

● PSF: Safe: Marshall 1941 - Apr. 14, 1942

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Rec'd Bof.*

*PSF*

*Safe: Marshall*

*To Secretary of War.  
D.C.W.*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2  
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject: The Mediterranean Situation.

Two German movements southward into the Mediterranean world are now in full swing.

A German army or army group, under General Field Marshal List, consisting of 16 divisions, three of which are motorized and five armored, has crossed the Danube and occupied Bulgaria. This movement southward, which is still in progress, has been covered by strong concentrations of the Bulgarian army in the upper reaches of the Maritza valley and to the north of Adrianople. The direction of the German advance is still obscure. However, a part of the German army appears to be taking position in the Struma valley to the northeast of Salonika and, hence, is constituting itself as a major threat to Greece. The German advance through Bulgaria is being protected by strong German air forces, the Fourth Air Fleet, under the command of General of Flyers Loehr. Twelve German divisions remain behind in Roumania. This latter force continues to receive reinforcements from interior Germany.

A second German army of undetermined strength is moving southward from Italy and Sicily into Libya. Very confused and contradictory reports from different European capitals speak of the strength of this army as being somewhere between 3 and 12 divisions, a large part of which are mechanized. Italian reinforcements are also being sent to Libya. The transport movement between Sicily and Tripoli is being covered by strong German and Italian air forces under the command of General of Flyers Geissler. British submarines have inflicted losses on the Italian ships comprising the convoys, but the German movement southward has not thereby been interrupted. At the present time there appears to be not more than two armored divisions of reduced strength in Libya.

German mechanized units are now in contact with British outposts to the southwest of Agheila. The German air force in Libya appears to have secure air supremacy as far east as Bengazi. The British state that, due to constant German air attacks, the

port of Bengazi is no longer being used by their ships.

The German concentrations in southern Bulgaria should be completed by March 10, 1941. It may be expected that Hitler will shortly thereafter seek to occupy Greece, either by force or with imposed Greek consent. Strong German and Bulgarian forces, in the meantime, are taking position to the north of Thrace to prevent Turkey from interfering with German operations in the direction of Salonika. No immediate German attack on Constantinople is to be expected.

It is probable that the German reinforcements now in Africa have already added considerable strength to the Italian defenses of Tripoli. It is not believed that this strength is as yet sufficient to undertake a campaign for the re-conquest of Cyrenaica, unless the British should markedly reduce their forces in this province.

It cannot be predicted when German strength in Libya will reach a level which will permit offensive action toward Cyrenaica. Such will depend on the rate of movement of troops and supplies from Italy to Libya and the increase or diminution of British strength in Cyrenaica.

Whereas the weather is not likely to interfere with military operations in North Africa until September, the necessity of accumulating supplies would seem to bar any such extensive German operation as an attack on Egypt for some months.

The German movement into North Africa, however, has westward as well as eastward military and political implications.

With only Italians in Tripolitania, Weygand was not seriously threatened from that direction. With strong German forces in Tripolitania, Weygand is seriously threatened from that direction.

The threat is against his weakest flank, even though it has a good fortified line. Tunisia is vulnerable from land, sea, and air; also, supplies and troops are less numerous in Tunisia than in Algeria and Morocco. The fortified line (Mareth Line) could be turned by mechanized columns from Tripolitania or taken in rear by forces landed from Sicily under powerful air protection in case direct assault was considered unwise.

Weygand's troops are indifferently equipped, lack essential supplies, and are no match for a German force, even one considerably inferior in numbers. Moreover, a large part of Weygand's troops must remain distributed over a wide area to maintain order among the


natives, while still others must stand guard near the frontier of Spanish Morocco. While that flank is relatively safe at present, a potential threat exists because of Spanish relations with the Axis.

In view of the above, Weygand has lost, in large measure, the freedom of action which he enjoyed prior to the arrival of the Germans in Africa. Formerly, he could join de Gaulle or the British without being exposed to immediate effective attack. This is no longer the case.

The Germans exert this restraining influence by their mere presence near the frontier of Tunisia; they do not even have to move in Weygand's direction. Their arrival in Tripolitania also places them in a favorable position to dictate the division of the spoils in North Africa and facilitates the organization of Fifth Column activities among the natives. The advantages France gained by the stroke of sending Weygand to North Africa have largely been dissipated.

To sum up, arrival of German forces in Tripolitania, in addition to helping the Italians morally and materially and constituting a long-range threat to Suez, has the following effects:

- (1) The chances of Weygand joining the British or of any establishment of an anti-German front in French North Africa are greatly diminished.
- (2) France is forced one step closer to the Axis.
- (3) Chances of eventual German occupation of Casablanca and Dakar are somewhat increased.

  
SHERMAN MILES,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

dfj

PSF safe; Marshall Marshall  
So Secretary of War

~~SECRET~~

W.P.D.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
WAR PLANS DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

By authority of A.C. of S., WPD

Date 7.1.41

Initials 1472

May 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Seacoast Defense Guns at Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad.

1. Reference the President's inquiry of May 20th on the above subject, the following seacoast armament has been or is now being installed:

Newfoundland

One two-gun, 8-inch railway battery, range 21,000 yards.  
Two two-gun, 155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

Bermuda

Two two-gun, 8-inch railway batteries, range 21,000 yards.  
Two two-gun, 155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

Trinidad

Four two-gun, 155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

2. In addition to the above, tentative plans provide for the following fixed seacoast armament:

Newfoundland

Two two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

Bermuda

Two two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

Trinidad

Two two-gun, 12-inch batteries, range 29,000 yards.  
Five two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

3. The 12-inch batteries for Trinidad are to be removed from harbor defenses in this country. It is expected that they will be installed in about eight months. Carriages for all of the 6-inch batteries are now under construction. Emplacement of the 6-inch batteries will commence in October 1941, and all can be emplaced by the early summer of 1942.

L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,  
Brigadier General,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

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BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

Safe: Marshall  
PSF

June 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Attached is the map of fields in the Caribbean and South America which I had prepared for you. The two principal points now to be considered are:

(1) Requiring, and financing, Pan-American to expedite fields they are now improving or building in Brazil. (They had planned to transfer the machinery now being used by them in the Caribbean region to Brazil - but this involves too much of delay.


(2) The financing of Pan-American to expand existing fields or build new fields in Brazil between Recife and Rio and along the cut off from the mouth of the Amazon at Belem, via Carolina, Araguary to Rio.

These two operations will require between five and six million dollars.

The two fields we now have Pan-American developing in Paraguay permit safe movement of our large bombers across the Andes from coast to coast.

  
Chief of Staff.

THIS OVERLAIN ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





**L E G E N D**

- PERMANENT U.S. BASES:
- PAN AMERICAN AIRWAY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
- LANDING FIELDS:
- COMBINATION LANDING FIELDS & SEAPLANE BASE:
- SEAPLANE BASE:
- PROJECTED LANDING FIELDS TO BE ADDED TO PAN-AMERICAN CONTRACT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE:
- FIELDS USED BY PAN-AMERICAN AND AFFILIATED AIRLINES SUITABLE FOR COMBAT AVIATION:
- FIELDS USED BY PAN-AMERICAN FOR OPERATION OF 4-MOTOR PLANES ON BELEM-RIO DE JANEIRO CUT-OFF:
- DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES, THUS:

**SECRET**

**MILITARY AIRPORTS  
EXISTING AND PROPOSED  
IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA  
AND NORTHERN SOUTH AMERICA**

FRENCH ST. MARTIN'S ISLANDY  
 PREF. ST. MARTIN'S ISLANDY  
 ... MIL. UNCLAS 19/07/1981

Safe: Marshall  
PSF

FIELDS FROM NATAL TO RIO DE JANEIRO

The development of facilities by Pan American Airways under existing contract on the fields of Natal to Bahia, both inclusive, was reported to be five percent complete as of June 1, 1941. Except at Bahia, the landing fields in their present condition are reported by the Intelligence Division of the Air Corps to be suitable for the operation of all types of Army aircraft, to include B-18 Bombers: to have limited servicing facilities, radio, etc.

Between Bahia and Rio de Janeiro (727 miles) only one field at Caravellas will be required for the movement of short-range aircraft.

ROUTE NO 1

1. MIAMI;
2. CAMAGUEY; Owned by P.A.A.; 32% complete; existing field, 2-3,000' runways, clay and sod surface. When completed will have 2-5000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
3. GUANTANAMO; United States Navy. Land and sea plane base.
4. PORT AU PRINCE; Leased by P.A.A.; 18% complete; existing field, 2 dirt runways, 1,850' and 2,200', sod surface. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
5. CIUDAD TRUJILLO; Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 18% complete. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
6. PUERTO RICO; 2-Major Fields; 4-Auxiliary Fields, all in use.
7. ST. CROIX; Steel landing mat in use; field, 70% complete.
8. ANTIGUA; Temporary runway 3,200' in use.
9. FORT DE FRANCE; P.A.A. has operating contract, construction deferred.
10. ST. LUCIA; Temporary runway 3,000' in use.
11. TRINIDAD; Temporary field at Cumato Reserve (Ft. Read) ready for use July 15. 1 Bomb. Sq. (H) now stationed at Colonial Airport at Piarco. Pan American development. When completed will have seaplane base with 2 ramps, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.
12. GEORGETOWN; Temporary runway 3,000' completed. Garrison will arrive July 28.
13. PARAMARIBO; Small field at present; runway 2,625'. Owned by Local Government, to be developed by P.A.A.; 10% complete. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, and lighting. Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.
14. AMAPA (MACAPA) Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 17% complete; present field 2,624' x 492'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
15. BELEM; Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 10% complete; present field 2 runways 5,000' and 4,000'. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel and lighting; seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.
16. MARANHAO; (SAO LUIZ) Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 8% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 4,921' and 3,608'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced

ROUTE NO 1 (Contd)

- runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.
17. FORTALEZA;  
(GEARA) Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 7% complete; present field 1 runway 3,280'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.
18. NATAL; Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 2 runways 5,576' and 4,264'. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel and lighting; seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.
19. RECIFE;  
(PERNAMBUCO) Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 1 runway 3,000'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.
20. MACEIO; Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 3,600' and 2,624'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
21. BAHIA; Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 1 runway 2,328'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.

ROUTE NO 2

22. BROWNSVILLE; Commercial Field.
23. TAMPICO; Owned by Mexican Nat. Co., in turn by P.A.A.; development by P.A.A.; 4% complete; present field 3 runways 3,100', 2,473' and 2,460'; all 300' wide. When completed will have 3-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
24. VERA CRUZ; Same as Tampico; work not started; present field, 3 runways 3,700', 2,600', and 3,200'; all 300' wide. When completed will have 3-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
25. TAPACHULA; Same as Tampico; 1% complete. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
26. GUATEMALA CITY; Owned by Local Government; concession to P.A.A.; 29% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 4,920' and 1,200'; new field. When completed will have

ROUTE NO 2 (Contd)

- 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
27. MANAGUA; Lease to P.A.A. by Local Government; work not started; present field 2 dirt runways 2,800' and 1,328'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
28. DAVID; Owned by Local Government; concession to P.A.A.; action pending but funds available for 1-5,000' runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
29. PANAMA DEPARTMENT; 3 Major Fields, 4 Auxiliary Fields in Republic of Panama and 6 Emergency Fields in Republic of Panama.
30. BARRANQUILLA; Owned by Avianca (Columbian Co.); 40% owned by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 2 runways 4,000' and 3,000'. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
31. MARACAIBO; Local Government P.A.A. has operating contract, work not started; present field 3 runways 3,300', 3,000' and 2,400'. When completed will have 3-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
32. LA GUAIRA; Owned by Local Government, P.A.A. has operating contract; work not started; present field 2,600' x 450'; sand and clay surface. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
33. CARIPITO; Owned by Creole Oil Co. and private party; development by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 3 runways graded and oiled, 3,051', 3,077' and 1,739'. When completed will have fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

ROUTE NO 3

1. MIAMI;
34. GREAT EXUMA, BAHAMAS: Location still under study; work not yet started.
35. BERMUDA; Two runways, 3,000' and 2,800' to be complete except surfacing by July 10.
36. JAMAICA; Surveys completed; work to start in the near future; Colonial Airport on Palasidoes available for military planes of all sizes.

*Marshall*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
GENERAL MARSHALL

I have heard from Winston Churchill advising me, in confidence, that General Auchinleck has been given full authority for the Air, as well as for the Army; this at such times as major operations are impending or in progress.

F. D. R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

PSF

*file  
Confidential*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since December 7th, the following military movements have occurred:

Rail Movements (largely to the West Coast):

572,000 troops, with armament and materiel  
2,945,000 short tons of freight.

Ship Movements:

38,000 troops  
265,000 ship cargo tons.

All this has been handled quietly, without confusion, largely due to the development during the past two years of our base port organization on the East and West coasts, with their depots for reservoirs of supplies; - also, through the vacating of cantonments in the Northeast which have been used as ~~staging~~ areas to accommodate troops enroute for overseas convoys. The Quartermaster General's section for coordinating rail movements has met the test.


The following comments regarding rail movements referred to above were made by the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company:

"I am hearing continuous praise of your Generals and their assistants in the handling of all the problems that come before our people.

"The railroads have never had more cooperation than they are now getting out of the armed forces. At this time, in the last war, we were already on the way to congestion on the Atlantic coast. By this time, in this war, there is little or no congestion in sight.

"The great thing that the armed forces have done is the establishment of the storage bases in the East, where it is possible to assemble, to store, and to dispatch

materials as needed, equalizing the accumulation of continuous production and intermittent shipment in a way that has avoided congestion at the tidewater front."

  
Chief of Staff.

PSF  
Safe  
Marshall

Bill  
Boat

WAR DEPARTMENT  
U. S. MILITARY NORTH AFRICAN MISHMISH  
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1942.

January 16, 1942

Dear George:

Will you let me know what your plans are for reinforcing General Maxwell's Mission in Egypt and General Wheeler's at Basra.

Very sincerely yours,

*Francis Bollerment*  
Francis Bollerment,  
Major, Specialist,  
Chief, Base Office.

General George C. Marshall,  
Chief of Staff,  
War Department.

HLH/lmb

27

*W. Maxwell*

**WAR DEPARTMENT**  
U. S. MILITARY NORTH AFRICAN MISSION  
**WASHINGTON**

January 2, 1942.

Mr. Harry Hopkins,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for your information are two cablegrams, Amseg 87 and Amseg 103, recently received from General Maxwell, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.

These cables have been taken up with the War Plans Division, who have given them consideration.

Yours very truly,

*Stuart L. Bullivant*  
STUART L. BULLIVANT,  
Major, Specialist,  
Chief, Home Office.

SLB:kew  
Encls.-2

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10 - 26 - 66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

A.G. 400.3295 (12-21-41)MSC  
From: CAIRO  
To: ADJUTANT GENERAL

PARAPHRASE

EHB/voc--1705  
December 21, 1941.

~~SECRET~~

414 AMSEG 103 MESSAGE IS SENT BY MAXWELL TO RIGGS PERIOD AS A RESULT OF A MEETING WITH BULLIT, IT WAS REQUESTED BY THE HIGHEST RANKING BRITISH AUTHORITY THAT TROOPS BE SENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE PERIOD THESE TROOPS WILL CONSIST OF 500 COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ALSO 14 THOUSAND MEN TO AID THE PRESENT COMBINED BRITISH FORCES PERIOD THESE TROOPS ARE REQUESTED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF PRIORITY: a) 2 - 2½ TON QM TRUCK REGIMENTS, b) 1 - 10 TON QM TRUCK REGIMENTS, c) 1 - HEAVY MAINTENANCE QM REGIMENT, d) 1 LIGHT MAINTENANCE QM BATTALION, e) 2 CONSTRUCTION SIGNAL BATTALIONS, f) 1 REPAIR SIGNAL COMPANY, g) 1 BATTALION WITH ONE SIGNAL COMPANY, OPERATIONS, h) 6 ENGINEER BATTALIONS MOBILE SHOP COMPANIES, i) 1 ENGINEER SPECIAL INLAND WATERWAYS WITH ONE MAINTENANCE COMPANY, j) 1 ENGINEER HEADQUARTERS RAILWAY DIVISION, k) 2 ENGINEERS BATTALION, RAILWAY OPERATING, l) 1 ENGINEER BATTALION, RAILWAY SHOP. THE ABOVE OUTFITS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEDICAL CORPS AND ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT TROOPS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ASKED FOR. IT ALSO SHOULD BE DEFINITELY KEPT IN MIND THAT ALL THE ABOVE-LISTED SERVICE TROOPS THAT ARE SENT WILL BE SUED BY THE MISSION AND UNDER ITS CONTROL, TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES SPECIFIED BY THE BRITISH. THE SERVICE TROOPS WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF AMERICAN OFFICES. THIS REQUEST FOR TROOPS IS SO URGENT THAT WE REQUEST THAT THE PERSONNEL OF THE MOTOR TRANSPORT ARRIVE BEFORE THE CARGO MATERIEL OF THE GROUPS SO THAT THEY (THE MOTOR TRANSPORT PERSONNEL) MAY OPERATE THE CARGO THAT IS HERE AT PRESENT. ALSO THE SAME SITUATION APPLIES TO MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE MEN AND IT IS REQUESTED THAT THEY CAN BE SENT EQUIPPED ONLY WITH HAND TOOLS AHEAD OF THE SHIPMENT OF POWER TOOLS SO THAT THEY CAN AID IN THE SOLUTION OF OUR PROBLEMS. A SMALL QUANTITY OF SUPPLIES AND ALSO SOME SHELTER CAN BE TURNED OVER TO THESE TROOPS BY THE BRITISH, BUT WE CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT ALL OF THE TROOPS, THAT ARE FURNISHED TO THIS AREA, BE ENTIRELY EQUIPPED WITH A HALF-YEAR'S SUPPLY OF SHELTER AND SUPPLIES.

