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W E E K L Y R E P O R T
N O . 5

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

STATISTICS BRANCH

O A S W

OCTOBER 26, 1939.

*PSF
Safe
War Dept.*

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
STATISTICS BRANCH

~~Oct. 28,~~ 19 ~~59~~

File No. SB-1740-1

Subject: Weekly Report No. 5

	Chief of Air Corps
	Chief of C.W.S.
	Chief of C.A.C.
	Chief of Engineers
	Surgeon General
	Chief of Ordnance
	Quartermaster General
	Chief Signal Officer
✓	Lt. Col. C. H. Tenney
	SECRET

REMARKS:

Weekly Report of ~~Oct. 28,~~ 19 ~~59~~

Statistical Reports Nos. ~~A, C, E,~~

~~M, 01, 02, 03, 01, 02, & S-17-40~~

~~Please enclose in return~~

To Be Returned

By _____ 19 _____


Received C.N.T.

Please Sign both slips.



AIRPLANES

PROGRAM TO JUNE 30, 1941*



Project: P. Roosevelt Library

Doc ID: 6200.9 (9/27/58)

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* TOTAL PROGRAM - 6132

INCLUDES OBSOLETE AND EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES.
ALSO SUBJECT TO REDUCTION BY LOSSES.

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. A-17-40
26 OCTOBER 1939

O.A.S.W.
STATISTICS BRANCH

SOURCE: A.C., P.R.



COAST ARTILLERY CORPS



Negative Report



CHEMICAL WARFARE

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STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.



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

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. C-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 O.A.S.W.
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: C.W.S., P.R.



(89/28/6) 8-2283
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
CORPS OF ENGINEERS

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.



* INCLUDING 108 UNITS FOR SEACOAST DEFENSE, MARINE CORPS, ETC., IN ADDITION TO MOBILE ARMY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE P.M.P.



SECRET
 STATISTICAL REPORT NO E-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939.
 O.A.S.W.
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: O.C.E., P.R.



MEDICAL

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

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

STATISTICAL REPORT NO. M-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 O A S W
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 SOURCE: MED.PR.



ORDNANCE SMALL ARMS

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

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

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STATISTICAL REPORT NO. 01-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
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 SOURCE: ORD, P.R.

ORDNANCE

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



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STATISTICAL REPORT NO. O2-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 O.A.S.W.
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: ORD.P.R.

ORDNANCE F. A. MATERIEL

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.




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 STATISTICAL REPORT NO. 03-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 O.A.S.W.
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: ORD., P.R.



Q.M.C. MOTOR VEHICLES

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939



ESTIMATED
COMPLETION DATE
MAY 1, 1940.

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UNDER CONTRACT
 ON PROPOSAL
 PENDING



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STATISTICAL REPORT NO. Q1-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 O.A.S.W.
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: QMC, PR.

Q.M.C. CRITICAL ITEMS


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STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.



• IN ADDITION 7000 SUBSTITUTE STANDARD RANGES ARE AVAILABLE


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STATISTICAL REPORT NO Q2-17-40
21 OCTOBER 1939
O.A.S.W.
STATISTICS BRANCH
SOURCE: Q.M.C.P.R.



SIGNAL CORPS

STATUS REPORT AS OF OCTOBER 21, 1939.

CURRENT PROCUREMENT



ACCEPTED DELIVERIES

SCHEDULED DELIVERIES

UNDER CONTRACT

ON PROPOSAL

PENDING

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STATISTICAL REPORT NO S-17-40
 26 OCTOBER 1939
 OASW
 STATISTICS BRANCH
 SOURCE: SIG. C, PR.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1937.

J.P.
to run down
do the
necessary

V.R.

~~Secret~~ - Please
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Get everything ready for
me on my return

The attached joint War and Navy report on espionage was forwarded to me with pencil memorandum to call it to The President's attention.

Since then the following memorandum from the Secretary of War has been prepared, with the suggestion that the data contained therein be distributed to the State, Treasury, Justice, Labor and Interior Departments.

Respectfully,

E.M. Watson

E.M. WATSON,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.
Military Aide to The President.

Incl.

PSF War Dept.

att to
Craig to Adj Genl:
2-24-57

August 5, 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The President requests me to advise that General Douglas MacArthur be informed that his services in the Philippines shall terminate upon the conclusion of a two year tour of duty there; that the General is needed for service in the United States; that the General be acquainted with post commands which he may be assigned at the time of his return to active duty in the United States; and that he be given his preference of such posts as may be available at that time. As a further consideration, in the event the General prefers some Corps Area or other command which may not be open, at that time, the President is willing that the War Department work out such transfer of officers as may be necessary to permit General MacArthur to take over the post he most desires.

The President has noted the contents of the confidential letter addressed by Brigadier General Conley to General Douglas MacArthur, under date of September 18, 1955. He directs that such portions of this letter or of existing War Department orders as conflict with the above request shall be nullified, i.e. "x x x limit of time of foreign service is waived in your case" etc.

STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

STG } Later memo from Craig on this
in Miss LeHand's Confidential Files.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 15, 1938.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL CRAIG

Will you speak to me about
the possibility of some useful
employment for Major General Frank
Parker?

F. D. R.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

War
1

For the President -

Emm
E.M.W.

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint signature]

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

Safe: War Dept
PSF

November 14, 1939

Dear Pa,

Here is Report No. 5, for the
President, covering "Foreign Inquiries for
Production of Munitions".

Sincerely yours,

Paul Johnson

General E. M. Watson
Secretary to the President
The White House

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD
MUNITIONS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Report No. 5.

November 14, 1939.

MEMORANDUM For The Assistant Secretary of War:

SUBJECT: Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions.

1. In accordance with instructions to submit from time to time brief reports on foreign inquiries for military equipment, the following notes are made:

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

The Naval Attaché of Argentine Republic (Captain Godoy) stated in a letter to Mr. James W. Young, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, that because of the war situation and diminution of sources of supply from Europe, he desired to obtain a list of approximately ten plants for each of a list of types of material furnished with the letter.

The items in which he is interested include steel, copper, brass, oil, refractories, machinery, electrical equipment, woodworking equipment, fabricated rubber, aluminum and zinc. The Department of Commerce furnished him a list of outstanding sources for these items.

BRAZIL

The Brazilian Government has ordered 60 searchlights from the Sperry Gyroscope Company.

An inquiry has been received from Mr. Sidney Mashbir, a former officer of the Army who is now agent for several manufacturers in this country. It seems that Mr. Mashbir has been approached by the Brazilian Government to procure forging and machining equipment for 75 mm and 105 mm shell, and machinery for the manufacture of gun tubes of the calibers noted above. He stated that the equipment desired was originally ordered from Rheinmetall in Germany and that the order has been cancelled by the Brazilians.

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Among other things, he desired to have an Ordnance officer detailed to inspect and install the machinery. It was stated to him that these requests should be transmitted by the Brazilian Government to the State Department, and that the detail of an Ordnance officer would have to be taken up with the Chief of Staff.

CANADA

Dr. Riddell, Counsellor of the Legation, presented a memorandum asking for permission to use designs of certain Naval searchlights in the Canadian affiliates of the Westinghouse and General Electric Companies. This request was referred to the Navy Department. It is noted that the Canadians desire to produce an American naval design in Canadian plants. Decision has not yet been received from the Navy Department.

Various newspaper reports have indicated that orders for training airplanes will be placed by Canada, but the Committee has not received any recent inquiries for airplanes of this type.

CHILE

Information has been received that Major Marin-Carmona, Secretary of the Army Armament Commission of Chile, is on his way to the United States to contact American manufacturers concerning the supply of armament to his government. It will be recalled that there was a previous inquiry from the Chilean Embassy but that nothing came of it.

CHINA

The State Department advised us that China Airmotive Company (Mr. Patterson) is having difficulty in obtaining aluminum for shipment to China. After consultation with the Division of Controls, the State Department sent a telegram to the China Airmotive Company stating that there is no legal restriction on the export of aluminum and that the State Department has had no communication with the Aluminum Company of America in regard to this matter.

FINLAND

The Signal Corps is in active cooperation with the Finnish Military Attaché in suggesting sources of supply for items of Signal Corps equipment which have been released for export, and a list of firms who manufacture the components of Army sets has been prepared.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Finnish Attaché has also advised the Committee that a firm of brokers in New York has offered him 37 Pratt & Whitney twin Wasp engines, 24 Pratt & Whitney Junior Wasp engines, and 22 2-place Bellanca airplanes. From what can be ascertained, this offer is for new equipment which was originally produced for the Spanish Nationalists and the brokers are evidently trying to sell it to the highest bidder.

In this connection, it is desired to point out that the Legation of Finland has kept the Committee fully informed on all of its activities.

FRANCE

A list of possible sources for gun tubes, small arms, small arms ammunition and fuze components was furnished to the French Attaché. France is also inquiring of the McQuay-Norris Manufacturing Company for 1,000,000 20 mm shell and 2,000,000 25 mm shell. The officials of the company have been in to see the Committee and have requested certain assistance on specifications of corresponding American shell. It seems probable that if this company accepts the order it will install screw machines at a slight additional cost which will be entirely suitable for the production of our own 37 mm shell.

The Bethlehem Steel Company has inquired whether there is any objection to acceptance of an educational order for 90 mm gun forgings from the French. The Committee has encouraged this order since an American 90 mm gun is now under development and the creating of facilities at Bethlehem will be to our advantage.

An informal inquiry has been received whether we would release the Garand rifle to the French and if so what size order would be required. There seems to be no objection to the release of this design if an order for at least 50,000 rifles is placed.

The French are buying horses and automotive equipment in considerable quantities.

A firm in New Bedford, Massachusetts, which can make gas masks, has been approached by the French with a view to an order for gas masks with a fully molded rubber facepiece. This is the type of facepiece which our own Chemical Warfare Service would like to see developed, and encouragement has been given to the commercial firm to go ahead with the order if offered to them.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PORTUGAL

The Minister from Portugal has requested the advice of the Committee concerning the supply of certain fixed coastal defense armament. His request was for eight 6" batteries of 2 guns each and four 9" batteries of two guns each, together with other ammunition and equipment. An estimated cost has been given to the Minister and a preliminary analysis of the problem provided for transmittal to his government.

RUMANIA

The Rumanian Minister visited the office and stated that he was having difficulty in buying 18-20 tons of electrolytic copper and 100 tons of aluminum, and asked our help to locate a supply of these materials for him. Contact was made with the local representative of the Aluminum Company, but no success was achieved in persuading them to sell this aluminum to the Rumanians. As to the copper, the local representative of the National Association of Manufacturers located a stock in Baltimore, and this information was transmitted to the Minister. Although the Aluminum Company would not sell, the Committee was able to give the Minister a list of dealers in so-called "secondary" aluminum, obtained by remelting scrap. The names of these firms were also obtained from the National Association of Manufacturers, who have cooperated very satisfactorily in all matters referred to them.

In the course of conversation with the Minister, it was learned that a considerable shipment of field shoes, trucks, ethyl fluid, aviation oil, tin and antimony has been bought and will be shipped on a Rumanian vessel from Chester, Pennsylvania, on November 20th. This information was furnished to the Division of Controls, State Department.

VENEZUELA


Another conference was held with the Venezuelan Minister and his Military Attaché concerning airplanes. They desire to purchase one training bomber, three basic training planes and six primary training planes. The names of firms best in a position to supply these needs were given to the Minister.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YUGOSLAVIA

It will be recalled that Yugoslavia made inquiry within the last month for a considerable list of American design equipment. Included in the list were some airplanes. Information was received a few days ago that Yugoslavia is purchasing airplanes from Italy and it is circumstantially stated that a contract to purchase 100 Savoia-Marchette bombers, to be paid for in cash in New York at the rate of \$115,000 each, has been signed by the Yugoslav Government. The information goes on to state that half of the purchase price has already been paid and that twenty airplanes have been delivered.

For the Army and Navy Munitions Board:



CHAS. HINES,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Chairman, Clearance Committee,
Army and Navy Munitions Board.

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PSF Safe: War Dept

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON, D. C.

G-2
J M

...the Allied units attempt to destroy the German force of 20,000 men and establish a firm front...
...the German main body can break through...
...Rena--Lillahaumen: The establishment of...
...decisive in the Scandinavian campaign.

April 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON: The German advance since April 20... Subject: Military Situation as of April 23, 1940.

I. Western Front.

Minor ground activity. Increased aerial reconnaissance in past few days. Allied and neutral forces remain vigilant although, due to the Scandinavian situation, tension is somewhat relaxed despite the undiminished German concentrations along the frontiers.

II. Scandinavian Front.

1. Ground Operations. The town of Nerviik and several outpost positions in that vicinity remain occupied by the isolated German force estimated at 3500. An attack against this force by combined British and Norwegian detachments, supported by naval units, seems imminent.

