TELEGRAM SENT

HSM
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C & Special Gray).

November 11, 1939
9 p.m.

Am Legation,

The Hague, (Netherlands).

140.

ULTRA CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER ONLY.

The President desires you to convey, either directly or through such discreet channels as you deem best, the following personal (underline personal) and unofficial message to the Queen. He appreciates that under existing conditions it might prove embarrassing to Her Majesty if this message were to become known; it is therefore being treated here as highly confidential. Should developing circumstances seem to warrant publicity, this will be a matter for later consideration and discussion. Meanwhile in order to limit the number of persons who have knowledge of the message I suggest that Her Majesty may want to send her reply through you.

(BEGIN SPECIAL GRAY) QUOTE To Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina.

I am thinking much of you and the House of Orange in these critical days, and it occurs to me that in the event
ham -2- No. 140, November 11, 9 p. m., to The Hague

of the invasion of Holland you may care to have the Crown Princess and the children, or the latter by themselves, come to the United States temporarily to be completely safe against airplane raids. It would give Mrs. Roosevelt and me very great happiness to care for them over here as if they were members of our own family and they could come to us either in Washington or at our country place at Hyde Park.

I am telegraphing my old friend Leopold in regard to his own children and I want you to know that I want to help in any personal way which lies in my power.

Signed FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE. (END SPECIAL GRAY)

HULL
(PM)

Eu:PM
KLP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

269, November 12, 4 p.m.

Department's 140, November 11, 9 p.m., was only received here today. The Queen being engaged in continuous conferences cannot receive me until this evening when I personally will deliver the President's message.

GORDON

WK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

270, November 12, 10 p.m.

My 269, November 12, 4 p.m.

I have delivered the President's message to the Queen who requested me to convey her very warm appreciation thereof and to say that she would answer it at the earliest opportunity.

GORDON

KLP
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C).

The Hague
Dated November 13, 1939
Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

271, November 13, 6 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

My 270, November 12, 10 p. m.

The following is the text of the Queen's reply to the President's message: (BEGIN SPECIAL GRAY)

"President of the United States, Washington.

Mr. Gordon will already have cabled how highly I appreciate the feelings for my people and my House which prompted your and Mrs. Roosevelt's kind offer for which I tender my heartfelt thanks and which I shall be very pleased to take into serious consideration should conditions become worse. Signed WILHELMINA R." (END SPECIAL GRAY).

GORDON

CSB
The Hague
Dated November 14, 1939
Rec'd 9:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

273, November 14, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

My 269, November 12, 4 p.m.

Although I went to the Palace quite alone at 9:30 in the evening, the fact of my going there was published in the press of yesterday. It is just possible that someone in the Palace gave it out although it was agreed before my going there that nothing would be; it is more likely that one of the "death watch" of reporters stationed outside the Palace recognized my car.

In response to inquiries from the press yesterday I merely stated that I could make no comment and upon my informing the Foreign Office thereof it promised to do the same.

Naturally

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Naturally the visit has occasioned lively interest, but as there are an infinite variety of matters on which I might have gone to see the Queen it occurs to me that the President and yourself may feel that on the whole speculation in certain quarters as to the actual purpose of my visit may be a rather useful thing.

GORDON

CSB
My dear Mr. President:

In reply to your memorandum of April 15 concerning Gordon's telegram no. 112 in which he suggested a further message from you to Queen Wilhelmina, I enclose copy of a message which the Secretary sent yesterday morning in reply. With your statement on Saturday regarding the American attitude toward small nations, there can be no possible doubt of our moral position. The Netherlands Government has never before been hesitant in suggesting ways and means whereby we could be helpful. In the circumstances, the wisest course seemed to be to give Gordon authorization to ask for an audience, if the Dutch authorities intimated that this would be helpful, but not to take a further initiative ourselves at the moment.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
Telegram no. 112, from The Hague, April 13, 1940.

The President,

The White House.
TELEGRAM SENT

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C-1)  
April 14, 1940
1 p.m.

AMBLEGATION

THE HAGUE

RUSH.

45.

