for the Vatican both of whom appear to be very able and well-informed. The interview with the former was a lengthy one leaving me with the following impressions:

(One) That the European situation is extremely delicate and dangerous and growing more so especially for this country.

(Two) That it is rendered so by the uncertain character of the two heads of state the one here equally with the one to the north.

(Three)

EDA - 2 - #144, March 2, 1 p.m. from Rome

(Three) That the one here who was the earliest apostle of preparedness and war has latterly been assuming the dual and difficult attire of axis partner and peace-seeker.

(Four) That he has no love for England and little for America.

(Five) That he seeks the greater glory of influencing the peace of Europe by force or persuasion with the utmost advantage to himself.

(Six) That contrary to our general belief the King is weak in comparison and has lost much of his control of the nation's affairs.

(Seven) That while the public are anti-war and anti-German they are not in a position to control the greater internal decisions.

PHILLIPS

PEG

FROM MYRON TAYLOR

*Safe: Italy*

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Rome

Dated March 2, 1940

Rec'd 1:22 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

145, March 2, 2 p.m.

Continuing my 144.

"(Eight) That there exists with the leader here a certain fear of the strength of the German army and the possibility of Germany's organizing Russia in a progressive way to fortify her own weaknesses and ultimately to expand her influence.

(Nine) My general impression was one of depression on the outlook as it appears today with a lively understanding on the part of those interviewed of a probable economic collapse following either war or a sudden and radical disarmament and demobilization creating troublesome unemployment.

(Ten) The Cardinal Secretary of State made a return call upon me on Wednesday and Thursday I received the return call of Cardinal Belmonte, Dean of the College of Cardinals, while this evening I made the prescribed call on the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Mr. Von Bergen, the German Ambassador to the Holy See. He is a diplomat of the

old

-2- #145, March 2, 2 p.m., from Rome.

old pre-war school with whom I had an agreeable conversation. He was Counselor under Ambassador von Ketler who was killed in the Boxer Rebellion and whose widow Baroness von Ketler is the niece of our mutual friend, Lewis Cass Ledyard, Sr.

(Eleven) Tomorrow morning, Saturday, I am to have another private audience with His Holiness during which Mrs. Taylor is to be presented.

(Twelve) Saturday I am to make a courtesy call upon the French Ambassador to the Holy See, Mr. Charles Roux. He is represented to be the ablest of the Vatican diplomats. I hope to obtain further impressions."

PHILLIPS

EMB

JAMES D. MOONEY  
1775 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK


Rome, March 15th, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith copies  
of the five messages sent to you through  
the courtesy of the Navy Department.

Before making any more contacts  
I shall await your further wishes.

Respectfully yours,

  
James D. Mooney

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington D.C.

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS  
"ALUSNA HOME"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A M E R I C A N E M B A S S Y

OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ

R O M E

AB-2/A14-4/(64)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15 March, 1940.

*Italy*

From: Naval Attache, American Embassy, Rome, Italy.  
To : Director of Naval Intelligence.

Subject: Forwarding reports from Mr. James D. Mooney to the President  
of the United States.

Enclosure: (A) Five reports and covering letter from Mr. James D. Mooney.

1. The enclosures are forwarded herewith for transmission to the  
President.

*T.C. Kinkaid*

T.C. KINKAID.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *Mal*

Rome, March 11th, 1940

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President,

I arrived in Europe via Rome on February 11, and in accordance with the conversations I had had with you at the White House during December and January I have absorbed myself in exploring the war and peace situation in Europe particularly in relation to the points of interest that you emphasized to me from your own point of view during my conversations with you.

I made a statement to you just before Christmas, immediately following my return from having travelled extensively throughout Europe and particularly the belligerent countries England, France and Germany during the opening four months of the war, to the effect that, during the scores of contacts I had had with all classes of people from aristocrats to workmen I had not found one individual from brass hat to taxidriver who considered the war anything but a catastrophe for Europe. Among the common people it was considered a prime piece of insanity and they were appalled at the thought of sacrificing themselves to suicide on the Western front. Further, they were horrified at the prospect of starvation, which is now already under way in Europe, and which will increase in intensity as the struggle goes on.

This situation is still true. No emotional background for war exists among the people who have to bear the brunt of it. There is such a strong undercurrent of antagonism against war among the peoples of Europe just as there is in the United States among our own people, that any political leader who does not recognize this powerful undercurrent is likely in time to find himself in the position of a flag-pole sitter. As a matter of fact, any political leader in any one of these countries who is not now planning how to bring about a peace consistent with the prestige and honor of his country is a flag-pole sitter even now. While this political leader, whichever country he is in, is making belligerent speeches, the crowd is showing evidence not only of not listening to the flag-pole sitter but of actually walking away from the flag-pole.

The disillusionment of world war number one still dominates the feelings of everyone in Europe. The time since that war is so short that poignant memories are still fresh from griefs induced by the loss of millions of husbands or sons, from four years of starvation and economic misery, and from the long years of painful reconstruction that had to be suffered during the post-war period. These memories naturally are powerful in stimulating every man's imagination in Europe for the consequences of the present war.

If the war gets under way with really aggressive military action on both sides the consequences of the pending war will be far more disastrous than the other war for two reasons:

First, the techniques of slaughtering and maiming great masses of people have been multiplied during the past twenty years in horror and effectiveness.

Second, Europe began the war of 1914 - 18 with some economic fat on its bones. Europe begins this war with scarcely economic skin on its bones.

Europe is poverty-stricken now, as you know, Mr. President, from the ordinary economic indices. This poverty has come under my own personal observation scores of times during these past years, particularly in the belligerent countries, where I am necessarily brought face to face with the standards of living among wage earners and salaried employes.

England, France and Germany are broke at the beginning of the war. Even if the war were to end right now every one of these three countries is confronted with huge social problems that arise out of bad economic conditions. Every one of these countries will confront the same kind of serious social and economic difficulties that confronted you when you took office as President for your first term in 1933.

The people of Europe are pathetically eager to see you, Mr. President, take some kind of a hand in the whole situation, for two reasons: First, they have a warm confidence in you because of your humane qualities and compassion. Further, you have shown constantly in your speeches and public attitudes that how ever a system of government is constructed or operated in any country it should have as its inspiration the freeing of men from the haunting fears of oppression and starvation.

The second point is a very practical point. The political leaders in the belligerent countries are very conscious of the political, economic and military power of the United States. Therefore they are extremely eager to avoid offending you or American public opinion in any way. They will respect what you say or any position you take because you have a lot of chips on the table. The other neutrals are not powerful enough to be listened to very attentively.

I have had a ringside seat at this European show for the past twenty-two years, beginning with my experience as a doughboy in the American Expeditionary Forces in France and continuing on through the many political and economic crises of the following years. The whole thing has been a fiasco of bad politics and dumb-bell economics. The poker playing of the past two years, particularly between Germany on one side and England and France on the other, that has culminated in hanging another world war around the necks of the people in Europe provides an ironic, futile and tragic last chapter.

Certainly your taking a quiet hand in the situation is infinitely justified. Your courage and tact and experienced understanding of European problems certainly could produce a better result than this.

After spending a few days in Rome and discussing the situation here with people who brought me reasonably up to date on the Italian, French and British viewpoints, I mean not only official viewpoints but the actual feelings of the people in these respective countries, I proceeded to Germany where I have spent the past three and a half weeks.


During my visit to Germany I rechecked the observations I had made to you after my last several months stay there ending just before I left for New York in December. I had several interesting discussions over the peace and war problem with the government officials including Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Fieldmarshal Goering, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop as well as several other of the leading officials of the German government.

I presented to these gentlemen unofficially and informally certain of your attitudes of mind about the whole war and peace problem and in turn received from them for your information certain of their unofficial, informal attitudes of mind to be presented to you. These personal messages I am working up from my notes now and shall cable them to you in series during the next few days.

Meantime I wish to inform you that generally the attitude of the German government as expressed particularly by the officials I have mentioned was one of warm response to your personal, informal, unofficial interest in the whole problem. They seem eager to work with you to resolve the present difficulties in the direction of a more orderly political and economic world. They seem eager also to do whatever can be done to improve the relations between our two countries.

The outline of my discussion with Chancellor Hitler, revolving around the points that you had emphasised during your discussions with me in December and January, will be forwarded in a day or so just as quickly as I can get it prepared and coded.

Yours respectfully

  
James D. Mooney

Rome, March 12th, 1940

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

This message will outline the discussion with Chancellor Adolf Hitler in Berlin on March 4th, 1940.

The arrangements for the discussion with Chancellor Hitler had been made by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop with whom I had visited on February 29.

Before pitching into the outline of the discussion with Chancellor Hitler I should like to present to you a few details about my reception by the Chancellor because these will provide you with a bit of background as to the basis on which I presented myself to the German Government and in turn the response that was made.

Shortly after my arrival in Berlin I sent the following letter to the Chancellor:

"I need hardly inform you, Mr. Chancellor, that the human and economic consequences of the present war are terribly disturbing to the people of the entire world.

"The people in my own country feel that the war can end only in disaster for Europe and that the war will eventually have very serious consequences in America.

"I know that the welfare of the people and their inner feelings have always lain close to your heart, and I believe that it would serve a useful purpose if I were given the opportunity to discuss this problem generally with you.

"I know also that you, Mr. Chancellor, belong to the group of men in Europe and the United States who believe that the present war is a poor and disastrous way to dispose of the many international political and economic mistakes that have been made since 1914, and it is on this common ground that I should like to discuss the entire problem with you."

My letter was routed through the Foreign Office and a few days later I was received by the Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop. During this discussion with the Foreign Minister the unofficial, informal character of my entire visit was made clear to him. The arrangements later for the visit with the Chancellor were established on this ground.

When I was received by the Chancellor, the Guard of Honor was turned out and generally I was treated most courteously. I need hardly tell you that this was not because of myself personally. Obviously the courtesies were intended as marks of respect to you and to the United States, or in any event to me as an American citizen carrying word from you.

The Chancellor was warm and friendly and the discussion during our visit took place between himself and myself alone. There were present only two other persons, one a uniformed official, acting really as his body guard, and another who took notes of the conversation and occasionally interpreted the more involved English into German for the benefit of the Chancellor.

I started out the discussion by presenting to the Chancellor your personal respects and greetings, to which he responded warmly.

I then told the Chancellor that the President had felt that by keeping the discussion on an informal basis, the heads of the governments could better understand each other and what they really wanted to get at. The President wanted to be informed as to what the leaders in the various countries in Europe really and actually had in their minds. In this way preliminaries could be developed for the formalities that must be arranged as an introduction to an orderly political and economic world.

I discussed the President's attitude towards Germany as he had disclosed it to me during the personal discussions I had had with him on my recent visits with him in Washington. The President had said to me: "I wish that you would remind the Germans that I went to school in Germany, and that I became very familiar with their country in my younger days. I have many German personal friends. In my business days I had numerous clients with interests in Germany, and through them, and in other ways, I have kept in close touch with Germany over a period of many years."

The President had disclosed to me that he was not interested in saying to the German people what they should do about their leaders or their Government. That was their own affair. He felt that every people was entitled to have the form of Government and the individual leaders as they desire and choose for themselves.

The President felt that the United States, in common with all other countries had a vital interest in the present war and that our country ran the risk of suffering serious consequences from the war. He was interested in a broad world solution of the many political and economic problems which confront the world today, and he was convinced that in the solution the United States must necessarily play an important part. He was interested in a fair and equitable solution of the immediate difficulties between individual countries primarily because these difficulties bear on the broad world problem.