The German main forces (strength now estimated at 90,000-100,000) advancing radially from the Oslo area quickly cleared southeastern Norway and have now opened communications with other German detachments along the southern coast as far as Stavanger. The objective of the German main body was to effect an early junction with the German landing force at Trondheim. The naval interruption of the line of the communications in the Skagerrak prevented the timely arrival of reinforcements, heavy weapons, motor equipment, and perhaps munitions. The resistance of weak Norwegian detachments north of Oslo gradually stiffened.

These unforeseen interruptions to German plans afforded British units landing at Andalsnes time to reinforce Norwegian delaying detachments along the general line Rena--Lillahaumen. For several days the Germans have been unable to advance beyond this line.


Meanwhile other British units advancing from Andalsnes closed on Trondheim in the region north of Storen, and a combined

British-French force from landings at Namsos joined Norwegians in pushing southward toward Steinkjer. Serious fighting is expected as the Allied units attempt to destroy the Trondheim garrison of some 10,000 men and establish a firm front facing southward before the German main body can break through the delaying area north of Rena--Lillahammer. The establishment or not of this front may be decisive in the Scandinavian campaign.

2. Recent Air Operations. The Germans have repeatedly since April 20 bombed Andalsnes, Namsos, and the railway junction of Dombas. Norwegian ground troops were attacked north of Hamar.

The Royal Air Force bombed German air bases at Aalborg, Denmark and fields near Kristiansand and Stavanger on the night of April 20-21. On the following night they again attacked Aalborg and, for the first time, bombed the fields near Oslo.

The ability of aviation to dominate narrow seas is an issue of this campaign. This issue has not yet been settled.


JOHN MAGRUDER,
Colonel, F. A.

td

Safe: War Dept
PSF

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

file
O Box

July 8, 1941.


Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you a compilation of some recent telegrams from our Military Attache in Cairo which I hope you will read without fail. I am sure they will interest you.

I am sure that you will understand after you have read them why I feel so keenly my responsibility to build up the efficiency of our own army and air force and not to subordinate its development too far to our efforts to build up the British defense.

These cables should also tend to confirm your confidence in the good judgment of our own military advisers in respect to the proper relation between air and ground forces.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

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Below are copies of three parts to a cablegram from the M.A., Cairo
Part 1 was filed June 14 and received at 15:12, June 15 in W. D.
Part 2 was filed June 15 and received at 08:57, June 18 in W. D.
Part 3 was filed June 16 and received at 06:55, June 17

Part I

1. The responsibility for the losses which the Navy sustained in the evacuation from Crete should be charged to the Army, according to Naval officers, for in the effort to save Army personnel the Navy exposed its ships to the most concentrated air bombardment which has ever been employed against naval units. The situation at Crete was sheer folly, a massacre of one branch of the service in order to preserve the other from being massacred.

2. The Army, on the other hand, contends that if the air force had granted any pursuit squadrons, the withdrawal would not have been necessary. What they lose sight of is the fact that after the casualties of the Greek campaign, the air force did not have enough planes to grant pursuit protection. Whoever expected it in Crete was ignorant of the facts, and yet it seems that all concerned expected it.

3. It is not possible to hold General Freiberg or his brave soldiers responsible. Denied protection from the air, they surrendered Crete deluged by the most concentrated air bombardment yet beheld. The island was secure from the sea. The naval protection afforded by the fleet kept the island's sea flanks and all ranks attained a stature beyond the call of duty during the withdrawal. It must be obvious that the air force which had never made any promise of substantial aid but which granted much more than deemed possible must be held innocent of any blame for the fiasco.

4. The air, land, and sea defeats of the Middle East Command since the month of March once again highlight divided responsibility which is part of its command system.

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5. After the withdrawal from Greece, the three commanders-in-chief voted not to attempt to hold Crete. Orders arrived from London that the island was to be held.

6. A conference was held on May 13 of the Army, Navy and Air commanders. It was the sentiment of all that the fleet would maintain the security of the sea flanks without fail and that "the present strength of the R.A.F., six Hurricanes, was to be added to by ten Blenheim pursuit planes if procurable."

7. The air force made no promise in regard to material assistance. However, as the German air operations grew, planes were tragically necessary and both at sea and ashore there were wild demands for fighter protection. No such planes were available for service. Nevertheless, the lack of them was availed of to alibi the Cretan disaster.

FELLERS

PART II

1. Admiral Cunningham, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has no very high opinion of the operation of the air force during the battle for Crete. Now that it is over, he estimates at its proper weight the importance of air strength, and has ordered to England by plane Lord Louis Mountbatten, the King's cousin and the former commander of the sunken KELLEY (destroyer), with the mission of gaining a personal audience with King George to inform him that if 1,000 planes are not immediately received, the Middle East cannot be held. General Wavell recently wired the Prime Minister that the War Cabinet must contain at least one man who is conscious of the fact that the British have other lines to hold than those which center in London.

2. After the evacuation from Crete, there arose a serious

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58) - 2 -

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ill will among the army, navy, and air force. When the troops were disembarked in Alexandria, air force enlisted personnel were not permitted in the harbor.

3. The appointment of Air Chief Marshal Tedder in the place of Marshal Longmore meets with general approval. Tedder knows American planes and appreciates them.

4. Dangerous rumors circulate which hint that commanders in the army will also be changed. However, if changes take place under present circumstances, they will in actuality be merely an effort to choose a scapegoat upon whom to fix responsibility.

FELLERS

PART III

1. If the recriminations which are described in Part II of this cable were to be avoided, the frantic demands as described in the same message should have been received at London prior to and not subsequent to the battle of Crete.

2. This battle was the fourth disastrous setback to Britain and on account of the divided responsibility which is a part of her command system, she has not yet the faintest conception of where the blame lies. The facts remain that no blame attaches to any one person. By dividing the responsibility a convenient system is built up which protects all commanders, reduces all blame, whitewashes every defeat, furnishes holeproof excuses, but will not manufacture victories.

3. It is fundamental that there be a single general commanding the Middle East theater, alone responsible for the conduct of all operations. He should be given command of all forces in this theater, Army, Navy and air, for the successful performance of his

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mission.

4. Prior to the defeat in Crete such a general, commanding the Middle East, knowing that the retention of the Island necessitated air forces which he did not himself have at hand, would have either obtained a sufficient number of squadrons for the defense or he would have been well situated to refuse to attempt the impossible. Recognizing that a withdrawal from Crete could only be effected with ship casualties beyond all precedent, he would have at once demanded of the War Office sufficient forces or he would have executed the withdrawal in time to avoid the losses. A shrewd commander-in-chief of the Middle East would attempt joint operations in one event only; that he had under his control a balanced force which promised a fair opportunity of success.

5. If personal responsibility for Middle Eastern activities attached to one officer, he would delegate such responsibility from top to bottom of the chain of command. Immediate reaction would be to energize all ranks for in the event of failure all ranks would risk being relieved.

FELLERS

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Lieutenant General Blamey under whose command the Australians fought in Greece and who is now Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East made the following statement to me: * * *

"Immediate air support is a matter of absolute necessity to a commander in the field. The German air system is right and the British independent air force is wrong. I will not go into combat again unless I am able to give direct orders to the squadrons allocated to my support."

(Extract from paraphrase of code cablegram received at War Dept. from Cairo May 15, 1941.)

General Gort—

Fundamentally the separation of the Army and Air Force was a mistake and that proper coordination of air and ground troops, both in training and in operations, can only be had under unified command and a single department of government.

Report # 41016 G.B.-9000
March 27, 1940.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff—General Ironside—expressed himself almost violently in opposition to the separation of the Air Force from the Army. He said that for certain specific missions, such as the aerial defense of Great Britain, an independent Air Force was not only fitting, but should have ground forces (A. A. etc.) under its orders for operations. For land operations independence was absurd, the most intimate mutual dependence based on close coordination of training is absolutely necessary.

Report # 40733—G. B. 9100
Jan. 5, 1940.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*PSF
Safe
War Dept*

July 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Will you take this up with
Jerry Land?

F. D. R.

copy

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

JUL 10 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 7th, requesting information relative to the activities of certain vessels of the Army Transport Service which were listed on an inclosure thereto, has been received. I am attaching in tabular form the information which you have requested.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

Incl.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

DATA U. S. ARMY TRANSPORTS AS OF JULY 1, 1941

~~SECRET~~

VESSEL	FORMER NAME	GROSS TONNAGE	DATE ACQUIRED	DATE IN OPERATION	REMARKS: POSITION & ACTIVITY
Ed. B. Alexander	Amerika	21,329	1-10-1940	1-15-40	Repairs, New York*
American Legion	Same	13,736	11-15-1939	3-2-40	Maneuvers, Buzzards Bay
Deltargentino	Same	7,997	6-28-1941		To sail N.O. 7-3-41
Irvin L. Hunt	Edenton	6,958	10-15-1940	12-14-40	Enroute Manila-Singapore
Liberty	Wichita	6,211	12-7-1939	12-18-39	Enroute Manila
Munargo	Same	6,336	3-26-1941	6-9-41	Secret Movement (Greenland)
Oriente	Same	11,520	6-16-1941	6-21-41	Discharging, San Juan, P.R.
Panama	Same	10,021	6-13-1941	6-17-41	Enroute C.Z. - N.Y.
Pres. Cleveland	Golden State	12,568			To be delivered 7-7-41
Pres. Coolidge	Same	21,936			To be delivered 7-12-41
Henry T. Allen	Pres. Jefferson	14,174	11-1-1940		Conversion San Francisco**
J. Franklin Bell	Pres. McKinley	14,127	2-21-1940		Conversion San Francisco***
Pres. Pierce	Hawkeye State	12,579	6-23-1941		To be delivered 7-26-41
Pres. Taft	Buckeye State	12,562	6-17-1941	6-21-41	Enroute S.F. - Manila
Irwin	Santa Cecilia	4,900	3-6-1941	3-12-41	Enroute C.Z. - Charleston
Kent	Santa Teresa	4,858	4-13-1941	6-2-41	Maneuvers, Buzzards Bay
John R. Hannay	Waukegan	6,209	8-22-1940	9-12-40	Discharging, C.Z.
Wm. H. Point	West Corum	5,795	10-29-1940	11-26-40	Discharging, Seward, Alaska
Henry Gibbins	West Elcasco	5,766	4-15-41		Repairs, New Orleans****
W. P. Gibson	West Segovia	5,701	11-15-1940	11-30-40	Enroute, Seattle - Alaska

* Available, 7-18-41

**** Ammunition Ship, complete 7-12-41. (Todd-Johnson Drydock Company)

*** Schedule to complete 8-15-41; delayed on account of strike. (Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation)

** Schedule to complete 9-1-41. (Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation)

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Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25

July 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Will you please advise me of what activity each of the ships listed on the enclosure herewith is engaged in and what objective these ships are carrying out as of July 1, 1941.

x550

Will you also advise me of the date of acquisition of these vessels and the date placed in operation.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Encl.

(List C - Vessels Acquired by War Department)

*no copy of
list found*

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Safe File: War Dept.
PSF ~~Bot~~
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September 19, 1941

The President,

The White House.


Dear Mr. President:

In conformity with your verbal instructions at the conference in your office on Wednesday, action is being taken by the Ordnance Department to increase the production of medium tanks to 2,000 per month and of light tanks to 800 per month, or a doubling of the program in effect previous to Wednesday. Action has been initiated with respect to that part of the expanded program calling for the creation of certain critical and essential new facilities since it is possible to make available for this purpose certain funds now available. However, a prompt carrying out of your instructions in full will also require at the earliest practicable date authority for the placing of additional orders for light, medium and heavy tanks. An estimate of the funds required for this purpose has been submitted to me by the Chief of Ordnance and will shortly be sent to the Bureau of the Budget.

As pointed out on Wednesday, the carrying out of your instructions for this major tank effort will require an A-1-A preference rating for all tanks, in order that the necessary machine tools and equipment may be made available promptly. Request for such a rating has already been made to the Joint Board.

With reference to your instructions to double immediately the production of light and medium tanks, the Ordnance Department estimates, provided an A-1-A preference rating be granted at once, that tank production can be increased approximately 15% by 30 June, 1942; that is, an increase of light tanks from 4,190 to 4,820 and an increase of medium tanks from 5,500 to 6,325.

Respectfully yours,



Acting Secretary of War.

Bot

PSE
Safe
War Dept.

~~RESTRICTED~~

G-2/2657-220; No. 504 M.I.D., W.D. 11:00 A.M., September 27, 1941.

SITUATION REPORT

I. Eastern Theater.

Ground: Information from both Russian and German sources is meager.

Heavy fighting continues around Leningrad.

The Germans claim officially to have completed the mopping up of the Russian forces east of Kiev, with the capture of 665,000 prisoners.

The situation in the Crimea is obscure.

The Russians are fighting strongly in the defense of Odessa.