Your 112, April 13, 9 a.m., and 115, April 14, 1 p.m.

If the Netherlands Government, which is best able to judge the value of your audiences with the Queen during past crises, should on their own initiative suggest that a repetition would be useful, you are authorized to ask for an audience. Otherwise, I question the advisability of any initiative on our part.

HULL

(CH)

S:CH
Eu:PM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

The Hague
Dated April 13, 1940
Rec'd 7:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
112, April 13, 9 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND
UNDER SECRETARY.

The net result of this week's developments in their impact on the Netherlands is that the situation now gives every indication of being as serious as it was in the week of November 11; in other words, the country seems as close to the brink (**) German invasion as it can be without being actually engulfed. At two other critical moments—i.e., on November 12 and January 20—the mere fact of my having gone to see the Queen, even though no one knew what I discussed with her (and apparently all the more so for that very reason) had an effect which was undoubtedly highly beneficial and understand that the rumor is reportedly widespread in this and neighboring countries.
No. 112, April 13, 9 a.m., from The Hague
countries. The effect, of course, was as the result
greater on account of her marked inaccessibility.

I strongly hope that you may concur in the idea of
suggesting to the President that he send me any (repeat
any) kind of a message to convey personally to the Queen;
I am convinced that it would be of great help and more-
over that it would not be over-playing the same line or
wasting any ammunition. If you approve of this proposal
I may add that if I can be received by the Queen on a
Sunday (i.e. tomorrow) the effect will be considerably
heightened.

GORDON

HPD

(*) apparent omission
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

THE HAGUE
Dated May 7, 1940
Rec'd 9:09 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

146, May 7, 11 p.m.

Please communicate the following immediately to the President.

Department's instruction 321 of December 21 and its enclosure.

The Queen desires to know whether in the event that the Princess and her children should, either within or outside of the Netherlands, be cut off from and unable to communicate with the Queen, a request from the Princess or Prince Bernard in one of their own names for the despatch of a cruiser to take them and the children to the United States would have the same weight as a similar request on her own part.

GORDON

EMB
AMERICAN LEGATION
THE HAGUE (NETHERLANDS)

RUSH

66,

Your 146, May 7, 11 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER

The President desires me to say that any request from the Princess Royal for the despatch of a cruiser will of course be regarded as equivalent to a request from the Queen herself. The President suggests that in the interest of the safety of the Princess and of her family it would be wise for them to consider travelling by way of France to Lisbon where this government has based at this present moment a cruiser which could transport the royal family to the United States.

Any ship in the channel is of course liable to air attack.

Please inform the Queen that the President in line with his previous message will do everything possible to assure the safety of the Princess's family in the event that an emergency arises.

WELLES
(acting)
JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

151, May 9, noon.
Department's 66, May 8, 1 a.m.

The Queen has requested that her warm appreciation of his message be conveyed to the President.

GORDON

NPL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON,
1294, MAY 21, NOON.

MY 1273, MAY 20, 4 P.M.

TOR THE PRESIDENT.

"MESSAGE OF HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE WHICH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES BROUGHT ME THIS AFTERNOON.

YOUR APPRECIATION OF THE SPLENDID RESISTANCE OF MY ARMED FORCES AGAINST OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF ENEMY TROOPS DEEPLY TOUCHED ME. IN THIS APPRECIATION EVERYONE WILL JOIN WHO REALIZES THE SUPERHUMAN EFFORT THEY MADE.

YOUR KIND CONSIDERATION OF MY PERSONAL WELFARE AND THAT OF MY FAMILY IS A GREAT COMFORT TO ME IN THESE DAYS OF STRESS. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD CALL FOR IT--MAY GOD FORBID ITS NECESSITY--I WILL NOT FAIL TO REMEMBER YOUR GENEROUS INITIATIVE. (SIGNED) WILHELMINA, MAY 20TH, 1940."