~~SECRET~~

FELLERS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASE

FROM CAIRO

DECEMBER 18, 1941

TO ADJUTANT GENERAL- MILITARY MISSIONS

2:17 A. M.

NO 384 AMSEG 87 DECEMBER 16TH

FOR RIGGS FROM MAXWELL FROM DATA AVAILABLE RE AMERICAN ORDNANCE  
ON HAND AND EN ROUTE COMMA REQUEST EARLY DISPATCH FOR DUTY  
WITH MISSION ONE ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY BATTALION AND  
ONE MAINTENANCE BATTALION COMMA ARMORED DIVISION PERIOD  
THESE TO OPERATE MOBILE ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENTS IN ADVANCE OF FIXED  
DEPTS AND SHOPS NOW PLANNED AND BEHIND BRITISH DIVISION SHOPS  
PERIOD THIS ARRANGEMENT NECESSITATED BY HEAVY BATTLE DAMAGE  
TO AMERICAN ORDNANCE IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND LACK OF BRITISH  
MAINTENANCE TROOPS PERIOD ADVISE IF ACTION TAKEN PERIOD

FELLERS

COPY gal

~~SECRET~~

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

January 2, 1942.

Mr. Harry Hopkins,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for your information are two cablegrams, Amseg 87 and Amseg 103, recently received from General Maxwell, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.

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Yours very truly,

STUART L. BULLIVANT,  
Major, Specialist,  
Chief, Home Office.

SLB:kew  
Encls.-2

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
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Marshall  
**SECRET**

Date- 4-6-59

February 23, 1942.

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


In our conversation February 17th you brought up the question of moving troops directly to New Caledonia without the necessity of uniting them with their organizational equipment in Australia. I have had the matter investigated and submit the following:

It is important that troops arriving in New Caledonia be prepared to fight, i.e., that they have most of their equipment at hand. Combat unit loading, each unit and its equipment on the same boat, was not possible.

In this particular instance seven transports sailed from New York in a single convoy on January 23d, with 17,000 troops for New Caledonia and about 4,000 troops for Australia. The Maritime Commission was unable to furnish freighters for their heavy equipment on the east coast so that was sent out on nine vessels from the west coast, between February 12th and 21st, without naval escort.

The troops are due in Australia February 26th, but the freight will not reach there until during the two-week period starting March 15th. To delay the troops while waiting for the freight would have meant delaying the arrival of the naval Borabora contingent in the same convoy and increasing the hazard for the convoy. To send the freight directly to New Caledonia would have delayed the arrival of airplanes destined for Australia which of necessity had to be loaded on these freighters. Also it would have involved a complicated reloading problem in a port of limited facilities which might at any moment be attacked. The troops and their equipment will be assembled in Australia, prepared for a rapid disembarkation in New Caledonia, with the critical equipment first available.

In brief, the voyage is being made to New Caledonia via Australia in order to utilize to the utmost the available capacity of shipping; this at a sacrifice of speed. I fear we will have to submit in part to these conditions until the shipping program has developed to such an extent that cargo space is no longer the limiting factor.

  
Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

*P5F, Safe, Marshall*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following summary of Army troop and supply movements will probably be of interest:

December 7 to January 13 .....	572,677 troops
January 13 to January 31 .....	423,359 troops
Total since December 7 .....	996,036

The following movements of troops, planes and other cargo for overseas destinations have occurred:

December 7 to January 13 .....	86,181 troops
	575 planes
	565,800 ship tons.

Troop movements within the United States have included the grouping of large units for super-gymnast and the organization of Army corps groups following the withdrawal of units for Hawaii, Australia and Ireland.

*W. H. H. H. H.*  
Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl L. Speer*

~~SECRET~~

1 . Bot  
To The President

from the Office of the Chief of  
Staff

DECLASSIFIED  
DOD 2000

~~SECRET~~

*PSF  
Safe  
Marshall*

Feb. 14, 1942

9:46 A.M.

From HQ USAFFE

To GEN GEORGE C MARSHALL

No. 274, Feb. 13.

Following supplies received by submarine and blockade runner. REURAD 1040. Jan. 28, by submarine from Australia, 72 rounds 3 INRHYRO AAHRAPNEL for M-1917 gun, 540 boxes caliber .50 AP, 135 boxes caliber .50 tracer. Feb. 3, by submarine from Hawaii, 3,517 rounds 3-inch AA shell HE with mechanical time fuze for M-3 gun. Locally by 3 vessels, approximately 1,500 tons food stuffs.

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COD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

COMMENTS ON THE USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

*PSF  
Safe  
Marshall*

1. General Estimate.

a. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN SYRIA.

A U. S. Force in the Syrian Theatre would be a strategically defensive force, capable merely of preventing the Axis from accomplishing some of their strategic aims. It would be incapable of accomplishing decisive results against Germany proper.

b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LIBYA.

A U. S. Force in Libya would be incapable of accomplishing decisive results against Germany proper. It would be basically a strategically defensive force, having however, the opportunity for limited offensive operations with the object of

(1) Eliminating Axis forces from North Africa.

(2) Securing of bases in North Africa from which long range bombing of targets in Europe would be possible.

(3) Preventing Axis domination of the Mediterranean.

c. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA.

A U. S. Force in Northwest Africa would be incapable of decisive results of an offensive nature. It would be a strategically defensive force, which once established, would

(1) Prevent Axis seizure of West Africa.

(2) Render impossible Axis naval operations based on the West African coast.

(3) Serve as a base for offensive operations having the limited objective of seizing French North Africa.

d. Shipping for movement of troops to any of the above named places will not be available prior to about September 1, 1942.

2. Discussion.

a. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN SYRIA.

Ground forces employed in Syria and the surrounding country should be of a highly mobile type, strong in armored elements. The area does not lend itself to the employment of large field armies on account of shortage in communication and transport facilities. It is doubtful if a force of greater than ten divisions can be supported in this area.

Six Infantry, two Motorized, and three Armored Divisions will be equipped and trained by August 15, 1942. Of these the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions will be ready by March 31, 1942, the 4th Motorized Division by June 1, 1942, and the 1st Armored Division by March 31, 1942.

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at. 10-25-66

signature- *Carl J. Spicer*

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The shipping situation is such that if our present commitments are carried out, including the reinforcement of overseas garrisons to bring them to a safe level, no troops can be dispatched to Syria until about September 1, 1942. At that time shipping for about 82,000 men will become available. On account of the long turn around, it is estimated that it will take until July 1943 to set down in Syria a force of ten or eleven divisions.

The turn-around for shipping to the head of the Persian Gulf or Suez is five months, while to England it is less than two and one-half months. In other words, for every division sent to the Middle East and supported in that area, over two divisions can be sent to England and supported in that area.

Due to the limits imposed by the size of the air forces available and our present commitments, it will be impossible to set up a large offensive Air Force in more than one theater during 1942. The pressure of events has forced us to disperse our Air Forces to such an extent that we now, at best, have only a bare minimum of defensive air strength in any theater. This is one of the reasons why the enemy still retains the initiative both in Europe and in Asia.

Now under consideration is a plan to send one group of medium bombardment, two groups of light bombardment and two groups of pursuit aviation to the Middle East as assistance to the British in holding that area. These would have to come from air forces intended for the British Isles or some other area.

The present situation should not blind us to the principle of concentration of force and our strategic conception must look toward the early establishment of an air force strong enough to achieve decisive results in some one theater.

b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LYBIA.

The considerations outlined above relative to operations in SYRIA would also hold true in the LYBIAN Theater. The forces we could place in this theater and the length of our lines of communication, would be approximately the same as for SYRIA. The sole advantage that this Theater has over SYRIA is that it might better our general strategic position by successful offensive action. This might occur as follows:

(1) Successful offensive operations as they progress would place us in a progressively more favorable position for long range bombing of targets in Europe.

(2) Elimination of Axis forces in North Africa would deny control of the Mediterranean to the Axis.

c. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA.

A U. S. Force in Northwest Africa, once established, would

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10-25-66

Signature - Carl D. Spence

**SECRET**

aid materially in breaking Axis control of the Mediterranean and would prevent an Axis move through West Africa. In this respect, such a force would have unquestioned strategic value. Plans for this operation are based on the assumption that it will be executed with the approval of the local authorities. Our forces, however, must be prepared to face resistance developed by Axis sympathizers among the local forces. In addition this operation must take place within the range of German long range bombardment based in Spain. Our air support during the initial phase of this operation will be limited to two aircraft carriers. Our forces here, when fully established, would still be incapable of decisive action against Germany.

Plans in this theater call for a combined U. S. and British operation and the U. S. Units of this force will be available for movement in the near future.

Available shipping is the limiting factor which fixes the earliest date on which this operation could be conducted. The initial elements of the U. S. Forces in this theater must be combat loaded and an insufficient number of vessels suitable for this task are now in the Atlantic. It is estimated that the earliest date on which this shipping might be available is during July 1942 but we have no positive assurance that the situation in the Pacific will permit this. Other shipping required should become available during the latter part of August or the 1st of September 1942 and could then be furnished at the maximum rate that the port facilities in Casablanca can accommodate.

The "turn around" time to this port is much shorter than to the Middle East and compares favorably with the shipping time to England. It is estimated that shipping time would permit deliveries at Casablanca at about 3/4 of the rate to England. This advantage in shipping time is offset to a considerable degree by the limited port facilities at Casablanca. The number of troops which can be debarked at a port is limited by the capacity of the port to handle the supplies and equipment which must accompany them. The port facilities at Casablanca will handle equipment and supplies for about 2 Divisions per month, roughly 44,000 men. As the size of the force ashore grows and the shipping ratio of supplies to troops increases, the rate of 44,000 men per month will decrease.

No reserve of Air power exists in the U. S. and the Air Forces set up for this operation must of necessity be allotted from forces available to other theaters.

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Date-10-25-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
Safe  
Marshall

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Seacoast Artillery Defense of the  
Outlying Islands of the Hawaiian  
Group.

1. The following information is furnished reference seacoast artillery armament actual and proposed for the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group:

We have no fixed or mobile seacoast artillery defenses on any of the islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, nor are there any projected.

2. The planned defenses of the outlying islands provide for defense against air and surface raids and protection of the airfields thereon from air and ground attack and sabotage. The inclusion of adequate seacoast defense artillery, fixed or mobile, to defend all of these islands against a major attack would be uneconomical in that it would immobilize a large number of troops and materiel; also the proper maintenance of these forces would require an excessive amount of shipping not available at this time. The forces projected are believed adequate to protect the islands against anything except a major attack. These forces comprise antiaircraft artillery, infantry, tanks and field artillery. The field artillery consists of 105 mm. and 155 mm. howitzers which are suitable for beach defense.

  
Chief of Staff.

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~~SECRET~~

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl S. Spitzer

*Box*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

*PSF  
Safe  
Marshall*

February 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes for ABDA.

4-Engine

Arrived in ABDA

From Natal	32
From Hawaii	<u>8</u>
Total	40

En route

Between Tampa (excl) and Natal (incl)	4
Between Natal (excl) and Cairo (incl)	8
Between Cairo (excl) and Ceylon (incl)	<u>12</u>
Total Africa	24

Between San Francisco (excl) and Hawaii (incl)	0
Between Hawaii (excl) and ABDA (excl)	<u>1</u>
Total Pacific	1

Total 4-Engine 65

Pursuit

Arrived in ABDA	326
En route	<u>169</u>
Total Pursuit	495

Dive Bombers

Arrived in ABDA	52
En route	<u>15</u>
Total Dive Bombers	67

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Total All Types

627

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

*[Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

Bob

Memo for the President

My dear Mr. President:

The attached papers  
bears very directly on  
your comments yesterday  
a. M. reference tank  
carriers to be constructed  
or improvised. It came  
in today.

W. H. H. H.

PSF  
Sife  
Marshall

U.S. SECRET.  
BRITISH MOST SECRET.

COPY NO. 6

C.P.S. 18.

19th February, 1942.

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS.

ADDITIONAL  
LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS.

Note by the Secretaries.

The attached memorandum, prepared by the British Joint Planners, is circulated for consideration by the Combined Staff Planners.

(Signed) E. L. SIBERT

P. O. A. DAVISON

Combined Secretariat.

Washington, D.C.  
19TH FEBRUARY, 1942.

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**DECLASSIFIED** JCS Reproding  
Memo 31-71

P. O. A. DAVISON

Combined Secretariat.

Washington, D.C.  
19TH FEBRUARY, 1942.

ADDITIONAL  
LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS.

British planning has continually been handicapped by the shortage of special craft for amphibious operations.

Present British Programme for Europe and Middle East.

2. The present programme of U.S. and British construction of landing craft was originally designed to enable 6 Armoured and 13 Infantry Divisions and 6 Army Tank Brigades to be landed on the Continent from Great Britain in the early summer of 1943. In addition it was hoped to build up by mid-1942 a landing craft fleet in the Middle East, capable of operating an amphibious striking force of 1 Armoured Brigade and 2 Infantry Brigade Groups.

3. Design and production difficulties have slowed down this programme very seriously and, in spite of the U.S. mass production of a most efficient tank landing ship capable of crossing the Atlantic, the plan for landing on the Continent has had to be recast and is now reduced both in tempo and extent. It may even have to be postponed for an appreciable period.

Similarly the Middle East programme has had to be reduced and only training and minor raids can be undertaken this year, in that theatre.

Far East Requirement.

4. The present programme does not include any provision for the Far East theatre of war in which we are likely to have to employ large amphibious forces for the offensive against Japan.

5. We are informed by our Supply Missions that within the next month the final allocations of building capacities are likely to be decided and thereafter it will be too late to increase the landing craft programmes. An early estimate of our combined requirements is therefore required so that the necessary orders for building can be placed. As a guide to the magnitude of the problem, it has been found that to land a British force of 1 division and 1 armoured brigade group requires approximately the following:-

50 T.L.C.	(Tank Landing Craft)
95 M.L.C.	(Motor Landing Craft)
16 S.L.C.	(Support Landing Craft)
95 A.L.C.	(Assault Landing Craft)

Conclusion.

6. We suggest that, at the very least, landing craft on this scale for 1 American and 1 British amphibious force of this size, with sufficient reserve craft, should be ordered forthwith, as an addition to the present programme.

7. We realise that this is, to some extent, prejudging the Pacific Appreciation but consider the matter to be most urgent.

THE PRESIDENT SIGNED THE  
LETTER TO ADMIRAL LAND THIS MORNING  
AND I SENT IT BY MESSENGER.

L. BERNEY

*Bert*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

I CALLED UP SUMNER WELLES AND  
NOTIFIED HIM ABOUT THIS.

H.L.H.

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
Safe  
Marshall

February 21, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The S.S. BRAZIL, the S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, and eleven cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 ship tons capacity each, are required by the War Department for the movement of troops to Australia and Hawaii. No other vessels are available at this time for this purpose.

The BRAZIL has been assigned by the Maritime Commission to the State Department for the repatriation of enemy diplomats. The Navy Department, to which the PRESIDENT GRANT is at present tentatively assigned, has indicated its willingness to permit the use of this vessel by the Army for one trip to Hawaii.