Air: The German communique claims strenuous activity in recent operations by the Luftwaffe particularly in the Crimea and the Ukraine. Russian arms works at Tula and military objectives in Moscow were attacked.

II. Western Theater.

Air: The R.A.F. resumed normally heavy operations yesterday afternoon after a period of relative inactivity since last Sunday. Raids on northern France particularly German airdromes there featured the assault.

There has been no report of any German activity over Britain.

III. Middle Eastern Theater.

Ground: No significant reports have been received.

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DDO DR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-1-66

Signature- Carl L. Spencer

~~RESTRICTED~~

part

PSF
Safe
War Dept.

January 13, 1942.

My dear Mr. Secretary:-

I approve your memorandum of
January eighth relative to the increase in
our Army for 1942.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Date- 4-7-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spear*

January 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. During the Cabinet meeting on January 2d you gave me a rough rule of thumb regarding your desires as to the strength of the military forces, as follows:

In Continental United States

Trained Troops -	1,000,000 men
Troops in training -	1,000,000 men

Beyond Continental United States

Such overseas forces as required.

2. It is the War Department's desire during 1942 to:

a. Reach the objective of 115 trained Air Corps Groups, (87 combat, 15 observation, 13 transport) as early in the year as possible. (Previous final objective, 84 Groups; present strength, 54 Groups).

(Total Air Corps strength - 1,000,000)

b. Increase the ground forces by:

4 Armored Divisions to a total of 10 Divisions
 32 Triangular Infantry Divisions (motorized or otherwise) to a total of 59 Divisions.

Essential supporting troops, and additional anti-aircraft and military police units for home employment.

(Total ground troop strength - 2,600,000).

3. Under the present agreed Defense Aid allotments of materiel, the 115 Air Corps Groups can be initially equipped.

For the new divisions of the ground forces, only the necessary training equipment (viz. about 50% of critical items) can be provided and this only if 105mm howitzers now set up for the British can be made available to the United States.

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4. Your decision as to the War Department's proposal outlined in paragraph 2 above (explained in more detail in the attached paper), is necessary to the prompt development of our military resources. Your approval could be given with the understanding that the present allocations under Lease-Loan will stand until the strategical situation or increased production rates make a new decision advisable. The matter of 105mm howitzers will be discussed with the British Chiefs of Staff as a separate proposition. Indications are that the British will be agreeable to the diversion of these howitzers.

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

1 Enclosure.

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INCREASE PROPOSED FOR 1942

1. Our plans at the present moment contemplate increases to the following totals by December 31, 1942:

Air:

115 groups (87 combat, 15 observation, 13 transport). These groups involve a strength of men in units of about 700,000. For the maintenance of these groups, for school overhead, and for trainees required for the organization of additional groups provided for in the Victory Program - 300,000 men.

Ground troops:

71 Divisions (present strength 35 Divisions). This would add 4 armored divisions to the present 6, and 32 Infantry divisions to the present 27 Infantry divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions.

2. There would also be included the proportionate additions of antiaircraft, tank destroyer units and supporting Corps and Army troops, particularly of Engineers, Signal Units, Ordnance and Quartermaster troops.

3. Further, there must be considered a heavy increase in Military Police for the permanent guarding of the most critical installations in the United States, in order to relieve combat troops now dispersed and tied down to this type of duty.

4. Total oversea land forces of 766,000, (including 300,000 men in strategic outposts and 466,000 men in probable expeditions, for some of which the task forces are now being organized), are projected in 1942.

5. Summary of strength to be reached by December 31, 1942:

Continental United States:

Trained troops:

a. Air Corps 600,000
b. Ground troops 1,300,000

(including expeditionary troops under consideration which may be transferred to overseas).

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Date- 4-7-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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Continental United States Cont'd

Troops in training:

a. Air Corps 300,000
b. Ground troops 1,000,000

Overseas forces:

a. Air Corps 100,000
b. Ground troops 300,000
(In strategic outposts)

(b. Includes general overhead,
base ports etc.)

Total strength:

December 31, 1942 - 3,600,000

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Shipment Small Troop Detachments
from Halifax, Nova Scotia.

An investigation has been made to determine the feasibility of shipping small detachments of troops in any space which might be made available on loaded freighters awaiting escort from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the United Kingdom.

It has been determined that less than 25% of such vessels have space which can be utilized. A few freighters do have facilities for from ten (10) to twenty (20) troop passengers and small additional cargo. The Canadian government makes a careful survey to secure any available space for troops or freight. From a replacement depot which has been established at Halifax all such space is fully utilized.

Any United States troops which might be transported by freighter from Halifax would cause a like reduction in Canadian shipments for which special facilities have been constructed. In view of the small numbers affected and since no overall gain would be secured, it is believed inadvisable to make use of this means of transportation at this time.

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-58

Signature- *Carl L. Speer*

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1

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

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War
Dept.

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Bot

February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Cargo Planes for China.

1. In order to cut down time of delivery of personnel and supplies to China the Air Ferry Service from the United States cross Africa to China must be used. Accordingly, the build-up of this Ferry Service must be considered along with the build-up of the service between Rangoon or Calcutta and Kunming. Furthermore, it is very doubtful if facilities now exist between Calcutta and Kunming to take care of a large number of air transports and it would be very wasteful and perhaps disastrous if they were to be sent in without facilities.

2. Calcutta-China Ferry Service. Conditions in Burma now are such that a new route into China other than through Rangoon must be developed. This is under way, using Calcutta as a port of debarkation and the end of the railroad at Sadiya as the start of the Ferry Service. From there the airplanes will fly either to the first point of the Burma road at Bhamo or all the way into Kunming. Five transport planes are being sent to Calcutta by air from our Army production. These planes will start by air within a few days. Five additional planes are being sent this month on the Chinese order, giving a total of ten. It is believed that this is all that can be absorbed for the time being.

Provisions are being made so that additional planes can be fed into this line from the Takoradi-Khartoum-Ceylon main line as soon as General Stilwell's Staff reports that ample facilities are available. It is believed that a total of maybe 50 airplanes may be put on the China line (if facilities can be provided) by June 30th.

3. Takoradi-Cairo-Ceylon Ferry Service. This is the main system and must be built up as rapidly as possible. Over this line will go supplies and personnel destined for:


- a. British, Near East operations in and around Cairo.
- b. Russia via Basra.
- c. Far East by way of Ceylon.
- d. China via Calcutta or Rangoon.

4. Personnel and Materiel for China Through Calcutta. Our present plans for this line contemplate a build-up to a peak of about 50 to 75 airplanes in operation. As facilities in China become available we will take planes from

the main Takoradi-Ceylon line and send them to the China line. In addition to what we take from the main line, China will have the 10 planes already allotted plus 10 more scheduled for them from production between now and June. The exact number which will go on the China run depends on the number they will be able to handle with the facilities available.

5. Instructions have been given to put the above into effect at once, with a view of reaching the maximum of about 75 on the main Ferry line by June 30th.

6. In view of slow delivery of Army cargo planes and the urgency of putting this plan into effect, any aid which can be received by securing cargo planes from airlines will be of tremendous value.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. H. Arnold', with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

Bark

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1942

Dorothy:

This can be filed.

Lois

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

With a view to enabling our representatives and those of the United Kingdom to plan and dispose of our joint program of armament production in a manner best designed to win the war, I am submitting the attached paper relating to our joint production as a basis for the discussions which are now proceeding.


This document does not embody any detailed study of either the Navy or Maritime Commission programs and to be complete should be supplemented by such programs. It is intended, primarily, as a statement of 1942 production of Army items. It is not exact but it gives an over-all picture of our joint production for 1942 upon which I believe basic decisions can be made.

It is necessary, of course, that British and United States 1942 production be reviewed in order to plan both production and strategy. As you are perhaps aware, it is proposed to increase the munitions production of the United States by about 13 billion dollars in 1942. How this increase is to be planned and disposed must be determined. It is likewise essential that consideration be given to our production of 1943.

I suggest a special committee of the Conference be set up immediately to deal with these considerations.

I am also sending you a brief report on the status of the United States Victory Program.

Sincerely yours,



Secretary of War

The President
The White House

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

RHP; NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: VICTORY PROGRAM.

The Victory Program is now on its way to becoming a reality. The Office of Production Management and Supply Priorities and Allocations Board estimate that the total munitions production potential of the country for the year 1942 is approximately 40 billion dollars. Of this 40 billion dollars, 27 billion dollars of munitions are already scheduled. We intend to increase this schedule to the limit of the country's potential, that is, another 13 billion dollars worth of munitions. An adequate carry-over into the year 1943 will be assured by certain measures which are now in process in the War Department and which are described below.

The War Department is at present expediting estimates for an appropriation of approximately 12 billion dollars for aircraft and its accessory equipment. It is anticipated that this money will be made available during January. This sum will insure that scheduled aircraft production rates will not only be maintained but will be increased through 1942 and 1943. To illustrate, it will permit the construction of new and converted facilities for heavy bombers sufficient to increase the production rate of this class of aircraft from 775 to 1,000 a month.

The War Department is also preparing new estimates for submission to Congress early in January to cover additional munitions other than aircraft. By expeditious action both in the War Department and Congress, a sum of approximately 14 billion dollars for munitions other than aircraft and about 3 billions for expediting production can be made available during January for subsequent releases to industry.

The estimates referred to in the preceding paragraphs will, with the funds appropriated by the Congress for Army equipment on December 17, 1941, aggregate about 33 billion dollars which should be translated into contracts and taken over by industry in the early months of 1942. The breakdown of this vast sum into the general categories comprising the proposed expenditures for munitions is shown in Inclosure 1. Whereas these categories are expressed in terms of

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

~~SECRET~~ RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

expenditures further figures are being assembled to translate certain of the more important categories into units produced per given period. When these are available, I shall forward them to you but I venture to caution you regarding their use as I feel to disclose them would aid the enemy.

With the appropriation of the funds covered by the estimates mentioned above, action may proceed with the orderly provision of raw materials, a broadening of the base for procurement, the construction of new facilities, and the renegotiation of contracts where advisable, with the result that a greatly accelerated production schedule will be achieved. As indicated in a previous paragraph, the production potential for the country for 1942 is estimated by SPAB and OPM to be approximately 40 billion dollars for the all-out war effort during this period compared with 27 billion dollars now scheduled. Of the margin available for new production in 1942, it is expected that approximately 6 billion dollars will be for ground army munitions, $3\frac{1}{2}$ billion for aircraft and accessories, and the remainder for military construction, the Navy, Maritime Commission and other purposes.

While the plan as outlined above is being put in effect, and under it, industry is absorbing the orders resulting from the proposed appropriations, the War Department will continue with its re-analysis of the list of materiel originally submitted for the Victory Program to the end that its portion of that program will be on as firm a basis as it is possible to make it for an all-out industrial effort. Although this analysis is now under way, it may be substantially influenced by the present Joint Conferences. While the date of March 1, 1942 has been set for the completion of the War Department's re-study of the Victory Program lists, unless difficulties arise that are not foreseen, it is expected that a completion date substantially prior to March 1 will be achieved. With completion of this re-analysis, the War Department will then be prepared to furnish SPAB and OPM with additional estimates for the purpose of enabling them to plan the complete production of the War Department's share in the total program.

The War Department has been in close contact with the representatives of SPAB and OPM. The procedure outlined above is familiar to them and has their hearty approval.

Henry H. Stimson

Secretary of War

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

Inclosure

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[REDACTED]

CATEGORIES OF MUNITIONS PROPOSED FOR EXPENDITURE
FROM THE THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ACT FY 1942 AND PROPOSED NEW ESTIMATES

CATEGORIES	TOTAL
<u>Air Craft and Accessories</u>	
Planes, Spare Engines & Parts	\$9,041,373,090
AC Small Arms & Cannon	243,785,400
AC Ammunition	1,301,208,729
AC Signal Accessories	592,508,460
AC CWS Munitions	234,572,518
Sub-Total Air Craft and Accessories	<u>\$11,413,448,197</u>
Antiaircraft Materiel	984,490,910
Small Arms & Automatic Weapons and AC Cannon	1,634,996,164
Artillery & Fire Control	1,095,047,531
Tanks, Armored Cars, Scout Cars, Tractors, Etc.	3,908,022,690
Ammunition	5,390,171,289
Signal Equipment	825,021,240
Engineer, Chemical, Medical & Quartermaster (other than motor)	1,435,907,240
Trucks & Passenger Cars	1,201,473,152
Sub-Total (other than Aircraft)	<u>\$16,475,130,216</u>
Contingencies	<u>2,458,882,492</u>
Total Munitions	30,347,460,905
Expediting Production	<u>3,000,000,000</u>
Grand Total	\$ 33,347,460,905

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

Incl. 1 RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington

M E M O R A N D U M

December 26, 1941

Supply for 1942

1. The means of warfare which will become available to the anti-Axis powers in 1942 will come primarily from the stocks and production of Russia, the British Empire and the United States.

a. Russian stocks and production are unknown, but can be assumed quite properly as inadequate for Russia's strategic role in 1942.

b. British Empire stocks and production are known, but it is doubtful that there can be any appreciable increase in production over present forecasts.

c. American stocks and production are known. Production schedules have been prepared based on appropriations to include all but the last supplemental (3d Supplemental, Fiscal Year 1942.) With additional appropriations, the amounts in these schedules can be increased.