In this connection he had said, "I am not interested in any scheme for world domination on the part of the British or the French any more than I am on the part of the Germans."

The President had said that perhaps we could agree on a framework for an orderly political and economic world to which the leaders of the various European countries could subscribe in principle. It was the President's attitude that to reinforce such a framework the United States could make a substantial contribution of its surplus commodities such as cotton, wheat, lard and copper, as well as gold.

The President felt that all countries, and especially Germany, should have broader and freer access to raw materials. As an example he mentioned copper as a material that could be made available in a broader way for Europe and the countries that particularly want copper. He would like to do something about this entire problem.

The President was in favor of freeing trade rather than in Free-trade as a world policy. With regard to reducing the obstructions to world commerce, he said: "I do not believe that some of the schemes that are being discussed for doing away with tariffs entirely in Europe are practicable. Governments will continue to need tariffs for revenue purposes. In the matter of opening up a broader distribution of goods and raw materials, it would be better to move in this direction gradually than to make a great many radical changes. There must be a gradual and orderly transition between war-time and peace-time economy throughout the world."

The President believes in promoting the acceptance of the most-favored-nation principle as a foundation for reconstructing international trade. He recognizes, however, that certain practical political and economic considerations will require intermediate deviations from this principle.

In connection with the absorption of unemployed and armament workers the President said: "However, tariff barriers must be reduced and trade relations remarkably improved in Europe, because in any discussion of reconstructing an orderly world it is necessary to provide some means for furnishing employment for the people who are now being used for armament programs. During recent years,

and particularly during the last year or two, employment has been used for armaments because industry and trade have been so badly hit by the many restrictions on the flow of international trade."

I pointed out to the Chancellor that the President had no detailed ready-made peace formula or statement of peace terms which he intended to present at this time to the belligerent powers. The President had expressed no interest, on the various occasions when he discussed the situation with me, in interposing himself between the belligerents to urge them to peace. He was not offering himself as a peacemaker in the present situation. Further, he was not offering himself as an arbitrator, either now or in the future.

However, if the belligerents wished to call upon the President's services in the capacity of a moderator, he would be very happy to serve as such. He had said to me: "I would much prefer to respond to such a request by serving as a possible moderator in the situation, rather than be asked to serve as an arbitrator."

I then explained to the Chancellor that the President had chosen a typically American office to illustrate the position and functions which he had in mind. The designation "Moderator" is used in connection with an old-established American institution, the "Town-meeting", and appears also in the organization of the Presbyterian and some other Protestant churches.

I presented at this point a written definition of the distinctive features of the position and functions of a moderator, which had been translated into German for the Chancellor. The Chancellor was extremely interested in this definition and read it most carefully.

The definition of a moderator which I presented to the Chancellor read as follows: "The moderator is chosen by the common agreement of those whom he serves. The moderator has no special power or supremacy over his associates, but is honored and his word carries weight as *primus inter pares* - first among equals. Those whom the moderator serves have no jurisdiction over the moderator. It is the duty of the moderator to see that the business of the meeting or conference over which he presides is transacted in accordance with a previously defined and accepted set of principles. The moderator's method of executing his function is not by making final decisions, as an arbitrator, nor by casting a decisive vote in the event of balanced opposing views. These powers are not inherent in the moderator's office. Instead, it is the function of the moderator to establish the magnitude and character of the areas of difference between opposing views, and to attempt by all means at his disposal to reduce and reconcile such differences for the greatest overall good of the group as a whole."

This concluded my presentation of the President's informal, unofficial attitudes.

In response the Chancellor, first of all, expressed satisfaction that President Roosevelt had considered it useful to exchange views in an unofficial, informal manner through Mr. Mooney. The Chancellor was glad to become acquainted with President Roosevelt's personal viewpoint and attitude towards these important questions.

The Chancellor listened to my presentation of the President's personal feelings and attitude as expressed in the foregoing outline without interruption to make comment relating peculiarly to any one of the points in itself. He seemed to prefer to wait and then discourse on the various points from his own general standpoint.

After my presentation of the outline of the foregoing points and after the Chancellor had had the opportunity to examine critically and attentively the definitions, translated into German, of the President's term "Moderator", he then responded generally as follows below.

His remarks were taken down in shorthand by the attendant present who later summarized them and submitted the summary to the Chancellor for approval. This approved summary, which coincided with my recollection and notes of the meeting, was translated into English and I was given the opportunity to copy this translation verbatim. I also had the opportunity of verifying the notes which had been made of my own presentation of the President's point of view.

The Chancellor began his remarks by stating that he had always been of the opinion that the circumstances under which President Roosevelt took office had confronted him with very great and difficult tasks, the solution of which the President had undertaken in a broad and constructive manner.

The Chancellor felt that from time to time unfortunate rumors and pieces of propaganda had disturbed badly the relations between our two countries. The Chancellor particularly deeply regretted that a false rumor had been circulated after a conversation he had had a few years ago with an American of German descent. This rumor he cited as typical of the rumors, propaganda, and lies which create unfortunate misunderstandings. The rumor was supposed to have been based on the conversation with the German-American referred to above. The rumor, it seems, was to the effect that on the occasion of President Roosevelt's second election the Chancellor was said to have expressed the opinion that he personally considered the reelection of the President to have been a mistake. The rumor was a lie on two grounds; first, the Chancellor had said no such thing, and second, the Chancellor has his own important problems to solve in Germany which absorb so much of

his time that ordinarily the problems of America are too far away from his own mind for him to make comment on them.

The Chancellor had been furious when he heard of this lie because he had never said that the reelection of President Roosevelt was a mistake. On the contrary, he had always been of the opinion that nobody else but President Roosevelt would be able to complete the important tasks which the President had begun during his first term.

Referring to the war, the Chancellor said that the present war was a curious one, in that Germany has declared war on nobody, but that England and France had declared war on Germany. Germany has no war aims, other than to oppose the war aims of her own destruction as proclaimed by England and France. These countries, the Chancellor said, want to dismember Germany, to interfere with her own internal system of government and to make her subject to a Franco-British hegemony.

These are the war aims, the Chancellor continued, which have been given wide publicity in the western countries, but England and France lack the necessary power to realize these war aims. They have forgotten that there is a tremendous difference between 1914-18 and today. In the last war, Germany had to fight alone against the whole world. At that time Japan, Russia and Italy were on the other side, while today they are sympathetic with Germany.

As far as man-power is concerned, Germany is today as strong as England and France together. From a military point of view, Germany has war on only one front, while her rear is secure and free. Germany is well prepared for the fight, and is fully determined not to rest until her security is fully safeguarded, not only for the present, but also for the future. Germany does not want to have to take up arms every twenty years.

The Chancellor said that the whole German people is inspired by the same determination. It is futile for her enemies to hope for dissensions within the German nation. The German Reich of today has its roots deep in the national structure, whereas the German monarchy in the last war had no such roots in the masses of the people. In spite of this lack of a broad popular foundation, Germany fought against overwhelming odds for four years. She can now look with all the more confidence to the future, in view of the many changes which have occurred in the situation, all to her advantage.

The Chancellor then turned to economic questions. He said that Germany regarded it as inadmissible that two countries like England and France should endeavor to rule the whole world, by means of their Empires, and to reserve to their exclusive use the whole of the economic resources of the world. He said further that for Germany's economic security, with respect to the importation of necessary foodstuffs and raw materials, it is imperative that she get out of the position where England, by one means or another, can take steps every ten years or so, to throttle or impede this flow of essential foodstuffs and necessary materials and goods.

Referring in this connection to the question of colonies, the Chancellor said that the German colonies had been stolen from them by the English and French in contradiction to assurances given to Germany by President Wilson. These colonies were of no vital importance to France and England, but they constitute a vital necessity for Germany. For these reasons the colonies must be returned to Germany.

Regarding the comparative density of population in Germany and the United States, the Chancellor said that Germany must necessarily produce ten times as much per square kilometer of ground as the United States, because there are ten times as many inhabitants per square kilometer in Germany as in the United States.

Furthermore, Germany cannot buy her necessary imports in her own currency. In order to receive her essential imports, Germany must export. For example, for every pound of coffee imported there must be a corresponding quantity of goods exported.

A country which is forced to live under such conditions must necessarily feel that the dictatorship which countries like England and France exercise over the seven seas is unendurable. The effects of such dictatorship have only recently been given further expression through the action taken by Great Britain in stopping maritime transport of German coal to Italy.

With regard to the military situation, the Chancellor said that in the World War there were 130 German divisions on the East Front and 117 on the West Front, while at present there are 200 divisions on the West Front alone. Speaking as a soldier in the great war, he said that he had learned how to evaluate his opponents, and he knows they are not superior to the Germans.

Germany has no war aims. Only aggressors have war aims, and in the present war the aggressors are those who declared war, namely England and France. Should it be said that Germany had attacked Poland, one must remember that action was taken by Germany against Poland in order to put an end to Polish terrorism against the German minorities in that country. There would never have been a German-Polish war if England had not interfered in the Polish affair, which was none of England's business.

The Chancellor said that the present war can only be brought to an end if England and France will abandon their war aims. He would be very glad to leave it to President Roosevelt himself to find out whether they were ready to do so. Germany will not make peace unless and until she receives adequate assurances of security for the future, because in the past three hundred years France has too often declared war on Germany.


If England and France, but particularly England, fully realized today that they could not hope for assistance from other countries, as for instance the United States, they would make peace tomorrow. England considers the war a kind of sport in which the others must do the fighting. She had first asked the Russians to help her, and was now busy trying to get assistance from Norway and Sweden.

In concluding and summarizing his attitude on this present problem of war or peace the Chancellor expressed his belief that he would be able to reach an agreement with President Roosevelt in ten minutes on the following basis: First, Germany is ready to respect England as a great world power. In like manner she is ready to respect France as a great world power. But Germany demands in return that she also be respected as a world power. Second, if these world powers respect one another, they can make peace. Third, once peace is established, armaments can be remarkably reduced and the labor thus released can be employed for more productive purposes. Further, by means of a better organization of international trade in harmony with the suggestions made by President Roosevelt this labor can be readily absorbed by the resulting improvement in overall economic conditions.

Meantime, unfortunately for the interests of peace, England refuses to admit that Germany herself is also a reality as a world power.

This concludes the outline of the discussion with Chancellor Hitler.

Yours respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James D. Mooney". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

James D. Mooney

Rome, March 13th 1940

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

On March 7th I visited with Fieldmarshal Goering at his home near Berlin and am preparing to transmit to you as quickly as possible a general report of the conversation with the Fieldmarshal.

However, during the conversation the Finnish problem came under discussion and it has occurred to me that you might find this part of the discussion particularly interesting. Accordingly, I am sending you this message immediately.

After presenting to the Fieldmarshal informally and unofficially your attitudes of mind in the same manner as I presented them to Chancellor Hitler, and after receiving his general responses to your points, I went into a discussion with the Fieldmarshal of American public opinion in relation to certain of the current political factors in Europe.

I pointed out to the Fieldmarshal that American public opinion held that it lay well within Germany's grasp to provide an early solution to the situation which existed between Russia and Finland. Germany's position in the matter, beyond doubt, entitled her to certain powers of mediation.

Sentiment in the United States with regard to Russia had been developing unfavorably for the past year or more and had received a still further setback through the attack on Finland. Further westward movement of Russian influence in Europe was regarded in America as undesirable.

