October 17, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As of possible interest, I send the attached memorandum regarding the arrival of the Russian tanker DOMBASS at San Pedro on October eighteenth.

C[Signature]
October 17, 1939.

Mr. Harrington, Visa Division, called at 3:30 to state that the Visa Division had been requested to give a waiver with respect to the necessity of a crew list visa for the Russian tanker DOMBASS to visit San Pedro October 18 on the grounds that there was no American Consul at the last port of call, Petropavlosk.

Mr. Harrington stated that he saw no reason for refusing the request which seemed reasonable in the circumstances, but that it was so unusual for a Russian tanker to visit San Pedro that he felt the Navy Department would be greatly interested.

I immediately telephoned Commander Struble and communicated that information to him. He said he would notify the Commander-in-Chief immediately so that any necessary precautions could be taken in San Pedro.

U.S. Consul: San Pedro
Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
RUSH.
837, October 30, 8 p.m.

I have just been informed that the British broadcast from London at 7 p.m., Moscow time in reporting the expected departure tomorrow of the Finnish delegation for Moscow stated that a Finnish newspaper this evening had published a report alleging "when Paasikivi was in Moscow a high official of the American Embassy handed him a personal message of sympathy from President Roosevelt asking to be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations". I need hardly assure the Department that this report, assuming it to have been published in a Finnish newspaper, is completely without foundation.

Neither I nor any member of the Embassy staff saw Paasikivi during his visits to Moscow.

Repeated to Helsinki.

STEINHARDT

HPD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br).

Moscow

Dated October 30, 1939

Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

838, October 30, 9 p.m.

My telegram No. 827, October 28, 6 p.m.

I am informed by the Finnish Legation here that the Finnish delegation is not expected here before Thursday morning.

STEINHARDT

PEG
TELEGRAM SENT

March 7, 1940
9 p.m.

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW (U.S.S.R.)

150
TRIPLE PRIORITY
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Finnish Foreign Minister has informed Sterling at Stockholm that the Finnish Government has accepted Russian invitation to send envoys to Moscow and that a delegation including Tanner and Passikivi flew from Stockholm to Moscow early this morning. It is believed that the Russian terms are drastic.

Kindly arrange to see Molotov immediately, putting the conference on as personal a basis as possible. Please state to him that this government has no purpose of intervening in the negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union, but the American people are vividly interested. Our public opinion would be deeply impressed were the Soviet government to take a generous attitude towards Finland.

In your discretion you might further intimate that you are informed that there has been increasing popular demand here for measures affecting economic relations with certain areas,
areas, and that some of such movements would be slowed down, depending on the degree of moderation and generosity arrived at in the Finnish settlement.

The substance of this telegram has been transmitted to Stockholm and Helsinki.

HULL
(AAB)

A-B AAB:ES

EA PA/D
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

March 8, 1940
11 a.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

151.

Your 253, March 8, 11 a.m.

We believe it inadvisable for the Finnish delegates to stay with you. You may, however, in your discretion call upon them and render them such courtesies as may seem appropriate. We feel that in such contacts as you may have with them you should take care to avoid creating the impression that they are obtaining advice from you, in view of Russian assertions that their real grievance against Finland was the use of Finland by non-Baltic powers in a manner disliked by Russia.

HULL

760D61
EU:LWH:KMB PA/D A-B
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

Moscow
Dated March 8, 1940
Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

255, March 8, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

A Swedish plane arrived yesterday evening bearing Ryyti, Paasikivi, General Wallin, Wuomanen, two minor Finnish officials, and a secretary. The omission of Tanner from the delegation is in my opinion wise.

The visit has been veiled in the utmost secrecy, the delegates having been provided with Swedish passports bearing fictitious names, and the plane having landed at an obscure airport. The presence of the delegation in Moscow is in consequence thus far known only to the Kremlin the Swedish Legation and this Embassy.

I have just had a talk with the Swedish Minister who has not yet seen any of the delegates. He assured me that notwithstanding press despatches to the contrary the Germans have had no connection of any kind with the negotiations leading to the presence in Moscow of the Finnish delegation. He also said that the suggestion of an immediate armistice has thus far not met with the approval of
of Kremlin which apparently wished first to explore the possibility of a final peace.

The Minister intimated very clearly that he and his Government hoped for the cooperation of the United States in strengthening the position of the Finnish delegates during the negotiations. He stated that he believed that once the presence of the Finnish delegation in Moscow became known it would be helpful if the interests of the United States in the successful outcome of the negotiations were to be publicly disclosed as this would have a material effect on the Soviet position since it is common knowledge that the Soviet Government is seriously concerned about its relations with the United States particularly in respect of purchases in the United States.

STEINHARDT

HPD
London, filed 15:10, June 24, 1941.

The following is the distribution of the Russian divisions along the German border at the commencement of hostilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Districts</th>
<th>Infantry Divisions</th>
<th>Cavalry Divisions</th>
<th>Tank Divisions</th>
<th>Tank Brigades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pri Baltir</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Caucasian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Leningrad</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Leningrad</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve in European Russia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 130 30 2 62

* It is felt by authorities at the British War Office that the number of divisions shown for the Western Military District is small but no other identifications have as yet been made.

LEE

Distribution:
THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War
State Department
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
GHQ
G-3
Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 09:41, July 9, 1941.

London, filed 14:38, July 9, 1941.

The report on the situation in Soviet given below has as its source the Intelligence Division of the British Royal Air Force.

1. The General Staff of the U.S.S.R., together with the Commander of the Air Force, appear to be full of confidence and the impression given out is that the situation is completely under control.

2. The British Military Mission in the Soviet believe that the initial stages of the German offensive have ended. Officers of the Soviet General Staff imply that large counterattacks may be launched in the near future.

3. Around Leningrad the counterattack staged by the Soviet troops has been successful. The claim that Murmansk had fallen to the Germans is false. Rear supply and communication lines of the Soviet Army are functioning very well.

4. German prisoners exhibit lower morale than they did ten days ago.

Distribution:
The President
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G.H.Q.
Conference held on 31st July, 1941, between M. Stalin, Mr. Hopkins, and the interpreter M. Litvinov, at the Kremlin in Moscow - 6.30 p.m. to 9.30 p.m.

I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have his - Stalin's - appreciation and analysis of the war between Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as follows:

He stated that in his opinion the German Army had 175 divisions on Russia's western front at the outbreak of the war, and that since the outbreak of the war, this has been increased to 232 divisions; he believes that Germany can mobilise divisions.

He stated that Russia had 180 divisions at the outbreak of the war, but many of these were well back of the line of combat, and could not be quickly mobilised, so that when the Germans struck it was impossible to offer adequate resistance. The line which is now held is a far more propitious one than the more advanced line which they might have taken up had their divisions been prepared. Since war began, however, divisions have been placed in their appropriate positions, and at the present time he believes that Russia has a few more divisions than Germany, and places the number of Russian divisions at 240 in the front, with 20 in reserve. Stalin said that about one third of these divisions had not as yet been under fire.

Mr. Stalin stated that he can mobilise 350 divisions and will have that many divisions under arms by the time the spring campaign begins in May, 1942.

He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air. Stalin said that "nothing in warfare can take the place of actual combat", and
he wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the
great campaign which will come next Spring. He stated that
the German troops seemed to be tired, and the officers and
men that they had captured had indicated they are "sick of
war".

The German reserves are as much as 400 kilometres
back of the front, and the communications between the
reserves and the front line are extremely difficult. These
supply lines require many thousands of German troops to guard
and protect them from Russian raids.

He said that in the battle now in progress, very
many Russian and German troops are fighting far forward from
their respective lines because of the advances made by both
sides with their mechanised forces. Stalin said that his
soldiers did not consider the battle lost merely because the
Germans at one point and another broke through with their
mechanised forces. The Russian mechanised forces would attack
at another point often moving many miles behind the German line.
Merely because German forces pierce the Russian line does not
mean the Russians are lost. They fight behind the Germans,
are adept at the use of cover and fight their way out in the
night. He said "Even the German tanks run out of petrol".
This is merely a phase of modern warfare, and accounts for the
fact that there have been no mass surrenders of troops on
either side. The Russians therefore have many "insurgent"
troops which operate behind Germany's so-called front line.
They constantly attack German aerodromes and lines of
communications. The Russians are more familiar with the
terrain and know how to use the natural cover which nature
has provided better than the Germans. These "insurgent"
troops are proving a great menace to the German offensive.

He believes that Germany under estimated the
strength of the Russian Army, and have not new enough troops
on the whole front to carry on a successful offensive war
and at the same time guard their extended lines of
communications. He repeatedly emphasised the large number
of men Germany was forced to use for this purpose, and
believes that the Germans will have to go on the defensive
themselves. There is considerable evidence that they are
already doing this. They are burying many of their large
tanks in the ground for defensive purposes. The Russians
have already found 50 such defensive positions. Mr. Stalin
stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has too many
men on the Russian front, which may account for their
preparing some defensive positions so that some of their
divisions might be returned to the German western areas of
actual or potential operation.

He thinks the Germans have now on his front about
70 tank and motorised divisions. He also states that the
Russo-German war has already changed the character of
divisional organisation; that the Germans had broken up
their large armoured divisions and dispersed this equipment
through what Stalin called their tank and motorised divisions.
Stalin stated that the war had already shown their infantry
divisions must include substantial amounts of mechanised
equipment. While Russia had a large number of tank and
motorised divisions - none of them were a match for the
German 'Panzer' division, but were far stronger than ether
German divisions. Hence the great pressure on the German
infantry divisions which caused the diversion of German
armoured equipment all along the line.

Stalin believes that Germany had 30,000 tanks at
the outbreak of the Russian war. Russia herself had 24,000
tanks and 60 tank divisions with about 400 tanks in
each division. They have always had about 50 tanks in
each infantry division. Stalin believes that the large
divisions are being broken up by the German Staff and as the
war progresses the number of men in the divisions will be
decreased in both Armies.