WILLIAM W. KENNEDY
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

The Dutch Foreign Minister has just called to see me. He is still very unhappy that the British do not seem to be making any plans ahead for the possibilities that might arise and the Queen instructed him to come and say to me that she and the Prince have decided to remain here for further developments, but they do want Princess Juliana and the children to go to Canada. The reason they want her to go to Canada instead of the United States is because if anything should happen to the Queen she would have to function as the head of the government.

The Dutch Foreign Minister realizes that America cannot or would not want to send a cruiser or ship into belligerent waters so his suggestion is that the Princess and her two children on Friday night of this week be put on one of the Dutch cruisers which will take
JRL 2 of 1414, May 28, 8 p.m., from London.

take her to meet any ship that you designate, which ship in turn might take her to Canada.

He realizes that this is a very difficult thing for you to work out, but that you have been so kind in your offers and suggestions that the Queen wished you to know what she would like to do at this minute, but she understands of course the difficulties in the situation for you.

Will you advise me as soon as possible as they are anxious to make plans.

KENNEDY

NPL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

London
Dated May 30, 1941
Rec'd 9:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NETHERLANDS SERIES 8, May 30, 2 p.m.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BIDDLE.

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands informs me in strictest confidence that he plans to arrive in Canada about June 7 and plans to accompany Princess Juliana on a brief visit to Washington where he hopes to have the honor of paying his respects to the President before returning here.

JOHNSON

NPL
From Department of State
The Secretary, September 1 1941

The President

In accordance with your instructions I am submitting the proposed draft of a reply to Queen Wilhelmina. If you approve the message can be sent by telegraph to London in the following form:

September 1, 1941.

American Embassy,
London.

For Ambassador Biddle.

Please deliver at earliest moment the following message from the President to Queen Wilhelmina:

"Your Majesty's gracious letter is appreciated and I regret sincerely that matters of state prevent your visit to Hyde Park at this time. Mrs. Roosevelt and I cannot be but deeply disappointed but trust that your visit is only delayed.

"Your heavy responsibilities are fully appreciated yet since I may not have the pleasure of welcoming you to Hyde Park now, I venture to raise in this message a matter of great mutual concern to your country and mine.

"This country secures from the Bauxite mines in Surinam two million tons of ore annually or 65 per cent of our total supply and if this supply were interrupted in any way it would most seriously delay the production of aircraft which are so urgently needed by all nations resisting aggression.

"The information reaching me indicates that the Bauxite installations in Surinam are at present inadequately protected and could be destroyed either by sabotage or by raiders approaching from land, sea, or air. In addition the transportation of the ore could be interrupted by sinking ships in the river approaches to the mines since these are the only avenues of egress for the ore.

"The situation is so grave that I turn to you direct in order that a way may be found for you and your Government to devise further means of protection. If you approve, I should be prepared, having in mind the Havana procedure, to make arrangements for the immediate entry of several United States troops into Surinam to remove the threat to this source of critical raw material. If this form of protection is agreed, I and any American associates will of course give you my formal assurance that occupation by American troops would be a temporary measure for the period of the emergency only and that they will be withdrawn as soon as the threat of damage to these vital mines is removed. The military forces involved will approximate a battalion of infantry, a battery of antiaircraft artillery together with the necessary aircraft and service troops. The total force should not exceed three thousand officers and men. They would be accompanied by suitable vessels to patrol the river approaches to the mines."
"I am confident you will realize that the situation requires immediate action, and while our preparations to move are being completed, we cannot go forward without the urgent reply of you and your government.

"The importance of secrecy is so great that I suggest the utmost precautions be taken to insure that no information is divulged until you and I are agreed in principle upon the course of action and subsequently upon the text of identical announcements. With this initiative upon our parts the details can be carried on by the appropriate officials of our respective governments.

"Mrs. Roosevelt's and my enjoyment of Princess Juliana and her husband's visit can only be exceeded by our anticipated pleasure in welcoming you at an early date in this country.

"Your friend,

Franklin D. Roosevelt."
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
September 3, 4 p.m.
Netherlands series number 20.
FROM BIDDLE. SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Your 3520, September 1, 4 p.m.

One. Message conveyed to Queen Wilhelmina at 11 a.m. this morning, and at her request, to Prime Minister Gerbrandy at 1 p.m.

