MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

The attached draft of a proposed message from you to Mr. Stalin has been approved by Secretary Knox, General Marshall, and Admiral King.

[Signature]
Secretary of War.
Published in
Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945

10-27-66
Mr. Stimson

The development of the situation in the North Pacific and Alaskan area presents tangible evidence that the Japanese may be preparing to conduct operations against the Maritime Provinces of the Soviet Union. In the event of such an attack we are prepared to come to your assistance with our air power, provided suitable landing fields are available in Siberia.

In order that such an operation can be promptly carried out, the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union must be carefully coordinated.

I was very happy to learn through Litvinoff that you have approved of the movements of our planes from Alaska through Northern Russia to your western battlefront. In order to meet this new danger in the Pacific area, I believe that an immediate exchange of detailed information pertaining to existing establishments in the Siberia-Alaska area and the initiation of secret staff conversations between our army, navy, and air representatives are essential to our common interests. I consider this matter of such urgency that our conferees should be empowered to make definite plans and initiate action. I propose that you and I designate such representatives and that they meet in Washington immediately.

Roosevelt
Published in
Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945
Vol. 11 Pages 26-27.

CLS
10-27-66
TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

JUNE 23, 1942

TO: MR. STALIN
FROM: PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

SUPPLEMENTING MY RADIOGRAM TO YOU OF JUNE SEVENTEENTH IT IS DESIRED TO EMPHASIZE THE GREAT SAVINGS IN TIME THAT WOULD BE EFFECTED IN THE DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT TO THE SOVIET UNION IF DELIVERIES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH ALASKA AND SIBERIA INSTEAD OF THROUGH AFRICA AS WE ARE NOW DOING. ALSO A FERRY ROUTE THROUGH SIBERIA WOULD PERMIT THE FERRYING OF SHORT RANGE AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE NOW BEING SHIPPED BY WATER. I AM PREPARED TO HAVE OUR FERRYING CREWS DELIVER AIRPLANES TO YOU AT LAKE BAIKAL PROVIDED LANDING FIELDS, WEATHER AND NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES CAN BE ESTABLISHED TO CONNECT WITH OUR OWN AIRWAYS AT Nome. SUCH AN AIRWAYS IN SIBERIA COULD ALSO BE EASILY CONNECTED WITH LANDING FIELDS LEADING INTO THE VLADIVOSTOK AREA. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO RAPIDLY MOVE OUR AIR UNITS INTO THAT AREA TO ASSIST YOU IN THE EVENT THE JAPANESE SHOULD INITIATE OPERATION AGAINST YOUR MARITIME PROVINCES. AS A RESULT OF MY STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF ESTABLISHING AN AIR ROUTE THROUGH SIBERIA TO LAKE BAIKAL IT IS EVIDENT THAT BULK SUPPLIES, SUCH AS GASOLINE AND MACHINERY TO DEVELOP LANDING FIELDS WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED INTO EASTERN SIBERIA VIA WATER OVER CERTAIN RIVERS EMPTYING INTO THE ARCTIC OCEAN. THIS WATER MOVEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WHILE THESE RIVERS ARE ICE FREE. THE NECESSITY FOR INITIATING ACTION AT AN EARLY DATE HAS DICTATED MY COMMUNICATING WITH YOU BEFORE RECEIVING AN ANSWER TO MY RADIOGRAM OF JUNE SEVENTEENTH. TO EXPEDITE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS AIR ROUTE, IF YOU AGREE WITH ITS IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU AUTHORIZE A SURVEY AND EXPLORATORY FLIGHT OF ONE OF MY AIRPLANES FROM ALASKA OVER THE PROPOSED ROUTE TO DETERMINE THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY IN THE CONSTRUCTING OF THE ESSENTIAL LANDING FIELDS AND NAVIGATIONAL AIDS. THE PERSONNEL MAKING SUCH FLIGHT WOULD WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHES AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION TO INSURE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED IN ANY RESPECT WITH THE MILITARY SERVICE. THEY WOULD, IN FACT, MAKE THE FLIGHT AS
PERSONNEL OF A COMMERCIAL AGENCY. THE SURVEY FLIGHT WOULD NOT BE IN LIEU OF
THE CONVERSATIONS BY OUR JOINT ARMY, NAVY AND AIR REPRESENTATIVES WHICH I
RECOMMENDED IN MY TELEGRAM OF JUNE SEVENTEENTH, BUT WOULD BE CONDUCTED FOR THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF ENABLING THOSE REPRESENTATIVES TO COMMENCE THEIR DISCUSSIONS
WITH A MORE DEFINITE AND DETAILED INFORMATION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED THAN
WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE CASE. We could of course talk on
one or two of your officers or officials at
Nome, Alaska.