He states that the pressure on his army in the last
ten days had become considerably less, and the only reason he
could give for it was that he thought Germany had been unable
to supply their mechanised divisions and air forces with adequate fuel. He stressed the great difficulty the German armies had encountered in moving vast quantities of fuel to the front, and believes these difficulties are going to increase. He does not think this is because Germany has any lack of fuel, but rather because of transportation difficulties, the lack of good roads and more particularly the effective interference of the Russians with the German communications.

Stalin says that even though the war has been going on only six weeks, his troops are meeting brand new divisions at the front, and some of the original divisions seem to have been withdrawn. He believes that the morale of his own troops is extremely high, and realises that this is partly due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that "moving mechanised forces through Russia was very different than moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France".

Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a surprise attack; he himself believed they would not strike but he took all precautions possible to mobilize his army effectively. Hitler made no demands on Russia, hence they were forced to organize a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians were counter-attacking at many points.

He said the Russian Army had met few of the 70-ton German tanks but that this was probably due to the inability of the Russian bridges to hold the tanks. He believes the terrain too difficult to manoeuvre these giant tanks. Where the 70-ton tanks were encountered, they were pierced by the Russian 75 mm. guns. He does not think that the very large German tank will play an important part in the war in Russia, although there are some parts of the front where these tanks can manoeuvre. The roads are very bad for the big tanks to operate over.
He believes that his largest tanks are better than the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown their superiority in the war to date. He stated that the two largest Russian tanks were of 48 and 52 tons respectively, with 75 mm. armour and 85 mm. guns. They have approximately $1/2$ of these tanks at present. The Russian medium tank of just over 20 tons has 45 mm. armour and 75 mm. guns. The infantry tank is 13 tons and has 37 mm. armour and 45 mm. guns. They have approximately $3/4$ medium (30 ton) tanks at present and $1/2$ light tanks (13 tons). He stated their present production of tanks was 1,000 per month. He stated that his production was equally divided between medium and heavy tanks on the one hand, and light tanks on the other. He stated they would be short of steel for tank manufacture and urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. He later said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the U.S. He also wished to purchase as many of our tanks as possible to be ready for the Spring campaign. Stalin said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter - the tank losses on both sides were very great but that Germany could produce more tanks per month this winter than Russia. Hence the aid of the U.S. in supplying steel and tanks is essential. He would like to send a tank expert to the U.S.A. He stated that he would give the U.S. his tank designs.

He emphasised the fact that Germany has a strong and powerful air force, and that their present production of planes was probably 2,500 fighters and bombers per month, but not more than 3,000 a month. Germany has more planes than the Russians at the front at this time but the quality of many of the German planes is not first-class - they are rough, plain machines, in which pilots fly without a long training. Some pilots they have captured indicated that their training was short and consisted of only a "practical course". He realises that Germany moved to
the Russian front a great many aircraft which types are
no longer being built in German factories. He thinks that
Germany under-rated the ability of the Russian Air Force
and thought that these second-rate planes could operate
successfully against them. The Russians have experienced
no trouble in destroying these planes. The Heinkel plane
was faster than the new Messerschmitt. On the whole the
most useful plane the Germans have against the Russians is
the Junkers 88, which is as good or better than anything of
that type that the Russians have.

He states that the Germans are putting 20 mm.
cannon in their fighters; some have 12 mm. machine guns.
Stalin said that all fighters must have cannon in modern
warfare. He has equipped all his fighters with cannon or
heavy calibre machine guns, and stated the Russians proposed
to have no fighters without cannon or the heaviest calibre
machine guns.

The Russians put their old fighter planes on the
front, and these have a speed of only 440 kilometres per
hour, but they have been very useful and successful against
many of the planes that the Germans put on Russia’s western
front. They have 7 500 thousands of these older type
fighters.

The new fighters are of three types. They have
approximately 2 000 of these at the front, and are producing
/ 200 a month. The speediest of these newer one motor
fighters is the M.I.G.3, with heavy armour and cannon, and
a speed of 650 kilometres per hour. The second fighter is
the L.A.G.3, which carries a cannon, has heavy machine guns
and a speed of 590 k.p.h. The third is the J.K.l; this
carries a cannon, and has a speed of 590 k.p.h.

Stalin said the Russians have three new medium
bomber types. First, a single-motor bomber, flying at
510 k.p.h., for close range bombing. Second, the 2-motor
dive bomber, flying at 540 k.p.h. with a flying range of
800 kilometres. The third bomber, which is only just being
produced in quantity, is a 2-motor dive bomber with a range of 2,200 kilometres and a speed of 610 k.p.h., and carries one ton of bombs on its full flight range, but double that amount of bombs on more than half range. It has 7 heavy machine guns. Stalin speaks of it as "a very good bomber".

He said he has three types of long range bomber. One, a 2-motor bomber which is quite slow, doing 440 k.p.h. with a range of 3,000 kilometres. Second, a 2-motor bomber, just in production, with a Diesel engine; range 5,000 kilometres, carrying one ton bomb load, 2 tons at 4,000 kilometres range; speed 500 k.p.h. Third, a 4-engine bomber, just now getting into production; range 3,500 kilometres, carrying 3 tons of bombs. He said they had at present about 600 heavy long range bombers.

He said that his total production of planes at present was 1800 per month; by January 1st, this would increase to 2500 per month. 60% of these would be fighter planes, and 40% bombers. This was exclusive of training planes, now being produced at 15 per day. The Russians had approximately 3500 training planes. Stalin said the training course for pilots was 8 months.

He expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America and left me the impression there would soon be a shortage of pilots. Stalin said the German claims of Russian air losses were absurd. The Russians lost more planes than the Germans at first, but he thinks the advantage is the other way now. He would not indicate the number of losses other than there were a "good many on both sides".

He stated there had been some damage to aircraft factories but that there had been considerable disbursement of the machinery before the destruction took place. (I saw two factories, which I was told by our Ambassador were aircraft factories, just outside Moscow completely destroyed).

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. He stated that their organisation was of the very best and that he believed that they had large
reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel. He thinks that we may be under-estimating Germany's oil supplies, and he bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He thought one weakness the British had was under-rating their enemy; he did not propose to do this. He therefore thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, the German Army is capable of taking part in a Winter campaign in Russia. He thinks however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after the 1st September, when the heavy rains will begin, and after October 1st the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the Winter months would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad - probably not more than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at the moment is that the Germans "are tired" and have no stomach for an offensive. He realises that Germany can still bring up about 40 divisions, making 275 divisions in all at the Russian front, but these divisions probably cannot get there before the hard weather sets in.

He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was light anti-aircraft guns, 20 mm., 25 mm., 37 mm., and 50 mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to give protection to their lines of communications against low flying planes.

His second great need was aluminium needed in the construction of airplanes.

The third was machine guns of approximately 50 calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the defence of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter
the Spring campaign with adequate equipment, particularly
in aircraft, tanks and A.A. guns.

He expressed an urgent desire that the British
send large planes as soon as possible to bomb the Romanian
oilfields, and made a point of urging that pilots and crews
be sent with the planes. He told me one of the great
problems was to determine the ports of entry which were to
be used for supplies; and that Archangel was difficult
but not impossible; he was sure his icebreakers could keep
the port free all winter. He stated that Vladivostok was
dangerous because it would be cut off by Japan at any time,
and he feared the railroads and roads in Persia were
inadequate. But all would have to be used for the
present.

Mr. Stalin expressed repeatedly his confidence
that the Russian lines would hold.

No information given above was confirmed by
any other source.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
1430, August 1, 3 p.m.

MOST SECRET, PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY
ONLY FROM HARRY HOPKINS.

“I have had two long and satisfactory talks with Stalin and will communicate personally to you the messages he is sending. I would like to tell you now, however, that I feel ever so confident about this front. The morale of the population is exceptionally good. There is unbounded determination to win. Stalin is anxious that the final negotiations for the loan from the R.F.C., be handled in Washington and is anxious that it be agreed upon at the earliest possible moment. I have had satisfactory conferences with Molotov, Steinhardt and Cripps. My mission here is nearly complete, and I shall be leaving soon. I am well and looking forward to seeing you. Harry”

STEINHARDT

CSB
Foreign Relations of the United States
page 815.
Secretary of State,
Washington.

1431, August 1, 5 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND UNDER SECRETARY

The reception accorded Harry Hopkins by the Soviet Government and the unusual attention which has been devoted to him by the Soviet press clearly indicate that extreme importance has been attached to his visit by this Government. He was met at the port of entry by a number of high ranking Army and Naval officials and by the Acting Chief of Protocol who flew with him to Moscow where an unusually large delegation headed by Lozovski had been assembled to await his arrival. He was received promptly by Stalin who granted him very extended interviews and discussed with a frankness unparalleled in my knowledge in recent Soviet history the subject of his mission and the Soviet position. All Soviet newspapers have published photographs and items concerning his visit on their front pages - a position
position of much greater significance here than in any other country.

I am certain that the visit has been extremely gratifying to the Soviet Government and that it will prove to have exercised a most beneficial effect upon Soviet-American relations in general and in particular to have greatly encouraged the Soviet war effort.

STEINHARDT

HPD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Situation in Ukraine.

1. On August 4th, the situation in the Ukraine along the southern portion of the German-Russian front is believed to be approximately as follows:

   a. The Russians hold a deep wedge extending westward from the Dnieper on both sides of the Pripyat river. This wedge corresponds approximately to the Pripyat marsh area.

   b. Immediately south of the marshes, German forces have advanced to the area between Korosten and the Dnieper river. The depth of this German advance to the east of Korosten is unknown.

   c. Russian forces hold Kiev and an extensive bridgehead around Kiev on the west bank of the Dnieper.

   d. The main German effort has been made in the past two weeks in a southeasterly direction along the axis: Zhitomir, Dnepropetrovsk. The left flank of this drive has been protected by the German High Command against the Kiev bridgehead by strong defensive formations of German infantry. Most of the armored divisions of the southern front appear to be concentrated in this "main effort" enveloping drive pushing southeastward from Belaja Zerkow towards Dnepropetrovsk.

   e. This German armored army attained the area of Steni-gorodka about July 25th and was close to Zinovsk on July 31st. It is, apparently, on August 4th continuing to gain ground in the directions of Dnepropetrovsk and Krivoi Rog.

   f. Strong Russian forces are fighting with determination in a half circle to the northwest, west and southwest of Zinovsk. These Russian forces have still an open line of retreat to the east Ukraine over Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhya. A further line of retreat is open to them to the southeast into the Crimea. However, the Russians' area for retreat between Zinovsk and the lower Dnieper is being further compressed daily.
The Russian armies west and southwest of Zinovieisk, probably amounting to between fifteen and twenty-five divisions, are being attacked by the Axis armies along a semi-circular front extending from Cetatea Alba at the mouth of the Dniester through Balta to Uman. Two large bridges have been built by German pioneers across the middle Dniester near Dubossary.

