IZVESTIYA of January 30, which was not received until after the dispatch of the Embassy's 88, January 31, 11 a.m., contains an editorial entitled "The Sixtieth Birthday of Franklin Roosevelt" which is even more complimentary in tone than that published in the local paper. It gives a brief review of his life with the statement that he may well be proud to look back on his past years. It quotes Stalin's remarks about him to H. G. Wells in 1934, emphasizing the President's outstanding personal qualities of initiative, courage and determination and characterizing him as the pre-eminent leader of the capitalist world. It describes in some detail the warnings against aggression which were voiced by the President prior to the outbreak of "the Second World War" and mentions the assistance which he has subsequently extended to Great Britain and the Soviet...
and the Soviet Union. It also observes that he was responsible for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Referring to the "sudden attack" of Japan upon the United States and the declaration of war by Germany and Italy which immediately followed, the editorial states that the aggressors counted the unpreparedness of the United States and hoped to "bring it to its knees by quick blows". It remarks that the attackers enjoyed all the advantages of their surprise attack and inflicted serious losses upon the United States, but that "under the vigorous leadership of their outstanding President, the American people have met the greatest ordeal of their century and a half of history in a united and worthy manner and are filled with an unswerving determination to achieve, jointly with other freedom loving nations, a final victory over Hitlerism and its Allies". The editorial states that the President is bending his every effort to this end and briefly refers to his armament program for 1942.

The final two paragraphs of the editorial state that the Soviet people, who are now bearing the brunt of the struggle
-3-/#92, January 31, 1942, 5 p.m., from Kuibyshev

of the struggle against Hitlerism and have been able to launch a powerful counter offensive, greatly value the actions of the brave and resolute American President, that notwithstanding these efforts, undertaken in close cooperation with England and the United States, the enemy is still strong and the struggle will be long, but that ultimate victory of the democratic states is assured. It adds that a prominent role in preparing the way for this victory belongs to the President. The editorial concludes, "We send President Roosevelt warm greetings on his sixtieth birthday. We wish every success to him personally, to his great country, and to his work-loving, energetic people."

THURSTON

L.I.S
Miss Tully:

These were sent through the State Department last night.

L.M.B.
TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 9, 1942

TO: AMBASSADOR
MOSCOW

AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN.

OUR SHIPMENTS FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY HAVE INCLUDED AND
WILL INCLUDE 244 FIGHTER PLANES, 24 B-25'S, 233 A-20'S, 408
MEDIUM TANKS AND 449 LIGHT TANKS

THE REPORTS HERE INDICATE YOU ARE GETTING ON WELL IN
PUSHING THE NAZIS BACK.

WHILE WE ARE HAVING OUR IMMEDIATE TROUBLES IN THE FAR EAST,
I BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE THAT AREA REINFORCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO
SUCH AN EXTENT THAT WE CAN STOP THE JAPS BUT WE ARE PREPARED FOR
SOME FURTHER SET BACKS.

I REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING OUR SUPPLIES TO YOU AT
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AND EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO
GET SHIPMENTS OFF.

(SIGNED) ROOSEVELT

Printed in part in Stalin's
Correspondence with Churchill,
Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman,
DOROTHY:

Here is a copy of the reply sent to Moscow for your files, if you want it.

Lois
February 27, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is requested that the following cablegram be sent to Brig. Gen. Philip H. Faymonville, in care of the American Embassy to the U.S.S.R.:

"Meet Confidential.
"For Faymonville from Spalding.
"Replying to your cablegram No. 18 of January 24. PART ONE. Amtorg has been offered two used but serviceable cracking plants which can be made quickly available. Now awaiting Amtorg's decision. The balance of requirements will require diversion from plants needed to meet U.S. shortage. Decision will be made shortly. Priority was given last October to Abadan plant on account of its accessibility to critical Middle East theater, and also since at the same time it would be a source of supply to the U.S.S.R.

"PART TWO. The matter of spare parts, except radio spares, is under investigation and report will be made shortly. Radio spare parts and equipment are of British manufacture and cannot be obtained in this country. The Soviet representative in London should be instructed to requisition the British Government for these necessary parts.

"PART FOUR. Nothing is known here as to procurement of 127 mm. naval guns.

"PART SIX. It is not contemplated at the present time to allocate any Mustangs for delivery to U.S.S.R. against U.S. protocol commitment.

"PART SEVEN. We have no information of any order for planes for Russian Navy."

Sincerely yours,

S. P. Spalding
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
NECESSARY ACTION.

F.D.R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State, Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Dated January 13, 1942

18, January 21, 8 p.m.

SECRET FOR GENERAL S. P. SPALDING.

Moscow

Recipient, 11:19 p.m., 21st

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED
GOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 2-24-70

Signature- [Signature]

PART ONE.

Hikoyan states that prompt action on projects for Soviet petroleum industry is essential. He desires hundred octane gasoline plants of latest type and for many months has attempted to get necessary machinery and apparatus from United States. He states that expansion of British plant at Abadan will not suffice for Russian needs and says in any case more economical for Soviet Union to have hundred octane plants near own fields. He urges release of materials requested for new Soviet plants. Mr. E. A. Beroud, member of Beaverbrook staff at Moscow conference and now on Littleton's is staff, Cairo, is now visiting Moscow and states that he hopes to persuade Soviet Government to agree to give British priority in enlarging British Abadan plant.
Abadan plant with American machinery "in the common interest."

