

●PSF SAFE FILE; NAVY DEPT,

1934

*W. J.*

*Safe Navy (S) (1) 35*  
*PSF*

Comparison of United States - British views.

I. Points of similarity.

- a. Willing to continue United States - British parity ratio.
- b. Maintain ratios of Great Britain and United States toward Japan.
- c. Desire abolition or reduction of submarines.
- d. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- e. Willing to abolish bombing, *provided universal and complete.*
- f. Reduction of destroyers conditional on reduction of submarines.

II. Points of Contrast.

<u>United States</u>	:	<u>British</u>
1. Freedom of construction within categories.	:	1. Match ship for ship within categories.
2. Maintain size of battleships.	:	2. Reduce size of battleships.
3. Maintain number of heavy cruisers.	:	3. Reduce number of heavy cruisers.
4. Maintain size of light cruisers.	:	4. Reduce size of light cruisers.
5. Reduce number of light cruisers.	:	5. Maintain, <u>or increase</u> , number of light cruisers.
6. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	:	6. Reduce gun caliber of battleships to 12".

Comparison of United States - Japanese views.

I. Points of similarity.

- a. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- b. Willing to abolish bombing, (but, for Japanese, on condition only of abolition of aircraft carriers and flight decks).
- c. Abolition of chemical warfare (United States desires right to use in reprisal).

II. Points of contrast.

<u>United States</u>	:	<u>Japan</u>
1. Maintain ratio United States - Japan	:	1. Increase ratio Japan to United States and Great Britain.
2. Abolish submarines, or reduce tonnage.	:	2. Maintain submarines and increase allowed tonnage.
3. Maintain aircraft carriers at full tonnage allowance.	:	3. Abolish aircraft carriers.
4. Maintain size of battleships.	:	4. Reduce number and size of battleships.
5. Maintain number and size of heavy cruisers.	:	5. Reduce number and size of heavy cruisers.
6. Maintain size of light cruisers.	:	6. Reduce size of light cruisers.
7. Reduce number and tonnage of light cruisers.	:	7. Increase number and tonnage of light cruisers.
8. Reduce number of destroyers.	:	8. Increase number (tonnage of destroyers.
9. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	:	9. Reduce gun caliber of battleships to 14".

Combined Comparison - United States - Great Britain - Japan.

I. Points of similarity all nations.

- a. Desire maintenance or extension of own base system.
- b. Willing to abolish bombing (with conditions, for Japan).
- c. Abolition of chemical warfare (reserving right to use in reprisal for Great Britain and United States).

II. Points of Contrast - Great Britain and United States as regards Japan.

<u>Great Britain and United States</u> :	<u>Japan</u>
1. Maintenance of ratios.	: 1. Increase of ratio of Japan.
2. Abolition or reduction of submarines.	: 2. Maintain submarines, and increase allowance.
3. Reduce destroyers, conditional on abolition or reduction of submarines.	: 3. Increase destroyers.
4. Maintain number of battleships.	: 4. Decrease number of battleships.
5. Maintain aircraft carriers.	: 5. Abolish aircraft carriers and flight decks.

III. Points of contrast - United States as regards Great Britain and Japan.

<u>United States</u> :	<u>Great Britain and Japan</u>
1. Maintain size of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers	: 1. Reduce size of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers.
2. Maintain number of heavy cruisers.	: 2. Reduce number of heavy cruisers.
3. Reduce number of light cruisers.	: 3. Increase number of light cruisers.
4. Maintain gun caliber of battleships.	: 4. Reduce gun caliber of battleships (Great Britain to 12", Japan to 14".)

28 May 1934  
T.S.W.

Extract from General Board draft of "Trend of  
naval policy of signatory nations."

. . . . (From a study of the information available) . . .  
the probable attitude of the several nations at the 1935  
Conference may be inferred. All nations will favor agreement  
on a naval limitation treaty in some form. All nations except  
Japan will be agreeable to actual reduction of their fleets,  
that is, the establishment of limitations lower than those of  
the Washington and London Treaties; Japan will desire to  
increase her fleet. All nations except the United States  
may be expected to urge the reduction of the maximum charac-  
teristics of battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers.  
Japan will insist upon an increase in ratio in the heavy cate-  
gories and an actual increase in tonnage allowed in light  
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; she will propose the  
abolition of aircraft carriers. Great Britain will urge an  
increase in light cruiser tonnage and will press for the aboli-  
tion of submarines or for a material reduction in that category.  
France and Italy will desire an increase of capital ship ratios  
and will insist upon cruiser, destroyer, and submarine strengths  
in greater ratio than that now allowed for capital ships. France  
and Japan may particularly be expected to oppose a reduction of  
submarine tonnage. The United States will find Great Britain  
favorable to any stand for the maintenance of their respective  
ratios toward Japan, for the abolition of submarines, and for  
the maintenance of aircraft carriers, but will probably be forced  
to play a lone hand if she urges the maintenance of the present  
maximum characteristics of battleships and cruisers. No single  
item upon which general agreement will be readily forthcoming  
can confidently be predicted.

C O P Y

25 May 1934.  
T.S.W.

Memorandum of General Board discussion on 1935 Conference.

The following points were brought out at most informal discussions on 23 and 25 May:

Ratio of 5:5:3 should be established throughout all categories; reasons - Mandate Islands - Philippines.

Adhere to 35,000 tons, battleships size (or 33,000(?) improved NEW MEXICO); accept reduction to 14-inch guns if necessary.

Adhere to 10,000 tons, cruiser size; abolish sub-categories; freedom of construction as to gun battery up to 8-inch - no discriminatory tonnage ratio against 8" ships.

No limitation of airplanes except as occasioned by limitation of parent vessels. (Decline discussion of airplane limitation.)

Net reduction is desirable for public interests but an increase in one category, for example, cruisers, is satisfactory if over-balanced by reductions in others.

Reduction of total tonnage of battleships to a minimum of 420,000, as ultimate concession.

Destroyers can be scrapped somewhat, due to present increased number of cruisers assuming own duties formerly assigned perforce to destroyers.

Reduction of submarines will also permit reduction of destroyers.

Submarines can be reduced without limit.

Except for submarines, no new ships should be scrapped.

A 20 per cent reduction throughout all categories would appear feasible without affecting the newer and more valuable vessels.

Extract from New York Herald Tribune - May 27, 1934.

"Five-Point Plan Outlined

"The policy which Foreign Minister Koki Hirota will submit to the Cabinet for its approval next Tuesday is said to contain the following provisions:

"1. Discussions shall be restricted to naval matters only, with all political matters excluded. Japan will emphasize the principle of equal armaments, with each nation determining its categories according to its needs, and also will emphasize the necessity of reducing offensive weapons like aircraft carriers. The Japanese further will stress the principle of permitting nations ample defensive weapons but restricting them to a power sufficient for any nation to wage an offensive naval warfare.

"2. Re-examination of tonnages, probably with special emphasis on the total rather than categories.

"3. Re-examination of regional naval needs, with attention on Pacific, North Atlantic, South Atlantic and European waters.

"4. Total abolition of whatever offensive weapons that can be dispensed with.

"5. Continuance and enlargement of the non-forfeited areas mentioned in the Washington treaty. It is expected that Japan will seek to include Singapore and Hawaii among the unfortified areas, with Japan making certain compensatory offers in return."

### I. GENERAL ATTITUDE.

1. The Department favors limitation and reduction of naval armaments if in accord with the fundamental naval policy, "to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce, and to guard the Continental and overseas possessions of the United States." (4)\*

\*(This and subsequent numbers refer to pages in the Gray Book, reference (a), containing discussion of these respective items.)

2. It believes that the geographic location, territorial distribution, political situation and economic interests of each nation must be considered in the determination of the respective naval strengths agreed upon. (90)

3. It believes that our Navy should be second to none in size and strength. (91)

4. It believes that the basic ratios of the Washington Treaty should be maintained so long as the restrictions contained therein, as to fortifications, and the collateral treaties, declarations, and resolutions, remain in effect. (90)

5. It believes that no departure from the ratios of the London Treaty other than toward the fundamental ratios established by the Washington Treaty should be considered acceptable by the United States. (90)

### II. METHODS OF LIMITATION.

The Department -

(1) Favors limitation of naval armament by tonnage per category. (9)

(2) Is opposed to limitation by global tonnage. (9)

(3) Is opposed to separate consideration of air armaments but favors adding the category "airplanes" to naval armaments. (9, 10)

(4) Is opposed to limitation of naval personnel as a basic method, but is willing to consider it as an indirect secondary limitation based upon full needs of material naval armament. (10, 11)

(5) Is opposed to global budgetary limitation as a direct method of limitation, and considers that under present conditions the indirect limitation of material by means of budgetary limitation is impracticable. (13, 242)

(6) Favors full exchange of information concerning expenditures, personnel and material. (13)

### III. QUALITATIVE REDUCTION.

(By this is meant the abolition of certain weapons or methods of warfare or the further reduction of the limiting characteristics of vessels of the several categories.)

#### A. Vessels of the Navy.

The Department -

(1) Is opposed to the abolition of battleships. (51)

(2) Is opposed to the discussion of reduction of characteristics of battleships until the 1935 Conference. (57, 61, 62)

(3) Is opposed to the reduction of the permitted size of aircraft carriers but agrees to the reduction of guns on future aircraft carriers to 6.1 inches in caliber, provided there is no restriction of the number of guns. (95, 144)

(4) Is opposed to further limitations on the characteristics of cruisers and to restrictions on the flying-deck provisions of the London Treaty. (95)

(5) Favors the abolition of submarines, but if not abolished is opposed to the reduction of the permitted characteristics. (94, 144)

(6) Is agreeable to the reduction of the unqualifiedly exempt class of combatant vessels from a maximum of 600 tons to a maximum of 100 tons, but is opposed to the reduction in speed or gun caliber of the qualifiedly exempt class (600 - 2000 tons). (167, 168)

#### B. Aircraft.

(1) Is opposed to the abolition of military and naval aircraft. (321)

(2) Favors the abolition of bombing if universal and complete. (300, 320)

(3) Is opposed to the abolition of "bombardment aviation," due to impracticability of delimiting such a type. (121, 124, 320)

(4) Is opposed to the restriction of characteristics of airplanes, e.g., unladen weight. (250, 301, 319)

#### IV. QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION.

(By this is meant the limitation and reduction of men or materials in numbers or tonnage.)

##### A. Vessels of the Navy.

The Department -

(1) Considers that the submarine is the real key to naval reduction. (94)

(2) Favors the material reduction of destroyer tonnage if submarines are first abolished. (94)

(3) Is opposed to the reduction of aircraft carrier tonnage. (95)

(4) Favors the reduction of submarine tonnage if that type of vessel is not abolished. (94)

##### B. Aircraft.

(1) Favors the limitation of numbers of naval combat airplanes (including all in commission, reserve and in storage) based upon full needs of the Treaty Navy and essential auxiliaries. (500, as allowed the United States by the British proposals, is inadequate for naval purposes alone.) (65, 67, 189, 250, 301, 310)

(2) Is opposed to the adoption of the present status quo of airplanes in possession of the several major naval powers as limitation figures. (313, 314)

(3) Is opposed to any method of limitation of airplanes additional to that by number, such as total horsepower, total weight, or total wing area. (64)

(4) Favors the limitation of dirigibles to the present number possessed by the respective powers. (301)

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and Europe

PP. 286-287

October 26, 1966  
CIS.

PSF Safe: Navy

lw

PLAIN

Dublin

Dated September 7, 1939

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

25, Seventh.

Your No. 15.

Read my open telegram from Galway 2:25 p.m.

September fifth in which I made report after interviewing several officers, members of crew and number of passengers of ATHENIA. My despatch setting forth more detailed statement should reaffirm beyond question that ATHENIA was torpedoed, this conclusion confirmed by Captain Allen Kirk, Naval Attache London, who made independent investigation. Believe any further statement by affidavit will be purely cumulative. Legation has American addresses of all Galway survivors.

CUDAHY

DDM

*Safe: Navy*  
*BSF*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral Stark quotes as follows:

1. When he gets her speed, knowing her hour of departure and destination, he intends to plot her course over the entire route to America.
2. He hasn't yet determined what Woodward or the gang afloat could do.
3. He is phoning Jerry Land and discussing with him the desirability of notifying the ship and also asking Jerry Land's advice as to further activity.

E. M. W.

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TO;- OPNAV

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4 OCTOBER 39

004 FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF NOTE HANDED ME PERSONALLY  
BY GRAND ADMIRAL RAEDER FOR WHICH I SIGNED RECEIPT :-

AMERICAN SS IROQUOIS SAILED FROM IRISH PORT WITH US PASSENGERS  
2 OCTOBER WILL BE SUNK OFF THE EAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES

UNDER ATHENIA CIRCUMSTANCES FOR APPARENT PURPOSE OF AROUSING  
ANTI-GERMAN FEELING X REPLY MY SPECIFIC QUESTION RAEDER STATED

THAT HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION IN NEUTRAL IRELAND VERY RELIABLE X  
CHIEFO OF STAFF SUGGESTED THAT IF SAFE ARRIVAL CLOSELY INSPECT

SHIP FOR EXPLOSIVES X IF THIS INFORMATION IS TRUE I BELIEVE IT  
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5 October 1939

ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH RELEASE TO PRESS

1. Possible political effect which would probably be double-barrelled one in favor, the other opposite and what the balance would be I am not competent to judge, but it should be carefully considered, at this time.

2. Effect on liaison of our Naval Attache in Berlin and the German Government. I would say - disregard.

3. The worry, etc. of families and friends of those on the IROQUOIS. This might be disregarded - it would be troublesome but that is all.

4. International aspect. It would serve notice of our intention to resist by force sinking of American vessels outside the war zone by belligerent ships. Again, the national as well as the international reaction.

5. Possible public demand for escort of all U.S. ships. Disregard. This is a special case.

6. Nye and his ilk - ?! -





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


November 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a memorandum which indicates the known present status of procurement orders for aircraft, placed in this country by foreign states.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

*Safe: Navy  
PSF*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.  
Op-16-B-2

10 November 1939

MEMORANDUM for the Director:

SUBJECT: Aircraft - Deliveries to Belligerents.

1. Contacted Mr. Green, State Department in company with Captain Bode, to ascertain if he could furnish the number of aircraft ready for delivery to belligerents. He had no data of those completed and ready for shipment. When an order is placed, export licenses are often placed immediately. In the last four days, 510 export license requests have been received in his office. In connection with flying planes abroad, Mr. Green stated that he had furnished Secretary Hull a statement, which was brought out in the State Department press conference yesterday, that this would be an unneutral act and subject to a \$10,000 fine - (the aviators approached were offered \$4,000).

2. Through Aeronautics, have obtained following information of planes awaiting shipment:

Total number ready - 374  
Breakdown -

- (a) 211 B-14's - Lockheed - Bombers for Great Britain.
- (b) 26 BC-1's - North American - Advanced trainers for Great Britain.
- (c) 50 BT-9's - North American - Advanced trainers for France.
- (d) 7 DB-7's - Douglas - Attack bombers for France (type that crashed on West Coast with French officer aboard.)
- (e) 15 SB-2U's - Vought - Scout bombers for France.
- (f) 65 Model 167 - Martin - Attack bombers for France.

40 BC-1's are now en route from West Coast for delivery to Great Britain.

3. The above information will be checked further.

4. The Clearance Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, reports they are working on figures which will be available in a few days covering progress of deliveries and contracts placed.

*E. B. Nixon*  
E. B. Nixon



LENGTH, PMS	600'
BEAM MID W 21/30AL	61.5'
PEAK	21.75'
DISPL - NORMAL	11750 TONS
DISPL - STOWED	10000 TONS
CROSSING RANGE AT 15 KTS	10000 MILES
SPEED	33-5 KTS
SHIP AT 33-5 KTS	100 000

- MAIN BATTERY - 4 TURRETS - 6" / 47 TURRETS
- SECONDARY BATTERY - 6 TWIN VOLS. PARALLEL - 5" / 30 MODEL
- FLAKES 4-6
- CATAPOULTS 2
- MAIN SIDE BELT ARMOR 5"-3 1/2"
- PROTECTIVE DECK 2"
- TURRETS - FRONT 6 1/2"; SIDES 5 1/2"; TOP 2"; REAR 1 1/2"
- BARRIERS 6"
- COUNSEL TOWER - DECK 5"; TOP 2 1/2"
- SECONDARY BATTERY 3 1/4"

PLAN REVISED OCT 31 1935  
 ARMOR BARRIERS PORT PA DE TO PA 23  
 TABLE OF CHARACTERISTICS ADDED

CONFIDENTIAL  
 PROPOSED 10000 TON CRUISER  
 MODIFIED CL-43453

AT WASHINGTON DC  
 MAIN BATTERY 12-6" / 47 CAL  
 SEC BATTERY 12-5" / 30 CAL

SCALE: 1/2" = 1'

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1940

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

In relation to Secret  
Memorandum of October ninth,  
covering measures to be taken in  
preparation for war, I approve  
the first three. Please do not  
put any of the others into effect  
without speaking to me about them.

F. D. R.

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

*BF Navy safe*  
*Safe File 7ully full*  
~~SECRET~~

October 9, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Orders have been issued for these measures to be taken at once:

1. Call the organized Naval and Marine Reserves.
2. Call Fleet Reserve, Navy and Marine, selective basis.
3. Lay nets and booms for drill purposes.