On July 31st the German High Command reports that these half-enclosed Russian forces launched a major counterattack in a northerly direction from Perwomaisk. Very fierce fighting occurred on this day near Novoarchangelsk.

The fate of the Russian armies fighting to the west and southwest of Zinovieisk now hangs in the balance.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:

- THE PRESIDENT
- Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Chief of Staff
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence
- General Embick

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

Date: 10-27-66
Signature: Carl S. Spaatz
August 20, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of Part I and Part II of the report of my trip to Moscow.

I am enclosing copies for the State, War and Navy Departments, with a proposed note from you.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosures.

The President,
The White House.
CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN
MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE
INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE
KREMLIN IN MOSCOW - 6:30 p.m. TO
9:30 p.m.

PART I

I told Mr. Stalin that the President was anxious to have his - Stalin's - appreciation and analysis of the war between Germany and Russia. Mr. Stalin outlined the situation as follows:

He stated that in his opinion the German Army had 175 divisions on Russia's western front at the outbreak of the war, and that since the outbreak of the war, this has been increased to 232 divisions; he believes that Germany can mobilize 300 divisions.

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He is anxious to have as many of his divisions as possible in contact with the enemy, because then the troops learn that Germans can be killed and are not supermen. This gives his divisions the same kind of confidence that a pilot gets after his first combat in the air. Stalin said that "nothing in warfare can take the place of actual combat", and he wants to have as many seasoned troops as possible for the great campaign which will come next Spring. He stated that the German troops seemed to be tired, and the officers and men that they had captured had indicated they are "sick of war".

The German reserves are as much as 400 kilometres back of the front, and the communications between the reserves and the front line are extremely difficult. These supply lines require many thousands of German troops to guard and protect them from Russian raids.

He said that in the battle now in progress, very many Russian and German troops are fighting far forward from their respective lines because of the advances made by both sides with their mechanized forces. Stalin said that his soldiers did not consider the battle lost merely because the Germans at one point and another broke through with their mechanized forces. The Russian mechanized forces would attack at another point often moving many miles behind the German line. Merely because German forces pierce the Russian line does not mean the Russians are lost. They fight behind the Germans, are adept at the use of cover and fight their way out in the night. He said, "Even the German tanks run out of petrol".
This is merely a phase of modern warfare, and accounts for the fact that there have been no mass surrenders of troops on either side. The Russians therefore have many "insurgent" troops which operate behind Germany's so-called front line. They constantly attack German aerodromes and lines of communications. The Russians are more familiar with the terrain and know how to use the natural cover which nature has provided better than the Germans. These "insurgent" troops are proving a great menace to the German offensive.

He believes that Germany underestimated the strength of the Russian Army, and have not now enough troops on the whole front to carry on a successful offensive war and at the same time guard their extended lines of communications. He repeatedly emphasized the large number of men Germany was forced to use for this purpose, and believes that the Germans will have to go on the defensive themselves. There is considerable evidence that they are already doing this. They are burying many of their large tanks in the ground for defensive purposes. The Russians have already found 50 such defensive positions. Mr. Stalin stated that in his opinion Hitler fears that he has too many men on the Russian front, which may account for their preparing some defensive positions so that some of their divisions might be returned to the German western areas of actual or potential operation.

He thinks the Germans have now on his front about 70 tank and motorized divisions. He also states that the Russo-German war has already changed the character of
divisional organization; that the Germans had broken up their large armoured divisions and dispersed this equipment through what Stalin called their tank and motorized divisions. Stalin stated that the war has already shown that infantry divisions must include a larger number of mechanized units. While Russia had a large number of tank and motorized divisions - none of them were a match for the German "Panzer" division, but were far stronger than other German divisions. Hence the great pressure on the German infantry divisions which caused the diversion of German armoured equipment all along the line.

Stalin believes that Germany had 30,000 tanks at the outbreak of the Russian war. Russia herself had 24,000 tanks and 60 tank divisions with about 350 to 400 tanks in each division. They have always had about 50 tanks in each infantry division. Stalin believes that the large divisions are being broken up by the German Staff and as the war progresses the number of men in the divisions will be decreased in both armies.

He stated that the pressure on his army in the last ten days had become considerably less, and the only reason he could give for it was that he thought Germany had been unable to supply their mechanized divisions and air forces with adequate fuel. He stressed the great difficulty the German armies had encountered in moving vast quantities of fuel to the front, and believes these difficulties are going to increase. He does not think this is because Germany has any lack of fuel, but rather because of transportation difficulties, the lack of good
roads and more particularly the effective interference of the Russians with the German communications.

Stalin says that even though the war has been going on only six weeks, his troops are meeting brand new divisions at the front, and some of the original divisions seem to have been withdrawn. He believes that the morale of his own troops is extremely high, and realizes that this is partly due to the fact that they are fighting for their homes and in familiar territory. He said that Germany has already found that "moving mechanized forces through Russia was very different than moving them over the boulevards of Belgium and France".

Stalin said that the Russian Army had been confronted with a surprise attack; he himself believed that Hitler would not strike but he took all precautions possible to mobilize his army. Hitler made no demands on Russia, hence they were forced to organize a defensive line of battle. Now the Russians were counter-attacking at many points.

He said the Russian Army had met few of the 70-ton German tanks but that this was probably due to the inability of the Russian bridges to hold the tanks. He believes the terrain too difficult to manoeuvre these giant tanks. Where the 70-ton tanks were encountered, they were pierced by the Russian 75 mm. guns. He does not think that the very large German tank will play an important part in the war in Russia, although there are parts of the southern front where these tanks can manoeuvre. The roads are very bad for the big tanks to operate over.
He believes that his largest tanks are better than the other German tanks, and that they have repeatedly shown their superiority in the war to date. He stated that the two largest Russian tanks were of 48 and 52 tons respectively, with 75 mm. armour and 85 mm. guns. They have approximately 4,000 of these tanks at present. The Russian medium tank of just over 30 tons has 45 mm. armour and 75 mm. guns. The infantry tank is 13 tons and has 37 mm. armour and 45 mm. guns. They have approximately 8,000 medium (30-ton) tanks at present and 12,000 light (13-ton) tanks. He stated their present production of tanks was 1,000 per month. He stated that his production was equally divided between medium and heavy tanks on the one hand, and light tanks on the other. He stated they would be short of steel for tank manufacture and urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. He later said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the United States. He also wished to purchase as many of our tanks as possible to be ready for the Spring campaign. Stalin said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter - the tank losses on both sides were very great but that Germany could produce more tanks per month this winter than Russia. Hence the aid of the United States in supplying steel and tanks is essential. He would like to send a tank expert to the United States. He stated that he would give the United States his tank designs.

He emphasized the fact that Germany has a strong and powerful air force, and that their present production of planes was probably 2,500 fighters and bombers per
month, but not more than 3,000 a month. Germany has more planes than the Russians at the front at this time but the quality of many of the German planes is not first-class — they are rough, plain machines, in which pilots fly without a long training. Some pilots they have captured indicated that their training was short and consisted of only a "practical course". He realizes that Germany moved to the Russian front a great many aircraft, which types were no longer being built in German factories. He thinks that Germany underrated the ability of the Russian Air Force and thought that these second-rate planes could operate successfully against them. The Russians have experienced no trouble in destroying these planes. The Henkel plane was faster than the new Messerschmitt.

On the whole the most useful plane the Germans have against the Russians is the Junkers 88, which is as good or better than anything of that type that the Russians have.

He stated that the Germans are putting 20 mm. cannon in their fighters; some have 12 mm. machine guns. Stalin said that all fighters must have cannon in modern warfare. He has equipped all his fighters with cannon or heavy calibre machine guns, and he stated the Russians proposed to have no fighters without cannon or the heaviest calibre machine guns.

The Russians put their old fighter planes on the front, and these have a speed of only 440 kilometres per hour, but they have been very useful and successful against many of the planes that the Germans put on Russia's western front. They have seven to eight thousand of these older type fighters.
The new fighters are of three types. They have approximately 2,000 of these at the front, and are producing 1,200 a month. The speediest of these newer one-motor fighters is the M.I.G. 3, with heavy armour and cannon, and a speed of 650 kilometres per hour. The second fighter is the L.A.G. 3, which carries a cannon, has heavy machine guns and a speed of 590 k.p.h. The third is the J.K. 1; this carries a cannon, and has a speed of 590 k.p.h.

Stalin said the Russians have three new medium bomber types. First a single-motor bomber, flying at 510 k.p.h., for close range bombing. Second, the 2-motor dive bomber, flying at 540 k.p.h. with a flying range of 800 kilometres. The third bomber, which is only just being produced in quantity, is a 2-motor dive bomber with a range of 2,200 kilometres and a speed of 610 k.p.h., and carries one ton of bombs on its full flight range, but double that amount of bombs on more than half range. It has 7 heavy machine guns. Stalin spoke of it as "a very good bomber".

He said he has three types of long range bomber. One, a 2-motor bomber which is quite slow, doing 440 kp.h. with a range of 3,000 kilometres. Second, a 2-motor bomber, just in production, with a Diesel engine; range 5,000 kilometres, carrying one ton bomb load, 2 tons at 4,000 kilometres range; speed 500 k.p.h. Third, a 4-engine bomber, just now getting into production; range 3,500 kilometres, carrying 3 tons of bombs. He said they had at present about 600 heavy long range bombers.
He said that his total production of planes at present was 1,800 per month; by January 1st, this would increase to 2,500 per month. 60% of these would be fighter planes, and 40% bombers. This was exclusive of training planes, now being produced at 15 per day. The Russians have approximately 3,500 training planes. Stalin said the training course for pilots was 8 months.

He expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America and left me the impression there would soon be a shortage of pilots. Stalin said the German claims of Russian air losses were absurd. The Russians lost more planes than the Germans at first, but he thinks the advantage is the other way now. He would not indicate the number of losses other than there were a "good many on both sides".

He stated there had been some damage to aircraft factories but that there had been considerable disbursement of the machinery before the destruction took place. (I saw two factories, which I was told by our Ambassador were aircraft factories, just outside Moscow completely destroyed.)

I asked Mr. Stalin about the location of his munitions plants. He did not reply to this in detail but indicated that about 75% of the sum total of his munitions plants, the percentage varying depending on the type of plant, were in the general areas of which Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev were the centers.

I gained the impression from him that if the German army could move some 150 miles east of each of these centers, they would destroy almost 75% of Russia's
industrial capacity.

Stalin said they had dispersed a good many of their larger factories and were moving many machine tools eastward to escape the bombing attacks.

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. He stated that their organization was of the very best and that he believed that they had large reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel. He thinks that we may be under estimating Germany's oil supplies, and he bases this on the fact that under the two-year agreement they had with Germany, the Germans asked for less fuel than the agreement provided for during the year 1940-41. He thought one weakness the British had was underrating their enemy; he did not propose to do this. He, therefore, thinks that so far as men, supplies, food and fuel are concerned, the German Army is capable of taking part in a winter campaign in Russia. He thinks, however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after the first of September, when the heavy rains will begin, and after October 1st the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the winter months would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad - probably not more than 100 kilometres away from where it is now. He thinks that one of the great advantages the Russian Army has at the moment is that the Germans "are tired" and have no stomach for an offensive. He realizes that Germany can still bring up about 40 divisions, making 275 divisions in all at the Russian front, but these divisions probably cannot get there before the hard weather sets in.
He told me that the first need of the Russian Army was light anti-aircraft guns, 20 mm., 25 mm., 37 mm., and 50 mm., and that they need vast quantities of these guns to give protection to their lines of communications against low flying planes.

His second great need was aluminum needed in the construction of airplanes.

The third was machine guns of approximately 50 calibre, and the fourth rifles of approximately 30 calibre. He stated that he needed large anti-aircraft guns for the defense of cities. In his opinion the Russian supply of ammunition was satisfactory. He stated the outcome of the war in Russia would largely depend on the ability to enter the spring campaign with adequate equipment, particularly in aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft guns.

He expressed an urgent desire that the British send large planes as soon as possible to bomb the Rumanian oilfields, and made a point of urging that pilots and crews be sent with the planes.

He told me one of the great problems was to determine the ports of entry which were to be used for supplies; and that Archangel was difficult but not impossible; he was sure his icebreakers could keep the port free all winter. He stated that Vladivostok was dangerous because it could be cut off by Japan at any time, and he feared the railroads and roads in Persia were inadequate. But all would have to be used for the present.

Mr. Stalin expressed repeatedly his confidence
that the Russian lines would hold within 100 kilometres of their present position.

No information given above was confirmed by any other source.
CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN
MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE
INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE
KREMLIN IN MOSCOW - 6:30 P.M. TO
9:30 P.M.

PART II

I told Mr. Stalin at this conference that our
Government and the British Government (Churchill having
authorized me to say this) were willing to do everything
that they possibly could during the succeeding weeks to
send materiel to Russia. This materiel, however, must
obviously be already manufactured and that he - Stalin -
must understand that even this materiel could in all
probability not reach his battle lines before the bad
weather closes in.

I told him that we believed that plans should be
made for a long war; that so far as the United States
was concerned we had large supply commitments in relation
to our own Army, Navy and Merchant Marine, as well as
very substantial responsibilities for supplies to England,
China and the Republics of South America.

I told him that the decisions relating to the long
range supply problem could only be resolved if our
Government had complete knowledge, not only of the
military situation in Russia, but of type, number and
quality of their military weapons, as well as full
knowledge of raw materials and factory capacity.
I told him that I knew that our Government, and I believed the British Government, would be unwilling to send any heavy munitions, such as tanks, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, to the Russian front unless and until a conference had been held between our three Governments, at which the relative strategic interests of each front, as well as the interests of our several countries, was fully and jointly explored.

I suggested that, in as much as he was so fully engaged with the immediate prosecution of the battle now in hand, he could not give the time and attention to such a conference until after this battle is over.

Stalin had previously indicated that the front would be solidified not later than October 1.

I was mindful of the importance that no conference be held in Moscow until we knew the outcome of the battle now in progress. I felt it very unwise to hold a conference while this battle was in the balance. Hence my suggestion to him to hold a conference at as late a date as was possible. Then we would know whether or not there was to be a front and approximately the location of the front during the coming winter months.

Stalin said he would welcome such a conference and said that of course it would be impossible for him to go to a conference anywhere other than in Moscow; that he would be glad to make available to our Government all information which was required and he offered to give us the Soviet designs of their airplanes, tanks and guns.
I told him that I was not authorized to make this suggestion of a conference to him officially.

Stalin then stated that in case our Government wished to have such a conference he would receive such a proposal sympathetically and would give the conference his personal attention.

Stalin has not given hitherto any information of any kind to any of the Embassies or to any of the Military Attachés of foreign governments. The British Naval Attaché has been given information confined to the Russian Navy because of certain joint operations.

There is literally no one in the whole Government who is willing to give any important information other than Mr. Stalin himself. Therefore, it is essential that such a conference be held with Mr. Stalin personally.

I believe he would give this conference his personal attention.

My suggestion is that the conference be not held prior to October 1, but not later than October 15.
August 20, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I have only made one copy of the attached.

My suggestion is that no copy of this be sent to the State Department and that the contents of this be discussed verbally by you with Mr. Hull.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House.
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CONFERENCE HELD ON JULY 31, 1941, BETWEEN
MR. STALIN, MR. HOPKINS, AND THE
INTERPRETER MR. LITVINOV, AT THE
KREMLIN IN MOSCOW.—6:30 p.m. TO
9:30 p.m.

PART III

After Stalin had completed his review of the military situation, he expressed to me his great thanks to the President for the interest he was showing in their fight against Hitler. He stated that he wanted to give the President the following personal message; that he had considered putting the message in writing but believed it would be more desirable to have the message delivered to the President by me.

Stalin said Hitler's greatest weakness was found in the vast numbers of oppressed people who hated Hitler and the immoral ways of his Government. He believed these people and countless other millions in nations still unconquered could receive the kind of encouragement and moral strength they needed to resist Hitler from only one source, and that was the United States. He stated that the world influence of the President and the Government of the United States was enormous.

Contrary wise, he believed that the morale of the German army and the German people, which he thinks is already pretty low, would be demoralized by an announcement that the United States is going to join in the
war against Hitler.

Stalin said that he believed it was inevitable that we should finally come to grips with Hitler on some battlefield. The might of Germany was so great that, even though Russia might defend herself, it would be very difficult for Britain and Russia combined to crush the German military machine. He said that the one thing that could defeat Hitler, and perhaps without ever firing a shot, would be the announcement that the United States was going to war with Germany.

Stalin said that he believed, however, that the war would be bitter and perhaps long; that if we did get in the war he believed the American people would insist on their armies coming to grips with German soldiers; and he wanted me to tell the President that he would welcome the American troops on any part of the Russian front under the complete command of the American Army.

I told Stalin that my mission related entirely to matters of supply and that the matter of our joining in the war would be decided largely by Hitler himself and his encroachment upon our fundamental interests. I told him that I doubted that our Government, in event of war would want an American army in Russia but that I would give his message to the President.

He repeatedly said that the President and the United States had more influence with the common people of the world today than any other force.
Finally, he asked me to tell the President that, while he was confident that the Russian army could withstand the German army, the problem of supply by next spring would be a serious one and that he needed our help.
September 11, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing two copies of the report of my first conference with Stalin, at which Ambassador Steinhardt was present, and a copy for Secretary Hull with a suggested transmittal letter.

I am also enclosing two copies of the report of my conference with Molotov, with a copy for Secretary Hull with a suggested transmittal letter.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosures.

The President
The White House.
MEMORANDUM

CONFERENCE AT THE KREMLIN ON JULY 30, 1941
6:30 TO 8:30 P.M.
BETWEEN HARRY L. HOPKINS AND MR. STALIN
ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR STEINHARDT
AND MR. REINHARDT, AMERICAN INTERPRETER

I told Mr. Stalin that I came as personal representative of the President. The President considered Hitler the enemy of mankind and that he therefore wished to aid the Soviet Union in its fight against Germany.

I told him that my mission was not a diplomatic one in the sense that I did not propose any formal understanding of any kind or character.

I expressed to him the President's belief that the most important thing to be done in the world today was to defeat Hitler and Hitlerism. I impressed upon him the determination of the President and our Government to extend all possible aid to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible time.

I told Mr. Stalin that I had certain personal messages from the President and explained my relationship to the Administration in Washington. I told him further that I just left Mr. Churchill in London who wished me to convey to him the sentiments which I had already expressed from the President.

Mr. Stalin said he welcomed me to the Soviet Union; that he had already been informed of my visit.

Describing Hitler and Germany, Mr. Stalin spoke of the necessity of there being a minimum moral standard between all nations and without such a minimum moral
standard nations could not co-exist. He stated that the present leaders of Germany knew no such minimum moral standard and that, therefore, they represented an anti-social force in the present world. The Germans were a people, he said, who without a second's thought would sign a treaty today, break it tomorrow and sign a second one the following day. Nations must fulfill their treaty obligations, he said, or international society could not exist.

When he completed his general summary of the Soviet Union's attitude toward Germany he said "therefore our views coincide".

I told Mr. Stalin that the question of aid to the Soviet Union was divided into two parts. First, what would Russia most require that the United States could deliver immediately and, second, what would be Russia's requirements on the basis of a long war?