No feature of the present war had attained greater prominence in the American mind, which traditionally favored the under-dog, than the brave struggle which Finland had been making against heavy odds for her right to exist.


This feeling had been so marked that it was difficult to conceive of any possible move which would do more to raise German prestige and good-will in America than a timely, humane and equitable settlement of the Finnish problem under German initiative and leadership.

Fieldmarshal Goering responded to the point that Germany might take the initiative in bringing about an early solution of the Finnish problem by referring to several German expressions that had already been made to Russia urging Russia to a moderate course and reasonable demands with respect to Finland. Further, Germany had encouraged Finland to consider carefully and, if possible, accept some of the Russian points of view. But Finland had refused to make any concessions.

The Fieldmarshal continued that everything possible in the situation was being done and that there were hopes that the destroyed city of Viborg might provide the nucleus for a solution of the problem on a realistic basis. He added further that this city, which has been one of the principal Russian demands and which is outside the Finnish lines of defense, will have to be almost completely rebuilt. It was hoped that Finland would agree to leave the present site to the Russians and rebuild it at a nearby site within their natural lines of defense.

In summarizing the Finnish situation the Fieldmarshal wanted me to give assurances to the President that Germany was most interested in an early and equitable solution of the whole problem. He concluded by saying that in the Finnish situation everything possible had been done and that everything that could possibly be done would be done to this end.

Very respectfully,

  
James D. Mooney

Rome, March 14, 1940.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

This message will outline the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering at his home, Karinhall, in the country near Berlin, on March 7th, 1940. Only one other person was present during the discussion, Dr. Wohlthat, who has represented the Fieldmarshal and Germany during the past couple of years as an Ambassador-at-large, specializing particularly on trade treaties. The arrangements for the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering had been made by Dr. Wohlthat.

I presented the President's personal respects and greetings to the Fieldmarshal and he responded warmly in kind.

I then presented to the Fieldmarshal the unofficial and informal personal attitude of the President on certain of the current political and economic problems just as I had done previously in the discussion with Chancellor Hitler, and really covered the identical ground.

Fieldmarshal Goering stated that he was pleased to get the information on the President's personal views because he had never heard these views expressed publicly and was glad to have the reassurances of the President's neutral and open mind.

In expressing himself as to the viewpoints of President Roosevelt, the attitude of the Fieldmarshal was most friendly and sympathetic. He intended to continue to explore every avenue leading towards improved relations between Germany and the United States, and was particularly responsive to the President's ideas relating to the present situation in Europe.

With respect to German-American relations, the Fieldmarshal felt that Germany had not taken a single step nor established a single policy which was contrary to American interests. Germany had not meddled in American constitutional affairs nor done anything damaging to American affairs generally.

He referred to the number of people of German descent in America, and was of the opinion that their influence politically was considerably less now than in the early Colonial days, when German failed by only one vote in the Assembly of becoming the official language in the newly founded state. The Fieldmarshal's own staff-adjutant, a General in the army has a brother and sister who are American citizens living in Kentucky.

Turning to the question of American neutrality, the Fieldmarshal regarded the cancellation of the arms embargo as representing, in effect, an advantage to England and France, through placing the entire industrial potentiality of the country at the disposition of the Allied nations. Meanwhile the realities of the situation prevented Germany from drawing upon America as a source. This effect he found in harmony with public opinion in America, which he realizes is broadly in favor of England and France. In this connection he was interested in the conservative attitude of American industry generally toward war orders.

With regard to new and drastic methods of warfare, the Fieldmarshal believed that his own feelings and those of the German people and their leaders were in sympathy with the American feeling of horror toward their use. However, in fighting for her national existence, Germany was forced to meet any military necessities which confronted her with every means at her disposal. England was surely using every weapon, military and economic, including the blockade, against combatants and civilian population alike, and was pressing forward to equal Germany in the very weapons whose use England now decried and against which American opinion was so definitely negative.

As to the British Empire, the Fieldmarshal considered that it has performed and can continue to perform a most useful service to the entire civilized world. He agreed with the American view that any serious weakening of the Empire would be a severe loss to the white race in all parts of the world. Germany had no quarrel with the British Empire as such, but with the English policy of interference in European affairs outside the

British Empire. Further, Germany resented the strangle hold on the world's economic resources and trade routes which England endeavored to maintain by means of the Empire, and to use against Germany as well as other countries, including neutrals.

The Fieldmarshal illustrated this point by raising the question of what America's attitude would be if Germany tried to stir up trouble in Mexico against the United States, as England had been doing in Eastern Europe against Germany. Or if Germany detained American ships and seized American mails to neutral countries as England is doing.

I went into a discussion with the Fieldmarshal of American public opinion in relation to certain of the current political factors in Europe. I pointed out to the Fieldmarshal that American public opinion held that it lay well within Germany's grasp to provide an early solution to the situation which existed between Russia and Finland. Germany's position in the matter, beyond doubt, entitled her to certain powers of mediation.

Sentiment in the United States with regard to Russia had been developing unfavorably for the past year or more and had received a still further setback through the attack on Finland. Further westward movement of Russian influence in Europe was regarded in America as undesirable.

No feature of the present war had attained greater prominence in the American mind, which traditionally favored the underdog, than the brave struggle which Finland had been making against heavy odds for her right to exist. This feeling had been so marked that it was difficult to conceive of any possible move which would do more to raise German prestige and good-will in America than a timely, humane and equitable settlement of the Finnish problem under German initiative and leadership.

Fieldmarshal Goering responded to the point that Germany might take the initiative in bringing about an early solution of the Finnish problem by referring to several German expressions that had already been made to Russia urging Russia to a moderate course and reasonable demands with respect to Finland. Further, Germany had encouraged Finland to consider carefully and, if possible, accept some of the Russian points of view. But Finland had refused to make any concessions.

The Fieldmarshal continued that everything possible in the situation was being done and that there were hopes that the destroyed city of Viborg might provide the nucleus for a solution of the problem on a realistic basis. He added further that this city, which has been one of the principal Russian demands and which is outside the Finnish lines of defense, will have to be almost completely rebuilt. It was hoped that Finland would agree to leave the present site to the Russians and rebuild it at a nearby site within their natural lines of defense.

In summarizing the Finnish situation the Fieldmarshal wanted me to give assurances to the President that Germany was most interested in an early and equitable solution of the whole problem. He concluded by saying that in the Finnish situation everything possible had been done and that everything that could possibly be done would be done to this end.

As to the government regime in Germany, in which England has professed lack of confidence, the Fieldmarshal was convinced that the German scheme of Government was so firmly rooted in the nation that it could not be displaced until Germany, and with her, most of middle Europe was brought to military, economic and social collapse. It was doubtful whether England could have greater confidence in the succeeding revolutionary regime which would spring up from the ruins of Europe.

Germany was fighting first of all against her own destruction by England and France, and for escape from starvation. Germany wanted a German sphere of influence in middle-Europe which could be likened to a German "Monroe-Doctrine". Germany wanted access to the world's raw materials and trade through restoration of her colonies and through removal of the strangle-hold which England and France imposed on natural resources and trade routes by force of their Empires.

Political, cultural and religious autonomy for the smaller states in the German orbit were included in this concept, and, since they were not strong enough in military or economic terms to maintain the independence of their international position in these respects, political interference from outside would be excluded from this German sphere of influence. These conditions already prevailed in Slovakia, were being developed as rapidly as possible in Bohemia and Moravia and would be introduced into Poland.

Turning to economic questions, the Fieldmarshal discussed the most-favored-nation principle, which was Germany's basic guiding principle in all the commercial treaties she was making. The only difference between the German and American views of this principle lay in the respective theories on this matter. In actual practice Germany was required by the necessities of the situation in various countries with which she negotiated trade agreements to establish some qualifications and deviations from the theoretical principle, just as America in certain cases made exceptions and special provisions. The qualifications thus established by Germany could also be compared with the exceptions and deviations observable in the Ottawa agreements.

There had been no change in Germany's views on the most-favored-nation principle since before 1914, but the altered circumstances throughout the world with respect to the gold-standard, severe exchange fluctuations and blocked currencies had rendered these deviations from the theoretical principle necessary if trade were to be maintained at all.

For example, the countries in Southeastern Europe, which Germany regarded as falling within the German sphere of influence, and with whom various trade agreements and arrangements had been effected, all had exchange controls of one kind or another. Germany was the best market by far for their products, these countries were ready and willing to accept German goods in payment, and to accept the capital assistance which Germany offered to build up their industries and to develop their natural resources.

These countries, however, could not compete with some of the large world producers of certain of the commodities such as wheat and barley which represented the greater part of their "trading assets", so that in establishing the arrangements between herself and those countries to their mutual advantage, Germany had found it necessary, if these arrangements were to function at all, to agree upon a margin over world prices for these products in much the same manner as the United States government had rendered assistance to the American farmer.

In this connection it was important to note that although the present Germany represented a far larger potential market for American goods than ever before, the American tariff position and generally impaired relations between the two countries prevented this potentiality, to a large extent, from being realized. The Fieldmarshal indicated a strong desire for improved economic and commercial relations and cooperation between Germany and the United States, and felt that much ground would be gained for both sides by a more liberal attitude in America towards accepting imports from Germany to pay for American exports.

Germany regarded middle-Europe as her sphere of influence, but granted in principle that each nation had a right to political, cultural and religious autonomy and its own form of government. Germany realized the need and the advantages to herself, to the countries in the German sphere of influence and to the rest of the world, of maintaining an open door and the freest possible trade relations with the countries of Western Europe and the rest of the world.

The relation of population to subsistence in this German sphere is such that the standard of living in this area could not be maintained and improved without a vigorous flow of trade in both directions with countries outside the German sphere. The modern industrial development of the world was far ahead of the political and social capacities to capitalize constructively upon this development for a broadly improved standard of living. Statesmen everywhere carry the responsibility to bring about the necessary equalization of these fundamental factors.

On the general subject of war and peace, the Fieldmarshal felt that this rested with England. Germany was ready to end the war and turn to more constructive purposes, provided England would abandon her war aim of Germany's destruction. Britain knew what she was fighting against - against a stronger Germany - but did not seem to know what she was fighting for.

The Fieldmarshal was particularly interested in the discussion of the position and functions of a "moderator", with which term he had not been familiar in such connection. He drew a comparison between this concept of a moderator and the part played by President Wilson in the armistice and peace negotiations following the world war, which, in his opinion, had not been productive of the best results. However, he recognized the distinction that in 1918-19 the situation involved victorious and defeated nations, which is not the case in the present situation. Furthermore, he realized that public opinion in the United States twenty years ago had not been in favor of some of the features of President Wilson's plans, whereas now American public opinion seemed to be definitely in favor of ending the war.

The Fieldmarshal continued that he would like very much to see something done to bring about an early end to the hostilities, but was inclined to doubt whether America could effectively assume the role of moderator now, in view of the English viewpoint and state of mind. He felt definitely that the principal difficulty at present in the way of an approach to the problem by way of a moderator lay in London.


If something were to be initiated from the American side in this general direction, the Fieldmarshal was of the opinion that it should be done very soon, because certain very important present advantages to Germany would be impaired by long continued delay. This was too great a responsibility for the leaders of Germany to assume, to incur such penalties by a policy of indeterminate waiting. If Germany could be sure that something constructive was in process of development, including the necessary changes in the English and French standpoints, she would not force the decision aggressively. But there were grave doubts as to the possibility of such circumstances materializing.

