MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto are three radiograms just received, two from General Marshall giving his plans and the other from General MacArthur, which is self-explanatory.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incls.
3 Radiograms.
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: American Embassy London
To: Milid

No. 2411, April 15th, 1942

To assist Air Ministry in construction of airfields and construction on airdromes, they desire that 7 Battalions of Aviation Engineers and 7 Engineer Regiments, General Service, fully equipped for performance these tasks, should be sent to England earliest practicable date. They state that such special labor and machinery is entirely lacking for this purpose. From General Marshall for Gen McNarney.

General Service Regiments would be additional to the 3 Regiments indicated in your cable number 20 as earmarked for Chaney. Chaney states that he will require approximately 5 additional General Service Regiments during next few months. His total requirement of 8 General Service Regiments in England should be accorded a higher priority than the 7 Regiments requested above. The 7 Battalions of Aviation Engineers would be from the 10 Battalions requested by Chaney in his 978. Advise whether Air Ministry's request can be met furnishing proposed schedule on arrival.

I leave tonight with PM for Salisbury Plain to witness demonstrations Thursday returning that night.
We plan to leave here Friday afternoon for Londonderry by plane reviewing US troops Saturday AM and proceeding to Stanraer Scotland from where we hope to depart that evening on flight home.

McClure

Radio 978 is CM-IN-0680.
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: London
To: Milid

No. 2412, April 15, 1942

Last night at 10 Hopkins and I met with Defense Committee of Cabinet PM presiding. Our proposal was formally accepted after oral presentation by me and by Hopkins followed by general comments by members and Chief of Staff PMQPMPM in impressive pronouncement declared a complete agreement and a deep appreciation of the purpose and time of our visit. He stated he would communicate the sense of their agreement and their intention of going ahead immediately and energetically with all preliminary preparations to the President today. Their pressing worry is over naval situation in Indian Ocean. Gen Marshall to Secretary of War. Lunched with King and Queen today and dine with King tonight at 10 Downing Street. Leave later by train with PM for Salisbury Plain for demonstrations tomorrow. Hopkins remaining near here for rest at Harrimans Place. We plan to leave for home Saturday morning.

McClure

Action Copy: SGS
Info. Copies: AG
FILE
OPD
S/W

CH-IN-3939 (4/15/42) PM 2:52

RECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

COPY No. 8

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Australia
To: Adjutant General

No. Ag 277, April 15, 1942

On April 13 and 14 a flight of 3 B-17's and 10 B-24's, under the personal command of Brigadier General Ralph Royce, attacked the enemy in the Philippines at Nichols Field, Batangas, Cebu and Davao with the following results: At Nichols, destruction of hangars and damage to runways; at Davao, 1 bomber destroyed and several damaged, 3 transports hit 1 probably sunk, 3 seaplanes damaged; shot down, 1 troop concentration dispersed, 3 docks and warehouses damaged; at Cebu, 3 transports sunk, 2 others hit and several close misses, shot down 3 planes, damaged several on the ground, and damaged docks; at Batangas, 1 freighter sunk. 1 of our planes was lost but the crew was saved.

MacArthur

*Come (macrtfronnes). Service is being made.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: AG
LOG
FILE
A-2
SGS
CGAAF
G-2
JIC
ONI
Maj. Hammond
BPR

DECLASSIFIED
R/O 11552, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) of (23)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP: Dated Data: MAR 28 1973

CH-IN-3922 (4/15/42) 1:53 PM

COPY No. 22

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto are two radiograms received from General Marshall. One is addressed to you personally and he directed that the other radiogram be sent to you also.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incls.
2 Radiograms from General Marshall.
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: London
To: Milid

No. 2432, April 18, 1942

Information contained in War Department message number 320 concerning planes for India; President's cable number 133 to Hopkins same subject and my message to McNarney indicating result of conference with Portal, have been shown to the former naval person. The last provides details for a basis of mutual agreement which has been incorporated in a message number 2419 to McNarney which he is directed to attach to this message to you. For the President from General Marshall.

I communicated to the Secretary of War favorable result of final interview with Defense Cabinet Wednesday night and assume that he transmitted this information to you.

Yesterday (Thursday) while Harry rested in country with Harriman specifically in pursuance of your instructions to me, I attended extensive military demonstration. The former naval person took me in his train to Salisbury Plains for an all day demonstration of weapon firing, infantry assault with supporting weapons, armored brigade attack with artillery support, parachute and glider operation of airborne division; a walk through inspection of tank brigade and a formal review in my honor by the Grenadier Guards.

I will see former naval person this morning (Friday). Harry and I leave this afternoon for Londonderry to review U. S. Troops in Ireland tomorrow, thence Saturday afternoon to Stranraes for departure.
that evening by Clipper. Route in accordance with weather, probably via Bermuda. Admiral Pound joins us at Stranraer.

I think our trip has been successful.

McClure

Action Copy: SGS
Info. Copies: FILE
OPD
ORD (Col. Gailey)
CM-IN-4790 (4/18/42) 9:22 AM
URGENT

From: London,
To: G-2

No. 2419, April 17th, 1942,

Air Ministry agrees to loan repeat loan from British allocations of up to 10 Liberator and 24 B-25 aircraft to bring U.S. Bombardment Squadrons in India up to full strength with U.S. crews. Do this.

From Marshall to McNarney. With regard to Pursuit aircraft Air Ministry feels that they should be taking greatest risks in Middle East if Kitty Hawks now allotted to that theatre are used for any other purpose. The use of Ranger they believe is of great value in speeding up deliveries to India and Middle East and request use of any vacant space in the ship for as many Kitty Hawks as possible for the Middle East.

So far as practicable use Ranger for transport of U.S. Pursuit for India to Africa and give all additional space to British Kitty Hawks for Middle East. U.S. to provide ferry pilots for same.

A copy of this message is to be attached to the message from me to the President which will follow this shortly today.

McClure.

Action Copy: SGS
Info. Copies: TAG

FILE

OPD

CGAAF

G-2

CM-IN-4481 (4/17/42) 8:03 AM

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Our Memorandum from General Sikorski.

I agree with your general observations concerning the points made by General Sikorski in his memorandum of April 13. With respect to his concrete suggestions concerning a general staff, he has proposed in almost exact detail, matters that we have been considering through two agencies. One of these is Colonel Donovan's organization, the other is the Psychological Warfare Committee of the War and Navy Departments. Without exhaustive study of the matter it would appear that the representative Staff Officers of the occupied countries could well be integrated with the machinery we have already instituted for the briefs General Sikorski outlines. This will be especially true if you should approve the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that recommends the placing of Colonel Donovan's committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the meantime I will have your memorandum, together with General Sikorski's suggestions, studied more thoroughly by the General Staff.

Chief of Staff.

Signature: (Earl L. Sperry)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While on an inspection trip in the South I was notified of your directive to increase the U.S. ground forces in Australia by 25,000 (to a total of 100,000) and the air combat force by 100 planes (to a total of 1,000 planes). The Staff has been studying the matter pending my return, but without delaying to receive their detailed report on the tonnage involvements, I wish to bring certain phases of the matter to your immediate attention.

My mission to England was greatly embarrassed by the fact that we could propose only 2 1/2 divisions to participate in a cross-channel operation by September 15th. Not only was this a very small force but in order to gather even that number of troops in the British Isles we were forced to set the late date of mid-September. The British, particularly the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, were strongly opposed to attempting such an operation so late in the season.

Your directive of May 1st relating to the ground forces in Australia would make it impossible for us to contribute more than a division and a half for the cross-channel operation, with an added deficiency in supporting troops.

There is another serious factor involved in the increase of U.S. ground troops in Australia, and that is the length of the turn-around for the ships involved. In order to increase the Australian set-up by approximately a division and a half, we would be forced to eliminate from our troop concentration in the British Isles double the number of troops, or three divisions. This would virtually eliminate the United States from ground participation in a 1942 offensive on the Continent, and would seriously limit our participation in early April, 1943.

The reduction in combat planes, so far as it concerns the cross-channel operation, is not quite so serious, although it would be unfortunate, in my opinion. What I do feel, though, in this

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, DASS Date: MAR 28 1973
matter of calculated hazards, is that rather than cut the allotment of U.S. combat planes to Great Britain for the purpose of increasing our strength in Australia, I would be inclined to give the increase to Hawaii and Alaska to protect our own interests, where we are definitely accepting a certain hazard under the present schedule of allocations. Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons urgently recommend 200 heavy bombers for Hawaii. We have 32 there at the present time. Admiral King desires 96 (an operating strength of 70) to which we are committed by December next.

Also, Admiral King has not accepted our present allotment of planes to the line of communications between Hawaii and Australia, and I am rather in agreement with General DeWitt as to the hazard we are accepting in Alaska and the Aleutians with the small aviation force available in that region. However, I have preferred to accept that hazard in order to stage an early offensive on the Continent of Europe. But I would recommend against continuing that hazard on the basis of reducing our planned effort from the British Islands in favor of an increase in Australia.

To sum up, I believe that the most important consideration is the gathering of the largest force of ground troops possible in the British Isles at the earliest possible date. The 2 1/2 divisions mentioned in the original memorandum I submitted to the British authorities was all that we could firmly promise in the light of the conditions at the time. That number is insufficient and must be increased and I have been hopeful that some additional tonnage could be made available for this purpose. If instead the number is to be decreased by more than 50%, then our recent proposal to the British Government for 1942 has, in effect, largely been cancelled.

Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) and 5(E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Aircraft and Troops for Australia.

The President remarked at the meeting of the Pacific War Council held on April 29, 1942, that it was his desire that the total number of planes assigned to the U. S. Army in Australia be raised to one thousand, the distribution as to types being left to the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the President directed that I inform the Chiefs of Staff that it was his desire to have in Australia 100,000 troops in addition to the personnel of air forces required to maintain the plane program referred to in paragraph one of this memorandum.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I fully appreciate the needs set forth in the Chief of Staff's memorandum of April 27th in regard to transport planes for Russia, and the need for transport planes in Panama and in Alaska and in later operations in several other places.

But it does not make much sense to me, in view of these great needs not only in the future but at the present, merely to carry out the recommendation of these transport planes of U. S. commercial airlines by earmarking them for Army use.

Please let me know just how many U. S. commercial airline planes carrying passengers and carrying U. S. mail there are in the United States, together with their age, carrying capacity and radius.

The old expression "pigs is pigs" should be translated into the modern term "planes is planes".
No matter what planes are in civilian hands at the present time, they are available for Army and Navy use, and the Army and Navy say they are short of planes.

F. D. R.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Dear Harry:

In view of your intimate concern with this matter I thought it might be of interest to you to have a copy of the attached letter from the President, through Mr. Hoover.

E.B.

4/27/42
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transport airplanes for Russia.

Successful execution of the European invasion plan that I recently presented, in your name, to the authorities in London involves the employment of large numbers of highly trained parachutists and air-borne troops. Consequently the availability of transport planes becomes a question of the most critical importance, not only with respect to the operational phases of the plan but also as it affects the program of intensive training, which must begin immediately.

To supply transport planes to Russia at this time will directly endanger success of the invasion plan. In London I found that a principal reason for original British reluctance to agree to an invasion of Europe in 1942 was the fact, in their opinion, that essential materiel means could not be made available in time. They were especially concerned as to availability of landing craft and transport planes. Under this latter item my memorandum listed U.S. allocations of only 200 transport planes during the coming summer, with approximately an additional 200 to be in England by late fall. This number was wholly inadequate, but I was able to secure their acquiescence to the general plan by pointing out that, in addition to the approximately four hundred airplanes specifically promised, the United States possesses, in its commercial airlines, an immediately available reserve in this critical item.

