January 25, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for the memorandum prepared by Mr. James Rowe, Jr. regarding the activities of Herbert Hoover with relation to food relief during and after the first World War which you were good enough to send me.

In accordance with your request I am returning the original to you, but am retaining the duplicate copy.

Very sincerely yours,

Herbert H. Lehman

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1943

PERSONAL & PRIVATE
MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN

I asked Jim Rowe to prepare the enclosed. It gives the historical and legal background of Herbert Hoover's activities during and after the first World War.

I am sending you the original together with Jim Rowe's memorandum. Please send it back but you may keep the copy attached.

F. D. R.

Enclosures
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In accordance with the request of Rudolph Forster, I send you the historical and legal background of Herbert Hoover's activities with relation to food and relief during and after the First World War.

This is 17 pages long. A two-page summary has been prepared for your convenience, although I fear it will be too inadequate.

James Rowe, Jr.

x10
ACTIVITIES OF HERBERT HOOVER WITH RELATION TO FOOD AND RELIEF DURING AND AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

SUMMARY

1. Commission for Relief in Belgium (1914-1919). Mr. Hoover was Director of the Commission for Relief in Belgium which was organized in August, 1914 as a private unincorporated philanthropic enterprise. It developed into an internationally recognized body which carried on its own diplomatic activities and which was accorded special immunities by belligerents on both sides. Its activities were financed at first by private contributions. These soon proved inadequate and Allied loans were made to Belgium to pay for the relief supplies.

2. United States Food Administration (1917-1919). Mr. Hoover was made Food Administrator by Executive Order in May, 1917, before any food control act was passed. Under this authority, he inaugurated a voluntary campaign of food economy and conservation. He also cooperated on food matters with agencies controlling exports and Allied purchases. After statutory authority for food control was obtained, he was made responsible for production, conservation, and price-control of food within the United States. He continued as well to supervise Allied purchases of food and exports of food. In 1918, he became the United States representative on the Inter-Allied Food Council, a body roughly comparable to the present Combined Food Board. This Council was responsible for preparing a unified program of Allied food purchases and shipments.

3. Director General of Relief (1918-1919). After several months of disagreement between the Allies after the Armistice, as to the necessity for
centralized control of food and relief, a Supreme Council of Supply and Relief was set up by the Allies and Mr. Hoover was made Director General of Relief. The Supreme Council was later abolished, and Mr. Hoover was made Chairman of the food section of the Supreme Economic Council, which was set up under the Supreme War Council. As head of these organizations, he was responsible for coordinating all the various public and private Allied programs of relief for occupied countries.

Funds for American relief were first derived from emergency funds of the President. After special appropriations for relief were obtained in February, 1919, the American Relief Administration, with Mr. Hoover as Director, was set up as the official United States relief agency. Its programs were coordinated with other Allied relief programs through the Supreme Economic Food Section of which Mr. Hoover was Chairman.

4. Relief after the Treaty of Peace (1919-1923). The general Allied relief programs were terminated shortly after the treaty. A number of special programs continued, however, under Mr. Hoover's direction. Many of these were carried out through a private charitable organization, the European Children's Fund. This organization assumed the responsibility not only for carrying out private relief programs, but also for distributing relief supplies provided by the United States and other governments. Its work was soon expanded from child feeding to include many types of adult relief. Some of its projects were continued until 1923.

In 1921, Congress appropriated funds for relief in Russia. A Purchasing Commission for Russian Relief was set up with Mr. Hoover at its head. Under the Commission's direction, food supplies and seed grain were purchased in the United States and distributed in Russia.
Commission for Relief in Belgium

The Commission for Relief in Belgium was established in London on August 22, 1914.

The decision to organize the Commission was made by Mr. Hoover after consultation with Walter Hines Page and the Belgian authorities in London. This decision was reached when Mr. Hoover had completed his work of arranging for the return home of American citizens stranded in Europe by the war. (See Report of Operations of the United States Relief Commission in Europe, Washington, 1914).

The Commission for Relief in Belgium was the buying and shipping organisation for all relief supplies sent to the occupied regions of Belgium and Northern France throughout the war. It continued its operations until August 31, 1919. Then the Belgian and French governments took over the work. The Commission for Relief arranged for the delivery, in all, of $861,340,244 of relief supplies to Belgium and Northern France.

The Commission operated through two distributing agencies: The "Comité National de Secours, etc." composed of Belgians; and the "Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France" composed of Frenchmen. These two committees carried out the actual internal distribution of relief supplies in their respective countries. In Belgium, it was necessary also to take over all of the crops and distribute them as part of the relief system. Under the committees, there were numerous district and local committees through which the supplies moved to the people.
The Commission was begun as a purely philanthropic enterprise. It was never incorporated. To the end its legal status remained undefined. It had its own flag. It made treaties with governments. It issued its own passports; and its representatives and vessels enjoyed special immunities from the belligerent powers. Because of its peculiar status, it has been termed "a piratical state organized for benevolence."

When the United States entered the war, the functions of the Commission were transferred to a neutral Spanish-Dutch committee. Mr. Hoover, however, continued to serve as chairman of the Commission and to arrange for financing the purchase and transport of food supplies.

The operations of the Commission soon passed the point where they could be financed by private charitable contributions although these amounted to more than $52,000,000. In the early years, the principal source of funds for Belgian relief were loans to the Belgian government from England and France. After the United States entered the war, the United States Treasury began to make advances to Belgium for expenditures through the Commission.

The United States Food Administration

Mr. Hoover's position as Food Administrator grew out of his services on food problems for the Council of National Defense. That body, created by the Army appropriation act of August 29, 1916, was charged with the duty of directing investigations and making recommendations to the President concerning the problems of transportation and supply involved in the creation of an armed force adequate to preserve the national safety. Under it was an Advisory Commission, consisting of seven experts in various fields such
as transportation, munitions and manufacturing, labor, etc.

Mr. Hoover, in February, 1917, addressed the Council and the Commission on the mobilization, distribution, and conservation of food supplies in Europe, but then returned to London where he was directing the Belgian relief activities. As the magnitude of the food problem in the United States became apparent during the next two months, the Council and the Commission began to realize the necessity of setting up a committee on food supply and prices. War was declared on April 6, 1917, and on April 12 it was announced that Mr. Hoover had accepted the chairmanship of such a committee. The committee's duties were to "report to the Council such experience as European governments have had, and advise as to proper methods of preventing recurrence, so far as practicable, of the evils arising out of speculative prices, and to stimulate increased production of all food supplies."