Two. Krutikov states that urgency of need for spare parts for Tomahawks is not sufficiently understood in United States. His representatives have had no success in negotiations with manufacturers to undertake these orders and he requests assistance further than that outlined in your 1305, December 22. He handed me list of required spare parts which will be cabled you. It is based on actual battle experience and is more extensive than list in my cablegram November 18.

Three. The first shipment Airacobras disappointed Russians because no guns. British are now preparing to supply guns. First Airacobra tester crashed with Soviet pilot.

Four. Commissar of Navy requests information reference 127 millimeter naval guns which were promised from England. Admiral Charknov reports to Commissar from London that British now propose to supply these 110 guns from United States. Sixty were promised for delivery during 1941, and fifty during 1942. Please cable me status of this order and probable delivery
probable delivery schedule.

Five. Have received from Naval Commissariat and am forwarding (a) pilots guides, Bering Sea and Chukotsk Sea (b) cipher tables requested by Admiral Standley for March, April, and May, 1942.

Six. British Air Mission reports that they may deliver Mustangs to Russia from British orders in United States provided the four Mustangs now being shipped to Soviet Union are satisfactory to Soviet Air Chief. Are we prepared to send any Mustangs to Russia to help fill our quota.

Seven. Please cable probable delivery schedule of thirty airplanes for Soviet Navy recently ordered in United States.

THOMPSON

HTM
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN.

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 20.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE SHALL
BE GLAD TO RECONSIDER WITH YOU OUR AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE
FUNDS WE ARE ADVANCING UNDER THE LEND-LEASE ACT. AT THE MOMENT
THE ALL IMPORTANT PROBLEM IS TO GET THE SUPPLIES TO YOU.

I AM HAVING CANVASED AT ONCE YOUR SUGGESTION RELATIVE TO
CENTRALIZING CONTROL HERE OF MUNITIONS BEING SENT TO RUSSIA.

THE FURTHER NEWS OF THE SUCCESSES OF YOUR ARMY HEARTENS
US VERY MUCH.

I WISH TO SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON THE
TWENTY-FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE RED ARMY.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

I think this is important and that we should do it. Will you prepare reply for my signature?

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

Acknowledging the receipt of your message of 13th February, I would like first to say that I share your confidence that the efforts of the newly-appointed Ambassador of the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Admiral Standley, of whom you speak so highly and in such warm terms, to bring our two countries still closer to one another, will be crowned with success.

Your decision, Mr. President, to place at the disposal of the Soviet Government another billion dollars, in accordance with the law for the supply of armaments under the Lend-Lease Act, on the same conditions which applied to the first billion, is accepted by the Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With regard to your enquiry I have to inform you that, at the present moment, in order not to delay matters, the Soviet Government is not raising the question of the modification of the conditions attaching to the granting by your Cabinet of the above-mentioned second billion dollars or of taking into consideration the extremely strained state of the resources of the U.S.S.R. in the war against our common foe. At the same time I entirely agree with you and should like to express the hope that at a later date we shall be able jointly to fix a time when it will appear desirable to both of us to revise
to revise the financial agreements now concluded in order to pay special attention to the above-mentioned circumstances.

I should like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that the Soviet organizations when realizing the loan granted to the U.S.S.R. are at present experiencing great difficulties with regard to the transport of armaments and materials purchased in the United States to U.S.S.R. ports. We would consider the most suitable arrangement for the transport of armaments from America, in the circumstances, would be that which is successfully adopted for the transport of armaments from England to Archangel, but which heretofore has not been possible to apply to deliveries from the United States. According to this arrangement, the British military authorities delivering armaments and materials, designate the ships themselves, as well as organizing their loading in the port, and their convoy to the port of destination. The Soviet Government would be extremely grateful if the same arrangements for the delivery of armaments and the convoying of ships to the U.S.S.R. ports, could be adopted by the United States Government also.

With sincere respect, I remain,

J. Stalin
Published in
Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill,
Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945

I want to give you part of a speech concerning the
United States for Germany and Europe.

I would like to express our admiration for the
spectacular success of our common enterprises.

It is only business to fulfill our agreement on
matters of military strategy.

I am pleased to see an end to the war and
acceptance of peace terms, so we shall be
able to turn our attention to other
problems.
February 19, 1942

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM MR. STALIN

I have received your message informing me of consignments of armaments from the United States for January and February.

I would like to emphasise the fact that at the present moment, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and its army are exerting all their powers to thrust back, by their determined offensive, Hitler's troops, the fulfilment of American deliveries, including tanks and aeroplanes, is of the utmost importance for our common cause, for our further successes.
February 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WELLES:

Here is the message which the President has approved. This does not imply that you should not change it if you think best.

Under any circumstances I think it need not come back to the President unless it is a major change.

Can you send a copy back for the President's files.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
February 23, 1942

Dear Harry:

I have made no change whatever in this message and I am consequently returning it to you for the President's files.

I handed a copy of it this afternoon to Mr. Litvinov who assured me that he would send it directly to Stalin. I have transmitted the message through the Soviet Ambassador since in that way it will reach Stalin much quicker than if we sent it through our own Embassy in Kuibyshev.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ Sumner Welles

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins,

The "White House."
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO STALIN.