The figures given to the British were calculated by charging against all planes allocated to the United States our firm commitments to other countries and our minimum requirements for other purposes. They did not involve an allotment for Russia since the War Department had previously reported that it was impracticable to include this item in the new protocol for Russia. The Army's minimum requirements, in exact figures, include 389 planes to arrive in England by late fall, 284 for the Ferry Command, 111 for training of parachute and air-borne troops, and 196 to supply and maintain air operations in Australia, Hawaii, the Caribbean and Alaska. To this total of 980 must be added a modest figure for attrition, making an aggregate requirement of 1150 transport planes. We have on hand 111, of which 57 are in the Far East and 54 are doing all the transport work in this hemisphere and providing only 10 for the training of 3,000 parachute troops. Immediate expansion in the training program is mandatory.
Without undertaking additional commitments and obligations, our total assets, including all U.S. allocations from new production, will leave us with a clear shortage of 379 transport airplanes. This exceeds the total number now operating on commercial lines by approximately 129.

I therefore submit two urgent recommendations:

First: That we undertake no commitment involving the provision of transport airplanes for Russia.

Second: That all transport planes of the U.S. Commercial airlines be immediately earmarked for Army use. They may be continued on their present status until required for military operations.

Quite obviously it is essential to keep up the flow of materiel resources to Russia. I believe we should strive to increase shipments in every practicable way and, subject to your approval, intend to increase the aggregate of such transfers to the maximum permitted by the availability of munitions and by possibilities in transportation. I have in mind, particularly, the hope of providing the Russians with greater strength in mechanized items. But the greatest service to Russia will be a landing on the European continent in 1942, and we must not jeopardize that operation or risk the sacrifice of the troops engaged by scattering the vital materiel required for what we know will be a hazardous undertaking.

I have not made a point of our serious lack of transport planes and parachute troops in Panama for the prompt suppression of revolutions or Fifth Column enterprises threatening the Canal, nor a similar and very serious lack of such planes in Alaska to meet the possibilities of isolated infiltrations in that vast region.

Chief of Staff.
May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL:
Chief of Staff

1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero". In regard to the first paragraph I did not issue any directive on May first regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground forces to a total of 100,000. I did ask if this could properly be done. I understand now that this is inadvisable at the present time and I wholly agree with you and Admiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to the South Pacific Theatre, it is my thought that all we should send there is a sufficient number of heavy and medium bombers and pursuit planes in order to maintain the present strength there at the maximum.

3. I do not want "Bolero" slowed down.

4. The success of raiding operations seems to be such that a large scale Japanese offensive against Australia or New Zealand can be prevented.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Subject: J.C.S. 48 - Defense of Island Bases in the Pacific.

1. In paragraph 5 of the memorandum from the Joint Planners forming a part of J.C.S. 48, the statement appears: "The Army members of the J.P.S. are reluctant to recommend any increase in aviation in the Pacific Area at this time due to the fact that any increase in this area means not only a corresponding decrease in the main effort but also an inordinate delay in its initiation." I agree that there must be no undue delay in the deployment of available forces in the main effort; but I am not in agreement with the recommendation that forces in the Pacific be kept at a bare minimum.

2. The PACIFIC Theater is an area for which the United States bears full strategic responsibility. The recent Japanese successes in BURMA, added to previous successes, leaves the Japanese free to choose any new line of action they see fit, including an attack in force on AUSTRALIA, on the AUSTRALIA-HAWAII line of communications, on HAWAII, or on ALASKA. Even now they are massing strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area beyond our range of observation.

3. The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in the Pacific. I am not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that theater are sufficient to "hold" against a determined attack in force by the Japanese, an attack which they can initiate very soon. The mounting of BOLERO must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific. I am convinced that the Japanese are not going to allow us to "hold" but are going to drive and drive hard.

4. The disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to hold the present position in the Pacific Areas are self-evident. We have already seen, in the Far East and in Burma, the results of being "spread out too thin"; we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

5. Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent - it must be faced now. Quite apart from any idea of future advance in this theater, we must see to it that we are actually able to maintain our present positions. We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theater to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific Theater, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us.

E. J. KING.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero."

1. The following issues have arisen involving conflicts between the requirements for the "Bolero" operation on the one hand and the Pacific theatre on the other:

a. Your directive of May 1st regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground troops to a total of 100,000.

b. A memorandum from Cominch, Admiral King, on May 4th stating a requirement of the following additional aircraft for the South Pacific theatre: 35 heavy and 83 medium bombers and 55 pursuit planes (i.e. a heavy group, a medium group plus 2 squadrons and one pursuit group (less 1 squadron). A 25 per cent increase in these figures is necessarily involved as a reserve.)

Another issue has been raised by a British request of May 4th for additional pursuit planes for the Middle East to enable them to retain an equivalent number of British planes in the United Kingdom.

2. With reference to your directive referred to in sub-paragraph a. above, I submitted a preliminary memorandum to you on May 4th, (copy attached) recommending against a further diversion of planes and shipping (for ground troops) to the Australian theatre. Admiral King, I believe, is in agreement with this view.

3. With reference to par. 1b above Admiral King's memorandum is attached hereto. (See also the attached chart.) In brief, he states that the Pacific theatre is an area for which the United States bears full strategic responsibility; that the Japanese are free to choose any new line of action they see fit, including an attack in force on Australia, on the Australia-Hawaii line of communication, on Hawaii, or on Alaska; and that the Japanese are now massing strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area. Admiral King further states: "The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in the Pacific." He is not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that theatre are
sufficient to hold against a determined attack by the Japanese. He states: "The mounting of BOLERO must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific." Admiral King calls attention to the disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to hold the present position in the Pacific; to the results of being "spread out too thin" in the Far East and Burma; and states that we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas. He further states: "Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent - it must be faced now." ** ** "We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theatre to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific theatre, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us."

4. The Army view follows. While I agree that we must hold in the Pacific, I do not concur that this is our "basic strategic plan." My view, and I understood it to be your decision prior to my visit to England, was that our major effort would be to concentrate immediately for offensive action against Germany from the British Islands. The most pressing need, in the opinion of the Army General Staff, is to sustain Russia as an active, effective participant in the war. That issue will probably be decided this summer or fall. Every possible effort, we think, must be made to draw off German forces from the Russian front. We believe that this may be done by combined British and American operations in Western Europe. Hence, the urgency of "Bolero." Only by a complete and whole-hearted acceptance by all concerned, British and American, and by the exertion of every practicable effort on the part of all, can "Bolero" have any chance of success. The increases in U.S. Army Air Force suggested for Australia and the South Pacific Islands, if executed this summer, would have the effect of postponing, by more than two months, the initiation of an American air offensive in Western Europe. The increase of U.S. ground forces to Australia would, in effect, eliminate the U.S. from participation in the most difficult and vital phase of "Bolero" the landing operation.

5. If the "Bolero" project is not to be our primary consideration, I would recommend its complete abandonment. We must remember that this operation for 1942 depends primarily upon British forces and not our own. They have far more at stake than do we and are accepting very grave hazards to which our own risks are not comparable. They have accepted the "Bolero" project with a firm understanding that it would be the primary objective of the United States. If such is not to be the case, the British should be formally notified that the recent Imperial Agreement must be canceled.
6. As far as Australia and the South Pacific area are concerned, it is impossible to make every point in the island chain impregnable to "any attack the Japanese are capable of launching." The enemy still retains the initiative and, because of his freedom of movement, is able to concentrate the bulk of his strength at any point of his own choosing. Moreover, our forces in the island garrisons throughout that region have no positive effect on the enemy, unless he chooses to attack them, except for heavy and medium bombers. Additional forces allotted there must come from those set up for "Bolero." All over the world we are striving now to meet our firm commitments in air equipment. Beyond this, new and urgent requests are constantly received for our air forces for the Middle East, India and Burma, and for additional strength in the British Isles. There is no reserve to draw on. The initial air forces set up for "Bolero" are still undergoing organization and training.

7. The specific point at issue between the Army and Navy is the allocation of approximately 215 Army combat planes to the South Pacific. Equally critical is the increase required to raise our forces in Australia to a strength in the air of 1,000 planes and on the ground to a total of 100,000 men. Both these questions are really only included parts of the broader one of whether or not we are now to decide that no further commitments will be made in U.S. air and ground forces where such commitments will reduce the strength of our concentration in England or postpone the time when we can undertake active operations there. I have not mentioned the hazard we are accepting in the Alaskan-Aleutian theatre now under threat.

8. I present this question to you as Commander-in-Chief, and request that you discuss the matter with Admiral King, General Arnold and me, and give us a formal directive for our future guidance.
May 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While on an inspection trip in the South I was notified of your directive to increase the U.S. ground forces in Australia by 25,000 (to a total of 100,000) and the air combat force by 100 planes (to a total of 1,000 planes). The Staff has been studying the matter pending my return, but without delaying to receive their detailed report on the tonnage involvements, I wish to bring certain phases of the matter to your immediate attention.

My mission to England was greatly embarrassed by the fact that we could propose only 2 1/2 divisions to participate in a cross-channel operation by September 15th. Not only was this a very small force but in order to gather even that number of troops in the British Isles we were forced to set the late date of mid-September. The British, particularly the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, were strongly opposed to attempting such an operation so late in the season.

Your directive of May 1st relating to the ground forces in Australia would make it impossible for us to contribute more than a division and a half for the cross-channel operation, with an added deficiency in supporting troops.

There is another serious factor involved in the increase of U.S. ground troops in Australia, and that is the length of the turn-around for the ships involved. In order to increase the Australian set-up by approximately a division and a half, we would be forced to eliminate from our troop concentration in the British Isles double the number of troops, or three divisions. This would virtually eliminate the United States from ground participation in a 1942 offensive on the Continent, and would seriously limit our participation in early April, 1943.

The reduction in combat planes, so far as it concerns the cross-channel operation, is not quite so serious, although it would be unfortunate, in my opinion. What I do feel, though, in this

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By Authority of

Army by The pers 7208/14
By Date...

matter of calculated hazards, is that rather than cut the allotment of U.S. combat planes to Great Britain for the purpose of increasing our strength in Australia, I would be inclined to give the increase to Hawaii and Alaska to protect our own interests, where we are definitely accepting a certain hazard under the present schedule of allocations. Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons urgently recommend 200 heavy bombers for Hawaii. We have 32 there at the present time. Admiral King desires 96 (an operating strength of 70) to which we are committed by December next.

Also, Admiral King has not accepted our present allotment of planes to the line of communications between Hawaii and Australia, and I am rather in agreement with General DeWitt as to the hazard we are accepting in Alaska and the Aleutians with the small aviation force available in that region. However, I have preferred to accept that hazard in order to stage an early offensive on the Continent of Europe. But I would recommend against continuing that hazard on the basis of reducing our planned effort from the British Islands in favor of an increase in Australia.

To sum up, I believe that the most important consideration is the gathering of the largest force of ground troops possible in the British Isles at the earliest possible date. The 2½ divisions mentioned in the original memorandum I submitted to the British authorities was all that we could firmly promise in the light of the conditions at the time. That number is insufficient and must be increased and I have been hopeful that some additional tonnage could be made available for this purpose. If instead the number is to be decreased by more than 50%, then our recent proposal to the British Government for 1942 has, in effect, largely been cancelled.

