TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

File Boy (left for me)

Date: 4-6-59
Signature: Carl S. Spencer
RADIOGRAM

AG 381 (1-7-42) MSC

FROM: FORT MILLS

TO: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WAR DEPT

NO. 20 JANUARY 7TH (PRIORITY)

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED YOUR NINE ONE THREE STOP IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR ARRIVAL OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATION IN MINDANAO I ORDERED BRIGADIER GENERAL SHARP COMDG VISAYAN MINDANAO FORCE ON THIRTIETH TO MOVE EQUIVALENT OF ONE OF HIS TWO VISAYAN DIVISIONS TO MINDANAO AND TO TRANSFER HIS OWN HEADQUARTERS THERE STOP NO REPORT OF EXECUTION YET FROM SHARP BUT MOVEMENT OFFERS NO DIFFICULTY STOP NINE P DASH FORTY AIRPLANES SENT TO DEL MONTE STOP ALSO DISPATCHED SIX HUNDRED FIFTY OFFICERS AND MEN OF NINETEENTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP TO DEL MONTE FROM HERE THROUGH ENEMY BLOCKADE STOP TROOP SHIP ARRIVED BUT ACCOMPANYING SHIP WITH AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES WAS SUNK STOP FORCE IN MINDANAO WILL CHECK HOSTILE DRIVE IF MADE FROM DAVAO AREA COMMA PLACE COVERING FORCES IN COTABATO PARANG REPEAT COTABATO PARANG AREA AND COVER POINTS OF ENTRY AT CAGAYEN MISAMIS REPEAT CAGAYEN MISAMIS AREA STOP WILL KEEP ME INFORMED ON AIRDROMES AND BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE AND SERVICE AIRPLANES STOP WILL DEVELOP ADDITIONAL LANDING FIELDS STOP ESSENTIAL THAT BLOCADE RUNNING SHIPS BE FORCED THROUGH TO MINDANAO WITH GROUND AND AIR OPERATING SUPPLIES STOP GROUND FORCE HAS VERY LITTLE AMMUNITION STOP OUR AIR FORCE BOMBARDMENT MISSIONS FROM SOUTH SHOULD QUICKLY ELIMINATE HOSTILE AIR FROM DAVAO AND OUR PURSUIT SHOULD GO INTO DEL MONTE WITHOUT DELAY STOP ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR FORCE WILL PERMIT IMMEDIATE EXTENSION INTO VISAYAN AND ATTACKS ON ENEMY FORCES IN LUZON STOP HAVE SEVERAL AIRDROMES IN OPERATION ON BATAAN SUBJECT TO
INTERMITTENT INTERRUPTION BUT ONLY VERY LIMITED GASOLINE STOP WILL
KEEP AIR FORCE ADVISED THEREON STOP AN ARMY CORPS SHOULD BE LANDED
IN MINDANAO AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE STOP ESSENTIAL THAT BLOCKADE
RUNNERS BRING VITAL ITEMS STOP NUMBEROUS SMALL VESSELS SHOULD BE USED
AND THOUGH LOSSES MAY BE HIGH A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE WILL GET THROUGH AND
A FEW WILL RELIEVE THE SITUATION STOP ENEMY APPEARS TO HAVE TENDENCY
TO BECOME OVERCONFIDENT AND TIME IS RIPE FOR BRILLIANT THRUST WITH
AIR CARRIERS end

MACARTHUR
AG 381 (1-12-42) MSC
FROM FORT MILLS
TO ADJUTANT GENERAL

NO. 36 JANUARY 12

GROUND ACTIVITY CONFINED TO ARTILLERY DUELLING AND PATROLLING stop
ENEMY AIR ACTION LIMITED stop I HAVE PLACED THE COMMAND ON HALF RATIONS

MACARTHUR

SENT 10:55 PM
1/11/42 CDM
NO. 7 JANUARY 13TH.

IT IS WITH UTMOST DIFFIDENCE THAT I AM SUBMITTING TO YOU THESE THOUGHTS BUT I AM SENDING THEM FOR WHAT THEY MAY BE WORTH. IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT AT THIS TIME IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BRING TO AN END THE WAR WITH JAPAN IF AMERICA AND ENGLAND OR EVEN IF AMERICA ALONE DECIDED TO USE ALL THE MATERIALS AT HER DISPOSAL TO CRUSH THE JAPANESE FORCES AT THIS TIME. RADIO REPORTS RECEIVED HERE INDICATE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER IS TO BE AMERICA'S FIRST OBJECTIVE. I REALIZE THAT THESE REPORTS MAY BE BRITISH PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO INFLUENCE ACTION IN THAT DIRECTION BUT THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN REFUTED IN ANY WAY AND IT IS REMARKABLE THAT NO ASSISTANCE BY SEA OR BY AIR HAS BEEN AFFORDED THE PHILIPPINES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. THIS APPARENT INACTIVITY IS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME AND MY PEOPLE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN LESS THAN TWO OR THREE YEARS; THAT THIS PERIOD OF TIME WILL GIVE JAPAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYA AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AND CONSOLIDATE ITS FORCES BY THE USE OF PRIME WAR MATERIALS THAT ARE TO BE FOUND IN THESE COUNTRIES AND
NO. 7 JANUARY 13TH.

IT WILL BE THEN VERY DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE FROM THE CONQUERED TERRITORIES. I HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY OF SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE WITHOUT SUBMITTING IT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR.

QUEZON.
The White House
Washington

The White House
February 4 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT

MacArthur repulsed enemy night attacks on his left. No new land attacks at Singapore. Air attacks continue. Our aircraft sank two transports in Balikpapan area.

Halsey arrives fifth Fletcher on sixth. British are making ten new vorvettes available to us and we are despatching crews for same to U.K., in February.

Combined chiefs of staff are urging British and Wavell to accept Chiang's offer of more Chinese troops.

Indications are that three subs destroyed yesterday in Atlantic.

Leary is flying to Anzac area. Comish feels we are moving too fast reference Hart.

Comish sent message to Hart and has reply thereto which he feels President should see on his return.

McCrea.

11:45am/d
REC'D BY PHONE AT 0236
From: COMICNH CODE ROOM

FROM RADIO CAVITE:
EIGHT TO TEN TRANSPORTS LANDING TROOPS AT CEBU CITY SUPPORTED BY FIVE WARSHIPS. LANDING BEING MADE AT TOLEDO. ALL LANDINGS HAVE AIR SUPPORT. HAVE DIRECTED DESTRUCTION TORPEDOES AT CEBU CITY.
FROM Ft. Mills, P.I.

To General Marshall

201 No. Feb. 4th

February 4, 1942.

6:49 P.M.

In compliance with your previous directive that from time to time I present my strategic conception of the situation I take this opportunity of presenting what I believe is a fatal mistake on the part of the Democratic Allies. The Japanese are sweeping southward in a great offensive and the Allies are attempting merely to stop them by building up forces in their front. This method, as has almost universally been the case in war, will fail. Such movements can only be negated by thrusts not at the enemy's strength but at his weakness. The lines of weakness from time immemorial have been the lines of communication. In this case they are stretched out over two thousand miles of sea with the whole line subject to American sea thrust. This line is not defended by enemy bombers but is held by scattered Naval elements.