Mr. Hoover returned to the United States early in May, 1917, and began to prepare recommendations on the food situation for the Council. On May 16, he informed the Council of his belief "in the necessity of an immediate, powerful, and independent administrative organ of food control." Bills had already been introduced into Congress at the Administration's request in the latter part of April, and hearings were being held to consider the advisability of a Food Administration. It was not until August 10, 1917, however, that a law was enacted.

In order that the necessary planning might get under way, President Wilson—with no statutory authority—appointed Mr. Hoover Food Administrator on May 19, 1917. He informed Congress of this on May 21, and explained
the necessity of the sweeping emergency powers over food and fuel for which he had asked. On June 12, the President wrote Mr. Hoover that "that portion of the plan for food administration which contemplates a national mobilization of the great voluntary forces of the country which are ready to work toward saving food and eliminating waste admits of no further delay . . . While it would in many ways be desirable to await complete legislation establishing the Food Administration, it appears to me that so far as voluntary effort can be assembled, we should not wait any longer, and therefore I would be very glad if you would proceed in those directions at once . . . I give you full authority to undertake any steps necessary."

The program instituted by Mr. Hoover under this authority was largely one of voluntary cooperation. It consisted of pleas, pledges and instructions about saving food and fuel and using it most efficiently. Cards setting out rules for economizing were distributed to be hung in kitchens, and personal pledges of food saving were signed by millions of persons. The Administrator also undertook to enlist the voluntary cooperation of business organizations to secure both conservation and direction of movement of supplies to the Allies.

On June 22, 1917, the Food Administrator was made a member of the Exports Council, which was set up to advise the President regarding export controls under Title VII of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. Through this medium, it was possible to exercise controls over the export movement of food and to direct these supplies to the Allied countries.

Controls were also established over Allied purchases of food in the United States. The Treasury, when granting loans to Allied nations under
the Act of April 24, 1917, required that all purchases be made with permission of the Treasury. Before formal controls could be set up, arrangements were made whereby all food purchases by the Allies were made in consultation with Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Hoover's activities during the period before the passage of the Food and Fuel Control Act were carried on through a rather anonymous organization, which was jointly financed by Mr. Hoover personally and by emergency funds of the President. Apparently Mr. Hoover was subsequently reimbursed for his own expenditures out of the President's emergency funds.

On August 10, 1917, the Food and Fuel Control Act became law. This act authorized the President, whenever he should deem it essential: (1) to license the importation, exportation, manufacture, storage, and distribution of food, feed, fertilizer, and fuel, and to prescribe regulations governing the businesses so licensed; (2) to fix standards of prices for such food and fuel so as to prevent the exaction of unfair prices; (3) to requisition such food, fuel, and other supplies, or factories or mines in which these are produced; (4) to buy and sell wheat, flour, meal, beans, and potatoes, at prices to be fixed by him; (5) to set a minimum guaranteed price for wheat; (6) to regulate the operations of boards of trade; (7) to limit, regulate, or prohibit the use of foodstuffs in the production of beverages, whether alcoholic or non-alcoholic; and (8) "to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this Act." Mr. Hoover was appointed Food Administrator under the act the same day it was passed.

The many steps taken by Mr. Hoover under the Food and Fuel Act with
regard to internal food problems will not be detailed here. His powers were roughly comparable to those exercised at the present time by the Secretary of Agriculture.

The work of coordinating and controlling exports of food to the Allied countries, which had been started before the passage of the act, was continued. A representative of the Food Administration was appointed on the War Trade Board, created by Executive Order on October 12, and the Board refused to give an export license on any food unless it had been first approved by the Division of Exports and Imports of the Food Administration.

The controls over Allied purchases in the United States were similarly strengthened and formalized. The Allied Purchasing Commission, created by agreement between the Secretary of the Treasury and Allied representatives on August 25, 1917, authorized the Food Administrator to act for it in regard to the purchase of all food and feeding stuffs by the Allied countries.

Unified buying and selling were first established in the cereal supplies field. In order to unify and coordinate their purchases of cereals, the Allied countries had, even before we entered the war, organized an Allied Wheat Executive with headquarters in London. Our controls over sales of cereals for export were exercised through the Food Administration Grain Corporation, established by Executive Order on August 14, 1917, which supervised all sales of cereals to the Wheat Executive.

It soon became evident that similar unity was needed with regard to all Allied food purchases. An Allied Provisions Export Commission was created to which each of the Allied governments submitted its food requirements other than for cereals. This Commission transmitted these requirements
to the Division of Coordination of Purchases of the Food Administration. The Division thereupon indicated the method of purchase which should be followed in order to secure these requirements with as little dislocation of the markets as possible.

In 1918, further coordination between the Allied food programs was thought necessary. In July of that year, Mr. Hoover met in London with the English, French and Italian Food Controllers. At this meeting, the four food "Czars" formed themselves into an Inter-Allied Food Council and appointed a Committee of Representatives to act in their behalf with the delegates from the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the Inter-Allied Finance Council, and the Inter-Allied Scientific Commission. The functions of the Committee were, "subject to the direction of their food controllers, to secure and co-ordinate the programmes of the various food executives ... dealing with particular classes of food-stuffs, and to consolidate these programmes into a general food programme for all foods and all allied countries; ... to supervise and ensure the purchasing and shipping programme." Under the Committee were placed four special authorities, the Wheat Executive, the Meat and Fats Executive, the Sugar Programme Committee, and the Oil-Seed Programme Committee.