(Sgd) C. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER

SUMMATION OF PACIFIC THEATER

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Additional planned for in area:
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370 RAAF, RNZAF and NEI.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

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<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber (M)</td>
<td>Bomber (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber (L)</td>
<td>Bomber (L)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>Pursuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional to above:
- 210 USAAF Observation, Transport and Photo (Planned)
- 80 RAAF Pursuit, equipped and maintained from USAAF resources (Now Present)
- 45 NEI Medium Bombers (Now Present)
- 69 RAAF Miscellaneous Combat (Now Present; probably to be augmented)

In Australia at present there are 466 Pursuit.

**Note:** The President's Directive of May 1, 1942 would increase the above by 108 airplanes to a total of 1,000.

### South Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navy Proposal</th>
<th>Army Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operating</td>
<td>Operating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber (H)</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber (M)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomber (L)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional to above:
- 26 RNZAF Medium Bombers (Planned)
- 50 RNZAF Pursuit (Planned)

No Aircraft in NEW ZEALAND are included.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. H.

Will you check on this and speak to me about it?

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note:]

Grace:

Since this was written, the President has issued specific War Instructions to War Dept about this matter. Hence this can be filed. Yr. tr.

[Handwritten signature:]

FDR
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Analysis of Air Transportation Requirements for the war program

1. Referring to your Memorandum of May 5, to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff regarding transport airplane requirements for military operations of the United Nations, the following recommendations are submitted:

   a. That an immediate analysis be effected to determine the minimum requirements in transport aircraft to provide essential air transportation service required for the conduct of our war effort. This analysis will be based upon the premise:

      1. Domestic air carriers: That only personnel engaged directly in the prosecution of our war program will travel by commercially operated airplanes and that no cargo or mail will be carried except that required by our military services or in the production of supplies destined for the military service.

      2. American air carriers operating outside the United States: The transportation of personnel, cargo and mail will be limited to the requirements of the war program and to the requirements of our international policies.

   2. It is believed that such analysis will indicate the possibility of effecting a substantial reduction in the number of airplanes now operated by our airlines while retaining in this country a highly mobile group of transport aircraft that could be concentrated, in a few hours, for the movement of several thousand troops to any threatened area within the Western Hemisphere.

   3. With regard to your request as to the number of United States commercial airline airplanes, together with their age, carrying capacity and range, there is submitted herewith a tabulation giving that information.
4. It is desired to point out that:

a. Five TWA Stratoliners and four Pan American Clippers are operating under contract with the Air Force Ferrying Command.

b. All other Pan American Clippers are operationally controlled by the Navy.

c. Fifty four other types of airline transports are now operating in military transportation under contract with the Air Service Command for the movement of military cargo from factory and depot to Army activities within the Western Hemisphere.
## Schedule of Civil Transport Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number Owned</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>Seat Capacity</th>
<th>Cruising Range - Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>FAA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas DC-3</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing 314</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>247D</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed 10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5 years</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2 1/2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikorsky Sh-4A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Sh-2B</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Sh-3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin 130</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>331</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>397</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Cruising range is calculated without provision for reserve fuel; range given is on basis of exhaustion of fuel. Fuel available is calculated on the basis of normal tankage and upon fuel available to be carried with full passenger or cargo load.

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*Declassified*

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date: **MAR 28 1973**
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information is furnished concerning the location of aircraft detector installations in the Middle Atlantic Area:

1. The aircraft detector sets now operating in the Middle Atlantic Area are located at:

Montauk Point, New York
South Manor, New York
Twin Lights, New Jersey
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Bethany Beach, Delaware
Accomac, Virginia (Two Stations)
Cape Henry, Virginia (Two Stations)

These locations are shown on the attached map.

2. These stations are capable of detecting planes at distances up to one hundred (100) miles from the detector sites. With allowances for the time required to identify the planes and pass the information through the information center, they thus provide early warning information for alerting Washington at least twenty (20) minutes before the planes could reach the city.

1 Incl.
U.S. Map showing locations of aircraft detector sets.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A radio has just been received stating that General Stilwell and his party are expected to arrive in Imphal about May 21. Arrangements have been made for General Stilwell to meet with Generals Wavell and Alexander in Calcutta on May 23. It is expected that he will then leave for Chungking.

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A radiogram has just been received from General Gruber at New Delhi, stating that General Stilwell and his entire party arrived at Imphal on May 21st, and that all were well with minor exceptions.

Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59
Signature- [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has just been received from General DeWitt's headquarters, Western Defense Command.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

J. R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Encl.
From W.D.C.
12 June 1942 2024 GCT

Additional info attack on enemy ships Kiska Harbor eleven-12 June received Alaska Defense Command. Reference our special this date, Navy PBY's scored three bomb hits on a heavy cruiser, one bomb hit on gun boat and one bomb hit on destroyer in Kiska Harbor. In addition, one destroyer and one heavy cruiser on a westerly course outside of Kiska Harbor were bombed with little damage.Extent of damage to ships bombed inside harbor not reported.

Weckerling

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
CLASSIFIED
300 DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl I. Spencer
For the President:

Following just received

Memo for Mr. McIntyre:

Quote

UNQUOTE

McIntyre

GENERAL MARSHALL STATES YOUR GUEST JUST TALKED TO HIM STOP HE IS PESSIMISTIC REGARDING BOLERO AND INTERESTED IN AUGUST GYMNASIAND ANOTHER SIMILAR MOVEMENT IN NORWAY GC MARSHALL CHIEF OF STAFF

end

1230pm/d
Mr. President:
The enclosed paper has been read by me and by General Arnold, Mr. Marrone, Eisenhower and myself. We are in complete agreement with the Secretary of War.

Yours truly,
[Signature]
Dear Mr. President:

While your military advisers are working out the logistics of the problem which you presented to us on Wednesday, may I very briefly recall to your memory the sequence of events which led to and the background which surrounds this problem. I hope it may be helpful to you.

1. Up to the time when America entered the war, the British Empire had, by force of circumstances, been fighting a series of uphill defensive campaigns with insufficient resources and almost hopeless logistics. The entry of Japan into the war and the naval disasters at Pearl Harbor and the Malay Peninsula imposed new defensive campaigns in the theatres of the Far East.

2. After the discussions with Mr. Churchill's party here last December the need for a carefully planned offensive became very evident. Russia had successfully fought off the entire German Army for six months. Winter had begun and the shaken and battered German Army would be helpless to renew its offensive for nearly six months more. The one thing Hitler rightly dreaded was a second front. In establishing such a front lay the best hope of keeping the Russian Army in the war and thus ultimately defeating Hitler. To apply the
rapidly developing manpower and industrial strength of America promptly to the opening of such a front was manifestly the only way it could be accomplished.

3. But the effective application of America's strength required prompt, rapid and safe transportation overseas. The allied naval power controlled the seas by only a narrow margin. There was a dangerous and increasing shortage of commercial shipping. With one exception the Axis Powers controlled every feasible landing spot in Europe. By fortunate coincidence one of the shortest routes to Europe from America led through the only safe base not yet controlled by our enemies, the British Isles.

4. Out of these factors originated the Bolero plan. The British Isles constituted the one spot

(a) where we could safely and easily land our ground forces without the aid of carrier-based air cover.

(b) through which we could without the aid of ships fly both bomber and fighting planes from America to Europe.

(c) where we could safely and without interruption develop an adequate base for invading armies of great strength. Any other base in western Europe or northwest Africa could be obtained only by a risky attack and the long delay of development and fortification.

(d) where we could safely develop air superiority over our chief enemy in northern France and force him either to fight us on equal terms or leave a bridgehead to France undefended.

5. The psychological advantages of Bolero also were manifest. The menace of the establishment of American military power in the British Isles would be immediately evident to Hitler. It at once tended to
remove the possibility of a successful invasion of Britain, Hitler's chief and last weapon. It awoke in every German mind the recollections of 1917 and 1918.

6. A steady, rapid, and unrelenting prosecution of the Bolero plan was thus manifestly the surest road, first to the shaking of Hitler's anti-Russian campaign of '42, and second, to the ultimate defeat of his armies and the victorious termination of the war. Geographically and historically Bolero was the easiest road to the center of our chief enemy's heart. The base was sure. The water barrier of the Channel under the support of Britain-based air power is far easier than either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. The subsequent over-land route into Germany is easier than any alternate. Over the Low Countries has run the historic path of armies between Germany and France.

7. Since the Bolero plan was adopted, subsequent events have tended to facilitate our position and justify its wisdom.

a. The greatest danger to America's prosecution of the Bolero plan lay in the Pacific from Japan where our then inferiority in aircraft carriers subjected us to the dangers of enemy raids which might seriously cripple the vital airplane production upon which a prompt Bolero offensive primarily rests. The recent victory in the mid-Pacific has greatly alleviated that danger. Our rear in the west is now at least temporarily safe.
b. The psychological pressure of our preparation for Bolero is already becoming manifest. There are unmistakable signs of uneasiness in Germany as well as increasing unrest in the subject populations of France, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Norway. This restlessness patently is encouraged by the growing American threat to Germany.

8. Under these circumstances an immense burden of proof rests upon any proposition which may impose the slightest risk of weakening Bolero. Every day brings us further evidence of the great importance of unremittingly pressing forward that plan. When one is engaged in a tug of war, it is highly risky to spit on one's hands even for the purpose of getting a better grip. No new plan should even be whispered to friend or enemy unless it was so sure of immediate success and so manifestly helpful to Bolero that it could not possibly be taken as evidence of doubt or vacillation in the prosecution of Bolero. Enemies would be prompt to jump at one or the other of these conclusions.

9. While I have no intention of intruding on any discussion of logistics by the staff, one or two possible contingencies have occurred to me which would bear upon the wisdom of now embarking upon another trans-Atlantic expedition such as Gymnast.

a. Assume the worst contingency possible: Assume a prompt victory over Russia which left a large German force free for other enterprises. It is conceivable that Germany might then make a surprise attempt at the invasion of Britain. She
would have the force to attempt it. She may well have available the equipment for both an air-borne and water-borne invasion. One of our most reliable military attaches believes emphatically that this is her plan — a surprise air-borne invasion from beyond the German boundaries producing a confusion in Britain which would be immediately followed up by an invasion by sea. Our observers in Britain have frequently advised us of their concern as to the inadequacy of British defenses against such an attempt.

Obviously in case of such an attempt it would be imperative for us to push our forces into Britain at top speed and by means of shipping additional to that already allocated to the project. In case a large percentage of allied commercial shipping had been tied up with an expedition to Gymnast, such additional reinforcement of Britain would be impossible.

b. On the other hand, if German invasion of Russia is prolonged, even if it is slowly successful, the increasing involvement of Germany in the east tends to make increasingly easy an allied invasion into France and the acquisition of safe bases therein against Germany.

c. Thus German success against Russia, whether fast or slow, would seem to make requisite not a diversion from Bolero but an increase in Bolero as rapidly as possible.
d. Furthermore, Bolero is the one overseas project which brings no further strain upon our aircraft carrier forces. Gymnast would necessarily bring such a strain and risk. It could not fail to diminish the superiority over Japan which we now precariously hold in the Pacific.

10. To my mind Bolero in inception and in its present development is an essentially American project, brought into this war as the vitalizing contribution of our fresh and unwearied leaders and forces. My own view is that it would be a mistake to hazard it by any expeditionary additional/proposal as yet brought to my attention.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: North Atlantic Air Ferry Route.

The expansion of the present North Atlantic Air Ferry Route to include additional airfields in the Hudson Bay, Baffin Island, and Labrador areas will materially contribute to the facilities along this general route for rapidly placing military aircraft in the European Theater.

By reducing the time during which aircraft are in transit, this air route will in fact increase the fighting strength of our air arm which should be a vital contribution to our planned operations in that theater.

I strongly recommend that this project be pushed as vigorously as possible within the limitations imposed by shipping and construction material.