In the opinion of the War Department, the military situation demands the dispatch of troops without delay to our overseas theaters. A delay of about one month in the repatriation of enemy diplomats will result. The War Department is prepared to make immediately available the S.S. ETOLIN and ACADIA for the transportation of enemy diplomats and prisoners of war from South America to the United States.

The Maritime Commission advises me that the eleven freighters cannot be assigned to the Army, unless a priority above shipments of copper and other strategic materials be assigned. Military necessity demands such priority.

I therefore request that you sign the inclosed letter, directing that the Chairman of the Maritime Commission allot these vessels to the War Department.

Respectfully yours,

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
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Incl.

Signature-

Carl S. Spicer

  
Chief of Staff.

~~SECRET~~

February 21, 1942

Admiral E.S. Land,  
Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of War advises me that military necessity requires the use of the S.S. BRAZIL, S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, and eleven cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 ship tons capacity each.

Please take the necessary steps to make these vessels available to the War Department at once, regardless of any previous commitment, excepting only vessels required for Russian Lend-Lease use.

At the same time, I am directing the War Department to make available the S.S. ETOLIN and ACADIA for the transportation of diplomats and prisoners of war from South America to the United States. The eventual repatriation of the diplomats from the United States and to the United States will have to await a later vessel.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Copy of memorandum to  
Admiral Land sent to the Chief of  
Staff.

*file  
Confidential*

*PSF  
Safe*

*Marshall*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND

I enclose copy of a memorandum to me from the Chief of Staff of the Army, pointing out the need of much larger tonnage for defense purposes in 1942 and 1943.

After our discussion the other day, I am asking that you and Vickery prepare plans to commission 9,000,000 tons in 1942 and 15,000,000 tons in 1943.

I realize that this is a terrific directive on my part but I feel certain that in this very great emergency we can attain it.

F. D. R.

*1200 conference  
Thursday*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The future effort of the Army is dependent upon shipping. More shipping than is now in sight is essential if the national war effort is not to be neutralized to a serious extent. By December 1942, there will be 1,800,000 troops ready for overseas service, and by the end of 1943 about three and a half million. We are now endeavoring to secure from the War Shipping Administration an additional eighteen cargo ships per month for military use, which would permit an overseas force of 750,000 by the end of 1942. This number, however, would be less than half of the troops potentially available.

The present 1943 program for the construction of 10,667,000 dead weight tons will permit an overseas fighting force of about one and a half million men by the end of 1943, again less than half of those to be available. Furthermore, defense aid requirements will not be met in full measure and the war production program will, therefore, be partially ineffective because of lack of ships.

The war effort of the United States, less what can be done by the Navy, will be measured by what can be transported overseas in troops and materiel. The conclusion that the small forces now envisaged are the measure of the capacity of the country and its military might appears unacceptable. Immediate steps are urged to increase the tempo of the ship building program to a much higher figure. The maximum possibilities in this regard should be exploited, in my opinion,, and the Army advised accordingly.

*Jerry  
Go to 9,000,000  
" " 10,000,000*

*W. B. ...*  
Chief of Staff.  
*1942*  
*1943*

*Ador*

~~SECRET~~

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

PERSONNEL IN THEATRES OF WAR (less U.K.)

The undermentioned figures are corrected up to Mid-February 1942. It has not been possible to split Dominion personnel within the R.A.F.

Theatre of War	British Personnel.		Indian Personnel.	Dominion Forces	Colonial Forces	Allied Forces	Total less R.A.F.
	ARMY	R.A.F.					
GIBRALTAR	15,382	950	Nil	206	377	12	15,977
MALTA	17,969	3,900	Nil	Nil	9,107	Nil	27,076
MIDDLE EAST less IRAQ and IRAN but including SUDAN	299,079	68,500	102,000	140,530	59,180	42,310	643,099
IRAQ and IRAN	29,113	7,400	132,000	Nil	Nil	Nil	161,113
WEST AFRICA	13,204	3,600	Nil	Nil	67,769	265	81,238
EAST AFRICA excluding Ethiopian Army	4,750		170	9,697	98,416	112	113,145
INDIA x	46,300	} 10,000*	427,191	Nil	Nil	Nil	473,491
BURMA x	5,406		36,000	Nil	711	20,558	61,964
TOTAL	431,203	94,350 †	697,361	150,433	234,849	63,257	1,577,103

x (i) Figures between Burma and India have probably altered by some 10,000 in the last month due to British and Indian reinforcements proceeding from India to Burma.

(ii) Indian figures include gazetted and non-gazetted civilians, embodied Auxiliary Force, embodied Indian Territorial force, Indian State Force units in British India and the Nepalese contingent serving in India. Enrolled and un-enrolled non-combatants have not been included.

(iii) British personnel in Indian units are included under the heading "British Personnel".

\* No distinction between India and Burma can be made at this stage.

† Some 6,000 men returning from Far East have not been included.

Bof  
C O P Y

██████████ DESPATCH FROM COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC FORCE, C T F 11, AND C T F 17  
DATED FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

FOLLOWING DECISION ON COMMAND AND MY GENERAL COMMENTS ON COMTASKFOR ELEVEN 232214,  
COMANZACFOR 250100 AND 250900, CINCPAC 250847 AND 251209 X (A) WHILE LEARY REMAINS ON  
SHORE SENIOR PACFLT OFFICER AFLOAT IN ANZAC HEREAFTER EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OF PACFLT

FORCES AND ANZAC FORCES ASSIGNED TO COMMON TASKS BUT LEARY COORDINATE SUPPORTING OPER-  
ATIONS OF U S AND AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCES BASED AUSTRALIA AND MORESEY. CANNOT APPROVE  
WITHOLDING ANZAC FORCE FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS MERELY TO FORM A RESERVE. THIS IDEA IS

PASSIVE AND APPEARS LIKELY TO BE PREMISED ON ACNB VIEWS. (B) AGREE THE CURRENT PRACTICE  
OF USING A SINGLE CARRIER IN AN IMPORTANT OFFENSIVE TASK WITHOUT SUITABLE COVERAGE BY  
SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. EITHER TASK FORCE  
11 OR 17 PREFERABLY BOTH SHOULD REMAIN ANZAC UNTIL NEW CALEDONIA IS GARRISONED BUT THIS

DEPENDS ON LOGISTICS AND MUST BE DECIDED BY CINCPAC. ADVISE. (C) OPERATIONS IN FORWARD  
AREAS SUCH AS "OFFENSIVE SWEEPS" ARE SELDOM JUSTIFIED IN THE ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS OF  
ENEMY PRESENCE SINCE SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DISCLOSE OWN PRESENCE AND INTENTION AND ELIMINATE

ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE. (D) OUR CURRENT TASKS ARE NOT MERELY PROTECTIVE BUT ALSO OFFENSIVE  
WHERE PRACTICABLE AS BEST WAY TO PROTECT IS BY REDUCING ENEMY OFFENSIVE POWER THROUGH  
DESTRUCTION OF HIS MOBILE FORCES PARTICULARLY CARRIERS CRUISERS LOADED TRANSPORTS AND

LONG RANGE BOMBERS. WHILE ENEMY SHORE POSITIONS MAY BE LOOKED ON AS LOCATIONS WHERE  
ENEMY NAVAL FORCES MAY BE STRUCK, RAIDS WHICH MERELY PUT AIR FIELDS AND FIXED INSTALL-  
ATIONS OUT OF COMMISSION TEMPORARILY MAY NOT IN THEMSELVES BE PARTICULARLY PROFITABLE.

(E) NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY IN BISMARCK SOLOMONS AREA CAN PROBABLY BE BETTER  
COVERED BY RECONNAISSANCE BY PATROL PLANES AND BOMBERS BASED NE AUSTRALIA USING MORESEY  
FOR REFUELING. RECOMMEND LEARY MAKE EFFORT TO HAVE US ARMY FIGHTERS SENT TO MORESEY

TO PROTECT THIS VERY IMPORTANT AIR FIELD. (F) WILL TRANSMIT IN SEPARATE DESPATCH MY  
ANALYSIS PRESENT ENEMY SITUATION AND INTENTION ANZAC

COM SW PACFOR TO COMINCH 271016

LANGLEY WITH 37 P-40's ABOARD ENROUTE TJIJATJAP DISCOVERED 130 MILES SOUTH OF ISLAND  
BY ENEMY AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY DESTROYED BY SQUADRON OF NINE ENEMY BOMBERS.  
SURVIVORS INCLUDING COMMANDER McCONNELL NOW IN TWO US DESTROYERS. PECOS EN ROUTE COLOMBO

AND IN GENERAL VICINITY LANGLEY WILL TAKE SURVIVORS ON BOARD AND PROCEED EXMOUTH GULF  
TO JOIN TENDER GROUP THEN TO LOADING PORT WHICH MAY BE CHANGED TO FRMANTLE. NO DETAILS  
YET OF BOMBING NOR OF SURVIVORS EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER. THIS IS FIRST BOMBING

OFF THE SOUTH COAST OF JAVA. STEAMER SEA WITCH WITH 27 P40's AND MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION  
ARRIVING TJIJATJAP TOMORROW MORNING TWENTYEIGHTH.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Box*

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. H.

*PSF  
Safe  
Marshall*

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY  
CONFIDENTIAL FILES.

F. D. R.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/50)

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

Date- 4-6-59

Signature-

*Carl L. Spicer*

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Air transport to China (sketch attached).

Route. The air transport route from Northern India to China will be from Sadiya, India, to Myitkyina, Burma, a distance of two hundred miles. In Myitkyina cargoes will be trans-loaded to barges and floated one hundred miles down the Irawaddy River to Bhamo, Burma. There they will be loaded on trucks and proceed over the Burma Road to Chungking, China.

Planes. Seventy-five transport planes are now being or will be fitted by the Douglas factory in Los Angeles with long range tanks to permit their flight delivery to Calcutta. Fifty of these will be Army transports taken from monthly production schedules up to June 1, 1942. Twenty-five are commercial type transport planes which you authorized to be taken from domestic airlines; the first of these will start moving to Calcutta on March 15th. All seventy-five airplanes will be in Calcutta by June 15, 1942.

Organization. Arrangements are under way to institute the service as soon as the airplanes begin to arrive in Calcutta. Arrangements are now being made with reference to obtaining the barges to be used on the Irawaddy River and also for labor at all points of loading. An Air Corps Ferrying Command group totaling one thousand officers and men under the command of General Earl Naiden, recently detached from General Brett's headquarters, is being set up to organize and operate the Sadiya - Myitkyina air transport route, in collaboration with Chinese National Air Service officials who are thoroughly familiar with the local conditions.

Tonnage capacity. When all seventy-five cargo planes are in operation they will have a capacity of 7500 cargo tons a month. To equal the present capacity of the Burma Road, 17,000 to 20,000 tons per month, an additional one hundred cargo planes would be necessary. Present allocation of cargo planes to China has been made after a close study of the comparative needs in the different theaters of operation.

Planes accompanying General Stilwell. There are five transport airplanes accompanying General Stilwell to China. They should reach Calcutta not later than March 10th and will be available to General Stilwell to use as he deems necessary.

SECRET

Passenger Service. The China National Air Service route from Calcutta to Chungking is being strengthened by the addition of American transport planes. This service consists of passenger airplanes operating on a commercial basis. It is essential that we assist in maintaining its continued operation in order to assure direct connections between Chungking and Calcutta. We are furnishing them with some twenty to twenty-five airplanes. This service, however, does not add in any way to the cargo capacity now carried over the Burma Road.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

Incl.  
Sketch


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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

SECRET



EXPLANATORY NOTES:

- (1) Road Imphal to Kalewa is fair weather and to be opened about the end of March, 1942.
- (2) Road from Ledo to Ft. Hertz is projected by Chinese. Estimated 6 months to complete. Distance - 135 miles.
- (3) Road Ft. Hertz to Bhamo is a fair weather road.
- (4) The Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers navigable for river steamers from Kalewa to Bhamo via Mandalay.

Scale approx. 1" = 120 mi.

February 26, 1942

F. E. Section, MID.

MC

Rangoon

SECRET

PSF

Safe File

Marshall folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR**

**H. L. H.**

**TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY  
CONFIDENTIAL FILES.**

**F. D. R.**

Memorandum to the President  
from General Marshall - Subject:  
"Air transport to China (sketch  
attached).

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1942.

*PSF  
Safe File  
Marshall*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Troop and Cargo Movements since December 7, 1941.

The following figures on the above subject may be of interest:

Troops transported by Rail

Dec.7th to Jan. 13th	572,677
Jan.13th to Jan. 31st	423,359
Feb.1st to Feb. 7th	100,847
Feb.8th to Feb.14th	112,905
Feb.15th to Feb.28th	<u>353,248</u>
Total since Dec.7th, 1941	1,563,036

Cargo, Planes and Troops sent overseas

	<u>Cargo*</u> (ship tons)	<u>Planes</u>	<u>Troops</u>
Dec.7th to Jan. 13th	265,000	313	37,200
Jan.14th to Jan. 31st	300,800	293	48,981
Feb.1st to Feb.7th	34,800	None	3,415
Feb.8th to Feb.14th	144,000	29	3,829
Feb.15th to Feb.28th	<u>368,264</u>	<u>190</u>	<u>36,347</u>
Total since Dec.7th,1941	1,112,864	825	129,772

\* Defense Aid shipments not included.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

*[Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl J. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~



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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*PSF  
Safe Folder  
Marshall*

MAR 4 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Defenses of Ireland.

I have discussed with Admiral Stark and General Arnold the questions raised in the attached letter from the American Minister in Dublin. We feel that the matter of placing additional American troops in Ireland should not be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this time.

As you know, we are in process of sending to Ireland a force of three triangular and one armored division with supporting ground troops, totaling about 105,000 men. Plans contemplate sending an additional 50,000 men, including 22,000 Air Corps, when the units become available. The movement of these forces will require the use of all available shipping for a considerable time.

A comprehensive study is now being made to determine the most effective allocation of American forces to specific areas in 1942. This study will form the basis for decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff affecting the use of American forces in all areas.

  
Chief of Staff.

1 Incl:

Ltr. to The President  
from the American  
Minister in Dublin,  
2-16-42.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Speier*

~~SECRET~~

February 16, 1942.

*Copies have  
been delivered  
to GHQ + to  
Col. Gevow.  
This original for  
Col. Handy.  
JCH*

Dear Mr. President : As you know, in Northern Ireland there <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ at present but two British divisions and one of our regiments with some odds and ends extra . Before this gets to you it is possible that more of our troops will move in but even so, the situation is dangerous . Within a fortnight I hope to get off to you some sort of rough estimate of what people on the ground feel is requisite in the way of troops and materiel in order to give us a preponderance of force against any possible German invasion.

A British air intelligence officer off the record tells me that he believes it possible for the Germans to land 200,000 air born troops in Southern Ireland in a few days, with fuel and ammunition, artillery and three ton tanks. With air bases established they could undoubtedly run in a big convoy landing three divisions in the Cork-Wexford area . If they control the island Britain is pretty well cooked, as the life line of supplies will be cut. You know what can be done and what not with the means available. I am writing to you direct, instead of through channels because you will see at once what I mean and its significance and not pooh pooh the possibility and talk about British sea power. Off hand it seems as if three of our tank divisions and six mobile divisions would be a minimum force to make the defense secure, that is on the assumption that Britain could send over two or three more divisions within forty eight hours. If the Germans seize the air fields as they would easily do

with only Irish defense to oppose them and then dig themselves into these stone villages it would take an awful lot of doing to get them out. The only possible defense, operating as we must from north of the border, are swift tank forces formidable enough to snuff out the separate attacks before they get organized. As there are six or eight areas which would probably be attacked simultaneously there must be overwhelming tank strength for each area. Of course, accessory to this is a fighter air force capable of coping with perhaps a thousand bombers and transport planes at one time in eight different areas.

If the Russians maul Hitler badly there is all the more reason for him to try for a knockout blow like this. However, I don't have to tell you about that. All I can tell you is that I do not think that the British have any realization of the danger they are in. They are still thinking in terms of invincible sea power.

I am going to feel out ~~this~~ the Irish Defense ministry on <sup>the following</sup> ~~this~~ proposition: If I can get you a squadron of Hurricanes, will you lay out a program of advanced base landing fields which will enable Defense planes from Britain and Northern Ireland to operate over the Cork and Foynes areas. I think we must swallow De Valera's "protest" and make a token gift to <sup>sweeten</sup> the Irish people which the Germans will know about. A few airplanes would do this best. If the Irish got ugly we have only to stop their gas. You can attend to Dev. later on. German propaganda is spreading the story of our intending to invade Eire industriously. We should do something to counter it without much delay.