The Committee in July and August prepared a combined program of imports of food by the European Allied nations in the coming cereal year (from September 1). It attempted to draw up a general list of food importation priorities. The Committee found this unsatisfactory because of the differences in domestic production among the importing nations. The Committee finally solved the priorities problem by assigning tonnage to each importing
The disagreement persisted for some months. Immediately after the
question concerning the distribution of our foodstuffs.
we could not partake an Inter-Alized Commission to over-ride American-de-
would triumph by far the largest amount of foodstuffs for recovery and that
economic resources after peace, on the grounds that the United States
opposed any program that even looks like Inter-Alized control of our
food supply, for which we have mentioned above. Mr. Hoover strongly
agreed, to the Inter-Alized Commission the Inter-Alized
commission on the Allied powers through the Allied Expenditure, Inter-Alized Food
occupied countries, the Allies, other than the United States, wished to
accept terms in October, 1918, for an organization to handle food relief for
whom plans were being made, during the discussion of arrangements
upon by the Federal
no system of relief other than that for Britain, however, was ever agreed
coming ever more severe in the European countries, and, if the enemy
During the war it had become apparent that food shortages were be-

Director General of Relief
Mr. Counselor. In the latter part of November, 1919, the Supreme Economic Council, by its recommendation, requested that the deprivations, which in its opinion, were subject to review only by the Supreme Economic Council over all economic matters of the Allied Governments, be considered by the Supreme Economic Council. This body was then appointed to review and with respect to the matters other problems which arose in the administration, and within the scope of the terms of reference, to prepare the recommendations for the means of establishing cooperative action between the Allied States of the United States of America and the Allied Governments in respect to the economic problems, and the means of making more efficient the work of the United Nations, the United States of America, and the Allied Governments. When the deprivations were communicated to the Allied Governments, they were instructed by the Supreme Economic Council to establish a special committee, to be the means of organizing the Allied Governments, and the United States of America, to cooperate with them for the purpose of establishing a special committee, to prepare the recommendations for the means of making more efficient the work of the United Nations, the United States of America, and the Allied Governments. When the other Allied Governments, keep interest on an inter-allied basis, and were interested, however, in making the proposals of the United States of America, and the Allied Governments. 1919, the President, through the Chief Executive, made it clear to the other governments that the proposals were to be determined by the President and the Allied Governments. 1919, the President, through the Chief Executive, made it clear to the other governments that the proposals were to be determined by the President and the Allied Governments.
Council set up a number of sections, one of which was the food section. The work of the other food organizations, including the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, was taken over by the food section of which Mr. Hoover was chairman. He continued, however, to act under the title of Director General of Relief. The Supreme Economic Council served as a medium through which problems of finance, transportation, blockade, etc., which arose in the food relief program, were worked out.

Missions were sent by Mr. Hoover to all countries in need of relief, and Allied staffs were permanently stationed there. They had two functions: (1) To investigate and report the amount and type of relief needed; and (2) to make certain that the food supplied under the relief program was being properly distributed. It is important to note that the actual distribution of the food once it had arrived in Europe was left to the individual countries concerned. The Allied nations turned over the food to the governments of these countries, and the Allied representatives served merely in an advisory and investigatory capacity.

The actual operations of purchasing and shipping food from the United States were carried on by the Food Administration Grain Corporation. The Corporation, as pointed out above, was incorporated by the direction of the President under the laws of Delaware. There was no express Federal statutory authority for doing this. When it became apparent that a large operating agency was necessary to handle the actual purchase and transportation to Europe of food supplies, the President ordered the Grain Corporation to undertake this work. The funds initially used by the Corporation were appropriated under the Food Act. Since its funds were totally inadequate
to maintain operations on the necessary scale, the Corporation borrowed
several hundred million dollars from private sources. The Corporation con-
ducted its operations on a careful business basis and charged prices high
enough to allow for all the shipping and other financial risks involved.
It operated so cautiously that a considerable profit was made. This was
later turned over to the American Relief Administration European Children's
Fund, which continued to feed under-nourished children of European countries
after the more general relief work had been terminated.

In order to ensure the success of the relief operations, it was found
necessary to organize a system of railroad and canal transportation in
central Europe. At the request of Mr. Hoover an Allied Railroad Mission
was set up to transport relief supplies. Each nation contributed locomo-
tives and rolling stock, and permitted the relief trains to come through
with no restrictions at the borders. A system of barge services was also
organized under Mr. Hoover's direction.

When the lack of any satisfactory means of communication in the
central European countries was threatening the success of relief operations
there, Mr. Hoover asked the Army Signal Corps to set up and maintain the
necessary telegraph and telephone system. A few new lines were built and
many old ones taken over and repaired. The system was run by United States
Army and Navy personnel under the direction of the Director of Relief.

As Director of Relief, Mr. Hoover undertook to organize and integrate
the work of the private relief and charitable organizations engaged in
sending food, clothing, or money to Europe. A large number of these or-
ganizations were established immediately after the war, and Mr. Hoover
undertook to direct their activities in coordination with the relief activities
carried on by him. Many of them had collected considerable amounts of relief materials and large sums of money, but they were unable to determine the needs to be fulfilled and they did not have operating staffs adequate to carry out their programs. Mr. Hoover undertook to transport and distribute clothing and medical supplies for the Red Cross and other relief agencies. He also arranged for transportation of food, clothing and other supplies sold to various central European governments by the United States Army through the United States Liquidation Commission, and the transportation of supplies to be distributed by organizations such as the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

Mr. Hoover at first had no specific authority under any United States statutes. His first funds were derived from the President's National Security and Defense Fund—an appropriation comparable to the President's Emergency Funds of the present war. Since certain of the liberated countries were technically allies, loans could be made to them under already existing statutes authorizing loans to Allied nations. In the case of Austria and Germany, however, no loans under these acts were possible. Loans were made, however, to England, France and Italy who in turn used the money to purchase food for Austria. Germany on the whole had sufficient funds to pay for the food sent to her.

On February 25, 1919, Congress appropriated $100,000,000 to be used for the relief of non-enemy countries of Europe. Under this act the President set up an American Relief Administration with Mr. Hoover as Director. This organization, with headquarters in Paris, served as the centralized planning and investigative agency for relief coming from the United States. It took over the functions of the United States missions in the various countries to which relief was sent, and it helped to organize the
transportation and communications systems which we have mentioned above. Its work was coordinated with that of the relief agencies of the other Allied countries through the food section of the Supreme Economic Council of which Mr. Hoover was chairman.