THIS WILL ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR MESSAGE OF FEBRUARY 20.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WE SHALL BE GLAD TO RECONSIDER WITH YOU OUR AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE FUNDS WE ARE ADVANCING UNDER THE LEND-LEASE ACT. AT THE MOMENT THE ALL IMPORTANT PROBLEM IS TO GET THE SUPPLIES TO YOU.

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THE FURTHER NEWS OF THE SUCCESSES OF YOUR ARMY HEARTENS US VERY MUCH.

I WISH TO SEND YOU MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE RED ARMY.

ROOSEVELT

REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED
Miss Berney

Attached is an extra copy of the Russian report for March 14th, as per our conversation.

M. Siewers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>PERIOD JULY 1 - MAR. 14</th>
<th>WEEK ENDED MAR. 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather (tons)</td>
<td>3,924</td>
<td>3,711,298</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoes (pairs)</td>
<td>631,079</td>
<td>2,152,960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wool &amp; Cloth (yards)</td>
<td>1,305,155</td>
<td>2,981,941</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat (tons) (British)</td>
<td>6,386</td>
<td>242,954</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat (tons) (American)</td>
<td>24,816</td>
<td>565,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour (tons)</td>
<td>16,535</td>
<td>1,066,982</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lard (tons)</td>
<td>5,157</td>
<td>1,559,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar (tons)</td>
<td>10,723</td>
<td>1,120,903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tires</td>
<td>13,111</td>
<td>375,557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reexports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Fuel &amp; Aviation Gas. (tons)</td>
<td>252,107</td>
<td>10,599,186</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Petroleum Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abrasives (tons)</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,075,542</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graphite Electrodes (tons)</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>263,538</td>
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<tr>
<td>All other non-metallic minerals</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>METALS:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Copper Wire &amp; Cable (tons)</td>
<td>4,879</td>
<td>2,952,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transmission Cable (tons)</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>839,450</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aluminum (tons)</td>
<td>3,491</td>
<td>2,816,099</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nickel (tons)</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>602,792</td>
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<td>Molybdenum (tons)</td>
<td>2,670</td>
<td>3,090,348</td>
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<td>Brass &amp; Bronze (tons)</td>
<td>17,158</td>
<td>7,342,936</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zinc (tons)</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>555,014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copper Goods, Tubes, etc. (tons)</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>1,258,685</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferrosilicon (tons)</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>107,940</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferrochrome (tons)</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>180,121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbed Wire (tons)</td>
<td>17,009</td>
<td>1,508,936</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copper Ingots (tons) (British)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1,759,039</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aluminum Ingots (tons) (British)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47,840</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tinplate (tons)</td>
<td>11,992</td>
<td>1,590,257</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Speed Steel (tons)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10,804</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nickel Chrome Wire (tons)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>227,567</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold Rolled Steel Strip (tons)</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>162,196</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold Rolled Steel Sheet (tons)</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>211,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Billets, Bars, etc. (tons)</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>234,071</td>
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<tr>
<td>Steel Wire (tons)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>36,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other metals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MACHINERY &amp; EQUIPMENT:</strong> (units)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Telephones</td>
<td>21,522</td>
<td>590,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Tools</td>
<td>9,047,640</td>
<td>621,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL EXPORTS TO U.S.S.R.**

Weekly Report as of March 14, 1942
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>PERIOD JULY 1 - MAR. 14</th>
<th>WEEK ENDED MAR. 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Furnaces</td>
<td>128,971</td>
<td>30,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forging &amp; Press Equipment</td>
<td>620,722</td>
<td>29,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Equipment</td>
<td>519,502</td>
<td>32,880</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electric Motors &amp; Locos. Gas Engines</td>
<td>1,828,278</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Engines</td>
<td>492,332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct. &amp; Convey. Equip.</td>
<td>503,233</td>
<td>24,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Oil Equip.</td>
<td>4,537,709</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam Engines</td>
<td>308,891</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Machinery &amp; Apparatus</td>
<td>448,393</td>
<td>133,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other machinery</td>
<td>1,364,822</td>
<td>24,546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| VEHICLES (NON-COMBAT): (units)     |           |          |           |          |
| Trucks (under 1 ton)               | 2,054     | 1,956,392| 209       | 225,563  |
| Trucks (under 2½ tons)             | 15,586    | 21,740,179| 1,692   | 2,470,765|
| Trucks (above 2½ tons)             | 229       | 798,969  |           |          |
| Railroad Cars                      | 500,552   |          |           |          |
| Other vehicles & parts             | 1,738,977 | 90,589   |           |          |

| MUNITIONS: (units)                 |           |          |           |          |
| Airplanes - bombers                |           |          | 26        | 3,599,999|
| - pursuits                         |           |          | 35        | 2,251,690|
| - observations                     |           |          | 2,584,325 | 1,070,632|
| Tanks - medium                     |           |          | 101       | 5,535,468|
| - light                            | 644       | 34,315,049| 24       | 672,849  |
| Other parts & accessories           |           | 1,560,939|           | 567,405  |
| Searchlights & Equipment           |           |          | 150       | 2,383,950|
| Sound Locators                     |           |          | 145       | 1,407,100|
| Machine Guns                       |           |          |           |          |
| Spares & Parts                     |           |          |           |          |
| Shells                             |           |          |           |          |
| Cartridges                         |           |          |           |          |
| Automatic Arms                     |           |          |           |          |
| Tank Armament                      |           |          |           |          |
| Other ammunition                   |           |          |           |          |