A sea threat would immediately relieve the pressure on the South and is the only way that pressure can be relieved. A great naval victory on our part is not necessary to accomplish this mission; the threat alone would go far toward the desired end. The enemy would probably not engage his entire Fleet in actual combat. If he did and lost, the war would be over. If he did and won, the losses he would sustain would still cripple his advance and take from him the initiative.
You must be prepared to take heavy losses, just so heavy losses are inflicted in return. I wish to reiterate that his bomber strength is practically entirely engaged on his southern front and represents little menace to such a naval thrust. With only minor threat from the fleets of Germany and Italy, the American and British Navies can assemble without serious jeopardy the force to make this thrust.

I unhesitatingly predict that if this is not done the plan upon which we are now working, based upon the building up of air supremacy in the Southwest Pacific, will fail, the war will be indefinitely prolonged and its final outcome will be jeopardized. Counsels of timidity based upon theories of safety first will not win against such an aggressive and audacious adversary as Japan. No building program, no matter of what proportions, will be able to overtake the initial advantages the enemy with every chance of success is trying to gain. The only way to beat him is to fight him incessantly. Combat must not be avoided but must be sought so that the ultimate policy of attrition can at once become effective. No matter what the theoretical odds may be against us, if we fight him we will beat him.

We have shown that here.

In submitting these views I may be exceeding the proper scope of my office and therefore do so with great hesitancy. My excuse, if excuse is necessary, is that from my present point of vantage I can see the whole strategy of the Pacific perhaps clearer than anyone else. If agreeable to you I would appreciate greatly the presentation of this view to the highest authority.

MacArthur.
RADIOGRAM

February 8, 1942.

9:04 A.M.

From Ft. Mills, P.I.

To General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

No. 2265-February 8.

The following message has just been received by me from President Quezon for President Roosevelt. "The situation of my country has become so desperate that I feel that positive action is demanded. Militarily it is evident that no help will reach us from the United States in time either to rescue the beleaguered garrison now fighting so gallantly or to prevent the complete overrunning of the entire Philippine Archipelago.

My people entered the war with the confidence that the United States would bring such assistance to us as would make it possible to sustain the conflict with some chance of success. All our soldiers in the field were animated by the belief that help would be forthcoming. This help has not and evidently will not be realized. Our people have suffered death, misery, devastation. After two months of war not the slightest assistance has been forthcoming from the United States. Aid and succour have been dispatched to other warring nations such as England, Ireland, Australia, the N.E.I. and perhaps others, but not only has nothing come here, but apparently no effort has been made to bring anything here. The American Fleet and the British Fleet, the two most powerful navies in the world, have apparently adopted an attitude which precludes any effort to reach these islands with assistance.

As a result, while enjoying security itself, the United States has in effect condemned the sixteen millions of Filipinos to practical destruction in order to effect a certain delay. You have promised redemption, but what we need is immediate assistance and protection. We are concerned with what is to transpire during the next few months and years as well as with our ultimate destiny. There is not the slightest doubt in our minds that victory will rest with the United States, but the question before us now is: Shall we further sacrifice our country and our people in a hopeless fight? I voice the unanimous opinion of my War Cabinet and I am sure the unanimous opinion of all Filipinos that under the circumstances we should take steps to preserve the Philippines and the Filipinos from further destruction.
Thanks to wise generalship two-thirds of my country is as yet untouched. We do not propose to do this by a betrayal of the United States. It appears to us that our mission is only to fight as a sacrifice force here as long as possible in order to help the defense of the Dutch and British in this area of the World. But you do not need to sacrifice the people of the Philippines to win this war. Members of your Government here repeatedly said that the action against Hitler would determine the outcome of the entire war.

I feel at this moment that our military resistance here can no longer hold the enemy when he sees fit to launch a serious attack. I feel that the elements of the situation here can be composed into a solution that will not reduce the delaying effect of our resistance here but which will save my country from further devastation as the battleground of two great powers.

I deem it my duty to propose my solution. The Government of the United States under the McDuffie Tydings law is committed to grant independence to the Philippines in 1946, and the same law authorized the President to open negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Japanese Government has publicly announced its willingness to grant the Philippines her independence. In view of the foregoing I propose the following:

That the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence;
That the Philippines be at once neutralized;
That all occupying troops, both American and Japanese, be withdrawn by mutual agreement with the Philippine Government within a reasonable length of time;
That neither country maintain bases in the Philippines;
That the Philippine Army be immediately disbanded, the only armed forces being maintained here to be a constabulary of modest size;
That immediately upon granting independence the trade relations of the Philippines with foreign countries be a matter to be determined entirely by the Philippines and the foreign countries concerned;
That American and Japanese civilians who so desire be withdrawn with their respective troops under mutual and proper safeguards. It is my proposal to make this suggestion publicly to you and to the Japanese authorities without delay and upon acceptance in general principle by those two countries that an immediate armistice be entered into here pending the withdrawal of their respective garrisons.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon."
I took the liberty of presenting this message to High Commissioner Sayre for a general expression of his views. States as follows:

"If the premise of President Quezon is correct, that American help cannot or will not arrive here in time to be availing, I believe his proposal for immediate independence and neutralization of Philippines is the sound course to follow."

My estimate of the military situation here is as follows:

The troops have sustained practically 50% percent casualties from their original strength. Divisions are reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to companies. Some units have entirely disappeared. The men have been in constant action and are badly battle worn. They are desperately in need of rest and refitting. Their spirit is good but they are capable now of nothing but fighting in place on a fixed position. All our supplies are scant and the command has been on half rations for the past month.

It is possible for the time being that the present enemy force might temporarily be held, but any addition to his present strength will insure the destruction of our Gonzale force. We have pulled through a number of menacing situations but there is no denying the fact that we are near done. Corregidor itself is extremely vulnerable. This type of fortress, built prior to the days of air power, when isolated is impossible of prolonged defense. Any heavy air bombardment or the location of siege guns on Bataan or even on the Cavite side, would definitely limit the life of the fortress. My water supply is extremely vulnerable and may go at any time. Every other vital installation can be readily taken out.

Since I have no air or sea protection you must be prepared at any time to figure on the complete destruction of this command. You must determine whether the (mission?) Mission of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort. The temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Everyone of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. It must be remembered they are hostile to Great Britain on account of the latter's colonial policy. In spite of my great prestige with them, I have had the utmost difficulty during the last few days in keeping them in line. If help does not arrive shortly nothing, in my opinion, can prevent their utter collapse and their complete absorption by the enemy. The Japanese made a powerful impression upon Philippine public imagination in promising independence.