Respectfully,

Uncle Sam
To Joseph Stalin
Moscow

July 10, 1942

I hereby appreciate your reply
authorizing transfer to Egypt
of forty bombers. I am arranging
to ship to you at once one hundred and fifteen
additional medium tanks with
ammunition and spare parts.
These tanks will be in addition
to all tanks going forward as
provided in July protocol.

Roosevelt

Miss Filly
To Joseph Stalin,

Moscow.

Inform Stanley. Quote

The crisis in Egypt with its threat to the supply route to Russia has lead Prime Minister Churchill to send me an urgent message asking whether forty A twenty bombers destined for Russia and now in Iraq can be transferred to the battle in Egypt. It is impossible for me to express a judgment on this matter because of limited information here. I am therefore asking that you make the decision in the interest of total war effort.

Roosevelt
July 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
CHAIRMAN OF THE MARITIME COMMISSION
LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATOR

I told General Bradley, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, the important thing to impress on the Russians is that we are wholly realistic about shipments to Russia and that he must impress this fact on the Russian authorities.

The one essential criterion is not pages and pages listing commitments under the Moscow Protocol.

The real criterion is the ability to deliver materials into Russia.

We must make every effort to make deliveries by any and all practicable means.

Therefore, our position should be to say to the Russians, in effect, that we can let them have almost anything they want, but they must list these items in an order of priority and that we will fill them in the order chosen by them.

I am, of course, referring to materials carried on shipboard or by transport plane. Bombers which can be delivered under their own power constitute the only exception and in this case these bombers must, of course, be allocated from the general pool.

F. D. R.
WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date 7-21-42

RECEIVED of the Headquarters Services of Supply:

S.O.S. Status of Military Dated 7-21-42 To President
Items under Moscow Protocol as of July 1, 1942

Officer Rank

Office

(Return this receipt promptly to Headquarters Services of Supply)
Room 3536 Munitions Bldg.)
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1942.

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith a table which shows the status of the Military Items under the Moscow Protocol as of July 1, 1942.

The table shows commitments under the Moscow Protocol, the quantities made available through June 30, 1942, the quantities actually exported prior to July 1, 1942, and the balances remaining to be exported. The table also shows the quantities of materials which have been scheduled for July availability, these materials to apply on the new Protocol.

Faithfully yours,

Harry L. Hopkins
SECRETARY OF WAR.

1 Incl.
Status of Moscow Protocol, 7/15/42 (dup.).
### MILITARY ITEMS IN ADDITION TO MOSCOW PROTOCOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Total Quantities Made Available October 1, '41 to June 30, '42</th>
<th>Quantities Fleated Prior to July 1, '42</th>
<th>Quantities Available but not floated prior to July 1, '42 to apply on Second Protocol when floated</th>
<th>Quantities Made Available in July to apply against 2nd Protocol</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Cars, Scout M3A1 w/armament</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Truck, personnel carrier, M2 w/o armament</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sub-machine gun Cal. .45</td>
<td>98,220</td>
<td>76,400</td>
<td>21,820</td>
<td>23,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Float, rubber 6 ton capacity</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>1,356*</td>
<td>579*</td>
<td>Not included on 8th Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>737*</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>287 to apply on 8th Protocol per agreement with U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Battery charging sets</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Included on 5th Protocol **

**287 to apply on 5th Protocol per agreement with U.S.S.R.

Date: JAN 20 1942

Signature: [Signature]
### Status of Military Items Under the Moscow Protocol as of July 1, 1942