The following steps in preparation for war can be taken to impress the Japanese with the seriousness of our preparations:

1. Army send reinforcement to Hawaii if contemplated.
2. Presidential proclamation for Maritime Commission to requisition merchant ships, in order to
3. Take over tankers, transports, auxiliaries, and begin to assemble Train on West Coast.
4. Coast Guard transfer to Navy.
5. Fill up garrisons of defense battalions in 14th District outlying bases.
6. Presidential proclamation establishing defensive sea areas.
7. Withdraw nationals from China. (Inconsistent with getting merchant ships out of danger).
8. Plan for evacuation of families out of Hawaii and later Panama.
9. Preparations regarding seizure German and Japanese merchant vessels in ports and near our coasts.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

10. Pressure on Britain to speed leases Bermuda and Newfoundland (essential).

11. Change laws to take limit off naval and marine personnel - limit to President's discretion.

12. Prepare plans for concentration camps (Army-Justice).

13. Executive Order to call Volunteer Reserves, including communication and merchant marine reserves.

14. Withdraw Marines from North China (this means Embassy should be closed). Leave very small token force. Stop sending replacements, Marines Shanghai - let attrition operate. Consider withdrawal when currency situation permits.

15. Netherlands East Indies:- Assist in material; line up for mutual support.

The following are matters for Treasury and State:

1. Freeze credits and assets of Japan.
2. Continue to bolster Chinese credit.
3. Take such steps as may be necessary to insure Chinese currency carrying on in case Shanghai is occupied by Japan.

For consideration, but in abeyance for the moment:

1. Alert the Asiatic Station at once to get ships other than river gunboats out of China. This should be the first secret step.

2. Alert the Naval Establishment (Establish security patrols, etc.)

Military Establishment  
Merchant Marine (Clippers)  
Department of Justice - sabotage -  
Surveillance of agents  
Panama Canal - all security measures.

~~SECRET~~

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

*Safe: Navy*

October 11, 1940

*PSF*

~~SECRET~~

U.S. FLEET Dispositions and Operations to meet special situation in Western Pacific.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.
2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.
3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce co-operation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.
4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.
5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.
6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.
7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific,- in Australia and Singapore,- and Dutch Forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.
8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.
- assumption* 9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.
10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.

~~SECRET~~MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S.FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S.Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.
2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
  - a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S.Shipping. *Use of South Amer. ports - by U.S. - would greatly facilitate this operation.*
  - b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
  - c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:-
    - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
    - 5 to San Francisco
    - 4 to Hawaii
  - d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
  - e. Move PatWing 5 (\_\_\_planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

10-11-040

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~~SECRET~~

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
  - a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
  - b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
  - c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.
4. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DD, 4 AMD, (Desdiv 51), 1 AO, 1 AD. This force will reenforce U.S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.
5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Aluetians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.
6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reenforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

10-11-40

~~SECRET~~

7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
- a. Reenforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrons, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
  - b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
  - c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patron with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
  - d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
  - e. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SAMOA.
  - f. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.
8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 14 SS) to CAROLINES and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.
9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.
10. Assist in defense of U.S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. On the Pacific this will be comprise: -
- 4 DM to HAWAII
  - 3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 11-24-69

Signature- *RHR*

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**DECLASSIFIED**

000 DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 5-7-69

Signature- RHP

SECRET

Safe: Navy  
6 November 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK

PSE

Complying with your request for comments on your secret memorandum for the Secretary dated November 4, 1940, the following comments are submitted but are not offered in any sense as a criticism.

I think your secret memorandum is excellent. I agree with it and with the general conclusions.

Under the national major objectives which you mention I note that no reference is made either to Hitler or to Nazi ambitions.

On page 5 of the secret memorandum emphasis is placed on the survival of the British Isles. For us is not the survival of the British Fleet a more vital factor?

I think the elements vital to Britain which must be held are in order of importance:-

1. British Fleet
2. British Isles
3. Suez and Egypt
4. Gibraltar
5. Far Eastern Possessions

I do not think that Hongkong, India and British Possessions in the Far East in any way compare in importance to holding these vital areas in Europe.

The immediate menace to Britain at the moment appears to be in the Eastern Mediterranean. The outcome here depends in no small degree on the attitude and the possible action of Russia. Perhaps more consideration should be given to the possible attitude of Russia, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.

~~SECRET~~

As an Ally of Britain I do not wholly agree that the landing of large bodies of troops on the Continent of Europe necessarily follows as the only means to win the war. Egypt, Suez and Gibraltar I consider vital and must be held. This doubtless will involve land combat. Land combat in Egypt, for example, will handicap the enemy in the matter of distance as well as Britain. Land war on the Continent of Europe will handicap Britain and ourselves alone. Land warfare on the Continent of Europe, I believe, is poor strategy.

In addition to the vital considerations discussed in your secret memorandum under Plans (B) and (C), unlimited and limited war against Japan, the following vital factors should be added.

If we wage war against Japan, either limited or unlimited, under Plan (B) or (C), we are aiding the enemy by enabling the Third Ally, Japan, to participate in the war. At present Japan can render no material aid to Germany or Italy by actual operations in Europe. Should we wage war against Japan and enable Japan to fight, and furthermore, to fight in an area to her own advantage, it seems to me to be extremely poor strategy.

As you have pointed out in your secret memorandum if we wage war upon Japan under the present circumstances we will have started something and our ability to finish it will depend, not upon ourselves, but upon some one else, namely, upon Great Britain and upon her holding out for a prolonged period of time. In battle

~~SECRET~~

or in war I do not think it wise to depend upon others for victory.

As you have also pointed out, if we wage war on Japan it will reduce the amount of aid which we can give to Great Britain. I believe Britain cannot survive without aid from the United States. If we wage war upon Japan under present circumstances we are not only risking, but contributing to, the following eventuality:

War on two fronts in two oceans separated thousands of miles and a war which we will have to fight alone.

I believe survival of Great Britain, or at least survival of the British Fleet, is essential to save us from war in two oceans. If this is true, this factor then becomes the one paramount vital factor for us to consider.

I believe the following to be, not only the soundest, but the safest strategic course to follow:

Protect the Americas, aid Britain with our whole strength, ensure victory in the Atlantic and Europe, and then deal with Japan and any questions in the Far East regardless of what may have happened in the mean time.

If victory in the Atlantic and Europe is insured, then we are secure both in the Atlantic and Pacific. If victory in Europe is only partial, or if it should be a reverse, we are still in an advantageous position to defend the Americas.

Respectfully,

*J. M. Reeves*



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
NAVY MANAGEMENT OFFICE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

WMC:LDJ:07

20 FEB 1956

*Comdr  
56-472*

Mr. Herman Kahn, Director  
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
Hyde Park, New York

Dear Mr. Kahn:

As requested in your letter of November 10, 1955, the classification status of Admiral H. R. Stark's memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy dated November 10, 1940, bearing the notation Op-12-CNR and known as "Plan Dog," has been reviewed.

The Chief of Naval Operations has declassified the "Plan Dog Memorandum" and the security classification on the document in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library should be removed.

Very truly yours,

*Louis J. Dayler, Jr.*  
L. J. Dayler  
Head, Naval Archives Branch

*Safe ; Navy  
PST*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Tasks of United States' naval forces in the Atlantic in case of a decision to escort convoys.

1. The conference in the Navy Department has reached agreement that the protection of shipping in the Atlantic, bound to and from the United Kingdom, would be most effectively accomplished as indicated herein.

2. The plan, in broad outline, consists of placing in convoy as much as possible of the shipping in question. North American shipping would be assembled in northern United States and Canadian ports, and pass thence via a route north of 60° North into the northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. South American, African, and Indian Ocean shipping would assemble at Freetown, move west of the Azores, and thence also into the Northwestern Approaches.

3. Protection would be afforded by escorting all convoys; and by tracking down surface raiders in the open sea by patrols and striking forces.

4. The United States, under this plan, would do the following:

- (a) Provide ocean escorts consisting of a battleship or a cruiser and two destroyers, from Halifax to a point in about Latitude 60° North, Longitude 30° West. As available United States' forces are insufficient, they would be assisted by a few British merchant cruisers.
- (b) Provide a force of destroyers and patrol planes for assisting the British to escort convoys between the point in Latitude 60° North, Longitude 30° West, and United Kingdom ports. The United States' forces involved initially would be three squadrons of destroyers (27) and four squadrons of patrol planes (48); mine-sweepers, tenders, etc. This force would base in ports in North Ireland.

Presidential Reference Library

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ROD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-10-26-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

- (c) Protect against raiders in the Western Atlantic by a striking force of two carriers, two cruisers, and four destroyers based in Halifax, Bermuda or Trinidad, as necessary.
- (d) Patrol the ocean area from Latitude 10° North to 25° South, using four old light cruisers. Patrol in the Caribbean and coastal waters with a very few patrol planes, short range seaplanes, nine old destroyers, and a considerable number of small craft.

5. The British would provide all additional escort forces required in the Northwestern Approaches; would escort convoys from Freetown to the United Kingdom; and provide striking forces in the eastern North Atlantic and in the South Atlantic.

6. When the situation in the Pacific would permit our withdrawing forces from the Pacific Fleet for duty in the Atlantic, we could send them to Gibraltar to escort convoys from Freetown as far north as Latitude 50° North, and to act as striking forces in the eastern North Atlantic. This step would permit the British to strengthen their forces in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. As suitable reinforcements become available from the Pacific Fleet and from new construction, we would increase our destroyer and aircraft escort forces based in the United Kingdom, and ultimately establish a detachment in Iceland to improve the efficiency of the escort.

7. In addition, we are now providing increased tankage for long range work to some of the Navy fighters now under construction. These will not be available at once, but when they are, we would base them in North Ireland and Iceland to escort convoys in the Northwest Approaches, in order to protect these against bombing planes.

8. Involved also in our plan is sending about twenty-five or thirty submarines to the British Isles and Gibraltar, for operations against enemy shipping in the Bay of Biscay and the Western Mediterranean.

9. We have begun intensive training of forces for all of this work. Our Navy is ready to undertake it as soon as directed, but could do it more effectively were we to have six to eight weeks for special training.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox.

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 10-26-66  
Call L. S. Speer  
-2-

*RSF*  
*Safe*  
*Navy*  
*Box*

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.  
Op-12-2-EH

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- *Carl L. Sprax*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

SECRET - MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1941.

From: The Director, War Plans Division  
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Requirements of the Navy for Merchant Vessels  
for Immediate Conversion.  
Reference: (a) Director of War Plans Secret memo to CNO  
of April 29, 1941.

1. In reference to paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of reference (a), the de-Gaussing, arming, conversion, and manning of the following ships with Navy crews should be accomplished prior to the times noted for the various groups to enable the Navy to carry out the initial movements for which commitments have been made and to give early support to United States Forces beyond the continental limits.

2. Transports - 18 ships, all on East Coast.

1 of the Brazil Class	August 1
AMERICA	" "
1 of Delbrasil Class	" "
SANTA CLARA	" "
PRESIDENT ADAMS	" "
PRESIDENT VAN BUREN	" "
SIBONEY	" "
CHIRIQUI	" "
ORIENTE	" "
ACADIA	" "
3 PRESIDENT BUCHANAN CLASS	August 25
1 EXCALIBUR CLASS	" "
2 Delmundo Class	" "
1 MEXICO CLASS	" "
HENRY R. MALLORY	" "

Five cargo ships, all on East Coast

1 EXPRESS CLASS	August 1
ROBIN KETTERING	" "
CAPE NEDDICK	" "
CAPE COD	" "
1 THOMPSON TYKES CLASS	" "

Tankers - Eight ships

CORSICANA	August 1
1 GULFCOAST TYPE (80,000 barrel capacity)	" "
6 PARATEX TYPE (20,000 barrel capacity)	" "

Refrigerator Ships - two

2 of the MORMACWREN CLASS	August 1
---------------------------	----------

Total ships - 33

2  
*R. K. Turner*  
 R.K. TURNER

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
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 DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

*Safe: Navy*


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-12-D-LED/hjw

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

12 May 1941.



MEMORANDUM for The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Convoy System as established by the  
British and Recommended Changes if  
the United States enters the War.

1. From observations made in the North-  
western approaches to the British Isles it is my con-  
sidered opinion that the reasons for the large merchant  
ship losses in these approaches are as follows: -

(a) Too many Ships in Convoy.

Size of convoys vary from 30 to as  
many as 90 ships. This tends to cut down speed of  
convoy as a whole, and makes convoys very unwieldy,  
especially when only a few escort ships are available.

With large convoys considerable time  
is also lost in assembling the ships of the convoy.

(b) Too Slow Average Speed of Convoys.

C-in-C of the Western approaches stat-  
ed that the speed of the convoys varied from 5 to 8 knots,  
with the average about 5.5 knots.

(c) Inadequate Number and Type of  
Escort Ships.

Many large convoys have only two or  
three escort vessels, usually destroyers and corvettes.

Two out of three convoys have only  
armed merchant cruisers instead of capital ships as  
escorts to protect them against such raiders as the  
SCHARNHORST, GUEBISSENEAU, and HIPPER.

(d) Inadequate Air Protection of  
Convoys.

Insufficient planes available at pre-  
sent to have air escorts over convoys, except when near  
land.

(e) Round About Route taken to reach Final Destination causes Loss of so many Ship Days that the same Result is obtained by the Axis Powers that would be reached if more Ships were sunk.

Present routes, used especially by convoys and single ships leaving Halifax, make it necessary to cover about 900 additional miles, which at the average speed of the convoys means the loss of approximately 7 ship days for each ship in a convoy, and if a convoy is composed of 60 ships the reason for the delay in getting essential material into Britain is readily seen.

The Northern route to Iceland is being used by the British due to lack of adequate numbers of escort ships and planes. This route is not recommended due to the great loss of time, not only due to the distance to be covered but to the slowing down of convoys incident to the continual gales in the winter months.

The S.S. GEORGIC, in which we travelled unescorted from New York to Liverpool, was routed to within forty miles of Iceland and almost to the Faeroe Islands in an endeavor to keep her clear of submarine waters. It took 13 days to make what would normally in peace time be a 7 day trip.

(f) Weather Conditions are such on the Northern route used by the British that from 50 to 70 percent of the escort vessels have been out of commission during the winter months due to storm damage and other material breakdowns. The British Navy hopes to reduce the number of ships out of commission to 30% during the summer months.

(g) Inadequate Repair Bases.

Great Britain has never had Navy repair bases, as such, in the Northwest, and until the collapse of France, they were never considered necessary. Now it has not been possible to give this sufficient attention, and only makeshift repair facilities are available.

The escort ships for the Northwest approaches base at Londonderry, Liverpool and Greenock, and there are no repair facilities at any of these three ports that we would consider adequate, although every effort is being made to improve the facilities.

All British Navy Yards are on the south and east coasts, and they have become untenable due to their being continually bombed by the Germans from bases in France.

(h) Insufficient Ships and Planes Available to Employ Groups to Hunt Down and Destroy Submarines and Planes along Routes Convoys are to use.

The plan used by the British, due to lack of sufficient ships and planes, is to route shipping so as to avoid areas in which enemy submarines and planes are known to be located rather than having sufficient destroyers, submarines, and planes keeping the routes clear which it is desired to use.

During the month of March an average of 14 enemy submarines were known to be at sea from Gibraltar to Iceland. They were on the arc of a circle between these two points, most of them being on the northwestern part of the arc. With the limited number of ships available four enemy submarines are known to have been sunk during that period. With more destroyers and planes available it is anticipated many more would be destroyed.

(i) Inadequate Anti Aircraft and Fighter Plane Protection at Assembly and Unloading Ports.

This allows the axis powers to drop acoustic, magnetic and contact mines from planes in the entrance to all the ports of Great Britain, and even in the inner harbor and rivers. Great loss of time is experienced sweeping these mines, and many ships are lost from mine damage.

2. It is realized that the British have a hard task to perform, and their Navy is spread very thin over the world. The above comments are not made in any critical vein, but rather in an effort to properly evaluate the methods used and results obtained with a view to avoiding their errors if we enter the war.

3. It is essential that the largest number of ships possible reach the British Isles in the shortest possible time, with as little loss as possible.

To do this satisfactorily, in an effort to win the war, it is my considered opinion that the following procedure be carried out, with minor changes.

(a) Escort groups to consist of 1 capitol ship, at least 3 - 1500 ton destroyers and 3 - 1200 ton destroyers, and 1 escort vessel (aircraft) with fighter planes attached.

(b) Air escort group to consist of from 3 to 6 patrol planes to be over or ahead of the convoy at all times when in waters where enemy submarines and aircraft are to be expected. In addition each escort group should have an escort vessel (aircraft) with fighter planes available for use over convoy to dispose of enemy long range bombers when sighted.

Air escort to cover such areas ahead, abeam and astern before dark, so that no submarine will be likely to get in attacks during night.

Air escort to keep enemy submarines down and enemy aircraft away from convoy, so that position of convoy cannot be reported.

(c) In addition to the escort groups, a force of surface ships and planes should be available as a striking group to attack enemy submarines and aircraft whose position is known within reasonable limits either by radio direction finder, having been sighted by surface ships or aircraft, or by ships having been attacked.

(d) Convoys should consist of about 20 ships, all ships having approximately the same speed.

(e) Convoys should be assembled in U. S. Ports and Halifax, and proceed directly from these ports to the Northwestern approaches to the British Isles by the most direct route. Routes to be varied from time to time.

(f) Merchant ships should not be allowed to travel independently unless they have more speed than any enemy raider known to be at large. It may be necessary to furnish escort ships for individual fast merchant ships.

(g) Planes and ships should be based on Iceland to attack any submarines or planes reported in the vicinity.

Op-12-D-LED/hjw

(h) Adequate anti-aircraft and fighter plane protection should be established at ports of assembly and unloading in the British Isles as well as at our own operating and repair bases.

(i) Establish adequate advance air and destroyer operating and repair bases in Ireland and Scotland for the use of our Force. The units for each base will have to be dispersed, be well camouflaged, and have bomb proof protection against bombing attacks. It is essential that we have a number of small bases, rather than one or two large ones.

4. If the above procedure is followed with an adequate number of ships and planes for escort and attack groups, there should be no difficulty in successfully escorting shipping from the United States to the British Isles.