So far as the military angle is concerned, the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer
the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle. It would not affect the ultimate situation in the Philippines for that would be determined by the results in other theatres. If the Japanese Government rejects President Quezon's proposition it would psychologically strengthen our hold because of their Prime Minister's public statement offering independence. If it accepts it, we lose no military advantage because we would still secure at least equal delay. Please instruct me.

MacArthur
February 8, 1942

Message from General Marshall to General MacArthur

The fundamental strategy outlined in your No. 201 has been under most careful study. From the moment the enemy began his southward drive the decisive effect of a successful flank attack against his communications has been recognized. Two factors have stood in the way of initiating such operations. The first is that, as a feature of his opening operations in early December, the enemy provided for naval flank security by seizing Guam and Wake and establishing there as well as in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands heavy protective forces principally air. The second factor has been naval weakness due to the initial elimination at Pearl Harbor of virtually the entire heavy striking elements of the Pacific Fleet. This weakness is now rapidly being corrected by repairs and transfers but very heavy convoy duties to Hawaii and Australia and the submarining of one of our few Pacific air carriers has seriously limited aggressive naval operations. From now on aggressive tactics are becoming possible. It has been necessary to convoy and set up garrisons on Canton, Christmas, Palmyra Islands, Bori Bori and Samoa and Fiji and a garrison for New Caledonia now enroute— all to cover communications with Far East. On January 30 the Navy carried out an offensive against the hostile flank, striking the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. A great deal of damage was inflicted upon Japanese shipping and local installations but the reaction, particularly by air, was such as to preclude deeper penetration with the limited forces available.

More recently United States and Dutch Naval Forces in the N.E.I., conducting an offensive against an isolated portion of the enemy's extended position, were met by formations of land based bombers. All cruisers participating in this attack were heavily damaged and were compelled to proceed to naval bases for repair. Similar results have been experienced in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea and in the South China Sea. It is obvious that surface vessels cannot operate in regions where they are subjected to heavy attack by hostile land based aircraft. Nevertheless, a second offensive is now underway to strike at the flank of the hostile advance on New Britain. But Army heavy bombers from Hawaii have to be moved into position to support this distant action. These facts and considerations have forced us to oppose the Japanese aggression in the only areas in which the required air bases and fields remain in our possession, namely, northern Australia and the N.E.I. It is clearly recognized that the decisive effects that would follow successful flanking operations as suggested in your radio cannot be accomplished through the methods we are now employing. However, these methods were adopted simply because there appeared to be no alternative except complete inaction.
Due to unannounced losses the number of aircraft carriers presently available to the Allies is not sufficient to permit the substitution of this type of air power for land based craft in a general offensive westward from Hawaii. Similarly, the number of capital ships that could conceivably be made available in the Pacific is not sufficient to permit an advance toward Japan, northward of the Mandated Islands, in an effort either to destroy his communications at their base or to force his main fleet into action on the high seas. The basis of all current effort is to accumulate through every possible means sufficient strength to initiate operations along the lines you suggest, building up behind the effort the forces required to push home a deep attack. More is under way than I dare risk reference to in this communication. In the meanwhile we are endeavoring to limit the hostile advance so as to deny him free access to land and sea areas that will immeasurably strengthen his war making powers or which will be valuable to us as jump off positions when we can start a general counteroffensive. There is always the possibility, as the Russians complete their highly successful winter campaign of tremendous counter attacks along the entire front, which are having a serious effect on German arms and morale, that Stalin will feel more free to consider action in his Pacific theatre. He has stated his expectation of an eventual Japanese attack on Siberia. He realizes the enemy's great advantage if that attack should follow rather than coincide with their present tremendous thrust southward. If we have an early success in checking Japanese progression and secure air superiority through employment of masses of heavy bombers which they lack, there is the strong probability that at that moment Stalin will strike against Japan. His eastern submarine force and bomber force should permit devastating action against Japanese shipping and industry.

I welcome and appreciate your strategical views and invariably submit them to the President.
From FORT MILLS

To GEN GEORGE C MARSHALL

NO 234 FEBRUARY NINTH

YOUR ONE ZERO TWO FOUR MOST ENLIGHTENING STOP

WOULD APPRECIATE GREATLY YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE

SITUATION FROM TIME TO TIME

MACARTHUR
President Quezon:

I have the deepest sympathy and understanding of the point of view you submit in your message. You may put it down as an absolute purpose from which there will be no deviation: we shall drive the Japanese out of the Philippines and preserve the independence of your people come what may. How soon we shall be able to achieve this purpose you will understand it is impossible for me to say now. We are bending every possible energy to supply the air power which is vitally essential before any effective and resultful move can be made.

You should know that the British have been more than generous in the diversion of air power designed to go to them - and they need it badly - to our use in reinforcing the American air power in the Southwest Pacific. Both British and American reinforcements are now arriving there. A very large number of four engine bomber planes are enroute. Some of them have already arrived. As you will recognize maximum and effective use of these heavy bombers can only be made when they are adequately protected by fighter craft. The only way of conveying the latter is by means of fast freighters or converted passenger ships. These means of transportation are now being used to the utmost and already some fighter planes have arrived and are now being put into action. In addition to air forces, ground forces are being transported as fast as convoys can carry them.

You will also understand that due to the damage done to some of our capital ships at Pearl Harbor our original plans for fighting Japan have had to be temporarily suspended.

I know you want me to make no promises which I cannot fulfill
but upon this you can completely rely - We shall bend every energy to support the Philippines.
I am much distressed that you should have received radio reports giving you the impression that it was our intention to await the destruction of Hitler before we endeavored to defeat the aggression of Japan in the southwestern Pacific. On the contrary from the very day of the attack on Pearl Harbor and in full cooperation with the British government we have been marshaling our forces for an immediate aggressive attack upon Japan in that area. The difficulties and time required for the full effect of this effort must be manifest to you and these difficulties have been somewhat accentuated by the losses at Pearl Harbor. But our air and ground forces are already beginning to reach that area and we have every hope of making our effort effective before Japan has time to complete her conquest of the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies let alone to consolidate any such conquest. The British have been most cooperative in this program and we are encouraged by our mutual progress. But our plans are comprehensive and must not be jeopardized by reckless or hasty steps which would imperil the whole ultimate result. You must rest assured that we shall proceed continuously and with all possible speed and that we shall not deviate from our purpose until the Japanese have been driven out of the Philippines and the independence of your people preserved.
Draft of Radio to U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

I am making through you an immediate reply to President Quezon's proposals of February 8th. My reply must emphatically deny the possibility of this government's agreement to the political aspects of President Quezon's proposal. Nevertheless, I am concluding to him the right to surrender, separately, his country and the Filipino elements of the defending forces to Japan. The details of all necessary arrangements will be left in your hands, including plans for segregation of forces into national elements and the withdrawal, if your judgment so dictates, of American elements to Fort Mills. The timing also will be left to you.

American forces will continue to keep our flag flying in the Philippines so long as there remains any possibility of resistance. I have made these decisions in complete understanding.
of your military estimate that accompanied President Quezon's message to me. The duty and the necessity of resisting Japanese aggression to the last transcends in importance any other obligation now facing us in the Philippines.