2. The means of warfare should be produced to fit the strategic concept of defeating the enemy. However, the establishment of production takes so much time that the items scheduled for 1942 cannot be greatly changed without causing a serious reduction in output during that year. Consequently, present production schedules for 1942 should be changed as little as possible. The change in emphasis on the production of certain types of supplies for 1942 should be effected within the increased productive capacity available primarily in the United States. In other words, for 1942 there are two sources of supply:

a. The stocks and presently scheduled production of the anti-Axis powers.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date

MAR 28 1973

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b. The productive capacity above presently scheduled production available in the United States.

3. Based upon the third revision of the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement, the present stocks and scheduled production of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States can provide the following means of warfare in 1942:

a. Aircraft.

(1) As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 700 heavy bombers are on hand, with a production of 5,000 in 1942. Assuming a six months life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the striking force of heavy bombers may be estimated to increase from 250 in early 1942 to 1,500 by the end of that year.

(2) A similar consideration indicates that the prospective striking force which can be maintained will be:

	<u>At the be- ginning of 1942</u>	<u>Mid- 1942</u>	<u>By the end of 1942</u>
Heavy Bombers	250	730	1,500
Medium Bombers	1,200	1,690	1,900
Light Reconnaissance and Dive Bombers	2,800	3,160	3,200
Fighters	4,200	4,755	5,000

b. Ammunition for Aircraft. Ammunition requirements for maintaining the aircraft in paragraph 2 a (2), compared with quantities available, are as follows:

(Figures are cumulative. Unit is a million.)

	<u>At the be- ginning of 1942</u>	<u>Mid- 1942</u>	<u>By the end of 1942</u>
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)			
A. P. (Required)	315.	667.	1,485.
(Available*)	400.	1,330.	2,850.
Tracer (Required)	77.	167.	371.
(Available*)	300.	1,100.	2,200.

*For all purposes including aircraft. While this table shows a generally satisfactory condition, there are considerable shortages in certain specific calibers, particularly caliber .50

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OSD letter, May 3, 1973

RHP, NARS Date

MAR 28 1973

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**Bombs, All Types
(Pounds)**

Required	390.	875.	2,230.
Available*	500.	1,070.	2,040.

*While this table shows a generally satisfactory condition, stocks and production are not sufficient in the presently desired types.

c. Tanks.

(1) As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 5,000 medium tanks are on hand with a production of 21,000 in 1942. Assuming a three months' life in operations against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the striking force of medium tanks may be estimated to increase from 1,600 in early 1942 to 5,550 by the end of that year.

(2) A similar consideration indicates that the prospective striking force which can be maintained will be:

	At the be- ginning of <u>1942</u>	Mid- <u>1942</u>	By the end of <u>1942</u>
Heavy Tanks	160	300	400
Medium Tanks	1,600	3,270	5,550
Light Tanks	800	984	1,450

d. Ammunition for Tanks. The requirement and availability of armor-piercing shot for tank and anti-tank cannon are as follows:

(Figures are cumulative and in thousands of rounds)

	At the be- ginning of <u>1942</u>	Mid- <u>1942</u>	By the end of <u>1942</u>
Required for Tanks Only	4,800.	11,725.	32,600.
Total Available	?	19,260	53,463

e. Anti-Tank Artillery and Ammunition. As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 5,000 anti-tank cannon of calibers varying from 37 mm. to 4.5" are on hand. Assuming a six months' life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, the anti-tank guns available for combat will increase from 1,600 at the beginning of 1942, through 3,160 at mid-1942, to 6,100

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at the end of 1942. Cumulative ammunition requirements, which must be met from the balances in sub-paragraph 2 d, which are sufficient after mid-1942, are 2,880 thousand at the beginning of 1942; 8,570 thousand by mid-1942; and 19,548 thousand by the end of 1942.

f. Machine Guns (except those in aircraft). As of the beginning of the year 1942, approximately 330,000 machine guns are on hand. Assuming a five months' life in operation against the enemy, and one-third of those on hand available to units in actual combat, a force of 2.8 million men on U. S. allowance basis can be maintained in combat throughout 1942, which can be increased at the end of 1942 to 3.0 million men.

g. Small Arms Ammunition. Indicated stocks for the beginning of 1942 are approximately 2,500 million rounds of ball; 400 million rounds of armor-piercing; and 300 million rounds of tracer. Based on U. S. rates of expenditure, after deducting the aircraft requirements, 2 million men can be supplied early in 1942; 2.5 million men by mid-1942; and over 4 million men by the end of 1942. However, there are serious shortages in certain types, particularly armor-piercing and incendiary; also in certain calibers, particularly caliber .50.

h. Land Antiaircraft Weapons (over 20 mm.) There is an indicated stock at the beginning of year 1942 of 4,000 heavy and 4,500 light land antiaircraft weapons. These will increase, allowing for normal losses, to 5,200 heavy and 8,100 light by mid-1942; and 7,200 heavy and 14,100 light by the end of 1942.

i. Land Antiaircraft Ammunition (over 20 mm.) At present U. S. rates, the following figures compare antiaircraft ammunition requirements and availability:

(Figures in thousands of rounds)

	<u>Required</u>	<u>Available</u>
1st Half 1942	19,620	25,000
2nd Half 1942	31,140	34,000

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i. T. N. T. Production outside the United States is practically stationary during 1942. U. S. schedules indicate that quarterly production will be approximately doubled during 1942. Even with this expansion, presently scheduled production is inadequate to meet requirements. Early in 1942, U. S. quarterly production is approximately 50% greater than U. K. plus Canada, and reaches three times their combined production by the end of 1942.

k. Naval Vessels

(U.S., U.K., AND CANADA)

	: On Hand :	Production				: On Hand* :
		1/1/42	1st Quarter	2d Quarter	3d Quarter	
Battle Ships & Battle Cruisers:	33	0	3	1	2	39
Aircraft & Seaplane Carriers :	14	1	0	0	0	15
Cruisers & AA Ships :	108	4	5	4	3	124
Destroyers :	447	29	39	42	41	598
Submarines :	203	16	14	17	20	270
Convoy Escort Vessels** :	217	(8)	(5)	(7)	(11)	248

*Assumed no losses

**50 on order for U.K. under Lend-Lease on which no schedules are available. No orders placed for this type ship for the U. S. Navy.

4. What has been discussed above is based upon the existing production schedules of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States for 1942. The present proposal is to increase the productive capacity of the means of warfare in the United States in 1942 by approximately 13 billion dollars. There exists at present a list of supplies required beyond the existing production schedules. Based on this list, and a consideration of 1942 production possibilities as they are now envisaged by O.P.M. and S.P.A.B., it is planned to utilize this additional U. S. productive capacity as discussed below (also, see attached list.) However, the production of these supplies is still in the planning stage and does

not fully utilize the additional productive capacity available in 1942. The supplies discussed below which are to be produced with this additional 1942 capacity can be adjusted within the limitations of production possibilities both to suit the strategical needs of 1942, and to serve as a basis for 1943 production.

a. Aircraft

The additional aircraft, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942, are:

- 250 Heavy Bombers
- 500 Medium Bombers
- 900 Light Reconnaissance & Dive Bombers
- 1,000 Fighters

Assuming the delivery of the great majority in the last quarter of 1942, the prospective striking force by the end of 1942 becomes:

Heavy Bombers	1,600
Medium Bombers	2,100
Light Reconnaissance & Dive Bombers	3,500
Fighters	5,300

b. Ammunition for Aircraft

The possibility of increasing the production in 1942 of small arms ammunition of the types and calibers required for the increase in the aircraft striking force to the figures shown in paragraph 4a seems at present to be barely sufficient to meet the needs of this force. Increase in production of bombs in 1942 is almost entirely a question of increasing the output of explosives. Cal. .50 ammunition and T.N.T. are the choke items which must be loosened in planning increased productive capacity.

c. Tanks

The additional tanks, which it is proposed to produce in 1942, are:

- 150 Heavy
- 6,000 Medium
- 3,000 Light

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Assuming the delivery of the great majority in the last quarter of 1942, the prospective striking force by the end of 1942 becomes:

Heavy Tanks	450
Medium Tanks	7,550
Light Tanks	2,450

d. Ammunition for Tanks. The possibilities of producing armor piercing shot during 1942, as compared with the requirements, are increased to the following figures by the end of 1942:

(Figures are cumulative in thousands of rounds)

Required for tanks only	41,250
Total available	78,463

e. Anti-tank Artillery and Ammunition. The additional anti-tank artillery, of 37mm and 3" calibers, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942 are 3,900 37mm, and 800 3", a total of 4,700 guns. This production increases the number of anti-tank guns available for actual combat by the end of 1942 from 6,100 to 7,400. The additional ammunition requirement for these guns, based on their utilization in the fourth quarter of 1942, is 5,200 thousand rounds making a total requirement by the end of 1942 of 24,784 thousand rounds. From paragraph 4d there can be 37,213 thousand rounds produced to meet this requirement.

f. Machine Guns (except those in aircraft.) The additional machine guns, except those in aircraft, which there is a possibility of producing in 1942 are approximately 70,000. The force which can be maintained in combat at the end of 1942 can be increased by this production from 3.0 million men to 3.6 million men.

g. Small Arms Ammunition. The increase in production planned for AP, incendiary and .50 cal. ammunition is more than absorbed by the need for these types and calibers for the increased aircraft striking force. For the remaining types of small arms ammunition it is not wise to plan on supporting in combat any greater force than that shown in paragraph 3g, viz. slightly over 4 million men by the end of 1942.

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h. Land Antiaircraft Weapons (over 20mm.) The additional antiaircraft guns in 1942, will increase the total heavy antiaircraft guns from 7,200 to 8,000; and the light from 14,100 to 15,000 by the end of 1942.

i. Land Antiaircraft Ammunition (over 20mm.) The additional antiaircraft ammunition in 1942 will be sufficient to keep pace with the additional production of antiaircraft guns.

1. T.N.T. The increase of present production schedules of T.N.T. in 1942 appears to rest upon two factors: first, increasing output of existing plants; second, completion in the calendar year 1942 of the plants recently financed. While the first is possible, the second is complicated, not only because of the time required for construction, but also because the producers of the highly specialized plant machinery have orders for equally specialized machinery for naval construction. An acute shortage is indicated throughout 1942.

5. This memorandum has been prepared in advance of the latest information on merchant shipping. Shipping information contained in the Consolidated Statement is now rather out of date. New information will be attached as soon as it becomes available. However, a rough estimate of the shipping requirements for the means of warfare which might leave the United States during 1942, based on average dollar value, is probably a maximum of 20,000,000 gross tons.

6. The information furnished above is based on the over-all figures of the Anglo-American Consolidated Balance Sheet. It is probably not exact in all respects. In many cases more specific or detailed requirements may operate to reduce the striking forces which have been indicated. However, it serves to indicate the possibilities for 1942 on present schedules, and to raise the question as to the kind of supplies which should be manufactured with the potential still available in the United States in 1942, in order to further the joint strategical plans for that

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year and for 1943.

7. A short summary of the major categories of United States production for the year 1942 is appended.

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U. S. PRODUCTION - CALENDAR YEAR 1942

(U. S. part of the information on which the discussions
in the memorandum "Supply for 1942" are based)

Supplies	Present Schedules	Tentative Increase
Aircraft (complete)		
Heavy Bombers	2,156	250
Medium Bombers	3,757	500
Light Reconnaissance and Dive Bombers	7,548	900
Fighters	11,097	1,000
Tanks (complete)		
Heavy	166	150
Medium	13,721	6,000
Light	6,524	3,000
A. P. Ammunition		
Cal. 50 (Unit 1000)	1,001,996	100,000
20mm (Unit 1000)	12,985	9,000
37mm to 4.5" (Unit 1000)	37,092	25,000
Anti-Tank Artillery		
37mm	6,374	3,900
3"	600	800
Machine Guns (less Aircraft)		
Cals. .30 and .50 ground	135,541	50,000
Cal. .50 AA	34,200	20,000
Anti-Aircraft Weapons		
37mm and 40mm	4,490	800
90mm	1,789	800

(Source: Present schedules, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Office of Production Management, December 23, 1941. Tentative Increase, Production Branch, Office of the Under Secretary of War.)