Stalin listed in the first category the immediate need of, first, anti-aircraft guns of medium calibre, of from 20 to 37 mm., together with ammunition. He stated that he needed such medium calibre guns because of the rapidity of their fire and their mobility. He stated that all together he needed approximately 20,000 pieces of anti-aircraft artillery, large and small. He believed that if he could acquire such a quantity it would immediately release nearly 2,000 pursuit ships which are today required for the protection of military objectives behind the Soviet lines and such planes, if released, could be used as attacking
forces against the enemy.

Second, he asked for large size machine guns for the defense of his cities.

Third, he said he heard there were many rifles available in the United States and he believed their calibre corresponded to the calibre used in his Army. He stated that he needed one million or more such rifles. I asked Mr. Stalin if he needed ammunition for these rifles and he replied that if the calibre was the same as the one used by the Red Army "we have plenty".

In the second category, namely, the supplies needed for a long range war, he mentioned first high octane aviation gasoline, second, aluminum for the construction of airplanes and, third, the other items already mentioned in the list presented to our Government in Washington.

At this point in the conversation Mr. Stalin suddenly made the remark, "Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminum and we can fight for three or four years".

I referred to the 200 Curtiss P-40's which are being delivered to the Soviet Union and, in reply to a question from Mr. Stalin, I confirmed the fact that 140 were being delivered by way of England and 60 from the United States.

In connection with the delivery of these planes I referred to Lt. Alison's presence in Moscow and said he was an outstanding expert in the operation of this type of plane. I asked if he would care to have
Lt. Alison stationed in Archangel in an advisory capacity, to which Mr. Stalin replied affirmatively.

Mr. Stalin stated that he would be glad if we would send any technicians that we could to the Soviet Union to help train his own airmen in the use of these planes. He stated that his own airmen would show us everything about the Russian equipment, which he stated we would find very interesting.

He described at some length, but not in great detail as he did in the conference the next day, the planes which he had available. Mr. Stalin said the plane he needed particularly was the short-range bomber, capable of operating in a radius of 600 to 1100 kilometres, or with a total range of 1200 to 2200 kilometres.

I asked Mr. Stalin what he thought was the best route to ship supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. Mr. Stalin stated that the Persian Gulf-Iranian route was not good because of the limited capacity of the Iranian railways and highways. He stated "Furthermore we do not yet know the view of the Iranian Government on this subject".

Mr. Stalin stated that the Vladivostok route was not a favorable one. I emphasized the danger of its being cut off by the Japanese and Mr. Stalin in turn emphasized the great distance from the scene of battle.

Mr. Stalin believed that the Archangel route was probably the most practicable. Both Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov stated that the Archangel harbor could be kept open in the winter by the aid of ice breakers.
Mr. Stalin pointed out that the only two absolutely ice free ports in the north were Murmansk and Kaldalaksha.

I told Mr. Stalin that my stay in Moscow must be brief. I wished to accomplish as much as possible in the short time which I had at my disposal. I asked Mr. Stalin whether he wished to carry on the conversations personally or would prefer that I would discuss some of the details with other representatives of the Soviet Government. I said that, of course, I would prefer to confer directly with him but I realized he had a great many responsibilities at the moment. I told him that I had some personal messages from the President which I wanted to deliver at an appropriate time.

Mr. Stalin replied, "You are our guest; you have but to command." He told me he would be at my disposal every day from six to seven. It was then agreed that I confer with representatives of the Red Army at ten o'clock that night.

I reiterated to Mr. Stalin the appreciation of the people of the United States of the splendid resistance of the Soviet Army and of the President's determination to do everything to assist the Soviet Union in its valiant struggle against the German invader.

Mr. Stalin replied with an expression of gratitude of the Soviet Government.

I told Mr. Stalin that I expected to interview
the representatives of the Anglo-American press following my meeting and asked whether Mr. Stalin had any wishes in connection with what I should say or whether he would prefer that no interview be held at all. I told him that under any circumstances the correspondents' stories would be subject to the control of his censorship.

To this Mr. Stalin replied that anything I might have to say would require no censorship by his Government.

I expressed to Mr. Molotov my desire to call upon him and it was arranged that I should see Mr. Molotov at three the next day.
State Dept copy published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941, Vol. IV, The Far East
pages 1013-1014
Mr. Molotov stated that while the Soviet-Japanese relations presumably had been fixed by, first, the conversations with Matsuoka and, secondly, the neutrality pact signed between the two countries, nevertheless, the attitude of the new Japanese Government toward the Soviet Union is uncertain and, since the Soviet Government is by no means clear as to the policy which the Japanese Government intends to pursue, it is watching the situation with the utmost care.

He stated that the one thing he thought would keep Japan from making an aggressive move would be for the President to find some appropriate means of giving Japan what Mr. Molotov described as a "warning".

While Mr. Molotov did not use the exact words; it was perfectly clear that the implication of his statement was that the warning would include a statement that the United States would come to the assistance of the Soviet Union in the event of its being attacked by Japan.

Mr. Molotov did not express any immediate concern that Japan was going to attack Russia and on Russia's part Mr. Molotov stated repeatedly that Russia did not wish any difficulties with Japan.

He left me with the impression, however, that it was a matter of very considerable concern to him and that he felt the Japanese would not hesitate to strike
if a propitious time occurred. Hence his great interest in the attitude of the United States towards Japan.

I told Mr. Molotov that the Government of the United States was disturbed at the encroachments which Japan was making in the Far East and I was sure the American people would not look with any favor on Japan gaining a further hold in Siberia; that our long period of friendly relations between Russia and the United States, with our two countries only fifty miles apart, should be some indication of our interest in seeing stability in the Far East, including Siberia.

I told him that our Government was watching developments in the Far Eastern situation with great care and looked with misgivings and concern at the threatening attitude of Japan, both to the South and to the North. I told him, however, that our attitude towards Japan was a reasonable one and that we had no desire to be provocative in our relations with Japan.

I told him I would give the President his message regarding his, Molotov's, anxiety about Siberia and his desire to have the President indicate to Japan that further encroachments would not be tolerated.

I asked Mr. Molotov what their relationships with China were in the light of new developments and whether or not they could continue rendering the substantial material assistance they had been giving to Chiang Kai-shek or whether the Soviet Union's requirements in its own war with Germany would preclude their continuing to supply China.
Mr. Molotov replied that, of course, the Soviet Union's requirements for war material must of necessity adversely affect delivery to China; that while they do not wish to cut them off entirely and would continue to give everything they could, the necessities of their own situation required them to divert the Chinese supplies to their own battle line. Molotov expressed the hope that the United States would increase its own deliveries to make good the deficiency caused by Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.

I told Mr. Molotov that the American people were impressed by the gallant defense of the Soviet Army and assured him of the desire of the President to render every possible aid in the terms of materials to the Soviet Union as speedily as possible.

Mr. Molotov asked me to convey the Soviet Government's thanks to the President for sending his personal representative on this mission to Moscow.
SECRET

SEPTEMBER 16, 1941

TO: AMBASSADOR
LONDON

FOR WILKIN AND HARRISON FROM HOPKINS

PRESIDENT REFERRED YOUR 4354 TO ME. ARMY ARE
RELEASING THREE B-16’S AND THREE B-25’S TO RUSSIANS.
THERE ARE NO B-24’S OR B-17’S AVAILABLE. THE PLANES
OFFERED TO THE RUSSIANS ARE FIRST CLASS.

HOPKINS

REGRADED
UNCATEGORIZED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you answer this
and tell him about the B-25s?

F. D. R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4354, September 18, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE
PRESIDENT.

Yesterday I talked with Oumansky. He came in with Maisky. Oumansky had just gotten word from Washington that the Russian air contingent here would not be given either a B-24 or a B-17. He tells me they had asked for five large bombers, that they had agreed to take four medium bombers but believed that you were going to get them one large bomber with automatic pilot and he hoped with a sperry sight. He felt that the arrival of this ranking group of Russian airmen in one of our best planes in Moscow would have a marked psychological effect and lift confidence there.

Since he told me he had had his conversations with you personally, I thought I should report the matter directly to you. He attached great importance to it.

WINANT

BB
September 18, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is important that we know on Monday the number of airplanes by types that can be exported from the United States each month beginning October 1 through July 1, 1942. I want this figure irrespective of the source of funds.

As a rule of thumb, particularly as it concerns the 4-engine heavy bomber, I suggest 50 percent of our output from January 1 to July 1, meeting the commitment until January 1 which General Marshall and General Arnold worked out with the British at my conference with Churchill.

The planes which the British promised the Russians on a monthly basis will be fighter planes, probably Hurricanes.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of War.

HLH/1mb
FROM: HARRIMAN
TO: HOPKINS

SUPPLEMENTING TODAY'S CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT:
THE 2½ PLANES PER MONTH THE BRITISH HAVE PROMISED RUSSIA WILL
BE FIGHTERS, PROBABLY HURRICANES. WE RECOMMEND, IF THE PRESIDENT
APPROVES OUR SUPPLYING 2½ AIRPLANES PER MONTH THROUGH JUNE AS
WELL. AFTER CONSULTING, BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF BRITISH,
GENERAL CHANEY SUGGESTS FOLLOWING: FOUR ENGINE HEAVY BOMBERS
AVERAGE THREE A MONTH. MODEL B-25, MEDIUM BOMBERS 5 PER MONTH.
MODEL A-2½A, B AND C LIGHT BOMBERS 92 PER MONTH. MODEL P½E
Pursuit 1½ PER MONTH. WE WILL PROPOSE TOTAL OF 2½ OBSERVATION
MODEL P-52 Lieu OF LIGHT BOMBERS OR PURSUIT IF WE FIND RUSSIANS
CAN USE THEM EFFECTIVELY PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER ABOVE SATISFACTORY
AS WE MUST BE EXACT AND DETAILED IN OUR PROMISES TO THE
RUSSIANS SO AS TO AVOID THEIR CLAIMING AT LATER DATE MORE MODERN
TYPES SUCH AS AIR-COBRA ETC., WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE. WE
ALSO FEEL THAT NUMBER OF TYPES SHOULD BE LIMITED AS FAR AS
PRACTICABLE. THE FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION INCLUDES SPARES
EDUCATIONAL PERSONNEL, IN THE FIELDS OF ASSEMBLY, OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE, ALSO AMMUNITION, GARMENTS, AND OTHER SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
ESSENTIAL TO COMBAT OPERATION OF THE AIRPLANES LISTED.
PM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

London  
Dated September 17, 1941  
Rec'd 6:45 a.m.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

4321, September 17, 11 a.m.