L. E. Denfeld

RECORDED

MAR 11 1970, Sec. 5(2) and (3) of (6)

OED letter, May 8, 1970

By BHP, NAME DATE MAR 28 1970

Safe: Navy

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

May 14, 1941.

Disposition of French Fleet

Port:	BB	OBB	CV CVS	CA	CL	DL	DD	SS	FG FR	XCL
<u>French Control</u>										
Toulon	1(1)	1(2)	1(3)	4(4)	3(5)	17(6)	16(7)	22(8)	16(9)	
North Africa	1(10)					2(11)	7(12)	13(13)		
Casablanca	1(14)				2(15)	2(16)	5(17)	10(18)	3(19)	
Dakar	1(20)				2(21)	2(22)		8(23)	5(24)	
Madagascar								2(25)		
West Indies			1(26)		2(27)				1(28)	1(29)
Indochina					1(30)			2(31)	13(32)	
Unknown						2(33)		3(34)	2(35)	
Total French	4	1	2	4	10	25	28	60	40	1
<u>British Control</u>										
England		2(36)				2(37)	7(38)	7(39)	12(40)	
Alexandria		1(41)		3(42)	1(43)		3(44)	1(45)		
Total British		3		3	1	2	10	8	12	
<u>Lost</u>										
Dir. Hostilities					1(46)	4(47)	6(48)	2(49)	2(50)	
Since Armistice		1(51)				1(52)	1(53)	5(54)	1(55)	
Total Lost		1			1	5	7	7	3	
Scuttled								1(56)	5(57)	6(58)
Condemned									1(59)	
Total	4	5	2	7	12	32	47	80	61	1

Basic Source of Information: French Ministry of Marine.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

Op-10/11

By RT, NARS Dat APR 6 1973

May 14, 1941

Toulon

- |     |                        |   |   |  |
|-----|------------------------|---|---|--|
| (1) | <u>BB</u>              | STRASBOURG  |   |  |
| (2) | <u>QBB</u>             | PROVENCE (damaged)  |   |  |
| (3) | <u>CVS</u>             | COMMANDANT TESTE  |   |  |
| (4) | <u>CA</u>              | ALGERIE<br>FOCH   | COLBERT   | DUPLEIX  |
| (5) | <u>CL</u>              | LA GALISSONNIERE  | JEAN DE VIENNE  | MARSEILLAISE   |
| (6) | <u>DL</u>              | AIGLE<br>GERFAUT<br>LION<br>TARTU<br>VAUQUELIN<br>VOLTA                                       | CASSARD<br>KERSAINT<br>LYNX<br>TIGRE<br>VAUTOR<br>MOGADOR (damaged)         | CHEVALIER PAUL<br>L'INDOMPTABLE<br>PANTHERE<br>VAUBAN<br>VERDUN                        |
| (7) | <u>DD</u>              | BALISTE<br>LANSQUENET<br>LE HARDI<br>TRAMONTANE   | CASQUE<br>LE BAYONNAISE<br>MAMELUX<br>TROMBE                                | FOUGUEUX<br>LA POURSUIVANTE<br>TORMADE<br>TYPHON                                       |
|     |                        | L'ADROIT (est EPEE)<br>BISON (ex FLIBUSTIER)  | FOUDROYANT (ex FLEURET)<br>SIROCO (ex CORSAIRE)                             |  |
| (8) | <u>SS</u>              | ACHERON<br>AMPHITRITE<br>BEVEZIERS<br>GALATEE<br>HEROS<br>LE REDOUBTABLE<br>PASCAL<br>SYBILLE | ACTEON<br>ARGO<br>DIAMANT<br>GLORIEUX<br>LE CENTAURE<br>LE TONNANT<br>PERLE | AMAZONE<br>ARGONAUTE<br>PRESNEL<br>HENRI POINCARE<br>LE CONQUERANT<br>MAIADE<br>SIRENE |
| (9) | <u>PG</u><br><u>PR</u> | AILETTE<br>CALAIS<br>CURIUSE<br>DUBOHRDIEU<br>IMPETUEUSE<br>TAPAGEUSE                         | BATAILLEUSE<br>CHAMOIS<br>DEDEIGNEUSE<br>ELAN<br>LASSIGNY                   | BEAUTEMPS-BEAUPRE<br>COMDT. RIVIERE<br>D'IBERVILLE<br>ENGAGEANTE<br>LURONNE            |

North  
Africa

- |      |           |                                 |                       |                     |
|------|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| (10) | <u>BB</u> | DUNKERQUE (Damaged) at Oran.    |                       |                     |
| (11) | <u>DL</u> | ALBATROS                        | MILAN                 |                     |
| (12) | <u>DD</u> | BOMBARDE<br>IPHIGENIE<br>POMONE | BORDELAIS<br>LA PALME | FRONDEUR<br>LE MARS |

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

May 14, 1941

North Africa  
(cont.)

(13) <u>SS</u>	ARIANE	CAIMAN	CALYPSO
	CIRCE	DANAE	DIANE
	EURYDICE	MARSOUIN	NAUTILUS
	REQUIN	SAPHYR	SOUFFLEUR
	TURQUOISE		

Casablanca

(14) <u>BB</u>	JEAN BART (77% completed)		
(15) <u>CL</u>	GLOIRE	PRIMAUGUET	
(16) <u>DL</u>	EPERVIER	LE MALIN	
(17) <u>DD</u>	ALCYON	BRESTOIS	BOULONNAIS
	SIMOUN	TEMPETE	
(18) <u>SS</u>	ANTIOPE	ARETHUSE	CERES
	IRIS	MEDUSE	PALLAS
	PSYCHE	ORPHEE	THETIS
	VENUS		
(19) <u>PG</u> <u>FR</u>	COMDT. BORY	GRACIEUSE	GAZELLE

Dakar

(20) <u>BB</u>	RICHELIEU (damaged)		
(21) <u>CL</u>	GEORGES LEYGUES	MONTCALM	
(22) <u>DL</u>	LE FANTASQUE	LE TERRIBLE	
(23) <u>SS</u>	ARCHIMEDE	ATALANTE	AURORE
	CASABLANCA	OREADE	SIDI-FERRUCH
	SULTANE	VESTALE	
(24) <u>PG</u> <u>FR</u>	BOUDEUSE	BOUGAINVILLE	COMDT. DELAGE
	D'ENTRECASTEAUX	LA SURPRISE	

Madagascar

(25) <u>SS</u>	ESPOIR	VENGEUR	
----------------	--------	---------	--

West Indies

(26) <u>CV</u>	BEARN at Martinique		
(27) <u>CL</u>	EMILE BERTIN at Martinique		
	JEANNE D'AR at Guadeloupe		
(28) <u>PG</u>	VILLE D'YS at Martinique		

(29) <u>ECL</u>	BARFLEUR at Martinique		
-----------------	------------------------	--	--

Indochina

(30) <u>CL</u>	LAMOTTE PICQUET		
(31) <u>SS</u>	MONGE	PEGASE	

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

May 14, 1941

<u>Indochina.</u> (Cont)	(32)	<u>PG</u>	ADMIRAL CHARNER	ARGUS	AVALANCHE
		<u>PR</u>	BALNY	COMDT. BOURDAIS	MARNE
			DOUDART-DE-LAGREE	VIGILANTE	MYTHO
			FRANCIS-GARNIER	TOURANE	TAHURE
			DUMONT D'URVILLE		
<u>Unaccounted for (*)</u>	(33)	<u>DL</u>	GUEPARD	VALMY	
	(34)	<u>SS</u>	DAUPHIN	ESPADON	PHOQUE
	(35)	<u>PG</u>	ANNAMITE	LA GRANDIERE	
			(*) Departure from Beirut announced April 23, 1941. Destination unknown.		
<u>British Control</u>	(36)	<u>OBE</u>	COURBET at Portsmouth.		
			PARIS at Plymouth.		
<u>England</u>	(37)	<u>DL</u>	LEOPARD at Portsmouth	Le Triomphant at Plymouth.	
	(38)	<u>DD</u>	FLORE at Portsmouth.	BOUCLIER at Plymouth.	
			LA CORDELIERE "	MISTRAL " "	
			LA MELPOMENE "	OURAGON " "	
			L'INCOMPRISE "		
	(39)	<u>SS</u>	MINERVE at Plymouth.	LA CREOLE at Swansea	
			JUNON " "	ONDINE at Southampton	
			SURCOUF " "	ORION "	
				RUBIS Unknown	
	(40)	<u>PG</u>	AMIENS	ARRAS	COMDT. DOMINE
		<u>PR</u>	COMDT. DUBOC	COUCY	CHEVREUIL
			EPINAL	LA MOQUEUSE	LA CONQUERANTE
			LA CAPRICIEUSE	SAVORGNIAN DE BRAZZA	
			SUIPPE		
<u>Alexandria</u>	(41)	<u>OBE</u>	LORRAINE		
	(42)	<u>CA</u>	DUQUESNE	SUFFREN	TOURVILLE
	(43)	<u>CL</u>	DUGUAY-TROUIN		
	(44)	<u>DD</u>	BASQUE	FORBIN	LE FORTUNE
	(45)	<u>SS</u>	PROTEE		
<u>Lost (during hostilities)</u>	(46)	<u>CL</u>	PLUTON (LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE)		
	(47)	<u>DL</u>	MAILLE BREZE	BISON (*)	JAGUAR
			CHACAL		

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

(\*) This name has been given to DD FLIEUSTIER.



In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-10-Dy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

So far as I know only two people in the Navy Department know about this, my Aide and myself, and I am enjoining strict secrecy.

Whether or not the Skipper did the right thing I admire his decision and guts and feel like patting him on the back. It takes no stretch of the imagination to consider that he was acting in pure self-defense against an oncoming enemy.

It is my understanding that German submarines have instructions to "beat it" just as fast as they can if they see a man-o-war coming over the horizon; their mission being only to attack shipping.

*Betty*

*PSF  
Safe  
Navy*

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CinC Lant File  
A2/(0039)

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET  
U. S. S. AUGUSTA, (Flagship)

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Newport, Rhode Island,  
May 17, 1941

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.  
To : Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S.  
SALEIER (Dutch).

1. Forwarded for information and for consideration  
as to:

- (a) possible repercussions upon the arrival  
home of the German submarine involved and,
- (b) possible action by German submarines  
which encounter United States Naval vessels at  
sea in future.

2. I feel obliged to state that this incident was  
reported to me only this forenoon (at about 0830 E.S.T.).  
The subject report has since been made up and acted on and  
is going forward by air in the hands of Rear Admiral Bristol  
(Commander Support Force) this afternoon in order that know-  
ledge of the incident may be known to the Chief of Naval  
Operations this same day.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Refer to

Serial:

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET

DD13/L11-1

SUPPORT FORCE

U. S. PRAIRIE, Flagship

~~SECRET~~

Newport, Rhode Island,  
May 17, 1941.


From: Commander Destroyer Division THIRTEEN.  
To: Commander Support Force.  
Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S. SALEIER (Dutch).

1. On Thursday, 10 April at about 1930, zone plus three, U.S.S. NIBLACK intercepted S.O.S. from S.S. SALEIER stating that she had been torpedoed in Lat. 58-05N Long 30-46W and was sinking rapidly. Decision was made to proceed to her assistance and accordingly at 2024 NIBLACK went ahead at 28 knots on course 063°.

2. At 0750, 11 April three small boats were sighted and after circling them on a sound search the NIBLACK at 0826 lay to to receive survivors on board. The entire crew of the SALEIER of nine officers and 51 men were taken aboard.

3. In the meantime sound searching was continued and at 0840 as the last of the survivors were coming aboard sound contact was reported bearing 75° true distant 1400 yards. This contact was about two points abaft the starboard beam and if it were a submarine, it was rapidly approaching a position for attack. With safety of ship, crew, and survivors in mind, decision was made to attack instantly as the most effective method to escape damage. Accordingly, on my orders the ship went ahead as soon as possible at full speed and turned to an intercepting course. When it was estimated the ship should be over the submarine (if one were present) three depth charges were dropped at ten second intervals, and then the ship proceeded to clear the area at 28 knots on course North without further investigation.

4. All survivors of the SALEIER were turned over to the British authorities at Reykjavik on arrival on 12 April.

  
D.L. RYAN.

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5200.9 (9/27/58)

Refer to

Serial: L11-1(0031)

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET  
SUPPORT FORCE  
U. S. S. PRAIRIE, Flagship

~~SECRET~~

Newport, R.I.,  
May 17, 1941.


FIRST ENDORSEMENT to  
CDD13 Secret ltr file  
DD13/L11-1 dated 17  
May, 1941.

From: Commander Support Force, ATLANTIC FLEET.  
To : Commander in Chief, ATLANTIC FLEET.

Subject: Events in connection rescue survivors S.S. SALEIER(Dutch)

1. Forwarded.

2. The report of this incident was first made to Commander Support Force by Commander Ryan in person on the return of the NIBLACK to Newport, R.I. Commander Support Force took into consideration two pertinent factors; first, the elapsed time from 11 April to the date the report was made, 28 April, and, second that the matter was an accomplished fact. My decision at that time was that best interest would be served by holding the information in my own hands and making no further report to higher authority. Recently there is evidence that some information regarding this incident has leaked out. It is therefore now considered that an official report of the matter must be forwarded.



A. L. Bristol, Jr.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

file  
Box

June 23, 1941

Sir,

I am instructed by the Admiralty to put forward the following requests from the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty for the provision of Convoy Escort Vessels, Minesweepers, Submarines and Tugs.

A. Convoy Escort Vessels.

2. The extension of the field of enemy submarine activity has increased our need for ships to protect our convoys.

3. The need can be met most economically by the Convoy Escort Vessel of about 1,500 tons. It is estimated that two or three Convoy Escorts can be built in the place of one Destroyer. On the other hand our experience of vessels of less than 1,500 tons proves that they are not able to fulfil their function in the Atlantic and we deprecate the expenditure of building effort on smaller vessels for this purpose.

4. The capacity of U. K. and Canada is estimated to be eight Convoy Escorts per month. This rate of increase does not meet our expanding requirements and we are seriously concerned to provide against the possibility of damage to our productive capacity by enemy action.

5. It is understood that U.S.A. have designed a Convoy Escort Vessel of about 1,500 tons. If production of such a ship is a reasonably early prospect, building and release of some of them would be a great contribution towards solving our convoy problems. In the interim, transfer of the 7 Coastguard Cutters of the George W. Campbell type would be of utmost value.

6. As a longer term policy it is requested that consideration may be given to the building of 100 Convoy Escort Vessels of about 1,500 tons for transfer to the British Navy at rate of about 10 per month. The exact number and rate to be fixed so that Merchant Shipbuilding may not be interfered with.

B. Minesweepers.

7. Anxiety is also felt about our present deficiency of large size Minesweepers and possible damage to our productive capacity for this type. We should be glad to know of the possibility of obtaining 20 vessels such as AM 57 - 81 of 1,070 tons standard displacement.

8. These vessels if supplied could be regarded as taking the place of some of the Trawlers for which requisitions

have been lodged.

9. As a longer term policy would it be possible to construct say 40 smaller vessels of about 800 tons?

C. Submarines.

10. War experience has shown the need for Submarines of about 700 to 900 tons to operate in "confined" waters off the enemy's coasts, and owing to the extent of these operations our losses have been heavy.

11. At the same time damage to our yards has resulted in some loss of capacity.

12. Information is therefore requested whether U.S.A. could transfer two Submarines of about this size and build a further 18 ships. Ships complete with armament and spare gear would be required.

D. Tugs.

13. Merchant ship sinkings can often be avoided if Rescue Tugs are available. We have several on service but more are required. For these Ocean-going duties they require to be of about 600 tons displacement, about 157' in length, of 1500 Horse Power, with an endurance of 24 days at 10 knots. 14 of these vessels are required.

14. Commander Sullivan, U.S.N., who has recently returned from the United Kingdom has full details and knows our requirements.


E. Further Action.

15. A requisition has been lodged for the above mentioned Tugs but no other action about the other requirements has yet been taken beyond showing advance copies of telegrams to Admiral Reeves and discussing the situation generally with Admiral Robinson.

16. I need hardly say that I am at your disposal at any time to discuss these requirements and would ask to be informed what further action if any is required to put forward these requests.

I am, Sir,

Yours truly, .



J. W. S. Dorling,  
Rear Admiral, R. N.

Colonel Frank Knox  
Secretary of the Navy  
United States Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

PSF  
Safe  
Navy

July 14, 1941.

1. I would leave out all reference in written instructions to British convoys and substitute a simple paragraph providing for constant information to the British and Canadian convoy authorities telling them exactly where American, Icelandic or neutral flagships are on the communications line between the United States or Newfoundland and Iceland, in either direction. They should also be simultaneously informed as to what the American Navy escort is of such ships.

2. In place of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6, I suggest something like the following:

"The President, in his message to the Congress, notified the Congress that:

(a) communications between the United States and U. S. Naval bases on the one side, and Iceland on the other, would be kept open and

(b) that such communications by water would be protected against attack or threat of attack. It is obviously impossible to define "threat of attack" by the presence of a German submarine or surface raider a given number of miles away from a convoyed vessel. It is necessary under the conditions of modern sea warfare to recognize that the words "threat of attack" may extend to reasonably longer distances away from a convoy ship or ships.

It thus seems clear that the very presence of a German submarine or raider on or near the line of communications constitutes threat of attack.


Therefore, the presence of any German submarine or raider should be dealt with by action looking to the elimination of any threat of attack on the line of communications or close to it.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8-26-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With further reference to the submarine attack on Convoy OG-71, the attached chart prepared by the War Plans Division, showing the submarine locations as reported on 22 August, is forwarded as of possible interest to the President.