The Board in taking this action merely implemented the recommendations of the War Department.

(Sgd) G. C. Marshall

Chief of Staff.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (6/24/58)

Date: 4-3-59

Signature: [Signature]

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Relief of Troops in Outlying Bases.

The relief of troops stationed at outlying bases is a very definite problem under war conditions and one to which the War Department has given a great deal of thought. Definite limitations have been imposed by shipping which have materially curtailed the desired rotation of military personnel in remote bases.

The present plans contemplate the relief of these personnel involved, as shown below. These plans are, of a necessity, applicable only insofar as they conform to the military requirements existing at the time.

On small island and remote bases in active theaters, relief will be effected at the end of an eight months' tour. In the case of Canton, Christmas, and Fanning Islands, personnel will be replaced from the Hawaiian Islands. Military personnel at Ascension and in Liberia will be transferred to other theaters or returned to the United States at the end of a like period. At Bora Bora, Tongatabu and other small Pacific bases, men will be transferred to neighboring major islands, or possibly to New Zealand, for rest periods.

On the island bases in inactive theaters, such as Bermuda and small Caribbean islands, relief will be made at the end of two years of service unless pertinent considerations make earlier relief advisable.

At large island bases where climatic and living conditions are most severe, as in Iceland and Efate, troops will be relieved by transfer to more healthful stations as soon as practicable, and subsequently with a view to effecting rotation within a period of not to exceed one year.

In theaters with large land areas, troops will be moved from one area to another to provide relief, as required, although they will be retained in the theater for the duration of the War. In general, this will apply to the Australian, Hawaiian, and Alaskan Theaters.
The Army Air Forces have a plan under study to return about 5% of their personnel in active overseas stations to the United States each month, with a view to providing combat-experienced men for instructional purposes in new units.

In Australia a system is at present in effect whereby Air Force personnel are moved from urban areas (Sydney), to advanced areas (Townsville), to combat fields (Port Moresby), and thence back to urban rest areas to start the cycle anew within five or six months.

In brief, I can assure you that every effort is being made, and will continue to be made, to provide for an effective rotation of personnel.
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Some time ago the Prime Minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British Navies were in close touch but that he was under the impression that there was not a similar intimate interchange between our two Armies. I wonder if you could take this up with General Dill and let me know.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

Some time ago the Prime Minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British Navies were in close touch but that he was under the impression that there was not a similar intimate interchange between our State Department and the Foreign Office. I wonder if you could take this up with the British Ambassador and let me know.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
H.L.H.

I think we should do something about this if it has not already been done.

F.D.R.
July 6, 1942

"Dorothy:

Mr. Hopkins has been holding this all this time. I assume that the question has been discussed since the letter was written and that this can be filed.

Lois
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.
My dear Mr. President,

One night when we talked late, you spoke of the importance of our cipher people getting into close contact with yours. I shall be very ready to put any expert you care to nominate in touch with my technicians. Ciphers for our two Navies have been and are continually a matter for frank discussion between our two Services. But diplomatic and military ciphers are of equal importance, and we appear to know nothing officially of your versions of these. Some time ago, however, our experts claimed to have discovered the system and constructed some tables used by your Diplomatic Corps. From the moment when we became allies, I gave instructions that this work should cease. However, danger of our enemies having achieved a measure of success cannot, I am advised, be dismissed.

I shall be grateful if you will handle this
matter entirely yourself, and if possible burn this letter when you have read it. The whole subject is secret in a degree which affects the safety of both our countries. The fewest possible people should know.

I take advantage of the Ambassador's homeward journey to send you this by his hand, to be delivered into yours personally.

With every good wish, my kindest regards. Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

Michael Merrick

The President of
The United States of America.
The President of the United States of America.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Presidential approval was given on March 13th to a directive proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which would authorize the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to evacuate to the mainland of the United States for internment in concentration camps Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands, either United States citizens or aliens, who were considered by appropriate authorities in the Islands to constitute a source of danger.

It has been found that this procedure is not feasible, as through application for a writ of habeas corpus any United States citizen can obtain release from custody. Consequently, agreement was reached by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that family groups of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated to the mainland for resettlement, rather than internment. Tentative arrangements have been made with the War Relocation Authority for the resettlement of up to fifteen thousand persons.

We now wish to recommend that the directive approved on March 13th, 1942, be rescinded, and that the following be substituted therefor:

"No United States citizen of any derivation whatsoever, either naturalized or native-born, now residing in Hawaii, and considered by appropriate authority in the Hawaiian Islands to constitute a source of danger to our national security, will be transferred to the continental United States for internment. Such individuals will be interned in the Hawaiian Islands under authority vested in the Military Governor. Further, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is authorized to evacu-
ate to the United States, for re-settlement in areas to be established by the War Relocation Authority, up to fifteen thousand persons, in family groups, from among the United States citizens of "Japanese ancestry who may be considered as potentially dangerous to national security."

Approval of the foregoing by the President is respectfully requested.

E. J. KING
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The situation in the Middle East.

Reports received from General Auchinleck through the British War Office indicate that a situation has developed in which the Germans are massing their means for an attack against the British center in order to gain complete control of the dominating observation of RUWEISAT RIDGE (see attached sketch). The Germans necessarily are weakening both of their flanks which will offer the British an opportunity to counter-attack in both the north and south.

Both sides are apparently weak in general reserves and any success gained by either will probably be the result of gaining surprise by a rapid shifting of troops. General Auchinleck summarizes his reports by indicating that local successes which the British have gained against Italian troops should have the effect of strengthening German doubts as to the value of Italian troops and further lowering the Italian morale. He felt that the Australians should have a good chance in their attack on the north flank since they were opposed mostly by Italians, and his only note of skepticism was in the fact that the Australians are not highly trained in open, mobile warfare and cannot undertake swift, wide movements.

General Auchinleck has ordered both of his Corps to press their attack from the north and the south in order to relieve pressure on the center. He also proposes to concentrate his air effort against the Axis drive in the center. He feels that the operations now in progress may be the climax of the whole battle.
Sketch Situation Libya
July 16-1942.

Mediterranean

Tell El' Ella

British 30th Corps

German Troops Massing in Center to gain this ridge
Ruweisat Ridge

British 13th Corps

Depression
MEMORANDUM TO GO WITH MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
DATED JULY 25, 1942, IN RELATION TO PROPOSALS IN MESSAGE
No. 625 FROM MARSHALL AND KING IN LONDON.

This memorandum from the Secretary of War is not worth replying to in detail -- because it is contradictory in terms and fails to meet the objective as of the Summer of 1942.

The situation at this time is as follows:

1. In the Pacific area Japanese forces have penetrated as far south as New Guinea and they are in occupation of the Netherlands' East Indies and Timor and the Malay States and Burma. In the North they are in possession of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Guam and Wake and three small Islands in the Western Aleutians. They seem to be making little progress westward or southward. The Battle of Midway has set them back at least for several months.

2. It seems unwise to attempt a major offensive in the Pacific area because of the time involved -- one to two years -- and the total lack of effect on Germany of such a major offensive. Success against Japan in one year or two years would not win the war if Germany puts Russia completely out of action, occupies the Near East and the Persian Gulf and starts down the west coast of Africa. On the other hand, helping Russia and Britain to contain Germany this Autumn and undertake an offensive in 1943 has a good chance of forcing Germany out of the war, in which case Japan could not conduct war in the Pacific alone for more than a few months.

The Secretary of War fails to realize the situation which prompted me to send Hopkins, Marshall and King to London to urge "Sledgehammer" or, failing that, some definite offensive, using American ground troops in 1942. They find that "Sledgehammer" is impracticable and, therefore, make the other proposal, with which the British agree.
The Secretary of War says in effect:

(a) "Sledgehammer" should not be abandoned.

(b) He offers no alternative for 1942.

(c) He agrees to further preparations for "Bolero" which is, however, one year off.

(d) He speaks vaguely of some kind of major operation in the Pacific area.

He, therefore, abandons any offensive by U. S. ground troops in the European or African Theatres in 1942 and would merely build up for a European offensive in 1943 and some kind of Pacific offensive at the same time. In this he gives, in effect, no help to Russian resistance in 1942.

F. D. R.
July 23, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

A couple of hours' reflection over the somber news which you gave me this morning has produced this summarized picture of the situation which we discussed:

1. When Churchill was here in June one thing that was deliberately agreed upon by him and all of us in our conference in your study was that we should all go ahead tentatively but with the utmost speed in reenforcing and preparing ourselves in the British Isles for a possible offensive until the middle of September.

2. That then the whole matter should be reconsidered in the light of the then situation with a view to determining what was possible.

3. The British have violated this program by suddenly confronting us ten days ago with a Cabinet decision two months before the agreed time and made without the light which the arrival of young, vigorous, forward-looking Americans in the British Isles might have shed upon the situation.

4. In view of the recognized fatigued and defeatist mental outlook of the British government, this violation of understanding was most serious and tended to destroy vital and fundamental possibilities. From what I have heard from many visiting witnesses to Great Britain, the impact of our arriving forces might have a revolutionary effect.
5. While the prosecution of other plans for 1942 will be taken up and studied vigorously under your directive, it seems to me very clear that the flow of men and munitions into Great Britain should go on with undiminished speed. It is just beginning to reach its full volume and that should not be checked. An ultimate Bolero is agreed upon by all hands and such an immediate and continuous flow is essential to insure a Bolero in 1943.

6. That being done, we may still see what we may see in September.

7. Furthermore, the British objections to Sledgehammer do not apply to enlarged air attacks upon Germany in 1942. On the contrary, such enlarged air attacks, engaged in by British and American air forces as promptly and as effectively as possible, may soon be our only method of helping Russia. The shipments which are now going over are most important to such a possibility.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

My views as to the proposals in Message 625

These proposals bear on their face the inevitable results of an attempt to compromise fundamentally opposed principles and policies. The U.S. has been seeking to establish a prompt offensive to ultimately destroy Hitler in Europe and in the meanwhile to keep Russia in the war. The U.K., while professing the same purpose, is equally if not more insistent upon a present attempt to preserve its empire in the Middle East. The result is as follows:

The message begins with an announcement of the British decision which has wrecked the American plan, evidently put there by the American delegates to explain their subsequent compromise.

First: Paragraph first is a statement of what has been saved from the American plan. Its provisions are sound and good so far as they go.

Second: Paragraph second states the extent of the contribution which can safely be made by the U.S. to the British aim of defending the Near East without weakening the American plan. This contribution was fully discussed when Mr. Churchill was here last and abandoned by the British because the contribution could not reach Egypt in time to be effective in the present fighting.
Third: Paragraph third represents an attempt to obey the
direction for an immediate offensive in the face of a Russian collapse
not based upon the sound logistics of the original American plan
(Sledgehammer and Bolero), which for lack of British cooperation has
had to be discarded.

Instead of being an actual offensive it states on
its face that it is the "definite acceptance of a defensive encircling line
of action for the continental European theater except as to air operations
and blockade".

Upon the American forces it deliberately proposes
the following diversion in the face of an assumed victorious Germany:

A. Isolated in the British Isles, a large American
force composed of our best combat troops deliberately trained
for offensive action, yet not large enough alone to assume such
an offensive in Europe and inhibited by lack of cooperation
against such an offensive.

B. In northwest Africa, a substantial American force
several hundred miles distant from its allies at Algiers. These
forces might conceivably be easily contained by relatively small
German forces advancing through the Iberian Peninsula and Spanish
Morocco just as 30,000 German troops under Rommel are now contain-
ing the entire British forces in Egypt and Syria.