Aff

DM

*Safe: Marshall*

March 4, 1942.

*port*  
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK  
GENERAL MARSHALL

While there is no assurance of war between Russia and Japan this Spring, such a war is always a definite possibility. This possibility is enhanced if the Japanese are able to withdraw a relatively large number of troops and planes from the southwest Pacific area, leaving only a containing force there.

I think it would be a good thing if the United Staffs would hold one or two sessions in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United States in the event of such a war.

It should be studied, of course, from all angles, such as an offensive by the United Nations, starting from the southern area, thus compelling Japan to send more forces there; second, from the point of view of the use of Chinese territory by Russia and the United States to conduct various kinds of offensives against Japan; third, from the point of view of opening up the Aleutian Islands route to Kamchatka and Siberia; the latter would also include, during the Summer months, the possibility of sending supplies to the Russian forces by an even more northerly route -- past Wrangel Island to the Arctic coast of Siberia and thence south.

F. D. R.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Review  
aircraft*

March 4, 1942

My dear Mr. Hopkins:

I have received instructions from my Government to raise once again the question regarding deliveries to the U.S.S.R. of the "Douglass" commercial airplane.

The present vast extent of the front lines demands great quantities of large commercial airplanes for the purpose of transporting troops to points at which reinforcements may be required at any particular time.

Taking into consideration the fact that it was difficult for the United States Government to deliver 600 airplanes as recently requested, my Government now asks whether it will not be possible to deliver immediately at least 100 and 25 airplanes monthly thereafter.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. is willing to accept not only new airplanes, but any airplanes available, including used airplanes.

It will be deeply appreciated if the United States Government will endeavor to use every means possible to effect delivery of these airplanes, for which the need is most pressing.

Sincerely yours,

  
Ambassador

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins

The White House

Washington

March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETT:

We are getting urgent requests from Russia for transports. You recall that some time ago they asked for an unconscionable number but it seems to me that any they can get are important.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I got from Litvinoff. Don't worry about the number he asks for. The important thing is, do you think we can give them any? You see he says he will take used airplanes.

I would think from a strategic point of view transports in Russia today are as important as any place in the world.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

cc: General Burns.

March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BURNS:

I want this matter of transport planes for Russia referred to the Air Committee. In referring it you should indicate whatever importance you place from a strategic point of view on the Russians getting some transports.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

March 6, 1942

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have your letter about the transport planes. I don't know what we can do about it but I am looking into it at once.

I have also asked the Lend-Lease Administration to look again thoroughly into the whole nickel business but, as you know, that is very tight here.

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

His Excellency  
Maxim Litvinoff,  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BURNS:

I wonder if you would put this  
formally in the mill.

I think there must be a great deal  
of merit to some way finding some transport  
planes for Russia and finding them damned  
soon.

Please return this correspondence.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

*S/P/S*  
*For memo, act.*  
*4/3/42 JMB*

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Action was taken by the Board April 8th on the Russian request for Transport airplanes.

An assignment was made of 10 C-47 transports in May and 15 C-47 and 4 C-53 transports in June. The C-47 is the cargo and troop carrier, the C-53 a passenger transport.

The Board considered it advisable to limit the firm commitment of transports to Russia to June in view of the impending extension of the Protocol. Additional transports after June can be included in the new Protocol.

Correspondence attached to your memorandum of April 2 on this subject is returned as per your request.

  
J. H. BURNS  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Executive  
Munitions Assignments Board

April 14, 1942

Col. Jamieson telephoned this morning requesting that no action be taken on this. lmb

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 9-18-73  
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

~~SECRET~~


**SECRET**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

1. The recommendation of the United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board, reference taking a reasonable number of transport planes from United States air lines for Russia, was considered today by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.
2. General Marshall made a presentation of the transport situation as he saw it in connection with operations.
3. He indicated that the air line transportation was included in the United States requirements and was counted on as a reserve against requirements for operations at an earlier date than the one originally contemplated.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Secretariat to return the paper to the United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board not favorably considered.

  
HARRY J. MALONY,  
Brig. General, U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 9-18-73  
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

*PSF  
Safe*

*Marshall*

*Bot*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I received from General MacArthur this morning a recommendation that Brigadier General Albert N. Jones be promoted to the grade of Major General and that Colonel Lewis C. Beebe be promoted to the grade of Brigadier General (both temporary).

He states: "These officers have been outstanding during the last three months. Jones is to be assigned to the command of the First Philippine Corps and Beebe is to be assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff at this headquarters (Fort Mills). These assignments are essential in the reorganization which you will understand. I request favorable action and radio information without delay."

I request authority to include these two names in the list of proposed promotions which General Watson has had for several days. If you approve I will have their names added to the formal list of nominations, rather than to the explanatory list now in General Watson's possession, which involves explanations and is seen by a number of people.

Pertinent to the above is a message yesterday from MacArthur which indicates March 17 as the date for the completion of compliance with your secret instructions to him.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

*all  
help*

**SECRET**

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**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOD DIR.** 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

BY AUTHORITY OF <sup>WPD</sup> ~~DA~~ C. OF S., WPD  
DDE

*Boy*

*OKR -*

Date

Initials

March 10, 1942.

*PSF  
Safe File  
Marshall*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Staff directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, USAFIA, Melbourne, Australia:

PERSONAL FROM GENERAL MARSHALL TO BE SEEN BY DECODING  
CLERK AND GENERAL BRETT ONLY STOP WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO  
THE SPECIAL MISSION MENTIONED IN MY FOUR THREE NINE COMMA IT  
APPEARS PROBABLE THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR WILL LAND IN AUSTRALIA  
ON MARCH SEVENTEENTH STOP UNTIL THAT TIME YOU ARE TO KEEP  
THIS ENTIRE MATTER ONE OF PROFOUND SECRECY STOP PARA THE  
FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU FROM THE PRESIDENT COLON  
GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELEGRAPH YOU AT  
MELBOURNE IMMEDIATELY UPON LANDING IN AUSTRALIA STOP WITHIN  
THE HOUR YOU WILL CALL UPON THE PRIME MINISTER OR OTHER  
APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIAL OF AUSTRALIA COMMA STATING  
THAT YOUR CALL IS MADE BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT STOP  
YOU ARE TO NOTIFY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR  
HAS LANDED IN AUSTRALIA AND HAS ASSUMED COMMAND OF ALL U.S.  
ARMY FORCES THEREIN STOP YOU WILL PROPOSE THAT THE AUSTRALIAN  
GOVERNMENT NOMINATE GENERAL MACARTHUR AS THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA COMMA AND WILL RECOMMEND THAT  
THE NOMINATION BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO LONDON AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON SIMULTANEOUSLY STOP YOU WILL INFORM THE PRIME  
MINISTER THAT THE PRESIDENT IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE  
PROPOSALS REGARDING ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THE AUSTRALIAN  
AREA AS RECENTLY SUBMITTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EXCEPT  
AS TO SOME DETAILS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIP TO COMBINED CHIEFS  
OF STAFF AND AS TO BOUNDARIES STOP THESE MATTERS WILL BE  
ADJUSTED WITH THE INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS AS QUICKLY AS  
PRACTICABLE STOP UPON COMPLETION OF YOUR VISIT TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER YOU WILL INFORM THE WAR DEPARTMENT BY URGENT RADIO  
THAT THIS MISSION HAS BEEN COMPLETED STOP END OF PRESIDENT'S  
INSTRUCTIONS STOP PARA YOU WILL ARRANGE TO TURN COMMAND OF  
AMERICAN ARMY FORCES IN AUSTRALIA OVER TO GENERAL MACARTHUR  
AS SOON AFTER HIS LANDING AS PRACTICABLE AND WILL REPORT TO HIM  
AS HIS DEPUTY FOR COMMAND OF AIR FORCES COMSMA THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY  
AND ALL AIR FORCES IF ARRANGEABLE STOP INFORM GENERAL MACARTHUR  
FULLY CONCERNING ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND OF ALL STEPS HERETOFORE  
TAKEN REFERENCE THIS AND OTHER MATTERS STOP REQUEST HIM TO  
INFORM THE WAR DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY AS TO THE NAME OF EACH  
INDIVIDUAL ACCOMPANYING HIM TO AUSTRALIA STOP

MARSHALL

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,  
Brigadier General,  
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT:

The attached data may be  
of interest to you.

  
Chief of Staff.

encl.  
Troop movements  
since Dec. 7/41

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**DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)**

**WAR DEPARTMENT**

**HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY**

**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

Date- **4-3-59**

*Carl T. Spicer*

Signature-  
March 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Subject: Troop and Cargo Movements since  
December 7, 1941.

*PSF.  
Sole File  
Marshall*

1. The following number of troops were transported by rail between the dates shown below:

Dec. 7, 1941 to Jan. 13, 1942 .	572,677 troops
Jan. 13, 1942 to Jan. 31, 1942	423,359 "
Feb. 1, 1942 to Feb. 7, 1942	100,847 "
Feb. 8, 1942 to Feb. 14, 1942	112,905 "
Feb. 15, 1942 to Feb. 28, 1942	353,248 "
Mar. 1, 1942 to Mar. 15, 1942	<u>340,905</u> "

Total since Dec. 7, 1941 **1,903,941 troops.**

2. The following amount of cargo, and numbers of planes and troops have embarked for overseas destinations:

	Cargo* (ship tons)	Planes	Troops	
Dec. 7, 1941 to Jan. 13, 1942	265,000	313	37,200	) Month of January
Jan. 14, 1942 to Jan. 31, 1942	300,800	293	48,981	) Approx. 58,000 Troops
Feb. 1, 1942 to Feb. 7, 1942	34,800	none	3,415	)
Feb. 8, 1942 to Feb. 14, 1942	144,000	29	3,829	) Month of February
Feb. 15, 1942 to Feb. 28, 1942	368,264	190	36,347	) 43,591 Troops
March 1, 1942 to March 15, 1942	<u>352,970</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>30,374</u>	)
Total since Dec. 7, 1941	1,465,834	915	160,146	)

\* Defense Aid shipments not included.



*Carl T. Spicer*

**BREHON SOMERVELL,**  
Major General,  
Commanding

**SECRET**

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON


March 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transporting Troops on Cargo Boats.

General Somervell informs me that arrangements have been made, through the Maritime Commission, to make some small constructional alterations on United States flag cargo boats which will permit approximately a platoon of 50 men to be carried without undue hardships. These alterations can be accomplished during the routine turn-arounds in port and, therefore, will involve no delays.

The estimate is that for all overseas cargo movements some 20,000 men can be accommodated in this manner in a six-months' period. This estimate does not include a similar arrangement by the British, but we have them looking into the matter.

  
Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59  
Signature- Carl S. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

PSF Safe: Marshall  
For the President:

~~SECRET~~

Griffiss was an outstanding  
who had been of great as-  
sistance to me. I was  
braving, from home.  
March 19, 1942

From London

To The Adjutant General

*[Handwritten signature]*

No. 830, March 19:

A British Court of Enquiry found that Liberator Air-  
craft number AM 918 in the service of British Overseas  
Airways, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Townsend Griffiss  
and British military and civilian passengers, was shot  
down about 5 miles southwest of the Eddystone Lighthouse,  
near Plymouth, England, on Feb. 15, 1942 at about 8:50  
A.M. British Standard Time. Plane was on non-stop flight  
from Cairo to England. Plane crashed into channel. Crew  
and all passengers were lost. No bodies have been re-  
covered. Plane was shot down by 2 Polish pilots of the  
Polish Air Force who failed to identify it as friendly  
aircraft. Court also found that contributory cause was  
lack of exercise of proper and effective control of pilots  
by ground organization. Evidence is being taken with the  
view of bringing the 2 pilots before court martial. It is  
requested that no publicity be given to findings of Court  
of Enquiry. Formal certificate of death will be forwarded  
as soon as issued by British Casualty Section. Request  
this information be furnished also Chief of Army Air Forces.

Chaney

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DDO DIA 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~SECRET~~

PSF Safe: Marshall

Russia Aircraft

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 28, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Harry L. Hopkins  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

During my absence at Wright Field your letter of March 6 in connection with the need for transports in Russia was studied by the interested divisions, particularly in relation to the request of the State Department that additional means for handling mail and providing passenger transport for Russia be developed if possible.

I have recently had occasion to go into the matter of the transport situation with the Air Service Command and the Ferry Command and I feel that a more responsive answer to your inquiry can be given you than has previously been made.

First, as to the need of the Russian Forces for a large number of transport aircraft. I think this is obvious in the light of our own, as well as British and Chinese experience in the war. In fact, I think their need must necessarily be critical.

Secondly, the tough part of your question is as to whether or not I think any can be given. Transport aircraft can only be supplied to Russia at the cost of either our own transport units which are in the most urgent need of equipment, or British or Chinese needs. In view of the fact that we are transporting so much stuff to the East, it seems to me that the question of a reallocation of transports currently scheduled for the British might be reasonable. We should have enough air traffic in the Middle East and Far East to answer a certain part of British needs which were stated prior to our involvement in the Far East.

They are presently scheduled to receive from production, beginning in June with nine DC-3 type, over 30 a month of this type alone for 14 months. In addition they get a few Lockheed twin-engine transports between now and June and continuing on through the rest of this year. In these circumstances, it is my opinion that through careful reallocation it might be possible to get, say, 100 transports for Russia by the end of this year.

Library of Congress

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510 012. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

The decision is, of course, one involving strategy and I assume that your other advisers will cover this aspect of the problem.

With kindest regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,



ROBERT A. LOVETT

111  
copy

file  
Confid.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Inspection trip to the Canal Zone, Galapagos, and  
Cocos, March 6-28, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Track Chart of Air Patrols.  
(B) Diagram.  
(C) Photos.

1. In accordance with orders, I have visited the  
following:-

Balboa, C.Z. -- Headquarters of Caribbean Defense  
Command, and of Fifteenth Naval  
District.

Coco Solo, C.Z. -- Naval Air Station, Submarine Base.  
Galapagos -- Army and Navy Advance Air Bases.  
Salinas, Ecuador -- Army and Navy Advance Air Bases.  
Cocos Island -- Future Base for Motor Torpedo Boats.  
Gulf of Fonseca -- Navy Sea-plane Base.  
Guatemala City -- Army Advance Air Base.

All travel was by air. At every place visited I conferred  
with the senior officers present and in addition I sought facts and  
opinions from all reliable sources. I submit herewith briefly my  
conclusions:-

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Paramount Duty

The most important present task of the Army and Navy in  
the Canal Zone is to defeat any attempted bombing attack on the Panama  
Canal. Such an attack from the Pacific side most probably would come from  
enemy carriers, launching their planes during bright moonlight and at  
a distance up to possibly 700 miles from the Canal. Dangers from  
submarine raids are secondary.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

~~SECRET~~

Paramount Duty (continued)

To insure the defeat of such a bombing attack, the enemy carriers must be discovered during daylight of the day preceding the attempted assault. This means, roughly, in the area between the 800 mile and the 1100 mile circles. See diagram.

The patrolling of this vast expanse of ocean can only be done effectively by long range planes

Consequently, the maintenance of this patrol on the Panama Sea Frontier is the most vital part of the war effort of the Army and Navy forces in the Canal Zone.

Army. — Under the aggressive leadership of Lieutenant General F. M. Andrews, USA, Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, the Army is doing a fine job. The personnel from top to bottom is grimly earnest and alive to the realities of the war situation and the importance of the tasks assigned to them.

Navy. — The Navy's war efforts, in some respects, have been sluggish because of lack of virile leadership. Lack of effective cooperation with the Army was evident.

Rear Admiral F. H. Sadler, USN, Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, has been ordered relieved of his command. His successor, Rear Admiral Clifford Van Hook, USN, is an able, younger officer who has proven his ability to cooperate with the Army.

Aviation. — The organization of Naval aviation activities in the Fifteenth Naval District is neither logical nor workable. Recommendations made by me to the present Commandant were summarily rejected by Admiral Sadler on the grounds - among others - that to accept them would aid the Army in its alleged plot to gain and retain control of Naval aviation. Admiral Van Hook will correct this situation immediately upon taking command.

It is a pleasure to report that the high efficiency and splendid cooperation of Patrol Wing Three and its dynamic commander, Commander Arthur Gavin, USN, were highly praised by Generals Andrews, Johnson and Lyons.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

-2-

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

~~SECRET~~

Aviation (continued)

The Army Air Force also is on its toes. However, its tremendous expansion has necessarily diluted the skilled personnel to a greater extent than is yet the case in Naval aviation, and, in consequence, the Army is experiencing more difficulties in maintenance and upkeep.