There has been gradually welded into a common front a powerful opposition to the predatory powers that are seeking the destruction of individual liberty and freedom of government. As the most powerful member of this coalition we cannot display weakness in spirit no matter how physically weak we may now be at the moment in any particular theatre. It is mandatory that there be established once and for all in the minds of all peoples complete evidence that the American determination and indomitable will to win carries on down to the last unit.

I therefore give you this most difficult mission in full understanding of the desperate situation to which you may shortly be reduced. The service that you and the American members of your command can now render to your country in the titanic struggle now developing is beyond all possibility of appraisement. Assuming therefore that President Quezon will choose to exercise the privilege of separate capitulation, I particularly request that you proceed rapidly to the organization of your forces and your defenses so as to make your resistance as effective as circumstances will permit and as prolonged as humanly possible.

Submit by radio the essentials of your plans in accordance with these instructions.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

Franklin D. Roosevelt
February 10, 1942.

Ft. Mills, P.I.

To General George C. Marshall.

No. 3, Feb. 10th.

The following communication is from President Quezon to President Roosevelt:

"The following is the letter I propose to address to you and to the Emperor of Japan if my recent proposal meets with your approval:

Two great nations are now at war in the Western Pacific. The Commonwealth of the Philippines is still a possession of one of those nations, although through legislative processes it was about to attain complete independence which would have insured its neutrality in any conflict. The Philippines has therefore become a battleground between the warring powers and it is being visited with death, famine and destruction, despite the fact that occupation of the country will not influence in any way the final outcome of the war, nor have a bearing upon the conflicting principles over which the war is being waged.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Law the United States has promised to recognize the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and the same law gave authority to the President of the United States to begin parleys for the neutralization of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Premier of the Imperial Government of Japan, addressing the Diet, stated that the Imperial Government of Japan was ready to offer the Filipino people independence with honor. On the strength of these commitments and impelled by a sincere desire to put an end to the sufferings and sacrifices of our people, and to safeguard their liberty and welfare, I propose the following program of action:

That the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan recognize the independence of the Philippines; that within a reasonable period of time both armies, American and Japanese, be withdrawn, previous arrangements having been negotiated with the Philippine Government; that neither nation maintain bases in the Philippines; that the Philippine Army be at once demobilized, the remaining force to be a Constabulary of moderate size; that at once upon the granting of freedom that trade agreement with
other countries become solely a matter to be settled by the Philippines and the nation concerned; that American and Japanese noncombatants who so desire be evacuated with their own armies under reciprocal and appropriate stipulations.

It is my earnest hope that, moved by the highest considerations of justice and humanity, the two great powers which now exercise control over the Philippines will give their approval in general principle to my proposal. If this is done I further propose, in order to accomplish the details thereof, that an Armistice be declared in the Philippines and that I proceed to Manila at once for necessary consultations with the two governments concerned.

(signed) Manuel L. Quezon.
From Ft. Mills,

To General George C. Marshall

S.162 - For President Roosevelt:

After witnessing our burying of about 400 dead Japs whom we had just mopped up, the Governor of Bataan has reported:

"I am having a little difficulty collecting the taxes because of some trouble in my province."

I assured him that you were broadminded and would understand.

MacArthur.
MARCHANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: For Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Far East:

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR STOP TRANSMIT

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRESIDENT QUEZON COLON QUOTE YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY TENTH EVIDENTLY CROSS ED MINE TO YOU OF FEBRUARY NINTH STOP UNDER OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EMPowered TO GIVE OR ALLOCATE ANY TERRITORY TO ANOTHER NATION STOP FURTHERMORE CONSIDER THE UNITED STATES HAS JUST BOUND ITSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH TWENTY-ONE OTHER NATIONS TO UNITED ACTION IN DEALING WITH THE AXIS POWERS AND HAS SPECIFICALLY ENGAGED ITSELF NOT TO ENTER INTO ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SEPARATE PEACE STOP PARA YOU HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STOP PARA I WILL MAKE NO FURTHER COMMENTS REGARDING YOUR LAST MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY TENTH PENDING YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MINE TO YOU OF FEBRUARY NINTH THROUGH GENERAL MACARTHUR AND

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

SECRET

L. T. GRESH, Brigadier General, Assistant Chief of Staff.
Messages received from General MacArthur during night February 11 - 12, 1942.

For President Roosevelt:

I have delivered your message to President Quezon and have shown your 11029 to High Commissioner Sayre. If opportunity presents and can be done with reasonable safety and of course with their own consent, I will evacuate the members of the Commonwealth Government, the High Commissioner, Mrs. Sayre and their son. I am deeply appreciative of the inclusion of my own family in this list but they and I have decided that they will share the fate of the garrison.

My plans have already been outlined in previous radios; they consist in fighting my present battle position in Bataan to destruction and then holding Corregidor in a similar manner. I have not the slightest intention in the world of surrendering or capitulating the Filipino elements of my command. Apparently my message gave a false impression or was garbled with reference to Filipinos. My statements regarding collapse applied only to the civilian population, including Commonwealth officials, the puppet government and the general populace. There has never been the slightest wavering among the troops. I count upon them equally with the Americans to hold steadfast to the end.

MacArthur

For the War Department:

President Quezon's suggested proposal was entirely contingent upon prior approval by President Roosevelt. Replying to your 1031. He has no intention whatsoever so far as I know to do anything which does not meet with President Roosevelt's complete acquiescence. I will however take every possible precaution that nothing of this nature goes out. President Quezon has several times declined to accept a trip by submarine. His physical condition is such that his medical advisors do not believe he could survive it.
February 12, 1942.

From Fort Mills, P.I.

To General G.C. Marshall

No. 262, Feb. 12.

The following message is from President Quezon:

"The President of the United States:

I wish to thank you for your prompt answer to the proposal which I submitted to you with the unanimous approval of my war cabinet. We fully appreciate the reasons upon which your decision is based and we are abiding by it.

(signed) Quezon."

MacArthur.


4-27-60
Carl I. Springer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: General Hurley.

General Hurley has reported in a radiogram dated February 12 that his mission of coordinating relief measures for the forces in the Philippines requires that he visit General Wavell's headquarters. He stated that for that purpose he was leaving Australia on the 12th and that upon his return from the trip, which will involve about 10,000 miles of travel by air, he will undertake his duties in New Zealand.

He asked that you be informed of the reason for his delay in engaging himself in the New Zealand situation, to which he will give his undivided attention as soon as he has returned from the Netherlands East Indies.

The Secretary of State is also being informed.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
COPY

From HQ Philippine Dept. in the Field
To Adjutant General

No. 289 Feb.15

For President Roosevelt.

Your message has been transmitted to me and I thank you for your kind words. I think it is wise not to publish my letter to General MacArthur regarding destruction of Philippine silver currency.