It should be noted that the actual relief operations of the Allied governments were not consolidated financially. Each of the Allied nations purchased food on its own account and made its own arrangements as to the payment or obligation in return for relief deliveries. The arrangements were coordinated and approved, however, by the Finance Division of the Supreme Economic Council. Neither were the relief activities of the Allied countries completely coordinated on the operational level. Each nation contributing relief supplies sent representatives to the countries receiving relief. These representatives had the responsibility of receiving, accounting for, and watching over the distribution of the supplies sent by their respective countries. To coordinate these various programs was the task of the food section and the Director General of Relief.

(4) Relief after the Treaty of Peace

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919. By August, 1919, most of the work of Mr. Hoover as Director General of Relief had been brought to a close. Certain special relief projects—both public and private—were, however, continued for a number of years.

In February, 1919, a Children's Relief Bureau had been organised within the American Relief Administration. In July, it became apparent that this phase of the work should be continued, and the European Children's Fund was incorporated as a private charitable organization with Mr. Hoover as chairman. Although it was a private organization, the Fund assumed
the responsibility for distributing the remaining food supplies for children purchased out of the Congressional appropriations and out of the President's emergency fund. The surplus accumulated by the Food Administration Grain Corporation was turned over to the children's fund and used to continue the work. Other funds came from such charitable organizations as the Commonwealth Fund, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Red Cross, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Friends Society, and the Y.M.C.A. In the Fall of 1920, many of these organizations united to form a European Relief Council with Mr. Hoover as chairman. Through a nationwide campaign, almost thirty million dollars was collected.

As it became apparent that much relief in Europe was still necessary, the Children's Fund expanded its activities to include relief for adults as well. The system of food drafts on the American Relief Administration Warehouses in Europe, by which food could be provided for specific individuals in Europe by friends in this country, and other special programs, including student and other feeding, were operated by the Children's Fund.

In March, 1920, Congress authorized the United States Grain Corporation (successor to the Food Administration Grain Corporation) to sell, for cash or credit, five million barrels of surplus flour to European countries in need of relief; the Children's Fund aided in the carrying through of this transaction and arranged for the British Government to pay for the freight and insurance.

The food shortage in Russia became so severe in 1921, that President Harding and Mr. Hoover asked Congress to appropriate money for Russian relief purposes. By the act of December 22, 1921, the President was authorized to spend $20,000,000 out of the capital of the United States
Grain Corporation. A "Purchasing Commission for Russian Relief" was set up with Mr. Hoover as chairman. The Commission purchased, during 1922, over eighteen million dollars of corn, seed grain, preserved milk, and other foods, through the Grain Corporation. Members of the American Relief Administration and the Children's Fund helped to distribute these relief supplies in Russia.

(5)

General Comments about the Organizations for Relief in the last War

It should be pointed out that the activities of the many different relief organizations which we have described overlapped in actual practice to a considerable extent. Much of the personnel consisted of unpaid voluntary workers who served in many of the different relief organizations set up during and after the war. There was thus a continuity of experience and a coordination of effort which an outline history of the various organizational forms does not reveal.

It should be pointed out, also, that very few of the relief organizations confined their activities within the narrow limits set by the purposes for which they were originally established. Thus, the Belgian Relief Commission after the war sold foodstuffs to Germany and several other European countries. Similarly, the European Children's Fund took over many forms of adult relief when it became apparent that the end of the armistice period had not terminated the need for general European relief projects. In the light of the jobs which had to be done, the organizations we have described developed a flexibility and a breadth of activity much greater than their technical structure and originally announced purposes would indicate.
such a substantial cut of current production that most of the people in
plundered the stocks of food in the occupied areas, but have also taken

when the war in the last war. In this war the Germans have not only
this war most of continental Europe have been occupied by the enemy. This
the war are likely to be far greater than they were in the last war. In
Unprecedentedly the magnitude and scope of the relief operation in

lease administration, to some of the people in French Africa—leased
Food and other necessities are being made available by the lend-

With lend-lease funds to military purposes in Germany
quantities are now going on about making available relief supplies procured
this. Royal relief supplies are also on the way to the people in Greece. This
lease administration to people released when they moved from Poland to
in Germany. Some relief supplies were also made available by the lend-
made available by the lend-lease administration to overseas purposes
Government today in the occupied areas. Some relief supplies are being

On the relief problem, very little has been done by the United States.
was in the last war for handling the production and distribution of food
the food administration, there is a clause on international bases then there
Secretary of the interior and executive order 9860 of December 5, 1942, creating
On the food problem, there is little doubt that under the present

Some caution should doubtless be exercised in utilizing in this war

Last year compared with this year

Exactly different from that of the food and relief situations in the

(9)
the last war, and this one too, seems to indicate the desirability of
having food, medical supplies, etc., for better purposes. The experience of

in the last-lease act—whether also cover power to use rent-over any and
in the last-lease work, such an amendment—resulting very few chances
and political reasons to amend the last-lease act to authorize the con-

For renter after the war is ended, it might be necessary for polit-
y

in meeting and solving the renter problems at the same time

cooperation with Mr. Lehman, the director of Foresight Rent and Rehabiliation,

the situation. That administrative work to some extent

about the powers and kinds of the last-lease administrative to meet

of the war, other areas are reconstructed, there is no longer to be little

the legal authority of the agency of funds under the last-lease act.

clearly far better than it was in the last war. There is no doubt about

the organization and structure for handling renter in the last war.

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in all probability be required, in larger quantities than the last.

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in the last-lease act—whether also cover power to use rent-over any and

of the war, other areas are reconstructed, there is no longer to be little

the legal authority of the agency of funds under the last-lease act.

clearly far better than it was in the last war. There is no doubt about

the organization and structure for handling renter in the last war.
February 15, 1943

My dear Mr. Herbert:

Your letter of January twentieth to the President has been received. I have at his direction again checked on the matter in which you are interested.

This has been gone into extensively, both by Dr. Bush and his associates and the Navy Department, and I see no course the President can follow other than to accept the recommendations of responsible officials who have repeatedly investigated it.

Again I regret not to be able to write you more favorably.

Very sincerely yours,

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Charles J. Herbert, Esq.
127 Pleasant Street,
Watertown, Massachusetts.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Miss Tully.

Frankly, I don't see much use bothering the President again but he might prefer to see this before it goes out.