Dealing with the military situation, the Fieldmarshal felt that since England had decided to make this war, a heavy responsibility rested upon those who directed Germany's effort if they failed to capitalize upon the present military advantages. These are felt to be a stronger air force, almost twice as many divisions on the Western front as in 1914-1918, superior artillery and more effective techniques in mine and submarine warfare.

The Fieldmarshal believed that England would not be convinced, without putting it to the test, that Germany was able, if necessary, to fight successfully against England and France. In consequence, England was continuing to develop every means in her power to destroy Germany. The Fieldmarshal further felt that if England were convinced of Germany's ability to defend herself successfully, England would be ready to discuss a basis for ending the war. Under such circumstances she would find Germany equally ready to take part in such discussions.

This concludes the outline of the discussion with Fieldmarshal Goering.

Yours respectfully,

  
James D. Mooney

Rome, March 15, 1940

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

During the past several days cables have been sent to you covering the exploration work that I have been able to do so far in the war and peace situation in Europe.

In this concluding message of the series I should like to make a few suggestions to you in relation to the current problem. I have been rather saturated with the problem, particularly during the past several months and am presenting these suggestions with the hope that they might be slightly helpful in developing your own views and plans.

The peoples of Europe are united in the belief that the present war could have been averted. There is today a deeper self-interest appeal for all the belligerent peoples in making peace than in continuing the war. Nobody can doubt the wish of every belligerent country for the ending of this war.

The world faces many problems today just as serious as war and far more worthy of sacrifices. None of these problems is going to be solved by this war.

There are times when a man or a nation must fight. There are things worth more than life itself. The death of martyrs sometimes enables others to live on in a better world. But nobody in Europe seems to believe that a better world will come out of this war. In other words, the war in Europe today is not regarded as martyrdom; but as suicide for winners and losers alike.

Is there a way out? There is still in Europe a universal hope that a way out might be found. There is still a strong undercurrent of feeling that a peace should be attempted

at the beginning instead of at the end of the war. Level-headed people everywhere in Europe are still hoping that there may be peace before millions of lives have been lost, before Europe has been made a shambles and before bitterness has been branded in the hearts of men here for another generation. Peace at the beginning of the war might provide some hope for the solution of European problems.

Europe can count only on the President of the United States to take an effective hand in the mediation that is necessary in the present situation. I know from my recent extended contacts back home in December and January that the American people believe too that it is an insane war and that the United States shares some responsibility for the deep causes of the present war. It seems therefore that the American people would support a discreet position as a moderator on the part of the President. However, I do not want to be so presumptuous as to extend the discussion of this phase of the whole problem.

I should like on the other hand however to make some suggestions to you for the practical points that will have to be considered in building up the approach for a peace. I feel reasonably sure of my ground in making these suggestions because of my intimate contacts in Europe with the problem over the past several years and particularly during the past six months of the war.

The problem of calling off the war is essentially one of practical politics. The political groups in the three belligerent countries have thrown so many dead cats over the other fellow's garden wall during the past two or three years and particularly during the last six months, that it is now very difficult for them to have any discussions with one another. These political factors not only distrust each other in a personal way but they have been telling the world violently and frequently that they hate and distrust each other.

One cannot help raising the question here, when it is said on either side that they cannot deal with the other crowd, as to how much the situation will be improved in this respect if the war goes on for two or three years. Certainly at the end of that time not a shred of trust or respect would be left on either side.

The situation needs the hand of a man skilled in practical politics. There are conflicting ideologies, and important problems of economics and political boundaries. But no political leader in Europe when in a frank mood will contend for killing off several million men and making a shambles of Europe as the means for settling these problems.

The root of the trouble at present seems to lie in the problems of personal prestige. In generating the peace pattern one must include a large element of face saving. I say this without the slightest implication of criticism of the various political leaders personally because the events of the past two or three years have been appallingly difficult.

The next important point is national prestige and honor. A practical approach toward mediation will have to include elements to reconstitute these less material but very important factors for both sides.

The third and last general point so far as the political leaders are concerned is security for their own countries and peoples.

As to the peoples themselves in the belligerent countries, two things are closest to their hearts: first, immunity from physical danger, in other words, a peaceful life. Second, the right to earn a living.

I have sent you a complete outline of the discussions with Chancellor Hitler and Fieldmarshal Goering on the subject of war and peace and in presenting these outlines I have tried carefully to avoid interpolating any of my own points of view about Germany's attitude into my report of their conversations. I considered it most important to report the conversations to you as faithfully as possible and to give you the opportunity to make your own deductions from them.

However, I should like now to present my own sense of the German attitude built up from an intensive exploration of their standpoint and outlook.

In the first place, my own opinion is that Germany is eager to make peace. I believe that this eagerness is not induced by any great fears on the part of Germany that they cannot withstand attack from England and France and take care of themselves rather well. They do not like the idea of taking up the war aggressively but they are just as grim and determined about seeing the war through as England and France.

Boiled down in essence, Germany is willing to make such concessions for Poland and Czechoslovakia as could please world opinion in relation to the religious, cultural and political autonomy of these nations. On the other hand, Germany seems thoroughly determined to prevent any recurrence of the nuisance value generated

by England and France through their making political and military pacts with countries contiguous to Germany.

The main other thing that Germany seems determined about is the return of the former German colonies. But it seems that they would want these returned primarily for their trading value. After the colonies were technically turned back to her, Germany would be willing to give way on actually taking over some of these territories. This is because Germany realizes that certain political embarrassments would ensue to England and France if the colonies as defined by their present boundaries were actually taken over by Germany. Germany might for instance be willing to trade the whole lot of her former colonies in Africa for a new block of territory in Central tropical Africa which she could open up and colonize. In other words, she is willing in spirit to have the colonial problem handled in a mutually constructive way.

Some of the points which you emphasized to me during our discussions at the White House in December and January, as for instance religious freedom and Germany's coming into the family of nations for international trade along the lines endorsed by you and Secretary Hull, are generally quite acceptable to Germany in principle. Furthermore, the many discussions I had with officials of the German government made me believe that they would meet you more than half way in supporting your broad general program for resolving the immediate political difficulties in Europe in the direction of an orderly political and economic world program.

One of the most important points in dealing with Germany at the present time, if not the most important point, is again a very practical human point. German officials have often said to me, and I have heard it a great deal during the past few years in Germany generally, that the Germans are tired of being treated like bad school-boys. They are tired of being talked down to and of being scolded all the time as though they had a special monopoly among the nations on all the failings of human nature.

During my recent visit with the government officials in Germany the friendly expressions that you had made toward Germany in your remarks to me had a tonic effect in soothing the irritation that could have arisen ordinarily in my discussing with them frankly and bluntly as I did, some of the elements of American public opinion in relation to Germany's present policies on certain matters.

In general, what this situation in Europe needs at the moment, Mr. President, is the healing influence of some of your tolerant, friendly, patient type of dealing.

I am not going to discuss what the French want or the English want, because you are just as familiar with this as I am, except I should like to touch on one or two points from the standpoint of either country, just as a means of introducing a few suggestions for the practical approach to peace.

The French want security. Further, they want a reconstitution of their national prestige and honor, which they feel suffered through their not saving Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Maginot line is a great part of the answer to French security.

In discussions for peace France could champion the rights of Poland and Czechoslovakia for certain national, religious, political and cultural autonomies. Undoubtedly France could get such rights from the Germans if such rights did not interfere with Germany's security on her eastern and southeastern borders.

England too wants security and a reconstruction of her national prestige and honor.

Let us address ourselves for the moment to the problem of prestige and honor for England and particularly to the problem of face-saving for the political group in England under whose leadership and inheritance of previous bad politics England became involved in the present situation.

Nobody could possibly take exception to England's having declared war on Germany at the time Germany declared her intention of invading Poland. England had said that she would declare war if this invasion took place and she was bound to keep her word. This does not mean that the present war is not still wrong because, although the declaration of war by England was logical on September 3, the preceding causes over a series of years, and particularly the poker playing of 1938 and 1939, provided a very illogical basis in the whole sequence of events.

The thing I want to suggest to you, Mr. President, is that England has found herself during the past six months since the outbreak of world war number two in the position of a school boy or young fellow who has got himself into a bad fight against a tough adversary. As is the way of a school boy or young fellow, he carries a chip on his shoulder and picks up challenges for a fight quite lightly.

After the fight is well under way and he has been accumulating a black eye, he is inclined to wonder why he had not been a bit more polite in the situation. Finally, if the fight is going badly or the opponent seems to be much tougher than he had anticipated, he is quite happy if a policeman happens to come along or perhaps some older man to stop the fight.

Honor is still intact because he did not fail to accept the challenge and he did not quit. But on the other hand, also, his nose is still reasonably intact and this is comforting. In other words, he retires from the fight with honor and not too badly bruised up. This is the perfect situation for a fellow who likes to maintain his reputation in the neighborhood for being a scrappy fellow.

Stopping a fight is very often a most thankless job and this fight in Europe looks particularly difficult.

But you are the only one who can stop it, Mr. President. Perhaps, some way or another could be found whereby you could project yourself into the situation in harmony with American public opinion and in harmony with saving face for the political leaders in the belligerent countries and in harmony with their national honor and prestige. God knows the peoples of these belligerent countries would be very happy for peace and I am quite sure this includes the political leaders themselves.

The final suggestion I have to make, Mr. President, is that instead of starting in by trying to settle some of the heated and irritating issues between England and Germany, that you set forth before the belligerents an attractive frame-work for an orderly political and economic world, which you would invite the belligerents to join. Such a frame-work would set forth certain broad principles to which the belligerents could subscribe.

This frame-work would have to recognize certain practical factors in the European situation. For example, England has declared again and again that Germany is a constant factor for unrest in Europe and that the world cannot settle down to orderly progress until Germany ceases to press its nuisance-value and stops grabbing more territory.

Some assurance must therefore be given to the British people that once Germany's legitimate demands are fulfilled Germany too will settle down to business and cease pulling some new stunt every few months.

As evidence of Germany's willingness to respond to this viewpoint and set of principles, Chancellor Hitler gave me emphatic assurance for transmission to you that with the recognition of Germany as a first class power, entitled to have some hegemony in her part of the world, and with the satisfaction of Germany's colonial claim, a long period of peace can come so far as Germany is concerned.

The President of the United States could elicit a solemn pledge from both sides that after the two parties had stopped fighting and had agreed upon an equitable peace between them, a peace formulated under the guidance of the President as moderator, they agree to let the other fellow alone and cease pin-pricking him by stirring up trouble in the other fellow's back yard.

It should be remembered that the United States would not guarantee either side. The American public opinion is dead set against any such commitment or involvement. The Allies did their best to make us guarantee their side after the last war, and failed. America, of course, will not fall for that this time either.


But the President of the United States could become the trustee for both sides by locking up in his safe, figuratively speaking, a solemn document from both sides whereby both sides agree that the peace treaty which they have signed shall be a lasting one. With his skill for dramatic presentation Mr. Roosevelt could give world-wide publicity to these pledges and also let the world know that a violation of them would raise up the entire moral force of the United States against the violator. Such a Magna Charta of world peace would assure the British nation that it had not declared war in vain. England would have achieved what it could not attain after the last war. Then, it was clearly a dictated peace and of course the loser could do nothing but accept it without really intending to do anything but throw off the shackles at the first opportunity. In contrast, a peace among equals would be something to the lasting observance of which both sides could pledge themselves.