ADVANCE AIR BASES.

Cocos. -- Except for being sighted twice daily by patrol planes, no surveillance over, or use of Cocos was in effect when I arrived.

As of today, a striking force of four submarines is basing for patrol intervals of two weeks on Cocos. Also, 8 tuna boats are now stationed on a North-South line just west of Cocos to serve as aircraft warning posts.

About July 1st a squadron of motor torpedo boats with a tender will be stationed at Cocos. By July 1st the Army expects to have in operation a long range Radar installation on Cocos, and this will carry with it a radio set and personnel so that there will then be a small shore-based force on the Island. Navy aviators were unanimous in their opinions that seaplanes could not be based at Cocos except at irregular intervals. From my personal experience I concur in this opinion.

Galapagos.-- By May 1st the Army will have a fully fortified and equipped Advance Air Base on Seymour Island with approximately 1500 troops, one squadron of "Flying Fortresses" and one squadron of pursuit planes. Small dispersion air fields on other islands are under consideration by the Army. The Navy bungled its job in setting up a Seaplane Base on North Seymour Island. However, I persuaded the Commandant to discard his original plan and to take steps to get the Navy base properly and promptly implemented. By July 1st there will be facilities to support the operations of two squadrons of PBV's at the Navy base. A converted destroyer now serves as tender.

The Navy also plans to install a fuel oil depot, probably on Charles Island, so that cruisers, and destroyers on convoy or patrol duty can top-off their fuel tanks without returning to Balboa.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

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Galapagos (continued)

Two long range Radar installations will be made on other islands in the Galapagos.

It is planned to base one squadron of motor torpedo boats with tender in the Galapagos by May 1st.

In view of the air patrols now in effect which cover parts of the Archipelago every day, the further air patrols to be inaugurated upon the completion of the Air Bases on Seymour Island, the basing in the Galapagos in the near future of a squadron of 12 motor torpedo boats, and the installing of two Radar stations (with radio), there appears to be no urgent need of lookout posts on shore or the employment of fishing craft to supplement the present surveillance.

Salinas, Ecuador. -- The Army is building an Advance Air Base to support two squadrons of "Flying Fortresses" and two pursuit squadrons. The work is well advanced: there are nearly 1000 troops there now, 6 inch guns are mounted; there is a Radar installation, and 8 heavy bombers and 8 pursuit ships are operating regularly from this Base.

The Navy's Seaplane Base will not be completed until June at which time two squadrons of PBV's can be handled. In the meantime, a converted destroyer serves as a seaplane tender at Salinas.

Gulf of Fonseca -- The Navy has established a small Seaplane Base here that can serve as an over-night refueling stop. Further development must be done to make this a secondary operating base for either seaplanes or motor torpedo boats.

Guatemala City. -- The Army is enlarging the airport there, and is now operating 12 heavy bombardment type planes and 8 observation and pursuit planes from this field. An emergency landing field for the Army's use is being built at San Jose on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala.

AIR PATROL OPERATIONS -- At present the air patrol in the Panama Sea Frontier, Pacific Sector, is being carried on by 24 Navy PBV's and 20 Army B-17's and LB-30s.

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By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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AIR PATROL OPERATIONS (Continued)

8 Navy planes and 7 Army planes are on patrol every day as shown on attached track chart. The Army states that not less than 70 planes of the B-17 or PB4Y types are needed to maintain an effective patrol. During the next 6 months the Army is scheduled to receive at Panama an additional 29 such planes and the Navy 12.

The Army hopes to have additional heavy bombers to use as a striking force and for training purposes. The Navy is seeking large landplanes to use in lieu of flying boats. There is no doubt of the superiority of the B-17 type over the PB4Y type and it would seem logical to provide the Naval aviators with some landplanes so that the best planes could be utilized by the men best trained to operate over the ocean.

MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS -- There is one squadron of motor torpedo boats now based in the Perlas Islands. When this squadron's tender, the USS NIAGARA, arrives this month the squadron will be moved out to the Galapagos. Additional squadrons with tenders are expected during the next few months and will be stationed at Cocos, Salinas, and the Gulf of Fonseca.

These squadrons will constitute a powerfully effective and speedy striking force on the Panama Sea Frontier for use particularly against enemy carriers at night.

Respectfully,

*Paul F. Foster*


Paul F. Foster,  
Commander, USNR.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973



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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 8, 1972

Enclosure "B"

By RT, NARS 5 1973

AIRPLANE COMMANDER'S REPORT  
Reconnaissance and Patrol Missions

Unit \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. Indicate on map on reverse side point and time of take off and landing, track of airplane to include latitude, longitude, and time of all turning points, hourly positions, positions of air and surface craft sighted, bad weather areas, and mean altitude of each leg of track.
2. Were messages sent or received? \_\_\_\_\_ Attach copies of all messages.
3. In event of combat action, submit detailed report to include injuries and damage received and inflicted on enemy, ammunition expended, performance, characteristics and tactics of enemy. See Form F, Field Manual 1-40.

NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS WILL BE MADE HEREON OF THE FOLLOWING:

4. Observations enroute description, position, and time of all surface and air craft seen.


5. General weather conditions. Show bad weather areas and resultant change of course on map.

6. Difficulties experienced.

7. Remarks. Use additional sheets if necessary.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
Airplane Commander

THIS OVERSIZI ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.



BLIND  
R.O. 11614, Dec. 3, 1942 and 6171 of (S)  
CGD Index, May 4, 1942  
No. 117, Serial No. APP 5 1973

ANNEX NO 1 TO FO. NO. 10 PANAMA AIR TASK FORCE

PLOT OF PATROLS

16 MARCH 1942.

Overlay of Hydrographic Office Chart V-200



By Command of Brigadier General LYON

FG ALLEN,  
Lt Colonel, Air Corps,  
Executive.

OFFICIAL:  
F. E. Glantzberg  
F. E. GLANTZBERG  
Lt Colonel, Air Corps  
5-5

— NAVY  
— ARMY

16 PLANES IN PACIFIC



Enclosure A

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RF: Safe - Marshall

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of *Letter of*  
*Major General J. C. Lambert*  
*of 30 May 1964*  
By *Albert H. ...*  
Date *20 May 1964*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON



*Marshall*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Basis for preparation of attached outlined plan for Invasion of Western Europe.

1. Western Europe has been selected as the theater in which to stage the first great offensive of the United Powers because:

It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In any other locality the building up of the required forces would be much more slowly accomplished due to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities the enemy is protected against invasion by natural obstacles and poor communications leading toward the seat of the hostile power, or by elaborately organized and distant outposts. Time would be required to reduce these and to make the attack effective.

It is the only place where the vital air superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary to a major attack can be staged by the United Powers. This is due to the existence of a network of landing fields in England and to the fact that at no other place could massed British air power be employed for such an operation.

It is the only place in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces. It is impossible, in view of the shipping situation, to transfer the bulk of the British forces to any distant region, and the protection of the British islands would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.

The United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place, due to sea distances and the existence in England of base facilities.

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onity of *Little, H.*  
*Gen. J. C. Sambist of*  
*400, 1964*  
 By *Albert R. Susman, Jr.*  
 Date *30 May 1964*

The bulk of the combat forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany, and then only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate against Japan.

Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front.

2. Decision as to the locality of the main effort must be made now. This is true even if the actual attack cannot be launched during this year. A major attack must be preceded by a long period of intensive preparation. Basic decision is necessary so that all production, special construction, training, troop movements and allocations can be coordinated to a single end. Until this process of coordinated and intensified effort is initiated it is difficult to calculate even the approximate date at which a major offensive can be undertaken.

The element of time is of the utmost importance. We must begin an offensive on a major scale before Russia, now practically alone, can be defeated and before Vichy France, Spain, Portugal and Turkey are drawn into the ranks of our enemies.

3. Gist of Plan.

The plan more fully outlined in later paragraphs provides for an attack by combined forces against Western Europe at the earliest possible moment that the necessary tactical forces can be accumulated -- estimated at April 1, 1943, provided decision is made now and our men, materiel and shipping are not further dispersed. (An earlier date for an "emergency" offensive is set for the fall of 1942 as will be explained later)

Combined forces required, exclusive of Naval support, are:

- Three thousand fighter planes.
- Twenty eight hundred planes (other combat types)
- Forty eight Divisions (all types - 30 of them U.S.)
- Paratroops; airborne troops; A.A. - etc.
- Total U.S. personnel to be transported to England:  
 1,000,000 by the date of initiating the  
 attack.

The plan contemplates three main phases.

- a. - Preparatory. Beginning now, to date of initiating main attack.

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Copy of

*Letter of  
Gen. J. C. Lambert*

By

*Alfred H. ...*

Date

*20 May 1964*

b. - Cross channel movement and seizure of beachhead between Le Havre and Boulogne.

c. - Consolidation of beachhead and beginning of further operations.

4. An added feature of this plan is that, during the preparatory period it provides means to act promptly under either of the following eventualities:

(a) If the imminence of Russian collapse requires desperate action, a sacrifice attack could be made.

(b) If German forces are almost completely absorbed on the Russian front, a prompt movement to the continent might be undertaken with much smaller forces than would otherwise be justified.

Included, later in this paper, is an outlined plan for an attack about September 15, 1942.

5. Limitations as to time and as to strength of attack are imposed upon both plans by the shortage of shipping, and, secondarily, by the difficulty in the production of landing craft. Further limitations are imposed by the necessity for executing certain commitments and requirements, already of record, which absorb a certain amount of shipping. These include:

- 2 Divisions to Australia
- 1 Division to New Zealand
- Sufficient shipping to England to transport 40,000 troops and equipment to the Middle East.
- Continuance of material aid to Russia and to others of the United Nations.

PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

6. Assumptions.

a. That the line, Alaska - Hawaii - Australia will be held and Pacific garrisons increased from a present approximate strength of 175,000 to an approximate strength of 300,000.

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By authority of *Lt. Col. J. C. Lambert*  
*J. C. Lambert* of 30 May 1964  
By *Albert R. Lumsden*  
Date *26 May 1964*

b. That present U. S. commitments will be executed. These include dispatch of the 41st and one additional division to Australia, one division to New Zealand, and the loan of sufficient shipping to the British to move 40,000 troops to the Middle East, and the building up of a small air force in China - India. Providing the British furnish the necessary planes from aircraft now allotted to them, two groups pursuit, one group medium bombardment and two groups light bombardment should be sent to the Middle East as the only additional U. S. commitment to theaters other than Western Europe. This will have a corresponding effect in diminishing the U. S. planes available for the offensive in Europe.

c. That Russia is still effective in the war to the extent that the bulk of the German forces are required on the Russian front.

d. That Axis forces in Western Europe remain at approximately their present strength.

7. From an examination of the hostile situation, it is concluded that a successful attack can be made only with combat power as follows:

a. Adequate air superiority over the enemy involving the use by the Allies of a minimum of 3,000 fighters and 2,850 combat planes other than fighters. (Combined British and U. S.).

b. Ability to land in the first wave the major combat elements of an infantry and armored force of at least six divisions. At the beginning of the actual invasion, U. S. land forces in England or en route should be approximately : six armored, five motorized, 18 infantry and one air-borne division.

c. An ability to land on the western coast of Europe behind the leading wave, a weekly increment initially of at least 100,000 troops, and, after the invasion forces have landed, a continuous flow of reinforcements from the United States at the maximum rate that shipping will permit.

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By authority of *Lt. Col. J.C. Lambert*  
*20 May 1964*  
By *[Signature]*  
Date *20 May 1964*

8. Plan.

a. This plan provides for the movement to the British Isles of U. S. air and ground forces comprising approximately one million men to participate with the British in an invasion of France between Le Havre and Boulogne. Logistic factors fix the earliest possible date for an attack on this scale at about April 1, 1943. Bottlenecks, as to time, will be shipping and landing craft, which will not be available in sufficient quantity by the time that aircraft, ground equipment and ammunition can be supplied.

b. The operation proper is divided into three phases:

- (1) Preparatory phase. (From now until April 1, 1943).
- (2) The cross-channel movement and seizure of the beach head.
- (3) The consolidation of the beach head with a view to further operations.

(1) Preparatory Phase.

During the preparatory phase maximum effort to be made to complete the organization, equipment and training of the air and ground forces involved, and to coordinate all productive effort toward this objective. This includes the early establishment of additional air installations in England, and the movement to the British Isles of air and ground forces to complete their training in conjunction with the British. A continued air offensive against vital Axis targets on the mainland of Europe should be carried out prior to April 1, 1943. In addition to the destruction accomplished this will enable American and British air forces to work together and so develop a coordinated combat team. Likewise, participation of U. S. ground troops in raids against the coast of continental Europe from Norway to the southern limits of occupied France will not only harass the German occupying forces, but will aid materially in the training of U. S. and British ground forces, and will obtain information concerning the organization of the German defenses along the coast. Above all, it will produce the coordinated combat methods vital to success. During the final two weeks just prior to the land invasion, an intensification of air activities against the invasion front will be carried out with the view to neutralizing the Axis air forces on that front and to beating down the Axis defensive system.

- (2) The cross channel movement and later consolidation.  
The invasion itself will consist of a cross-channel movement and the seizure of a beach head between Le Havre and Boulogne,

By authority of *Letter of Maj. Gen.*  
*J.C. Hamilton 20 May 1964*  
 By *Arthur H. ...*  
 Date *20 May 1964*

strongly supported by combat aviation. The main landing should be made on a six division front. Parachute and air-borne troops to be employed in addition to combat aviation in assisting the ground forces in establishing the beach head and in preventing rapid movement of German reinforcements toward the coast. As soon as a beach head is established, strong armored forces are to be ferried across the channel to break the German resistance along the coast and to seize the line of the Oise-St. Quentin. A movement towards Antwerp will then follow to widen the salient and permit the movement of additional forces across the channel between Boulogne and Antwerp. (See Map A).

c. U. S. and British forces as follows should be in Great Britain or en route when the land attack begins:

<u>U.S.</u>		<u>British</u>
(can be available)		(Numbers of British aircraft shown are minimum requirements. Information is not at hand as to how many the British can make available.)
1, 450 Fighters	) Modified by any planes sent to Mid- dle East.	1,550 Fighters
1,800 Combat other than fighters		1,000 Combat other than fighters
400 Transport aircraft)		200 Transports.
18 Infantry Divisions		(It is estimated that the British can make available.)
6 Armored Divisions		15 Infantry Divisions
5 Motorized Divisions		3 Armored Divisions
1 Air-borne Division		1 Parachute Brig.
11 Parachute Bns.		3 A.A. Gps.
30 A.A. Regts.		

#### 9. General Comments.

a. Some protective effect will be felt in the Atlantic Ocean as a result of a major attack against West Europe. The garrisons in the Atlantic will not require material reinforcement. This does not apply to the Pacific, to India, and to the Middle East, consequently our protective measures in those regions must be adequate.

b. U. S. troops will be equipped and trained in time for the operation.

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**SECRET**

By authority of *Att. of Maj.*  
*Gen. J. C. Lambert of 20 May 1964*

By *Walter J. ...*

Date *20 May 1964*

c. American shipping available for movement overseas of the U. S. troops will transport approximately 40% of the number involved by April 1, 1943. If this movement must depend entirely on available U. S. shipping, the date of initiating the invasion of France must be postponed until late summer 1943, by which time U. S. shipping can effect the overseas movement of the entire force.

d. An accurate estimate of the availability early in 1943 of all Allied shipping is being made by the CG, SOS. However, it is believed that when the movement of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East now projected for 1942 has been effected, and the situation in those areas stabilized, sufficient passenger transports can be made available for the movement of U. S. troops to England to meet the requirements of this plan. Additional cargo vessels will have to be diverted after January 1, 1943 to support this operation.

e. Landing craft necessary for the operation is not available at present in sufficient quantities to support the cross-channel movement. Provision for some 7,000 landing craft considered essential for this operation has been initiated. However, only through intensification of this construction program, immediately after agreement in principle has been reached, can this number possibly be procured.

f. One of our current tasks is to send to Russia sufficient materiel aid to keep that nation in the war as an active participant. Since the execution of the contemplated plan is not feasible in 1942, other means of rendering assistance to Russia will have to be undertaken. This definitely involves air support to the Middle East; although this is a British responsibility, our vital interests are involved.