Two. Gerbrandy will consult with the Queen this evening and call Cabinet together Thursday morning on this matter. Immediately thereafter, he will notify me of decision taken.

Three. He revealed that a small Dutch force of three hundred men had already been ordered to Surinam; half from here and half from the East Indies. He felt that if the Government accepted your gracious offer, collaboration Kingdom forces could be readily effected.

Four. It was his belief that the Cabinet would render a favorable decision at tomorrow's meeting. Meanwhile, the Queen and he wishes to express to you their deep gratitude for your suggestion.

ALC
WINANT
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

Serial 0149212

December 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The attached memorandum of the Netherlands Minister, herewith returned, makes the following points:

The Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies has received no information from American Headquarters.

He stresses the importance of the supply of war materials to the Far East, and of a carefully coordinated defense.

He requests information as to the system used by the U.S. Navy in the protection of trans-Pacific Netherlands shipping.

Late in November the Navy Department was informed that the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies had represented to the Minister here that he was not receiving information. Admiral Hart was directed on December 2nd to send pertinent information to the Dutch Naval Commander in Chief; the Chief of Naval Operations stated that he considered this important, and suggested that our naval observer in Batavia undertake the liaison. The Chief of Naval Operations also suggested the Dutch send a liaison officer to Admiral Hart in Manila. Admiral Hart replied that a Dutch liaison officer had been in Manila for some time, and that he was constantly exchanging information with the Dutch naval Commander in Chief. Inquiry at the War Department establishes the fact that a military observer is stationed in Batavia. The War Department believes that all pertinent information that the Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, desires to convey has been transmitted to the Governor General.

The subject of coordinated defense was long ago a subject of conversations at Singapore, at which the Dutch were represented. A conference with a similar purpose is now being held, or soon will be held, in Singapore.

DECLASSIFIED

R.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By KT APR 6 1973

NARS Date
Admiral Glassford and Admiral Purnell are now in Batavia. These officers are fully informed as to Admiral Hart's plans, and it is certain that they have conveyed pertinent information to the Netherlands East Indies authorities, and will make joint plans with them. Admiral Glassford commands the U.S. Navy surface vessels of the Asiatic Fleet, and one patrol bomber squadron. His force now comprises 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 3 gunboats, several minesweepers, and 5 aircraft, destroyer, and submarine tenders. His surface vessels lack fighter aircraft defense, and can not operate in areas where dominated by enemy air strength. They are now in the Netherlands East Indies, operating against the probability of penetration of this area by Japanese naval forces.

Admiral Hart is in Manila, using his submarines in support of the defense of the Philippines, and offensively against enemy naval forces. How much longer the submarines can base at Manila is problematical. If the submarine base must be shifted from Manila, Admiral Hart has been advised to operate from the Netherlands East Indies in support of the defense of Luzon, in support of the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, and in attacks on Japanese vessels attempting to obtain oil from Borneo. His eventual retirement base would be Port Darwin. He has been directed to convey this information to the British and the Dutch. The Army and Navy are making every effort to provide logistic support for the Philippines. Troops, aircraft, and material now en route will be used for this purpose. But if the Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, finds his sea and air communications cut, these reinforcements will be available for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.

The principal protection of shipping across the Pacific to the Netherlands East Indies is by the choice of routes that at the time appear safest. There are not enough men-of-war to escort all vessels on the routes across the Pacific, though troop convoys must be escorted. An alternative is the route around the Cape of Good Hope.

The Netherlands Naval Attache in Washington has been informed that the United States naval authorities would be glad to furnish "routings" to Dutch vessels departing U.S. ports. The suggestion was also made that the Netherlands Naval Attache request routings from the British Naval Control Service Organization in other than United States ports.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

What should be done about this? Please return enclosure.

F. D. R.
Memorandum for The President

Attached is a copy of a memorandum handed me today by the Netherlands Minister.

C.H.
MEMORANDUM

No news or information is being received by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies as Commander in Chief, from American Headquarters.