These U.S. and U.K. forces, even if successfully
landed and united, would be unable
(1) to take an offensive against Germany in Europe,
(2) to protect the Persian oil supply at Basra,
(3) to prevent the juncture of Germany and Japan in the Middle East,
(4) or to perform any other function than
   (a) the establishment of air bases on the north African coast
   (b) to harass the Italian peninsula
   (c) to make a little more secure but not safely control the Mediterranean Sea.

C. Isolated in Australia, a substantial American force too small
   (1) to effectively strike at the extended line of Japan by an attack through the Javanese Archipelago
   (2) to thus protect the Persian oil fields and India
   (3) to regain Burma and establish effective bases in China

Fourth: The inevitable effect of this plan is thus
A. To secure to Germany the initiative in this war for an indefinite time and thus give her ample opportunity to consolidate her military and economic position.
B. To give the same opportunity to Japan in the Pacific area where Japan's effective consolidation would be even more securely accomplished than that of Germany due to the absence of any effective resistance from enslaved peoples.
Fifth: I suggest that the fundamental mistake of the proposals in paragraph third is this:

A. It is proposed that we wait until the collapse of Russia is practically certain.

B. It then proposes that we should take steps in the face of a victorious Germany which can no longer be effective to help Russia but which will dangerously weaken our own position vis-a-vis both Germany and Japan.

I believe this is a fundamental mistake. I believe that as we approach the time when Russia's defeat seems possible we must consolidate our own forces in as sound a position strategically as is possible. It should be a position from which ultimately they may launch an overwhelming attack against Germany if and when that time finally arrives. The only such place is the British Isles.

In the meanwhile they should strike offensively at Germany's partner Japan in a method which would not only eliminate the Japanese danger to us but be by far the most effective help to our allies as follows:

1. By check-mating Japan's attack against Iran and India.
2. By falling on Japan's back in Siberia.
3. By opening access to China through Burma.

The great advantage of the American plan of Bolero and Sledgehammer was that it, so far as it went, preserved these strategic opportunities.
To Hopkins Marshall and King.

Replying your telegram of 25 July and Marshall-King telegram No. 625 of 24 July proposals contained therein for 1942 - 1943 approved in principle details and time to be settled after conference with you, Marshall and King following your return.

Please inform British Chiefs of Staff it is my opinion Gymnast should be started with landing not later than October 30, 1942, and that plans to that end proceed at once.

Tell former Naval Personnel I am delighted that decision is made. We will go ahead full speed. I hope you can keep your plans.
PART II

In what circumstances would the Canal be really "out of service"? Could you tell me the exact figure for the cost of blockading the Canal? If so, we will then have a better idea of the cost of blockading the Canal. I gather that six months would be required to reopen the Canal after blockading it. Is this correct? If so, how long before the Canal could be re-opened?

John Bull estimates that six months would be required to reopen the Canal. Can you confirm this estimate?

PART III

The British have plans to block the Suez Canal at the point of passage through the Red Sea. Can you assure me that the Canal will be fully blocked? If not, can you give me an effective block of the Canal? This is essential.

John Bull states that six months would be required to reopen the Canal. Can you confirm this estimate?

PART IV

Operations against the Suez Canal will probably require the movement of British forces. I think that we need 48 hours more to judge the situation as it is now in order to have the maximum number of British forces and personnel available at this time. It would be impossible to keep them in reserve.

Do you think that we can make immediately that night favorable efforts to maintain the oil situation in the Middle East? The number of planes now available is the greatest number that can be maintained with American material and personnel available at this time. It would be impossible to keep them in reserve.

M. C. C. in the Middle East.

M. C. C. in the Middle East.
success of Russian defense in the north.

The probable strategic defense of the Allied flanks would

be by a group of forces also to be anchored on the

River, and to make a stand behind it. By this

strategy, the Allies could hold the line at

invested points, and the Allied

forces could be employed to

attack the enemy in this

direction.

The British forces now at sea could

be employed to

somewhere on the Allied

flanks.
Memorandum from General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to the President, July 30, 1942.
5. "Will you give me your judgment on kind of air and land forces in Syria that would tend to hold Turkey in line?"

To defend Syria and hold Turkey in line would require a sufficient force to defeat Rommel, approximately four armored divisions, two motorized divisions, and three infantry divisions, with about ten air groups. An open Mediterranean would permit very heavy reinforcements to Rommel, which eventually could be employed in this area, and this would necessitate an ever increasing expansion of the forces listed above - an expansion far beyond our capacity.

6. "What consideration should be given to strong defense of Basra or Black Sea area?"

Defense of the Black Sea area will necessarily depend on the Russians. The Basra area is of great importance. Its port facilities are limited. Further, the sea lines of communication to Basra are long and vulnerable, presenting an impracticable proposition for major military operations against strong enemy movement out of the Mediterranean. The forces that may be assembled in this area immediately from Egypt and now enroute to Egypt can fight a defensive and a delaying action over a considerable period of time provided (1) the Russian front does not collapse; and (2) all existing facilities and equipment in the Basra area are used. This would mean that Russian supply through this port would stop. A major effort in this region would bleed us white.

Chief of Staff.
Memorandum from General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, to the President, July 30, 1942.

Page 333
National Archives, World War II Records Division
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Attached is a draft of a proposed directive which has been concurred in by both General Marshall and Admiral King.

[Signature]

JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING


1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. You will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER, bearing in mind the vital urgency of sustaining Russia this year. This is of such great importance that grave risks are justified in order to accomplish it. If you consider that, with the most complete and wholehearted effort on the part of the British, SLEDGEHAMMER is possible of execution, you should strongly urge that preparations for it be pushed with the utmost vigor and that it be executed in case Russian collapse becomes imminent. The geographical objective of a cross-channel operation in 1942 is of vital importance, providing the great purpose of the operation can be achieved, i.e., the positive diversion of German air forces from the annihilation of Russia. SLEDGEHAMMER should be executed on the basis of our remaining in France, if that is in any way practicable.

3. If you are convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me. In that case my views as to our immediate and continued course of action are that we should continue our present plans and preparations for ROUNDUP, while carrying out planned activities and present commitments in other areas. We should proceed at top speed with ROUNDUP preparations, intensifying air attacks and making frequent and large-scale Commando raids. This action should be continued until it is evident that Russia can not, any longer, contain appreciable German forces. Material aid to Russia should continue with the bulk delivered through Basra, the northern convoys to Russia to be suspended.

4. You will, with the British authorities, investigate the courses of action open to us in the event of a Russian collapse. In this investigation, and in the recommendations you make as to the course to be pursued, you will be guided by the following principles:
a. Our aim must continue to be the complete defeat of the Axis powers. There can be no compromise on this point.

b. We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

c. Effective coordinated use of British and American forces should be sought.

d. Available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used. It is very important that U.S. ground troops are brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

e. Any course of action adopted should include support of an air offensive from the British Isles by strong U.S. air forces and the assurance of the security of that base for operations against Germany by U.S. ground reinforcements.

5. The subjects listed below are considered as appropriate for discussion with the British in arriving at our course of action in case of Russian collapse. Your discussion will not necessarily be restricted to these subjects. The United States will not be committed to a course of action to be followed in the event of Russian collapse without my specific approval.

a. A continental invasion in 1943. This course of action may be impracticable unless strong German forces are contained on the Russian front. However, it should be investigated.

b. All-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible.

c. Operations in the Middle East with U.S. air forces now planned, with such ground forces as can be reasonably sustained, while at the same time using the bulk of our strength against Japan. The purposes of the Middle East operation would be to secure the area; to protect vital oil resources and to cover the Russian flank (if any remains).

6. You will take note that the state of Russia in the spring of 1943 may be such as to make ROUNDUP impracticable, by reason of the resistance that Germany can then bring to bear in France. It is this possibility that emphasizes the urgent necessity to do SLEDGEHAMMER this year when it is certain that Germany's effort against Russia will afford the best opportunity that can be expected to do any part of BOLERO.
July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

1. O.K. (written)

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3. [Blank]

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U.S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.
4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason calls for it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U.S. troops to fight in 1942. It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.
(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.

(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following:

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

(9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. Unless some plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa, beginning in 1942, it is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1943 or in 1945 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

(10) Please remember three cardinal principles — speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This affords the immediate objective of U.S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942.

(11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADmirAL KING

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE -- JULY, 1942.

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(b) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.
(b) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

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(d) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

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10. Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This affects the immediate objective of U. S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942.

11. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
July 24, 1942.

FOR HOPKINS, MARSHALL AND KING

RE: YOURS OF JULY 23RD.

It seems to me from a common sense viewpoint that ROUNDUP is dependent on two very grave contingencies. First, concentration on ROUNDUP from now on and, therefore, abandonment of GYMNAST or any other new assignment of American troops in 1942. Second, the maintenance of resistance by Russia on Western Front without which ROUNDUP would be impracticable.

Therefore, if the American objective of putting ground forces into useful action in 1942 is maintained, ROUNDUP as planned must be abandoned as the primary objective at this time.

In its place, if we leave out of consideration Norway and Persian Gulf, we have the choice between GYMNAST and reinforcements to Egypt.

I still think that GYMNAST is preferable on the ground that because of relative distances we can obtain control of Mediterranean more quickly and more surely than if we decide on mere reinforcements in Near East.

I wish you would consider in relation to GYMNAST this plan which I spoke of before you left, namely, that the initial operations be wholly American, using British and American transport; that the American mission, after
securing bridgeheads and ports, be directed due east through Algiers and Tunis; that after the initial task is successfully completed, British ground troops and air, in relatively small number, use American controlled ports and move south in direction of Dakar such relatively sufficient forces as would be necessary to secure the bulge of Africa, including.

I think previous logistic figures of troops to be landed per month are much too low because transports need not be combat loaded if the initial expedition obtains control of ports.

For example, I see no reason why we cannot put 80,000 American troops and air into the initial operation, using many of our troops now in England and Ireland, together with expeditionary force from the United States.

Time is of the essence to prevent German air concentration as you indicate.

I should like to have you give favorable consideration to this problem with the purpose of accomplishing it if it possibly can be done.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1220, July 24, 1942.

W.C. Mott
Lieut., U.S.N.R.
Dorothy:

Do you have a copy of this in your files? It was sent from Hyde Park when we were up there. I find I have two copies. I think Grace probably had the original.

Lois
TELEGRAM

AUGUST 19, 1942

TO: GENERAL MARSHALL

COULD I HAVE TOMORROW BRIEF OUTLINE PLAN AND
LOGISTICS TORCH, INCLUDING AIR.

FURTHERMORE WILL YOU GIVE ME NUMBER AND TYPES
OF COMBAT PLANES IN VARIOUS THEATERS, INCLUDING
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, INDICATING WHETHER OR
NOT THE PLANES ARE READY FOR COMBAT. INCLUDE PLANES
ON THE WAY TO VARIOUS THEATERS.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following, regarding the detachment of 50 Rangers who participated in the Dieppe Commando operation, has just been received from General Eisenhower.

It appears from early reports that the American contingent in the Dieppe operation may have suffered extremely heavily. Almost the entire American contingent accompanied an assault force which by accident encountered an enemy coastal convoy. Apparently only remnants of this particular assaulting force escaped. Details are meagre and reports conflicting. I will keep you informed as to the details. General Truscott (the senior U. S. officer on duty with Lord Mountbatten's Commando Staff) has just returned but is unable to add much to the above.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff

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JOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl S. Spicer
August 21, 1942

THIS CAN BE FILED.

H.L.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I have read with interest the memo-
randum from General Vladislaw Sikorski
sent to me by you. In the main he is
right though perhaps he underestimates
the time required to establish the
second front in Europe. I think he is
correct in saying, as an illustration,
that one armored division of the allies
operating in Western Europe in 1942
is more effective than five such
divisions in 1943.