M. H. M.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. McINTYRE.

The attached correspondence from Mr. Charles J. Herbert is returned. Attention is invited to memorandum of Commander H. L. Phelps, U.S.N. (Ret.), dated February 9, 1943.

I agree that we should attempt to close the correspondence with a statement to the effect that the President must, of necessity, rely upon the advice and decisions of his technical advisors in the selection of appropriate instruments of war.

[Signature]

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN, USN

Naval Aide to the President

Subject: Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Director, proposed by William A. Remick.

Enclosures:
(A) 4 page ltr from Chas J. Herbert to the President dated 20 Jan. 1943.
(B) Copy 2 page ltr from Mr. McIntyre to Mr. Herbert dated 9 Dec. 1942.
(D) Memo from Mr. McIntyre to Capt. McCrea dated 10 Dec. 1942 (in duplicate).
(E) Ltr from Dr. Bush to Mr. McIntyre dated 7 Dec. 1942.
(F) 2 page ltr from John T. Tate to Dr. Bush dated 4 Dec. 1942.
(G) Telegram from Mr. Herbert to the President dated 25 Nov. 1942, (in duplicate).
(H) 8 page description of subject device.
(I) Fwdg. memo of 25 Nov. 1942 from Mr. McIntyre to Dr. Bush.
(J) Fwdg. memo of 27 Nov. 1942 from Mr. McIntyre to Dr. Bush.
(K) 3 page conf. ltr from Coordinator of Research and Development to Director of Public Relations dated 28 Dec. 1942.

1. With the return of your file (Enclosures (A) to (J)), I am sending you a copy of a confidential letter from the Coordinator of Research and Development to the Director of Public Relations dated 28 December 1942 (Enclosure (K)). Attention is invited to paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of this enclosure.

2. Any further correspondence with Mr. Herbert will only give rise to an invitation to debate on a multiplicity of issues and I feel that Mr. McIntyre should terminate this correspondence once and for all.

Phelps

H. L. Phelps

x

C. F. Navy

x C. F.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In analyzing the letter from Secretary McIntyre of December 9th, 1942 it is obvious that Dr. Vannevar Bush's staff within the Office of Scientific Research and Development has utterly failed to visualize even in a small way the superior capabilities of Mr. Remick's inventions, and has also failed to understand how little help he needs.

Paragraph 5 of Secretary McIntyre's letter concerning "other projects now being worked on" was covered by the blue-printed memorandum listing the superior features of Mr. Remick's inventions beginning at the bottom of page 4. (This is in your hands). Three possible competitive devices were discussed, giving them the benefit of all doubt.

Further, paragraphs 5 and 7 of the letter assume that assistance and support would "complicate" the present effort and "would require at least six months using all NDRC personnel skilled in this field." This is not the case as no assistance from NDRC is contemplated. NDRC was approached primarily to obtain unquestioned expert opinion outside our group on the feasibility of the inventions. This has been obtained.

On August 27, 1942 the Navy's Assistant Co-ordinator of Research

*Note: The text is cut off at the bottom of the page.*
and Development wrote, "... and the decision not to proceed with your proposals at this time was influenced to some extent by considerations other than the feasibility of your inventions from a technical standpoint." And speaking of six months, we could have had a model completed long before now as it has been exactly six months since Mr. Remick first presented his proposals to Washington.

Paragraph 7 also states that "many specific things in the proposal are not well considered." This is only partly true. Many things have been considered beyond the pictorial and schematic form submitted, but obviously no one except a company anticipating a large contract, or preparing to build a model, would work out all the details on the drafting board. Especially is this true in view of the complete lack of any government enthusiasm to date. However, our group is about to work out these details regardless, and only asks, as was pointed out in my telegram of November 25, 1942, "... for the go-ahead signal in the way of priorities for a few hundred dollars worth of Rochelle salt crystals (which by the way are not a critical material), selsyn motors, etc. to build the model -- the model will do the rest."

Paragraph 8 of the letter read, "... I wish to emphasize that the more important objectives involved in the proposed Remick structures are paralleled in devices which are under study and certain elements or features which have been the subject of study by us during the past year are beginning to show promise and to find limited application.
(The underlines are mine. They show how far short
the present work must be of the Remick proposals and verify
the assumptions of the blueprinted memorandum. Undoubtedly the
"Limited application" is due primarily to the bulk of that
portion of the equipment which projects below the hull of the
ship.)

The worst argument is contained in paragraph 9 of
the letter. It suggested by inference that "temperature gra-
dients, turbulence, reverberation, and other factors" would
reduce the margin of superiority of the Remick devices to the
point where their value would be doubtful. This is far from
being the case. On the contrary, these factors operate to
increase the margin of superiority of the Remick inventions.
The Remick devices would have optimum performance capabilities
in respect to turbulence and reverberation. With the Remick
systems reverberation (from the variable frequency transmission)
would come back in a form which would react upon the receiver
in a manner similar to turbulence, and the superiority of the
Remick devices in respect to signal-to-noise ratio is covered
in paragraph 4(a)(b) and (c) of the blueprinted memorandum.
Of course, all systems would be somewhat affected by the tem-
perature gradient as this is a limiting characteristic of the
transmission medium. The Remick Attack Director, however,
with its greater angular accuracy and "follow-up" capabilities,
is the only system which would lend itself conveniently to a
study of this temperature gradient factor.

Probably the most important single superior feature
is covered in paragraph 7 of the memorandum, which states, "Target can not be 'lost', if within the normal range of the equipment, because the continuous stream of echoes gives the equipment 'follow-up' capabilities considerably in excess of the demands made by any attack."

Summarizing: We need no financial assistance. We need no technical assistance. We need only a small amount of co-operation and moral support. May we have it?

Yours very sincerely,

Charles J. Herbert.
From: Coordinator of Research and Development
To: Director of Public Relations

Subject: Publicity Campaigns by Inventors - Case of Mr. Charles J. Herbert in connection with inventions of Mr. William A. Remick.


Enclosure: (A) Ltr from Mr. Charles J. Herbert of 25 November 1942 to Secnav and various national leaders, enclosing (B) Copy of telegram from Mr. Charles J. Herbert to President of the United States; and (C) Blueprint memo making unsupported assertions regarding the merits of a "Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Detector".