Development and construction of air fields, bases, cantonments, etc., in the British Isles in preparation for invasion of Western Europe in 1943 must be substantially completed in 1942.

g. An advantage of this plan is that, while it is still in the preparatory stages, if the German army should show signs of imminent collapse, an invasion of Western Europe can be carried out on a limited scale.

**SECRET**

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By authority of

Lt. Col. Lambert 20 May 1964

By

Date 20 May 1964

10. Modified Plan.

The following represents what can be accomplished to effect an invasion of France on or about September 15, 1942 should a decision be made to advance the date of execution of the operation.

a. U. S. troops that can be made available and arrive in England in time to participate. (Figures include 34th Division and 1st Armored Division).

Air Forces.

400 Fighters  
333 Combat other than fighters  
200 Transport

Ground Forces.

2½ Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division, or  
1½ Infantry Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions, or  
1½ Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 4  
Parachute Bns, and 10 Antiaircraft Regiments.

b. Inclusive of the above, a total of six Infantry, three Armored, and two Motorized Divisions, four Parachute Battalions, and ten Antiaircraft Regiments will be equipped and trained in the U. S. in time to participate in this operation. Shortage in shipping precludes transporting more than the number indicated unless shipping is diverted from another commitment.

c. British troops estimated to be available to participate.

Air Forces.

No data is at hand as to how many planes the British can make available. The minimum considered essential, exclusive of U. S. air forces, is 2,600 fighters, 2,400 combat other than fighters, and all available transport aircraft.

Ground Forces.

15 Infantry Divisions  
3 Armored Divisions  
1 Parachute Brigade  
3 Antiaircraft Groups.

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~~SECRET~~

By authority of *Letter of Maj. Gen. J. L. Lambert of 20 May 1964*  
By *Alfred N. Siskind*  
Date *20 May 1964*

d. THIS LIMITED OPERATION CAN BE JUSTIFIED ONLY IN  
CASE

(1) THE SITUATION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT BECOMES DESPERATE, i.e., the success of German arms becomes so complete as to threaten the imminent collapse of Russian resistance unless the pressure is relieved by an attack from the west by British and American troops. In this case the attack should be considered as a sacrifice in the common good.

(2) THE GERMAN SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMES CRITICALLY WEAKENED.

11. The details of necessary Naval support are under study.

12. There is attached a paper commenting upon the employment of U. S. troops in Syria, in Lybia, and in Northwest Africa.

Chief of Staff.



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**SECRET**

OPERATION MODICUM

*Boof*

*RSE  
Safe  
Marshall*

1. Code Name.

The code name to be applied to the party leaving Baltimore for England on April 4 by Pan American aircraft will be "Modicum." All reference to this party in trans-Atlantic telephone calls, radios or cablegrams will be by this code name.

2. Fictitious Names.

Members of the party will be referred/<sup>to</sup>by the following fictitious names in all communications where secrecy is essential. These names will be known to those shown on the distribution list below:

Mr. Harry Hopkins--Mr. A. H. Hones  
General G. C. Marshall--Mr. C. G. Mell  
Commander James R. Fulton--Mr. A. L. Foss  
Colonel H. A. Craig--Mr. J. H. Case  
Lt. Col. A. C. Wedemeyer--Mr. J. E. White

3. Officers in Charge of Detailed Arrangements.

a. Colonel H. A. Craig is designated as the officer through whom all detailed arrangements pertaining to the flight to and from England will be made. It will be his duty to see that the arrangements indicated below are carried out and to act as liaison officer between British air authorities and Pan American Aviation.

b. Lt. Col. Wedemeyer will, in addition to his other duties, perform such duties as Aide to the Chief of Staff as may be directed. He will also make any other detailed arrangements during the visit in England for the entire party as may be necessary.

4. Schedule of Flight.

Leave Baltimore 7 A.M. April 4 (Eastern War Time). Arrive Bermuda 1 P.M. April 4 (Eastern War Time). Leave Bermuda 9 A.M. April 5, G.M.T. (daybreak). Arrive Lock Erne at 5:45 A.M., G.M.T., April 6 (daybreak). Delays from Bermuda will be on a 24-hour basis.

5. Type and Number of Airplanes.

Flight will be made in Pan American airplane of the Boeing B 314 type Flying Boat. The number of the aircraft is M018604. It is equipped with a 275 watt transmitter, call sign KHCKM, frequencies 3285, 6573, and for long range daylight 12776. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

UNCLASSIFIED

DOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~SECRET~~

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

6. Papers Required on Departure.

The flight from Baltimore to Bermuda will be considered a ferry flight and no ticketing, immigration papers, etc., will be required.

7. Weather Forecasts.

Air Commodore Thornton, British Air Commission, has arranged through the Ferry Command radio facilities to have weather information, forecasts, and facilities made available to PAA upon arrival in Bermuda. He has also arranged to have and will be responsible for proper weather information, route forecasts and local forecasts covering the destination and alternate terminals in the British Isles.

Two route forecasts will be available to PAA at Bermuda, one prepared by the Newfoundland airport, and one prepared by the British at Bermuda.

Air Commodore Thornton will arrange to have a special radio watch for this flight maintained in order that the aircraft will have proper communication at all times with British control stations.

8. Security.

a. The Pan American Aviation will arrange directly with the Navy for a clearance of the aircraft from the United States and for security against United States ships at sea for the initial stages of the flight.

b. Air Commodore Thornton will arrange through the British Air Ferry Command to have appropriate codes and recognition signals or devices turned over to the captain of the aircraft at Bermuda.

c. Arrangements have been made with the R.A.F. to provide for protection for the landing of the Pan American aircraft and for protection for the further flight from Lock Erne to England.

9. Release of Flight from Bermuda.

Prestwick (Air Ferry Command Control--Montreal) shall only release the flight from Bermuda providing contact conditions (1,000 feet and 2 miles) prevail at Lock Erne, the terminal destination, or at one of the other available British alternates. The British have arranged that Prestwick (control station) will, by special arrangement, collect hourly local weather from Foynes and release them only when required by PAA in the event that Foynes must be used as an emergency alternate. All arrangements with Prestwick will be handled by Air Commodore Thornton.

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10. Destination of PAA Plane and Alternate Destinations.

The intended destination of the Pan American aircraft is Lock Erne in North Ireland. In case of necessity one of the following alternates may be used in order of priority:

- (1) Lock Ryan,
- (2) Islay
- (3) Oban
- (4) Pembroke
- (5) Plymouth
- (6) Foynes

The last named will be used only in extreme emergency and in the event that none of the others are available. Horta, Azores, will be used as an alternate as a last resort. PAA will arrange for swell forecasts from Horta.

11. Flight from Lock Erne to England.

Arrangements have been made with Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal to have the Pan American aircraft met at Lock Erne and for the party to be transported from Lock Erne to London by British aircraft.

12. Return to United States.

Arrangements for the return flight to the United States will be under control of the R.A.F. or the British Air Ferry Command which will issue instructions to the Pan American Airways through Colonel H. A. Craig, member of the party.

13. Delay in Departure from Baltimore.

In case of delays in departure from Baltimore, accommodations will be available in the Lord Baltimore Hotel. If the delay is to be prolonged, instructions will be obtained from the senior members of the party.

DISTRIBUTION:

The President	2 Copies
The Secretary of War	1 Copy
Each member of party	2 Copies
The Deputy Chief of Staff	1 Copy
Chief of Operations Division	2 Copies
Chief of Naval Operations	2 Copies
General Chaney	3 Copies
Air Commodore Thornton	1 Copy
Col. Craig - for PAA	1 Copy
(to be used on board only)	

- 3 -

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
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spear*

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE



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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: JAN 20 1972

c4-5390

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Signature: *RHP*

Memo for the President:


This is a corrected copy of Admiral Starb's study on "Courses open to us" - which the C.N.O. asked me to substitute for the one Secy. Kwon gave to the President about ten days ago.

Respy,  
*A. G. Cunningham*

~~SECRET~~

U.S. ARMY

ISSUE No



BASE	GROUND		AIR		TOTAL	
	O.	E.M.	O.	E.M.	O.	E.M.
(1) GREENLAND-----	19	387	16	331	35	718
(2) ICELAND-----	721	13,771	56	490	777	14,261
(3) NORTH IRELAND-----	534	10,463	0	0	534	10,463
(4) LONDON, ENGLAND-----	376	333	48	15	424	348
(5) NEWFOUNDLAND-----	NA	NA	NA	NA	187	2,168
(6) BERMUDA-----	111	2,259	5	88	116	2,347
(7) PUERTO RICO-----	952	16,055	554	6,090	1,506	22,145
(8) ST. THOMAS-----	25	495	0	0	25	495
(9) ST. CROIX-----	6	163	0	4	6	167
(10) ANTIGUA-----	23	473	21	259	44	732
(11) ST. LUCIA-----	12	247	15	172	27	419
Arrived 3-10-42-----	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	196
(12) TRINIDAD-----	163	2,837	62	1,697	225	4,534
(13) BRITISH GUIANA-----	18	271	16	188	34	459
(14) SURINAM-----	30	627	30	312	60	939
(15) VENEZUELA-----	12	277	0	0	12	277
(16) CURACAO-----	57	1,111	0	0	57	1,111
(17) ARUBA-----	46	1,018	0	0	46	1,018
(18) JAMAICA-----	17	268	1	24	18	292

NA - Figures not available  
 \* - Sailing strength

March 31, 1942

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

Last December, in a conference with you, it was agreed that it was within our economic potential to produce completed munitions, war facilities and military construction to the value of \$40 billions in calendar year 1942 and \$60 billions in 1943. We feel certain that these are feasible goals although, at the time when they were set, many doubted that they were attainable. At that time, the production schedules for all items, extended at peak, represented commitments amounting only to \$27 billions for 1942 and \$34 billions for 1943. Thus there was, according to our calculations, margin for additional requirements amounting to approximately \$13 billions for 1942, and \$26 billions for 1943.

The specific objectives which you set for airplanes, tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and merchant shipping were accomplishable within the margin between the then existing production programs and the production possibilities of this Nation.

Since that date the programs which have been formulated by the Army, the Navy, and the Maritime Commission have expanded far beyond the \$40 billion and \$60 billion estimates. As these programs now stand, they represent munitions and war construction outlays totaling some \$62 billions for 1942 and \$110 billions for 1943.

The War Department has advised me that it is submitting recommendations to you for the modification of certain of the specific objectives which you have set which would permit the production of armored cars, self-propelled artillery weapons and other arms necessary to provide a balanced equipment for the Army. As you realize, I do not feel qualified to pass on the relative urgency of weapons desired by the Army. However, I have examined the production possibilities and must report that, in my judgment, it will not be possible to provide all of the items set forth in your list of objectives, and at the same time produce everything else now called for under the programs of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and Defense Aid, which would call for the total outlays of \$62 and \$110 billions as stated above.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

It is of critical importance that the Board should have a clear mandate of the items that are to be procured under a maximum economic effort. If requirements are defined short of our utmost potential our planning will, of necessity, fall short of providing for a complete mobilization of our resources. If requirements are set of a dimension far beyond attainment, we shall find ourselves with overexpanded facilities for which there are insufficient raw materials, with many finished items and components for which necessary complements are missing, and with general economic confusion and dislocation.

I should feel myself negligent in duty if I did not point out that we are at an impasse in our production planning, in that we still are without definition of a full list of requirements that are consistent with what we have defined as, and still believe to be, practicable overall goals.

Under these circumstances, I feel that I must come to you for instruction upon what is clearly a matter of major policy.

Respectfully,

Donald M. Nelson

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

SMay:jr

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

*Boyd*

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES IN 1942

~~SECRET~~

*PSF  
Safe  
Marshall*

(Based on the Army's "18 ships per month Program" as augmented by the needs of recent commitments.)

TABLE I - - Present Commitments

	Present or Enroute Mar. 31, 1942	Projected Garrisons	Balance to Move	Scheduled				
				April	May	June	July	August
North Atlantic	18,520	25,640	7,120	12,000	800	360	350	350
Ireland or U.K.	11,770			16,000				
Caribbean	92,200	113,730	21,530	8,000	8,000	3,780	1,750	
Alaska	31,450	41,900	10,450	4,000	4,000	2,450		
Hawaii	79,000	119,430	40,430	13,000	16,000	11,430		
S.W. Pacific (Less P.I.)	67,190	149,190	82,000	39,890	21,000	11,000	10,110	
China India Burma	7,470	14,300	6,830				6,830	
	307,600	464,190	166,360	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350

TABLE II

Troop Ship Capability to Reinforce U.K.  
(Combat Loaded Ships Not Included)

	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Troop Capacity Scheduled (including British ships)	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350				
Troop Capacity Required	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350				
Balance Available for Movements (Troops) to U.K.	-	-	-	8,300	27,800	41,400	64,700	65,000	65,000
British Ships		Beginning September				22,000	22,000	22,000	22,000
Total Troops in U.K. (Cumulative)	11,800	27,800	27,800	36,100	63,900	127,300	214,000	301,000	388,000

TABLE III

Cargo Ship Capability to Reinforce U.K.

(Assuming 18 per month for Army plus needs of recent commitments)

	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Cargo Ships Available	175	243	249	254	238	256	275	293	312
Cargo Ships Required									
Backlog	12	12	12	12	12				
Maintenances	91	127	143	151	156	170	179	190	204
Initial Movements (Table I)	72	104	94	91	62	44	34	30	-
Total	175	243	249	254	230	214	213	220	204
Balance Available for Movements to U.K.	0	0	0	0	8	42	62	73	108
Total Troops in U.K. (Cumulative)	11,800	27,800	27,800	27,800	36,800	85,600	120,000	166,800	254,800

\*Includes maintenance for Table I plus that required for August to December reinforcements to U.K.

Table III indicates that cargo shipping is the limiting factor.

The full capacity of available troop ships can be supported if 14 cargo ships per month, additional, are provided beginning in July, 1942.

If two-thirds of the combat loaded transports with their supporting cargo ships (AK's), are made available the first of September, an additional 15,000 troops per month can be moved to the U.K., making a total of 448,000 troops in the U.K. by the end of 1942 (Table II), and of 314,800 troops (Table III).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Transportation Division  
Services of Supply  
April 1, 1942

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DOD W.M. 8200.9 (8/27/08)

PSF safe: Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

A detailed examination of production schedules and possibilities indicates that material progress has been made in attaining production rates for 1942 which will meet the objectives which you have established for tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and machine guns. However, there is a serious deficiency in the production rates for armored cars, self-propelled mounts for artillery weapons and artillery weapons required to equip a balanced military force. The requisite increase in productive capacity to meet these deficiencies has been discussed with the War Production Board and Mr. Nelson has advised us that it will be impossible to meet the deficiency in these items from available productive capacity and at the same time provide all of the items set forth in your list of objectives.

A joint committee representing the United States and the United Kingdom has developed the requirements for those nations, the U.S.S.R. and other Defense Aid in tanks, armored cars and self-propelled artillery for the remainder of the calendar year and for 1943. The aggregate requirements for 1942 call for 46,523 units which may be considered of tank type and which include 24,703 tanks, 8,940 armored cars, and 12,880 self-propelled mounts for artillery weapons. The production of these 46,523 units is proposed as the goal for 1942 in lieu of the 45,000 tanks which now represents this goal.

We are also faced with a serious deficiency in artillery weapons which can be overcome only through a modification of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun program. The proposed modification would provide for the production of 17,400 anti-aircraft, 25,300 anti-tank, and 9,682 field pieces, an increase of 11,682 over the objective now established for 20,000 anti-aircraft, and 20,700 anti-tank guns.


No modification is recommended in the machine gun objectives nor at this time in the objectives established for 1943 since the peak production rates to be reached this year will suffice to meet the objectives established for 1943 unless military requirements should make further recommendations appear desirable.

Three charts are attached hereto which provide additional information with respect to the proposed shift in production. Chart number one gives, in comparable units, the objectives as now established and the proposed modification. Chart number two lists the requirements recommended by the U.S.-U.K. Tank Committee. Chart number three presents, graphically, the proposed conversion of productive capacity to meet balanced requirements.

The proposed modification does not represent a decrease in production. However, it would result in a substantial reduction in the requirements for certain critical materials such as steel plate, which is also needed in the shipping and Naval programs. It would meet all requests on hand or now foreseen for tanks and, at the same time, would provide the equipment for a balanced military force. It would strengthen our offensive power as it would increase the fire power which could be developed on the battlefront.

In view of the above reasons, the modification proposed herein is recommended for your favorable consideration.

Faithfully yours,

  
Chief of Staff.