<p>| CHEMICALS: (tons)                  |           |          |           |          |
| Toluidine                          | 5,231     | 750,591  |           |          |
| T.N.T.                              | 3,425     | 1,777,222| 984       | 456,407  |
| Phenol                             | 1,383     | 433,153  | 170       | 52,973   |
| Ethylene Glycol                    | 438       | 129,119  | 182       | 56,072   |
| Sodium Bromide                     | 305       | 176,318  | 22        | 12,488   |
| Phosphorus                         | 483       | 168,282  | 22        | 6,756    |
| Dimethylaniline                    | 268       | 132,502  | 89        | 44,000   |
| Colloxylin                         | 784       | 329,440  | 232       | 97,548   |
| Carbon Black                       | 2,799     | 319,714  |           |          |
| Methanol                           | 770       | 85,700   | 164       | 18,158   |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formaldehyde</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>55,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dibutylphthalate</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>29,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diphenylamine</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>28,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDICAL SUPPLIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,779,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALL OTHER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,694,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$234,073,109</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures compiled from Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Foreign Trade Statistics, Special Reports.
PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN

It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of minds in personal conversation would be greatly useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days together next Summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views.

I have in mind very important military proposal involving the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your critical western front. This objective carries great weight with me.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington
in the immediate future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an important way. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my friend, Mr. Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but we can gain time by the visit I propose.

I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we determine with finality the strategic course of our common military action.

I have sent Hopkins to London relative to this proposal.

The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler's armies and materiel more than we are doing now.

I send you my sincere regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
COPY OF MESSAGE GIVEN TO COUNSELLOR OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY, APRIL 11, 1942 - 12 noon

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useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if
things go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days
together next Summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in
the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance
that we have the nearest possible approach to the exchange of
views.

I have in mind very important military proposal involving
the utilization of our armed forces in a manner to relieve your
critical western front. This objective carries great weight with
me.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov
and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate
future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an important way. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

I do not want by such a trip to go over the head of my friend, Mr. Litvinov, in any way, as he will understand, but we can gain time by the visit I propose.

I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we determine with finality the strategic course of our common military action.

I am sending Hopkins to London relative to this proposal.

The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler’s armies and materiel more than we are doing now.

I send you my sincere regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942.

Personal to M. Stalin

MOSCOW

It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of our minds in personal conversation would be greatly useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few days together next Summer near our common border off Alaska. But, in the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views.

As you are aware, we have been conducting a delaying action in the Pacific, but it is my belief that matters in that ocean are now fairly well stabilized for the time being. Furthermore, our increasing production program has strengthened our weak spots and enables me to present to you a specific and, I believe, very important proposal.
for diverting German strength away from the attack on your country on the Western Front.

This objective bears great weight with me.

One of the compelling reasons bearing on my proposal is that the shipping problem is our most difficult one. Therefore, the voyage across the Atlantic for troops and munitions is much more militarily advantageous than the much longer voyage across the Pacific.

A number of alternatives in the European field must be considered.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an important way this Summer. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

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FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
April 1, 1942.

STALIN

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but we can gain time by the visit I propose.

I suggest this procedure not only because of the secrecy, which is so essential, but because I need your advice before we determine with finality the strategic course of our common military action.

The American people are thrilled by the magnificent fighting of your armed forces and we want to help you in the destruction of Hitler's armies and materiel more than we are doing now.

I send you my sincere regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
March 31, 1942.

STALIN
Moscow

It is unfortunate that geographical distance makes it practically impossible for you and me to meet at this time. Such a meeting of our minds in personal conversation would be greatly useful to the conduct of the war against Hitlerism. Perhaps if things go as well as we hope, you and I could spend a few hours together next Summer near our common border of Alaska. But, in the meantime, I regard it as of the utmost military importance that we have the nearest possible approach to an exchange of views, receive your advice and counsel at the earliest possible moment.

As you are aware, we have been conducting a delaying action in the Pacific, but it is my belief that matters in that ocean are now fairly well stabilized for the time being. Furthermore, our increasing production program
has strengthened our weak spots and enables me to turn my eyes toward consideration of diverting some German strength away from the attack on your country on the Western Front.

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MOSCOW

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A number of alternatives in the European field must be considered.

Therefore, I wish you would consider sending Mr. Molotov and a General upon whom you rely to Washington in the immediate future. Time is of the essence if we are to help in an important way [this Summer]. We will furnish them with a good transport plane so that they should be able to make the round trip in two weeks.

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I send you my sincere regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942

TELEPHONE CALLS

General Smith
Sidney Hillman
Sir John Dill
Walter Davenport - New York
Frank Walker
Ambassador Winant - Washington Hotel
Par 1 - The White House

Par 2 - I have in mind a very important military proposal involving the utilization of our forces in a manner to relieve your critical western front. This objective carries great weight with me.

Par 3 - cont

Par 4 - cont

Par 5 - cont

Par 6 - cont

Par 7 - cont

Par 8 - cont, regarding matters to

Par 9 - cont
Dear Mr. President,

After our meeting yesterday I asked our people for the latest information on shipments of aircraft to Russia. I think you were disposed to make a guess at the figure at somewhere round about 700.