  
JOHN R. BEARDALL  
Captain, U. S. N.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25 August 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1. We have already carried out the escort of several Icelandic flagships in each direction.
2. Three U. S. flag tankers are now under escort to Reykjavik.
3. In the preparations to fully execute W.P.L. 51 the one item which has required rather extensive arrangements has been the acquisition of merchant vessels in the necessary number and of proper characteristics to ensure that at least one is fully ready and will positively be in each convoy we escort, eastbound and westbound.
4. Close collaboration has been had with the Maritime Commission to obtain the required vessels which obviously must be under naval control (N.S.&T.S.) as regards sailing dates and routing, and they must be acquired through the Maritime Commission; the first list compiled contained only a very few 10 knot ships, the great majority being rated at only 9 knots; all units of a more recent list appear to have acceptable characteristics and it is expected to have the necessary initial units at Reykjavik by 8 September and to initiate the escort schedule on or about 14 September.
5. Convoy schedule (eastbound), as now presented by Canadian authorities, is as follows: Depart Halifax 27 August - 2 September - 8 September - 14 September, and every 6 days thereafter.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 10-26-66

Signature - Carl L. Spicer

Jack

Show President -

HRJ

R. M. BRAINARD,  
Rear Admiral, USN.



WINDY HAT

DOMINION OF CANADA



UNITED STATES

CARIBBEAN SEA



X Attacks Subs

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DOD DIR. SACO.9 (9/27/88)

Date 10-2-66  
Signature Carl J. Spence

20<sup>th</sup> reported loc  
27<sup>th</sup> reported location

Case A

Case 224623

WOLFEARSHEAD SEA

EUROPE

SECRET

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-12B-9-Br

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Serial 096712 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 25, 1941.

~~SECRET~~ - MEMORANDUM

From: The Director, War Plans Division.  
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Submarine Locations.

1. On August 19, OG71 (empty convoy en route England to Gibraltar) was attacked twice 500 miles west off Brest. Four ships were struck.

2. On August 22 and 23 this convoy was repeatedly attacked west of Portugal (having been shadowed in the meantime by air and submarines).

3. In the second series of attacks, 6 ships were hit. Total merchant ships sunk: 7 (all about 1500 tons); 1 tug; 2 escort vessels (one was the ex-USS Hopewell).

4. The accuracy of exact submarine locations received from London is doubtful.

*R.K. Turner*  
R.K. TURNER.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

PSF SAFE NAVY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1941.

file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The President will be interested in the attached tabulation of characteristics of our proposed 2100-ton destroyer's set opposite those of the new British destroyer for Fleet use.

Bearing on this comparison, we are now giving consideration to improvements in the AA machine gun battery for the later of these ships. As a first move, we will probably install twin 40 mm (Bofors) guns instead of the 1.1", with probable omission of the .50 caliber guns. 20 mm Oerlikon guns may be added. We also feel that additional depth charges are necessary. With increased AA battery and depth charges, we may have to reduce torpedo tubes to one quintuple or two triple tubes.

Respectfully,

*J. R. Beardall*  
J. R. BEARDALL

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By PT

Date APR 6 1973

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 1331 Monograph Index Guide No. 912,600  
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-63, 7-63)  
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From NAVAL ATTACHE at LONDON Date 5 AUGUST, 1941  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Director of Naval Construction Evaluation Reliable  
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—Identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GREAT BRITAIN - NAVY - DESTROYER DESIGN  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)



SUMMARY:

The Director of Naval Construction, Admiralty, has in hand a preliminary design of a "fleet" destroyer based on requirements established by the Naval Staff.

1. The Director of Naval Construction is preparing sketch plans of a destroyer for fleet use to meet requirements established by the Naval Staff. The following are the characteristics of the design:

US DD 445 CLASS

2110	Displacement (standard)	- - - - -	2,220 tons
2390	Displacement (deep)	- - - - -	2,960 tons
369	Length	- - - - -	364 feet
38.5	Beam	- - - - -	39' 6"
3.0-3.5	G.M.	- - - - -	Not less than 3.0 feet
1.2	G.H.	- - - - - (light condition)	1.2 feet
60,000	H.P.	- - - - -	48,000
	Est Endurance (free route clean bottom) at		
5000	20 knots	- - - - -	4150 miles
	Est Operational Endurance (war conditions) at		
6500	15 knots	- - - - -	about 4000 miles
	Est Maximum Speed	- - - - -	theoretical at
41 APPROX.	standard displacement	- - - - -	36 kts.
35	At deep displacement	- - - - -	32 kts.

Armament:

- 5- $\frac{5}{8}$ " Two in number, twin 4".7 R.A./L.A. turrets forward of bridge.
- MAX. ELEV. Maximum elevation 80 degrees. "Below Deck" (sunken) mountings.
- 85°
- 1-QUAD. Four in number, twin Bofors (40 m.m.) aft arranged for four corner defense.
- 11
- 4-60 CAL. Six in number, Oerlikons (20 m.m.).
- 2-QUIN. Two in number, quadruple torpedo tube mounts.
- 10-600" Seventy depth charges.

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 5-8-72

REUS 1-300"  
NOTE: Arrangements are to be provided for "two speed" mine sweeping equipment if required.  
Distribution By Originator \_\_\_\_\_

Routing space below for use in O. N. I. Draw circle around unit or units (as shown on the distribution block below) to which this particular copy of this report has been routed for information, for further routing, or for retention. Indicate by check (✓) on this copy the complete distribution of other copies of this report. To show routing not provided for on this form, use blank boxes.

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		F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8, F-9, F-10, F-11, B-1, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8														
War College	M. I. D.	H. O.	Nav.	Op.	Y. & D.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Aers.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	C. in C. Land.	C. in C. Pac.	C. in C. A. F.			
				✓	✓											
Attached at		Op-16-1/1	Op-17	Op-13	Op-14	Op-20	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-30	Op-38	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sec. For.			
F. A. T. U.	State	Commerce	Maritime Com.	Civil Aere Auth.	F. B. I.	N. E. L.	Naval Dist.								Return to Reas. No. _____	

PLEASE RETAIN

This form for original and copies of para 1, and standard 2 by 13 inches plain white paper for additional pages. Forward original and six copies. Officers preparing and those forwarding reports sign the first page of original and retained file copy of reports only. Submit copies of clippings, sketches, etc., when practical. If practicable, prepare sketches suitable for blueprinting or photostating.

[REDACTED]

Subject: Great Britain - Navy - Destroyer Design.

-----

2. This design is referred to in the Department of Naval Construction as "the H.A. (high angle) destroyer" which points up the emphasis placed on anti-aircraft armament in the design.

3. A Denny-Brown Stabilizer is included in the design.

Respectfully,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT,

NAAS Date

APR 5 1973

Capt Beaidall - Rad and talk me with CNO.

Safe: Navy

~~SECRET~~

Spuch

Franklin  
Jack B -

2678

IN REPLY ADDRESS NOT THE SIGNER  
OF THIS LETTER, BUT  
HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



REFER TO No.

HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

September 2, 1941.

Dear Admiral Stark:-

Your letter about my encounter with a submarine went all over creation, and finally came to me last Saturday. I hasten to reply. For exact information I would have to send to the TEXAS, and pore over the records of the event, but I believe that my memory serves well enough for the kind of information you wish.

*about July 17 or 18*

We were on our sixth day of patrol, going NE, in Latitude 47 N., Long 41 W., approximately, when about 2000, a little before dusk, a submarine periscope was sighted by several lookouts simultaneously, or nearly so. It was sighted on the port quarter bearing about 225 relative, distant less than 1000 yards. We immediately went to torpedo defense quarters, hoisted the emergency signals to the DD's, sent them out to try to trail the sub, and attack if she was a menace to us. The TEXAS was put on an easterly course, speed increased, and maneuvered to be in an advantageous position for any eventuality should such occur to one of the DD's. *The presence of the sub was broadcast, and of Nav notified in usual manner later.*

How the submarine was able to get into that locality is a mystery to me. She had to pass through a cordon of at least two DD's, unless she was deeply submerged and rose to ~~the surface~~ periscope depth immediately they had passed over. In all of our patrols we had submarine alarms (sound) in this approximate locality. I believe that this is caused by the fact that this latitude is about right for a trip from Brest to Newfoundland.

The DD's formed a scouting line and tried to locate the sub, but she got away. This may be accounted for by the increased noises in the water when a vessel increases speed, or maneuvers in any way to disturb the normal situation. I would have put this alarm down as one of the ordinary alarms except for the fact that I saw the periscope myself before he submerged, and it was seen by at least three other officers and several lookouts.

In my opinion this sub was on the way home to Brest with no more torpedoes, because had he had any, the chance was a grand one if the Germans wanted to start anything. *After an hour of search I recalled the DD's and we continued our patrol,*

I hope this sketchy recital gives you the main facts. In order to keep this secret and personal I am typing this myself so if the script has a lean and hungry look, that is the cause.

I thank you sincerely for your good wishes, and be assured that mine follow you always.

With great respect,

Very sincerely,

*C. T. Shubert*  
Captain U. S. Navy,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Naval Operations.

Note:- My new address is Hydrographic Office.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

I think the President would like to read this latest despatch from Senior Officer Present Afloat, Iceland, dealing with attack on GREER, in connection with preparation of the President's forthcoming speech.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-5-24-65

Signature-Carl L. Spricer

[ATT. 9-9-41]

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>CONTASKROUP 1.5</b>	<b>OPNAV</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b>
RELEASED BY _____		<b>URGENT</b>
DATE <b>6 SEPT. 1941</b>	<b>CINCLANT</b>	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>2130</b>		DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____		<b>URGENT</b>
PARAPHRASED BY <b>GLUNT</b>		ROUTINE
		DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE	TIME	GCT
------	------	-----

TEXT **IN REFERENCE TO YOUR 042006. SUBMARINE ORIGINALLY SIGHTED ON SURFACE AT 0707 BY BRITISH PLANE. SUBMARINE SUBMERGED AND AIRCRAFT REPORTED POSITION TO GREER. UNDER-WATER CONTACT MADE BY GREER AT 0920. MAINTAINED CONTACT, TRAILED AND BROADCAST WARNING ON 500 KCS. UNTIL 1244. AT 1030 BRITISH PLANE ATTACKED SUBMARINE DROPPING 4 - 250 LBS DEPTH CHARGES WITHOUT EFFECT. PLANE RETURNED TO BASE AND GREER CONTINUED TRAILING. AT 1244 SUBMARINE FIRED TORPEDO AT GREER FROM CLOSE ABOARD FOLLOWED BY TWO MORE TORPEDOES SHORTLY AFTERWARD. AFTER BEING ATTACKED GREER DROPPED 8 DEPTH CHARGES APPARENTLY WITHOUT EFFECT AND LOST CONTACT. GREER MADE CONTACT AGAIN AT 1512 ATTACKED SUBMARINE DROPPING 11 DEPTH CHARGES. GREER DID NOT CONTACT SUBMARINE AGAIN. AT 1615 I RECALLED OUR FORCES ON REQUEST OF BRITISH WHO IT NOW DEVELOPES DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE INFORMATION. POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT SUBMARINE FIRED AT LEAST 2 TORPEDOES AND PROBABLY 3 AT GREER. FROM BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE BRITISH PLANES AND DESTROYERS WHO ARE PATROLLING AREA HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT WITH SUBMARINE SINCE GREER DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES LAST TIME. SUBMARINE WAS NOT SEEN BY GREER HENCE THERE IS NO POSITIVE EVIDENCE THAT SUBMARINE KNEW -**

**SECRET**

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DOD DIR. 5000.0 (0/27/00)

SEE ART 76(4)  
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL COPY DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

45425

Date- 5-24-65

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM COMTASKGROUP 1.5  
RELEASED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_

FOR ACTION

**OPNAV**

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

TOR CODEROOM \_\_\_\_\_  
DECODED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
PARAPHRASED BY \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION

**CINCLANT**

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

**SHEET TWO 052100CR0372**  
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DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_  
TEXT \_\_\_\_\_

**NATIONALITY OF SHIP AT WHICH IT WAS FIRING.**

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- **5-24-65**

Signature- *Carl A. Spier*

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**FILE**

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**\*SHOWN TO OP-38 & OP-20 AT 2200/05**

**SHOWN TO OP-10 AT 2250  
SHOWN TO OP-11 AT 2300**

**\* OP-10A STATED THAT IT WAS NOT  
NECESSARY TO DELIVER TO ADM KING  
IN PERSON.**

**SECRET**

SEE ART 76(4)  
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

part

PSF  
Safe  
Navy


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These despatches, from Naval authorities, having to do with the sinking of the "STEEL SEAFARER," are of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES		MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA CAIRO</u>	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			DEFERRED
DATE <u>7 SEPT. 1941</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM _____			ROUTINE
DECODED BY <u>ROONEY</u>			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>			

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0968

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DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT

ISTHMIAN LINES SS STEEL SEAFARER SUNK AT MIDNIGHT SEPTEMBER 5-6 BY AERIAL BOMBS 25 MILES SOUTH OF SOHAI PENINSULA, NO LIFE, RN CRUISER COVENTRY ON SPOT INVESTIGATING, 24 OF CREW ON SHADWAN ISLAND AND 12 AT HURGADA.

DISTRIBUTION:

38S.....ACTION SHOW TO OPDO.....  
R.C. NO 38W.....38.....12.....13.....16.....00A.....NAVAIDEN CNO FILE.....  
FILE.....

DELIVERED TO.....AT.....BY.....

~~SECRET~~

SEE ART 76 (4)  
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES		MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>SPENAVO LONDON</b>	FOR ACTION	<b>OPNAV</b>	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			<b>RRRRR</b> ROUTINE
DATE <b>7 SEPT. 1941</b>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <b>SIEGLER</b>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ALLENSWORTH</b>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

**071706 CR 0719**

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT

**UNITED STATES FLAGSHIPS IN RED SEA ARE STEAMING AT NIGHT WITH NAVIGATION AND OTHER LIGHTS BURNING FIRST SEA LORD HAS BEEN INFORMED BY CINC MEDITERRANEAN.**

**DISTRIBUTION:** CNO FILE.....

38S.....ACTION

R.C. TO 38W....16....38....10A....12....13....NAVAIDE....FILE

DELIVERED TO.....AT.....BY.....

~~**SECRET**~~

SEE ART 76 (4)  
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

Roosevelt Library

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE	
FROM <u>SPENAVO LONDON</u>	OPNAV	PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY _____		<del>ROUTINE</del>	
DATE <u>7 SEPT. 1941</u>	FOR ACTION	DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM _____		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>REISS</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ALLENSWORTH</u>	DEFERRED		

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

072009 CR 0735

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE	TIME	GC

TEXT

REFERENCE MY 071918, FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY ADMIRALTY FROM SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER SUEZ CANAL AREA QUOTE BOAT CONTAINS 12 MEN LANDED HURGHADA REPORT ALL CREW SAVED UNQUOTE.

DISTRIBUTION:

CNO FIVE.....

13.....ACTION

R.C.TO 38W.....16.....38.....00A.....12.....38S.....NAVAIDE.....

FILE.....

SHOWN TO OPDO AT 2240/7 BY CANNING

DELIVERED TO.....AT.....BY.....

~~SECRET~~

SEE ART 76 (4)  
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

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REF ID: A66155

PSF safe  
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK

I wholly approve the Re-  
definition of Western Atlantic  
Area as approved by you and  
Admiral King.

F. D. R.

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-10-MD  
Serial 0103312

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt L  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/2)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature-  
Carl L. Spe

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Re-definition of Western Atlantic Area.

You may remember at our recent conference you approved the re-definition of the Western Atlantic Area, as shown in green on the attached chart. However, Admiral King feels that this line runs somewhat too close to the southern part of Iceland, and has proposed another line whose western end is somewhat further south. The slanting line coincides approximately with your definition of the European Combat Area.

I can see several advantages in going along with Admiral King in this matter. I did not like to bother you with it, under the present circumstances, and so have myself issued instructions to him, defining the Western Atlantic Area as shown by the vertical green line at longitude 26° West, but turning northeast at latitude 52° North and running along the line shown in blue entitled "Proposed Modification".

This new area should give a better opportunity for appropriate sea routes to Iceland, and the protective operations of naval escorting and covering forces. It is also advisable from an iceberg standpoint.

I would like to get an "Okay, F.D.R.", but, of course, if you do not approve, we can cancel instructions by dispatch and adhere to the green line.


I felt so sure that the orders issued would meet your approval, and in the interest of getting them out as soon as possible, I went ahead.

Betty.



MIDDLE AT

DOMINION OF CANADA



UNITED STATES

CARIBBEAN SEA

AS APPROVED BY PRESENT  
PROPOSED MODIFICATION


COMBAT AREA

WELLS

MILITARY BOLLING

1954

EUROPE



Box

PSF  
Safe: Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A despatch has been received from Commander Task Group 15 (Army Convoy) reporting the following contacts:

At 2110, GCT, 14 September, in latitude 59-02 N., longitude 25-25 W., visibility about 500 yards, TRUXTON in sound screen encountered submarine on surface, distance 300 yards on port bow, on opposite course. Submarine dived and TRUXTON attacked with depth charges, results uncertain.

Other contacts (sound) by screening destroyers of same convoy:

H. P. JONES	1430, Sept. 10th	Lat. 49-35 Long. 49-50
BAINBRIDGE	1904, Sept. 11th	Lat. 51-15 Long. 43-55
TRUXTON and MacLEISH	1815, Sept. 12th	Lat. 52-23 Long. 37-30
BENSON and H. P. JONES	1100, Sept. 14th	Lat. 57-12 Long. 25-15


Contacts developed and depth charges dropped, but results unknown.

Respectfully,

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

  
J. R. BEARDALL

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

PSF SAFE  
NAVY  
bot.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

September 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached digest of lengthy secret  
despatches from the Naval Attache, Istanbul,  
will be of general interest to the President.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

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**DECLASSIFIED** int. 0445, OPNAVINST  
5510.1C By OP 09B91C  
Date 11/10/71

Date- 11/16/71

Signature- RHP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In reply refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1941

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

Art. 0445, OPNAVINST  
5510.1C BY OP 09891C  
DATE 11/10/71  
Date- 11/10/71

Signature- RHP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT

The following memorandum is based on information received from the American Naval Attache in Istanbul. The source is an informant believed by the Naval Attache to be reliable.