**Available**, as used herein, designates completed products in U.S. centers of production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol Number</th>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantities Floated Prior to July 1, '42</th>
<th>Quantities Available but not floated prior to July 1, '42</th>
<th>Total Quantities Made Available October 1, '42 to June 30, '42</th>
<th>Required Availability by June 30, '42</th>
<th>Shortage: Quantity Not Made Available</th>
<th>Quantities Being Made Available In July to Apply Against 2nd Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium bombers B-25, w/ armament and ammunition</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light bombers A-20, w/ armament and ammunition</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pursuits P-40, w/ armament and ammunition</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium, w/ armament and ammunition</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light, w/ armament and ammunition</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90mm, complete w/ fire control equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note A:**
1. Such portions of these quantities as are floated on boats originally scheduled for June sailing will apply on the Moscow Protocol.
2. Quantities not so floated will be used to fill assignments for future months under the new Protocol.
3. Figures on floatings as defined in paragraph #1, above, cannot be ascertained until sometime in August.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol Number</th>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantities Available but not floated prior to July 1, '42 (See Note A)</th>
<th>Total Quantities Made Available October 1, '42 to June 30, '42</th>
<th>Required Availability by June 30, '42</th>
<th>Shortage: Quantity Not Made Available</th>
<th>Quantities Made Available In July to Against 2nd Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Guns, 37mm Ammunition</td>
<td>Being supplied to match armament on a scale in accord with U. S. production.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Trucks 2/3 ton 4x4</td>
<td>6,270</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>7,001</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Overage 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trucks, cargo</td>
<td>36,783</td>
<td>34,719</td>
<td>71,502</td>
<td>85,600</td>
<td>14,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Telephone, field</td>
<td>59,925</td>
<td>21,585</td>
<td>81,510</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>26,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Wire, field telephone (miles)(single strand)</td>
<td>393,714</td>
<td>111,286</td>
<td>505,000</td>
<td>562,000</td>
<td>57,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Armor plate (ton)</td>
<td>8,274</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>8,946</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>5/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Toluol (lbs.)</td>
<td>33,573,330</td>
<td>27,212,046</td>
<td>61,442,371*</td>
<td>39,600,000</td>
<td>Overage 4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.N.T. (lbs.)</td>
<td>22,973,895</td>
<td>8,198,105*</td>
<td>31,172,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>Overage 4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Phenol (lbs.)</td>
<td>7,896,105</td>
<td>3,825,437</td>
<td>11,721,542</td>
<td>10,976,000</td>
<td>Overage 618,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Ethylene Glycol (tons)</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Sodium Bromide (lbs.)</td>
<td>1,320,795</td>
<td>824,865</td>
<td>2,145,660</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>Overage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Number</td>
<td>Item Description</td>
<td>Quantities Available but not floated prior to July 1, '42 (lbs.)</td>
<td>Total Quantities Made Available October 1, '42 to June 30, '42</td>
<td>Required Availability by June 30, '42</td>
<td>Shortage: Quantity Not Made Available</td>
<td>Quantities Being Made Available In July to App: Against 2nd Proto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Phosphorus (lbs.)</td>
<td>2,930,445</td>
<td>3,306,126</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Dibutyl-phthalate (lbs.)</td>
<td>4,061,610</td>
<td>6,236,174</td>
<td>4,927,506</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Dimethylaniline (lbs.)</td>
<td>1,397,970</td>
<td>2,688,000</td>
<td>2,688,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Diphenylamine (lbs.)</td>
<td>1,532,475</td>
<td>1,930,810</td>
<td>2,016,000</td>
<td>85,190</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Colloxylin (lbs.)</td>
<td>8,460,415</td>
<td>9,309,647</td>
<td>6,048,000</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td>720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>Machine Tools</td>
<td>Deliveries to continue as rapidly as possible to meet unfilled U.S.S.R. requests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Forging and pressing equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Leather (Metric tons)</td>
<td>10,681</td>
<td>12,622</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66.</td>
<td>Army shoes (prs.)</td>
<td>1,582,000</td>
<td>1,810,909</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>Army cloth (yds.) (wool and cotton)</td>
<td>1,656,000</td>
<td>1,822,714</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>Overage</td>
<td>96,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In the event that this telegram has not been brought to your personal attention, I am enclosing herewith a copy for your information in accordance with Ambassador Winant’s request.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.
Telegram 4294,
from London.

The President,
The White House.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State
Washington

4294, August 1, 10 p.m.

I got from a person in whom I have confidence the following statement which I have personally checked:

"On Friday, July 31, Mr. Maisky received twenty one editors-in-chief of leading British newspapers and talked to them about the position of Russia. What he said very closely followed the lines of his remarks to nearly 300 Members of Parliament at a private gathering at the House of Commons on the preceding day.

He told the editors that the Caucasus and Lower Volga are gravely threatened.

The only choice remaining to the Soviet armies, he said, was to withdraw to avoid encirclement and annihilation. They have retained their cohesion and fighting power.

He recalled that in the 1914-18 war Germany had never concentrated more than one third of her army's striking forces on the Russian front, the other two thirds always
-2- #4294, August 1, 10 p.m., from London

thirds always having been pinned down on the western front. For the second year in succession, he continued, Russia is compelled to take on at least eighty percent of German striking power. At the same time she is bound to keep large forces in other parts of the country.

The Ambassador said that Germany now controls over three hundred million people, including those in countries allied to her and in satellite states. Of these, he said, she can draw on 150 million for her military forces.