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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PSF
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Dear Mr. Secretary:

I deem it necessary that there be established with the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East a branch of the Office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review in such branch office. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Article of War 50¹, I therefore direct The Judge Advocate General to establish such branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, and to establish in such branch office a board of review. Upon the establishment of such branch office and board of review therein, they shall be empowered to perform for the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, under the general supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

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Auth: TAG

Initials: *DLW*

Date: _____

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

WD 321.4 (2-26-42)MSO

March 3, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, by radio dated February 25, 1942, has recommended that a branch office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review be established in the Philippine Islands under authority of the final paragraph of Article of War 50 $\frac{1}{2}$, which reads as follows:

"Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such branch office a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command, under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, the duties which the Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President."

The establishment of the branch office and the board of review is made necessary because of the existence of a distant command with which communication is now difficult or impossible. It is obvious that Congress in enacting Article of War 50 $\frac{1}{2}$ had such a situation in contemplation.

It is now impossible to forward records of trial by general court-martial from the Philippine Islands to the Judge Advocate General's Office at Washington. The establishment of a branch of the office of The Judge Advocate General and a board of review in the Philippine Islands will make the administration of military justice within General MacArthur's command self-contained and will permit the execution of certain sentences which may not now be carried into effect because not approved by the board of review in the office of The Judge Advocate General and by The Judge Advocate General himself. The maintenance of

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Date- 4-7-59

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discipline in General MacArthur's command may require the prompt execution of sentences imposed by courts-martial.

The Article of War above quoted contemplates a direction by the President to establish such an office whenever he shall deem such action necessary. I concur with General MacArthur in thinking such action now necessary. Officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department now in the Philippine Islands under General MacArthur's command may be detailed to these duties by radio. A draft of letter authorizing such action, pursuant to the Article of War above quoted, is herewith submitted, which I recommend receive your signature.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

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Date- 4-7-59

Signature- CL Spicer

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1942 & 1943 PROGRAMME

AIRCRAFT	1942	1943
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	30,000
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	17,000
Pursuits	16,000	38,000
Observation & Transports	6,700	15,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	100,000
TANKS		
Heavy	500	5,000
Medium	25,000	50,000
Light	19,500	20,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	45,000	75,000
ANTI-AIRCRAFT		
Light 37 mm.	1,600	-
40 mm.	13,000	25,000
Heavy 90 mm.	5,400	10,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	20,000	35,000
ANTI-TANK		
37 mm.	13,700	-
3"	1,200	4,000
MACHINE GUNS (Ground, Tank A.A.)		
.30"	330,000	
.50"	170,000	
	<hr/>	
	500,000	

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bot

March 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I have your outline report of your visit to Panama. I approve the proposed steps for the greater security of the Canal. As I understand it, all of the proposed steps are within the jurisdiction of the War Department, with the exception of the problem of the east coast patrol. Please take this up with the Secretary of the Navy and settle it.

Please also take up with the Secretary of the Navy the problem of the type of radar or ASV. This is a technical matter which the technical people of the Army and Navy should determine at once.

F. D. R.

PSF - Safe =
War Dept.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

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March 14, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Here is the cursory report on
Panama which I mentioned to you over the
telephone.

I will bring you the map when I
come tomorrow morning.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry H. Stimson

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-1-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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~~SECRET~~DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58) WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Date- 11-1-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

March 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is a cursory outline report on my visit to Panama. I am omitting figures and details. My views in general coincided with those of General Andrews and his officers.

I.The problem

1. At present the Canal is vulnerable to a sufficiently heavy air attack. Such an attack from one carrier might be sufficient. From two or three carriers it would have a strong chance of success.

On the other hand, a successful attack from adjacent land bases in Central or South America is not considered likely owing to the difficulty which an enemy would have on concentrating sufficient planes on a secret base within sufficiently short range.

2. A heavy successful attack at either of two places might, by draining Gatun Lake, close the Canal for over two years.

3. After a carrier has released its planes for attack, no subsequent means of defense against those planes can sufficiently ensure the safety of the Canal.

4. Therefore by far the most effective defense is by a long distance patrol to intercept and destroy the carrier before she gets within range of the Canal.

II.Proposed outer patrols

We discussed with the Bomber Command at Panama the essentials of a theoretically perfect outer patrol, it being admitted that the existing outer patrol is very imperfect. A carrier attack from the Pacific is assumed to be the most likely attack, and the geographic approaches to the Canal make an approach by a carrier from the Pacific more difficult to intercept than one from the Atlantic where the Caribbean Sea is encircled on the east by islands which leave only a comparatively few narrow entrances

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Date- 11-1-66

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open for the approach of such a carrier.

- a. Such a theoretically perfect outer patrol on the Pacific side would consist of a patrol zone about 400 nautical miles in width extending from an outer semi-circle 1000 nautical miles distant from the Canal to an inner semi-circle about 600 miles distant. The patrolling bombers for such a zone could be most conveniently based upon Guatemala City, Tehuantepec, Mexico, on the Central American coast; Salinas, Ecuador, and Telara, Peru, in South America; and the Galapagos Islands in the center. The width of the patrol zone is fixed by the distance a carrier could cover at a speed of thirty knots during the twelve hours of darkness and allowing a two and a half hour margin of safety. The longer arc between Central America and Galapagos could be covered by the faster Army four engine bombers; and the shorter arc between South America and Galapagos could be covered by the slower Navy PBY's. The landing fields at Galapagos will probably be complete before the end of April. Unless new bases are obtained at Tehuantepec, Mexico, and Telara, Peru, the patrolling of the zone from Guatemala and Salinas alone would place upon the planes much additional strain. The outer distance of the arc of 1000 miles from Panama is fixed by the possible range of a bomber loaded with bombs.
- To effectuate this patrol all of the bombers must of course be equipped with ASV's. These would give each sweep an effective width of at least fifty miles.
- b. The Atlantic side. At present General Andrews, the Commander of Panama Defense, has no operational control over patrolling the entrances to the Caribbean Sea through the gaps in the Antilles. In my opinion he should be given such control and an adequate arrangement should be worked out with the Navy for that purpose. Otherwise a thoroughly coordinated defense of the Canal is rendered difficult if not impossible. Admiral Hoover, who today is commanding the patrol of the gaps in the Antilles, has the mission of defending shipping against submarine attack and not the defense of the Canal. The difference in these missions necessarily affects the conduct of the patrols and thus reacts adversely on the effectiveness of the defense of Panama.
- c. In addition to the patrolling planes, there must be a striking force of long distance bombers provided of sufficient power to enable it to go out and sink the aircraft carrier as soon as it is located by a patrolling plane. In addition

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to such a striking force of bombers, it is planned to have available striking forces of torpedo boats at various bases within reach to also attack the carrier. One of these proposed bases is the island of Cocos.

III.

Present outer patrols

It was agreed that the present patrols are very ineffective and leave wide gaps for the approach of a hostile carrier.

- a. The planes are not yet equipped with ASV but are limited to visual observation.
- b. The number of the heavy bombers available is not yet sufficient even if they were equipped with ASV.
- c. There is not yet a sufficient reserve either of bombers or torpedo boats for the purpose of destroying a carrier when located.
- d. The base at Galapagos is yet incomplete and unusable.
- e. The patrolling system on the Atlantic side is subject to the defects of operational command above mentioned.

As a result, while an outer patrol is being regularly conducted from Guatemala outward towards Galapagos and back and from Salinas to Galapagos and back, there are many necessary gaps in its effectiveness, and the strain upon the planes employed is very excessive.

All of these defects can be eventually remedied by additional equipment and the proper organization of operational command in the Carribean. When made, they will greatly strengthen that form of the defense of the Canal which is most effective against the most probable danger.

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IV.

The inner defenses of the Canal

1. The inner patrol. An inner patrol is now being conducted by medium range bombers and flying boats on a radius of 400 nautical miles out from Panama. The main purpose of this patrol is to supplement the recognized gaps in our present outer patrol and to try to catch a carrier which has evaded that outer patrol. Its range, however, would afford no certainty of catching a carrier before she had released her bombers.

On the Atlantic side a similar but less thorough short range patrol is also being conducted.

2. The airplane warning service. A number of both fixed and mobile detectors (called by the Navy RADAR) are now in operation at various points on the coast including Salinas. Their principal mission is to detect the approach of a hostile plane. At present this mission is being carried out ineffectively, partly on account of great geographical difficulties (causing confusing echoes) and partly because these American detectors are not effective in catching the approach of a low flying plane.

A few weeks ago I sent a British expert, Mr. Watson Watt together with some Canadian assistants to Panama to examine this service and also to locate the proper places for some Canadian CHL detectors which I had the promise of from the Canadian government. These CHL detectors are effective on low flying as well as high flying planes. These CHL's are now on the way to Panama and sites have already been selected and they will all probably be in operation before the end of April. These foreign experts have also given us useful assistance in relocating and improving our original American instruments.

Note: One of the mistakes of our original location was in placing the detector on too high a base, it having been discovered that such a height produced confusing echoes which prevented proper detection, when still higher mountains lay behind the site.

By these various steps the air warning service can be expected to be very considerably improved in detecting the approach of low flying hostile planes. Our force of interceptor planes must be enlarged.

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3. The island of Cocog. This island is situated about 500 miles from Panama. It thus lies in the intermediate space between the outer and the inner patrol. Admiral Sadler is planning to make it the base of one of his squadrons of small torpedo boats. No detector (RADAR) has yet been placed upon it.

4. The fishing boat detection service. Fifty such small boats have been obtained by the Navy and it is planned to place them on watch in a line between Point Mala and Point Pinas at the entrance to the Gulf of Panama. This would be about one hundred miles distant from the Canal.

An inner group is to be placed about fifty miles out from Panama. Each boat is equipped with radio to convey the reports of visual observation of approaching hostile planes. At the time of my visit some of the boats were on their way from California but none had yet arrived.

5. Balloon barrage. While I found a number of these balloons in the air, that number was quite insufficient. It was estimated that we should have about three hundred balloons on hand.

6. Smoke screen. This is regarded as quite an effective potential defense but we have not yet enough of the materiel. Some smoke pots and smoke generators were available but in quite insufficient quantities. In my opinion sufficient generators should be installed, particularly at Gatun and Pedro Miguel, to screen and keep screened with smoke those places during the entire period of a crisis.

7. Torpedo nets. The torpedo bomber is considered the greatest danger to the Canal. Torpedo nets have been installed but I think their number should be increased and spare nets kept on hand.

8. Emergency gates. Much admirable work has been done in the construction of such gates. The latest models, however, have not been finished in all of the locks and cannot be completed for some months.

9. Anti aircraft guns. A fairly satisfactory supply of the larger anti aircraft guns have been installed with some shortages. The main need of additional anti aircraft guns was in the smaller caliber automatic weapons suitable for defense against torpedo and dive bombers.

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V.

In summary.

While the Canal is not at present in danger of a sustained land attack, it is in danger at almost any time from surprise raids from sea and air. There is the possibility of very serious damage from such raids. This possibility can be greatly minimized by steps which can be taken and completed with comparative speed and cheapness.

The Command is well aware of these dangers and has shown very commendable energy in seeking to take the steps which I have above enumerated. Every support should be given to these efforts. The Canal is such a vital asset to our war effort and that effort could be so impaired by the Canal being put out of action that these comparatively small steps which will secure the minimization of the danger should be given the highest priority.

Henry L. Stimson

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A-2 Div.
#9

~~File
B-2
War~~



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War Dept.
~~White House
H. H. Watson~~

TALK GIVEN BY
MAJOR WILLIAM P. FISHER (AC)
BEFORE G-4 OFFICERS, WDGDS .
MARCH 20, 1942.

Col. Thomas: Will you tell us where you served in the Pacific Theatre?

Major Fisher: I was at Clark Field when the War began. The 19th Group had been over there about a month, and we were attached to it as soon as we arrived. There were 4 Combat Squadrons. We had B-17's at Clark Field although 2 Squadrons had been removed before the War started. The morning of the 8th there were 2 Squadrons at Clark and those 2 were destroyed.

The remaining 2 Squadrons started operating from Del Monte, using Clark as an advance base as long as was practicable. After about a week, we gave up Clark Field. After leaving Del Monte, we operated from Darwin. That's the general picture until Java.

I will try to give you a short picture of the Bataan show. While the B-17's were still operating, the remainder of the 19th Group withdrew down to Bataan. We were down on Bataan until the 29th of December. At that time the 19th Group -- all of the Ground Echelon and everything except the Combat Crews that were operated -- evacuated from Bataan by ship, as Infantry for a month. The Japanese had made their big landing. The 19th Group was there until Col. Eubank began to evacuate Combat Crew members by bomber, and took crew members down to Australia. That was going on continuously.

The last airplane was sent in around the 26th of January from Darwin. They were operating from Darwin bombing bases on the Group. Then we got

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LP-30's and B-24's to evacuate the personnel. By that time the Japanese had moved very far south and were operating against Java. Meanwhile Gen. Brett and Gen. Wavell had shifted operations to Java.