The Office of Naval Intelligence gives the information a reliability rating varying from "A" to "B". An explanation of this rating is as follows:

Rating "A" - The information is considered reliable in substance and proceeding from a reliable source. Subject to other information received from other reliable sources either in affirmation or in negation, weight and credence in general should be given to it.

Rating "B" - Information is considered reasonable, but is not confirmed. Information of this type may proceed from a mere logical deduction from the general or specific circumstances attending and influencing general or specific situations.

The memorandum will for purposes of coherence be divided into separate subjects, but attention is called to the fact that all the subjects are interrelated, and each contributes toward the general conclusion that may be reached.

I. Factional strife in Germany: possible peace moves.

The Reichswehr command is today (September 15th) divided into two factions, the first - Extremist, the second - Conservative. The Extremists are strong adherents of Hitler, and include such personalities as Generals Keitel and Reichenau, and a dozen or so less important high ranking officers. The conservative group includes such men as Generals Witzleben, Brauchitsch, Runsted, and Blaskowitz. In addition to these men Marshal Goering is now inclining toward the Conservative group, which is the real reason for his present alienation from Hitler. He and other members of the Conservative faction are under close surveillance of the Gestapo.

The Conservatives aim at final liquidation of the Nazi party at the earliest opportunity, and through loyal non-commissioned officers are spreading disrepute of Nazi leaders among the soldiers. The argument of the Conservatives when approaching the soldiery is to point

out the damage being done to German world prestige and German army reputation by Nazi tactics, and this argument has had telling effect.

The Conservative group is not in favor of embarking on such a costly venture as the invasion of Britain. They feel that even if this venture proved successful, it would greatly weaken Germany at a time when America grows progressively stronger. However, even the Conservatives will risk an invasion if unable to negotiate a satisfactory peace. They do not any longer believe in the possibility of a German dictated peace, but hope for American intervention in arriving at a negotiated peace. They consider that even with America's help, Great Britain would be unable to successfully invade Europe since the German army reserve in men and equipment is sufficient to enable Germany to carry on for a long time independently of supplies obtained in Russia. The Army claims to have a reserve of armament, munitions, and equipment sufficient to last years, and stored all over Europe, particularly in France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

The liquidation of the Nazi party is held by the Conservatives to be a primary essential to a successful peace move, but they realize that it could be effected only by a coup which would be accompanied by serious internal disorders and bloodshed. The Conservatives hesitate to take such a step while major military operations are still under way, since the success of these operations would then be prejudiced. If there was some assurance that the British would meet them half way, and not seek dismemberment and eternal ruination of Germany, the coup might be attempted.

A discussion was recently held in Munster under the leadership of Colonel Schmidt and Major Gerken of the Sixth Army Staff, with respect to possible peace terms. In general these terms might be broadly outlined as follows:

1. The British Empire would be left intact.
2. The Germans would be given a free hand in Russia to occupy up to the Ural Mountains for twenty-five years.
3. A free occupation of the protectorates of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
4. Germany would free Holland, Belgium, and Norway, but would retain Luxemburg, and Alsace Lorraine.
5. France would be freed, but with the condition that the Germans have unlimited freedom of enterprise and movement of German Nationals in French Colonies.
6. Croatia, some Greek Islands, and part of Greece near Albania to go to Italy.
7. Germany would claim no colonies, but would want large concessions in East Indies products for which she now has contracts with the Dutch

puppet Government.

8. Germany would not back Japan in any conquest of the Dutch East Indies.

The Naval Attache's informant states that the Conservative group would like to send, preferably to Istanbul, one of their principals, to meet a person having the confidence of the President of the United States, in order to discuss peace terms, and obtain the latter's views as to a just peace.

## II. Possibilities of invasion of England.

The Brauchitsch (Conservative) group have no enthusiasm for invasion, but will ultimately try it unless some kind of favorable negotiated peace can be arranged.

The German general staff admits they are seven weeks behind schedule in the Russian campaign, and they are disappointed with the slow progress and the heavy losses they have suffered. This may result in postponing any contemplated plans for invasion of England for six months or longer. The staff realizes that such an invasion would entail the sacrifice of huge quantities of men and material and would leave Germany so weakened as to make it impossible to carry out further military operations.

The General Staff, while not very confident of accomplishing a successful invasion of Britain, has nevertheless made detailed preparation for such a venture. More than 3,000 Heinkel 111's with several thousand towing gliders with specially trained pilots are being held in reserve. There are also many Junkers transports of which 500 are now in daily operation bringing back seriously wounded from the Russian front.

The High Command realizes invasion of Britain must be done chiefly from the air, especially since motor speed boats, of which much was expected, have proved worthless in rough weather. If an invasion is attempted 80% of the troop carrying and other activity will be in the air, and the Germans will throw in everything they have. For this reason, an invasion attempt is held highly improbable, until three months or more after destruction of Russian first line forces and the establishment of a front line east of Moscow and Kiev.

Hitler wanted to undertake an invasion of England soon after the end of the Greek campaign, but the high command was unwilling to embark on such a venture with the potential threat of Russia at their backs and their dependence on that country for supplies.

## III. German Morale.

The heavy bombing by the British during the last two months has had a decided effect upon the German civilian morale, especially at Munster,

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Page Four

Aachen, Bremen, Hamburg and Kiel. The damage to date in Berlin has been slight, however. Should this bombing by the English continue to increase, the inhabitants in some of the above enumerated cities may not be able to stand it much longer, and will decamp.

It is obvious that German workmen, to say nothing of indentured workmen, will not continue indefinitely to produce under the present high pressure conditions. This fact is evidenced by the noisy protest meetings held in numerous factories last month, in addition to serious revolt at the Junkers works at Dessau and Leipzig, and at the shipyards in Hamburg and Bremen. Such grumblings cannot be curtailed without placing a substantial percentage of available workmen in prison camps, which would result in a serious stoppage of production. Even though serious consequences might follow if such a step were taken, it would not mean that German morale would crack. The German rulers try to avoid shooting those who interfere with the production schedule, but would not hesitate to do so if they felt conditions warranted such steps.

#### IV. Intelligence information on Italy. (Source - Adelchi Serena)

Italian people no longer believe in German victory, but cannot get out of German grip. The morale is low and there is a longing for peace, but nevertheless there have been no strikes or sabotage in factories.

Hitler asked for ten more Italian divisions for Russia, but Il Duce refused on the grounds that Italian soldiers were not inured to the Russian climate. The Axis is training many Germans and Italians in Sicily, while at the German Colonial School in Rome, there are being trained 2,200 young Germans for colonial police.

Bombardment of Naples toward the end of August hit a big munitions train of 98 cars which all exploded. Missed, however, were two large cruisers and three destroyers in the harbor. These were protected by a smoke screen. The ships mentioned were still there about the tenth of September.

The Italians are working hard on fortification of the Italo-Austrian frontier.

The Italian government no longer believes that Japan can be relied on as an axis partner.

#### V. Military Intelligence.

Germany has great need of manganese, rubber, cotton, and nickel. Their supply of copper seems to be sufficient for about one year, and they have enough gasoline for the time being.

During the past six months some twenty auxiliary cruisers have been completed and equipped. In part, these cruisers have been converted from large freighters seized from Holland, Belgium, and Norway, and bought from Denmark. Four 18,000 ton cruisers of a new secret type are now under

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construction in Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel and Danzig, but will not be ready for some time. They are reputed to be very fast and effective. Informant is endeavoring to secure more information concerning these ships.

Central Headquarters, air defense set up in Berlin Tiergarten one minute from Zoo station and eighty meters from Charlottenburger Chaussee. It is a large green stone building, resembling a 16th century fortress with four of the largest AA guns ever built, in retractible turrets on the roof. These guns are said to be able to fire up to heights of 12,000 meters. The largest sound locator in Germany is erected in a building close by.

#### VI. The Russian campaign.

German losses in men and material in the Russian War are far greater than in all previous military operations combined.

Hitler did not desire SS troops used on active fronts but Goering, who has read the writing on the wall for the Nazi party, sent many under fire in Serbia, Greece, Crete and Russia. These units suffered heavy casualties, especially in Russia, around Minsk and Smolensk. One of these SS units did however do effective work at Minsk, and later south of Kiev by slipping through the Russian lines and giving false orders supposedly emanating from a Russian major. These orders caused confusion in the Russian ranks and resulted in heavy losses in men and material. The leader of this unit and the man responsible for the feat was one Captain Donner of SS regiment 17 G (or E?). He was born in St. Petersburg of German parents, is forty-five years old, and of course speaks Russian like a native. He did successful intelligence work in Russia as a member of military delegations before the Russian campaign started.

Two motorized and one infantry division which were stationed at Stahnsdorf and Luchenwald, and especially trained and equipped for African service, were re-equipped and sent to Russian front because of heavy losses there.

The Germans have nearly 70,000 trained pilots and at least 100,000 more are being trained. They have suffered heavy losses in Russia among their most experienced pilots including 18 of their best squadron leaders during the first month.

#### VII. Coordinated advance on Suez, Malta, and Gibraltar.

Notwithstanding the fact that the German General Staff is not inclined to undertake simultaneous major operations on different fronts renewal of action against the Suez is quite probable within the next two to four weeks. (Date of this information approximately September 17th.)

The Germans claim that they have moved great quantities of material to Libya in the last four months and that they now have, in addition to strong Italian reinforcements, seven mechanized and infantry divisions. The axis

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reinforcements in Libya are reputed to be heavier than the British believe, as only six transports in forty were torpedoed or damaged while enroute from Italy in the three weeks preceeding September 2nd. The British were successful however in damaging five more in the harbors of Tripoli and Benghazi, but not until they had been unloaded.


The Germans feel that unless they can reach Suez, or render it untenable, they cannot hope to stop the enormous supply of men and materials for that area, and eventually for Russia.

Hitler and Mussolini have met alone four times recently, and in these meetings decided upon taking stronger action in the Mediterranean in general, and specifically to attack Malta and Gibraltar. The source of this last item is the cousin of Signor Serena, the chief adviser of Mussolini, and the Secretary of the Fascist party. (A position formerly held by Starace).

The British should be on the alert for a new thrust from General Rommel aimed at the Suez defenses, coupled with a simultaneous air attack on Alexandria with special air troops, transport planes, and equipment from Greece and Crete. At the same time, there will be a heavy and coordinated drive on Malta and Gibraltar, for which German troops are now being organized in Italy. In this connection, our informant states that German soldiers in civilian clothes are reported filtering through the Spanish frontier. Troops, transport planes, and equipment for the Malta Gibraltar operation are now being assembled in Italy.

End of this memorandum.

Additional information from this informant will be supplied when available.



A. G. Kirk, Captain, USN.,  
Director of Naval Intelligence

Copies to  
CNO 16-F  
MID F-1  
Op-16 F-9  
OP-12

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Last night you "wondered" about two items. Here is what information I have been able to get today.

RADAR for Small Craft. You specifically mentioned the possibility of using aircraft RADAR on small surface craft. The Bureau of Ships tells me that to be effective for as much as two miles on a periscope three feet in height above the water, the radar antenna (weight slightly above 100 pounds) must be at least thirty feet above the water. Most small craft, of course, will not have masts which can carry that weight, nor are they susceptible of alteration to permit carrying such top side weight. BuShips states that they are developing radar equipment for all types of vessels in excess of 75' in length, and hope to be in production with same about July 1942.

The nub of the problem seems to be that when the antenna is placed but slightly above the water's surface, the more difficult the problem becomes. Aircraft, medium and large surface craft, use comparatively low frequencies, whereas in small surface ships very high frequencies are necessary.

Cedar Point, Maryland. As I recall it, you said "Piney Point" - and that the activity there was being undertaken by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Aeronautics disclaims knowledge of any activity at Piney Point and the Budget Office (Navy Department) states that there is nothing in the estimates having to do with that place. Aeronautics and the Navy Budget Office think you had in mind Cedar Point. The story of that place follows: Aeronautics wants to establish at Cedar Point (mouth of the Patuxent River) a Flight Test Center. It is intended to concentrate at this station all testing work for Naval sea and land aircraft, which is now done unsatisfactorily at widely scattered points, i.e., Philadelphia, Anacostia, Dahlgren and Norfolk. The advantages of having such a place, according to Aeronautics, are:

- (a) That there will be concentration and better control of testing efforts.
- (b) That test flights will be removed from the densely populated areas where they now take place.
- (c) That there will be better security of tests involving confidential matters.

The initial increment involves some \$3,000,000. The whole project, according to the Plans Division of Aeronautics, will cost about \$8,000,000.

Very respectfully,

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

*V.L. McCrea*  
JOHN L. McCREA

*PSF safe file: Navy*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JAN 22 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Letter of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 15, 1942, requesting your approval of an expanded program of 2,000 vessels requested as a result of conferences with the British Commission, was transmitted by you to me for the preparation of reply and is returned herewith.

On January 16, 1942, in connection with consideration of Navy Department estimates for a supplemental in 1942 and changes to the 1943 Budget, you approved this program insofar as the construction of 1,799 vessels is concerned. Accordingly, I have prepared and there is attached hereto for your signature a proposed letter to the Secretary of the Navy advising him of your action upon his request.

I request your attention particularly to the following facts. The Navy Department advised that you had approved the 958 vessels and requested your approval of the 2,000 vessels (including a margin of 71) as set forth in the letter of the Secretary of the Navy. For your consideration, I presented the expanded program of 1,929 vessels (without the margin of 71); and, in accordance with your directions, after conferring with representatives of the Navy Department, I reduced the expanded program to 1,799 vessels by the elimination of seventy Motor Minesweepers, ten Harbor Craft, twenty 72' Motor Launches, and thirty (or half of the) 63' Aircraft Rescue Boats.

*John W. Blawie, Jr.*  
Acting Director.

7mm

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to your letter of January 15, 1942, requesting release of the program for the construction of 2,000 miscellaneous vessels, resulting from conferences with the British Commission, you are advised as follows:

I approve the program insofar as it relates to the construction of 1,799 vessels and, under date of January 16, 1942, presented to Congress in Estimate No. 11 the following provisions for the fiscal years 1942 and 1943, respectively:

Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels

Emergency Construction

(1942) The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine additional vessels, including hulls, machinery, outfits, armor, armament, ammunition, and essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, at a total cost of not to exceed \$3,900,000,000, toward which there is hereby appropriated \$300,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to enter into contracts in the amount of not to exceed \$750,000,000 for essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, ..... \$300,000,000.

(1943) On account of vessels, including hulls, machinery, outfits, armor, armament, ammunition, and essential tools, equipment and facilities in public or private plants for the building or equipping of said vessels or portions thereof, authorized (and appropriated for in part) by Title VI, Naval Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1942, \$1,588,600,000, to remain available until expended.

The details, including your estimates of cost, of the 1,799 vessels, for the construction of which my approval has been given, are set forth on the following page.

APPROVED PROGRAM FOR EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION  
(Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels)

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Estimated Total Cost</u>
Convoy Escort Vessel (BDE)	250	\$1,600,000,000
Minesweeper Fleet (AM)	48	162,480,000
Motor Minesweeper (YMs)	150	115,200,000
A/S Vessel (PC 180')	150	334,000,000
Oceangoing Tug (AT)	9	6,435,000
Salvage Vessel (ARs)	2	4,200,000
Atlantic Tank Loading Craft	300	577,500,000
Tank Landing Craft Carrier	10	45,250,000
Shallow Draft T. L. C.	300	40,131,000
- Higgins Eureka	500	6,350,000
Harbor Craft	20	14,000,000
- 72' Motor Launch	30	5,550,000
- 63' Aircraft Rescue Boat	30	3,000,000
Ordnance for above		339,290,000
All facilities		680,000,000
<hr/>		
TOTAL APPROVED PROGRAM	1,799	\$3,933,386,000
<hr/>		

In accordance with our understanding, the allocation or use of these vessels will be determined when they are completed.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy.

Harry

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

15 January 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Your authority is requested to present to the Budget and Congress a program for the construction of two thousand (2,000) miscellaneous vessels of categories and at estimated costs as shown in the accompanying table. Of these two thousand (2,000) vessels you have previously released nine hundred and fifty-eight (958) which are marked "Released" in the accompanying table. This part of the program is now under way. It is considered advisable to release the program as a whole, at this time, in order to better coordinate our efforts and to effect completion at the earliest possible date.

The number of vessels for which release is requested is a result of conferences between the British Commission based on their original request which in turn was based on their deficiencies for an all-out war effort. The list represents essentially what we consider reasonably possible to produce within the times shown in the table.

It is our understanding that with your approval of this program we will handle it with the Budget in the same way as we do our own. While this program is based on the British requirements, it is our understanding that these vessels when completed will be allocated where most needed.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank Knox*

The President,  
The White House.