Incls.:  
Three Charts

APPROVED:

April 1942.

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.


OFFICE OF  
DONALD M. NELSON  
CHAIRMAN

May 7, 1942

Dear Miss Tully:

I am returning herewith the President's file of material sent him by the Chief of Staff, and transmitted to me under date of April 2. I believe you will want this material for your own files.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. M. Nelson".

Donald M. Nelson

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Attachment

1942

PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVE

TANKS	
LIGHT	19,500
MEDIUM	25,000
HEAVY	500
<hr/>	
TOTAL TANKS	45,000
<hr/>	
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS	
	20,000
<hr/>	
ANTI-TANK GUNS	
	20,700
<hr/>	
TOTAL AA and AT GUNS	40,700

MODIFICATION RECOMMENDED

TANKS	
LIGHT	10,588
MEDIUM	14,000
HEAVY	115
	<hr/>
	24,703
<hr/>	
ARMORED CARS	
LIGHT	6,000
MEDIUM	1,940
HEAVY	1,000
	<hr/>
	8,940
<hr/>	
SELF-PROPELLED MOUNTS	
FOR { 37 & 40mm. AA GUNS S.P.	3,100
{ 37mm. AT GUNS S.P.	2,539
{ 3" or 57mm. AT GUNS S.P.	7,241
	<hr/>
	12,880
<hr/>	
TOTAL TANKS and TANK TYPE	46,523
<hr/>	
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS	
90mm.	2,800
37 & 40mm.	14,600 (a)
	<hr/>
	17,400
<hr/>	
ANTI-TANK GUNS	
37mm.	17,000 (b)
3" or 57mm.	8,300 (c)
	<hr/>
	25,300
<hr/>	
TOTAL AA and AT GUNS	42,700
<hr/>	
WHEELED and SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY	
75mm. HOW. PK. and S.P.	3,050
105mm. HOW. WH. and S.P.	5,817
155mm. HOW and 4.5" GUN.	815
	<hr/>
	9,682
<hr/>	
TOTAL GUNS	52,382

(a) INCLUDES 3,100 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.  
 (b) INCLUDES 2,539 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.  
 (c) INCLUDES 7,241 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

**REQUIREMENTS 1942 AND 1943**  
**TANKS, ARMORED CARS, SELF PROPELLED MOUNTS**  
EMBODIES RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. AND U.K. TANK COMMITTEES  
ADJUSTED FOR BALANCED PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES


ITEM	1942								1943								REMARKS
	N E I	L A	CHINA	RUSSIA	U K	U S	TOTAL ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS	PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES	L A	CHINA	RUSSIA	U K	U S	TOTAL ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS	PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES		
LIGHT TANKS	50	322	180	4,000	3,500	2,534	10,586	19,500	280	180	6,000	1,750	9,734	17,944	20,000	200 A MONTH PRODUCTION OBJECTIVE.  TOTAL REQUIREMENTS REDUCED IN 1942 FROM 20,553 TO 14,000 TO PROVIDE CHASSIS FOR SELF PROPELLED MOUNTS. MADE IN 1943. U.K. SENDS RUSSIA 3,750 IN 1942, 4,500 IN 1943.	
TANK, AERO T-9			270		500		770			270		500		770			
MEDIUM TANKS		85		4,038	5,777	4,100	14,000	25,000	85		6,000	14,493	14,600	35,178	50,000		
ASSAULT TANKS												8,500		8,500			
HEAVY TANKS						115	115	500							5,000		
ARMORED CAR, HEAVY						1,000	1,000	600				1,700		1,700			
ARMORED CAR, MEDIUM		26			750	1,611	1,937	3,000	26				4,819	4,845			
ARMORED CAR, LIGHT (SUB TANK T-9)							11,070	11,070					13,576	13,576			
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 37mm AT				300	112	2,127	2,539	2,539			1,300	43	6,906	8,241			
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 40mm					2,500	600		3,100			11,000	1,000		12,000	PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS.		
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 3" AND 57mm				600	1,300	1,212	7,241	7,241			2,600	1,500	70,387	8,001	PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS.		
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 105mm				500	1,100	1,182	2,782	2,782			500	720	3,257	4,477	PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS.		

BRITISH PRODUCTION 1942 & 1943		
ITEM	EXPECTED 1942	EXPECTED 1943
LIGHT TANKS, AIR	NIL	NIL
LIGHT TANKS, OTHER	250	1,000
CRUISERS, MEDIUM	4,795 (INCLUDES 450 MK VIII)	9,322 (INCLUDES 2,217 MK VII) (INCLUDES 7,000 MK VIII)
ASSAULT TANKS	6,170	6,738 (INCLUDES ONLY 408 HEAVY MK VIII)
HEAVY TANKS		
LIGHT ARMORED CARS		
MEDIUM ARMORED CARS	3,000	3,500
HEAVY ARMORED CARS	NIL	NIL
SELF PROPELLED AT GUNS 6 PDR OR 57mm	NIL	NIL
25 PDR ON T 32 OR EQUIVALENT	100	NIL
3" GUN ON MOTOR CARRIAGE T 35	NIL	NIL

# RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS IN PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES

*Safeguard Marshall*  
CHART NO. 3

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION TO MEET PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES AND ADDITIONAL ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FOR OTHER MAJOR ITEMS OF PROGRAM QUANTITIES REQUIRED FOR A BALANCED PROGRAM		PRODUCTION IN EXCESS OF BALANCED PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS		CONVERSION OF EXCESS PRODUCTION TO PROVIDE A BALANCED PROGRAM	ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION TO PROVIDE BALANCED REQUIREMENTS BY DEC 31, 1943	RECOMMENDED PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE BALANCED PROGRAMS SHOWN IN COLUMNS 3 & 4		REMARKS
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	CALENDAR YEAR 1942	CALENDAR YEARS 1942 & 1943	1942	1943	(7)
LIGHT TANKS 18,500								
10,588	5,551	10,588			28,532	10,588	17,944	
MEDIUM TANKS 25,000								
14,000	11,000	14,000			49,176	14,000	35,176	
HEAVY TANKS 500								
115		115			115	115	115	
90mm A.A. 5,400								
2,800	2,600	2,800			6,600	2,800	5,800	
37 & 40mm A.A. 14,600								
9,800	4,800	9,800 (a)			38,400 (a)	9,800	28,600	(a) Includes 3,100 S.P. Mounts for 40mm Guns A.A. (b) Includes 15,100 S.P. Mounts for 40mm Guns A.A.
37mm AT 17,000								
17,000		17,000 (c)			47,000 (c)	17,000	30,000	(c) Includes 2539 S.P. Mounts (d) Includes 10,788 S.P. Mounts
3" or 37mm AT 12,000								
3700	8,300	8,300 (e)	3700		26,900 (f)	8,300	18,600	(e) Includes 7241 S.P. Mounts (f) Includes 15,250 S.P. Mounts
CAL. 30 MG. 275,000								
275,000		275,000			605,000	275,000	330,000	
CAL. 50 MG. 125,000								
125,000		125,000			295,000	125,000	170,000	
75mm HOW SP. 1,839								
312	1,527	1,839			5,723			
75mm How. FLD. 0								
0		0			310	3,050	5,886	
75mm PK. 1213								
258	955	1,213			2,903			
105mm HOW WHEELED 3035								
		3035			7,299			
105mm HOW SP. 2782								
912	1,870	2,782			7,259	5,817	14,558	
4.5" GUN 365								
100	265	365			818	365	450	
155mm HOW M.I. 843								
150	693	450	393		2,127	450	1,680	
CAR ARMORED HV 1,000								
600	400	1,000			2,700			
CAR ARMORED MED 1,940								
1,940		1,940			6,784	14,010	34,330	
CAR ARMORED LT. 5,070								
5,000	5,070	6,000	5,070		24,826			
ASSAULT TANKS 0								
0		0			6,500	0	6,500	
SERVO TANKS T-9 770								
770		770			3,170	770	2,400	
S.P. MOUNT 37mm AT 2,539								
2,539		2,539			10,788	2,539	8,249	
S.P. MOUNT 40mm 3,100								
3,100		3,100			19,100	3,100	12,000	




ESTIMATED PRODUCTION IN OTHER MAJOR ITEMS

}

April 3, 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is the message that General  
Marshall referred to at lunch today.



J.R. Deane,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Secretary, General Staff.

~~SECRET~~

*File Box*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

March 31, 1942

From AUSTRALIA  
To IMMEDIATE GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL

NR 56 April First

In order to relieve the blockade pressure in at endeavor to permit passage of supplies from Cebu to Corregidor I prepared prior to my departure delayed plans for an air attack of B rpt baker one leven bombers from here to Mindano and thence to Mission destination. I am now preparing its prompt execution, reurad nine six six. This effort is a critical one due to the lack of Air Force available here. I have only twelve serviceable B one sevens, many of which are approaching exhaustion. I believe there is a fair hope for blockade runners from the U S to reach destination if they approach by the route north of Luzon. Their speed will give them an excellent chance to get through as the enemy is concentrating his patrols on the routes from Visayan waters and the entrance to Manila Bay is not yet mined by the enemy. I believe also that the supplies on Bataan will last beyond the date of April 15th. I am in addition diverting submarines sufficient for the purpose to ferry food supplies from the Southern Phillippine Islands to Corregidor. The supply should be ample for maintenance for an indefinite time. When I left on March 11th it was my estimate that serious shortage would not develop at the earliest before May 1st, allowing sufficient time for arrival of blockade runners from the U S. It is of course possible that with my departure the rigor of application of conservation may have relaxed.

I am utterly opposed, under any circumstances or conditions, to the ultimate capitulation of this command as visualized in General Wainwrights radio. If it is to be destroyed it should be upon the actual field of battle taking full toll from the enemy. To this end I had long ago prepared a comprehensive plan to endeavor to cut a way out if food or ammunition failed. This plan contemplated an ostentatious artillery preparation on the left by the first Corps as a feint and a sudden surprise attack on the right by the second Corps. This movement to be made in conjunction with the full tank strength and with the maximum artillery concentration with heavy guns run forward under cover of darkness the night before so that their fire would reach and cover an infantry advance as far as possible toward the Dinaluphan dash Olongapo rpt

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May 8, 1978

By RHP, NARS Date

MAR 28 1973

OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.

31

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

## INCOMING MESSAGE

Dinalupahan dash Olongapo Road; this road to be seized and the Second Corps to thrust with all speed and force due West taking the enemys Subic rpt Subic Bay positions in reverse simultaneously with a frontal attack by the First Corps. If successful, the supplies seized at this base might well rectify the situation. This would permit them to operate in Central Luzon where food supplies could be obtained and where they could still protect Bataan and the Northern approaches to Corregidor. If the movement is not successful and our forces defeated many increments thereof after inflicting important losses upon the enemy could escape through the Zambales rpt Zambales Mountains and continue guerilla warfare in conjunction with forces now operating in the north. Simultaneously aggressive action within their capabilities would be launched by both the Visayan force and the Mindanao Force. I had not informed General Wainwright of this plan as I feared it might tend to shake his morale and determination. I shall however, in view of his radio to you, I inform him thereof in the near future. I would be very glad if you believe it advisable to attempt myself to rejoin this command temporarily and take charge of this movement. The pressure on this situation could be immeasurably relieved if a naval task force with its own air protection could make some kind of threat in that general direction. The long series of disasters in the Pacific Theatre can be traced basically to one cause: the unopposed control of the sea lanes by the Japanese. Until this condition is remedied these disasters will continue. Line of communications control is fundamental either on land or sea. Enemy control has been complete up to the present time. I know how desperately you are pressed for reinforcements and supplies in all areas and I do not repeat not intend to harras you by requisitions that cannot be accomplished. It would however tend to relieve the dangers here if without delay a small force of say nine B repeat Baker one seven bombers could immediately made available instead awaiting the normal flow as now anticipated. Please inform me as soon as possible of any modifications you may desire in the plan I have outlined. Several days ago I informed General Wainwright about the contemplated air attack but will not rpt not convey further instructions until I hear from you.

I have complete and instantaneous communication with General Wainwright and all the forces in the Phillipine Islands and I believe that greater rapidity of action and more complete coordination of command can be achieved if he routes his communications except for routine administration matters through my head quarters rather than direct to the war department and essential in his operations reports for he not only reports

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (3)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

[REDACTED] COPY No.

By RHP, NARS THE [REDACTED] MAR 28 1973  
[REDACTED] AND EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

Thence here to me. This is not/direct to you but also paraphrases them to me. I have no rpt no doubt that not only efficiency but speed will be accomplished if a clear channel of communications be established from Wainwright to MacArthur to Washington.

I am still operating under my old designation as Commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and will continue to do so until I receive your directive with reference to the Southwest Pacific Area.

My relationships with the Australian authorities are of the utmost cordiality and they are adopting without reservation all suggestions I make. Their forces are being reorganized and regrouped and every possible step within the means available is being taken to place this area in a posture of secure defense.

MacArthur

CM-IN-0013 (4/1/42)

Action Copy: WPD

Info. Copies: G-2  
SOS  
CGAAF  
TAG  
File

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

[REDACTED]

COPY No.

*Safe i Navy*

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

**TOP SECRET**

April 4, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

By **RT**, NARS Date APR 5 1973

Subject: Galapagos - Permanent United States Air Base,  
and Pan-American Wild-Life Park.

Vice-Admiral Horne and Lieutenant-General Andrews and other senior Army and Navy officers with whom I have discussed the subject are strongly of the opinion that under no circumstances should our government relinquish our air base in the Galapagos upon the termination of the war ("Free Men's War" or "War of Free Men"?). The reasons are crystal clear -- in this new era of aviation, the Galapagos are the veritable keystone of the outer defenses in the Pacific of the Panama Canal.

This objective should be achieved without doing violence to the Good Neighbor Policy. If at any time in the near future conditions should develop under which we could purchase the entire Archipelago or make a long term lease for our air bases or bases, we should not hesitate to seize the opportunity. But in view of existing political conditions in Ecuador and the troublesome traditions that have grown up concerning this issue in that country, it is likely that a new formula will have to be found that does not appear to involve a permanent surrender of sovereignty to us.

The Liberal, pro-American administration of Dr. Carlos Arroyo Del Rio, President of Ecuador since 1940, is under severe criticism from the Conservative party, which numbers among its strongest supporters the Clergy, and Falangists, and other elements of varying degrees of pro-Axis sympathies. The President is charged with surrender of Ecuador's territory and future greatness in his acceptance of the terms of the Rio settlement of the Peruvian border dispute. He is also being charged with making a secret surrender of Ecuadorean sovereignty in granting us military bases in Ecuadorean territory. His Foreign Minister (a Conservative), Dr. Tobar Donoso, has just tendered his resignation.

~~SECRET~~

At the same time the Ecuadorean Army is reported to be ready to install the Superior Commander of National Defense Forces, Colonel Ricardo Astudillo, as Dictator. Although trained in Rome, Colonel Astudillo is considered to be pro-American; he certainly is the "man on horse-back" in Ecuador today.

So at the moment conditions are not propitious for negotiating a new treaty on the Galapagos. For this reason I did not attempt to talk with President Arroyo Del Rio during my one day visit to Quito in mid-March. But I did discuss the subject with our Ambassador there, Mr. Boaz Long, and with the President's closest personal and political adviser, Senator Caton Cardenas, who is well and favorably known to me as a man of sound judgment and great discretion. I carefully explained to Senator Cardenas your long standing interest in the Galapagos and the unique fauna and flora found there and how your interests had been enhanced by your visit in the "Houston" four years ago. I further outlined in very general terms the idea you have for making the Galapagos into an International Park for the preservation and perpetuation of wild-life.

I ventured to suggest two ways by which this might be done:

- A) By outright sale of the Galapagos to the United States, and then our creating a Pan-American Board of Trustees to govern the Archipelago in the interests of science but under the protection of the United States.
- B) By an agreement between Ecuador and the United States under which Ecuador created the Pan-American Board of Trustees and technical sovereignty remained in the name of Ecuador, but the United States would pay the costs of administration, and we would police the Archipelago from a base leased to us for a long term of years.

I made it explicitly clear that you had no idea of exerting any pressure to persuade Ecuador to take any course of action that was not entirely welcome to the government of Ecuador itself, that our government did not seek additional territory anywhere, that we would scrupulously observe the sovereignty of

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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every Republic in the Western Hemisphere, but at the same time your mind would be very receptive to any suggestions originating in Ecuador's government that would lead to formal negotiations to find ways and means of putting into effect the plan you cherished.