MOST URGENT AND SECRET FOR HOPKINS FROM HARRIMAN.

We have been meeting with the British since arrival Monday afternoon, largely working through five subcommittees. Greatest obstacle so far is tanks due to disappointment on the part of the British because the number of tanks available for export on account of the low production figures used by Embick is so much smaller than what they had been led to believe from earlier information. General Wesson tells us that 1000 a month to be reached in April is not feasible on account of insufficient guns and ammunition.

Discussion tanks is becoming acrimonious particularly because, as you well know, the British had definitely counted on the large number prior to January 1 as promised at cruise meeting.

It would
It would be most helpful if you could now give me the definite figures on tanks by months and types which will be made available for export through June.

WINANT.

WWC
September 19, 1941

MISS TULLY:

This telegram is in answer to Mr. Harriman's telegram of September 16 to the President. I assume you have a copy of Mr. Harriman's telegram. If not I will make one for you from the copy Mr. Hopkins has.

L. Berney
TELEGRAM

SEPTEMBER 18, 1941

TO: HARRIMAN
LONDON

PRODUCTION SCHEDULES OF TANKS IN THIS COUNTRY WILL NOT BE BELOW SCHEDULES. IN FACT DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO INCREASE THEM ABOVE SCHEDULES. WILL ADVISE YOU MONDAY OR TUESDAY OF TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS BY DESIGN AND MONTH THAT CAN BE EXPORTED FROM THIS COUNTRY IRRESPECTIVE OF SOURCE OF FUNDS.

IMPORTANT THAT YOUR MISSION IN COOPERATION WITH OTHERS JOINTLY DETERMINE ON DISTRIBUTION OF OUR EXPORTABLE TANKS.

ALL THAT I HAVE SAID ABOUT TANKS APPLIES EQUALLY TO AIRPLANES. NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BY THIS GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO DISTRIBUTION OF BIG BOMBERS AFTER JANUARY FIRST. WILL ADVISE YOU AT AN EARLY DATE RELATIVE TO NUMBER OF FOUR ENGINE BOMBERS THAT CAN BE EXPORTED FROM JANUARY FIRST TO JULY FIRST 1942.

ALTOGETHER PROPER THAT YOU SHOULD DISCUSS WITH STALIN VICTORY PROGRAM.

DO NOT WISH YOU TO DELAY YOUR TIME OF DEPARTURE. INFORMATION SHOULD REACH YOU BY THE TIME YOU ARE IN MOSCOW.

AGREE WITH YOU THAT OFFERS TO RUSSIA BY ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES SHOULD BE SPECIFIC.
ASSUME YOU MEAN THAT WE SEND TOP RAILROAD MAN
TO IRAN AND WILL ARRANGE THIS AT ONCE.
GOOD LUCK. WILL KEEP YOU CLOSELY ADVISED.

(signed) Roosevelt
DISCUSSIONS ON ALLOCATIONS TO RUSSIA HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN EASY BECAUSE OF DISAPPOINTMENT OF BRITISH DUE TO:

(A) REDUCED PRODUCTION SCHEDULES BELOW THEIR EXPECTATIONS.
(B) THEIR HAVING COUNTED ON RECEIVING MUCH OF WHAT WE NOW OFFER TO ALLOCATE TO RUSSIA.

AFTER A DETAILED ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, CONCURRED IN BY BEAVERBROOK MAKES THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS:

(1) THE UNITED STATES TO OFFER RUSSIA TANKS AND AIRCRAFT EQUAL IN NUMBER TO THAT ALREADY PROMISED BY THE BRITISH NAMELY; 200 AIRCRAFT AND 250 TANKS PER MONTH OCTOBER THROUGH JUNE.

(2) THIS EQUIPMENT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM LEND-LEASE OR UNITED STATES ARMY PURCHASES AS YOU MAY DETERMINE.

(3) THAT THE TANK PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AS TO MEDIUM TANKS AND THAT THE PRODUCTION OF LIGHT TANKS BE CONTINUED AT PEAK PRODUCTION RATE WITH THE HOPE THAT IN ADDITION TO PRODUCTION FROM BRITISH CONTRACTS THE BRITISH WILL RECEIVE MINIMUM OF 1,500 TO 2,000 OF EACH TYPE DURING THE PERIOD FROM EXPORTABLE SURPLUS. THIS IS A HOPE, NOT
A CONDITION TO OUR RUSSIAN OFFER.

(4) THE ALLOCATION OF 1,800 AIRCRAFT TO RUSSIA DURING THE NEXT 9 MONTHS IS AN INCREASE OF 600 AIRPLANES OVER THE APPROXIMATELY 1,200 SUGGESTED BY THE ARMY. THIS ADDITIONAL 600 PLANES TO COME FROM THE UNITED STATES ARMY ALLOCATIONS AND NOT IN FURTHER REDUCTION OF BRITISH UNDER LEND-LEASE.

(5) BRITISH SHARE MUCH DISAPPOINTED WITH THEIR ALLOCATION OF BIG BOMBERS AND AS THEY HAVE BEEN CUT DOWN TO 51 FROM AMERICAN PRODUCTION AGAINST AT LEAST 200 HOPED FOR THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO SEE ANY GO TO RUSSIA. WITH THIS VIEW I PERSONALLY AGREE. ON THE OTHER HAND GENERAL EMBICK, BURNS AND CHANEY ALL FEEL THE MORALE EFFECT OF BIG BOMBERS ON RUSSIANS IS IMPORTANT AND GENERAL EMBICK PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZES THE VALUE OF DETERANT EFFECT ON JAPAN.

I WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON WHETHER TO OFFER ANY BIG BOMBERS TO RUSSIA AND IF SO, HOW MANY AND DATE OF AVAILABILITY.

(6) PRIME MINISTER HOPES THAT YOU WILL AUTHORIZE ME TO TELL STALIN OF THE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE VICTORY PROGRAM IN GENERAL, NOT IN DETAIL, AND ALLOW ME TO INDICATE TO STALIN THAT AFTER JUNE RUSSIANS WILL OBTAIN FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH THEIR FAIR SHARE OF EXPORTABLE MUNITIONS.

(7) HE HOPES THAT WE WILL GIVE ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE CAPACITY OF THE IRanian RAILROAD SO NECESSARY TO SUPPLY RUSSIA AS WELL AS ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THIS AREA. HE ASKS THAT WE SEND TOP RAILROAD MEN TO ADVISE AND SUPPORT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROMPT SHIPMENT OF MATERIAL NEEDED. THIS MAN IS NEEDED IN ADDITION TO THE ONE ABOUT TO GO TO EGYPT.
MEMBERS OF YOUR MISSION AND GENERAL EMBICK RECOMMEND
ACCEPTANCE OF PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTIONS EXCEPT AS NOTED
ABOVE REGARDING HEAVY BOMBERS AND REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON THESE
POINTS AND IN ADDITION ON METHODS BY WHICH PROMISES TO RUSSIA
WILL BE FIANCED. DISCUSSIONS REGARDING VICTORY PROGRAM ARE
CONTINUING.

WE HOPE TO LEAVE FOR RUSSIA SUNDAY OR AS SOON THEREAFTER
AS WE RECEIVE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. WE FEEL IT IS OF THE UTMOST
IMPORTANCE THAT OUR OFFERS TO RUSSIA BE SPECIFIC AND IN DETAIL.
WE ARE FORWARDING RECOMMENDATION IN SEPARATE CABLE AS TO SPECIFIC
TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO MAKE UP THE ABOVE MENTIONED 2% A MONTH,
ALSO AS TO TANKS AND OTHER ARMY, NAVY AND RAW MATERIAL ITEMS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept. 19, 1941.

Mr. Forster:

Attached telephoned over private wire to Mr. Long at Poughkeepsie and will be delivered to The President when Mr. Hassett goes out to the house in the morning.

Tel. & Tel.

10:15 PM.
MEMO TO MR. FOSTER  
EXECUTIVE CLERK  
WHITE HOUSE  

THE NAVAL AIDE HAS DIRECTED THAT THE ENCLOSED BE TELEPHONED TO THE PRESIDENT.

19 SEPT 1941

RESPECTFULLY,

R.G. COPELAND
LIEUT, U.S. NAVY

CODING ROOM 2140/19SEPT., 1941
19 Sept., 1941.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN. (COPY TO HOPKINS).

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN YOUR STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE THIRTY NINE ZERO FOUR WILL LEAVE ON DATE MENTIONED IN MY ALUSNA EIGHTEEN FOURTEEN THIRTY EIGHT. I ASSUME THAT YOU APPROVE OUR OFFERING RUSSIA TWO HUNDRED AIRCRAFT PER MONTH AND AVERAGE OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TANKS PER MONTH DURING NEXT NINE MONTHS OCTOBER THROUGH JUNE. THE SCHEDULE OF MONTHLY TANK DELIVERIES CAN BE WORKED OUT FROM THE FIGURES OF EXPORTABLE SURPLUS GIVEN ME BY THE ARMY AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE BRITISH. THIS IS NOT TRUE OF THE AIRCRAFT HOWEVER. MY CABLE INCLUDED RECOMMENDATION MADE AT URGENT REQUEST OF BRITISH THAT TWELVE HUNDRED COME FROM FIGURES GIVEN AS EXPORTABLE SURPLUS AND SIX HUNDRED FROM ARMY ALLOCATIONS IN WHICH RECOMMENDATION ALL HERE INCLUDING GENERAL EMBICK CONCUR. HOPE WE MAY HAVE DECISION ON THIS POINT. IN ADDITION AM MOST ANXIOUS FOR CLARIFICATION OF METHOD OF FINANCE BY OUR ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW.