## BRITISH NAVAL REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY

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DDO DIN. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CATEGORY	: Vessels : Released	: Release : Requested	: Total : Vessels to : be Provid- : ed.	: Unit : Cost	: Total : Cost	ESTIMATED DELIVERIES		
						: Year : 1942	: Year : 1943	: 1/2 Year : 1944(July)
1. Convoy Escort Vessels	: 250	:	: 250	: \$6,400,000.	: \$1,600,000,000:	:	: 150	: 100
2. Atlantic Tank Landing Craft	: 300	:	: 300	: 1,925,000.	: 577,500,000:	:	: 300	:
3. Shallow Draft T.L.C.	: 300	:	: 300	: 133,770.	: 40,131,000:	: 10	: 290	:
4. Tank Landing Craft Carriers	:	: 10	: 10	: 4,525,000.	: 45,250,000:	: 2	: 6	: 2
5. Salvage Vessels	:	: 2	: 2	: 2,100,000.	: 4,200,000:	: 2	:	:
6. Rescue Tugs	:	: 9	: 9	: 715,000.	: 6,435,000:	: 9	:	:
7. Minesweepers (Fleet)	: 48	:	: 48	: 3,385,000.	: 162,480,000:	:	: 24	: 24
8. A/S Vessels (PC's 180')	: 60	: 90	: 150	: 2,560,000.	: 334,000,000:	: 30	: 75	: 45
9. Harbor Craft (Boom Vessels)	:	: 30	: 30	: 700,000.	: 21,000,000:	: 30	:	:
10. Minesweepers (small)	:	: 220	: 220	: 768,000.	: 168,960,000:	: 50	: 120	: 50
11. Higgins Burekas	:	: 500	: 500	: 12,700.	: 6,350,000:	: 450	: 50	:
12. 72' Motor Launches	:	: 50	: 50	: 185,000.	: 9,250,000:	: 50	:	:
13. 63' Aircraft Rescue Boats	:	: 60	: 60	: 100,000.	: 6,000,000:	: 9	: 40	: 11
	: 958	: 971	: 1929	:	: \$2,981,556,000:	: 642	: 1055	: 232
Margin (Ships)	:	: 71	: 71	:	: \$ 218,444,000:	:	:	:
Total (Ships)	: 958	: 1042	: 2000	:	: \$3,800,000,000	:	:	:
Facilities					700,000,000			
Armor and Armament					400,000,000			
TOTAL COST					\$4,300,000,000			

*PSF Safe Navy* *Boat*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPT. McCREA:

Will you let me have a memorandum showing the characteristics of these ships?

F.D.R.

-----

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A tabulation showing the characteristics requested above is attached hereto.

Very respectfully,

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA

January 24, 1942.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SHIPS IN THE 1799 VESSEL PROGRAM

VESSEL	Length		Draft F. L. Mean	Displace- ment F.L.	Speed F.L.	Cruising Radius		Armament	Type Machinery
	O. A.	Beam				Miles	at Knots		
Escort Vessel (BDE)- Convoy	306'	35'6"	10'7"	1680	24	6000	12	1 - triple 21" T.T. 3 - 3" 50 Guns 5 - 20 mm M.G. Depth Charges: 2 tracks 8 throwers	Some Turbo Electric and some Diesel Elec. depending on avail- ability of engines.
Minesweeper Fleet (AM)	221'	32'	10'	1131	18	4500	16-1/2	2 - 3" 50 4 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel Electric
Motor Minesweeper (YMS)	136'	24'6"	6'5"	260	14-1/2	1500	14-1/2	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel
A/S Vessel (PC)	184'6"	33'	9'	850	16	4000	15	2 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G. Depth Charges: 2 tracks 4 throwers	Diesel
Oceangoing Tug (AT)	205'	38'6"	14'3"	1500	16-1/2	5000	15	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - .50 M.G.	Diesel Electric
Salvage Vessel (ARS)	183'3"	37'	13'1"	1384	12	3000	12	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel Electric
Atlantic Tank Landing Craft (ATL)	309'	50'	9'	3365	10	5000	10	4 - 20 mm M.G.	Diesel
Tank Landing Craft Carrier (APM)	458'	72'	14'5"	7100	17	8000	15	1 - 3" 50 Guns 8 - 20 mm M.G.	Steam
Shallow Draft T.L.C. (YTL)	107'	32'	3'6"	265'	10	500	10	Use Tank Battery	Diesel

VESSEL	Length C. A.	Beam	Draft F. L. Mean	Displace- ment F.L.	Speed F. L.	Cruising Miles at	Radius Knots	Armament	Type Machinery
Higgins Bureka	36'	10'9"	3'6"	9.2 Tons	10.5 mph	65 mi.	Full Speed	2 - 30 Cal. M.G.	Diesel
Harbor Craft (This includes the Net Tender (YN) and certain other small craft not as yet clearly defined by the British) Net Tender (YN)	151'8"	30'6"	13'7"	700 Tons	11	3000 mi.	11	1 - 3" 50 Guns 2 - .50 M.G.	Diesel Electric
72' Motor Launch	75'	16'	4'3"	50 Tons	10 kts	500 mi.	Full Speed	1 - 3 Pounder	Diesel
63' Aircraft Rescue Boat	63'	15'	3'6"	25 Tons	34 kts	500 mi.	"	2 - 30 Cal. Twin or 2 - 50 Cal. Twin	Gasoline

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF  
Safe  
Navy

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.


Op-10D-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1942

Memorandum for Captain McCrea

Admiral Stark directed that I furnish  
you a copy of this correspondence.

  
F. C. DENEBRINK

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

C  
O  
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Y

Op-10-d/kr

January 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Admiral King has been furnished a copy of the attached despatch from Sumner Welles.

As King and I have repeatedly ~~said~~, and as Mr. Welles has been told, the ABC Navy, if used effectively, could do a whole lot to help themselves.

As an item of interest, I am enclosing on a single sheet their individual and combined strength.

H.R.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 5, 1941

COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTHS  
LATIN AMERICA  
(Built and Building)

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Cuba	Mexico East West	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Total	
BB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
OBB	2(1914) (1915)	2(1910) (1910)	1(1915)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	
CA	2(1931) (1931)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
OCA	-	-	2(1894) (1898)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	
CL	1(1939)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
OCL	-	2(1910) (1910)	1(1902)	-	1	-	-	2(1906)	-	-	6	
Coast Defense (old)	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	
DD	11(6-'38)	9*	6(1928)	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	
ODD	4	1	2	-	-	-	-	2(1917-18)	-	-	9	
SS	3(1933)	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	
OSS	-	1	9	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	14	
PG	2**	2	-	3	1	6	7	2	2	3	28	
OPG	5	2	1	4	9	1	3	3	2	1	34	
AM	9	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	
AO	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	9	
AP	2	-	1	2	-	1	1	-	1	-	8	
Torpedo Boats	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	6	
Training Vessels	1***	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>185</b>

\* Three of the Cassin Class have been launched.  
None have been commissioned.

\*\* Building.

\*\*\* LA ARGENTINA - tabulated under CL.

Note: Figures in parentheses denote year of commissioning.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date - 10-26-66

Signature - Carl S. Spicer

BB Battleship  
 OBB Old Battleship  
 CA Heavy Cruiser  
 OCA Old Heavy Cruiser  
 CL Light Cruiser  
 OCL Old Light Cruiser  
 DD Destroyer  
 ODD Destroyer, second line  
 SS Submarine  
 OSS Old Submarine

PG Patrol Vessel - Gunboat  
 OPG Old Gunboat  
 AM Mine Vessel - Mine Sweeper  
 AO Auxiliary - Oiler or fuel-oil tanker  
 AP Auxiliary - Transport

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January 29, 1942

Op-10-D/KR

TO: DIRECTOR, Central Division, War Department, **January 29, 1942**

FROM: Liaison Officer

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF: other protection in South America.

There is forwarded herewith a copy of the  
I enclose a paraphrase of a telegram of January 28, 1942  
despatch received from the Under Secretary of State,  
20 from Mr. Welles at Rio de Janeiro. I would appreciate  
Sumner Welles, which is self-explanatory.  
it if you would transmit this message immediately to

Admiral Stark.

HRS

Liaison Officer

Enclosure: Paraphrase of telegram  
no. 70, January 28, 1942,  
from Mr. Welles, Rio de  
Janeiro.

C  
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Y

January 29, 1942

TO: DIRECTOR, Central Division, Navy Department  
FROM: Liaison Officer  
SUBJECT: Maintenance of patrols and other protection  
in South America.

I enclose a paraphrase of a telegram of January 28 from Mr. Welles at Rio de Janeiro. I would appreciate it if you would transmit this message immediately to Admiral Stark.

/s/ Orme Wilson

Liaison Officer

Enclosure: Paraphrase of telegram  
no. 70, January 28, 1942,  
from Mr. Welles, Rio de  
Janeiro.

Telegram no. 70

1-28-42, 5 p.m.

From: Rio de Janeiro

1-28-42, 5:47 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND THE  
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

I refer to messages previously transmitted concerning the need for keeping up sufficient patrols, as well as protection of other kinds in the South American continent. The countries of South America, with the severing of relations, have been very bluntly told by the Italians, Germans, and Japanese that they can look forward to difficulties. The representatives of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile especially are greatly worried about the danger of possible attack or acts of sabotage on such strategic places as the mines of Bolivia, Talaba, and Tocopilla. Once more I urge that particular thought be given to these protection problems.

810.20 Defense/1967

U-L:SM:MPM

1-29-42

Copies to WAR and NAVY.

TELEGRAM

PSF Safe: Navy

Bot

The White House  
Washington

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wavell advises King enemy losses in Macassar strait to date conservatively assessed as follows:

First:- Totals definitely sunk nine ships, possibly sunk six ships including two warships. Damaged nineteen ships including seven warships. Details follow:

Second:- Definitely sunk. By U S dds four large transports including one either gasoline tanker or ammunition ship. By U S aircraft four transports; by Dutch aircraft one transport.

Third:- Possibly sunk. By U S dds two medium transports left burning from gunfire. By U S sub one heavy cruiser or carrier. By Dutch aircraft two transports.

Fourth:- Damaged. By U S dds two transports. By U S aircraft one cruiser one transport. By Dutch aircraft four cruisers two dds., nine transports.

Nothing further from Halsey raid. Will keep you advised.

MCCREA.

Feb 1 1942

1:40 p.m. /d

*navy  
pot.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am forwarding the attached as being  
of possible interest to the President.

Very respectfully,

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 19 1974

## DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM: ADMIRALTY

T.O.R. - O.N.I. 021310

Following is a summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions.

1. Germany is becoming short of oil and her air force has been reduced to first line strength of approximately 4,000 operational and 1,400 transport aircraft.
2. She has recently increased naval and air forces in the Mediterranean. Considerable number of submarines and small craft have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have been accumulated at Mediterranean ports.
3. We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for protection of Axis communication with North Africa to neutralize Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to the Tunis frontier.
4. On Russian front the initiative still in Russia's hands and German forces withdrawing under strong pressure. As yet, no sign of present Russian offensive exhausting itself. Until it does, it will be impossible for Germany to withdraw substantial forces from Russia to rest and refit so as to form a striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian front or for large scale operations in other theatres of war.
5. On the contrary, we know Flak defences in Ukraine are being strengthened at the expense of Roumania and that other air units including air force troops, recently withdrawn from Russian front are being hurriedly returned there after minimum time spent in rest and refit.
6. Owing to reduction in strength of German Air Force unlikely that Germany will be able to make available sufficient air force to contain Russians and at the same time undertake large scale operations elsewhere. Further, this weakness will compel Germany to limit her offensive to one major operation only where she might hope to concentrate an air force sufficient to give her local superiority. To achieve this she would have to reduce her air force elsewhere to a minimum required for security.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

7. No evidence (?German) striking force being created now, nor do we consider a striking force sufficient for large scale operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilisation is reached by 15th February, earliest date by which division (including divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons) for large scale operations could be withdrawn, rested and restored, would be the 1st May. So far as Russia is concerned large scale operations unlikely to take place owing to thaw during April, and the consequently difficulty of movement.

Possible courses of German action.

8. (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front. For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly impossible as yet.

(B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian army in north and centre).

Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible substantial supplies of oil. She can only obtain fabric oil in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the most likely major operation.

9. A thrust through Turkey (?towards) Syria and thence to Iraq and/or Egypt. Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany in possession of oil fields potentially capable of meeting her needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within striking distance of Abadan and open way to a further advance into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would be more difficult than from Caucasia, at least until Germany had a secure sea route through Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of German forces through her territory Germans would be undertaking new military commitments. Seems unlikely that Turkey would acquiesce unless Russian army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt confident that Germany would win the war.

10. Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas (a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Advantage to be gained substantial but operation would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre of war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. Occupation of Peninsula would subsequently be a heavy economic liability. This operation therefore appears likely, only in order to counter or forestall action against ourselves or America. (b) Through North Africa ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Germans will attempt to maintain and exploit their position in North Africa, and for this purpose reinforce Rommel with forces necessary. Presence of strong air force in central Mediterranean area would serve to neutralise Malta and protect communication with Tripoli. Germany may try to capture Malta.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

11. Invasion of British Isles. It is unlikely that Germany could undertake so large and risky operation as long as Russia remains undefeated.

### CONCLUSION

12. Most probable German major operation likely to be made through Ukraine (?towards) Caucasus to obtain oil. Meanwhile, every effort will be made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and (?exploit) the position in North Africa.

13. Following is our estimate of force Germany would require for operation referred to in paragraph 5 to 11 above and of time that must elapse between beginning of withdrawal of divisions from Russia and concentration of force ready for attack in several theatres of operation. "Z" day is date on which withdrawal of divisions beginning:

(A) Renewed offensive against Russia.

(i) An offensive all along the Russian Front. We cannot as yet see possibility of this operation. Forces required more than Germans have got.

(ii) Thrust in south towards Caucasus (while containing Russian armies in north and centre). Force required against Caucasus some 30 Divisions (of which some 4 to 6 armoured and 4 to 6 motorized) and 1500 aircraft. Earliest date by which this operation could be developed. Concentration on the southern sector Z upward 2-1/2 months. Fall of Rostov Z plus 3 months. Occupation of Maikop - Tuapse area Z plus 4 to Z plus 4-1/2 months. Occupation of Srozni area Z plus 5 months. Occupation of Batum - Baku area dependant on degree of resistance in Caucasus.

?(B) Thrust through Turkey towards Syria and thence Iraq and/or Egypt. Land force required 20 Divisions (including 4 armoured and 6 motorized). Air force required -- if Germans decided to attack Turkey they would expect Turks to receive air assistance from ourselves. Unlikely therefore that Germans would attack until they had assembled, in area from central Mediterranean to Black Sea (which must be treated as a whole) some 1500 aircraft in addition to all available Italian aircraft.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

Earliest date on which forces could be concentrated on Turkish Frontier, Z plus 2-1/2 months. Earliest date on which force could reach Syrian Frontier, Turkey acquiescent Z plus 4-3/4 months. Turkey resistance incalculable.

(C) Invasion of British Isles.

Land force required: 30 divisions (including 9 armoured), exclusive of Divisions required for diversion.

Air Force required: - Full first line strength, denuding all other theatres of war.

Naval forces required: - Substantially the whole German Navy would be involved. Earliest date by which force could be concentrated in west. Z plus 3 to 4 months.

(D) Operations in Central and Western Mediterranean.

(i) Through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Land and Air Forces required - since these operations only likely to be contemplated by Germans to forestall or counter Allied action, they would have to employ such forces as they could muster at the time. Timing would similarly depend on the state of affairs then existing.

(ii) Through North African ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Land force required - 7 divisions made up say as follows: - 2 German armoured divisions, 1 German motorised division, 1 Italian armoured division, 1 Italian motorised division, 2 Italian infantry divisions.

Assuming of Axis forces now in Libya, equivalent of 1 armoured, 1 motorised and 2 infantry division will still be in area. These are included in above. Air Force required - the force set out in sub paragraph (B) above would cover this operation. Earliest date by which force in TRIPOLITANIA could be reinforced. Not using Tunisian ports - 3 months from date of embarkation. Using Tunisian ports - 1-1/2 months from date of embarkation.

14. Above, putting into terms of CALENDAR, and assuming 15th February as earliest date on which substantial force can be withdrawn from Russia, gives earliest date for stage referred to above as follows: -

- (a) 1. Earliest date of concentration on the south Russian sector 1st May.
2. Fall of Rostov 15th May.
3. Occupation of MAIKOP-TUAPSE area 15th June to 30th

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

June.

4. Occupation of GROZNI area 15th July.
5. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area, dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasia.

(b) 1. Concentration on the Turkish frontier 1st May.

2. Earliest date on which forces could reach the Syrian frontier - Turkey acquiescent - early August, Turkey resisting - incalculable.

(c) Concentration of forces for invasion of U.K. - 15th May to 15th June.

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USMC...Op-16...Op-16-F...Op-16-F-1...Op-16-F-3...Op-16-F-4

Op-16-F-5...Op-16-F-6...Op-16-F-10...F-11...F-105...F-111

F-35

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

**SECRET**

NO. 3369

From: M/O Bandoeng to War Dept.  
Time Filed at Source: Jan 31, 1942  
TOR MID: Jan. 31, 1942  
TOR ONI: 311620 Jan. 1942

The causeway between Johore and Singapore Island has been destroyed and all ground forces have been withdrawn to within the boundaries of the island.

There are no reliable reports regarding the movements of the enemy convoy from Balikpapan.<sup>1</sup> Macassar<sup>2</sup> and Bandjermasin<sup>3</sup> are the likely objectives of this convoy. It is, however, possible that the Japanese plan to secure Soerabaya or Timor--by gaining Timor to try to intercept the Australia Java route of communications. It is not probable that substantial and effective resistance can be offered against these objectives of the enemy since naval and airplane strength is not adequate.

There is nothing new to communicate with regard to the Island of Ambon.

THORPE

1. Balikpapan on east coast of Borneo.
2. Macassar in southern Celebes.
3. Bandjermasin in southern Borneo.

All copies informational.

MID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV AIDE...Op-10/11...Op-12...Op-16...Op-16-F...Op-16-C  
Op-16 F-1...Op-16 F-2...F-105...F-11...F-111...F-35

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RETAIN OR DESTROY.

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FEB 19 1974

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~~SECRET~~

No. 3984

From: C. C., A.F.F.E. Ft. Mills  
To: War Department  
Time Filed at Source: January 31, 1942  
T.O.R. - P.I.D. January 31, 1942  
T.O.R. - C.N.I. 011030

The Japanese made a sudden attempt to break the center of our lines in Luzon with no success whatsoever. Sporadic fighting has been carried on along the whole line. There has been heavy artillery fire. Activity in the air has been negligible. Nothing of special interest is reported from Mindia o.