From the note supplied to me, of which I send you a copy, it looks as if it comes out a good deal better than this, and that arrivals in Russia up to the end of March have been:

- From the U.K. 1292
- From the U.S.A. 226
- Total: 1518

Believe me, dear Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

Halifax

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America.
LATEST INFORMATION ON SHIPMENTS OF AIRCRAFT TO U.S.S.R.

Shipped from U.K. as of March 31, 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Protocol</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Protocol</td>
<td>1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arrivals in U.S.S.R. from U.K. as of March 29, 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Protocol</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Protocol</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shipments from U.S.A. as of March 28, 1942:

Under Protocol 726 (Protocol requirement 1200)

Arrivals in U.S.S.R. from U.S.A. as of March 29, 1942:

Under Protocol 226 (This figure includes estimated arrivals in March)

Shipments from U.K. to U.S.S.R. for first half of April:

179

U.S.A. Shipments  Arrivals in U.S.S.R.  Not yet available.
Dear M. Litvinov - Would you be good enough to send this to Mr. Stalin?

TELEGRAM

TO: JOSEPH STALIN

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

For Mr. Stalin

WE ARE HAVING GRAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NORTHERN CONVOY ROUTE AND HAVE INFORMED LITVINOFF OF THE COMPLICATIONS. YOU MAY BE SURE, HOWEVER, THAT NO EFFORT WILL BE OMITTED TO GET AS MANY SHIPS OFF AS POSSIBLE.

I HAVE HEARD OF ADMIRAL STANDLEY'S CORDIAL RECEPTION BY YOU AND WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION.

I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING MOLOTOV AND THE MOMENT I HEAR OF THE ROUTE WE SHALL MAKE PREPARATIONS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION. I DO HOPE MOLOTOV CAN STAY WITH ME IN THE WHITE HOUSE WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON BUT WE CAN MAKE A PRIVATE HOME NEARBY AVAILABLE IF THAT IS DESIRED.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

Note: Original copy carried notation in the President's handwriting.
Memo for Miss Fullop

The original of the attached was, at the President's direction, delivered to M. Litvinov this date.

J. L. McGeen
MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD

To


P.S. No. 14001

Attached is proposed draft for

J. H. Burns

4/23/42
April 25, 1942.

DRAFT OF PROPOSED DISPATCH FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN.

Ever since war developed between the U.S.S.R. and Germany there have been a growing desire and determination on the part of my country to assist the U.S.S.R. to the maximum extent practicable. Such desire and determination will continue to grow until a Soviet victory is achieved. In accordance with such national policy, I have been striving to send to the U.S.S.R. as rapidly as possible the stores scheduled in the Moscow Protocol, together with other items not so scheduled but needed by your country. At the present time large shipments are afloat, large quantities of stores are enroute to the ports and ships are also being made available for their transportation to the U.S.S.R. through drastic curtailment of other pressing needs. But now that stores and ships are moving at a reasonably satisfactory rate, enemy action is developing in such a manner as to affect seriously the possibilities of delivering the ships to northern Soviet ports. The battleship "Von Tirpitz", together with supporting surface craft, are based on Norway and lying on the flank of the convoy route; some 15 to 20 submarines are similarly based; a large number of land based heavy bombers are located in northern Norway and German aircraft are also within bombing range of Murmansk. Furthermore, although it is temporary, ice floe conditions are very bad and are forcing the convoys rather close to the North Cape. In the last convoy to Murmansk, which consisted of 25 cargo ships, 15 had to turn back to Iceland due to enemy action and weather conditions, some of the remainder were sunk and information is not yet available as to the number that reached Murmansk.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972
At this time ships are available for convoy to the U.S.S.R. approximately as follows:

- In Iceland and England .................. 61
- En route from United States to Iceland .... 30
- Loading in United States and England ....... 15
- Scheduled to load in U.S. within next 2 weeks 38
- Scheduled to load in England within next 2 weeks .......... 20

Total .......... 164 ships

Information was received from England to the effect that only three convoys can be taken to northern Soviet ports during each two month period and each convoy can escort only 25 ships.

At my request, the Prime Minister of Great Britain personally reviewed this estimate and reluctantly confirms it.

It therefore appears to be necessary for the present to curtail total loadings destined for the northern route so that they will conform to probable convoy limitations. However, it is planned to make arrangements in consultation with your representatives for the loading of high priority items so that they can go forward. It is also planned to increase shipments through the Persian Gulf to the maximum extent practicable which, for the present, appears to be a total of 15 ships per month with a total cargo of 80,000 tons.