I think he overestimates the value
of insurrections in those countries
which have been conquered by Germany.

However, his thesis of a general
staff representing these countries is
worth considering. Such a staff could
not, of course, be led by an officer
of any one of the occupied countries.
I do not believe that a British officer
would be accepted by all of them as
readily as an American officer. Such
an organization need not be a general
staff at the outset. It might better
be called a planning unit under American leadership.

Do you think anything more need be done?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memorandum prepared by General Vladislaw Sikorski which he asked me to give you and which I think you will find interesting. This is an exact copy except for the captions which have been added in my office.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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DOC. 489.2 (9/27/68)

Date- JAN 16 1972
Signature-
MEMORANDUM

Subject: Study of European Operations.

Russian-German Situation

There is no doubt that in the nearest future Soviet Russia will have to face a new German offensive. The concentration of the German land forces seems to be drawing to its close. Divisions which had been transferred to western Europe for the winter months of 1941-1942 as well as the newly organized units have either already arrived or are on their way to the eastern front. The Germans will endeavor to crush the Soviet Union by means of operations carried out on a vast scale. It will most probably be their supreme offensive effort, and its result will bear upon the ultimate issue of the world conflict.

The Soviet Government are applying special tactics towards their Allies, whom they maintain in ignorance of their forces and possibilities. It, nevertheless, seems certain that, notwithstanding the great power of resistance of their peoples, the Soviet Government are considering not so much the prospect of a compromise with the Third Reich, as the possibility of a war crisis, if they were left to themselves in complete isolation at the approach of the spring campaign.

Alternative Results of Russian-German Situation

Under the above circumstances, it would appear correct to anticipate one of the following alternatives with regard to the final issue of the imminent developments on the eastern front:

1. Either Russia will successfully resist the German offensive, and, even in spite of further loss of territory, will occasion the further considerable wastage and exhaustion of the potential of the German armed forces. In this case, no matter how far the Red Armies would be pushed back, the final issue would be evident: Germany would be defeated.

2. Or the German offensive will be sufficiently powerful to threaten the complete destruction of the Soviet Army. In that case, Great Britain with the United States and their cooperating Allies would find themselves in 1943, or perhaps even in the late autumn of 1942, in the face of German forces sufficiently powerful to eliminate any possibility of an allied offensive action on the continent. A similar course of events would completely reverse the present dislocation of the German armed forces in Europe. The armored and motorized divisions from the eastern front as well as the major part of the Luftwaffe would take the place of the inferior divisions of the Landsturm, which are at the moment stationed in western Europe, and the second-rate units would be sent to occupy the conquered areas of Russia.
Conclusions as to Effect of the Above on Allied Operations

The conclusions are easily drawn and clear.

Should the first alternative arise, it would be necessary to take advantage, even at a great price, of the engagement of the whole German forces on the Russian front and the almost complete exposure in western Europe, in order to obtain a decisive issue by an offensive on the continent and by striking at the heart of Germany.

It would be necessary to commence the immediate realization of the conditions preliminary to this action, which would be started by the attainment of mastery in the air over western Europe and the detailed preparation of a landing.

The second alternative should be avoided at all costs. The defeat of Russia would put in doubt the final issue of the war, or at any rate prolong for many years the armed struggle, which would have to be calculated to exhaust the enemy and leave no possibility to seek an issue by an open battle on the continent. Even in the anticipation of a successful German offensive in the East, the only sure and effective assistance to the Russian effort would be the establishment of a second front. The estimate of the forces left by the Germans in western and central Europe at the time of their first offensive against Russia in 1941, is commonly known. The principle of economy of effort is a canon of German strategy and during the current year will undoubtedly be applied to a similar extent. It should be expected that Hitler will concentrate to the maximum his forces in the East for the offensive of 1942 and only leave the remnants of inferior units for defense in the West. Accepting this hypothesis, based upon the knowledge of the adversary and confirmatory information on the part of the intelligence service, the conclusion which had already been previously mentioned in a letter to the British Prime Minister that one armored division thrown on the continent in 1942 would prove more effective than five such divisions in 1943, finds confirmation.

Allied Landing on European Continent

There can be no doubt that independently of the date at which the Allied Forces will be capable of landing on the European continent and regardless of what area is chosen for that purpose, it will be a united and common operation of the land, naval, and air forces.

This operation should be directed by one man in command of the whole armed forces and disposing of one General Staff for the whole of the forces.

Such a Staff should be established without delay, in order to commence the study and preparation of the future, undoubtedly difficult
and complex, operations. It would consist of officers from the General Staffs of those Allied countries whose forces will be employed, and of the countries upon whose territory the landing operations will take place.

Decisive Factors in Final Issue of War

The following three factors will be decisive of the final issue of the war in Europe and should, therefore, already be considered at the present stage:

(a) the armed forces of the Soviet Union,
(b) the armed forces of the Allies, particularly those forces which will be destined to land on the continent and establish a second front,
(c) the countries occupied by Germany.

Consideration of Countries Occupied by Germany

The first two of the above factors do not require further comment. The third has so far not been sufficiently appreciated.

The German bases and lines of communication, especially those connected with the eastern front, are situated on the territories of countries which have been invaded during the previous campaigns. Those countries have not recognized the German occupation and each one of them is continuing to a smaller or greater extent, and on their own, an underground struggle, which undoubtedly yields certain results and obliges the Germans to keep up in those countries considerably larger forces of occupation. These results, however, could be more considerable in spite of the occupation and notwithstanding the circumstance that at the present moment they do not possess the conditions for open action. During the final contest with Germany, this factor will carry far greater significance than it is generally supposed, provided that the effort of the United Nations will be directed on uniform lines, prepared methodically, and coordinated with the whole war plan.

This vital problem is directly connected with Poland.

The extent of what has so far been done in the direction of organizing the future action of the occupied countries is insufficient. The solution of the problem should be considered on the following lines.

Common Staff for Occupied Countries and their Duties

A common staff should be established for all the countries in Europe under German occupation. This staff would consist of U.S. officers of those occupied countries which may be seriously considered in connection with the future armed risings. The tasks of this staff would be:
(a) to prepare plans for the future insurrections of the conquered countries, in coordination with the general war plan, and particularly with the plans connected with landings on the continent;

(b) to prepare plans of assistance for the insurrections from without, in the first place by the air force and airborne units;

(c) to establish and develop liaison with the occupied countries;

(d) to issue instructions to the secret military organizations of the occupied countries in order to coordinate their purposes with the established insurrection plans;

(e) to unify the direction of diversion and sabotage on the rears of the Germans, both in the East and in the West, and of the intelligence service;

(f) to supply the secret military organizations with arms, equipment for diversion, liaison, men etc.

It seems certain that only a radical change in these two domains connected with the conduct of the war would secure, or at any rate greatly hasten a decisive victory over the principal enemy.

April 13th, 1942.
August 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I wish you would explore very carefully the merits and possibilities of our putting an American air force on the Caucasian front to fight with the Russian armies. Churchill, while in Moscow, cabled that Stalin would welcome such cooperation. If such an enterprise could be accomplished would it be advisable to have British air also represented?
August 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I wish you would ask General Arnold to submit to you his judgment of the number of combat aircraft by types which should be produced for the Army and our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy.

This report should be prepared without consideration for existing schedules or production possibilities or any other competing military requirements. I am asking for this because I would like to know what the theoretical requirements are to get complete control and domination of the air.

I realize fully, however, that there are limiting factors to the creation of air power, such as the availability of pilots, high octane gas, transportation and the competition of other essential critical munitions of war. Hence, I would like you and Admiral King to submit a second schedule based on these realities and the proper relationship of air power to the Navy and our ground forces.

Copy to: Admiral King.

HLH/1mb

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
FEB 7 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
August 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I am receiving almost daily a variety of military requirements for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and our Allies. While the most important of these requirements is the proposed increase of the Army, there are others which affect our production quite as much, if not more.

Furthermore, I believe that our production schedules in certain respects, particularly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels, are probably too low and, therefore, need to be revised. I am enclosing a separate memorandum to you on aircraft, which indicates my anxiety in regard to this.

What I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look at 1943 over-all requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that certain assumptions must be made on which estimated requirements for United States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of war, by number and general composition, are determined. It naturally follows that these assumptions must include judgments as to the strength of our Allies in 1943 and the probable strength of our enemies. The ability to transport and supply these forces overseas, of course, is an essential factor in determining our requirements.

This review — and I do not imply a detailed analysis, — should be made by you and Admiral King jointly and your respective staffs.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972
The British are our partners, hence we must have the fullest and frankest collaboration with them. Lend-Lease and merchant shipping must naturally be integrated in an overall requirement picture.

I feel that we may have our major impact with the enemy in the fall of 1943. Therefore it seems to me that a supreme effort from a production point of view should be given to producing the weapons and military units that we can bring to bear on the enemy by that time.

I think our general policy should be to put our munitions to work directly against the enemy as promptly as possible. We must always remember that the enemy is not going to wait for us to become fully prepared.

Pending a final approval of total requirements, which I hope will be in my hands not later than October 1, I am prepared to authorize an increase in the Army by December 31, 1942. I should like to discuss with you at once the exact increase which should be authorized because I fully realize that you must continue with your augmented plans.

Copy to: Admiral King.

HLH/1mb
August 25, 1942

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I am enclosing two cablegrams I received, one from the Prime Minister and one from Averell Harriman, relative to our taking over the responsibility for the development and operation of that part of the Persian railroad now under British control.

I wonder if you would be good enough to have a plan drawn up which would accomplish this and also let me have your judgment as to whether we should accede to these requests.

Harriman and General Spalding, who, I understand, has been making a study of the transportation into Russia, will both be back on Monday and I suggest that whoever prepares this plan for you consult both of them.

[Signatures]

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L.J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972
CAIRO, August 23, 1942 - 0134 Z

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN

Reference to the Prime Minister's cable to you requesting that the responsibility for the development and operation of that part of the Persian Railroad now under British control be taken over by the United States Army and also the ports serving it.

This request has resulted from protracted discussions between us all here and expresses the considered judgment of the British officers involved both in Iran and Cairo.

Generals Maxwell, Spalding and other United States officers who have been studying the situation agree (a) that with proper management and personnel and with additional equipment the capacity of the railroad to Teheran can be increased to six thousand long tons a day (b) that the British have not the resources or personnel to carry out this program even if we should supply the equipment (c) that unless the United States Army undertakes the task the flow of supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the British forces in the theatre increase (d) that the importance of the development of this railroad to its maximum cannot be overemphasized (e) that the condition in the Prime Minister's cable of the British retaining control of traffic to be moved is reasonable offers no practical difficulty and should be accepted.

We therefore recommend that the task be undertaken.

Although the mileage of the railroad is not great its operation presents difficult problems due to heavy grades, long tunnels and climatic conditions as well as those of a political nature in dealing with the Iranians and the Russians and the task should not be undertaken unless it is accepted as one of great importance and be given the necessary priority for both the full personnel and equipment needed.

It is therefore recommended (A) that a top calibre railroad man with the position of operating vice-president or general-manager of a western railroad be drafted and commissioned in the Army with rank of Brigadier General. He should be vigorous and
young, not much over fifty with experience on mountain and desert operations, ability to handle relations with different nationalities, is an essential quality (B) this man should organize a party of about twenty to twenty-five key men and proceed by air to Iran at the earliest moment possible (C) two railroad operating and one engineer shop battalions should be despatched by sea promptly (D) the method of gradually taking over control should be worked out on the ground with the British (E) Colonel J. P. Johnson, formerly mechanical engineer of the Santa Fe who has spent several months in the railroad and who is now with us in Cairo should be ordered to Washington at once to assist in shaping the program.