"The Soviet Union is fighting an aggregate power much more formidable than that of the Kaiser's old Empire ".

So far, he went on, the Allies have lacked a unified strategy. Each ally has its own strategy which often fails to coincide with that of its partners. As a result it has never been possible to secure synchronized action of all the Allies against the common enemy. Yet the enemy, he remarked, has been able to attack the Allies one by one.

"The Russians regard as dangerous complacency," he said, "the view that the Allies with a preponderance in population, territory, national wealth and industrial resources assure
resources assure final victory. So far with every month the balance unfortunately changes more and more in favor of the enemy, he said. The issue is being decided not by potential resources but by those actually mobilized. He said that no figures will save the Allies unless they concentrate a preponderance of their forces at the decisive moment at the decisive spot. This requires a unified war strategy, he concluded. "The remedy is the second front in 1942."

The Ambassador said that the Soviet Government first raised the question of the second front in July, 1941 and in the past twelve months had reverted to it again and again in Washington. "Establishment of the second front this year is an absolute necessity." He said that there is a tendency to postpone it until the spring of 1943.

"There are many reasons for believing that the military power of the U.S.S.R. has reached its peak and that by 1943 it will be lower than today," he said.

The Ambassador stated that the Soviet casualties so far—killed, wounded and prisoner—amount to about five million men. He said that corresponding percentages applied to
applied to Great Britain alone would mean one and one fourth millions and for the British Empire twelve to thirteen millions.

"Soviet manpower is not inexhaustible", he said, "and in the past few months we have begun to see its limits very clearly".

Since the beginning of the war, he continued, Russia has lost nearly 600,000 square miles of territory, equal to the area of France, Britain and Germany together. He added that the lost territory encompasses a total population of at least fifty million. He said that Russia can now draw on only 140 million inhabitants, compared with 300 million under German control. Having lost the entire green fields of the Ukraine, the Kubon District—the Granary—is under immediate threat of invasion. "This means that in 1943 we may have very considerable food difficulties."

He said that the Soviet authorities had been able to transfer factories from regions in danger of occupation and move them to the east of the Volga, but that they naturally could not evacuate coal, iron ore and other mineral deposits.

He stated
#4294, August 1, 10 p.m., from London

He stated that nearly one half of Russia's pig iron and steel production has gone "and we can hope to have only ten million tons a year against forty million which Germany and her satellites now have.

We have lost three forths of our aluminum production, besides suffering a reduction of output in other industries. We are bound to rely more than before on imports and that entails, transport difficulties which have recently become acute".

The Ambassador remarked that the U.S.S.R. has lost a wide net of railways, lowering the Red Army's mobility while the captured railways have increased the mobility of the German armies.

He said that if the transport of oil from the Caucasus becomes more difficult the general situation will further deteriorate.

"In 1943 Germany may be in a position considerably to limit the number of troops she is bound to keep in the U.S.S.R", he said, "and would be able to transfer many forces to the west. British and American forces, instead of facing second and third rate German divisions now stationed there, will have to cope with a great number of first class seasoned troops. Allies air superiority in the west would be reduced or would disappear."
-6- #4294, August 1, 10 p.m., from London

disappear.

Any increase in strength in Britain and United
States in 1943 will be out weighed by the weakened
state of the U.S.S.R. As a result by the spring of
1943 the balance of power will at best remain unchanged
compared to the present year. But the balance may
deteriorate.

If the Soviet people and Red Army are disappointed
in their expectations regarding Britain and the United
States, that experience is bound to live long in their
memories. The greatest danger of all is the postponement
of the second front until next year. Every division
landed on the continent in 1942 is worth two or three
divisions in 1943.

If I may add a personal comment, I would like
to say that there is a natural tendency to discount
the blackness of the picture drawn by Mr. Maisky
and to see it only as second front propaganda.
Personally I think this would be a very mistaken
interpretation. I believe that his anxiety about
the present position is completely genuine.

Will you please see that copies of this go to
the White House and to General Marshall and Admiral King.

WINANT

HTM
Let me thank you for the message which I received in Moscow the other day.

The Soviet Government agrees that it is necessary to arrange a meeting between V.M. Molotov and yourself for an exchange of opinions on the organization of a second front in Europe in the immediate future. V.M. Molotov can come to Washington with a competent military representative not later than May 10 to 15.

It goes without saying that Molotov will also stop in London for an exchange of opinions with the British Government.

I have no doubt that it will be possible to arrange a personal meeting between you and myself. I attach great importance to it, particularly in view of the important tasks facing our countries in connection with the organization of victory against Hitlerism.