If a truce could be declared during which these principles could be discussed, only a few months of relief would be needed from the danger and fear of imminent military aggressiveness to explore the practical possibilities of applying these principles.

If at the end of such a period of truce it should be found that the principles contained no ground for a more orderly political and economic world, then it would be time enough to say: let the war go on and let the world go to hell.

This is my last message of the present series and before making any more contacts I shall await your further wishes.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James D. Mooney". The signature is fluid and extends to the right with a long tail.

James D. Mooney

~~SECRET~~  
HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 16, 1940

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

UNCLASSIFIED  
RECORDED

190, March 16, noon.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WELLES.

I was received by the King this morning and had  
with him a conversation lasting just under an hour.  
In the conversation which was in general terms the  
King expressed his highest admiration and regard for  
yourself and for all that you have done in the cause  
of peace.

I have just concluded a conversation of an hour  
and a half with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The  
Minister emphasized even more than he had done in our  
conversation two weeks ago the determination of Italy  
to do everything within its power to further the reestab-  
lishment of peace, to adhere strictly to its present line  
of policy and to take no steps which would further trouble  
the world situation. (END SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PHILLIPS

PEG

HSM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 16, 1940

Rec'd 11:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

190, March 16, noon. (SECTION TWO)

In my conversation with him I was given full opportunity to evaluate the recent Ribbentrop conversations here in connection with the course of my present mission. Twenty (repeat twenty).

I am being received by Mussolini this afternoon. Count Ciano requested me to postpone my departure from Rome which had been scheduled for Monday until the following day in order that I might before my departure receive personally and secretly from him further impressions which they were now obtaining from Berlin. I shall consequently sail from Genoa on March 20th instead of from Naples on March 19th. (END MESSAGE).

PHILLIPS

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached telegram from Mr. Welles is in nine sections and being received only slowly off thw wire. It is in secret code requiring slightly longer for decoding but will be forwarded as rapidly as possible

CH

*PSF*  
*Safe: Italy* *Pres.*

AC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 9:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

191, March 17, noon.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM  
WELLES.

Referring to my telephone conversation with the  
President last night I believe that the urgency of  
the situation demands that I telegraph this summary  
of my conversations of last evening with the Duce  
and with Count Ciano.

In my conversation with the Duce I stated that I  
had been impressed everywhere during my trip with the  
confidence expressed that the Duce and his Foreign  
Minister were sincerely desirous of doing their utmost  
to bring about a reestablishment of peace on a just  
and durable basis. I said that it seemed to me that  
the influence of Italy towards this end might consequently  
be very great. The Duce replied that if he had not in  
fact sincerely wished to do everything possible to  
avert the present war and, after war had broken out,  
to limit its spread there would today be engaged in war

MORE

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon, from Rome.

more than two hundred million additional human beings  
in the Mediterranean region and in Africa. (END ONE  
OF NINE SECTIONS).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated January 17, 1940

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

191, January 17, noon (SECTION TWO).

He said that it was impossible for Europe to stand a war at this time and that the course of salvation lay in preparing the foundation for a peace which would give assurance of durability for the next generation. He asked me if I would give him the impressions which I had formed as the result of my recent visits. I said that as he knew I had committed myself to consider the conversations I had as strictly confidential and as solely for the information of the President and the Secretary of State and that consequently he would recognize, I knew, that I could not disclose the statements made to me nor the opinions expressed to me. I said that I had however felt at liberty to say in the visits to the various capitals which I had made after my first visit to Rome that I had been glad to learn from the Duce that he did not believe that the establishment of a just and durable peace at this time was in any sense outside the realm of possibility.

- 2 - #191, January 17, noon (SECTION TWO) from Rome

I had thereby **been** encouraged in my search for information. (END SECTION TWO).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ROME

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

191, March 17, noon (SECTION THREE).

While for the reasons expressed I could only reply in a general sense, I could state that I had everywhere found that the fundamental demand was for security; not a fictitious nor illusory security but a security which involved a real disarmament including the abolition of offensive types of armaments and in particular areas freed from the present nightmare which today oppressed all peoples, namely, the ever present danger of the utilization of offensive types of airplanes for the bombing of civilian populations and the slaughter of women and children. I said that in my first conversation with the Duce two weeks ago he had outlined to me what he believed were essential territorial and political readjustments. I said that I had formed the very definite impression that the readjustments which he had mentioned to me - which included the reconstitution of a free and independent Poland with economic access to the sea - were by no means insoluble problems

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon (SECTION THREE).

problems. I said that I had formed the equally positive conviction that these problems could only be solved successfully on the basis of real security of the type I had indicated. (END SECTION THREE).

PHILLIPS

CSB

AC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

191, March 17, noon (SECTION FOUR)

At this stage Mussolini said too that upon the initia-  
tive of Hitler he had agreed a few hours before to  
meet Hitler at the Brenner Pass at ten a.m. on March 18.  
He said that throughout the course of Ribbentrop's recent  
visit to Rome the latter had refused to agree to any  
possible negotiations for peace but had insisted that  
Germany would seek peace only through military victory  
and that after military victory had been gained peace  
would be determined by German dictation. The Duce  
said that he believed that the German military offen-  
sive was imminent and that in all probability it was  
only a few hours away. He said that once this offensive  
was undertaken any hope of peace by negotiation would  
probably be killed and in any event indefinitely postponed.  
He said that he would do his utmost to persuade Hitler  
to postpone the offensive but that if he was to have  
any chance of doing so he must have some hope to offer.  
Hitler that the allied powers would not assume a posi-  
tion of complete intransigence. He wished consequently  
to know

- 2 - #191, March 17, noon (SECTION FOUR) from Rome.

to know whether I would authorize him to communicate  
to Hitler the impressions I had given him.

(END SECTION FOUR).

PHILLIPS

CSB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SC)

ROME

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

191, March 17, noon (SECTION FIVE).

In reply I stated that I could not give him such authorization without consulting the President which I would do by telephone and that I would communicate the President's decision on to him later in the evening through Count Ciano. I said that I felt sure that I need not emphasize to him the fact that I was in no sense acting as an intermediary but solely as a reporter and that I considered it doubtful that the President would feel able to reach any decision in regard to all of the issues involved until I had been afforded the opportunity to report to the President in full and personally. Mussolini said that the minute hand had reached one minute before midnight and that he feared the time would necessarily elapse.

Before the termination of my interview Mussolini said, I think very significantly, that while the

German-Italian

-2- #191, March 17, noon from Rome

German-Italian pact existed he, Mussolini, retained entire liberty of action. He requested that I defer my departure from Rome until after his return from his meeting with Hitler so that he could communicate to me the results of the interview in order that I might have them available before leaving Europe to report to the President.

(END SECTION FIVE).

PHILLIPS

PEG

HM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 2:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

191, March 17, noon (SECTION SIX)

I then telephoned to the President and obtained his approval of my recommendation that I should send word to the Duce that the President did not feel able to instruct me to authorize Muesolini to communicate any impressions I had formed with regard to territorial readjustments to Hitler.

I then had a further interview with Count Ciano at his house and conveyed to him the President's message. Count Ciano said emphatically that he fully agreed as to the wisdom of the decision made. I stressed the message which the President had given me on the telephone that the fundamental problem of security involved a real disarmament so that men and women might again undertake constructive work with consequent betterment of living standards and with the consequent possibility that beneficial economic adjustments could be made. I

repeated

hsm -2- No.191, March 17, noon, (Section Six) from Rome  
repeated to Count Ciano the President's confident belief  
that the Allied Governments did not (repeat not) hold  
as an objective the destruction of Germany nor of the  
German people but that they did want a real guaranty  
that war would not be forced upon them every generation.  
Count Ciano said that he himself completely shared these  
views.

PHILLIPS

HTM

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC)

Rome  
Dated March 17, 1940  
Rec'd 4:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION SEVEN)

He said that throughout the course of the Ribbentrop conversations Ribbentrop had talked of nothing but war and of the German assurance that Germany could defeat France within three or four months and that subsequently England would crumble soon thereafter. He also spoke of Ribbentrop's reiterated insistence that Italy and Russia come to a close and friendly understanding. Ciano stated emphatically that there would be no change in Italy's present policy either with regard to the present war or with regard to Russia. He arranged to meet me confidentially at noon on March 19 with no press publicity in order that I might be fully advised by him of the conversations with Hitler.

As I see the situation there are two possible alternatives: first, that as a result of his conversations with Hitler, Mussolini may convey to the Allied

Governments

hsm -2- No. 191, March 17, noon (Section 7 ) from Rome

Governments peace terms which would prove entirely unacceptable and which might be couched in the nature of a German ultimatum.

PHILLIPS

PEG

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC)

Rome  
Dated March 17, 1940  
Rec'd 7:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION EIGHT)

In the event that this step is taken I would suggest that the Secretary issue a statement saying that while the President greatly appreciates the particularly cordial and friendly reception accorded me by the Duce and by Ciano, as well as the opportunity they have given me of procuring the information which the President sent me to Europe to obtain, nevertheless, neither the President nor I have been consulted in any way with regard to the peace terms nor were the President nor I in any way apprised of their nature before they were made public. In the hypothesis that a peace drive is now put on by Hitler through Mussolini, a statement of that character issued in Washington would immediately kill the impression which would presumably be intentionally created that the President's step in sending me abroad had favored a peace drive of that character.

(END SECTION EIGHT)

PHILLIPS

PEG

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated March 17, 1940

Rec'd 7:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

191, March 17, noon. (SECTION NINE)

A second alternative is that Hitler actually is determined upon a military offensive in the immediate future and will consider no alternative. It may be that Hitler's desire to see Mussolini at this juncture is due to Ribbentrop's inability to persuade the Italian Government to enter into some understanding with Russia and that he feels it imperative if a military offensive is now undertaken by Germany to prevent any discord between Italy and Russia from having prejudicial effects on Germany's source of supplies in the Near East and in particular in the Balkans. In connection with this second alternative Ciano said to me two significant things: first, that when Hitler had requested the meeting with Mussolini the latter had suggested March 19 and Hitler had replied that it could not be later than March 18;

second,

hsm -2- No. 191, March 17 (section nine) from Rome

second, that Hitler has informed Mussolini that he cannot spare more than one hour for the interview since he must return to Germany with the utmost haste.

(END MESSAGE).

PHILLIPS

HTM

*Safe: Italy*

NAVAL DISPATCH  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: ALUSNA LONDON 231230CR980  
TO: OPNAV  
INFO:  
RELEASE:

DATE: 23 APRIL 1940  
PRECEDENCE: CABLE  
TOR CODE ROOM: 1454

GODFREY ON THE EVENING OF 22 APRIL EXPRESSED APPRECIABLE LESSENING OF ANXIETY OVER ITALIAN ACTION. HE QUOTES THE CHANCES NOW TWO TO ONE AGAINST. HE FEELS THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE (ACCORDING TO RECENT RELIABLE INFORMATION) IS SERIOUSLY UNPREPARED AND THAT THE ARMY IS ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS SO. HOWEVER, HE FEELS THAT THE ITALIAN NAVY IS FULLY READY.

GODFREY SAID AGAIN THAT HIS IDEA WAS THAT THE ITALIAN MOTIVE WAS TO KEEP UP THEIR NUISANCE VALUE UNTIL THE WINNING SIDE WAS MORE CLEARLY DEFINED WHEN THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO DRIVE A HARD BARGAIN. HE STATED THAT THIS WAS A DANGEROUS GAME. HE INTIMATED THAT THEY STILL THINK DIVIDED COUNCILS PREVAIL IN ITALY.