(signed) Quezon

MacArthur
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following message be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

The President has approved the plan outlined in your No. 296 for the evacuation of President Quezon and his War Cabinet to unoccupied portions of the Philippines. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy has issued instructions which will place the next submarine to arrive at Corregidor under your orders for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed further that if no submarine is now in that vicinity one will be dispatched to you forthwith. The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that this Government will support his effort in every practicable way. Means for secret communication between President Quezon and this Government should be arranged.

Marshall
From: Ft. Mills.
To: General George C. Marshall

No. 296. Feb. 16th

President Quezon and his War Cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islands initially in the Visayan. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water travelling only by night proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique on Panay. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine which will be in here within the next 3 or 4 days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far south. Under present plans the High Commissioners party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would
No. 296, Feb. 16th

involve the postponement of his departure for 4 days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CINC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me the Quezon's will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine, however, would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

MacArthur
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I submit herewith a condensed record of the plan for evacuation of governmental officials from the Philippine Islands.

MacArthur Plan:

President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islands initially in the Visayas. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water, travelling only by night, proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique or Pana. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine which will be in here within the next three or four days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far South.

Under present plans the High Commissioner's party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would involve the postponement of his departure for four days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CinC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the
passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me then Quezon will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine however would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

Note: It is assumed that the 1st and 2nd parts of plan, mentioned by General MacArthur, refer respectively to the two paragraphs as above quoted. It is possible that he refers only to successive stages of the Quezon evacuation, but the first interpretation is considered the more likely, and that the Sayre family has now left Luzon.

The President's reply to No. 296 was as follows:

The President has approved the plan outlined in your No. 296 for the evacuation of President Quezon and his War Cabinet to unoccupied portions of the Philippines. The Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy has issued instructions which will place the next submarine to arrive at Corregidor under your orders for evacuation of key civil personnel and has directed further that if no submarine is now in that vicinity one will be dispatched to you forthwith. The President desires you to convey his best wishes for success to President Quezon and to say that this Government will support his effort in every practicable way. Means for secret communication between President Quezon and this Government should be arranged.
From: Ft. Mills.

To: General George C. Marshall

No. 297, Feb. 16.

The unexpectedly early capitulation of Singapore emphasizes the fact that the opportunity for a successful attack upon the hostile lines of communication is rapidly vanishing. If this enemy victory is followed by further success in the NEI the sensitiveness of his lines of communication will largely disappear due to consolidation of his positions in the south. A determined effort in force made now would probably attract the assistance of Russia who will unquestionably not move in this area until some evidence is given of concrete effort by the Allies. The opportunities still exist for a complete reversal of the situation. It will soon, however, be too late for such a movement.

MacArthur
SECRET RADIOGRAM

NPM 2757
1325/17
AC 381 (2-17-42) MSC

FEBRUARY 17, 1942
11:01 A

FROM: FORT MILLS
TO: AGO

NO. 307 FEBRUARY SEVENTEENTH

THE FOLLOWING LETTER WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON: "FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND FOR PURPOSES OF RECORD AND FUTURE REFERENCE, I AM ENCLOSED HEREWITH CERTAIN DOCUMENTS SHOWING THAT THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS DELIVERED TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY THE FOLLOWING: ONE SMALL CASE MARKED G-11 CONTAINING 5 SMALL BARS OF GOLD BULLION, 1 BAR OF SILVER BULLION, AND VARIOUS OTHER PIECES OF GOLD AND/OR SILVER BULLION; 264 SMALL BARS OF GOLD BULLION; 630 BAGS CONTAINING 1000 PESOS EACH WITH THE REQUEST THAT THESE ITEMS BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY WASHINGTON D C FOR SAFE KEEPING. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN IN ORDER TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF THE GOLD AND SILVER FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY". THE SHIPMENT MENTIONED WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NAVY ON FEB. 4. THE FOREGOING IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

MACARTHUR

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DOO Dir. 5200.9 (6/27/53)

Date: JAN 20, 1952
Signature: RKA
From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 341, Feb. 22, 1942.

Feb. 22, 1942.

There are indications that the enemy has been so badly mauled during the Bataan fighting that he is unable to set up with his present forces the attack necessary to destroy me. Practically every regiment has consolidated by eliminating one battalion, and a number of regiments themselves have totally disappeared. His artillery groupment may be from weakness rather than strength. I may have gained the respite I so desperately need. Do not publicize in any way any of the above. Little activity yesterday except by enemy air. Our counter-battery temporarily silenced his Cavite shore fire. No Change in south.

MacArthur
From Fort Mills
To: General Marshall
No. 344, February 22.

The Coast Farmer, first surface vessel dispatched to run blockade from Australia, arrived safely in Mindanao February 19. Cargo 2,500 tons balanced rations, 2,000 rounds 81 MM mortar ammunition, 800,000 rounds caliber .30 and 30,000 rounds caliber .50. She had no difficulty in getting through. The thinness of the enemy's coverage is such that it can readily be pierced along many routes including direct westward passage from Honolulu. I have secure bases for reception in Mindanao and the Visayas. I suggest that the problem of supplying me should be revised in the above circumstances. This revised effort should center in Washington and not in Australia or the N. E. I. The commanders there, however able they may be, have neither the resources nor the means at their disposal properly to accomplish this mission. Many categories of supply that are required are not available in that area. Moreover, they are so engaged in the actual zone of immediate or threatened conflict that it is impossible for them to concentrate upon my needs. The size of the problem is greater than the means now being used to solve it. The prime requisite is the making available in the United States of the necessary ships and material, especially the former, and their continuous dispatch to destination. Nowhere is the situation more desperate and dangerous than here. The War Department has complete knowledge of our needs which is not true in Australia, the quantities involved are not great but it is imperative that they may be instantly available in the United States and that the entire impulse and organization be reenergized and controlled directly by you. If it is left as a subsidiary effort it will never be accomplished. Careful consideration should also be
given as to troop replacement by this means; even if losses occur they will be small compared to the loss out here if we do not have success.

MacArthur
FOR THE PRESIDENT,
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
From Ft. Mills

To: General George C. Marshall

No. 349 - February 23.

First part of plan outlined in myrad 296 successfully accomplished.

MacArthur.
From Ft. Mills

To General George C. Marshall

No. 296, Feb. 16th.

President Quezon and his war cabinet desire to establish the seat of the Commonwealth Government in the unoccupied portions of the Philippine Islands initially in the Visayas. They feel certain that their usefulness will be greatly enhanced by contact with the Filipino public which is now impossible to them because of siege conditions existing here. Their purpose, in accordance with President Roosevelt's desires as expressed in his recent directive, is to maintain the cohesion morale of the populace in the unoccupied communities in order to prolong and make more effective resistance to the Japanese. Their usefulness here is over and it is advantageous from every point of view that they do not share the destruction which now faces this garrison. I propose to evacuate them by water travelling only by night proceeding first to Mindoro and thence south to Capiz or Antique or Pana. If pressed they will continue to Mindanao where they could safely exist in the interior indefinitely. I am heartily in favor of the plan and propose to execute it promptly unless you order otherwise. In order to assist in the movement I request be given authority to utilize the submarine
No. 296. Feb. 16th

which will be in here within the next three or four days to evacuate them as far as Capiz and then to return here to evacuate the High Commissioner and his family to the far South. Under present plans the High Commissioner's party is scheduled to leave here in this submarine immediately upon its arrival. My plan would involve the postponement of his departure for four days. The available capacity is not sufficient to accommodate both groups at the same time and hence they must be evacuated separately. The Quezon trip being the short one I place it first. If this authority is given the proper instructions should be radioed to the CinC Asiatic Fleet who controls not only the submarine but the allocation of the passengers who are to be transported. If the submarine is not made available to me then Quezon will attempt the trip in a small surface vessel. The use of the submarine however would increase the factor of safety. Request immediate action.