1. The inventions described in enclosure (C) have received an exceptional amount of study by the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development, by the Bureau of Ships, and by the National Defense Research Committee.

2. In essence, these studies indicate that if we ceased work on certain National Defense Research Committee projects which had been pursued for considerable periods of time, and dropped some projects which were already in production, and if the Remick inventions were a complete success, they would at most fulfill the functions, probably in a somewhat inferior manner, of devices that have already been developed or are now being developed.

3. To do this would divert talents of skilled men, critical materials, and critical laboratory facilities without serving any useful purpose. Therefore, without regard to the technical feasibility of Mr. Remick's inventions, it did not seem wise to undertake the work. Mr. Remick was so advised by the Navy on 27 August 1942 with an expression of regret that we could not discuss the confidential military reasons which led to the decision.

4. Mr. Herbert's telegram of November 25, 1942 to the President, which he states is being made public, includes the statement that "I
Mr. Remick and his group ask is for the go-ahead signal in the way of
priorities for a few hundred dollars worth of Rochelle salt crystals,
selsyn motors, etc., to build the model. This is an instance where
an inventor and his associates are attempting to arouse distrust and
dissatisfaction on the part of the public without making any serious
attempt first to come to a constructive understanding with the govern-
ment agencies concerned. A telegram of 15 July 1942 from Mr. Herbert
to Dr. John T. Tate of the National Defense Research Committee listed
some five specific pieces of equipment which would have to "be supplied".
In addition, that telegram further suggested that they be given some
laboratory facilities, and such other cooperation, materials, and
priorities as may be reasonably requested. It further specified that
some additional devices would be necessitated by the requirements of
the invention. Thus, if the statement in Mr. Herbert's telegram of
November 25, which is quoted above, is true when he is obviously
trying to promote his program by pressure and publicity without even
taking the trouble to state his requirements to those from whom he
wishes them.

5. Moreover, it was on July 24, 1942 that the National Defense
Research Committee transmitted to Mr. Remick its conclusion that it
would be inadvisable to push the development of these devices at the
present time. It was August 27, 1942 that the Coordinator of Research
and Development transmitted the conclusion that the Navy should not
undertake the development of these inventions. Then, for a period
of some three months, nothing more was heard from Mr. Remick and his
associates, no reconsideration was asked, and no limited alternative
request was submitted, until Mr. Herbert on November 25, 1942 addressed
his telegram to the President with the statement that he was making
that telegram public.

6. In one of the interviews with the inventor, reported to
Dr. F. H. Hunt, of the National Defense Research Committee, the inventor
seemed to betray information about confidential devices which he probably
could not have obtained except by someone's violation of the Espionage
Act. The information on this suspicion was not definite enough at the
time, and is not now, to prefer actual charges.

7. There is no objection to an inventor or his representative
reporting to the President or any superior officer his suspicion that
high ranking Naval officers are bungling their jobs and merely rejecting
his invention by virtue of being "brass hats". There is, however, an
objection to his doing this by means of a publicity campaign.

8. One of the several tricks of our enemies to obtain information
is to start a publicity campaign stating for example (a) that they have
sunk the Ark Royal and (b) if you don't believe it, make your leaders
reveal where she is. An entirely analogous method to discover our most
secret inventions would be to claim (a) we have made a better invention
and (b) if you don't believe it, make your research people reveal what
they are doing.
From: Coordinator of Research and Development
To: Director of Public Relations

9. Only a very small fraction of inventions and ideas submitted to the Navy can be used. For example, reference (a) shows that of inventions submitted in the period reported, not over 1 in 1,000 was worth serious consideration by a committee, and not more than 1 in 100,000 was put into production. The only satisfied inventors are the approximately 1 in 100,000 who get their inventions produced. A few are rejected, as in the case of Mr. Remick, because we are already doing what they propose in an equal or superior way, but for military reasons cannot give them specific reasons for the rejection. The vast majority of inventions and ideas submitted are worthless, though they are all studied with the greatest care to discover if they contain even the germ of a useful idea.

10. However, with approximately 100,000 disgruntled inventors for every contented one, there is political pressure, criticism by the press, and continuous efforts to establish new committees and boards which will yield to the importunities of the dissatisfied.

11. When the representative of the inventor, as in the present case, deliberately sets out to blackmail us by inaugurating an unfavorable publicity campaign which would only result in injury to the Navy, something should be done. It is requested, therefore, that the Director of Public Relations examine this matter and determine whether a general educational campaign can be instituted to convince the public how thoroughly their ideas are studied, and that rejections are only made for the best of reasons.

12. In this particular case of Messrs. Remick and Herbert, which is used merely as an example, a file is available in the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development.

13. Please return the enclosures when they have served their purpose.

Copy to: BUShips
Chairman, NDRC
ONI
JAG

J. A. FURER, Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

11 December 1942.

Memorandum for
Captain John L. McCrea, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

I think that Mr. McIntyre's letter is O.K. and can suggest no changes in it.

I hope this letter will close the matter.

H. L. Phelps
Comdr., U. S. Navy, Ret.

[Handwritten note:]

Here, Comdr. Phelps memo, please, with which I concur.

J. L. McC
Dr. Bush put me rather on the spot in leaving it up to me whether to pass on certain information in the memorandum to him or not. I have eliminated that. Would you be good enough to read this letter over and see if you consider it O. K. for me to send?

M. H. McIntyre

Let. to Mr. Charles J. Herbert, 127 Pleasant St., Watertown, Mass.
December 9, 1942

Dear Mr. Herbert:

Your telegram to the President dated November twenty-fifth and the letter confirming it were received.

I immediately referred it to the Office of Scientific Research and Development and I am advised that Dr. Bush has the question reopened and a comprehensive review made.

Dr. Bush has advised me that the findings of his Board can be summarized as follows:

"Our staff carefully reviewed Mr. Remick's suggestion as to his two devices; namely, the submarine panoramic course recorder and the submarine attack director. We find no reason for changing our recommendations made to Admiral Furer last July twenty-third which was summarized in the statement that it would be inadvisable at present to spend effort in the development of Mr. Remick's inventions."