A SIMILAR VIEW OF THE GENERAL ITALIAN SCENE WAS RECENTLY VOICED BY THE FRENCH NAVAL ATTACHE HERE, BUT HE SAID THEIR OWN OFFENSIVE POWER COULD SEVERELY DAMAGE IMPORTANT NORTHERN OBJECTIVES. HE SUGGESTED IN CONCLUSION THAT THE EVENTUAL ITALIAN ATTITUDE WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY ITALY'S ABILITY TO GET COAL:- IF FROM THE NAZIS THEN THAT WOULD BE THE WAY THEY WOULD SWING.

HE FRANKLY REPLIED "I DO NOT KNOW BUT FEEL IT IS DOUBTFUL", WHEN I ASKED HIM "DO YOU THINK IT IS PROBABLE THAT SUCH WILL OCCUR?"

DISTRIBUTION:

16 ACTION  
10/11...13...NAVAID...

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDC DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- J. W. [unclear]

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C."

Safe: Italy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PSF

THE SECRETARY

Keep in  
Personal files

14 May 1945

Published in

Foreign Relations

General and "Eu

Italy, pp. 704

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Sections

1, 2, 3, 4,

delivered earlier

2/11/14

Philipps Romer A

May 14, 1940.

11 pm  
Original

.President desires you to present the following personal message from him to Mussolini:

I do not know what Your Excellency plans or proposes but reports reaching me from many sources, to the effect that you may be contemplating early entry into the war, have given me ~~such~~ <sup>great</sup> concern, that I feel justified in urging you, with all possible earnestness and in the name of humanity, against extending the ~~threat~~ <sup>theater</sup> of war, with the inevitable loss of the lives of countless men and women and children and the tragic undermining of the whole foundations of our civilization. Both victors and vanquished would thereby be losers.

My final appeal to Your Excellency is to refrain from any course of action that could be construed

B

May 14, 1940.

~~MUSSOLINI,~~

I send you this appeal as the head of a peaceful nation and as a close friend of twenty other American Republics. All of us in the Americas feel in our hearts that tonight the whole world faces a threat which opposes every teaching of Christ, every philosophy of all the great teachers of mankind over thousands of years.

Forces of slaughter, forces which deny God, forces which seek to dominate mankind by fear rather than by reason seem at this moment to be extending their ~~conquest~~ <sup>conquest against</sup> a hundred million human beings who have no desire but peace.

You whom the great Italian people call their leader have it in your own hands to stay the spread of this war to another group of 200,000,000 human souls *in the Mediterranean area.*

I have sent word to Your Excellency before that I am a realist. As a realist you also will, I know, recognize that if ~~this~~ <sup>this</sup> war should extend ~~its spheres to all continents~~ <sup>throughout the world</sup> it would pass beyond the control of heads of States, would encompass the destruction of millions of lives and the best of what we call the liberty and culture of civilization. And no man, no matter how omniscient, how powerful, can ~~fortell~~ <sup>foretell</sup> the result either to himself or his own people.

Therefore, I make the simple plea that you, responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack. So only can you help mankind tonight and tomorrow and in the pages of history.

*Franklin D. Roosevelt*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1st Draft  
May 14  
10 p.m.

Mussolini:

I send you this appraisal as the  
head of a peaceful ~~the~~ nation  
~~the~~ and as a <sup>close</sup> friend of twenty other  
American Republics. All of us in  
the Americas feel in our hearts  
that tonight the whole world  
faces a threat which opposes every  
teaching of Christ, every philosophy  
of <sup>all</sup> the <sup>great</sup> teachers of mankind ~~and~~  
over thousands of years.

Forces of slaughter, forces

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

which deny God, forces which  
state & dominate maintained by  
fear rather than by reason & law  
at this moment it is extending  
their sway over a hundred million  
human beings who have no  
desire but peace.

You whom the great Italian  
people call their leader have it  
in your own hands to stop the  
spread of this war & another  
group of 200,000,000 human  
beings.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

I have not used to your Excellency  
before that I am a realist. As  
a realist you also will I know  
recognize that <sup>it</sup> a world war  
should extend its <sup>embracing</sup> to all continents <sup>it would</sup>  
pass beyond the central <sup>of heads</sup>  
of states, <sup>would</sup> ~~and~~ encompass the  
destruction of millions of lives and  
the loss of what we call <sup>the</sup> liberty  
and substance of civilization.

And no man, no matter how  
powerful, has powerful can  
forget the result either to  
himself or his own people.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Therefore I make the simple  
plea that you, responsible for  
Italy, withhold your hand, ~~and~~  
I stay wholly apart from my  
war <sup>and refrain from</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> threat of attack.

So only can you ~~withstand~~  
<sup>hold</sup> ~~maintain~~ tonight and tomorrow  
~~stand~~ and in the pages of  
history.

President

PSF Safe: Italy

HSM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communi-  
cated to anyone. (Br.)

Rome  
Dated May 15, 1940  
Rec'd 7:23 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH  
348, May 15, 1 p. m.  
My 347, May 15, noon.

Ciano has called me on the telephone to say that Mussolini asked me to convey his thanks to the President and to assure the President that his message would be given most serious consideration but that at the moment he had no further comment to make.

It is clear therefore that the Duce does not desire to receive me today.

RR

PHILLIPS

*PSF Safe: Italy*

CK  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

Rome

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 6:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

457, May 15, noon.

Department's No. 116.

Ciano received me this morning at 10 o'clock after he had been made aware that I was bringing message from the President to Mussolini. He read the message carefully and then informed me that he had already advised the Chief of Government of the purpose of my visit and that Mussolini had asked him to tell me that he preferred at this time to receive the message through the Foreign Minister rather than directly from me. Ciano explained that Mussolini wished to avoid at this moment any sensationalism and he assured me that the message would be in Mussolini's hands within a few minutes. I said that I was certain that the President would appreciate the fact that Mussolini had received me if only to tell me that he had read the message and to express to me for transmission to the President any comments he might care to make. Ciano did not say that this would be impossible and indicated that he would telephone me a little later in the day.

• HILLIPS

EMB

FILE IN THE PRESIDENT'S DESK

The following is the enclosed information regarding the  
... of ... and ... from the ...  
... in the ... and ...  
... of ... by ... the ...  
... of ... and the ...  
... the following report is ...

There is attached hereto a table showing the total  
... of ... of ... products to Italy for  
... of ... in ... of ... 1941, to-  
... for the ... of ...  
... The ... also shows  
... of ... The  
... of ...

It will be noted that total ... of ...  
... of ... in ...  
... of ...



Safe: Italy  
PSF

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached telegram regarding exports of petroleum and petroleum products from the United States to Italy in the last eight months, and for similar figures of exports to Italy from the principal South American suppliers (Venezuela and the Netherlands West Indies), the following report is submitted:

There is attached hereto a table showing the total dollar value of exports of petroleum products to Italy for each of the eight months September 1939 to April 1940, together with the total for the corresponding eight months of 1938-1939. For this same period there is also shown the leading petroleum products making up this total. The products separately listed account for about 98 percent of the total trade in petroleum products.

It will be observed that total exports of petroleum and petroleum products have been about 9 percent higher in the last eight months than in the corresponding months a year earlier. Exports of crude petroleum and residual fuel oil have been decidedly lower than a year ago, while exports of lubricating oil have risen substantially.

With

With reference to exports of petroleum products from Venezuela and the Netherlands West Indies to Italy, there appear to be no data available in Washington for any recent period. The latest information which the Division of Regional Information of the Department of Commerce has is for 1936 in the case of Venezuela and for the first quarter of 1939 for the Netherlands West Indies. Telegrams are being sent to Caracas and Curaçao asking for the latest available data on this subject.

	1936	1939	1939	1939
Crude petroleum	1,451	12	60	60
Gasoline	125	230	—	—
Other Oil & Diesel Fuel	33	33	1,333	1,333
Exhausting Oil	—	1,386	—	1,387
Gas	25	1,372	214	596
Other	129	1,388	23	124
Netherlands West Indies	1,610	60	26,528	187
Total	1,610	1,773	—	2,816

\* Exports of petroleum products to Italy in May, 1939 totaled 1,773,000 lbs. Exports received through May 31.

U. S. EXPORTS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO ITALY, 1938 - 1940

Total Petroleum Products \* (Thousands of Dollars)

1939---	September -----	704
	October -----	1,128
	November -----	1,874
	December -----	1,123
1940---	January -----	1,288
	February -----	970
	March -----	1,804
	April -----	1,105
		<hr/>
	8 months ending April, 1940 -----	9,996
	" " " " 1939 -----	9,160

Commodity	Unit	8 months ending			
		April 1940		April 1939	
		Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
		(thousands)	(thousands)	(thousands)	(thousands)
Crude petroleum-----	barrels	2,521	3,340	4,032	5,096
Gasoline -----	barrels	57	112	175	663
Gas Oil & Distillate fuel oil -----	"	151	269	--	--
Residual Fuel Oil ---	"	373	351	1,333	1,203
Lubricating Oil -----		--	4,906	--	1,327
Red and Pale ----	"	239	1,572	114	546
Cylinder -----	"	254	2,838	75	528
Paraffin Wax -----	pounds	16,217	801	20,520	727
Total leading commodities	--	--	9,779	--	9,016

\* Exports of petroleum products to Italy in May, 1940 totaled \$797,000, for declarations received through May 29.

Prepared by:  
 Division of Foreign Trade Statistics  
 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce  
 June 7, 1940

HSM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated June 5, 1940

Rec'd 8:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

1036, June 5, 11 a. m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MORGENTHAU.

Professor Charles Rist has just called on me to state that the Ministry of Blockade has received authoritative and absolute information that the Italian Government has been transshipping to the German Government an average of 175,000 tons of oil products per month during the past few months. The Ministry of Blockade regards the transshipment of lubricating oils as especially serious and states that all the good lubricating oil imported by Italy comes from the United States.

Professor Rist asked me if, at this moment when Mussolini had announced definitely that he was about to make war on France and England although he had not fixed the date, it might not be possible for the Government of the United States to cut off all supplies to Italy of oil and petroleum products.

BULLITT

CSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

February 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your memorandum concerning the cable from Rome about the situation of Italian women and children, there is attached a copy of the reply sent to Ambassador Phillips.

CH

Safe <sup>BSF</sup> : Italy

XXX

February 7, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

ROME.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Your 167, February 6, noon.

For reasons of policy the Department does not repeat not desire you to undertake any arrangements personally or on behalf of this Government looking toward the chartering of a vessel or other active participation in the evacuation of Italian nationals in Italian East Africa. However, the Department regarding with humanitarian concern the situation of Italian women and children there, authorizes you informally to discuss their situation with the appropriate Italian authorities and to offer the good offices of this Government in an informal approach to the British authorities for safe conduct and such other facilities as those authorities may be able to extend to the Italian authorities in evacuating Italian women and children and other noncombatants from the area in question. Formal approach to the British authorities in the matter would, of course, have previously to be made through the Brazilian Embassy at Rome inasmuch as it is understood that the representation of Italian interests in Great Britain have been undertaken by the Brazilian Government.

Government. The Department is glad to have had you bring the matter to its attention and in view of its sympathetic interest in it, will appreciate prompt word from you as to further developments.