MacArthur
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Apropos of your direction Sunday night for the organization of a blockade-running effort towards the Philippines via Hawaii, I have the following to report:

The Army has three Naval destroyers under conversion. Diesel engines are being installed and a cargo-going capacity of 1500 tons made possible.

The first of these three will be ready for service in a few days, at the port of New Orleans. The other two should be ready by the first week in March, also at New Orleans. We are going ahead with the loading of the first of the three and will dispatch it through the Canal to Hawaii and from there to be routed by the Navy. The others will follow.

Further, we find that three more of this type of converted destroyers are being operated commercially in the Caribbean. Arrangements are being made to take them over and add them to the three boats referred to above.

Admiral King states that though these converted boats only have a rate of speed of 14½ knots an hour, they are suited to the purpose. They will have a cruising capacity of 10,000 miles.

A radio has been sent to General MacArthur notifying him accordingly of this, we hope, cheering possibility.
FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

[Handwritten note: Boy]

The Confidential Papers
From: USAFFE
To: Adjutant General
No. 363 February 25

The following messages dated February 22, indicative of the loyalty of the Moros of Mindanao, are transmitted:

"Colonel Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C., through General MacArthur:

"As son of your friend the late Datu Piang of Mindanao and as war leader of the Moros I wish to reiterate to the great American President, through you, my people's pledge of loyalty to the Government of the United States. The 20,000 Moros enlisted as Bolomen of the United States Army whom I command will fight to the last and die for America and their country.

Captain Datu Gumbay Piang"

"General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East:

"The old friendship of our families remain unshaken. Your great father's saber is used in our war against the enemy and picture is in my headquarters. The 20,000 Moros enlisted as Bolomen and I greet their great Commanding General and join their brave comrades of Bataan in celebrating the birthday of the father of American nation.

Captain Datu Gumbay Piang."
February 26, 1942

FROM: Ft. Mills

TO: Adj. Gen.

No. 371 Feb. 26

With light forces I swept through the enemy's screen before my battle position and am now in command of the terrain to my front. The enemy has definitely recoiled. He has reversed his flank in front of my right six to ten kilometers and in other sectors by varying distances. I am pressing to locate and fix his position. His attitude is so passive as to discount any immediate threat of attack. There are periodical attempts of enemy destroyers and occasionally a cruiser in and out of Subic Bay. This has possibly become an intermediate base for naval convoy to the south as well as for local supply of the enemy in Bataan. In the mountain province and Abra our guerilla activities have become so harassing and deadly that the enemy will shortly be forced either to evacuate or rebuild his forces. Indications are the former. Patrol activities increasing in Mindanao but with no indication of enemy becoming seriously aggressive.
From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 382, Feb. 28

The enemy contour has now been definitely fixed as a semicircular defensive position buttressed on the slopes of Mt. Natib. He blocks firmly to the north the Moron-Bagac Road on the west and patrols weakly the Abucay-Orani Road on the east. In North Luzon he has evacuated the Abra Valley from Cervantes to Bengued. He begins to show signs of exhaustion. Every indication that we are entering upon a phase of positional warfare of indecisive character. No other changes.

MacArthur
From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 383, Feb. 28:

President Quezon today issued a proclamation in which he cited the valiant defense of Philippine territory and the steadfast loyalty of the civilian population. He announced the allocation of funds for civilian relief and urged every Filipino to trust America. The proclamation closed with the following: "The United Nations will win this war. America is too great and too powerful to be vanquished in this conflict. I know she will not fail us." I am transmitting proclamation in clear to Public Relations.

MacArthur
From: Ft. Mills, P.I.

To: Gen. G.C. Marshall

March 1, 1942.

The following message has been received from the Lanao Moros:

"We the undersigned leaders of Lanao Moros request you to inform General MacArthur, Commanding General of all military forces in the Philippines and through him the President of the United States that we have consulted together and agreed without any exception that we will fight with all our strength against the Japanese and other enemies of the United States and Philippine Government; that we recognize that the present conflict is a great emergency where all men of character must stand together united, so we agree to avoid politics or struggle for personal advantage, to stop personal quarrels which disrupt the unity of Moro Community, that we will disregard differences in religion between Christian, Filipino, Mohammedan or Paga, but will fight together as one people for a greater purpose to destroy the enemy of good government, that we place ourselves under command of the military commander and will obey his orders; to all of this we have sworn upon the Koran to hold our lives forfeit in the fulfillment of this purpose to fight the Japanese and enemies of the United States, and we have prepared our bladed weapons because we lack fire arms and with sharp kris, barong, campilan, tabas, and spear, we will attack or defend as ordered.

"We have over 10,000 already sworn upon the Koran and additional fighting men are being sworn every day. We Lanao Moros have fought for many generations, we know how to fight, and when we swear upon the Koran we know what it means; which General Wood, our good friend, would know means all out fight and no mercy asked.

"We want you to know and the President of the United States to know that we Lanao Moros are loyal and will fight all enemies of the United States. All fighting men of Lanao would like to sign their names but they are too many so we signed for them:

Senator Sultan S.A. Ramlain Alonto
All Sultans Lanao,
Deputy Governors,
Municipal Mayors and other District officials."

I have transmitted to the Moros the following message:

"Please tell the Lanao Moros that no more inspiring or significant incident has occurred in the mighty struggle that now engulfs the world than the magnificent stand they have taken. It covers them with immortal
glory and elevates the Moro race to the highest pinnacle of spiritual grandeur. However hard the road, ultimate victory is certain. I have transmitted this message of superb fidelity to the President of the United States.

MacArthur.
From Ft. Mills

To The Adjutant General

No. 413, March 4

We made a surprise air attack on Olongapo and Subic Bay, destroying the following vessels: one of 12,000 tons, one of 10,000 tons, one of 8,000 tons and two motor launches. Inflicted much damage on smaller craft. Large fires were started at shore installations on Grande Island and Olongapo.

MacArthur
RADIOGRAM

MARCH 4, 1942
5:20 AM.

From FORT MILLS

To GENERAL GEORGE C MARSHALL

NO 414 MARCH FOURTH

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FOR PRESIDENT
ROOSEVELT FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON QUITE HAVE VISITED
SOME PROVINCES VISAYAN GROUP STOP PEOPLE LOYAL TO
THE END AND MORALE FINE UNQUOTE

MACARTHUR
Copy

Secret Radiogram

From: Ft. Mills, P. I. March 16, 1942
    1:59 P.M.