Please accept my sincere regards and wishes of success in the fight against the enemies of the United States of America.

J. Stalin.
PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM HARRIMAN

The Prime Minister has shown me the cable he is sending you regarding the rough sledding he had in his talk with Stalin last night. He is transmitting also Stalin's memorandum which he handed us both simultaneously and his aide memoire in reply.

I have written Stalin a letter as follows:

"I have had an opportunity to study the memorandum of August 13 you handed me last night an identical copy of which you simultaneously gave to the Prime Minister. I have also had an opportunity to read the Prime Minister's aide memoire of August 14 replying to your memorandum.

"I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served in comments by me additional to what the Prime Minister has said. I feel however that I must reaffirm his statement that no promise has been broken regarding the second front."

The technique used by Stalin last night resembled closely that used with Beaverbrook and myself in our second meeting last year. I cannot believe there is cause for concern and I confidentially expect a clear-cut understanding before the Prime Minister leaves.

11:15am/d
TO: STALIN
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I AM SORRY THAT I COULD NOT HAVE JOINED WITH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE MOSCOW CONFERENCES. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE URGENT NECESSITIES OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE SITUATION ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT.

I BELIEVE WE HAVE A TOEHOLD IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FROM WHICH IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE JAPANESE TO DISLODGE US. OUR NAVAL LOSSES THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL BUT IT WAS WORTH IT TO GAIN THE ADVANTAGE WHICH WE HAVE. WE ARE GOING TO PRESS THEM HARD.

ON THE OTHER HAND, I KNOW THAT OUR REAL ENEMY IS GERMANY AND THAT OUR FORCE AND POWER MUST BE BROUGHT AGAINST HITLER AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THIS WILL BE DONE, JUST AS SOON AS IT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER THE TRANSPORTATION.

IN THE MEANWHILE, OVER 1000 TANKS WILL LEAVE THE UNITED STATES IN AUGUST FOR RUSSIA AND OTHER CRITICAL SUPPLIES, INCLUDING AIRPLANES, ARE GOING FORWARD.

The United States understands that Russia is bearing the brunt of the fighting and its losses this year. We are filled with admiration of your magnificent resistance. Believe us when I tell you that we are coming as strongly and as quickly as we possibly can.

Roosevelt
Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley,
American Embassy,
Kubishev

I am delighted with your excellent report and with all that you tell of the magnificent operations and fine morale of the Russian Armies. If you see Mr. Stalin again, please tell him how happy I have been in receiving your report and give him my renewed congratulations.

ROOSEVELT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

Moscow
Dated December 8, 1942
Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
SECRET FROM GENERAL HURLEY FOR THE PRESIDENT

I returned to Moscow last night after ten days at the front in the Stalingrad area. On my tour of this front I was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Park, Jr., United States Army acting Military Attache at Moscow and Major John C. Henry of the air corps United States Army, as aides.

All of the officials both political and military of the Red Army with whom we came in contact were uniformly courteous and cooperative. They seemed eager to give us the information we desired pertaining to their operations, their supply logistics and their strategy.

We have been told that we were the first officers of any foreign army to see actual combat operations on the Russian front from the Russian side. I am asking
-2- #523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow
asking Lieutenant Colonel Park and Major Henry to
prepare a detailed narrative report on our inspection
and our observations for submission directly to G-2
of the army unless you direct otherwise.

We entered the area reconquered in the present
Russian offensive by which the city of Stalingrad
and an enemy force estimated at twenty divisions
is now completely encircled by crossing the Don
River at Serafimovich.

At that point Soviet officers designated to
accompany us Colonel Alexander Rogov and Lieutenant
Colonel Onmotinov gave us the general outline of
the area in which five red armies made their
initial attacks across the Don and the objectives
of this first phase of their offensive. The
offensive opened and has maintained a southward
encircling corridor or salient from 60 to 120
centimeters; width. We followed this corridor
southward inspecting each point of major battle
operations and stopping for the first night at
Zakharov.

We next proceeded in a south easterly direction
to the headquarters of the 21st Red army spearhead of
the attacking armies at Golubinskia. At these
headquarters General Chistakov, commander, and his
staff
-3- #623, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow staff gave us our first view of the maps of the battle area, details of the battle plan and a description of the engagements which had been fought in the area.

General Chistakov detailed for us the precautions that were being taken and the armies which were being employed in protecting the flanks of his salient. He gave us also considerable information regarding his transportation and supply problem. Because of unfavorable weather conditions he said that air strength had not taken any important part in the battle up to that time. He made clear, however, the important part which air strength was expected to play in the subsequent phase of destroying encircled enemy troops.