740,0011 European War 1939/8155

En:SR

SD:GLB:LFS

*Safe: Italy*

HSM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Rome

Dated February 6, 1941

Rec'd 11:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

167, February 6, noon.

There is deep concern apparent in Italian circles with regard to the situation of Italian women and children in Italian East Africa now unable to leave the country. This fear will presumably become acute with advance of British forces and probable native uprisings. In the circumstances it occurs to me that it would be in line with our tradition and would at the same time be a highly important gesture for us to make at this moment if, acting on my own initiative and yet with your approval, I could discuss the situation at the Foreign Office intimating that we might be able to be of assistance in evacuating the women and children. Already I have heard it said that the Japanese might undertake this task. In event that Italian Government should welcome my suggestion we should of course have to explore the possibility of chartering a vessel immediately available in those waters.

PHILLIPS

GW

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Safe: Italy*

September 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is the autograph copy, with translation, of the letter from Victor Emmanuel dated September 21. You may recall that the substance of the letter was transmitted by radio at that time.

The letter was delivered to me by courier from General Eisenhower with the request that it be transmitted to you.

*W. H. Taft*  
Chief of Staff

Enc.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- JAN 18 1972

Signature: *RHO*

S [REDACTED]

MR PRESIDENT

I deem it opportune to submit to your Excellency in a confidential and personal way certain considerations based on the common interest of our two countries.

In my opinion, it is urgently necessary that all or as much as possible of the territory of Italy be liberated from the Germans in order to prevent the operation of the great industries of Northern Italy, in spite of themselves, for the benefit of the enemy, by supplying him with tanks, airplanes, and motor vehicles; within a few months, it is possible that warships, including two of our battleships, may again plow the waters of the Mediterranean flying the German flag, as the result of the compulsory labor done in our northern shipyards.

In the meantime, it is of vital political importance to Us and to You that we reach Rome as soon as possible.

On July 25, the Italian People decidedly renounced its adherence to the Fascist regime, but I think that a new Fascist Government, even if illegally set up, could, if it were in possession of the Capital, seriously hinder our military operations and foment civil war with the support of its armed militia units and of a criminal minority actuated by self-interest.

It is to our common interest that this shall not happen, and this can be prevented all the more quickly the sooner I and my Government can return to Rome and our troops can push toward Northern Italy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

At present, my Government is exercising civil authority over four provinces of Apulia and over Sardinia; it would bring about a remarkable accession of moral and political strength if my Government were permitted to extend its own jurisdiction over the rest of the occupied territory, including Sicily.

The exercise of civil authority over a considerable part of the National territory would make possible the political reconstruction of the country, to be completed by the return to the parliamentary system, which I have always favored, by giving us a greater choice between statesmen.

Lastly, I wish to bring to Your Excellency's personal attention the important problem of exchange: a handling of this problem more favorable than that adopted in Sicily would have moral and political repercussions of incalculable benefit to the common cause.

With the best wishes for our two countries, I beg you, Mr. President, to believe in my profound confidence.

(Signed) VICTOR EMMANUEL

Sept. 21, 1943.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

SIGNOR PRESIDENTE

Ritengo opportuno prospettare in via riservata e personale a Vostra Eccellenza alcune considerazioni ispirate all'interesse comune dei Nostri Paesi.

A mio avviso è necessario ed urgente che tutta o la maggior parte possibile del territorio Italia\_ no venga liberata dai tedeschi ad evitare che le grandi industrie dell'Italia settentrionale possano, loro malgrado, lavorare in pieno per il nemico fornendogli carri, aerei, autocarri: in pochi mesi col lavoro forzato dei nostri cantieri del nord, parecchie navi da guerra, comprese due nostre navi da battaglia, potranno nuovamente solcare il Mediterraneo battendo bandiera tedesca.

Nel frattempo è di essenziale importanza politica per Noi e per Voi raggiungere al più presto Roma.

Il popolo italiano il 25 luglio si è decisamente staccato dal passato regime, però io penso che un nuovo governo fascista, sia pure illegalmente costituito, ma in possesso della Capitale, potrebbe sempre, appoggiandosi su formazioni armate della milizia e sull'interessato apporto di una minoranza facinorosa, ostacolare seriamente le nostre operazioni militari e fomentare la guerra civile.

E' interesse comune che questo non avvenga e ciò potrà tanto più prontamente evitarsi quanto più presto il mio Governo ed Io potremo ritornare a Roma e le

*21 Settembre 1944*

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

**SECRET**

[REDACTED]

nostre truppe spingersi verso l'Italia settentrio-  
nale.

Attualmente il mio Governo esercita i poteri civili su quattro provincie delle Puglie e sulla Sardegna: esso trarrebbe un notevolissimo rafforzamento morale e politico nei confronti del Governo illegale del nord, ove gli fosse consentito di estendere la propria giurisdizione anche sul rimanente territorio occupato, Sicilia compresa.

L'esercizio del potere civile su di una notevole parte del territorio nazionale, consentirebbe, fornendo una maggiore scelta di uomini politici, la ricostruzione politica del Paese da completarsi col ritorno al regime parlamentare da me sempre auspicato.

Sottopongo infine alla personale attenzione di Vostra Eccellenza l'importantissimo problema del cambio: un trattamento più favorevole di quello adottato in Sicilia avrebbe ripercussioni morali e politiche incalcolabili per la causa comune ..

*Formulando i migliori  
voti per il nostro Paese, ti prego,  
Signor Presidente, di credere  
alla mia alta confidenza.*

*V. Mussolini*  
*21 Settembre 1943*

(Safe) Italy folder  
Zupfel

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheable Date FEB 8 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1943


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram from Harold MacMillan to Mr. Churchill concerning the Italian constitutional crisis which indicates that the Prime Minister may request your views. With this in mind I am enclosing copies of Robert Murphy's recent telegrams for your convenient reference, as well as an exchange of telegrams between Mr. Churchill and MacMillan.

General Eisenhower has suggested the following formula which has been approved by the War and State Departments: If the King is successful in forming a liberal government, or if the King is unsuccessful and agrees to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples (which Sforza, Croce, etc., have stated would be acceptable) no problem arises. If, however, the King is unsuccessful in forming a broad-based government and refuses to abdicate, the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi is faced with a first-class constitutional crisis. General Eisenhower has proposed that, in this event, the present arrangement with the King and Badoglio will be permitted to continue until Allied forces have occupied Rome.

In our opinion, General Eisenhower is in the best position to deal with the situation to our military advantage. We feel that his judgment should prevail.

Enclosures:  
As stated.



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Enclosures:  
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972

COPY

Text of message sent by the Prime Minister to Resident Minister at Algiers dated November 3rd.

~~TOP SECRET~~

I am sure everything could be settled better in Rome but when are we going to get there? Meanwhile it seems to me dangerous to make changes. King Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us and we certainly do not wish to incur political unpopularity on his account. Nevertheless I incline myself to Eisenhower's view as stated in your paragraph 6.

2. A note by the Foreign Office follows giving more background.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of State Dept.  
telegram, 1-12-72  
By JL Date FEB 8 1972

COPY

Text of message sent by Prime Minister to Resident Minister at Algiers dated November 3rd.

~~SECRET~~

Following is note by the Foreign Office.

Begins.

The crisis over the King is now largely due to Sforza's success in rallying all the non-King elements amongst the available politicians, with the result that Badoglio is now unable to get any of them to enter his government so long as the King remains.

2. If the Italians find a solution without appealing to us we must, I suppose, accept it even if it involves the King's abdication and the setting up of Badoglio as Regent. We do not want to be saddled with undue responsibility for deciding what government Italy is to have. If we have to express a view, it should be that until the Government is established in Rome and in contact with the Italian people as a whole the King and Badoglio should temporarily carry on as at present in view of present difficulties in the way of broadening the Government.

3. We favour this course because although Sforza might be able to bring a number of representative Italians into his Government, he himself would be a very doubtful quantity as a leader. Nor is it likely that a Badoglio Regency would last long. Sforza is jealous of Badoglio and would probably try to discredit him in order to put himself in his place, not necessarily as Regent, but perhaps as some sort of Republican dictator. In that case the dispossessed King might well become the rallying point for the Monarchists, both in liberated and unliberated Italy.

4. Even if Sforza did play the game, it is difficult to believe that these two men of past and discredited regimes, Sforza and Badoglio, will be allowed to hold power for very long, once the younger politicians get loose, and there will soon be lots of them thirsting for office and power after twenty years of repression.

5. Then there is the military clique which is looking to the Prince of Piedmont. They might well decide to intervene once the King had abdicated in order to prevent the Government of the country from degenerating into a struggle for power amongst rival political groups.

6. In fact, the abdication of the King might well open the way to all sorts of troublesome problems from which we should not be able to disassociate ourselves.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept. telegram 112-72

By JS Date FEB 8 1972

COPY

Text of a telegram dated November 3rd from the British Resident Minister at Algiers to the Prime Minister.

~~SECRET~~

You will see from my telegram of November 3rd the decision which may soon confront us. On the assumption that our intervention becomes necessary I therefore put forward for your consideration following points.

2. The arguments in favour of bringing about the King's abdication and forming at once a broadly-based government are obvious and attractive. Such a course would be in harmony with basic war purposes of the Allies and their latest definition at Moscow. British and American public opinion would be gratified.

3. The arguments against are, however, not negligible. We are not sure that all Italy will share known views of intellectuals of Naples and alleged views of leaders in Rome. We do not know what will be the effect on Italian army and still more important Italian fleet which is again working well both at sea and on shore, in our interest. We cannot assess results on Italian diplomats all over the world or on merchant seamen in different localities. If we care to we could keep the King in his small enclave round Brindisi and administer the country quite efficiently under Commission and with operational AMGOT. We have quite enough officers for this purpose.

4. There is a further argument in favour of delay and encouraging Badoglio and the King to carry on for a limited period. The Allied Commission for Italy is just about to come into being. Is there not a danger that Russians and other governments less extensively involved will feel that we have taken a decision on a vital point without waiting for the Commission to meet and deliberate? As the arguments in favour of one course or the other are very evenly balanced it may be to our ultimate interest to postpone decision until the Commission can meet, this with an eye not only upon Italian questions but upon maintenance of the principle that similar questions in other countries shall be settled by the Allies as a whole, that may be very important for us in future.

5. I venture to submit these points for your thought. My main struggle here is to secure that decision shall be taken by British and American Governments at the highest level. It is too serious a matter for anyone except you and the President.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of State

Dept telegram 1-12-72

By JL Date FEB 8 1972

COPY

Text of a telegram dated November 3rd sent by the British Resident Minister at Algiers to the Foreign Office.

~~SECRET~~

General Mason Macfarlane reports that Badoglio in conversation on November 2nd showed great depression at the present situation. He stated that he had advised the King not to go to Naples and that he had not known that the King had decided to do so until General Macfarlane had told him.

2. In Badoglio's considered opinion there was no solution to the present difficulty without the King's abdication. Neither Sforza nor Croce nor probably Rodino would have anything to do with the King. It was unlikely that either Porzio or Nicola would consent to take office under the King and if they did Sforza and his followers would probably make serious trouble.

3. Badoglio showed General Macfarlane a copy of a letter dated October 24th in which he told the King definitely that it would be impossible to form a representative government unless the King abdicated. Badoglio agreed with General Macfarlane's view that the King would probably return from Naples having accomplished nothing and that we should then be confronted by a situation which could only be dealt with by the earliest possible abdication of the King.