I sincerely regret that it is necessary to send you this information at a time when you and your country are in need of larger and larger shipments of munitions and you may rest assured that both the Prime Minister and I will do everything within our power to increase the flow to the maximum extent practicable.
TO JOSEPH STALIN  
FROM ROOSEVELT  

APRIL 26, 1942  

WE ARE HAVING GRAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NORTHERN CONVOY ROUTE BUT ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OVERCOME THEM. YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE OF THESE HAZARDS PARTICULARLY BOMBERS OPERATING FROM NORTHERN NORWAY. DO YOU THINK THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF THESE FIELDS BEING AT LEAST PARTIALLY IMMobilIZED BY YOUR AIR FORCE? I AM IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH RELATIVE TO THIS MATTER AND YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE RISKS TO GET THE STUFF THROUGH TO YOU. IT MAY BE THAT THE NEXT CONVOY OR TWO MIGHT NOT BE AS LARGE AS WE HAD HOPED BUT I AM MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ADJUST THIS. I HAVE WORD THIS MORNING OF ADMIRAL STANDLEY'S CORDIAL RECEPTION BY YOU AND WISH TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING MOLOTOV AND THE MOMENT I HEAR OF THE ROUTE WE SHALL MAKE PREPARATIONS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE TRANSPORTATION. I DO HOPE MOLOTOV CAN STAY WITH ME IN THE WHITE HOUSE WHILE HE IS IN WASHINGTON.
MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you follow up on this and prepare reply, if necessary?

F.D.R.

May 21-

I don't think this requires a reply. Stalin called me up to say that Molotov has accepted your invitation.

Mary
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM JOSEPH STALIN.

I thank you for the message conveyed through Ambassador Litvinov. I have already requested Prime Minister Churchill to contribute to the speediest overcoming of certain difficulties in connection with the transportation and convoying of ships to the U.S.S.R. Since the delivery of materials in May from the U.S.A. and England is of the utmost urgency, I make a similar request to yourself, Mr. President.

The journey of Mr. Molotov to the U.S.A. and England must be postponed for a few days owing to uncertain weather conditions. It appears that this journey can be made on a Soviet airplane both to England and to the U.S.A. I would at the same time add that the Soviet Government considers that Mr. Molotov's journey should be accomplished without any publicity whatever till the return of Mr. Molotov to Moscow, as was done when Mr. Eden visited Moscow in December last.

In regard to the place of residence of Mr. Molotov during his sojourn in Washington, Mr. Molotov and I thank you for your kind suggestions.

May 15, 1942.
May 20, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Here is a message I got from Stalin.

Molotov is coming with one of Russia's important generals to discuss the military situation. I have asked Molotov to stay with me here at the White House and Stalin has accepted.

As soon as we know when Molotov is coming, will you make the appropriate arrangements to be sure his visit is kept secret? I imagine you will have to do it by means of Byron Price and censorship, because I doubt if he could get in and out of the United States without someone finding it out.

F.D.R.

Enclosure.
From Mr. Eden

To Viscount Halifax

d. 2.24 p.m. May 21st 1942.

r. 8.55 a.m. May 21st 1942.

DEYOU

MEMORANDUM and Personal

M. Molotov arrived here yesterday and discussions with him have begun (?) full stop (?) that it may last but he informs us that he will be going on to the United States.

In spite of our representations as to the difficulty of meeting his wishes he insists on complete secrecy being observed regarding his movements and wishes nothing published before his return to the U.S.S.R. He has made similar requests to the United States Government.

Please inform Mr. Hull confidentially and express the hope that the United States Government will fall in with M. Molotov's wishes as far as possible.

Conversations here have not yet developed but M. Molotov has informed us that he wishes to discuss not only our draft treaties but also the question of a second front. One of the reasons he gives for including latter question is that President Roosevelt himself has raised it with Stalin.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (MQ)

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2007. May 21, 6 p. m.

MOST SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

Our Russian visitor (my telegram No. 2007, May 20, 6 p. m.) is staying down in the country. Through Eden he sent word to me this morning that he will go directly from here to Washington and asked that there be no (repeat no) publicity given to his journey there. He asks both the British and ourselves, and Stalin has supported his request, that he be allowed to come here, go to the United States and return here and go back to Russia before any announcement of his trip is made public. It is expected that the present negotiations here will last for several days.

A brief preliminary conference was held this morning which Eden described to me as easy and friendly. The Russians are still however holding to their original requests for the Baltic States and the Finnish line. Eden explained to him our position and England’s relationship to us and that all three countries

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11/72

By J. Schaubie Date FEB 7 1972
three countries should work together. The Russian visitor in turn reminded Eden that there was also a public opinion in Russia that had to be considered. A second conference is scheduled for this afternoon.

I am asking for a meeting with the visitor tomorrow.

WINANT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated May 24, 1942
Rec'd 7 a.m., 25th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
2897, May 24, midnight.

MOST SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY

The British-Russian negotiations have continued almost without respite since my message to you announcing Molotov's arrival. There were three major points of difference which at first appeared to block possible agreement.

One. There was a reference to Poland which Eden refused to accept because it ran counter to the British understanding with the Poles. (Agreement signed August 25, 1939).

Two. The complete rejection by the Russians of the clause suggested by us to the British to protect the inhabitants of the Baltic states in their persons and in their property and permitting migration.

Three. The Russians wanted a secret agreement with the
with the British in which the latter were to promise to support claims relating to the Finnish and Rumanian frontiers.

Up to noon yesterday both parties to the negotiations had apparently come to the conclusion that agreement was improbable. The Russians had explained that even if a treaty was not arrived at, good had come of the negotiations, and Eden had suggested a substitute treaty which made no reference to frontiers. Late yesterday afternoon, however, the Russians began to recede from their original position, and Eden called me at six o'clock tonight to say that the negotiations had gone so far that he would have a proposal to make to the Cabinet tomorrow afternoon. He went on to say that:

(One) The Russians had withdrawn their demands affecting Poland.