When we got down to Darwin, there was word there for me to take the Interceptor Command on the East of Java. We operated there with P-40's. The British had Hurricanes. After losing our airplanes there, we left and evacuated the 1st of March to Australia. Specifically, our airplanes were combatted mainly with Navy 96 and Army 96 -- bomber and predominately fighters. There were not very many Messerschmidts 109 and 110.

The comparison of Japanese performance is significant -- their Zero Fighter weighs around 4,045 pounds, has a 14 cylinder (Pratt Whitney) engine, very high rate of climb -- 4,500 feet a minute, ceiling around 30,000 feet and outmaneuvers anything we have. It has no armor plate and sacrifices self-sealing tanks, but the P-40 outruns the Zero by about 25 m.p.h. Tactics were more or less based on these facts.

We did not attempt to combat their fighters, for our mission was to protect the Navy at Soerabaja. We started off with around 31 P-40's -- about 24 of which were in commission until our supply line was cut down through the Eastern Indies. We slowly lost airplanes after that until the first of March, although we were operating from a hidden airdrome, using all concealment possible.

The Japanese did not find our drome until the 28th of February, although the first major attack came into Soerabaja about the middle of February, being sent in unescorted by fighters. We were able to get the pursuit up about 26,000 feet and shot down 9 out of 27 planes. More probably went down, but 9 were confirmed.

After this the Japanese sent in their bombardment planes at 27,000 to 30,000 feet. The P-40 cannot get that high -- not much over 26,000. We were

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operating normally the past couple of weeks in formations of 12, 9, 14 or perhaps 16 planes. The enemy planes attacked with 27 to 34 bombers and 20 to 30 pursuit fighters, keeping from 25,000 to 26,000 feet. We got some of them, but it was difficult and we lost ships doing it. Their fighters would come down on the P-40's. These continued attacks kept up. They were increasing their air strength all the time. They first took Bali and their base on Bali caused more trouble than anything else. The Japs made their Bali landing at night and we attacked the next morning. Our B-17's were bombed then. We had a few dive bombers -- operating around 10,000 to 12,000 feet -- with P-40's giving protection. Our bombers managed to finish up what the Navy left. Only 1 destroyer and 1 cruiser got out. We lost only 1 dive bomber and 4 pursuit ships. We were down after that to 12 or 14 airplanes.

We lost our planes a few at a time, a couple a day. When the invasion fleet came in on the 28th, it was met by our fleet as it came from the North.

There were 46 transports, about 8 destroyers, 6 or 8 cruisers, They were met by our fleet about 100 miles out of Soerabaja where they had quite a cover up for their fleet. Our Navy sunk a cruiser and set some destroyers afire. Their fleet action was in front and there was a V formation. We lost 1 destroyer.

On the afternoon of the 28th fighting, bombing -- everything -- was going well for us. The Japanese convoy turned around and started north again.

They next came in to Soerabaja. The fleet turned around, came in again and we had no fleet to oppose it. We were reinforced with 6 British Hurricanes and 6 Brewsters flown and operated by the Dutch but they were no good for interception. On March 1 there were 9 P-40's in commission. We ran a

mission with 9 P-40's, 6 Brewsters and, 5 Hurricanes, 2 of which came back very badly shot up. There were 4 or 5 airplanes still ready to be used. The Japs found our field on the 28th, but a heavy rainstorm prevented much damage. When we came in from the morning mission, we put airplanes in dispersed position, but they came in with bombers and strafers and burned up everything that was left. They finished up the P-40's and we loaded all our personnel we had and fled to Singaradja. The fields had been attacked all day. We got out about a day before the Dutch blew up the flying fields there

Gen. Moses: Was there anything at all there when you left?

Major Fisher: We had absolutely nothing. The fighter outfit was wiped out. The bombers had about 5 or 6 left -- B-17's but we could not protect their airdromes.

Gen Moses: Going back to high-elevation bombing! How about the accuracy of the enemy bombing from that height?

Major Fisher: It was not very good. They did not hit our fleet. Their bombs were dropping in the water. The Japs bomb in formation only -- string bombing -- V formation and wide out as far as they can stretch it -- 24 planes wide. The Japs are accurate with that tactic when they are unopposed. After interception, they were not so good at this game.

Col. Hoag: Have you seen any indication of other than Japanese personnel?

Major Fisher: Yes. Germans. I have seen one body that was apparently German -- tall, blond, etc. You run into quite a few white men in their crews. It's hard to tell much about the men though after death as they are usually pretty badly smashed up and also we shot down Japanese women pilots.

Col. Hoag: What about our own bombing?

Major Fisher: Our bombing has been more accurate than peacetime, due to the

fact that we were using large bombs with better projectory. We use around 600 now. Kelly used that on the Haruna.

Col. Hoag: I understood that was 500's -- 3 of them.

Major Fisher: I think 2 bombs did the damage ... When Kelly came back to Clark, there was an overcast 10,000 feet over the field, and there were some enemy fighters in the vicinity. He let down through the overcast, starting his approach to come into the field when these fighters attacked him. In a few moments the parachutes bloomed. They had set his plane afire. He was able to get all his crew out except the co-pilot. The controls were probably burned through. Kelly crawled out the top hatch and was struck by something. The co-pilot was getting ready to climb out behind him and the plane exploded, burning his arms and hands, face and hair. The co-pilot didn't seem to know how it happened -- he was in the plane, and then in the air the first thing he knew. Kelly was the only pilot out of the original 14th Squadron over there to be killed so far. Most of the pilots have gotten out and the Navy has had exceptionally good luck on getting out after wandering through the jungles, etc.

Col. Thomas: What about ships being burned up on the ground?

Major Fisher: That comes from the 20mm Guns and incendiaries from the machine guns. The Jap cannon makes quite a hole in the tank. It catches fire. In the air, you know, gasoline will leak out and blow away. Only a couple of ships burned up in the air as we had self-sealing tanks.

Col. Thomas: What about the attack at the airdrome in Java? Did they circle around much? At low altitude?

Major Fisher: Very low altitude. We had the planes covered with palms back in the trees. The bunkers and revetments are absolutely worthless. Bunkers give no protection against strafing, except from a theoretically close bomb. In the first big raid at Clark Field the Japs were dropping anywhere from 5 to 10 bombs a piece. Only 2 B-17's were damaged by the bombing.

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Col. Blair: There were 30 caliber incendiary and 20mm Cannon on the fighters? Didn't the cannon do the most damage?

Major Fisher: It was hard to tell. Sometimes they would start to burn in the tail. It was not always the gasoline that started the fire.

Col. Thomas: Were the ships loaded with gas?

Major Fisher: We knew about the Pearl Harbor attack which occurred at 3 o'clock in the morning. We heard about it at 6 or 7. We were prepared for the first mission at Formosa when we got our first air raid alarm. One of the stations reported 27 airplanes flying toward Clark Field. We stayed up all morning. We landed about 11:30, when given an "all clear". At that time the order came in to prepare to attack air bases on Southern Formosa at about dusk. We were getting our ships prepared and our crews ready and all organized when we looked out of the hangar and there were 54 airplanes over us. All communications to Clark Field had been cut about an hour or so before the attack. There was no warning. We were caught with everything on the ground.

Col. Blair: What did you lose in the Clark Field attack?

Major Fisher: Around 15 B-17's, and pursuit about the same number not to mention B-18's shot up, and miscellaneous airplanes, around a total of possibly 40.

Col. Thomas: How about Nichols Field?

Major Fisher: They were patrolling when Clark Field was attacked, but for some reason they did not get word of the attack.

Major Fisher: We had no dive bombers in the Philippines. They first went into action at Java. The A-24 is a very excellent weapon. The most effective weapon against small surface vessels. If we had had about 50 or 60 we would

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have done a lot better in Java. We attacked with 3 A-24's. It did not worry us that the Japs had air superiority. We just had to catch them in the air. The morale of the men has been remarkable all the way through. Everybody over there has the idea everyone over here is sending all they can.

Major Fisher: Around 5,000 Air Force troops were on Bataan. Half of the Headquarters squadrons and the base squadrons, all at Bataan.

Col. Thomas: Did you go to Corregidor?

Major Fisher: No.

Gen. Moses: Are the planes able to get up there at all? (On Bataan)

Major Fisher: 12 P-40's were left with General MacArthur. They used P-40's and bombs in place of belly tanks on Bataan. One of the pursuit boys has worked out a technique of coming in at a 45° glide, with his engine throttled, using his gun sight and doing a very accurate bombing job. Several fields on Bataan, Cabanatuan, and a small field at Marivales, could have P-40's worked on them.

Gen. Moses: Can they hide planes in where they cannot be found?

Major Fisher: We had 25 pursuit planes on Clark Field. A large group of trees concealed these P-40's in the horseshoe of trees and they were never found by the Japanese. They were not damaged at all in the 2-week period.

Col. Borum: Did you have hard-surface runways.

Major Fisher: Some at Java. Most of the time, though, we operated off of turf.

Col. Borum: B-17's also?

Major Fisher: Yes, sir.

Gen. Moses: Do you have aviation engineers for runways?

Major Fisher: Aviation engineers build air fields faster than you can think. They build them in a week.

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Gen. Moses: You had no mats, of course. They could improvise runways?

Major Fisher: We were operating under extreme field conditions. Another thing that came up was in fighting from island to island, if you leave many people you lose them. If you have a small group of maintenance men and combat crews and you have to leave a place, you can take them with you.

Col. Blair: You would recommend considerable reduction in Tables as we have them today?

Major Fisher: The 2 Squadrons of Bombers - 15 - B-17's - operating at Del Monte had only about 100 men besides the combat crews. It is amazing what you can operate with when you have to. The men were overworked. The first week or two it was terrific. The combat crews did their own maintenance and bomb loading for a couple of days.

Col. Thomas: Is there any necessity for Ordnance Companies, pursuit and bombardments?

Major Fisher: It won't work in the Theater of Operations. We need air bases and depots. In a Theater of Operations about all you can do is just fix 1st echelon maintenance and not too much of that, and load your bomb, ammunition, gasoline, oxygen and food. We need to split up in small fields. Only operate 6 or 8 airplanes on one field. Fighting in the islands is different from fighting on the mainland. All of our transportation was accomplished by air. There were no transports, no boats.

Col. Whiteley: What is the difference between pursuit and bombardment?

Major Fisher: For pursuit unit at Noro about 35 airplanes, 1 squadron strength 100 men, total 42 pilots. As we lost planes and strength diminished, we started to evacuate excess men above the strength necessary to operate. That was necessary because no reinforcements were coming. They operated

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very effectively there with a minimum of personnel and absolutely no supply as far as parts were concerned. If the oil tank were shot out, we would use the rest of the airplane for parts.

Col. Thomas: How about mechanics tools?

Major Fisher: That was the greatest difficulty. One bag you could pack and carry with you, and the mechanic had his bag plus a Kennedy kit. At one time in Java we had so few mechanics they would fly them from one island or plane to another so that work could be done on them.

Col. Hoag: Has there been any incendiary bombing?

Major Fisher: We heard it reported, but saw no incendiary bombs. The Japs dropped a small bomb which has a long nose and sets above the ground and does not continue to burn.

Col. Blair: As a result of your experience what would be your recommendations as to things we could change or do here in the way of organization and planning?

Major Fisher: All organizations that go out should be complete and trained. There is no room or time or equipment to train them in Australia. We suffered at first from untrained pilots.

Col. Blair: What changes in organization and ground equipment would you recommend?

Major Fisher: The staff was way too large. We spend our time supporting ourselves instead of the combat squadrons. There were too many pilots sitting behind desks shuffling papers and some of the work could have been consolidated. There was too much duplication of work. When I went out all I had was a morning report and payroll.

Col. Whiteley: What about the organization of the Japs?

Major Fisher: They had a good system worked out as they were going down to

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the South Pacific. They would come in with a heavy bombardment and send fighters over, which have terrific range, and clean out everything left. After several days of these attacks, they would bring in a Navy convoy of a few transports, with 2 or 3 cruisers or destroyers coming in at night taking over, and next day flying in on bombers or fighters and fight until they had complete area protected from ground forces and start operating with that as a base and then proceed to take another base in the same way. They would come in at night with equipment and get oil, gasoline, supplies, and get ready to operate next day. The organization was so good they could be operating in a day.

Col. Thomas: Do you have gasoline scattered all over the Philippines? Bombs, too?

Major Fisher: Yes, sir.

Col. Hoag: How long were you in Australia?

Major Fisher: At Darwin a week and Melbourne a week, and then left for Java. No trouble with gasoline supply there (Australia). Gasoline is strictly rationed to civilians there. They are allowed 4 gallons a month.

Col. _____: Organizational equipment? We plan here on Hemisphere defense.

Major Fisher: The organization and equipment should be cut down to the minimum. Figure in your Theater of Operations.

Col. Blair: When you cut your personnel down, you cut your equipment down.