WWC

THOMPSON
FMH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated December 8, 1942
Rec'd 12:35 p.m., 9th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

While we were at General Chistakovs headquarters a flight of 26 junkers transport planes passed over in the direction of Stalingrad with the apparent mission of supplying the encircled German troops. Anti-aircraft fire was directed at them but at that point they appeared to be out of range.

Our next stop was at the headquarters of the 51st guard division, spearhead of the 21st Red Army attack, located at Sokarevka.

This division is commanded by Major General Tovartkaledze, 34 years old, who was a colonel when the attack was launched and had been promoted as a reward for the aggressiveness and skill he had demonstrated in handling his troops in battle. He has since been decorated.

In operating as the advance striking force of the 21st army, the 51st division had engaged in twelve days and nights of almost continuous fighting and had driven a distance of 120 kilometers into enemy occupied territory.

Generally speaking, this division drove past the enemy strong points, encircled them and attacked...
and attacked from the rear while the elements of the 21st army attacked from in front. These tactics were employed successfully again and again throughout the entire distance of the advance.

In the vicinity of Selyonye and Marinovka, units of this division made contact with the two Russian Armies of General Trufanov and General Talbukin which formed the southern arm of the pincer starting at Krasnoarmaisk, just south of Stalingrad. The meeting of the Red forces at Selyonye and Marinovka completed the encirclement of Stalingrad and of all enemy troops within and in the immediate vicinity of the city.

Establishing his headquarters at nearby Sokarevka, Major General Tovartkaledze then faced his division eastward and attacked the enemy in the direction of Stalingrad. It was engaged in this attack when we were with him.

General Tovartkaledze showed us maps and details on the engagements which his troops had fought in the past twelve days, and pointed out their further objectives. In their positions of that date -- December 1 they were about 51 kilometers west of Stalingrad.

General Tovartkaledze reported that his anti-aircraft batteries had shot down two of the Junkers transports.
transports which we had seen heading eastward earlier in the morning over Golubinskia.

The 51st division was designated a guard division as a reward for its conduct during the offensive. We were impressed by the spirit, the morale and physical strength of the troops then in combat with the enemy and which in so many desperately fought engagements had suffered surprisingly few casualties.

THOMPSON

EDA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
523, December 8, 8 p.m., (SECTION THREE)

After a second stop at the headquarters of General Chistakov of the 21st Army we proceeded northward to Kletzkia for another crossing of the Don River and the return to Serafinzhich by a different route than was followed going down. On arrival there we were taken to the headquarters of Lieutenant General Vatutin, Commander of the armies operating southward in the encircling movement. In addition to the army of General Chistakov, these included an army on the west flank commanded by Lieutenant General Romanyenko, one on the east flank commanded by Major General Batov, and other forces further to the east.

General Vatutin and members of his staff showed us more maps, outlining fully the plans of the entire offensive and the manner in which these plans were executed. The actual achievements in battle coincided to a remarkable degree with those plans.

The General
The General also described in detail the plan for liquidation of the Axis forces then surrounded in the Stalingrad area.

After completing his exposition the General submitted himself and his staff to any questions which we desired to ask. Our inquiries were directed principally to the problems of flank protection, transport supplies and man power. They frankly stated that their transport and supply problems are admittedly difficult and complicated. They did not hesitate to explain clearly to us their difficulties.

General Vatutin expressed the conviction, however, that his present operation will be successfully concluded and that with proper supplies and transport the Red Army possesses man power for the final defeat of the Axis in Russia.

As near as we could determine all enemy troops within the salient visited by us were Rumanian. We were told however, that two German divisions had been present but we saw no German dead and no German prisoners. We were also told by one Russian division commander that he had taken 575 German prisoners. Russian officers always referred to the encircled enemy troops as being German but
German but we have no definite information on that point.

The Rumanian troops, judging by the dead we saw on the field and by the appearance of the prisoners, were far below the standard of the Soviet troops. The Rumanians were equipped for the most part with second-rate arms and horse-drawn artillery, although we saw a few modern German tanks and guns. We also saw destroyed German Focke-Wolfe, Heinkel and Junkers airplanes.

While the Russian equipment was not in every respect modern it was superior to that of the Rumanians.

Throughout the entire salient we were hardly ever out of view of dead horses and dead Rumanian soldiers.

THOMPSON

JT
DLA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated December 8, 1942
Rec'd 11:18 a.m. 9th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

One of the battles reviewed was that fought in the vicinity of Verkhnye-Buzinovka. In this battle Russian tanks, the Russian 51st Guard Division and Russian cavalry participated. The Rumanian forces in this area were constituted almost entirely of cavalry and horse-drawn artillery. From the best information we could obtain the Russian cavalry outnumbered the Rumanian. The Russian cavalry was better mounted, better armed, better equipped and in every way superior to the Rumanian.