192130.
192130.

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

CODING

SECRET

[Signature]
19 Sept., 1941

URGENT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN. COPY TO HOPKINS.

PARA ONE. THE BRITISH ARE SHIPPING TO RUSSIA THIS MONTH FIVE THOUSAND LONG TONS OF ALUMINUM AND HAVE PROMISED TWO THOUSAND PERRA MONTH THEREAFTER. TOTAL APPROXIMATELY THIRTY THOUSAND TONS. THIS WILL SO REDUCE BRITISH STOCKS THAT THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THIS ALLOCATION FROM US BY END OF NINETEEN FORTY TWO. IN ADDITION THEY ARE PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF OTHER ESSENTIAL MATERIALS SUCH AS TIN LEAD RUBBER JUTE INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS WOOL SHOES AND SUGAR. FORTY THOUSAND TO FIFTY THOUSAND TONS OF COPPER ASKED FOR BUT NONE AVAILABLE HERE.

PARA TWO. LIST OF MATERIALS AS SUBMITTED BY OPM REMAINS UNCHANGED AND WE ASSUME AUTHORIZATION TO OFFER THIS HELP TO RUSSIA. WILL DISCUSS AVAILABILITY OF TEXTILES OFFERED BY YOU IN CABLE THIRTY NINE ZERO SIX ON ARRIVAL IN RUSSIA.

PARA THREE. IT IS BELIEVED HERE THAT LARGE QUANTITIES OF THESE AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS LIKELY TO BE ASKED FOR AT MOSCOW.
TRIPLE PRIORITY

TELEGRAM

THROUGH NAVY RADIO

SPECIAL

SECRET

SEPTEMBER 20, 1941

TO: MR. HARRIMAN

AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS BY MONTHS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO SEND IT TO YOU AT ONCE. THE LIST INCLUDES ALL TANKS BY MONTHS AND TYPES AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THEY GO TO BRITISH OR RUSSIANS. FURTHERMORE IT IS AN INCLUSIVE LIST IRRESPECTIVE OF SOURCE OF ORIGINAL FUNDS. IT THEREFORE INCLUDES UNITED STATES ARMY ORDERS, BRITISH ORDERS AND LEND LEASE ORDERS. THE FIGURES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MEDIUM TANKS OCTOBER 116 NOVEMBER 184 DECEMBER 304 JANUARY 415 FEBRUARY 425 MARCH 435 APRIL 520 MAY 810 JUNE 785 TOTAL 3994.

LIGHT TANKS OCTOBER 183 NOVEMBER 180 DECEMBER 180 JANUARY 100 FEBRUARY 110 MARCH 300 APRIL 300 MAY 300 JUNE 300 TOTAL 1953.

THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES IN THE EARLY MONTHS WITH 37 mm AMMUNITION FOR LIGHT TANKS, 75 mm FOR MEDIUM TANKS AND SOME POSSIBLE SHORTAGE OF 75 mm GUNS. HOWEVER YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO GIVE IMMEDIATE APPROPRIATE PRIORITIES TO EVERYTHING RELATING TO TANKS.

FURTHERMORE CONFERENCE BEING HELD HERE MONDAY WILL I BELIEVE SUBSTANTIALLY ACCELERATE PROGRAM DURING THE COMING MONTHS AND GREATLY INCREASE OUR PRESENT PLANS FOR TANK PRODUCTION DURING THE NEXT EIGHTEEN MONTHS.
IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THEREFORE THAT THE ABOVE LIST IS A MINIMUM WHICH I BELIEVE CAN BE FURTHER INCREASED. IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE YOU AIRPLANE FIGURES TODAY BUT BELIEVE PROPOSAL MADE BY BRITISH IS REASONABLE. DETAILS HOWEVER MUST BE WORKED OUT AND THESE WILL BE CABLED TO YOU TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY.

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE THIS CABLE AND REPEAT FIGURES TO BE SURE THERE IS NO MISTAKE.

IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE TANK FIGURES THAT MORE THAN 250 A MONTH SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO RUSSIA. BELIEVE PUBLIC OPINION HERE TO AID RUSSIA IMPROVING BUT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GIVE YOU DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS AS TO METHOD OF FINANCING ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT IT CAN BE FULLY WORKED OUT AND WE WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED. JONES HAS ALREADY PROMISED TO ADVANCE ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS FOR PURCHASE OF RAW MATERIALS FROM RUSSIA AND THIS ARRANGEMENT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY RUSSIA.

YOUR 4371 PARAGRAPH (D) NO COMMITMENT CAN BE MADE AT THIS TIME RELATIVE TO TRANSFER OF LEND LEASE MATERIAL BY BRITISH TO RUSSIA. THAT POLICY IS DEPENDENT ON FINAL OUTCOME OF METHODS OF FINANCING ALL RUSSIAN PURCHASES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THIS WILL ALSO ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR CABLE ABOUT ALUMINUM. ANY TENTATIVE FIGURES AS TO AMOUNTS OF ALUMINUM TO BE REQUIRED IN RUSSIA SHOULD BE CABLED FROM MOSCOW. THE LIST OF MATERIAL WHICH PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED BEFORE YOU LEFT WILL BE DELIVERED. WILL SEND YOU MOSCOW MONDAY CONFIRMING TELEGRAM GIVING PRECISE DATES OF DELIVERY OF ALL THOSE MATERIALS.

WILL ALSO CABLE YOU MONDAY PRECISE INFORMATION RELATIVE TO "JEEPS" AND GARAND RIFLES.

HOPKINS
From: Mr. Harriman
To: The President of the United States and
       Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. Beavorbrook and I agreed with Stalin to furnish him 400 airplanes per month for period October to June both inclusive, the British to furnish 200 fighters per month and the United States to make available 100 fighters and 100 bombers per month:

It is essential that shipments in these amounts be initiated at once. To carry out our part of this agreement Britain have agreed with us to divert from their share in both Lease-lend contracts and their own contracts, during the first part of this period up to 300 A 20's provided the borrowed planes can be returned to the British in like amounts from our later productions as soon as possible, and provided the number borrowed from them is kept to absolute minimum necessary to insure our fulfilling our agreements:

After examining characteristics of the O trajector 52 the Soviets definitely concluded they can not use this type and do not desire it to be shipped to them. They are very doubtful of being able to use the A trajector 29 due to its inadequate speed, defensive armament and armor. All their operations are in face of fighter opposition even over Black Sea. Their urgent request was for bombers with a radius of action of about 375 miles with bomb load
of one ton, with good speed and defensive armaments and armor at the rate of 300 per month.

As this was impossible they desire the A trajector 20 and what we can give of the B trajector 25's. I am convinced that bombers furnished must have adequate defensive armament and armor to be of use to Soviets and that their operating personnel are fully capable of flying and maintaining our best and latest equipment. Based on above I urgently recommended that the U.S.S.R. be allotted 900 F trajectors 40 trajector E, 828 A trajector 20 and 72 B 25's in the amounts of 100 bombers and 100 fighters per month beginning with October:

In addition to the 141 Tomahawks and 2 R.A.F. squadrons totaling 40 Hurricanes now operating on Russian front the British have shipped from England 100 Hurricanes in September and will ship 300 in October, all to arrive in Archangel before first week in November. Russians wish our aircraft shipped to Archangel as well for the present.
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

FOR HARRIMAN FROM HOPKINS

THE PRESIDENT TODAY SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
STALIN.

WE ARE SHIPPING OCTOBER 94 LIGHT TANKS AND 72
MEDIUM 32-TON TANKS WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION.
MOST OF THESE WILL LEAVE THE UNITED STATES BY
OCTOBER 15.

WE ARE SHIPPING 100 BOMBERS AND 100 OF OUR NEWEST
FIGHTER PLANES WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION. THESE
WILL BE PLACED ON SHIPS DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS.

WE ARE SHIPPING 5500 TRUCKS DURING OCTOBER AND
LARGE AMOUNTS OF BARBED WIRE. ALL OTHER MILITARY
SUPPLIES WE PROMISED FOR OCTOBER ARE BEING SWIFTLY
ASSEMBLED TO BE PLACED ON SHIPS.

THREE SHIPS LEFT THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY FOR
RUSSIAN PORTS. EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO RUSH OTHER
SUPPLIES.

HOPKINS
VIA NAVY RADIO

SECRET          OCTOBER 13, 1941

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
    MOSCOW

FOR STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

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MEDIUM 32-TON TANKS WITH SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION.
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SUPPLIES.

ROOSEVELT

(Original FDR)
VIA NAVY RADIO

SECRET

OCTOBER 13, 1941

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW

FOR STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

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THREE SHIPS LEFT THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY FOR RUSSIAN PORTS. EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO RUSH OTHER SUPPLIES.

ROOSEVELT
State Dept: copy of paraphrased text
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
pages 851-852.
TO: MR. STALIN

I HAVE SEEN THE PROTOCOL OF THE CONFERENCE HELD IN MOSCOW
AND DISCUSSED THE DATA CONTAINED THEREIN WITH THE MEMBERS OF OUR
MISSION.

I HAVE APPROVED ALL OF THE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AND MUNITIONS AND HAVE DIRECTED THAT THE UTMOST EXPEDITION BE USED
TO PROVIDE SO FAR AS POSSIBLE THE RAW MATERIALS. I HAVE ORDERED
THAT DELIVERIES BEGIN AT ONCE AND BE MAINTAINING IN THE GREATEST
POSSIBLE VOLUME.

IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANY FINANCIAL OBSTACLES I HAVE ALSO
DIRECTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE EFFECTED IMMEDIATELY WHEREBY SHIPMENTS
UP TO THE VALUE OF ONE BILLION DOLLARS MAY BE MADE UNDER THE LEND
LEASE ACT.