The Governor General is of the opinion that for a successful prosecution of the war it is most essential that the front in South East Asia should strongly be maintained. The fall of strongholds in Malacca, the Philippine Islands Netherlands Indies, mandated territories, New Zealand and Australia, would not only cause a considerable protraction of the war but would also make the final outcome doubtful.

It is therefore essential that not only the closest military collaboration and coordination should exist between the participants in that theatre of war, but also adequate and prompt measures should be taken in order to secure the quickest possible supply of war materials to these fighting fronts. If this is not done
done with sufficient expediency the situation may arise that the fighting forces in Malacca, the Philippines and Netherlands Indies have exhausted the available supplies and that fully trained personnel is doomed to inactivity because they have no weapons to fight with. Japan, on the contrary, is at least for the present in a position to ship the necessary war materials and other supplies to its fighting forces in these regions.

It is therefore of the greatest importance that, apart from the dispatch of American naval and air forces, the supply of war materials to the areas in question should be intensified and accelerated to the utmost.

The Netherlands Indies Government is doing its utmost in order to maintain ship connections with the United States of America and to continue the delivery of strategic materials to this country. With a view thereto it is essential to be informed of the system of American protection of merchant vessels on the Pacific-
Pacific-routes as only thus Netherlands Indies authorities
will be in a position to consistently derout ship traffic.

The Netherlands Indies Government will give sub-
sequent information as to the military and civil require-
ments which are most needed.

Washington, 16 December 1941.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

December 17, 1941

FOR: THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The attached memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from the President of the United States requests information as to what should be done about the problem covered in the enclosed memorandum received by the President from the Netherlands Minister.

Edward A. Hayes
Lieutenant Commander, USNR
Special Assistant to the Secretary
December 20, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

The attached memorandum of the Netherlands Minister, herewith returned, makes the following points:

The Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies has received no information from American Headquarters.

He stresses the importance of the supply of war materials to the Far East, and of a carefully coordinated defense.

He requests information as to the system used by the U.S. Navy in the protection of trans-Pacific Netherlands shipping.

Late in November the Navy Department was informed that the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies had represented to the Minister here that he was not receiving information. Admiral Hart was directed on December 2nd to send pertinent information to the Dutch Naval Commander in Chief; the Chief of Naval Operations stated that he considered this important, and suggested that our naval observer in Batavia undertake the liaison. The Chief of Naval Operations also suggested the Dutch send a liaison officer to Admiral Hart in Manila. Admiral Hart replied that a Dutch liaison officer had been in Manila for some time, and that he was constantly exchanging information with the Dutch naval Commander in Chief. Inquiry at the War Department establishes the fact that a military observer is stationed in Batavia. The War Department believes that all pertinent information that the Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, desires to convey has been transmitted to the Governor General.

The subject of coordinated defense was long ago a subject of conversations at Singapore, at which the Dutch were represented. A conference with a similar purpose is now being held, or soon will be held, in Singapore.
Admiral Glassford and Admiral Furnall are now in Batavia. These officers are fully informed as to Admiral Hart's plans, and it is certain that they have conveyed pertinent information to the Netherlands East Indies authorities, and will make joint plans with them. Admiral Glassford commands the U.S. Navy surface vessels of the Asiatic Fleet, and one patrol bomber squadron. His force now comprises 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 3 gunboats, several minesweepers, and 5 aircraft, destroyer, and submarine tenders. His surface vessels lack fighter aircraft defense, and can not operate in areas where dominated by enemy air strength. They are now in the Netherlands East Indies, operating against the probability of penetration of this area by Japanese naval forces.

Admiral Hart is in Manila, using his submarines in support of the defense of the Philippines, and offensively against enemy naval forces. How much longer the submarines can base at Manila is problematical. If the submarine base must be shifted from Manila, Admiral Hart has been advised to operate from the Netherlands East Indies in support of the defense of Luzon, in support of the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, and in attacks on Japanese vessels attempting to obtain oil from Borneo. His eventual retirement base would be Port Darwin. He has been directed to convey this information to the British and the Dutch. The Army and Navy are making every effort to provide logistic support for the Philippines. Troops, aircraft, and material now en route will be used for this purpose. But if the Commanding General, Army Forces in the Far East, finds his sea and air communications cut, these reinforcements will be available for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.