The Board pointed out that there are already projects under consideration which have been actively worked on for considerable periods of time and some of which are in production, which cover the essential claims of the Remick inventions. The Board felt that the proper procedure is to give proper support to the projects now being worked on rather than to complicate the effort by beginning work on these new proposals.

After pointing out the engineers' study and report of last July, the report continues:

"Mr. Remick has not produced a model of his device, and it is estimated that it would require at least six months using all NDRC personnel skilled in
Mr. Herbert -- #2.

this field. This would seem very unwise since many specific things in the proposal are not well considered and would require very considerable development work before even a first model could be completed.

"We see no reason for changing our conclusions as formulated last July. In making this statement I wish to emphasize that the more important objectives involved in the proposed Remick structures are paralleled in devices which we have under study and certain elements or features which have been the subject of study by us during the past year are beginning to show promise and to find limited application.

"As you can well appreciate, it is perfectly possible for an engineer with imagination and some familiarity with the arts involved to formulate ideal detection and location systems which should work beautifully provided the ocean was an ideal transmission medium. Unfortunately, temperature gradients, turbulence, reverberation and other factors limit the performance of instrumental set-ups. For this reason an inventor is likely to feel discouraged if his method, which looks fine on paper, is not enthusiastically received by those who have had experience in making gear work under the actual conditions of use."

I regret very much not to be sending you more encouraging news.

Very sincerely yours,

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Charles J. Herbert, Esq.,
127 Pleasant Street,
Watertown, Massachusetts.
Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

Following receipt from you of the telegram to the President from Mr. Charles J. Herbert and the memorandum on the Remick submarine panoramic course recorder and submarine attack director, I asked the group in my office concerned with such questions to make a re-study of this matter. I now send you enclosed a copy of a letter giving the results of this review, and I return herewith the material from Mr. Herbert which you sent me. I have great confidence in the group that has reviewed this matter, not only by reason of their scientific competence, but also because of the open-minded way in which they approach such problems, so that I feel that the opinion here expressed is well-considered and entirely sound. I leave it to your judgment as to whether we are warranted in telling this man that most of his ideas were included in developments which were started before he proposed them. I don't ordinarily do this, for if it were done generally it would give out quite a lot of information as to what is considered important.

Cordially yours,

V. Bush,
Director.
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Office of Scientific Research and Development
1530 P Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Bush:

Two or three days ago you handed me the following papers:

One page long-hand notes, undated and unsigned.
Mr. McIntyre’s memorandum of November 25th, 1942, evidently referring to your telegram dated November 25, 1942 from Charles J. Herbert to President Roosevelt.
Memorandum dated November 27th from Mr. McIntyre referring a copy of the above mentioned telegram, to which was attached a memorandum entitled: "Superior Features of Mr. Remick’s Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Director."

These papers are being returned to you herewith.

I have had our staff carefully review Mr. Remick’s suggestions as to his two devices, namely the submarine panoramic course recorder and the submarine attack director. We find no reason for changing our recommendation made to Admiral Furer last July 23rd, which was summarized in the statement that it would be inadvisable at present to spend effort in the development of Mr. Remick’s inventions.

In July we had a very complete study made by several engineers connected with our work and they reported on the Remick inventions at considerable length. Dr. Shankland summed up the results of this study in a report from which I quote the following:

"In general, the consensus of opinion of those who have studied these two inventions is as follows:

"There are already projects in the NDRC which have been actively worked on for considerable periods of time and some of which are in production, which cover the essential claims of the Remick inventions. These are:

"1. The Harvard NDRC Right-Left Indicator
"2. The Chemical Recorder
"3. The General Electric PPI Course Plotter
"4. The San Diego NDRC Echoscopes
"5. The Harvard NDRC SONAR which has the same general objectives as Mr. Remick’s inventions and is now being given field tests.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 503, 371 and 372. The reproduction or dissemination of its contents in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
"It would seem that the proper procedure is to give support to the NDRC projects now being worked on rather than to complicate the effort by beginning work on these new proposals of Mr. Remick.

"Mr. Remick has not produced a model of his device, and it is estimated that it would require at least six months using all NDRC personnel skilled in this field. This would seem very unwise since many specific things in the proposal are not well considered and would require very considerable development work before even a first model could be completed."

We see no reason for changing our conclusions as formulated last July. In making this statement I wish to emphasize that the more important objectives involved in the proposed Remick structures are paralled in devices which we have under study and certain elements or features which have been the subject of study by us during the past year are beginning to show promise and to find limited application.

As you can well appreciate, it is perfectly possible for an engineer with imagination and some familiarity with the arts involved to formulate ideal detection and location systems which should work beautifully provided the ocean was an ideal transmission medium. Unfortunately, temperature gradients, turbulence, reverberation and other factors limit the performance of instrumental set-ups. For this reason an inventor is likely to feel discouraged if his method, which looks fine on paper, is not enthusiastically received by those who have had experience in making gear work under the actual conditions of use.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John T. Tate
Vice Chairman of Division C
November 27, 1942.

Respectfully referred to Dr.
Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of
Scientific Research and Development,
for attention in connection with Mr.
Herbert's telegram of November 25th
which was referred to you on November
25th.

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

Charles J. Herbert,
127 Pleasant Street,
Watertown, Mass.

Copy of telegram of November 25, 1942, addressed to the President. Re;
Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and the Submarine Attack Director,
invented by William A. Remick. Encloses an eight-page memorandum
entitled "Superior Features of Mr. Remick's Submarine Panoramic
Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Director."
November 25, 1942

Respectfully referred to Dr.
Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of
Scientific Research and Development.

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President

November 25, 1942
Telegram from
Charles J. Herbert,
127 Pleasant Street,
Watertown,
Massachusetts.