To: AGO

No. 498, March 16, 1942.

For General Marshall. Request that the following message from President Quezon be transmitted to President Roosevelt: "Your messages always lighten our burden and encourage us to still greater efforts and sacrifice."

MacArthur

Secret Radiogram
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a message received yesterday from General MacArthur. You will see that prior to his departure from Fort Mills he created four separate commands in the Philippines, to be controlled by him at Melbourne through a deputy at Fort Mills. He left the command of Manila Bay and Fort Mills independent of General Wainwright who is in command of the nearby forces on the Bataan Peninsula. The coordination of these two intimately related garrisons was to be handled from Australia, through a Deputy Chief of Staff at Fort Mills—General Beebe, promoted to the grade of Brigadier General just prior to General MacArthur's departure.

Prior to the receipt of General MacArthur's message, of March 21st just referred to, instructions had been sent to General Wainwright as follows:

(a) The message signed by you personally, stating your confidence in his leadership and advancing him to the grade of Lieutenant General.

The following message from me:

(b) "Upon the departure of General MacArthur you became Commanding General of United States Forces in the Philippines. You are to communicate directly with the War Department in rendering daily operation reports which are to be dispatched over your name."

I am sending General MacArthur a message that General Wainwright has taken over command of all forces in the Philippines and so reported himself yesterday. In other words, the subdivided command as created by General MacArthur prior to his departure has been consolidated as a result of the fact that we had no information from MacArthur of the unexpected action he had taken. However, control of these subdivisions from Australia would appear to be an impracticable proposition, whatever the reasons were for such an arrangement. Furthermore, as Supreme Commander of the Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, he is barred from exercising direct command over national forces, under the terms of such agreements for combined commands. You will remember that this last proviso was insisted upon by us.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Charles L. Scott
to avoid the possibility or rather the natural tendency for General Wavell to so involve himself personally in the affairs of Singapore and Burma that he might fail to give due weight to the problems of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines.
March 21, 1942.

From Australia

To General George C. Marshall

No. NR 3 - 21st

Upon my departure and based upon the special problems involved I set upon the following organization in the Philippines:

Luzon Force comprising all units on Batan and elsewhere in Luzon under General Wainwright; Visayan Force comprising all units in those islands under General Chynoweth; Mindanao Force under General Sharp; Harbor defenses of Manila Bay under General Moore. I left at Fort Mills an advance echelon of my headquarters under General Beebe who was designated Deputy Chief of Staff, USAFFE, and who will effect necessary coordination under my direct supervision. Due to intangibles of situation in Philippines the foregoing organization is deemed most advantageous.

In Australia I have found the Air Corps in a most disorganized condition and it is most essential as a fundamental and primary step that General Brett be relieved of his other duties in order properly to command and direct our air effort. His headquarters in Melbourne is too far from the scene of air activity to perform most effectively the functions of organization, training and combat. I propose to relieve him immediately of all duties pertaining to ground forces and to have him establish his headquarters in the forward area in some locality he may select. I propose to assign General Barnes to command U.S. Army Ground Forces. Coordination with Australian Forces for the present in accordance with your radio will be secured through cooperation. Task forces will be created to meet tactical requirements.

Request immediate approval of this organization as a fundamental step in order to bring some order into what is at present a most uncoordinated and ineffective system which is a menace to the safety of this country. I will later and in more detail inform you of glaring deficiencies and make recommendations for their rectification.

My relationship with the naval elements in this zone is not clear to me and I request further information in this regard.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58) MacArthur.

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl I. Spier
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: MacArthur's command status.

Attached hereto is a radiogram received last night from General MacArthur on the above subject. Our radiogram #810 to which he refers, informed him as follows:

"That as Supreme Commander he is ineligible to retain direct command of any national forces, including those in the Philippines; that it is considered necessary that command of all Philippine forces be consolidated under Wainwright; approves his proposal that Brett command Australian and United States air forces and that Barnes command United States ground forces; suggests that with the arrival of the headquarters of an Australian Corps, command of the ground forces should pass to an Australian general; informs him that his relationship with the Navy will be clarified in a later directive; and tells him that efforts are being made to have him operate under the President and the United States Chiefs of Staff rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

Incl.

Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date: 4-6-57
Signature: (Anonymous)
From: Australia
To: General George C. Marshall
NR 19 March 24, 1942

I understand thoroughly the difficulties outlined in your eight one zero of the twenty-second and you can count upon my accommodating myself completely to any arrangement that is made. I am heartily in accord with Wainwright's promotion to Lieutenant General which I intended myself to recommend. His assignment to the Philippine Command is appropriate.

In view of your radio and of my further survey of the situation I propose to establish the following organization here modifying somewhat that outlined in my number three: ground combat forces under the command of the appropriate Australian General, having the local zone of the interior function under the present Australian authorities; a U. S. service command under General Barnes comprising all administration and supply functions; the Air Force under General Brett. American and Australian units will be assigned to the ground or air echelons as required and strategic control and intimate cooperation exercised through directives to the respective commanders. The U. S. Service Command will operate under policies established by me while requirements to be met by the corresponding Australian establishment will be presented to the Prime Minister for action through his normal channels. I shall thus free the combat echelons of all administrative, supply and political considerations permitting uninterrupted concentration on combat missions and at the same time avoid any interference with the Australian military and governmental organization. I am confident that complete and enthusiastic cooperation can be secured through my contact with the Prime Minister.

MacArthur.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Congratulatory Message.

The Chief of Staff directs that a message be sent as follows in the most expeditious manner consistent with secrecy, to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the Philippines; WDOFD:

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL WAINWRIGHT PERIOD

CONGRATULATIONS ON KNOCKING OUT ANOTHER WHOLESALE JAP ASSAULT PERIOD PLEASE INFORM OUR FILIPINO AND AMERICAN SOLDIERS FOR ME THAT THEIR FIGHTING EXAMPLE IS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL OF US

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

McNARNEY,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Date - 4-6-59
Signature - Carl S. Spencer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has just been received from General MacArthur.

[Signature]

Acting Chief of Staff.
Simultaneously with the receipt of the President's contemplated message to Wainwright I received the following message from him: "At 6 o'clock this morning General King Commanding Luzon Force without my knowledge or approval sent a flag of truce to Japanese Commander. The minute I heard of it I disapproved of his action and directed that there would be no surrender. I was informed it was too late to make any change that the action had already been taken. Enemy on east had enveloped both flanks of the small groups of what was left of the Second Corps and was firing with artillery into the hospital area which undoubtedly prompted King's action. In order to relieve the pressure on the right, last night I ordered the First Corps to attack to the North with its ultimate objective Olongapo but the attack did not repeat not get off. Physical exhaustion and sickness due to a long period of insufficient food is the real cause of this terrible disaster. When I get word what terms have been arranged I will advise you. Fearing just what happened, I endeavored last night to withdraw some of the Philippine Division and other regular units but only succeeded in getting out some scattered mixtures of individuals. I will endeavor to hold Corregidor. Enemy yesterday landed on Guimaras and the enemy will be in Iloilo today. Please send bombers as contemplated. We will still inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy and attempt to bring through ships from Visayan Island signed Wainwright." As the action taken on Bataan anticipated the authority conveyed in the message I do not repeat not believe it advisable to transmit now its contents to General Wainwright. The air attack from here will be made as planned on Saturday morning. As Corregidor has supply which Wainwright estimates will last until June 1, I strongly recommend that all supply ships now en route be diverted as safety dictates. I am taking safety measures with regard to submarines engaged in ferry supplies from Visayas.
April 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached radio just received.