(Two) They had compromised on the protective clause but only to the extent of allowing minorities to withdraw, i.e. Poles from Lithuania. This, Eden acknowledged, did not help much.

(Three) The idea of a secret agreement was abandoned but they asked that a clause be inserted in which the British would recognize that Russia had special
May 24, midnight from London.

had special interests in Finland and Rumania.

Eden told me that he still hoped that this reference might be eliminated.

From the beginning Molotov has been interested in two things: First, a second front, and second, the treaty proposals. I understand that the British have told him that we (United States and Great Britain) stand together on the second front issue.

I was also told that both the Prime Minister and Eden did their utmost to make Molotov understand our opposition to the Russian frontier proposals.

I was to meet with the Russians on Friday but it could not be arranged. Eden then asked them to have lunch with him yesterday, explaining that he was inviting me. They in turn asked him to have lunch with them at their Embassy in London. He said that he would be delighted to, and that he would bring me. The Saturday morning meeting however, ran until late with many differences of opinion, so the Russians asked to postpone their luncheon until Tuesday. I lunched alone with Eden at the Foreign Office. Maisky had previously told me that he wanted to arrange a meeting for me with Molotov.
Molotov, so I called him on the telephone. He called me back at six o'clock tonight (Sunday), inviting me to go to the Russian Embassy tomorrow at four o'clock. I called him back and told him that I thought it was unnecessary that we meet sooner than that, and he made an appointment for me at ten o'clock tonight at his Embassy. Both Molotov and he were most courteous and cordial. I explained to them that we were trying to cooperate with them, that we were both interested in a second front, and that within the last week the Department had informed me that we were arranging to discuss commercial policy with them (Department's 2152, May 14, 7 p.m.) and that we were trying to work out a program in the relief field that went a considerable distance toward meeting the suggestions in Maisky's memorandum to me on that subject, but that both you and Mr. Hull were set against introducing frontier problems at this time and that that was true of other friends who were doing all that could be done to support our common war effort. I also told them very frankly that I did the best I could to present the Russian point of view to you and to Mr. Hull,
Mr. Hull, but that you were both definitely opposed to a British Russian Treaty containing agreements on frontiers. They listened with great attention and Molotov told me that the President's position on this question was a matter for their serious consideration. He then asked me if I had seen Eden's draft treaty which eliminated any reference to frontiers. I told him that I had, because I had worked with Eden in an effort to find the formula for a treaty that might be satisfactory to them and at the same time eliminate any reference to frontiers which was opposed by my country. He told me that he would reconsider the draft treaty and perhaps refrain from making any decision until after he had talked with the President. This was a definite concession, as Molotov had intended to return directly to Moscow from Washington and up to this point they had shown no interest in the draft treaty. I had just gotten back to our Embassy when I got a call from Eden, saying that Molotov had called him in the interim asking for an appointment tomorrow morning to discuss the draft treaty. I am attaching a copy
copy of this treaty to my message.

The Russians are deeply interested in establishing a second front. They feel that both the Prime Minister and Eden have great sympathy for their point of view, but that Brooke is reluctant to move and that they could get no definite commitments on action this year. I have felt myself that there has been less support for action than when I returned here. Maisky asked me if I would suggest a date when such a front might be established. I told him that I had no authority to speak on the subject and that I could not even discuss it with him, that it was a question that Molotov would have to take up when he reached Washington. They plainly do not want to make any commitment on the Japanese situation and Molotov told me that in speaking of a second front he was speaking of a Western Front. They feel that they are carrying their maximum load on the Eastern Front.

Maisky told me that he is very grateful for our promise to do everything in our power to keep Molotov’s visit secret until his return tomorrow.

(Department's
7- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London

(Department's 2297, May 22, 3 p.m.).

The draft treaty follows:

"SECRET.

DRAFT TREATY

His Majesty the King of Great Britain,
Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the
Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the
Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R;

Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the
Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.S.R.
for joint action in the war against Germany, signed
at Moscow on the twelfth July, 1941 and to replace
them by a formal treaty;

Desiring to contribute after the war to the
maintenance of peace and to the prevention of
further aggression by Germany or the States
associated with her in her acts of aggression
in Europe;

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to
their intention to collaborate closely with one
another as well as with the other United Nations
at the peace settlement and during the ensuing
period of reconstruction on the basis of the

principles
principles enunciated in the Declaration made on the fourteenth August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to which the Government of the U.S.S.R. has adhered;

Desiring, finally, to provide for mutual assistance in the event of an attack upon either High Contracting Party by Germany or an of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Have decided to conclude a Treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:--

PART ONE
-9- #2897, May 24, midnight, from London.

PART ONE

ARTICLE I. In Virtue of the Alliance established between them the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE II. --The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude except by mutual consent any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

PART TWO

ARTICLE III. --(One) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to associate themselves with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression.

(Two) Pending
(Two) Pending the adoption of such proposals, they will take all the measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE IV. --Should one of the High Contracting Parties become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III (Two) in consequence of an attack by that State against that Party, the other High Contracting Party will at once give to the Contracting Party so involved in hostilities all the military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until superseded by the adoption of the proposals contemplated in Article III (One). In default of the adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of (20) years, and thereafter until terminated by either High Contracting Party, as provided in Article III.