Major Fisher: Gen. Arnold told me this morning that one squadron went out of Australia with 500 and some men. Ordnance equipment would go with decontamination squads, etc.

Col. Blair: The garrison we sent down to occupy one island near Australia

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was about 500.

Col. Borum: Do you use Drums? with hand pumps, motorized pumps, or what?

Major Fisher: They are extremely valuable. The most valuable piece of equipment is motor driven gasoline refueling equipment. The one with a washing machine engine. That little engine is wonderful. We used the hand pumps for refueling the drums.

Col. Thomas: How about portable lighting system?

Major Fisher: We have to operate at night right now. It has been used at Del Monte and other fields. It seems to be all right.

Major Fisher: Night lighting. Darwin had their own. No. 10 cans full of Kerosene and a stick rope in it were used.

Col. Blair: If you had pursuit, they would not be doing so much day flying?

Major Fisher: If we had P-47's we could take over. They should go down to Australia.

Col. Thomas: What about fuel stores down there?

Major Fisher: It is in barrels dispersed around the field. That way you don't lose so much. They should be painted green, brown or something instead of red as they are now.

Major Fisher: On the bases we are operating from the Bob trucks. The Government bought a lot of trucks in Java.

Col. Borum: What about light maintenance equipment?

Major Fisher: One P-40 engine was changed in the field at Java.

Col. Borum: Is the mobile depot group in the field?

Col. Thomas: The mobile depot group is supposed to take care of wrecks, etc. Did you ever recover any of these crashes?

Major Fisher: We did not have time. The Dutch fished a couple out of the water. You can't do anything when you are operating the way we were.

Col. Hoag: Are destructors being used on bombsights?

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Major Fisher: Destructors are not being used on bombsights. I do not believe we have captured any Jap sights yet. Our men take care of the sights and remove them after a crash.

Col. Thomas: How about the flight SBAE equipment?

Major Fisher: No bombs dropped with it. It is impossible to maintain in the field. It is too complicated. My answers are generally the opinion of most of the pilots and not merely my own. We need an automatic pilot. The Sperry is better as far as an automatic pilot is concerned. PBI is what we need. It takes too long to set up SBAE equipment.

Col. Hoag: How does the LB-30 compare with the B-17?

Major Fisher: The LB-30 cannot get the altitude. Anything that cannot get altitude will be subjected to heavy attack. On one flight 3 LB-30's were shot down, 1 got back. Armor plate and self-sealing tanks are very essential. It saves a lot of airplanes. You need turbos on them.

Col. Hoag: Have our pursuit ships got enough range -- the present ones?

Major Fisher: On that mission at Bali 16 P-40's participated about 200 miles from their hidden field to the airport. They went over there with full belly tanks holding about 195 gallons. 2 ran out of gas on the way home. The Japanese fighters have a range of around 1200 miles. The Japanese have operated 400 miles without refueling. They accompany their bombardment with fighters which is something we cannot do.

Gen. Moses: What have they sacrificed?

Major Fisher: Armor plate, self-sealing tanks, weight in general.

Major Fisher: This hidden field was around Noro (Java) in the mountains, just foothills, about 200 feet above sea level.

Col. Whiteley: Do you have any weather service over there?

Major Fisher: The weather was generally good. Except for Navy ARI's there

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is no weather service. We would very seldom run into an overcast. They have tropical type of weather. The rain season had not started. We had ground warning system only, that is ground observers. No Radar equipment. This ground warning system was very effective. It would give the number and type of airplane and whether it was high or low.

Col. Hoag: What about friend or foe identification?

Major Fisher: No, the difficulty was to know the position of friendly operations. We were using 4-motor bombers and theirs were bi-motor bombers. Our fleet called for fighter protection several times.

Col. Borum: About the B-17's, what range did you get out of them? How much did you have left in your tanks when you got across?

Major Fisher: From Hawaii I went to Midway, Wake. From Wake Island to Port Moresby -- 2100 nautical miles -- 2500 miles, and we had 500 gallons of gasoline left. The bathtub was already on the D. The E with the 2 tail guns gained an awful superiority.

Col. Hoag: Does the Japanese stuff begin to compare in bombardment with the B-17's?

Major Fisher: No sir, They can't touch it. Their ceiling is 26,000 feet, speed 160 miles an hour. They have wonderful discipline. If you shot down the leader another files in at once.

: Can Jap fighters get up to the B-17's?

Major Fisher: They can get up to 30,000 feet but the B-17 can outrun them. But the B-17's get 30,000 feet, go in as fast as they can and get out.

: Was there any trouble with wire cutting by Jap agents, etc., at Java?

Major Fisher: Not so terribly much. In the Philippines everytime we took off at night there was smoke columns going up. Flares and signals.

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I got to Melbourne on March 10th. General Brett is sending back all heavy bombardment pilots he can spare since we lost so much equipment. We are to form new units.

: Do you have any idea of the chance of surface vessels getting to the Philippines?

Major Fisher: No, sir, I don't. I wouldn't like to be on a surface ship that was trying to get into the Philippines. We left Marivales at night. We got down on the island of Mindoro to sit during the day. It was a 3 day, 2 night trip. At 2:30 the next afternoon a Navy patrol bomber found us and bombed us 40 minutes. The first bomb he dropped struck off the stern of the boat. The next approach, he dropped one that hit out on the edge of the rail. He made six more approaches, each time further back but he never hit the boat. A number of men jumped off the boat after the first bomb was dropped and attempted to swim to shore. One of the bombs hitting in the water killed a number of these men. The next night we pulled into some coves on the island of Negros. The captain of the Panay, which was a munitions ship, told us that some bombers had come over the day before and sunk his ship and we evacuated our boat. No bombers came over that day and that night we went on down to Mindanao.

The Japanese intelligence is perfect. There is nothing they don't know about our operations and strength.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
Safe
War Dept.

War

3-26-42

GENERAL WATSON:

Major Sherry of the G-2 Ferry Command brought in these pictures, at your suggestion, for the President to take to Hyde Park to look over at his leisure.

This is only a small part of the large collection of pictures of ferry routes in Africa which Major Sherry brought to you yesterday.

Mr Pres.

ld

Perhaps you would care
to look at these pictures
at your leisure,
Elliott

75F(5)-War
Safe

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I think this situation is in need of correction. Bill Bullitt is leaving within the next two weeks to make another trip as my Special Representative in the Near and Middle East. What do you think of having him make you a personal report?

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Kirk in Cairo, dated March 31, 1942, re divided control in that area of American military activities. The U. S. Military North African Mission, so Mr. Kirk says, is fully equipped to command control but the Air Corps Ferrying Command appears to be operating without read to that Hdqts.

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 4, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I acknowledge receipt of your memorandum of April 2, enclosing paraphrase of message (#507, March 31) from Louis Johnson relating to the matter of the United States Military North African Mission at Cairo and the Ferry Command activities in that district. I am glad to say that this is one of those cases in which the men in general supervisory charge of these operations have already diagnosed the difficulty and have instituted corrective measures insofar as the Ferry Command is concerned.

A thorough reorganization of the Ferry Command is now under way. Colonel Harold George is now in charge of the Command. We have obtained the services of the man who is reputed to be the ablest airline operator in the country, C. R. Smith of American Airlines. He is now actively engaged in reorganization of this Command. We propose to make him a Colonel in the United States Army Air Forces and Colonel George will place him in over-all charge of operations. We are bringing into this organization outstanding operating, traffic and technical men from all scheduled airlines.

In general, the program calls for dividing the South Atlantic transport and ferrying operation into five main divisions: first, from Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, to Natal; second, Natal to Coast of West Africa; third, the Transafrican operation to Cairo; fourth, Cairo to the Indian Terminal; and fifth, the Extension into China. Trained specialists will be in charge of each of these operating divisions. The reorganization plans are well advanced and will rapidly be put into effect.

As a result of reports from Ferry Command officers and the information obtained from Mr. Bullitt following his recent trip to the Far East, difficulty seems to have arisen mainly out of the following factors:

1. Inadequacy of personnel in the Middle East.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

CONFIDENTIAL

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2. The matter of franchises in neutral countries and some jealousies arising out of post-war ambitions of commercial operators.

3. Lack of an adequate and efficient British communications system, which has resulted in deficient radio control, frequently resulting in planes arriving prior to receipt at the destination of radio messages reporting their flight.

4. Lack of whole-hearted cooperation between the British and American officials in part arising out of fear of post-war commercial designs.

5. Tendency on the part of the separate military commanders in Cairo and Basra to regard the Ferry Command as a local, instead of a through, service, resulting in confusion and conflicting instructions.

An expert operating man from the civil airlines and an inspector are scheduled to leave shortly for Cairo to investigate and report on the general situation in that district. They will, of course, inquire specifically into any matters which have caused difficulty. Any readjustments required as a result of their report will be incorporated into the general reorganization program now in process.

Since the stories of various travelers into this district necessarily reflect the special interest of the individuals with whom they have discussed the matter, I suggest that it would be wise to allow the experienced airline operators now in our service, and one of our trained military inspectors report on the matter after hearing all sides, before any final conclusion is reached on the recommendation made by Mr. Johnson that command of the enterprise be vested in the U. S. Army mission in Cairo. In a long-range transportation problem, it would be unsound if each divisional superintendent of a railroad had complete authority over equipment and movements through his division without regard to through schedules or terminal problems. In the same way, the best operation of this great airline must be planned with these elements very much in mind.

If anything unusual develops as a result of the above inspection, I will see that it is brought to your attention.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stinson

The President
The White House

CONFIDENTIAL

PSF
Saf
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

B. F.
War Dept
October 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR *x25*

x I still think it would be an excellent gesture to return at least one flag captured at Chapultepec Castle. I do not think it is necessary to go into the matter of other Mexican flags at this time.

But in the case of the flag or flags of the Cadets at Chapultepec, I would suggest that if there is any question of identification you should get a Mexican historical expert to help us identify the flag or flags. Also, please go ahead with initiating action to get the necessary legislative authority.

"7.D.R.
F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Under Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED

DOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT 26 1942

Date- 10-19-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

x146

Subject: Return of Captured Mexican Flags.

You have asked me to comment on the suggestion made by the Under Secretary of State that certain flags captured by our troops in the battle of Chapultepec be returned to the Mexican Government as an expression of the fine relations which now exist between our two countries. Particular emphasis is placed on the desirability of returning those flags which were taken from the Cadets of the Mexican Military College who died in the defense of Chapultepec Castle during that battle. As has been pointed out, the Cadets who lost their lives there have come down through history as the child heroes of Mexico, and September 13th is set aside annually in commemoration of their death.

The flags that were captured in the Mexican War were deposited for preservation at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Many of these flags cannot be positively identified as having been captured in any particular battle. Only one flag has been identified as having been captured at Chapultepec Castle, but the unit from which this flag was taken has not been identified. It is possible that this flag may have belonged to the Mexican Military College, but to date it has been impossible to establish its identity. Further investigation is being made in this regard.

x25-6

I am advised that, according to the law, all property taken from the enemy, such as the flag in question, becomes the property of the United States, and can only be disposed of in the manner suggested by the Under Secretary of State by special authorization of the Congress.

If you desire that one or more of the captured Mexican flags be returned to the Mexican Government, the War Department would be pleased to initiate action with the view to obtaining the necessary legislative authority.

Carl L. Spicer

Acting Secretary of War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Oct. 18, '42

Respy forwarded to
The President
C. M. W.

1116
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

FOR REPORT

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, ^{x20}10/2/42, to the
President, with attached copy of a despatch received
from Ambassador Messersmith suggesting that the flags
captured by our troops in the Battle of Chapultepec
on September 13, 1847, be returned to the Mexican ^x
Govt. Copy of Mr. Welles' retained for our files.

x b. F. State

October 2, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I attach herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from Ambassador Messersmith suggesting that the flags captured by our troops in the Battle of Chapultepec on the thirteenth of September, 1847, be returned to the Mexican Government. I agree with the Ambassador that this would be a highly-desirable gesture and that it would be a very happy symbolic expression of the relations now existing between Mexico and the United States. It is indeed a source of the deepest satisfaction that Mexico and the United States, for the first time in the history of the two nations, are fighting side by side.

It is my understanding that the flags in question are currently in the Chapel at West Point and under the general custody of the Quartermaster General of the Army. If you are in agreement with our recommendation that they be returned to the Government of Mexico, you will wish to communicate with the Secretary of War in regard to the carrying out of the necessary arrangements.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:

As above.

The President,

The White House.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

P5F
safe C. F.