MacARTHUR

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PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY

Exact Action Copy: A. C. of S., WPD

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OSD Letter 5-3-72

FEB 19 1974

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ONI DISTRIBUTION: Op-16...Op-12...USMC...Op-16-F...Op-16-F-2...F 11...F-105...  
F-111...F-35... NAV AIDE

No. 3381

From: CGAFFE, Fort Mills  
To: War Department  
Time Filed At Source: February 1, 1942  
T.O.R. - M.I.D. February 1, 1942  
T.O.R. - O.N.I. 011030 February 1942

The situation still remains the same in Mindanao and in the Visayas.

An uncounted number of Japanese bombers from Formosa landed at Nichols Field. They had navy crews and undoubtedly are headed further South.

Concentrations of our heavy guns wiped out a Japanese force with small boats and launches at Ternate.\*

On our front we are more than holding our own against heavy shelling and intermittent infantry fights all along the lines.

MacARTHUR

\*Ternate, at 120° 43' E X 140° 18' N, is a small town on S. W. shore of Manila Bay about 10 miles across from Corregidor.

THIS DESPATCH IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED WITHOUT THE  
PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY

Exact Action Copy: A. C. of S., WPD

MID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: Op-12...Op-38...USMC...Op-16...Op-16-F...Op-16-F-2...Op-16-F-10...  
F-11...F-105...F-111...F-35... NAV. AIDE

No. 3394

From: CGAFFL, Fort Mills to War Dept.  
Time Filed At Source: Feb. 020005  
TOR MID Feb. 020049  
TOR ONI Feb. 021020

There has been no change in the situation in the south and very little air activity here. Japanese attacks on my right flank and against my left rear were beaten off with serious enemy loss.

MACARTHUR

MID DISTRIBUTION: JIC

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV AIDE...OP10/11...OP12...US MC...OP16...OP16F...  
OP16F-2...F-11...F-105...F-111...OP16C...F-3b.

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DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

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DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 5-3-72  
FEB 19 1974

From: M/A Lima to War Dept.  
 Time filed at source: Jan. 30, 1942  
 TOR MID: Jan. 31, 1942  
 TOR ONI: 311620 Jan 1942

As soon as it is received a copy of the terms of the Peruvian Ecuadorian boundry dispute settlement will be sent to Panama and Washington D. C. It is not considered important that a few yonger Army Officers consider Peru was unjustly dealt with by th accord since the general public reaction is one of satisfaction.

ENT

G-2 Comment: No previous information on the attitude of the army regarding the border settlement has been received. Some few members of the army possibly feel that no compromise at all with Ecuador was in order, since Peru had complete superiority in the military operations of the last six months.

All copies informational.

MID DISTRIBUTION: State Dept....JIC

ONI DISTIRIBTION: Nav Aide...12...38...US MC...16...16-F...op 16 f-7..  
 F-105...F-11...F -111...F-35...16-C

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 PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY.

DECLASSIFIED  
 OSD Letter, 5-3-72

FEB 19 1974

FROM: THE ADMIRALTY  
 TO: DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
 TOR ONI: Feb. 021310

OPTIL No. 38

Information received up to 7 A.M., 1st February, 1942.

1. NAVAL

Photographic reconnaissance on the 31st located the battleship TIRPITZ and a tanker at Trondhjem, and another photographic reconnaissance of Brest located the SCHARNHORST and CHELSEA at the torpedo-boat station and PRINZ LUCEN at the coaling wharf. A German ship, probably the SPRENGELD (5,000 tons), reported on 31st in English and German that she had been torpedoed 400 miles North of Azores and was on fire and sinking and had British prisoners on board. Corvettes have been sent. An ex-United States coast-guard cutter has been torpedoed and sunk in the Atlantic while escorting a homeward-bound convoy. An 8,000 ton tanker was torpedoed and abandoned on the 15th East of Newfoundland, and survivors from a small Greek ship have been landed at St. John's. A medium sized British merchant vessel was sunk by submarine gunfire on the 30th 50 miles East of Madras. An 8,000 ton British ship, independently routed from Buenos Aires to the United Kingdom, was torpedoed this morning 300 miles South-East of New York.

2. MILITARY

LIBYA. On the 31st, there was no forward movement of enemy main bodies, which were in the area Benina-Msus. Their patrols were, however, active as far as Marawa. Our forces were approximately on a line El Garib-Charruba-Tengeder with patrols pushed well forward. Part of the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had been cut off in the Benghazi area, has broken through and is reorganizing.

MALAYA. During the night 30th/31st. Our forces effected their withdrawal to Singapore Island in spite of continued enemy pressure. The causeway has been breached. Part of an Indian Brigade which was cut off two days previously has not yet rejoined during five nights beginning 26th/27th, the Royal Navy evacuated nearly 2,000 all ranks, British and Indian, who had been cut off on the West Coast of Johore.

BURIA. On the 30th, Moulmein was heavily attacked, and fighting continued throughout the night. During the 31st, our troops were withdrawn to the West bank of the Salween River.

DECLASSIFIED  
 JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
 BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

RUSSIA. South-East of Vyazma, the Russians have made further progress towards the town, In the Donets Sector Russian attacks are continuing.

3. AIR OPERATIONS

WESTERN FRONT. 31st. A Hudson bombed a 3,500 ton freighter in convoy off Holland. Two hits were followed by smoke from amidships. 31st January/1st February. 131 aircraft were sent out - Brest 72, St. Nazaire 31, Havre 14, leaflets 13. Five bombers are missing. Results were mainly unobserved owing to heavy cloud. 12 R.C.A.F. aircraft participated without casualties.

LIBYA. 29th/30th. Wellingtons and Liberators bombed enemy supply columns in the Aghcila-Jedabya Area. Aircraft attacked military objectives at Misurata and mechanical transport parks south of Tripoli (L). They also hit an 8,000 ton merchant vessel north of Tripoli and a 4,000 ton ship off Cape Bon. Both vessels were left stationary and listing.

MALTA. On the 30th and 31st. Enemy aircraft caused slight damage at Hal Far aerodrome which, with Takali water-logged, remains unserviceable. Dockyard property was also damaged.

MALAYA. 30th. Enemy aircraft bombed the docks area at Singapore, and on 31st Seletar aerodrome was attacked by 27 heavy bombers. Some buildings were destroyed and the aerodrome is still unserviceable. Our fighters destroyed four enemy aircraft, probably destroyed one and damaged one. Two of our fighters are missing.

ONI DISTRIBUTION: NAV ADM...OP12...OP36...BU AIR...US MC...OP16...OP16F  
OP16C...OP16F-1...OP16F-2...OP16F-3...OP16F-4...OP16F-5.  
OP16F-6...OP16F-10...F-11...F-105...F-111...F-35...  
Comdr. Bailey...JIC.

THIS DESPATCH IS NOT TO BE DUPLICATED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE  
DIRECTOR OF N.V.A.L INTELLIGENCE.

RETAIN OR DESTROY.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-78  
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1304 PSF Safe: Navy  
COMINCH TO CINCPAC 051555 February:

CONTINUOUS STUDY OF GENERAL PACIFIC SITUATION IMPELS ME TO THE CONVICTION (WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY DEMANDS FROM AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC) THAT WE MUST USE MAXIMUM FORCES AVAILABLE IN AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. THIS RELIEF CAN BE EFFECTED EITHER INDIRECTLY BY SUITABLE OPERATIONS IN YOUR AREA OR DIRECTLY BY SENDING REINFORCEMENTS TO ANZAC AND/OR ABDA AREA. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS SHOULD MARK EDLY REDUCE NEED FOR ESCORT OPERATIONS IN EASTERN PACIFIC. LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER INCLUDING GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION IN YOUR AREA IN WHICH CONSIDERATIONS OF ORIGINAL TASK INVOLVING USE OF BATTLESHIPS SHOULD APPEAR.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC (AND OTHERS) 061513 February:

GIVE THIS DESPATCH IMMEDIATELY TO ADDRESSEES IN PERSON. THERE ARE DEFINITE SIGNS OF A WIDESPREAD AND COORDINATED JAPANESE OFFENSIVE IN ABDA AND ANZAC AREA WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WHICH MAY WELL BE ACCOMPANIED BY STRONG RAIDS AGAINST MIDWAY OAHU NEW HEBRIDES NE AUSTRALIA OR POSSIBLY WEST COAST OR CANAL. EXPEDITE DISPOSITIONS AND OPERATIONS OF YOUR FORCES TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING DETACHED ENEMY VENTURES COSTLY FOR HIM. COMTASKFOR 11 PACFLT CONTINUE TOWARD ANZAC AREA FOR COOPERATION WITH COMANZACFOR. INFORM ARMY AND AUSTRALIANS. MORE WILL FOLLOW.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC (AND OTHERS) 062352 February:

SITUATION IN NORTHERN ANZAC AREA REQUIRES PROMPT ACTION TO CHECK ENEMY ADVANCE AND OCCUPATION. ESTIMATE ENEMY GARRISON AND STRONG SHORE BASED AIR WILL BE ESTABLISHED RABAUH NEXT FEW DAYS AND THEN ENEMY STRIKING FORCE OF AT LEAST TWO CARRIERS SEVERAL CRUISERS DESTROYERS POSSIBLY BATTLESHIPS AND AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE TO STRIKE NEW CALEDONIA AND HEBRIDES AND OTHER POSITIONS ON OUR LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. COMANZAC FORCE EXPEDITE CONCENTRATION NAVAL FORCES FIJI-NEW CALEDONIA AREA ALSO PRESS AND ARRANGE FOR FULL COOPERATION AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE INCLUDING ONE GROUP US ARMY PURSUIT RECENTLY ALLOCATED. CINCPAC ARRANGE FOR AND DIRECT TASK FORCE 11 AUGMENTED BY SAN FRANCISCO TWO DD AND ALL PRACTICABLE NAVY PATROL AND ARMY BOMBER PLANES FROM HAWAII TO PROCEED AT ONCE TOWARD ANZAC AREA AND COOPERATE WITH COMANZAC FORCE UNDER DIRECTION OF LATTER. EXPEDITE PENSACOLA AND TWO DD JOINING UP BUT DO NOT DELAY OPERATIONS AWAITING THEIR ARRIVAL. THIS ACTION CONSIDERED GOOD PROTECTION CONVOYS 2030 AND BT200 WHICH SHOULD BE COMBINED NEAR BORABORA THENCE PROCEED AUSTRALIA UNDER REDUCED ESCORT HONOLULU AND TWO DD SUGGESTED. CINCPAC PROVIDE THESE FORCES WITH ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION OF ENEMY.

CINCPAC PACIFIC FLEET MARKEDLY INFERIOR IN ALL TYPES TO ENEMY. CANNOT CONDUCT to AGGRESSIVE ACTION PACIFIC EXCEPT RAIDS OF HIT AND RUN CHARACTER WHICH ARE COMINCH UNLIKELY TO RELIEVE PRESSURE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. LOGISTIC PROBLEMS FAR 080239 SURPASS PEACETIME CONCEPTION AND ALWAYS PRECARIOUS DUE TO FUELING AT SEA AND DEPENDENCE UPON WEATHER. YOUR 051555 061523 062532. OFFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT BATTLESHIPS DOES NOT FIT IN WITH HIT AND RUN OPERATIONS AND THEIR INDEPENDENT OR SUPPORTING USE PRECLUDED BY LACK AIR COVERAGE AND ANTISUBMARINE PROTECTION. SUCH EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERED INADVISABLE AT PRESENT. CONTINUED OPERATION OF ONE OR MORE PACIFIC FLEET TASK FORCES IN ANZAC AREA WILL INVOLVE DEPENDENCE UPON LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WHICH SUPPORT XXXX APPEARS LIMITED. SITUATION OUTLINED OPNAV 160115 DECEMBER AND COMINCH DIRECTIVE 301740 DEC INHIBIT UNDUE WEAKENING THIS FLEET WITHOUT SERIOUS HAZARD TO OUR POSITION IN CENTRAL PACIFIC; UNLESS THIS FLEET IS STRENGTHENED BY STRONG ADDITIONS PARTICULARLY IN AIRCRAFT LIGHT FORCES CARRIERS AND FAST FLEET TANKERS ITS EFFECTIVENESS FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION IS LIMITED. TASK FORCE 11 PROCEEDING AND WILL BE AUGMENTED BY SURFACE FORCES AS DIRECTED. SIX PATROL PLANES AND CURTISS PROCEEDING SUVA. SITUATION HAWAII STILL SUBSTANTIALLY AS OUTLINED OPNAV 170115 DECEMBER HENCE CONSIDER RETENTION ARMY BOMBERS HERE VITAL NECESSITY. TASK FORCES 8 AND 17 REFUELING REPAIRING PREPARATORY FOR SEA IN ABOUT 5 DAYS. TASKS TENTATIVELY ONE FORCE PROJECTED TOWARD SUVA OTHER IN RESERVE PEARL.

COMINCH  
to  
CINCPAC  
092245

YOUR 080239 PACIFIC FLEET NOT REPEAT NOT MARKEDLY INFERIOR IN ALL TYPES TO FORCES ENEMY CAN BRING TO BEAR WITHIN OPERATING RADIUS OF HAWAII WHILE HE IS COMMITTED TO EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. YOUR FORCES WILL HOWEVER BE MARKEDLY INFERIOR FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA WHEN THE ENEMY HAS GAINED OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC UNLESS EVERY EFFORT IS CONTINUOUSLY MADE TO DAMAGE HIS SHIPS AND BASES. ACTION BY YOU TOWARDS AND IN MANDATES WILL OF ITSELF COVER AND PROTECT MIDWAY-HAWAII LINE WHILE AFFORDING BADLY NEEDED RELIEF OF PRESSURE IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. CANNOT READILY ACCEPT USE OF BATTLESHIPS FOR ESCORTING CONVOYS AS SUITABLE EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE IT IS PASSIVE IN CHARACTER. FEEL ALSO THAT GREATER USE OF AIR UNITS IN SUPPORT OF TASKFOR 11 IS CLEARLY INDICATED RATHER THAN LOCAL PASSIVE DEFENSE IN HAWAII. REVIEW SITUATION ON ABOVE PREMISES AND CONSIDER ACTIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST MANDATES AND WAKE FROM NORTHWARD AND EASTWARD OR OTHERWISE VARY PATTERN OF OPERATIONS.

CINCPAC  
to  
COMINCH  
120307

HALSEY DEPARTS THIRTEENTH FLETCHER FIFTEENTH FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST WAKE AND NORTHERN MARSHALLS. WILL BE COMBINED AS TASK FORCE 13. TANGIER LEFT PEARL TODAY FOR SUVA VIA PAGO PAGO .....

120459

CONCUR IN GENERAL YOUR 092245. AIR SUPPORT TASKFORCE 11 NOW 6 VP AND 12 B17s. USE OF BB IN SUPPORT OF RAIDS WHERE STRONG ENEMY FORCES ARE LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW OF SITUATION NOW INTEND TO EMPLOY TASK FORCES 8 AND 17 IN COORDINATED RAIDS ON WAKE AND THE NORTHERN MARSHALLS.

COMINCH FILE

~~SECRET~~

*file*  
*Bot*

PSF  
Safe  
Navy

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 6, 1942.

DETAILS OF ATTACK BY TASK FORCE EIGHT.

KWAJALEIN ATOLL: 35 VSB and 18 VT (9 torpedo loaded) employed in attack against about 10 ships, 5 submarines, and seaplane base.

Destroyed: One CL or CA  
3 large fleet tankers  
1 AK  
2 SS  
2 large seaplanes  
1 ship (type undeciphered)

Damaged: Several other ships.

ROI:

Destroyed: 2 hangars  
-o-  
Ammunition dump  
Fuel stowage  
All storehouses and warehouses  
Radio building  
3 VF in the air  
6 VSB, 1 VB on the ground.

Our losses: 4 VSB.

TAROA:

Attacked new and well-equipped airfield with 1 CA (CHESTER), 2 DD, 5 VF, 18 VSB.

Destroyed: 2 hangars  
Both fuel tanks  
Some industrial building  
7 VF ) in the air  
5 V(?) )  
5 VF ) on the ground.  
6 VB )

Our losses: 1 VSB: one small bomb hit on CHESTER.

WOTJE:

Attacked nine ships and airfield (no planes found) with 2 CA, 1 DD, 6 VF, 8 VSB, and 9 bomb-loaded VT.

-1-

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature: *Paul L. Spicer*

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 6, 1942.

SECRET

WOTJE (Continued): Destroyed: 4 or 5 AK  
3 or 4 small ships  
2 hangars  
Oil and gasoline stowage  
Shops and storages  
2 AA Batteries  
5 or 6 intermediate coastal guns.

ENTERPRISE was attacked by two groups of five and two twin-engined bombers; shot down two, and one shadowing plane. 1 VF lost in launching.

CHESTER attacked by eight large bombers and several fighters at TAROA.

MEMORANDUM  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

*12/1*  
*Lab: Navy*

*To The Secretary  
for  
The President*

*VR  
75B*

PSF Safe: Navy

INFORMATION ABOUT RADAR

EXPLANATION

- CXAM-1** Radar designed primarily for detecting aircraft at long ranges (antenna approximately 18' X 18').
- YE** Radio homing device.
- TBS** Ultra high frequency radio transmitter.
- ZE** Part of homing device.
- IFF** Radar identification device "Friend and Foe."
- MCW** Modulated continuous wave radio.
- SC** Radar designed primarily for detecting aircraft at medium ranges (antenna approximately 7' X 8').