I PROPOSE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE U.S.S.R., THAT NO INTEREST BE CHARGED ON THE INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED
AS A RESULT OF THESE SHIPMENTS AND THAT THE PAYMENTS ON SUCH INDEBTED
NESS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. BEGIN ONLY FIVE YEARS AFTER
THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR AND COMPLETED OVER A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS
THEREAFTER.

I HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN ARRANGE TO MAKE SPECIAL
EFFORTS TO SELL THE UNITED STATES SUCH COMMODITIES AND RAW MATERIALS
AS MAY BE AVAILABLE AND OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES MAY BE IN URGENT
NEED, THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATE TO BE CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

I want to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of this government for the expeditious way in which the supply conference in Moscow was handled by you and your associates and to assure you that all of the implications of that conference will be carried out to the limit.

I trust you will not hesitate to get in touch with me directly should the occasion require it.

ROOSEVELT
I have examined the record of the Moscow Conference and the members of the mission have discussed the details with me. All of the military equipment and munitions items have been approved and I have ordered that as far as possible the delivery of raw materials be expedited. Deliveries have been directed to commence immediately and to be fulfilled in the largest possible amounts. In an effort to obviate any financial difficulties immediate arrangements are to be made so that supplies up to one billion dollars in value may be effected under the Lend-Lease Act. If approved by the Government of the U.S.S.R. I propose that the indebtedness thus incurred be subject to no interest and that the payments by the Government of the U.S.S.R. do not commence until five years after the war's conclusion and be completed over a ten-year period thereafter.

I hope that special efforts will be arranged by your Government to sell us the available raw materials and commodities which the United States may need urgently under the arrangement that the proceeds thereof be credited to the Soviet Government's account.

At this opportunity I want to tell you of the appreciation
appreciation of the United States Government for the expeditious handling by you and your associates of the Moscow supply conference, and to send you assurances that we will carry out to the limit all the implications thereof. I hope that you will communicate with me directly without hesitation if you should so wish.

Roosevelt
MISS TULLY:

This telegram was sent in the President's name by Mr. Hopkins today.

L. BERNEY

10/31/41
TELEGRAM VIA NAVY RADIO

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1941

TO: STALIN
THROUGH THE AMERICAN EMBASSY

SECRET FOR STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. It was agreed in the Confidential Protocol of the Moscow Supply Conference that the possibility of supply of a number of items you requested was to be investigated.

Investigation shows that in addition to the items definitely offered in the Protocol the following items can be made available as requested and I have so directed.

Item 7, Field Telephone Apparatus,
Item 8, Field Telephone Cable,
Item 9, Underwater Telegraph Cable,
Item 10, Submarine Cable,
Item 11, Aluminum and Duraluminum,
Item 12, Rolled Brass,
Item 22, Tubes and other manufactures of copper,
Item 31, Hot-Rolled Steel,
Item 32, Steel Billets, Chrome-Silicon-Manganese,
Item 33, Cold-Rolled Steel Strip,
Item 34, Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet,
Item 35, Tinplate,
Item 36, Steel-Wire
Item 37, Steel-Wire-Ropes,
Item 41, Barbed Wire,
Item 45, Petroleum-Products,
Item 46, Ethylene Glycol,
Item 47, Sodium Bromide,
Item 48, Phosphorus,
Item 52, Colloxylin,
Item 58, Abrasives,
Item 59, Graphitized Electrodes,
Item 64, Sole Leather

2. The items listed below can be made available in part or require further mutual study:

Item 6, Trucks, 5,600 immediately and 10,000 monthly thereafter. Difficulty will be shipping.

Item 14, Nickel, the full amount of this item will be supplied jointly by United States and Great Britain in equal amounts for the next three months; further amounts to be subject to later considerations.

Item 19, Magnesium Alloys. Cannot be supplied from the United States at the present time. Study of the possibilities will be continued.

Item 20, Electrolytic Zinc, the full amount of this item will be supplied jointly by the United States and Great Britain as follows: Great Britain will supply the full amount for October, the United States will supply the full amount for November and each will supply 750 tons monthly thereafter.

Item 21, Bimetal, requires further study of possibilities of supply.
It is impossible to determine the exact number of tons of product to be produced in the future due to the lack of data on current production levels and market demand. However, it is estimated that the production of Item 29, high-speed tool steel, is currently at 1,000 tons per month.

Immediate action will be taken to review the plans for Item 32, ferritin, with a view to increasing production and preparing for future expansion of American production capacity. Immediate study will be made to poss...
Item 50, Dimethylamine, 100 tons monthly beginning November; 200 tons monthly beginning March 1942.

Item 51, Diphenylamine, 100 tons monthly.

Item 53, Metal cutting machine tools, is receiving further joint study by Great Britain, United States and Antorg.

Item 54, Electric Furnaces, 140 pieces definitely, further amounts dependent upon specifications.

Item 55, Forgings and Press Equipment, 627 pieces definitely, further amounts dependent upon specifications.

Item 56, Various Industrial Equipment, every assistance practicable will be given, satisfaction or particular requisitions being dependent upon specifications.

Item 66, Army Boots, at least 200,000 pairs monthly available and already offered to Antorg.

Item 67, Army Cloth, amounts available dependent upon specifications but one million yards woolen overcoat cloth will be available upon requisition over next four months.

3. Further communications will be sent shortly on navy and medical supply lists.

ROOSEVELT
PARAPHRASE OF THE TEXT OF A LETTER ADDRESSED
BY MR. JOSEF STALIN UNDER DATE OF NOVEMBER 4,
1941 TO THE PRESIDENT.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Steinhardt, through
Mr. Vyshinski, presented to me on November 2, 1941 an
aide memoire containing the contents of your message,
the exact text of which I have not yet received.

First of all I would like to express my sincere
thanks for your appreciative remarks regarding the exp-ep-
deditious manner in which the conference was handled.
Your assurances that the decisions of the conference
will be carried out to the limit is deeply appreciated
by the Soviet Government.

Your decision, Mr. President, to grant to the Soviet
Union a loan in the amount of one billion dollars subject
to no interest charges and for the purpose of paying for
armaments and raw materials for the Soviet Union is
accepted with sincere gratitude by the Soviet Government
as unusually substantial aid in its difficult and great
struggle against our common enemy, bloodthirsty Hitlerism.

I agree completely, on behalf of the Government of
the Soviet Union, with the conditions which you outlined
for this loan to the Soviet Union, namely that payments
on the loan shall begin five years after the end of the
war and shall be completed during the following ten-year
period.

The
The Government of the U.S.S.R. stands ready to expedite in every possible way the supplying of available raw materials and goods required by the United States.

I am heartily in accord with your proposal, Mr. President, that we establish direct personal contact whenever circumstances warrant.
November 25, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I gather that what is really behind this is that in the light of the whole strategic situation as it is in the world today the Navy feels it would be unwise to send a carrier. Hence, unless you decide otherwise, we are going to move these planes at once by merchant ship, although, as I have told you, the Maritime Commission is having a good deal of difficulty getting enough ships.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

(Notation in President's hand writing)

H.L.H.

O.K. but say to them from me:
Hurry, Hurry, Hurry!

F.D.R.
Memorandum for the President.

Subject: Transportation of Defense Aid Aircraft for the USSR.

1. The monthly average of Defense Aid airplanes for the USSR which must be transported from U.S. ports to Basra, or possibly alternate ports such as Karachi or Bombay, is approximately 100 P-40E, 100 A-20 and, after January, 12 B-25's. The distances involved are: Hampton Roads to Basra, 12,452 miles, or San Diego to Basra via Torres Strait, 12,830 miles.

2. The following comments have resulted from conferences with representatives of the Army, the Navy and the Maritime Commission.

3. The Army plans to send officers and men to Basra for assembly of planes. The Maritime Commission is prepared to furnish transportation for personnel to meet the Army's requirements. Thus the use of a carrier for this purpose does not appear to be necessary, since it is estimated that a carrier with accompanying cruiser escort would not average over 18 kts, whereas the ship selected by the Maritime Commission would probably not be appreciably less.

A carrier could transport about 35 assembled P-40 planes. However, since Basra is some distance up river, the carrier would have to fly off planes and discharge personnel, spare parts, etc. at sea some 90 miles from Basra, which would involve a difficult lightering problem.

With allowances for refueling en route, unloading and recovering pilots, it is estimated that about 67 days would be required for the round trip.

The use of the Navy's ex-Sea Train ships which are completing their conversion was also studied. The combined capacity of these two ships would be only 64 P-40's or 20 P-40's plus 20 A-20's per month. These ships are sorely needed to transport both Army and Navy planes to outlying stations.

4. The Maritime Commission, however, is prepared to undertake the delivery of planes. There are many cargo ships which can carry 60 to 120 P-40 planes since these are crated. The B-25's are to be uncrated and, due to their size, must thus be carried on the upper decks, but since there are so few of these, it presents no problem. The original plan in the case of the A-20's was to transport these in an assembled condition. These are large planes and thus it presented a difficult problem, if a total of 100 per month were to be delivered. The Maritime Commission's studies indicated that using all available ships, including the Navy's two ex-Sea Train ships and two large ore carriers, no more than 65 A-20's could be delivered per month in an assembled condition. As a result of this the Army is now making plans to permit most of these planes (A-20's) to be shipped in a disassembled condition, with assembly to be undertaken at or near the unloading port which must in any event be done with the P-40 type. Under these conditions the shipment of the 100 A-20 planes can be handled by the Maritime Commission each month.

5. Any merchant ships which are used to deliver airplanes to the Middle East can on their return voyage bring to the United States critical and strategic materials.

6. Since the Maritime Commission is prepared to deliver the planes in the quantities and within the time limits desired, and is also able to furnish transportation for the necessary Army personnel required for assembly and piloting, it is recommended that this be done.

Army concurs -

H. R. Stark.
P-40 Delivery Rates per month.
Various Vessels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capacity (each)</th>
<th>Turn around</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seatrains (2)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier (1)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Merchant ships controlled by Maritime Commission will have capacities of 60 to 120 P-40's in crates. Since they will return via ports at which they load other materials, their turn around will vary widely. Their rate of delivery will be adequate.

Notation in President's hand writing:
[NRS]