ARTICLE V. --The High Contracting Parties agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration
May 24, midnight, from London

collaboration after the reestablishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other peoples.

ARTICLE VI. --The High Contracting Parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the War.

ARTICLE VII. --Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE VIII. --The Present Treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in as soon as possible.

It comes into force immediately on the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's
May 24, midnight, from London.

Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, signed at Moscow on the twelfth July, 1941.

Part I of the present Treaty shall remain in force until the reestablishment of peace between the High Contracting Parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her acts of aggression in Europe.

Part II of the present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of 20 years. Thereafter unless twelve months notice has been given by either party to terminate the Treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

In Witness Whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Duplicate in ____ on the ____ day of ____ 1942, in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

WINANT

ALC
Published in
Foreign Relations of the United States
1941 Vol. I General, The Soviet Union
pages 814-815.
May 25, 1942


Subject: "Feasibility of Supply Route from Alaska to Irkutsk, Siberia via Lena River."

1. General. Supply routes into the heart of Siberia are being exploited and much research on the subject has been in progress both in this country and in Soviet Russia.

The main difficulties are: The severity of the weather which limits shipping to 60 - 90 days per year, the type ships to be used (small sturdy vessels, together with ice-breakers), and the lack of port facilities for handling heavy military supplies.


a. The Wrangel Island area of the East Siberian Sea is notorious for its treacherous weather.

b. Tiksi Bay, the only usable port on the delta at the affluent of the Lena into the Sea of Laptev is unable to handle any appreciable volume of supplies at this time since it lacks docks and derricks. Especially since a transfer of cargo from ocean going vessels to river freighters or barges would be necessary. Approximately 15,000 tons of freight passes through this port each year, most of it as timber rafts.

c. Despite many shifting sand banks and shoals, the Lena is navigable by smaller vessels to Ust-Kut (a railhead with a connecting single track to the Trans-Siberian Railroad). Ust-Kut is approximately 150 miles north of Irkutsk.

d. The Trans-Siberian Railroad could handle the supplies, either to the East or West once supplies reached Ust-Kut.
3. Discussion.

a. Advantages.

(1) The suggested route is safe from interruption by Axis U-boats and aircraft in comparison with the U.S.-Murmansk route.

(2) Small arms, ammunition, food and other light cargoes could be shipped via this route.

(3) Supplies at Ust-Kut or Irkutsk could be shipped East or West as conditions may require.

(4) In the event of a Russo-Japanese War, the suggested route might circumnavigate any threat to cut off supplies to Russia.

(5) The morale of Russians would definitely be improved by a successful operation of this route.

b. Disadvantages.

(1) In the event of a war with Russia, the Japanese would undoubtedly direct their efforts northward in order to sever this route, since Japanese "fishermen" are active off the East Coast of Kamchatka.

(2) With an acute shortage of shipping facilities, it would be to our disadvantage to risk further losses due to the climatic conditions of this route.

(3) The only products which could be returned in the holds of the ships would be furs, gold and silver, as neither tin nor manganese are produced in commercial quantities in northern Siberia at this time.

(4) The limited dock facilities preclude sending heavy guns and tanks via this route.

(5) Furthermore, the erection of port facilities for use during the short period that this port is ice-free would be impracticable.

(6) Supplies limited to smaller items could be sent by transport planes quicker.
4. Alternate Routes.

a. The Lena River - Aldan River to Tommot - improved road to Bolshoi Never. This route has the same merits and demerits as the one described above.

b. Another North Siberian route partly developed by the Russians is as follows: The Kolyma river south to Byrybylykym (approximately 350 miles south of the mouth of the Kolyma) - unimproved road south to Ust-Utinaya - improved road to Nagayovo, an excellent port on the Sea of Okhotsk, ice-free for six months. Thence coastwise to Nikolaevsk. The route has the same limitations as the others. However it is shorter, but on the other hand more susceptible to attack by the Japanese. The latest data on this route are of 1938.

5. Conclusion.

That the northern routes to Siberia could be utilized in dire necessity, but they are impracticable for heavy shipping.

R. S. BRATTON,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, Intelligence Group.

Enclosure:

1 map.
May 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR CHESTER HAMMOND, J.A.G.D.
White House Map Room.

Subject: War Supplies to Russia.

In reply to your Memorandum for the Chief of Staff of May 22, 1942 relative advantages and disadvantages of shipping war supplies to Russia via the Arctic Ocean from Alaska, attention is invited to the attached memorandum on this subject.

I concur in the conclusion made by Colonel Bratton.

R. W. CRAWFORD,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

3 Incls.
Incl. 2 - Memo for ACS, OPD, 5/25/42.
Incl. 3 - Map (Economics of Eastern Siberia).

By T. S. TIMBERMAN,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Chief, China-India Section,
THEATER GROUP, O.P.D.

Date - 10-27-46
Signature - Carl S. Schurz

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. In response to a question of The President, it is requested that information on the more important advantages and disadvantages be furnished relative to the carrying of war supplies (i.e., tanks, trucks, etc.) to Russia via the following route: North Atlantic, Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, Nordenskjold Sea, Lena River (Russia), Irkutsk, and from there either east or west, depending on the particular needs of Russia at the time.

Chester Hammond
Major, J.A.G.D.
White House Map Room