4. Badoglio assured General Macfarlane that he would meanwhile do his best loyally, in accordance with armistice terms, to carry on administration and preserve order, but if things went on as they were he would obviously be in a very difficult position and could only be expected to carry on this way as a very temporary expedient.

5. General Macfarlane comments that the only political organization of any consequence now in being in liberated Southern Italy is the group around Croce and Sforza, it is possible but unlikely that the orientation of Roman groups differ substantially from that of Naples group but that in any case unless we get to Rome sooner than appears probable, it is really only the Naples group who can be considered at the moment. Badoglio has tried and failed on account of the King to gain their support. It is unlikely that the King will have any greater success.

6. General Macfarlane (words undecypherable) if the King fails with the Naples group that he may not regard this as final test and that it may require considerable pressure to make him abdicate as he will doubtless quote Bonomi's message to Badoglio from Rome stating that he was willing to participate in an administration "under the crown" and will argue that he cannot be stampeded by a small proportion of his people while so many of them are unable to express their opinion.

7. General Macfarlane's considered view is that the best interests of the Allies will be served by the removal of the King and the establishment of a regency in favour of his grandson since the present King is not only a great obstacle to the formation of a representative Government but is so old and at times so muddle-headed that he would be better out of the way. General Macfarlane therefore considers that while not intervening we should do nothing to prevent present unsatisfactory situation from coming to a head.

RECEIVED  
Priority of State  
Dept. of State  
1-12-72  
Date FEB 8 1972

CAM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.. (SC)

Algiers  
Dated November 1, 1943  
Rec'd 2:39 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State

Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

1881, November 1, 5 p.m.

**SECRET** FROM MURPHY

In view of the Allied agreement that the transfer of sovereignty need not wait arrival in Rome but will be effected as soon as circumstances permit, the King and Badoglio resolved to proceed at once to form a broader base for the government. The Brindisi administration has become increasingly cautious of the activities of the political groups in Naples and Rome. They have also established secret radio communication with the six parties in Rome. A recent message from the latter signed Bonomi (Democrazia del Lavoro) indicated that the Rome representatives of the parties have not been prepared to serve in a government under a military leader such as Badoglio but would be prepared to assist in the formation of a government under the Crown. It is noteworthy that in reference to the Crown no specific reference is made to the present King. Badoglio fears that

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

FEB 8 1972

-2- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

fears that the Bonomi group is organizing a shadow government in Rome which might be set up before the arrival of the Allies.

The Naples group under the leadership of Benedetto Croce and Carlos Forza all refuse to participate in the Badoglio Government as long as the King remains. They propose the abdication of the King in favor of the Prince of Naples, who is now in Switzerland and the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. It is obvious from our recent conversations in Naples that Sforza is being pushed forward as Prime Minister.

Sforza and the Naples group agree that there can be no question of establishing a republic in Italy before the entire country is free to participate in general elections even if it should be possible at that time. Your 1888, October 27, 11 p.m.

Leopoldo Piccardi joined the Badoglio Government in Brindisi about ten days ago after a sojourn in Naples where he was in contact with the Committee of National Liberation. Badoglio leans on him heavily in matters concerning economics and industry. Piccardi is a favorable and useful element.

Badoglio about October 22 wrote a letter to the King inviting the latter's attention to the position

taken

-3- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

taken by Sforza and Naples group. Acquarone is discussing this matter with our Brindisi Mission as well as with Sforza interpreted this letter as an effort on the part of Badoglio to induce the King to abdicate. Acquarone later proceeded to Naples for the purpose of canvassing the political personalities there in the King's behalf. The Naples group includes individuals only of regional importance some of whom might serve as useful technicians in the government. At present they are taking their directives from Sforza and Croce.

In our recent conversations with Badoglio, he was categorical in his statements that he could not be a party to any movement to force out the King even if a Regency is established. He asked MacFarlane if in a communication he proposed to send to Bonomi in Rome he could include a statement that the Allies do not favor any changes in the form of government at this particular junction. He was referred to the public pronouncements made by the American and British Governments and the importance which they attach to the efforts of driving out the Germans. He will show the text of his eventual reply to the mission before its despatch. Badoglio said that he was loyal to the King and would refuse to cooperate with the Naples and Rome groups if they

-4- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers

forced the King's abdication. He said that he would urge the formation of an administration for national unity for the avowed single purpose of expelling the Germans. Failing this, he would resign and leave some politician to assume his duties.

Notwithstanding Badoglio's avowals, I believe that an understanding exists between Badoglio and Sforza looking to the abdication of the King and the establishment of Badoglio as Regent for the Prince of Naples.

Badoglio visited Sforza and Croce at Naples on October 31. He immediately thereafter advised MacFarlane that Sforza refused to take part in the government if the King remained. Sforza urged that the King abdicate in favor of the Prince of Naples and also urged the appointment of Badoglio as Regent. Croce was in entire accord. Badoglio also interviewed Rodino of the Christian Democracy Party. The latter maintained that he would not participate in the government unless Croce, Sforza, Orlando or Renaudi were included as Orlando is in Rome and Renaudi in Switzerland. This means Sforza and/or Croce.

Badoglio's conclusion now is that no political government can now be formed without Sforza stating that the

-5- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

that the latter had become clearly a symbol around which the six parties could rally. According to Badoglio he would be unable to fulfill without them the promise he made to the Allies to form a broad base Government. Therefore, Badoglio proposes to inform the King of this situation and tender his resignation, recommending that the King ask Sforza to form government. Badoglio takes the position that Sforza and the Liberals must persuade the King to abdicate. He as a soldier would not take this step. If this action is taken appropriately, Badoglio now states that he would accept the Regency.

Before returning to Brindisi November 1, Badoglio planned to see De Nicola on the evening of October 31, but he did not anticipate this interview would change anything.

It appears therefore that our mission is faced with a fairly important constitutional crisis. In dealing with it our first consideration will be maintenance of order and the armistice. We consider it important for purpose of armistice that Badoglio remain at least as Regent. Both Sforza and Croce admit Badoglio's prestige in the country and with the army

-6- 1881, November 1, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

the army and assert that his retention as Regent will be approved by anti-Fascist elements in northern Italy.

Planning for transfer of AMGOT territory to Italian administration continues. Allied Control Commission for Italy will be established about November 10 under a directive which will be issued shortly.

Sent to Department repeated to London, Madrid, Lisbon and Moscow.

WILEY

HTM

SCB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated November 2, 1943,

Rec'd 7:24 p.m.,

Secretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

1891, November 2, 2 p.m.

Our military (FROM MURPHY) mission in Brindisi telegraphs as follows November 1,

Badoglio intends to see the King today and inform him that he finds it impossible under present circumstances to form a representative anti-Fascist Government representing existing political parties. He therefore tenders his resignation. Badoglio will recommend that the King summon Sforza who, in Badoglio's opinion, is the only person presently available to whom all the parties will rally.

Our mission has asked Badoglio orally to explain to the King that the Allies don't wish to interfere with constitutional practice provided: (one) that Badoglio remain in office as effective head of the government until the new government is ready to take over and (two) that there be close accord with the Allies in all steps taken to insure the maintenance of order and that the provisions of armistice are

respected.

-2- 1891, November 2, 2 p.m., from Algiers.

respected.

In a subsequent telegram dated November 2 early our mission reported that late November 1 the King received Reber and McFarlane and Coccia and informed them that Badoglio had reported his inability to form a broad based government because the Naples group would not collaborate "with the Marshal". The King said therefore that he wishes to go to Naples on November 3 for the purpose of discussing the situation with Sforza, Croce, Rodino and others. The King apparently is convinced that the Naples group would not obey a summons to come to Brindisi but hopes that they will not refuse to see him in Naples.

This is further evidence that the King does not understand his situation or refuses to admit that he himself is the obstacle to the formation of a broad based government. We have informed our mission that there is no objection to the King's proceeding to Naples, but that it would be better if Mac Farlane or other members of the mission did not (repeat not) accompany him as proposed by Mac Farlane. General Alexander has no objection from his point of view to proposed visit to Naples.

Sent Department repeated Madrid London Moscow.

WILEY

HTM

GEP  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

November 2, 1943

Rec'd 3:47 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1898, November 2, 8 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FROM MURPHY.

Count Sforza sent MacFarlane a letter October 31 enclosing two documents regarding the establishment of a regency. Sforza said both had been drawn by a distinguished jurist. The first presented a legal argument showing why the strict provisions of the "statual" should be superseded to meet existing state of national emergency. The second is a draft declaration of abdication which would apparently in due course be submitted to the King for his signature specifically naming King's grandson as King and Marshal Badoglio as regent. It also includes a renunciation by the Crown Prince of his rights.

In acknowledging these MacFarlane informed Sforza there would doubtless be an opportunity in near future for discussing the important matters raised which clearly would need to be considered in common accord with all concerned and with due regard for the

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By J. Schauble Date

FEB 8 1972

requirements

-2- 1898, November 2, 8 p.m., from Algiers.

requirements of the situation.

Sforza remains in Naples and yesterday with Croce met a group of Allied journalists to whom they repeated freely and frankly their views as already explained to us.

Repeated to London, Madrid and Lisbon for information.

WILEY

RR

LC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated November 4, 1943

Rec'd 6:15 a.m. 5th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1918, November 4, midnight.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY  
FROM MURPHY

AG WAR telegram MAT 77 of November 3 to the Combined  
Chiefs of Staff in substance stated that King is in Naples  
today attempting to persuade the Naples group to join his  
Government. Either he will succeed or he will be met by  
their refusal to participate in any Government unless he  
abdicates and the Crown Prince renounces his right in  
favor of the Prince of Naples.

Should he succeed in forming a Government no immediate  
problem for the Allies arises. On the other hand should  
he fail and accept the proposal for abdication there will  
also be no occasion for Allied intervention.

However if the King refuses to abdicate and appeals  
to Badoglio to continue notwithstanding the refusal of the  
Naples group to participate Badoglio undoubtedly will  
seek Allied advice. This for the reason that he will have  
failed to obtain the participation of liberal elements

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in line with

By J. Schauble Date FEB 8 1972

-2- #1918, November 4, midnight, from Algiers

in line with stated Allied policy. Therefore unless instructions to the contrary are received it is proposed in the later event to continue the present arrangements until we reach Rome. The alternative would be to stimulate the King's abdication resulting in a coalition Government and the establishment of Badoglio as regent for the Prince of Naples.

Incident to the foregoing MacMillan is telegraphing to the Prime Minister in amplification of the foregoing requesting the Prime Minister's views.

The formula proposed by Sforza with which I believe Badoglio is in full accord ~~seems to me~~ <sup>seems to me</sup> a desirable solution which the U.S.A. if necessary might well support. The departure of the King should not adversely affect the military effort and the liberalization of the Italian Government should if anything aid it.

There are of course a number of practical considerations. Principles among these are the command of the Italian armed forces, the operation of the ports and communications, the eventual transfer of Italian territory now under AMG to the Italian administration, the conduct of the civilian Italian administration and the attitude of the personnel of the Italian diplomatic and consular personnel abroad.

Information

-3- #1918, November 4, midnight, from Algiers

Information regarding the signing of the long term armistice document has been closely held in Italy. If Sforza does form the new government it will be necessary to inform him of the details of the terms and to insist on his acceptance of the obligations of the armistice terms.

WILEY

WFS