(Typical plane attack going in)  
"You came off to the right, that big one is nice, come off to the right"  
"Take that cruiser underway off to the right"  
"We have boys, take 'em down"  
"Already completed one plane sitting (later showed up)"  
"We sure got that big bastard didn't we now?" (intense conversation)

(From a fighter who had withdrawn from attacking a Jap bomber too close to fire)  
"You're shooting too high, too high"  
"Now you're getting closer, but too far astern"  
"We tell 'em to cease firing and I'll shoot the engine"  
"Think down" (he did)  
There is much to be told about all this.

This is a war of aircraft and submarines and light forces. Everything

2-11-71

February 19, 1942

The following letter was received by me from my brother, Lt. Comdr. L. J. Dow, Communication Officer on the Staff of Comairbat (Vice Admiral Halsey). It is believed that the comments on the functioning of Navy radio equipment will be of interest. As the letter is personal it is requested that this memorandum be given no further distribution and that it be destroyed when it has served its purpose:

"First I want to say that when the story of this war is told, the equipment the Radio Division is giving us will deserve the greatest credit for winning the war. We use it, depend upon it, and have every confidence in it. Your radar and YE alone are a Godsend, and the fleet from the top to the bottom appreciate it.

As you probably know already we were lucky to just miss the December 7th fiasco and after a few weeks going in circles we started paying the bastards back in the Marshalls. We didn't just hit and run, we stationed ourselves in the middle of four of their bases and pounded hell out of them for nearly twelve hours. Thanks to radar we missed being discovered the day before by one of their patrol planes, were able to keep their bombers off with fighters, and were able to retire without getting hurt. We did shoot down a few antennas and probably would have shot down a couple more Jap suicide pilots with AA fire if we had been equipt with gunnery radars but outside of that we have nothing to gripe about. We broke every rule of warfare (and of communications) and in doing so were able to accomplish the thing we were sent to do. A few of the choice excerpts from the voice radio log are as follows:

(Torpedo plane attack going in)

- - -"You ease off to the right, that big one is mine, ease off to the right"
- - -"Take that cruiser underway off to the right"
- - -"Tak 'em home boys, tak 'em home"
- - -"Attack completed one plane missing (later showed up)"
- - -"We sure got that big bastard didn't we Mr---"(interphone conversation)

(From a fighter who had withdrawn from attacking a Jap bomber due to own AA fire)

- - -"You're shooting too high, too high"
- - -"Now you're getting closer, but too far astern"
- - -"Aw tell 'em to cease firing and I'll shoot the son-of-a-bitch down" (He did)

There is much to be told about all this.

This is a war of aircraft and submarines and light forces. Everything

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300 111-21-21 (2/27/88)

Date- 2-11-71

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in the book about battleships, battle lines, and heavy ships, and fleet actions is as useless as a left-handed corkscrew in prohibition days. Speed is the essence of the whole thing. When you are struggling with priorities keep this in mind and push the equipment for aircraft, carriers, submarines, cruisers, destroyers in that order. Bear in mind that the aircraft and light force picture to be of real value. The old concepts and unfortunately the tactics we have had the most training in are practically dead issues in this naval blitz. In the development of new equipment give us the things we need and want and we will bring home the bacon. Another thing, with all due respect to the British and their problems and ways of doing things, it is all right to find out what their problems are but let's solve them in the American way - it's better. Too much of our stuff is based upon how the British do it. Take fighter direction for example, their average interceptions with fighters is from 3 to 6 percent of those attempted - ours around 90 percent - yet our books on the subject would have us use their methods. There are many other things being done along the same lines, not only in methods but in equipment and arrangements. There are too many reports and opinions from abroad.

A few comments on equipment. Our CXAM-1 is performing beautifully and gives us little trouble. We use it twenty-four hours a day every day we are at sea. The only thing that causes consternation is images caused by side lobes. When they installed the radars they set each one on a slightly different frequency to reduce mutual interference. The frequency therefore does not exactly conform to that of the array hence an enlarged side lobe. You can imagine what happens on the bridge in enemy waters when you report that you "think" it is only a false or sidelobe echo. We are rematching ours and hope to eliminate this difficulty. We have tracked single aircraft as far away as eighty six miles and groups of aircraft over a hundred miles. Our altitude curves consistently permit us to determine altitude of approaching planes within three hundred feet. I suggest that carriers be equipped with an SC in addition to the CXAM-1. Greater use is made of radar in carriers than in any other type of ship. We are lost when our one radar is out of commission at any time. Our gunnery radars must be pushed - we need them badly. Repeater screens for radar plot and on the bridges would be a desirable improvement if they could be developed. Each ship should be furnished with frequency measuring equipment to make proper adjustments. There is a shortage of 852 tubes in this area - a larger number of spares of this type should be aboard.

The YE is invaluable. It works fine but requires much maintenance. The array rotating part, brushes, and sliprings give continuous trouble due to moisture. I suggest an arrangement similar to that on the radars be developed to replace the present system. Other recommended improvements: Provide voice modulating equipment so that it can be used to communicate with planes. Also the modulation frequency should be variable between 3000 and 7000 kc's to correspond to the usually used aircraft frequencies and to preclude the

necessity for shifting coils in the plane. When the planes are on the YE frequency we have a hell of a time communicating with them. A ready means of orientating the dividing line between any two letters-sectors to any desired bearing. This is desirable to permit using the dividing line between two sectors as a beam for planes to follow to an objective.

The next item is a MUST item and we need them pronto. All carriers, cruisers, and destroyers must be equip with TBS equipment immediately. One frequency is all that is required (72.5). We have built haywire equipment to work our destroyers. The carriers are task force flagships and are constantly the primary targets of enemy submarines and aircraft. We must have a direct voice channel for day and night emergency maneuvers and warning or radar reporting channels with our protecting cruisers and destroyers. Radio silence and limitations on visual signalling at night and the normal delays in handling this type of traffic preclude the use of other circuits for this purpose. I cannot too strongly emphasize the necessity for equipping the carriers and cruisers with TBS equipment immediately. When can we expect ours? CXAM and SC equipped ships need two each - one for the radar net and one for maneuvering channel.

Based upon my entire experience and most thorough considerations, the following are the general specifications for the ultimate aircraft radio equipment for all CV or single engined aircraft. Crystal controlled, five channel, quickshift both transmitter and receiver, 25 watts, 3000 to 20000 kcs., built-in ZB circuit with provisions for two way voice communication on the ultra high frequency. No direction finders and no plug-in-coils, voice and MCW only. Interphone separate from radio. Include IFF circuit if practicable. The number contracted for after all bugs were worked out would be sufficient to provide all small planes in the navy with one model. I could expound for hours on the advantages of such a set over the present equipment and know about all the limitations and arguments against crystal control."

J. B. Dow,  
Comdr. U.S.N.

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DDO DNL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-11-71

Signature- RHP

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

(SC)P17-2/00  
(012900A)/GEM

March 9, 1942

BSF  
Safe  
Navy

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

As I told you sometime ago, I have asked nine senior officers in the Navy, in whose judgment I have confidence, to serve for me as an unofficial selection board to select the forty most competent officers in the Navy out of 120 of flag rank. I have just received complete returns from all nine officers who were asked to serve on this unofficial selection board. Applying the rule that five votes out of nine in a selection board constitutes a selection, the returns gave me the names of 38 officers which, including King and Stark, bring the total up to the desired forty. King and Stark were not voted on. They were divided as follows:

Those receiving all nine votes: -

Bristol  
Edwards  
Hoover  
Ingram  
Purnell

Those receiving eight out of the nine votes: -

Halsey  
Ghormley  
Glassford  
Giffen  
C. M. Cooke  
Pownall

Those receiving seven votes: -

Ingersoll  
Fletcher  
Fitch  
Bellinger  
Turner  
Hustvedt  
Mitscher

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FORM 114 5200.9 (8/27/58)

*file to Post Navy*

March 9, 1942

Those receiving six votes: -

Leary	Carpender
Russell Willson	W. W. Smith
Brainard	Olendorf
McCain	Griffin
Farber	

Those receiving five votes: -

Wilcox	Kirk
Draemel	Ainsworth
Theobald	Bieri
Jacobs	Badger
Monroe	Callaghan
Lee	

Here we have, then, 38 officers by process of selection *as by* probably as high class a selection board as one could get together, *all* available for sea command. Incidentally, the nine officers who comprised this unofficial selection board were as follows:

Richardson	Yarnell
King	Reeves
Jacobs	Bloch
Stark	
Edwards	
Kalbfus	

All nine of these men have had unexcelled opportunity to know the ranking men of the Navy and are themselves men of sound judgment and utter devotion to the service.

In addition to these 38, I have available the names of others who received less than five votes as additional background material for future guidance. It is interesting to note that the average age of the 38 officers in the above lists is 56.2 years.

I also asked Admiral Jacobs to prepare for me, and he has done so, a list of the best 100 men in his judgment in the Navy below the grade of rear admiral, and I have this list available for reference.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)


Date- 4-6-59

Signature-

*Carl S. Spicer*

*Frank Knox*

Frank Knox



# COCOS ISLAND NORTHEAST PROFILE

ALTITUDE OF PLANE 4500 FT.









































PX 71-38(1)

8297

14 MAR 1942

WESTERN SHORE OF "FOSTER COVE", SHOWING  
LAVA ARM EXTENDING NORTHWARD WHICH PROVIDES A  
LEE WHEN SW OR W WINDS OCCUR.

MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CAMBIE ISLAND

GENERAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

NAVY PHOTOGRAPH

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)



OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (2)

ANCHORAGE OFF VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FOR  
LIGHT CRAFT IS CLOSE TO LAVA ROCKS SHOWN IN LEFT SIDE OF  
PHOTO.



PX 71-38 (3)

8297

14 MAR 1942

JAMES BAY, JAMES ISLAND, FROM WEST.

MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR OTHER THAN OFFICIAL USE OF THE  
NAVY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE  
NAVY PHOTOGRAPHIC CENTER


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



8297

PX71-38 (4)

14 MAR 1947

CAPE MARSHALL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND.

MADE FOR

U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CAMALLOE

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
BY ORDER OF THE  
COMNAVSTA

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (5)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

3233 DATE 10 MAR 1942

SUBJECT ALBEMARLE POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM SE

MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

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PX 71-38 (6)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


By RT, NARS Date ~~APR 3~~ 1973

CS 2297 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT ALBEMARLE POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM NORTH.

MADE FOR  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
P.O. BOX 100, CATALINA ISLAND

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION, BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

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PX 71-38 (7)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

CS 8297 DATE: MAR 1942  
NORTHERN COAST OF ALBEMARLE ISLAND, BETWEEN  
ALBEMARLE POINT AND CAPE BERKELEY, SHOWING POINT THAT  
MIGHT BE MISTAKEN FOR ALBEMARLE POINT WHICH IS FURTHER  
EAST.

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PX 71-38(8)

CU 829? DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT BOAT LANDING AT VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,  
IS MARKED "X".

NUMBER  
PAC. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION BY ORDER OF THE:


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38(9)

COB 287 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.  
PREPARED BY  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
CANTON SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PA 71-38(10)

CS 8297 DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.

FROM THE NAVAL AIR STATION  
CANTON SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (11)

0329 / DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.

U.S. MARINE AIR STATION  
CAMP 0 0500, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_



PX 71-38(12)

CS 8297	DATE	14 MAR 1947
SUBJECT UNNAMED COVE, SE. OF GARDNER BAY, HOOD ISLAND.		
MADE BY		
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.		
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH NOT TO BE PUBLISHED; BY ORDER OF THE		

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38(13)

8297 ..... DATE 1 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT FRESHWATER BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.  
MADE FOR  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE  
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (14)

CG 8297

DATE

14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT WRECK BAY, CHATHAM ISLAND.

MADE FOR

U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

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CHIEF OF BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



CC 3297 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
 BLUE MOUNTAIN (CERRO AZUL), SW CORNER  
 OF ALBEMARLE, THE HIGHEST POINT IN THE GALAPAGOS  
 ARCHIPELAGO. VIEW FROM SOUTH, SHOWING LAVA FLOW  
 INDICATED ON CHARTS.  
 MADE FOR  
 U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
 COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
 ORIGINAL IS A PHOTOGRAPH  
 NOT TO BE REPRODUCED BY ORDER OF THE  
 COMMANDER, U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION.

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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)  
 OSD Letter, May 8, 1972  
 BY RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

PX 71-38 (15)



43

2297

14 MAR 1942

CAPE ROSE, SOUTHERN COAST OF  
ALBEMARLE ISLAND, FROM SW.

U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

PHOTOGRAPH  
OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


RECORDED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD Letter, May 1972  
APR 6 1973

By ITT, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_

PX 71-38 (16)



45

PX 71-38 (17)

CS 8297

DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT VILLAGE AND ROADSTEAD OF VILLAMIL, ALBEMARLE I.

MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION, IN WHOLE OR IN  
PART, BY THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 1973



PX71-38 (18)

NO. 2687 DATE 1 MAR 1942

SUBJECT CHRISTOPHER POINT, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,  
FROM NORTH.


MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPH  
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LINE OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

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DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RT, NARS Date APP 3 1973



Px 71-38(19)

8207 34 MAR 1942

CAPE HAMMOND AND WESTERN SIDE OF  
NARBOROUGH ISLAND.

U.S. MARINE CORPS STATION


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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (2)

GSD letter, May 3, 1972

By ET, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX71-38 (29)

3237

DATE 14 MAR 1953

SUBJECT CAPE HOWARD AND SOUTHERN SIDE OF NARBOROUGH ISLAND.

MADE FOR

J. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
3300-8010, CANAL ZONE

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PROPAGANDA  
OR OTHER UNAUTHORIZED PURPOSES

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
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

APR 6 1973

By RT, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_



03 2237 DATE 14 MAR 71 Pk 71-35 (2)

SUBJECT NARBOROUGH ISLAND, FROM SE


MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 2 1972 APR 6 1973  
By RT, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_



PX71-38(22)

8337

DATE: 1 MAR 1942

CAPE BERKELEY, ALBEMARLE ISLAND,  
FROM NORTH.

MADE FOR

U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
WPTO 5500, CANTON, OHIO.

REPRODUCED FROM THE PHOTOGRAPH  
MADE BY THE U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION, BY ORDER OF THE  
COMMANDANT, WPTO 5500, CANTON, OHIO.


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E.O. 1.652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (23)

8297

DATE 14 MAR 1942

"FOSTER COVE", SW PART OF ELIZABETH BAY,  
ALBEMARLE ISLAND.

MADE FOR  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
CROSS ISLAND, CANAL ZONE.

U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
BY ORDER OF THE  
BUREAU OF NAUTICS.


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REMOVED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX71-38(24)

8297

DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT CARTAGO BAY, NW PART, LOOKING SE .

MADE FOR

U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS  
WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE COMMANDANT


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

GSD letter, May 3, 1972

D- RT, NARS Date APP 6 1973




PA 71-38(25)

CG 8297 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT BINDLOE ISLAND, SOUTHERN END.  
NAME FOR  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
FOOD SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



Px7-38(26)

CS 8277	DATE 11 MAR 1942
SUBJECT CAPE IBBETSON, PINTA ISLAND, FROM SW.	
MADE FOR	
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION	
COMUSCLO, CANAL ZONE.	
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH	
PREPARED BY ORDER OF THE	
COMMANDER, COMUSCLO.	

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS D APR 6 1973



PA 71-38(27)

CS 3287 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT BINDLOE ISLAND, FROM NORTH.  
.....  
.....  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
CROSS ISLAND, CHINA ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES OF THE

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (28)

REF ID: A6297 DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT WEST SIDE OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM SOUTH.

FROM THE  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

THIS IS A COPY OF A PHOTOGRAPH  
MADE BY THE U.S. NAVY BY ORDER OF THE  
COMMANDER, THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973




12

PA 71-38(29)

8297	DATE 14 MAR 1942
SUBJECT CAPE CHALMERS, PINTA ISLAND, FROM WEST.	
MADE FOR	
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION	
CANTON SOLO, CANAL ZONE.	
THIS IS A PHOTOGRAPH	
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APP 6 1973



Px71-38(30)

8297 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT PINTA ISLAND, FROM NORTH.  
OFFICE  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
CANTON SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS.


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38 (31)

CS8287 DATE 11 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT NORTHERN POINT OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM NE .

MADE FOR  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
FOR THE RECORD AND BY ORDER OF THE


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NAAS D. APR 6 1973



PX 71-38(32)

CS 8237

DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT EASTERN POINT OF PINTA ISLAND, FROM SOUTH.

MADE AT  
NAVY AIR STATION  
CANTON, CALIFORNIA

PHOTOGRAPH  
ORDER OF THE  
NAVY


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973



PX71-38(33)

CSg 297	DATE 14 MAR 1942
SUBJECT BINDLOE ISLAND, FROM NORTH	
MADE FOR	
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION COMSO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.	
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION, BY ORDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS, U. S. NAVAL AERONAUTICS.	

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NAES Date APR 6 1973



PX 71-38(34)

REF ID: A6297 DATE 14 MAR 1942


SUBJECT: NORTHERN POINT OF BINDLOE ISLAND

FOR THE  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
GORDON SOLO, CANAL ZONE.

OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
NOT TO BE USED FOR PUBLICATION; BY ORDER OF THE  
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 2 1972 APR 6 1973  
By RT, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_



4

Px 71-38(35)

CG 8237 ; DATE 14 MAR 1942


SUBJECT Tower Island & Darwin Bay, Galapagos.

MADE FOR  
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973








px71-38 (37)

CS 3297 DATE 14 MAR 1942  
SUBJECT TOWER ISLAND AND DARWIN BAY, FROM WEST  
MADE FOR  
U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION  
COCO SOLO, CANAL ZONE.  
OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAPH  
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RT, NARS DATE APR 6 1973



PX 71-38(38)

8297 DATE 14 MAR 1942

SUBJECT NORTH SIDE OF TOWER ISLAND, AND DARWIN BAY

IN OFFICIAL AIR STATION  
COLD 5000, CATAL...

OFFICIAL U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTOGRAPH  
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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

E. RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973