[Signature]

Joseph J. McNamarra
Acting Chief of Staff.
No. 746 April 9, 1942

Shortly after Flag of Truce passed through the front lines this morning hostilities ceased, for the most part, in Bataan. At about 10 o'clock this morning General King was sent for to confer with the Japanese Commander. He has not returned as of 7 P.M. repeat 7 P.M. nor has the result of the conference been disclosed. Japanese Forces are now in control of the Southern End of the Bataan Peninsula and have already placed batteries in position to fire on Corregidor. 1 Battery is located in the vicinity of Cabacabon and others are located farther to the west. I do not at present feel at liberty to return the fire of these batteries as I would be firing into areas occupied by my own troops. Since the fall of Bataan the hostile air force has renewed its attack on Corregidor. This island was heavily bombed this afternoon but suffered no damage of military consequence. For General Marshall.

Wainwright.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a radiogram just received from General Wainwright, who wrote it in response to my request for a completely frank and confidential estimate of his situation.

General Wainwright has performed a marvelous job and without ever uttering a word of complaint. I feel he has earned a commendation from you in the highest terms.

The enclosed draft is my suggestion for such a message, and if you approve it, I will dispatch it at once.

[N. C. Williams]
Chief of Staff.

[Signature]

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DOD Dir. 5200.2 (5/17/89)
Date: 8-10-21
Signature: PAP
MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation

The Chief of Staff directs that the following secret message in code be transmitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in the Philippine Islands, Fort Mills, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy: WDWP:

PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL WAINWRIGHT

PERIOD DURING RECENT WEEKS COMMA WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH GROWING ADMIRATION THE DAY BY DAY ACCOUNTS OF YOUR HEROIC STAND AGAINST THE MOUNTING INTENSITY OF BOMBARDMENT BY ENEMY PLANES AND HEAVY SEIGE GUNS PERIOD IN SPITE OF ALL THE HANDICAPS OF COMPLETE ISOLATION COMMA LACK OF FOOD AND AMMUNITION YOU HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD A SHINING EXAMPLE OF PATRIOTIC FORTITUDE AND SELF-SACRIFICE PERIOD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ASK NO FINER EXAMPLE OF TENACITY COMMA RESOURCEFULNESS COMMA AND STEADFAST COURAGE PERIOD THE CALM DETERMINATION OF YOUR PERSONAL LEADERSHIP IN A DESPERATE SITUATION SETS A STANDARD OF DUTY FOR OUR SOLDIERS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD PERIOD IN EVERY CAMP AND ON EVERY NAVAL VESSEL SOLDIERS SAILORS AND MARINES ARE INSPIRED BY THE GALLANT STRUGGLE OF THEIR COMRADES IN THE PHILIPPINES PERIOD THE WORKMEN IN OUR SHIPYARDS AND MUNITIONS PLANTS REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS BECAUSE OF YOUR EXAMPLE PERIOD YOU AND YOUR DEVOTED FOLLOWERS HAVE BECOME THE LIVING SYMBOLS OF OUR WAR AIMS AND THE GUARANTEE OF VICTORY PERIOD

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
To be seen only by decoding clerk and General Marshall.

Reurad 1411. Hostile Air Corps has been bombing Corregidor relentlessly since March 24. Following fall of Bataan on 9 April, enemy immediately emplaced artillery on south shore of peninsula and has since then subjected our defenses to artillery fire. Beginning 29 April (Emperor's birthday) the fire of hostile artillery increased in intensity and has continued at that tempo to present date. The hostile bombing has been relatively ineffective but artillery fire from large caliber guns (240 MM) has resulted in destruction of large percentage of coast defense and beach defense artillery and small arms. Continued bombardment has resulted in about 600 casualties since April 9, and has lowered morale of troops. Morale difficult to maintain at best because troops have been constantly under or subject to air or artillery attack since December 29 and have been receiving half of poorly balanced ration since January 8. However, morale amazingly good considering conditions under which troops are now operating. Persistent reports from our operatives indicate that enemy is planning to launch an assault against Corregidor. He has prepared a large number of motor boats on which weapons are
mounted, and has also constructed a large number of smaller boats to be used in transporting troops. I have nothing on which to base an estimate of present hostile troops strength on Luzon. However, enemy has recently taken Cebu and Panay, using about ten thousand men in each operation, and is now engaged in attack on Mindanao. I estimate that at least ten thousand are now engaged in operations on Mindanao. Unless troops have been withdrawn from the Philippines I believe that a sufficient force remains on Luzon to undertake an operation against Corregidor. Enemy forces will soon be in possession of all important areas bordering on coast of Mindanao and our troops will be confined to mountains. Thereafter enemy can clean up Visayan islands and Mindanao at leisure. In my opinion the enemy is capable of making an assault on Corregidor at any time. The success or failure of such an assault will depend entirely on steadfastness of beach defense troops. With morale at present level I estimate that we have something less than an even chance to beat off an assault. In accordance with your request I have given you a very frank and honest opinion on the situation here as I see it.

Wainwright
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following messages were received in the War Department during the night:

Situation in the Philippines:

Message from General MacArthur states that he received a radio from General Sharp, commanding our forces in Mindanao, that because of crumbling defensive lines on Bukidnon Plateau, Mindanao has become indefensible and he has been forced to surrender effective at daylight May 10th. Message from Sharp states that Lanao and Cotabato are held by the enemy and that the small units in Zamboanga and in the Agusan province will be unable to hold out against a superior force. Sharp regrets this action has been forced upon him but states there was no alternative. General MacArthur advises no publicity.

Situation in Burma:

One message was received that Stilwell and his party had been located by air reconnaissance fifteen miles east of Homalin; that food had been dropped to them.

A later dispatch says that he and his party had been located by the RAF and food dropped to them late in the afternoon of May 9th about eighteen miles east of Homalin on the Chindwin River. Dispatch says that organized resistance in Burma is about over. Also information indicates that the Generalissimo on May 2d ordered his troops to retire on China; those south of Mandalay to break through via Taunggyo and Kengtung; those northeast via Shano to Myitkyina. In this dispatch General Magruder says he does not believe that Stilwell knew about this. He also states that all action on the training project in India has been deferred. He has also established a branch headquarters in New Delhi.