The principal protection of shipping across the Pacific to the Netherlands East Indies is by the choice of routes that at the time appear safest. There are not enough men-of-war to escort all vessels on the routes across the Pacific, though troop convoys must be escorted. An alternative is the route around the Cape of Good Hope.

The Netherlands Naval Attaché in Washington has been informed that the United States naval authorities would be glad to furnish "routings" to Dutch vessels departing U.S. ports. The suggestion was also made that the Netherlands Naval Attaché request routings from the British Naval Control Service Organisation in other than United States ports.
December 20, 1941.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973
The Netherlands Government says that the United States Government are awaiting assent of His Majesty's Government to Dutch association with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee for discussion of matters relating to the South West Pacific. Please at once inform the United States Government that we welcome such participation by the Dutch.

February 17th 1942.
February 23rd, 1942.

Dear Mr. Hopkins,

In accordance with the President's wish, I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a personal message of Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands to the President of the United States of America.

Believe me, dear Mr. Hopkins

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr. Harry Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.
The serious development of events around Java and the imminent menace to our last military stronghold, which is a most valuable base for an offensive against Japan, induces me to make a most urgent appeal to you, my dear President, as an associate and great friend of my country.

That island where about 50 million people live, my peoples and I are determined to defend to the last.

I am fully convinced you will give all possible help, but I must emphasize that in this moment immediate assistance is the only real one.

I have been greatly heartened by the recent successful cooperation of our forces and I thereby feel all the more convinced that, if such action could be repeated, the whole situation might be changed.

Wilhelmina
February 26, 1942.

SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR BIDDLE, LONDON.

FOR H. M. THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS

I have received your personal message and I want to assure you that we are doing everything possible to get more fighter planes into Java. Some are on their way there directly at the present time. The problem is going to be to get fighter planes from Australia to Java in view of the apparent loss of Timor. My people in Australia have definite orders to keep sending all possible reinforcements of every and any kind that will be useful. I think the American Navy ships are operating usefully under your Admiral.

I received word from Aruba that our planes got there just in time. The coast guns had arrived two or three days before the bombardment but had not yet been set up. Apparently the planes prevented destruction of the refinery.

In the East Indies your forces are putting up a gallant fight and none of us here subscribe to the thought that they will inevitably be defeated. There are signs that the Japanese are much disturbed by their exceedingly heavy losses.

I send you my very warm regards.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972 ROOSEVELT
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE;

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM QUEEN WILHELMINA IS CONVEYED TO YOU AT HER REQUEST;

"I AM LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MY VISIT TO YOU AND MRS ROOSEVELT AND WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET YOUR COUNTRYMEN AND SEE YOUR BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY SOON. I GREATLY THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE. WILHELMINA."

IN A DAY OR TWO PRINCE BERNHARD WILL GIVE ME DETAILS OF ACCOMPANYING PERSONS AND PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE TELLS ME THAT THE QUEEN WILL PLAN TO DEPART ON ELEVEN JUNE.
BIDDLE

LONDON

VIA STATE DEPARTMENT (CODE)    JUNE 11, 1942

ALL ARRANGEMENTS WITH CANADIAN GOVERNMENT MADE.

PLEASE WIRE CANADIAN PREMIER PLACE AND HOUR OF ARRIVAL
AND NOTIFY ME ALSO. I PERSONALLY FEAR I CANNOT GO TO
HYDE PARK UNTIL TWENTY-EIGHTH BUT EXPECT TO SEE THE GUEST THEN.