Received from * (AFASC-O), Headquarters, Army Air
Forces the following (SECRET) document:

War Dept

Addressed to: **Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.**

Subject: **RE: SRTC**

Type of Corres.: **Letter**

Date: **November 28, 1942**

Basic Dated: **--**

No. Incls. : **1 Incl -**

**S" SRTC"
W/ITT**

*Filed by
Miss Jackson
1-8-43*

Confidential

PLEASE ACCOMPLISH AND
RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO:
~~Classified Mail Unit,
Signal Corps, Department of
Transportation~~ Army Air Forces
Room 1228, Overseas Division,
Hq., Air Service Command,
Gravelly Point,
Washington, D. C.

DATE RECEIVED _____

BY _____
Name

Rank _____ Branch

OFFICE OF: _____

AAF NO. _____
* Insert symbol of office of origin.

x150
x25-U
x25
x773

Dear Mac. (File Confidential) 28-92

Please talk to Mr Currie about this, he knows more about Currie's problem than anyone whom I have met.

M.H.M. to Mr. Currie
talked and later again
to Col. Campbell.
at M.H.M.'s request J
phoned to see if he wanted
& she said papers back
he said no.
51.


(Col. Tom Campbell)

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ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL
AIR SERVICE COMMAND
ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ARMY AIR FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, AIR SERVICE COMMAND
WASHINGTON

(AFASC-O)

SECRET

By Authority of
The Commanding General
Air Service Command

NOV 28 1942

Initials *RW*

November 28, 1942 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-19-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spitzer*

Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

I am attaching a summary of a somewhat lengthy report which has been prepared in regard to "Supply Routes to China". There are now over 70,000 tons of supplies of all kinds in Karachi, and the tonnage is increasing rather than decreasing owing to the transportation restrictions between India and China.

China is more in need of supplies than any one of our allies, and I believe it is possible to increase the delivery of supplies to China with very little delay and by the use of equipment and labor now available.

I have talked this over with my Commanding Officer, Brigadier General Clements McMullen, Commanding General, Overseas Division, Air Service Command; and he fully recognizes the need of the delivery of more supplies to China but his jurisdiction ends at Karachi. I have a feeling that I can contribute a great deal towards the solution of the ground transportation problem by the building of roads and the maintenance and repair of the thousands of trucks which have been used on the Burma Road but are now in poor operating condition. It is much easier and infinitely quicker to use the supplies which are now in China, repair the trucks which are there, than to ship in new equipment from the United States.

The work which I have been doing on increased supplies for Russia is finished primarily by the help of Admiral Leady, who is doing a grand job in every respect. I would like to go to China as my experience has equipped me for such a job and I want you to take this up with the President.

Faithfully yours,

Tom

THOMAS D. CAMPBELL, X
Colonel, Air Corps,
Overseas Division,
Air Service Command.

ASO 3077 SA



1 Incls. -
Summary "Supply Routes to China".

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SUPPLIES FOR CHINA

November 28, 1942

1. China is in more urgent need of supplies now than any other one of our allies. England and Australia are well provided for. Russia has received enormous quantities in spite of loss in transit, but China has received practically nothing--caused primarily by the invasion of Burma and the loss of trade routes.

2. It is very evident that until the Burma Road can be re-opened or some short route developed between India and China, it will be necessary to have a combination of air and ground transportation in order to increase the delivery of supplies to China.

3. There are now over 73,000 tons of supplies for China in India, as per list attached, and the logical thing is to deliver these supplies first. This can be done if we adopt the following procedure:

a. Increase the number of transport cargo planes.

b. Develop new roads from Sadiya to connect with points on the Burma Road using such equipment as they may now have on hand in China and Chinese laborers.

c. Repair the trucks now in use on the Burma Road and establish a system of maintenance. There are now 1,800 tons of parts for these trucks in Karachi and complete maintenance shop equipment which has never been delivered to China.

d. There is a possibility of using some river routes which should be investigated; and, if the railways between Karachi and Sadiya are crowded with freight, there is no reason why supplies can not be delivered to Calcutta by vessel and from there to Sadiya by rail.

4. Meager reports now available in the United States indicate that a great increase in the delivery of tonnage to China can be done by following the above suggestions with the equipment and supplies which are now in China and India. The attached map shows the available and suggested routes which should be investigated.

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Date- 10-19-66

Signature *Carl L. Spicer*

Thomas D. Campbell
THOMAS D. CAMPBELL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Overseas Division,
Air Service Command.

1 Incl. -
Map.

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SUPPLIES AT KARACHI and OTHER POINTS
IN INDIA

	<u>Long tons</u>
Arsenal	17,999.9
Aviation	7,028.5
Medical and General	2,366.9
Motor transport.	21,927.4
Ordnance	22,697.8
Signal Corps	1,494.2
	<hr/>
TOTAL	73,514.7

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November 27, 1942

SUMMARY OF REPORT ON SUPPLY ROUTES TO CHINA.

1. Lend-Lease records indicate that there are over 73,000 tons of supplies for China at Karachi and other points in India with thousands more to come as per list attached.

2. This means that it will be necessary to have a combination of ground and air transport to deliver these supplies using the railway across India to Sadiya.

3. Meager reports which we have from various sources indicate that there are several possible short, quickly constructed road routes between Sadiya and points on the Burma Road. These road routes should be investigated immediately by engineers.

4. It is absolutely necessary to have trucks—modern Armies can not operate without them. Mr. C. V. Bowman, Zone Manager, who was superintendent of maintenance on the Burma Road, reports that the trucks which were used on this highway are in very bad condition and that there are practically no facilities at all for maintaining these trucks. None of the equipment shipped from the United States and intended for maintenance for some 5,000 trucks on this highway ever reached China. Lend-Lease reports that there are 1,800 tons of spare parts—a greater portion of which are for vehicles in China are still at Karachi. It should be easier to transport these parts by plane to points on the Burma Road and install a system of maintenance and repair than to ship new trucks from the United States.

5. Lend-Lease reports the following trucks at Karachi:

Number of trucks:

1/4 ton (4x4)	285	a/
1/2 ton (4x2)	31	
3/4 ton (4x2)	50	
2 1/2 ton (6x4)	42	
2 1/2 ton (6x6)	449	b/
	<hr/>	
	857	
Tank trucks	48	
Wrecker trucks	79	
Floodlight trucks	40	

all of which are supposed to be in good condition. These trucks can be shipped from Karachi to Sadiya by rail or go by highway and transport a load, if necessary. Colonel Dawson, Indian Supply Mission, says that the journey would require about three (3) weeks.

- a/ Fifteen diverted - Jeeps
b/ Probably 20 diverted.

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
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"Summary of Report on Supply Routes to China".

They should not be turned over to the Burma Road Organization again without some system of maintenance as they will be needed by the Chinese Army. These trucks could deliver at least 3,000 tons plus their own weight if gasoline and oil could be secured enroute.

6. This seems to be the logical distribution point as it is at the end of the railway 23,000 miles from Karachi, is the closest railhead to China, is now used by Air Transport Command as its last terminal on its flying route to China and is the location of a large refinery.



THOMAS D. CAMPBELL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Overseas Division,
Air Service Command.

1 Incl. -
List "Supplies at Karachi
and Other Points in India."

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
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Date - 10-19-66

Signature - Carl T. Spicer



GENERAL TRANSPORTATION MAP OF CHINA

SCALE: 1:6,356,000


0 50 100 200 300 400 Miles

LEGEND

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| International Boundary | | Provincial Boundary | |
| River | | Town | |
| City, Important | | Road | |
| Railway | | Road, Projected or under Construction | |
| Railway, under Construction | | Trail | |
| Railway, Projected | | | |
| Railway, Dismantled | | | |

LEGEND

International Boundary	-----	Provincial Boundary	-----
River	~~~~~	Town	○
City, Important	●	Road	—
Railway	—+—+—	Road, Projected or under Construction	- - -
Railway, under Construction	- - -+ - - -	Railway, Projected	- - -+ - - -
Railway, Projected	- - -+ - - -	Railway, Dismantled	---+---
Railway, Dismantled	---+---	Trail	



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
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
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DDO DIR. 2200.8 (8/27/88)

Date- 10-19-66

Signature- *Carl E. Speer*





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War Dept

Box

May 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL W. B. SMITH ON "Flare Signal Pistol".

The President made the following statement in a speech:-

January 7, 1942. "And our overwhelming superiority of armament must be adequate to put weapons of war at the proper time into the hands of those men in the conquered nations who stand ready to seize the first opportunity to revolt against their German and Japanese oppressors, and against the traitors in their own ranks, known by the already infamous name of "Quislings". As we get guns to the patriots in those lands, they too will fire shots heard 'round the world."

The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee studied the question and came to the conclusion that because of the limitations of weight, size and usability, only a pistol be used for this purpose. The Army Ordnance, at our request, produced this one pound pistol made of stampings for regulation .45 calibre ammunition. The total weight of pistol and 20 rounds of ammunition is 2 lbs.

This is a revolutionary type of weapon in its method of manufacture by stampings.

The pistol was O.K'ed by General Eisenhower, General Somervell and Assistant Secretary Patterson. Dies are being made and one million have been ordered and will be produced by the end of July. After that the rate can be stepped up to 2 million per week if necessary.

It is the opinion of the J.P.W.C. that this pistol should be used only in case of invasion of the continent and possibly for a general revolution. In either case, the dissemination of this weapon must be a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In case of invasion, the dissemination of pistols by planes to cell units of agents for distribution to loyal people must be carefully organized and well-timed. Much work on this has been done by the British S.O.E. We are working with the S.O.E. on this proposition. A hundred miles or more along the coast to be invaded should have a belt 40 miles deep of its people prepared and organized by agents for arming so that at the given time shootings of Gestapo, soldiers, etc., demolitions of bridges, railroads, yards, and power plants, etc., with general chaos

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS D. APR 6 1973

[REDACTED]

and revolution would prevail to require German beach line troops and troops from support points in the rear to try to prevent sabotage and to take care of revolt among the people rather than be ready to concentrate on the point where the allied beach head was attempted.

It is essential for a successful invasion to have this extra help that the civilian population can give if properly organized and armed. If agents and the people are armed, they can then carry out the many important tasks of sabotage of communications, subversive activities for diversion of enemy troops.

Note

The deception plan for this weapon is that it is considered as a flare signal pistol for ground troop units, and because of priorities nothing will be done about it until later this year.

O. W. Solbert
Col. G.S.C.
Psychological Warfare Br.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

[REDACTED]

31-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Landing Craft for BOLERO Operations.

1. Pursuant to the directions of the President, given at a conference in the White House at 2:30 P.M. May 6 at which the procurement of landing craft was discussed, the following report is submitted in answer to the questions:

- a. What can be done by September 1942?
- b. What can be done by April 1943?

2. What can be done by September 1942?

The following landing craft can and will be available in the United Kingdom by early September 1942:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BY U.S.</u>	<u>BY U.K.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ATL's (328')	0	4	4
YTL's (105'- 200')	45	151	196
TL's (50')	400	95	495
YR's (36')	400	202	602
Y's (36'- 39')	400	195	595

By that time the U.S. will have in the U.K. a total force of about 105,000 troops, including 3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 6 Pursuit Groups, 2 Medium Bomber Groups and 11 Heavy Bomber Groups.

The landing craft listed above can carry a force of about 21,000 men, 3,000 vehicles and 300 tanks.

3. What can be done by April 1943?

Present plans entail the launching of an assualting force of

76,500 men
18,380 vehicles
2,250 tanks

The British recommend the use of the following landing craft for this operation:

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 6 1973

200 ATL's	(328')	carrying 18,000 vehicles
570 YTL's	(105'-200')	" 2,250 tanks
300 Giant Y's	(153')	" 60,000 men
300 TL's	(50')	" 300 vehicles
500 Y's	(36')	" 18,000 men
80 YR's	(36')	" 80 vehicles


It will be seen that chief reliance is placed in the larger, more seaworthy types of vessels. The British Navy recommend against a shore to shore crossing in small boats and against a ship to shore operation from combat loaded transports. The U.S. Army accepts the method and plan proposed by the British. It expects to have in the U.K. by April 1943 a total force of 832,000 men to sustain the movement.


To provide the landing craft listed, the construction of the following additional vessels in the U.S. to be available at seaboard by March 1, 1943 is required:

294 YTL's
 172 ATL's (328')
 300 Giant Y's (153')

This construction is considered to be physically possible only upon condition that this program be given priorities over all other items of the Defense Program as necessary to meet the date of March 1, 1943

The construction of the ATL's and Giant Y boats would require a modification of existing combat and cargo shipbuilding programs which may affect joint operations. It is therefore recommended that this entire matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for immediate consideration in collaboration with other affected agencies as necessary and report.


 Brehon Somervell,
 Lt. General, U.S. Army.


 F.J. Horne
 Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy.

May 14, 1942.

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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 "R" 6 1973

-2- By RT, NARS Date _____

May 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Will you please send me your recommendation at an early date regarding the attached memorandum.

Will you consult with Mr. Nelson relative to the effect of this program on priorities which will have to be given these craft and the effect these priorities will have on other military items.

HLH/lmb

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By RT.

Date APR 6 1973