The turnaround of ships in the ports referred to is deplorably slow. Three port battalions will be needed to operate efficiently all of the ports servicing the railroad. There is one port battalion now in Karachi which has not been allowed to function due to labor union restrictions. This battalion should be transferred to Kurramshahr promptly and the two others despatched from the United States when possible the resulting saving of ships time will pay a good dividend.

The British are also asking for help with trucks and personnel to increase the road transports. Details of this request General Spalding is cabling to Somervell and Bruns. I join in recommending favorable action. This is an important proposal but of second priority to the railroad and ports.

(MAXWELL)
FOR NAVY USE ONLY

FROM LONDON
AUGUST 22, 1942

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

TO PRESIDENT - MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

NO. 135

Your 166 of 16th July. I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans-Persian situation on the spot. This I have now done both at Teheran and here, and have conferred with Averell, General Maxwell, General Spalding and their railway experts. The traffic on the Trans-Persian Railway is expected to reach three thousand tons a day for all purposes by end of the year. We are all convinced that it ought to be raised to six thousand tons. Only in this way can we ensure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance.

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the railway personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in reasonable time if enthusiasm and energy are devoted to the task and a high priority accorded to its requirements.

I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the United States Army, with the railroad should be included the ports of Khorranshahr and Bandarshahpur. Your people would thus undertake the great task of opening up the Persian corridor, which will carry primarily your supplies to Russia. All our people here agree on the benefits which would follow your approval of this suggestion. We should be unable to find the resources without your help and our burden in the Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere of the British units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have to be retained in the hands of the British military authorities for whom the railway is an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working.
The changeover would have to be carefully planned to avoid any temporary reduction of effort, but I think it should start as soon as possible. Averell is cabling you detailed suggestions.

PRIME
August 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Donald Nelson relative to aircraft production for the balance of 1942 and for 1943.

A supplement is attached showing a breakdown by types of planes. You will note that the probable production of all types for the balance of this year and next is greatly below the original Victory Program and substantially below the War Production Board's S-K objective.

[Signature]

Enclosures.
Office of
DONALD M. NELSON
Chairman

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of August 12th to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to myself on the subject of aircraft production has received our most careful attention. It is desirable now to reappraise our position from the standpoint of past deliveries, retarding factors and remedial measures necessary to secure the more rapid acceleration we all desire.

The replies to your letter from Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were prepared in cooperation with representatives of the Aircraft Production Division of the War Production Board and, I believe, give you a correct picture of deliveries compared to schedules during the first seven months of 1942 and, in addition, list the main factors that have contributed to the prevention of greater accelerations.

There are a number of matters pertaining to the aircraft program of such vital importance that I am taking the liberty of presenting them here, since they were discussed and agreed upon at the "clinic" which you requested be held by representatives of the several agencies involved.

1942 Program

On January 3rd of this year you announced an aircraft program objective of 60,000 planes for 1942. This has subsequently served as our directive, toward the attainment of which every effort has been made. Although many of our associates have from the first indicated that they considered it unlikely that we could reach this figure, I have, nevertheless, felt it would be unwise to advise you of their doubts until the time had arrived when we could give you convincing evidence of what within closer limits the final figure would be. That time has now arrived.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (A) and 5 (D) & (K)
Commerce Dept. Letter, 11/18/73
By RHP, Date MAR 28 1973
Under the existing conditions of aircraft priority assignments, manufacturing facilities, and material supplies available to aircraft, it is probable that our 1942 deliveries will not exceed 48,000 planes. The flow time of materials in the aircraft industry is from five to seven months, so that it is not now possible greatly to accelerate output during the remainder of 1942. Every additional plane that can be turned out will be, so as to add as many possible to this number. I suggest a "green light" for the whole aircraft program, except primary trainers. With a stimulus, for instance, such as would be given by extending special preference to every item required for aircraft whether tool, material, or equipment, I believe our 1942 total airplane deliveries can be raised to something over 50,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be tactical airplanes (56% combat and 10% cargo and communications). The remaining 34% will be trainers.

1943 Program

Your announced directive for 1943 was 125,000 airplanes. Although little can be done to improve 1942 output, drastic steps taken now will substantially increase 1943 production. Here are, however, several factors involved of which we feel you should be cognizant, and these together with attainable objectives, will be briefly touched upon in following paragraphs.

Weight Increase

As our program progresses, the percentage of heavy bombers will increase and training airplanes diminish. The disparity of weight is so great that, whereas the average airframe weight was about 4,000 lbs. at the beginning of 1942, it will be almost 9,000 lbs. at the end of 1943. For 1942, the average weight will be approximately 5,600 lbs., which will increase to an average of 9,000 lbs. for 1943. A 108% increase in number of airplanes produced (60,000 to 125,000) would represent almost a 200% increase in terms of airframe weight, and an increase of the same general order in the productive effort required. It is also important to note that, with an increasing proportion of bombers, the number of engines used will increase more than in proportion to the number of airframes.

Spares

The global war in which we are engaged makes necessary the establishment of great numbers of bases, widely separated. To keep our airplanes flying at these bases under war conditions, it has been necessary continually to increase percentages of spares. The latest directive for spares requirements for 1943 as established by the Services calls for very greatly increased percentages compared to those scheduled or actually being received in 1943. The manufacturing load is increased proportionately, with attendant reduction in the program of completed airplanes.
Engines

One of the major limiting factors in the aircraft program is the production of high horsepower engines. Facilities for the manufacture of these are being rapidly expanded. In addition to the engines which are being manufactured for original installation in planes, it is necessary for us to manufacture an additional fifty percent which are to be used as spares.

Gilders

The glider program, introduced subsequently to the announcement of your program, is competitive with the aircraft schedules in instruments and in some equipment and materials. Its importance has given it a high priority position.

Changes

Combat experience makes changes necessary although it is always the aim to incorporate alterations at a stage of production which will cause the least possible interruption of manufacturing flow. This postponement of the time when changes are incorporated is not always a wise or practicable policy from the standpoint of military effectiveness. Changes will remain always an uncertain element in production forecasts.

The Program

Under the existing priority position for the aircraft program, and indications of the material supplies available, and with due consideration for the above factors, our forecast of probable 1943 deliveries is 92,000 airplanes. Although your directive of 125,000 airplanes for 1943 has remained as our ultimate objective and is being used as the basis of planning expansion of facilities, nevertheless, our target schedule for materials and equipment allocations is 107,111 (about 16% higher than our forecast so as to permit maximum possible delivery increase consistent with proper allocation policy, but 14% less than the ultimate objective). To attain this quantity, 107,111 will require that the unqualified "green light" signal for aircraft in all of its components including facilities, machine tools, basic materials and all other factors entering into the completed airplane, described above in the discussion of 1942 problems, be continued through 1943. I suggest that the aircraft program as a whole be preferred over all other production and that great caution be taken to avoid the giving of highest priority to special projects believed to be of an emergency character. Only in this way can there be any reasonable assurance of obtaining the target objective.
We fully appreciate the need of aircraft in ever-increasing quantities and assure you of the continuing best efforts of us all in getting the largest possible number, yet I urge that you accept our judgment that the figure 107,111, which represents about what we are likely to deliver even with the "green light", is the maximum realistic target figure and should be adopted both for allocation and expansion purposes, on the premise that a target set too high above a feasible goal may result in establishment of more facilities than can effectively be used, and this would be to the detriment of the scheduled program. Materials and labor expended in obtaining such facilities will not only cause us to get less planes than we otherwise would have produced, but unnecessarily detract from other vital parts of the program.

However, it is important for you to know that by the end of 1943 our target schedule of 107,111 airplanes provides for an annual rate of production of just over your directive figure of 125,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be combat types.

*Remedies*

We have ordered a listing of all items of tools, materials and equipment, the lack of delivery of which is in any way retarding the aircraft program. Our "clinic" considers the aircraft part of our war production effort as so outstandingly important that we feel justified in giving every such item a priority position so high as to assure its delivery when required. Your approval of the program as outlined is requested.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ D. M. NELSON

Donald M. Nelson

Approved:

/s/ ROBERT P. PATTERTON

For the Army: Acting Secretary

/s/ RALPH A. BARD

Acting for the Navy:
### 1942 - 1943
#### AIRCRAFT PROGRAM ANALYSIS

**1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President's program</th>
<th>W.P.B. Objective</th>
<th>Probable Production Under Existing Conditions</th>
<th>Gain by &quot;Green Light&quot; Support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range, Heavy &amp; Medium Bombers</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>7,464</td>
<td>6,824</td>
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<td>Light, Dive, Torpedo &amp; Scout Bombers</td>
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<td>Pursuits</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>11,942</td>
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<td>998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observation &amp; Transports</td>
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<td>6,745</td>
<td>565</td>
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<td><strong>2,737</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total Trainers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>18,079</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,272</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>52,571</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,615</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,737</strong></td>
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Total Under "Green Light" Support: 50,352

**1943**

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<th>President's Program</th>
<th>W.P.B. Objective</th>
<th>Probable Production Under Existing Conditions</th>
<th>Gain by &quot;Green Light&quot; Support</th>
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<td><strong>3,332</strong></td>
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<td><strong>107,111</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,032</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,079</strong></td>
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Total Under "Green Light" Support: 107,111

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(X) and 5(D) or (E) Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72 By RHP, Date MAR 28 1973
August 27, 1942

My dear Mr. Nelson:

I have received your letter relative to aircraft production for the balance of this year and 1943.

I have sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments as to how nearly these production figures meet our requirements during this period.

I note that in all categories the figures are considerably below the original program and even substantially lower than the recent War Production Board revised objective.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Five ships containing the tanks and self-propelled guns for the British in the Middle East, which left here July 10th, are due in Aden today. The sixth vessel, containing 33 of the 100 self-propelled mounts, was sunk while in convoy in the South Atlantic. It was replaced by a sea train carrying duplicate equipment, which is due in Egypt on September 12th.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET AND
CONFIDENTIAL

September 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I want you to see this. I am greatly distressed. Perhaps you might think this over until I see you early next week.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

Memorandum to the President from General Marshall, dated Sept. 2, 1942 re message from General Eisenhower re letter the latter received from British Chiefs of Staff saying French official states Americans are working on plans for operations in French Morocco. Also, French official stated that he had heard same thing from Mr. Bullitt while the latter was in London.
MR. HOPKINS SUGGESTS THE PRESIDENT SEND THIS.

LOIS
September 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Do you know what the present British plan is relative to an offensive in Burma and what the possibilities of such an enterprise are? And what the British consider to be the probabilities of the Japs striking at India?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Operation of Persian Communication Facilities.

A plan has been drawn up for the operation of certain Persian communication facilities as requested in your letter of August 25. As formulated at present, the project contemplates the operation of certain ports and truck roads as well as railroads.

The plan has been turned over to the Combined Staff Planners for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, after which it will be promptly submitted to you for final approval.

Chief of Staff.

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl T. Spier
GRACE:

MR. HOPKINS SUGGESTS THIS BE SENT THIS AFTERNOON.

LOIS
September 9, 1942

Dear George:

Do you know what the British intentions are relative to either attacking the Japanese flank in Burma or defending against the Japanese thrust into India?

What forces have they got to do either?

Sincerely yours,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: British Plans Relative to Burma.

The British plan for the recapture of Burma, which follows, was obtained through discussion with the British Planners in Washington. It was drawn up in London and sent to General Wavell who, it was explained, will either adopt it or use it as a basis for the development of a plan of his own.