ROOSEVELT
HONORABLE W. MACKENZIE KING
OTTAWA

VIA STATE DEPARTMENT (CODE) JUNE 11, 1942

THANK YOU FOR HANDLING THE MATTER I TELEPHONED YOU ABOUT. PLEASE THANK THE GOVERNOR GENERAL ALSO. I HAVE ASKED BIDDLE INFORM YOU HOUR AND PLACE ARRIVAL. I THINK OUR GUEST SHOULD STAY AT OTTAWA UNTIL ABOUT THE TWENTIETH BEFORE PROCEEDING TO HOUSE AT STOCKBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS, THUS GIVING TIME TO HAVE HOUSE IN PROPER ORDER. I CANNOT GO TO HYDE PARK UNTIL ABOUT JUNE TWENTY-EIGHTH BUT WILL SEE OUR GUEST AT ABOUT THAT TIME. PLEASE TELL HER DAUGHTER OF THE ABOVE.

ROOSEVELT
FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE

11 JUNE 1942

(1) QUEEN WILHELMINA ASKS ME TO TRANSMIT TO YOU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: "I THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND VERY KIND THOUGHT SUGGESTING SHORTENING MY JOURNEY BY FIRST LANDING AT OTTAWA AND I SHOULD BE VERY HAPPY IF THAT COULD BE SO ARRANGED. I SHALL BE DELIGHTED TO COME AND STAY WITH YOU AND MRS. ROOSEVELT AT HYDE PARK AS YOU SO KINDLY PROPOSE AS SOON AS I AM SETTLED IN THE HOUSE WHICH YOU SO KINDLY INFORM ME WILL BE AT MY DISPOSAL FROM THE 15TH AND WHICH I AM SURE WILL BE MOST BECOMING WILHELMINA."

(2) IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUEEN'S VISIT TO HYDE PARK, I KNOW SHE WOULD APPRECIATE YOU GIVING HER A HINT LATER AS TO JUST WHEN YOU AND MRS. ROOSEVELT WOULD LIKE HER TO COME.

(3) IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR THOUGHTFUL OFFER TO INFORM THE CANADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL AND PREMIER OF THE QUEEN'S APPROACHING ARRIVAL IN CANADA, SHE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD SAY TO THEM THAT SHE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING YOUR COMMUNICATION IN THE MATTER AS ALSO BEING IN BEHALF OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, WHICH FOR REASONS OF SECURITY, BELIEVES IT BETTER
NOT TO MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE NORMAL PROCEDURE.

(4) PRINCE BERNHARD BEGS LEAVE TO SUGGEST THAT WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH CANADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL AND PREMIER, A REFERENCE MAY BE MADE TO THE NEED FOR THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES PROVIDING THE NECESSARY POLICE PROTECTION WHILE IN CANADA.

(5) ARRANGEMENTS FOR PLANE ARE BEING WORKED OUT SATISFACTORYLY AND THE QUEEN TENTATIVELY PLANS TO TAKE OFF TOMORROW OR THE DAY AFTER. I SHALL LET YOU KNOW DEFINITE DAY OF DEPARTURE AND PROPOSED CANADIAN POINT OF ARRIVAL AS SOON AS PAN AMERICAN HAS WORKED THIS OUT, SO THAT YOU CAN CONFIRM TO PROPER CANADIAN AUTHORITIES.

(6) SINCE THE DUTCH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE MONARCH SHALL NOT GO ABROAD WITHOUT A MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER VAN KLEFFENS, ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSISTANT, BARON C. W. VAN HAERSOLTE, WILL GO TO THE UNITED STATES IN FULFILLMENT OF THAT REQUIREMENT. THEY WILL HOWEVER NOT TRAVEL IN THE QUEEN'S PLANE.

(7) IN THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE QUEEN, ZINAIDE SOZPENKOFF HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED FOR MARIA GROENHUIJZEN AS THE QUEEN'S MAID.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 7 1972
9 JUNE 1942

FOR PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT.

FROM BIDDLE

JONKHEER VAN TETS VAN GUDRIAAN, CHIEF OF CIVIL HOUSEHOLD OF QUEEN WILHELMINA; LIEUTENANT CHRISTOFFEL KREDIET AND FIRST LIEUTENANT DIRK TER BEEK, AIDES; AND MARIA GROENHUIZEN, MAID, WILL ACCOMPANY QUEEN WILHELMINA.

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