Senator Cardenas expressed his personal belief that the President would be enthusiastically in favor of Plan B above, but that it would not be politically wise for him to initiate negotiations until after the Congressional elections in August of this year.

I asked Senator Cardenas to write me by mid-April as to the President's re-actions, and I told him that I had informed our Ambassador, Mr. Boaz Long, of what I was telling him and therefore it would be quite proper for the President to talk directly with Mr. Long on the subject if he desired further information. And I further told the Senator that if President Arroyo Del Rio did not want to talk to anyone at this time about this matter, his disinclination would be understood and his wishes respected.

In closing, I expressed to Senator Cardenas your sincere regret that the laws of Ecuador made it impossible for Dr. Arroyo Del Rio to visit you officially at the White House.

In order to strengthen the hands of the present Administration in Ecuador, it would seem to be prudent for us to give further financial assistance to Ecuador at the earliest opportunity. I understand that a Lend-Lease agreement is ready for signature, but our aid should extend to the broader fields of economic rehabilitation on a comprehensive scale to include agriculture, industry, mining, and, particularly, extensive road-building.

Respectfully,

  
Paul F. Foster,  
Commander, U.S.N.R.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS APR 5 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

*PSF  
Safe File  
Marshall  
File  
Bof*

April 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is an extract of a message sent  
by General Marshall to General Stilwell April 3, 1942:

-----

Wheeler relieved as Chief of Iranian Mission  
and remains assigned to Stilwell's Command as  
Commanding General SOS India, Burma and China.  
Shingler replaces Wheeler as Chief Iranian Mission.  
Stilwell will continue to control and supervise  
Lend Lease affairs for China. Iranian Mission  
Area remains the same except India is detached  
and placed under Stilwell. Karachi Base will  
continue to afford assistance to North African  
and Iranian Missions as is now being done.

-----

*J. R. Deane*

J. R. DEANE,  
Colonel, General Staff,  
Secretary, General Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~



*Marshall*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
GENERAL McNARNEY

I think I told General  
Marshall to send the enclosed.  
If it has not gone, will you  
and Admiral King prepare the  
gist of it and send it?

F. D. R.


Also enclosed letter to the  
President, dated April 5, 1942,  
from Dr. Evatt, enclosing memo-  
randum of suggestions regarding  
establishment of machinery for  
the allocation of munitions, and  
also memo covering joint opinion  
of Generals MacArthur and Brett  
and the Australian Chiefs of  
Staff regarding the danger which  
threatens Australis.

P.S. Please return enclosures for  
my files.

C O P Y

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1942.

  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral King and I have gone over very carefully the proposals of the Australian Government relative to organization and command in the Pacific Theater. While the general subject of strategic theaters of operation is being considered this afternoon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, King and I agree that a reply to certain of the Australian proposals need not, and should not, be delayed since they concern operationsl control in the Pacific. Accordingly, we suggest a message by you to the Prime Minister substantially in accordance with the attached draft.

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL  
CHIEF OF STAFF

O. K.

F. D. R.

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\ JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date **FEB 19 1974**

  
Anticipating general direction by the United States of operations in the Pacific Theater, which is the theater generally east of the meridian of Singapore, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate establishing a Southwest Pacific Area, south of the Equator and west of longitude 160° - 165° E., to include Australia, the Netherlands East Indies less Sumatra, plus Philippines, New Guinea, Bismarcks, and Solomons, and a South Pacific Area, to include all east of above Southwest Pacific Area and south of Equator, extending Eastward generally to longitude 110° W.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider each of these to be an integrated strategic area.

The Southwest Pacific Area, under Army unity of command, has to do initially with the defense of the land mass of Australia and ancillary islands in the approaches from the northwest and north; it eventually becomes a springboard for offensive operations to the northwest.

The South Pacific Area, under Navy unity of command, has to do primarily with protection and maintenance of lines of communication with Australia and the Far East, and while linked with the Southwest Pacific Area, it must be set up as a distinct strategic entity. New Zealand is located in the South Pacific Area, that is, the lines-of-communication area, because of strategic considerations involving naval bases.

With respect to the Australian proposals on control in the Pacific Theater, the following must be said:- Unquestionably the Australian Government

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

representatives must have a definite voice in the higher direction of the operations in that theater. This is equally true of the representatives of New Zealand, The Netherlands, Free France, and China. Army, Navy, and Air representatives of these countries should by all means be available to advise and consult with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, as it is impossible to conduct military operations through such a large group, the executive power for the conduct of these operations should rest with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President, as Commander-in-Chief. Proposals of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made to the President as U. S. Commander-in-Chief, are subject to review by him from the standpoint of higher political considerations and to reference by him to the Pacific War Council when necessary. The interests of the nations whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved in these military operations are further safeguarded by the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its forces for any project which it considers inadvisable.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

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
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
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Gymnast Operations.

After our conversation with you Wednesday we have had our staffs re-examine the Gymnast project as a possible plan for the employment of U.S. forces against the Axis powers in the summer and fall of 1942. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing the Gymnast plan as compared to other operations, particularly 1942 emergency Bolero operations, lead to the conclusion that the occupation of Northwest Africa this summer should not be attempted. The attached discussion presents our joint views on this subject.

  
Chief of Staff.

  
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and  
Chief of Naval Operations.

1 Incl.  
Memo for Pres. on subject.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Gymnast Operation.

General.

From only one base, the United Kingdom, can the power of the combined British and United States air effort be exerted in such a way as to strike directly at Germany. Plans are now being implemented, as rapidly as sea transportation and the availability of trained air units permit, to build up a strong air striking force in the United Kingdom. Operations by ground forces, with adequate equipment, can only be successfully carried out against the west coast of Europe, in areas within range of aircraft based in the U.K. with adequate aircraft, and in other areas if sufficient carrier-borne aviation is available. In areas beyond the range of land-based aircraft, strong carrier-borne aviation is essential for the support of landing operations until a strong land based air force has been established. This applies particularly to Northwest Africa because, even though the French may be willing to cooperate fully, there always exists the definite threat that Axis aircraft now based in the Mediterranean area would move rapidly into Spanish and North African bases, from which they could operate against Casablanca, in such strength that carrier-borne aviation is unlikely to be able to be sufficiently effective during the time required to establish adequate land-based aviation.

The urgency of engaging U.S. Army forces in combat to support the Russian effort in 1942 is evident. If we can spare from other theaters the necessary means to execute Gymnast, particularly such as combat loading vessels, carriers, aircraft, and antiaircraft, other more advantageous operations would be feasible - for example, one against the Brest Peninsula, which we have wished to include in "emergency" Bolero but have been unable to mount due to lack of landing craft, air coverage, etc.

The initiation of Gymnast would mean the creation of another theatre with all the "overhead" involved. It will almost surely develop the need to reduce the 1942 Bolero effort, either initially in order to mount Gymnast adequately or later, when likely difficulties will render necessary a choice between supporting either Gymnast or Bolero, as means will not be available to do both. To carry out Gymnast in 1942, involves consequences of far-reaching importance. The problem of adequate naval escorts, and effective naval air support during the landing and until Army Air Forces are firmly established on land bases, is a critical factor. The U.S.-U.K. line of sea communications must be kept open regardless of the direction of allied strategic effort. This task, absorbing about the entire strength of the Allied Navies available in the Atlantic for this type of duty, is

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E  
JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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aggravated by the growing submarine menace and by the ever present threat of hostile capital ships in the North Atlantic. This plan would require use of naval escorts now engaged in escorting vessels to outlying stations all over the world. The result of thinning out of resources of this kind may bring disaster in the North Atlantic, or convoys to every theater will have to lie in ports for such long periods awaiting proper escort that our already inadequate resources will not be able to meet minimum requirements.

PLAN. The plan Gymnast calls for the occupation of Northwest Africa with a force of 220,000 U.S. troops comprising 6 divisions and 24 squadrons of planes supported by the Navy, including three aircraft carriers with a total of 210 planes, 66 of which are to be Army Pursuit planes. Having secured a landing at Casablanca, Northern French Morocco will be seized. Spanish Morocco, Northern Algiers and Tunisia must be occupied in order to block an Axis threat against those areas. Control can then be extended over all North Africa and the Atlantic shipping lanes along the Northwest Coast of Africa protected.

French cooperation and Spanish neutrality are essential to the successful outcome of the expedition. In this connection, an agent of the State Department in reporting on a recent conversation with Weygand stated, "The General definitely rejects any idea of a landing in North Africa. He considers the morale of a large part of the French troops of North Africa so poor that an American landing here would be met with general apathy if not direct hostility. Because of such a probable attitude in North Africa, Weygand considers that the prospect of Frenchmen fighting Americans should be avoided at any cost."

At the time of execution of this plan the disposition of Axis ground and air forces must be such as to eliminate any possibility of major air or ground units of the Axis operating against the landing forces during the early stages of the venture. A recent report from the Vice Counsel at Casablanca, through the U.S. Naval Attache at Tangier, indicates that the Germans have already made plans to meet a U.S. invasion of Northwest Africa. This report states: "They (Germans) are assembling the materials for 3 armored divisions in Spanish Morocco. They already have one armored division there. I have heard from another very reliable source (A) that they have some 300 tanks there and from a good but not so sure source (B) that they already have 700 tanks there.

"They would also prepare at least 500 Stuka bombers in Spanish Morocco. (Source A above reports there are already some 200-300 Stukas and some 58 Messerschmitts, 110 in Spanish Morocco.) They have already prepared all maintenance supplies such as spare parts, oil, gasoline, bombs, machine gun ammunition and technical personnel for the plans prescribed.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By **[REDACTED]**, Date **FEB 19 1974**

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"They have also collected a large quantity of fast motor launches, both on the coast of Spain and in the Canary Islands, as it is their plan to attack from Spanish Morocco and the French Moroccan coast simultaneously. My source (A) mentioned above, told me only 2 days ago, there were some 250 to 300 fast launches collected on the coast of Spain.

"Once they were certain that the Americans were coming, they would start their drive with the 3 motorized divisions which they believe to be sufficient to help overcome any French resistance and follow up the drive and occupy the ground taken with 10 Spanish divisions plus the landing parties from the motor launches. They give themselves four days to accomplish their plan, leaving them four to get ready for our troops".

CONVOYS. Continued use of British Middle East shipping which provides a lift for approximately 40,000 men would probably meet transportation requirements in so far as personnel is concerned without material effect on 1943 Bolero. Utilization of this transportation prior to October, 1942, would seriously affect the flow of vital reinforcements to the Middle East and India, now of greatly increased importance because of the reverses in Libya. The diversion of sufficient cargo shipping from the U.K.-Middle East run to support this plan would reduce the flow of supplies from the U.K. below the minimum required to maintain the forces now in the Middle East. At the same time, the diversion of these cargo ships would result in the reduction of British imports by approximately one-half million tons over the 6 months period involved.

The U.S., by employing every available escort vessel in the Atlantic, could not establish a new escort route without either serious effect on the movement of ships to the U.K. and elsewhere in the Atlantic, or the transfer of escorting ships from the Pacific. To make full use of port capacity two escort groups would be required constantly for at least six months. Even by reducing shipments to the Middle East to bare maintenance requirements the British could not furnish at most, more than one-half the necessary convoy protection. If, however, they furnish full escort (2) it would require a heavy reduction in the North Atlantic shipping. Due to lack of means British convoys to the Middle East and India do not receive the escort protection provided troop convoys from the U.S. to the United Kingdom. The British convoy methods are on an arc system; from the U.K. to Freetown; from Freetown to the Cape of Good Hope; and from there to the Middle East. Naval escorts rarely leave their assigned areas, meeting convoys by prearranged direction. In a recent case, a single British cruiser escorted a convoy of 40,000 troops through the U.K.-Freetown arc. Such a method would be unacceptable for the escort of American troops to Northwest Africa. In

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
BY: [REDACTED], NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

[REDACTED]

event of a Russian collapse and the elimination of Russian shipments, the resultant threat to the Middle East would require a maximum of British shipping and escorts to block a probable Axis advance into that theater.

CARRIERS, COMBAT LOADED CRAFT, ETC. The provision of carriers to provide necessary air support for the operation will seriously weaken carrier strength in other areas. Of the 3 first line aircraft carriers considered the minimum necessary for the operation, only 1 is now available in the Atlantic. Two small converted aircraft carriers will become available during the summer. The original Gymnast plan, developed by the Army and Navy in collaboration with the British, required a minimum carrier capacity of 226 airplanes during the landing stage. Only 8 of the necessary 15 combat loaded transports are now in the Atlantic and 4 more will be available by September (others are in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific). At least 5 and probably 6 of these vessels with their crews will be required for the training of landing craft personnel for 1943 Bolero. If the air force tentatively set up for the Middle East is diverted to this project, it would not be of sufficient strength until December, 1942. The necessary antiaircraft regiments would not finish their training prior to October, 1942.

PORT CAPACITY. Casablanca is the only Atlantic port of Northwest Africa which can accommodate ships of any size. Although the harbor will accommodate 43 vessels, only about 12 can be unloaded at one time. It is estimated that the equipment and supplies for 40,000 troops can be unloaded in 1 month. Due to the limitation of the port and the necessity of providing maintenance supplies for the steadily increasing force ashore the number of troops that can be handled will steadily decrease. To land the entire force would consume at least 6 months. Other small ports will of necessity have to be developed to accelerate the movement.

CONCLUSION. Plans are continuously under study for an African operation should the situation require it. However, it appears that this operation should not be undertaken in the present situation.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E  
JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

April 13, 1942

To: GENERAL MARSHALL

War Dept. No 305

The President to General Marshall. Delighted your message to McNarney. All quiet here. I am telling McNarney to continue all preparations.

Please put Hopkins to bed and keep him there under 24 hours guard by Army or Marine Corps. Ask the king for additional assistance if required on this job.

Signed Roosevelt

McNarney

ORIG: SGS

INFO. COPY: AG  
FILE  
OPD

CM-OUT-2345 (4/13/42)

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DDO DIA. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

ASF  
Safe  
Marshall

Box 111

April 13, 1942.

**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY:**

Dear McNarney:

The President has asked me to give you the below message to be sent to General Marshall:

"Delighted your message to McNarney. All quiet here. I am telling McNarney to continue all preparations.

"Please put Hopkins to bed and keep him there under twenty-four hour guard by Army or Marine Corps. Ask the King for additional assistance if required on this job.

ROOSEVELT"

E.M.W.

AMDI 7  
filed 13/620p  
RET

~~SECRET~~

CSWD  
April 13, 1942  
RET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

No 2387 April 13th, 1942

From: London  
To: Milid

No 2387 April 13th, 1942

Returned Monday morning from weekend at Chequers which included conversations with British Chiefs of Staff, Lord Mountbatten, General Paget, Oliver Lyttelton, A V Alexander, Lord Leathers, Lord Churwell and others. It appears that our proposal will be accepted in principle but relative to avoidance of further dispersions particularly of planes such acceptance will have to be considerably and continuously bolstered by firmness of our stand. I am endeavoring to secure clear commitments as to means to be made available for the preparations and building up from now on of the forces and material necessary to carry out our purpose. Virtually every one agrees with us in principle but many if not most hold reservations regarding this or that. Hopkins and I will be present at full cabinet meeting tonight and with defensive committee of the cabinet tomorrow night. I dine with Cigs and leading army officials tonight, attend Chief of Staff meeting tomorrow morning, lunch with King and Queen informally Wednesday and I understand that Prime Minister is arranging dinner for us with the King and the Chiefs of Staff. I leave London Wednesday night by rail with Prime Minister for Salisbury plains to spend day there witnessing various demonstrations and troop organizations probably will proceed to Portsmouth that night with Pa spending Thursday morning in the General vicinity. I hope thereafter to get under way to North Ireland for review of troops and to leave for home probably from vicinity of Prestwick. What is the degree of urgency for my return to Washington? I assume that you are keeping Secretary of War informed my cables. I have hesitated to predict outcome of negotiations and Hopkins has been communicating with President Direct on the

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DOD WML 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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# INCOMING MESSAGE

From London To Milid No 2387 Page two

subject. From Marshall to McNarney. Part two. Have received following message: "United Office professional Workers CIO Philadelphia. Pledge fullest support immediate opening second European front " second message from Social Service Employees Union Company Philadelphia: " Pledge every effort behind opening Western front now" Please have suitable acknowledgment prepared in War Department and dispatched.

McClure

Action Copy: SGS  
Info. Copy: File

CM-IN-3457 (4/13/42) PM 3:21

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

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