Literally thousands of horses were left dead on this field. Interspersed among the carcasses of the horses were the bodies of dead Rumanian soldiers. The field had been swept by artillery; first cold rain, then snow, then bitter freezing weather. The frozen remains of the horses and Rumanian soldiers in grotesque postures made a weird and hideous impression.

This battlefield
This battlefield formed a superb and ghastly picture of the horrors of war.

Russian officers told us that the Rumanian horses had been so weakened by water and food shortage that they could hardly run. About 8000 Rumanian horses were reported captured. We saw several herds being taken to the rear.

Although the Russians usually refer in their news releases and in conversation to the enemy in this area as being German, the commanding officers pointed out that they had chosen this sector for their offensive because it was held by Rumanian troops.

We were also told that both the Italian and Rumanian troops in Russia showed a lack of ardor for the cause for which they were supposed to fight and usually surrendered whenever opportunity presented itself.

Details of the number killed, the number of prisoners taken and equipment captured have all been published by the Russians.

The Red Army is at present being led largely by officers whose military capacity has been developed
-3- #523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Moscow in the present war. We were told that the leadership is much superior to what it was at beginning of this war. The general officers are for the most part young men and are quick to adopt new strategist and advanced tactics. The drive which we have been describing indicates that they have availed themselves to a great extent of both German strategy and German tactics.

THOMPSON

MRM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated December 8, 1942
Rec'd 2:55 p.m., 9th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
525, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

We saw numerous mobile machine shops, transport pools and other evidences of resourcefulness behind their lines.

Heretofore every unit in the Red Army had attached to it a political representative of the Communist Party called a Military Commissar. The system was established originally because of distrust in the political inclinations of the Red Army. The execution of any plan by a Military Commander that did not have the approval of the Commissar was at the risk of the Commander. If the plan of the Military Commander failed, it made him liable to being relieved from duty or worse. This situation, we were advised, made many Military Commanders extremely cautious. Fear of the consequences of failure of a military plan made Commanders over-conservative to the point of actual timidity. The result was that Military Commanders seldom took the chances
chances that are always a concomitance of bold and successful military operations.

The Commissars were in many instances almost completely without military training or experience. The system resulted in the control of the Red Army by Commissars and the weakening of essential military leadership.

All this has recently been changed. The Military Commissar system was abolished as of October 10, 1942. The need for single command has always been recognized, but a slow transition was necessary.

The Commissars are now subordinate to the Military Commanders. Although they are being given military rank they are designated assistants to the Military Commanders. The military commanders now exercise final (?) (*) in the execution of military missions.

We were told that the unification of command has contributed greatly to the efficiency of the military leadership of the Red Army. Many of the former Military Commissars have had experience in battle, had become effective military leaders, and have been commissioned as officers in the Army. In these cases the political duties have been transferred to newly appointed Commissars, all of whom are subordinate to Military Commanders.
#525, December 3, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from Moscow

Commanders,

During our conversations we were frequently asked by Generals when the United States and Great Britain would open a second front in Europe. Almost invariably they expressed the opinion that a Second Front in France would more effectively divide German forces than one in Italy.

THOMPSON

L.S.

(*) Apparent omission

Above omission has been serviced.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated December 8, 1942
Rec'd 12:50 p.m. 9th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
523, December 8, 8 p.m. (SECTION SIX).

Another angle of my discussions with the generals that may be of interest to you concerned German air power. One Soviet officer asked where the German air force had gone; another asked what the Germans were preparing to do with their air power.

In the resultant discussion the Russians said the Germans have been using far less air force than previously employed on the Russian front. They expressed the opinion likewise that the Germans are now using less air force in Africa and comparatively none over the British Isles.

These discussions led to two conclusions: one, that the Germans are conserving their air power and petroleum for an attack or, two, that the Germans are building interior defense lines and have decided to conserve their air power for defensive action.

Both of
Both of these conclusions left unanswered in the minds of the generals the question expressed in Army slang, "what's cooking?"

Invariably the generals were interested in the amount of war supplies—especially planes, tanks, and trucks—that the United States can furnish Russia. Without exception they were of the opinion that time is now running in favor of the Axis and that supplies should be furnished to Russia and a second front opened at the earliest possible date.