Concept of the Operation. The British intend to conduct operations at the most propitious time subsequent to the monsoon season, (a) with the objective of seizing territory in Burma and thus creating conditions favorable to (b) a more extensive offensive effort, when appropriate forces become available, to open the Burma Road and expel the enemy from the Burma area.

The initial phase of the plan involves the employment of two or three divisions and will be initiated in December or January. The plan visualizes landings at Akyab (1), on attached map, and Sandoway (2) simultaneously with a land advance through the mountain passes into upper Burma. It is hoped that the operations resulting from this initial phase will permit the attainment of the line: Akyab (1)-Kalewa (3)-Katha (4)-Myitkyina (5). This phase of the plan would have no effect on the opening of the Burma Road (6) but would have for its objectives the raising of Chinese morale, the containing of Japanese ground forces now in Burma, and perhaps a diversion of Japanese air strength to Burma from other areas.

The principal phase of the plan, as envisaged, is largely amphibious in nature. Its implementation will be delayed pending the release of landing craft from Special Operations now under way. This phase of the plan involves the employment of a force of approximately 9 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 62 squadrons of aviation. The plan includes the neutralization of the Andaman Islands (7) and a combined land, sea, and air opera-
tion with the object of seizing Rangoon (8), and possibly Moulmein (9), the operation continuing from these bases until the recapture of Burma is accomplished.

**Date for execution of principal plan.** The military resources for the execution of the principal phase of the plan might possibly be available early in May, 1943. However, the monsoon season begins at that period of the year and would delay the initiation of this phase of the plan until October, 1943.

The forces for these operations could be drawn from the following units now in existence or to become available in India by December 31, 1942:

**Ground Forces:**
- Infantry Divisions: 9 — two of which are all British.
- Armored Units: 1 Indian Tank Brigade.

**NOTE:** Very few, if any, of these divisions are complete. At least half are short one brigade each; several lack artillery units; and nearly all lack some special units and equipment.

Three additional Indian Infantry Divisions and two Armored Divisions will become available in the spring of 1943.

**Air Forces:**
- About 36 squadrons totalling 433 planes.

**Summarizing the present available forces,** it appears that there are enough units for the initial phase of the operations as envisaged by the British plan. For the principal phase, assuming that no divisions are transferred to the Middle East, or elsewhere, the required ground forces would appear to be available, but a serious shortage of air units would exist: only 36 squadrons of aviation as against 62 called for in the plan.

**The probabilities of the Japs striking at India.** The British consider a Japanese thrust at the close of the monsoon season (November) to be a possibility. However, they are con-
fident that their present forces could successfully resist a penetration. Their estimate of Japanese capabilities and their own ability to prevent invasion of India by the enemy is based upon a continuation of the political and economic control that they now exercise in that country. While they do not anticipate difficulty in handling the internal affairs of India, a deterioration of this situation would definitely embarrass them and might strongly militate against the success of projected military operations.

Security of plan. The British Planners are concerned about the secrecy of the plan for the recapture of Burma. They request that the Chinese not be informed of the plan, fearing that if past experience is a criterion, the security of the plan might be compromised.

Chief of Staff.
PRELIMINARY TEST OF DESTROYER TYPE RADAR

Preliminary tests of destroyer type Radar, model designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory, were conducted by the USS SEMMES during the period 10 - 22 June, 1941. The results obtained from this test indicate excellent performance on both ship and aircraft targets, ranges up to 30 miles being obtained on the former and in excess of 60 miles on the latter.

This apparatus operates on the same frequency but at a much higher power than the already installed battleship and carrier models. The antenna is considerably smaller and is mounted on top of the foremast. The accuracy of bearing and range is not the primary function of this particular model but is sufficient to give target bearings within 2° and ranges within 250 yards. Additional equipment will be furnished final models to permit accurate ranging with this instrument for gunnery purposes.

Deliveries of this type of equipment in quantity begins 1 October 1941.

Deliveries of the submarine model, also designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory, also begins 1 October.

The production of this and other Radar production models by the Naval Research Laboratory marks the culmination of over 10 years of pioneering research by the Navy.
Date: 4-6-59

Signature: Carl L. Singer

MEMORANDUM of proposed shipping adjustments

Ireland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 16,000 as follows:

4100 troops to sail January 15
7000 troops on Queen Mary February 1
9000 troops on Andes, Uruguay and Orion on February 15, 20

Total 24,500 to sail January 15 to February 24

(Note: Cargo tonnage extremely short. British must provide shelter, or lumber to winterize tents)

Iceland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 8,000 as follows:

2,500 troops on January 15

(Note: Remainder as shipping becomes available. Probably about 2500 per month)

British Near East and Far East

7,000 Queen Mary to load in England
5,100 from Cairo on Mt. Vernon - now in Far East
11,200 from Cairo on second round trip of West Point and Wakefield - now engaged in first round trip for Far East.

Total 23,300 British troops for Near and Far East on U.S. ships and Queen Mary.

U.S. Far East

21,800 troops to sail from New York January 20

\[
\begin{align*}
20a & + 140 \\
3 & \text{ to 4 weeks to prepare to sail}
\end{align*}
\]

SECRET
SECRET

250 Pursuit planes
86 Medium Bombers
57 Light bombers

220,000 Cargo tons

4 1/2 millions gals. gasoline

(Note: Troops, air and supporting services, except reinforced
brigade for New Caledonia - 7,000 men.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Eisenhower requested that the attached message be forwarded to you. This is in reply to your message to him, dated 13 May, on the French situation.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

Return to Originating Office of War Dept. Showing Action Taken
To: General Marshall
8-5199 personal from General Eisenhower to General Marshall

I have received from the President a personal message dated 13th May, on the French situation. I have also read General Smith's personal message to you dated 11th May commenting on the message from the President. General Smith's radio presents some of our views in this headquarters.

I have a message from the French Prime Minister, saying that the Communist Committee will be very glad to have the opportunity to conduct a civil administration. I understand your anxiety in the matter, and I am sure that it can be handled in any effort to influence the character of the future government of France today only with the assistance of the French people. It must be done, however, in such a manner as to avoid anything that could be interpreted as the practice of a military force in a city. I fully share your apprehension as to the Communists, and I hope that you will be able to consider the matter with the French people in a practical manner.

I request that you have the following delivered to the President as my reply to his message:

You may be quite certain that I have been dealing with the French agents and through the medium of the radio, I hope that you will not feel that I am able to influence in any way the character of the future government of France. I am sure that it must be done in such a manner as to avoid anything that could be interpreted as the practice of a military force in a city.

I hope that you will be able to consider the matter with the French people in a practical manner.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

From General Eisenhower
intentions of some members of the French Committee concerning
the future, but I am merely presenting to you the picture
that may develop inside France itself.

"I will not, of course, express any such opinions to
the French Committee, nor will I concede them any exclusive
right to deal with me in the handling of French liberated
territories. Actually, I cannot foresee any development
which would call for early establishment of civil control
over large sections of France. I will keep you informed of
all developments.

"Because this is an Allied Command, I hope that your
desires on this subject, of which I am already aware, can
eventually come to me as a joint directive of the two
governments. This would help me."

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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COD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/88)

Date- 10-26-66
Signature- Carl S. Spaatz
June 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

When you get over there, tell General Eisenhower that I have read his memorandum to you but that I still think he does not quite get the point.

He evidently believes the fool newspaper stories that I am anti-deGaulle, even the kind of story that says that I hate him, etc., etc. All this, of course, is utter nonsense. I am perfectly willing to have deGaulle made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else so long as the action comes in an untrammeled and unforced way from the French people themselves.

But it is possible in an election so to influence it, so to restrict the vote, so even to count the vote, that the people in power can swing it overwhelmingly their way.

Let me cite an example which I happen to know about. In a town of four or five hundred people in German-occupied France, the Mayor, now about sixty, was first chosen about 1917 because he could not go to the front on account of a club foot. He has been a magnificent success as Mayor, has been reelected every couple of years since then. The people in the village learned through the underground that the French National Committee for Liberation had picked another man to be imposed on them, even though there was nothing against the present Mayor, who had had no dealings with Vichy but has merely administered his own arrondissement. The man chosen by the Committee is well described as an unsuccessful politician and, in all probability, a porch-climbing robber.

I want Eisenhower to do what we have done in Italy -- i.e., have a British and American representative go to the community and talk with a number of leading citizens, such as the cure, the doctor, the avocad, the leading merchants, some leading farmers and see who should be installed, if anybody.
As a matter of fact, most of these arrondissement officials are not pro-Vichy. They have gone about their local duties and kept out of the other problem altogether.

I do not agree when Ike says that there are only two major groups in France today -- the Vichy gang, and the other characterized by unreasoning admiration for deGaulle. I wonder how he knows this because nobody else knows anything really about the international situation in France. Most of the people who get out come out with the help of the French National Committee, and they are rightly grateful.

Tell Ike that it is my thought, based on talks with many people who have come out of France recently, that he has overlooked the biggest group of all -- bigger than the Vichy group and bigger than the deGaulle group. It consists of those people who do not know what it is all about. Probably the great majority of them are anti-Laval and, by now, anti-Petain. Probably most of them like the symbol of deGaulle and his early actions in 1940, but they have not made up their minds as to whether they want deGaulle and his Committee as their rulers.

It is awfully easy to be for deGaulle and to cheer the thought of recognizing that Committee as the provisional government of France, but I have a moral duty that transcends "an easy way". It is to see to it that the people of France have nothing foisted on them by outside powers. It must be a French choice -- and that means, as far as possible, forty million people. Self-determination is not a word of expediency. It carries with it a very deep principle in human affairs.

As a matter of practical fact, Ike has plenty of time because for some time every square kilometer under his control will be a part of the military zone. I count on his good judgment in case Germany collapses or in case he can move his armies toward Germany at the rate of ten miles a day.

Good luck to him. We shall be thinking much of him and his problems.

F. D. R.
I have received from the President a personal message, dated 13th May, on the French situation. I have also read General Smith's personal message to you, dated 14th May, commenting on the message from the President. General Smith's radio presents some of our problems in French collaboration and represents in general, the views of this headquarters.

Today I have a message from the Prime Minister, saying that he now considers it advisable to defer asking General DeGaulle to come to London until D-Day. In this way no question of security will be involved, and we would still have time to work out some of our more difficult problems with DeGaulle, because it will be a considerable period before questions of Civil Government become acute.

I request that you have the following delivered to the President as my reply to his message:

"You may be quite certain that my dealings with the French Committee will be confined to military matters and related civil administration, and will be conducted on military level. I understand your anxiety in the matter and I assure you that I will carefully avoid anything that could be interpreted as an effort to influence the character of the future government of France. However, I think I should tell you that so far as I am able to determine from information given to me through agents and through escaped prisoners of war, there exists in France today only two major groups, of which one is the Vichy gang, and the other characterized by unreasoning admiration for DeGaulle. This may merely be an indication of the 'shell shock' to which you refer, but its effect will be a practical one when we once shall have succeeded in liberating areas that will fall outside the strictly military zone, and should therefore be turned over to local self-government. It is possible that we then shall find a universal desire to adhere to the DeGaullist group. I fully share your apprehension as to the
intentions of some members of the French Committee concerning the future, but I am merely presenting to you the picture that may develop inside France itself.

"I will not, of course, express any such opinions to the French Committee, nor will I concede them any exclusive right to deal with me in the handling of French liberated territories. Actually, I cannot foresee any development which would call for early establishment of civil control over large sections of France. I will keep you informed of all developments.

"Because this is an Allied Command, I hope that your desires on this subject, of which I am already aware, can eventually come to me as a joint directive of the two governments. This would help me."