Conversations with these officers made it evident that they were not familiar with our transport problems. They discussed their own transport shortage in great detail but expressed surprise that United States and Britain were having difficulties in getting supplies to North Russia by way of the North Atlantic and to South Russia by way of the Persian Gulf.

The average Russian general knows little or nothing about the sea battles of the Atlantic and the Pacific. These subjects have not been publicised in Russia.

It is my
It is my conclusion that the Red Army is a far better fighting force and is distinctly better led than it was at the beginning of the war. Its supply and transportation problems however are becoming and will become more acute. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the defeat of the Axis armies within Russia must depend more and more on supply assistance from the United States.

Arrangements have been made with President Stalin for us to see the Red Army in the Caucasus. Our departure from here awaits flying weather.

(END OF MESSAGE).

THOMPSON

JMH
January 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach a letter from General Deane to General Marshall which the Chief of Staff and I both feel is an apt presentation with sound recommendations.

General Deane has informed us that the American Ambassador in Moscow has seen this letter and concurs fully in the thoughts and recommendations and believes that they apply with equal force to political matters. Mr. Harriman, however, wished to point out the difficulty of giving an accurate picture in such a short letter and states that he would like to express his views in greater detail if consideration is to be given to a change in our policy in dealing with the Soviet Government.

I have furnished the Secretary of State with a copy of General Deane's letter.

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

Enc.
Dear General Marshall:

Now that I have been in Russia for some time and am qualified as an "expert," I think it might be of some interest to you to have my general reactions. They may be of value to you since I have served under you long enough to enable you to evaluate them. A report is always more useful if one knows the reporter.

Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with Russia -- now and in the future. It won't be worth a hoot, however, unless it is based on mutual respect and made to work both ways. I have sat at innumerable Russian banquets and become gradually nauseated by Russian food, vodka, and protestations of friendship. Each person high in public life proposes a toast a little sweeter than the preceding one on Soviet-British-American friendship. It is amazing how these toasts go down past the tongues in the cheeks. After the banquets we send the Soviets another thousand airplanes, and they approve a visa that has been hanging fire for months. We then scratch our heads to see what other gifts we can send, and they scratch theirs to see what else they can ask for.

This picture may be overdrawn, but not much. When the Red Army was back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible assistance with no questions asked. It was right to bolster their morale in every way we could. However, they are no longer back on their heels; and, if there is one thing they have plenty of, it's self-confidence. The situation has changed, but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet.

The truth is that they want to have as little to do with foreigners, Americans included, as possible. We never make a request or proposal to the Soviets that is not viewed with suspicion. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union.
Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised.

We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we could assemble. These included the Frantic bases, improved communications, exchange of weather, trucks to China, exchange of enemy intelligence, some promises regarding the Far East, and some other inconsequential ones. The cost to the Soviet Union for any of these projects has been nil compared to the cost of our efforts in their behalf. Some will say that the Red Army has won the war for us. I can swallow all of this but the last two words. In our dealings with the Soviet authorities, the U. S. Military Mission has made every approach that has been made. Our files are bulging with letters to the Soviets and devoid of letters from them. This situation may be reversed in Washington, but I doubt it. In short, we are in the position of being at the same time the givers and the supplicants. This is neither dignified nor healthy for U. S. prestige.

The picture is not all bad. The individual Russian is a likeable person. Their racial characters are similar to ours. Individually I think they would be friendly if they dared to be -- however, I have yet to see the inside of a Russian home. Officials dare not become too friendly with us, and others are persecuted for this offense. The Soviets have done an amazing job for their own people -- both in the war and in the pre-war period. One cannot help admire their war effort and the spirit with which it has been accomplished. We have few conflicting interests, and there is little reason why we should not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future.

In closing, I believe we should revise our present attitude along the following lines.

(1) Continue to assist the Soviet Union, provided they request such assistance, and we are satisfied that it contributes to winning the war.

(2) Insist that they justify their needs for assistance in all cases where the need is not apparent to us. If they fail to do so, we should, in such cases, refuse assistance.

(3) In all cases where our assistance does not contribute to the winning of the war, we should insist on a quid pro quo.

(4) We should present proposals for collaboration that would be mutually beneficial, and then leave the next move to them.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974
(5) When our proposals for collaboration are unanswered after a reasonable time, we should act as we think best and inform them of our action.

(6) We should stop pushing ourselves on them and make the Soviet authorities come to us. We should be friendly and cooperative when they do so.

I think there is something here worth fighting for, and it is simply a question of the tactics to be employed. If the procedure I suggest above were to be followed, there would be a period in which our interests would suffer. However, I feel certain that we must be tougher if we are to gain their respect and be able to work with them in the future.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Deane