That on July 13, 1942, William A. Remick, inventor of the submarine panoramic course recorder and the submarine attack director, was in Wash. with 3 companions; at the suggestion of Rep. McCormack his inventions were described to the Sound and Visual Research Section of the Bureau of Ships; at suggestion of Dr. Busch inventions were described to a group of scientists of the Detectors Division of the National Defense Research Committee; months have passed; NDRC reported it would be inadvisable to push development of these devices at present time; he claims these inventions are 100 to 1 improvement over present methods; all Mr. Remick and his group ask is for the go-ahead signal in way of priorities for a few hundred dollars worth of Rochelle salt crystals, selsyn motors, etc., to build the model.
The White House
Washington

BOSTON MASS NOV 25 1942 811A

PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

WHITE HOUSE

On July 13, 1942, William A. Remick, inventor of the submarine panoramic course recorder and the submarine attack director, was in Washington, D.C., with three companions. At the suggestion of Representative McCormack, his inventions were described to the sound and visual research section of the Bureau of Ships. The following day, at the suggestion of Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute, the inventions were described to a group
OF SCIENTISTS OF THE DETECTORS DIVISION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE.

MONTHS HAVE PASSED. NDRC WROTE THAT "IN VIEW OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE TO PUSH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE DEVICES AT THE PRESENT TIME." THE OFFICE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NAVY WROTE, "AND THE DECISION NOT TO PROCEED WITH YOUR PROPOSALS AT THIS TIME WAS INFLUENCED TO SOME EXTENT BY CONSIDERATIONS OTHER THAN THE FEASIBILITY OF YOUR INVENTIONS FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT."

IN THE MEANTIME, HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT NEWS OF SHIPS BEING TORPEDOED; AND SINCE THE OPENING OF THE SECOND
FRONT IN AFRICA SECRETARY HULL SAID, "OUR SHIPS MUST NOW CONVOY THROUGH A SEA OF SUBMARINES," AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL EISENHOWER SAID THAT THE BLUE MEDITERRANEAN WATERS WERE "SWARMING WITH ENEMY SUBMARINES."

IS THE LACK OF INTEREST IN THESE INVENTIONS A CASE OF BUNGLING BY THE NAVY'S "BRASS HATS?" MR. REMICK'S INVENTIONS REPRESENT A 100 TO 1 IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRESENT METHODS. THIS IMPROVEMENT IS DESCRIBED IN AN EIGHT-PAGE MEMORANDUM ENTITLED "SUPERIOR FEATURES OF MR. REMICK'S SUBMARINE PANORAMIC COURSE RECORDER AND SUBMARINE ATTACK DIRECTOR." A COPY OF THIS MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS BY AIR-MAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY.
ALL MR REMICK AND HIS GROUP ASK IS FOR THE GO-AHEAD SIGNAL IN THE WAY OF PRIORITIES FOR A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS WORTH OF ROCHELLE SALT CRYSTALS, SELSYN MOTORS, ETC., TO BUILD THE MODEL -- THE MODEL WILL DO THE REST.

THIS TELEGRAM IS BEING MADE PUBLIC. FOR OBVIOUS MILITARY REASONS THE MEMORANDUM IS NOT

CHARLES J HERBERT 127 PLEASANT ST WATERTOWN MASS.
COPY of TELEGRAM of November 25, 1942

President, Franklin D. Roosevelt
White House
Washington, D. C.

On July 13, 1942, William A. Remick, inventor of the Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and the Submarine Attack Director, was in Washington, D.C. with three companions. At the suggestion of Representative McCormack his inventions were described to the Sound and Visual Research Section of the Bureau of Ships. The following day, at the suggestion of Dr. Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institute, the inventions were described to a group of scientists of the Detectors Division of the National Defense Research Committee.

Months have passed. NDRC wrote that "in view of all the circumstances it would be inadvisable to push the development of these devices at the present time." The Office of the Co-ordinator of Research and Development for the Navy wrote, "and the decision not to proceed with your proposals at this time was influenced to some extent by considerations other than the feasibility of your inventions from a technical standpoint."

In the meantime, hardly a day goes by without news of ships being torpedoed; and since the opening of the second front in Africa Secretary Hull said, "Our ships must now convey through a sea of submarines," and Lieutenant General Eisenhower said that the blue Mediterranean waters were "swarming with enemy submarines."

Is the lack of interest in these inventions a case of bungling by the Navy's "Brass Hats"? Mr. Remick's inventions represent a 100 to 1 improvement over the present methods. This improvement is described in an eight-page memorandum entitled "Superior Features of Mr. Remick's Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Director." A copy of this memorandum follows by Air-Mail special delivery.

All Mr. Remick and his group ask is for the go-ahead signal in the way of priorities for a few hundred dollars worth of Rochelle salt crystals, selsyn motors, etc., to build the model -- the model will do the rest.

This telegram is being made public. For obvious military reasons the memorandum is not.

Charles J. Herbert
127 Pleasant Street
Watertown, Mass.
Superior Features of Mr. Remick's Submarine Panoramic Course Recorder and Submarine Attack Director

Six superior features of the panoramic course recorder, as compared to searching by the previous system of Echo Ranging:

1. No highly skilled operator required.
2. Records automatically -- no continuous watch necessary.
3. Searching time speeded up
   (a) at least 2 1/2 times for simplified embodiment (to three minutes);
   (b) at least 5 times for other embodiments (to 90 seconds).
4. Range is quite considerably increased
   (a) due to several db increase in signal-to-noise ratio, because at some portion of the recording the projector is always directly on the target;
   (b) due to a considerable increase in signal-to-noise ratio, because the signal is transmitted continuously instead of about one percent of the time;
   (c) due to a considerable increase in signal-to-noise ratio because of the long time-constant of the output circuit, resulting in an average noise output at a definite "threshold", with the signal appearing above this "threshold". (The previous system could not use a long time-constant circuit because accurate distance indications were dependent upon small time differences and because the signal itself was of short duration).
5. Numerous submarines are indicated and recorded simultaneously.
6 Sufficient improvement in performance should be obtained to allow the recording of mines.

NINE ADDITIONAL SUPERIOR FEATURES of the ATTACK DIRECTOR, as compared to attacking by the previous system of Echo Ranging:

7 Target cannot be "lost", if within the normal range of the equipment, because the continuous stream of echoes gives the equipment "follow-up" capabilities considerably in excess of the demands made by any attack.

8 Angular accuracy (even of the simplified embodiment) is improved 2 or 3 times, because numerous readings are available over a narrow angle and the midportion of this angle may be estimated or the increased reading observed.

9 Angular accuracy is considerably increased in the differential embodiments, to the point where all errors will total about 1/3 of one degree -- equivalent to 10 yards at a distance of one mile. (The previous system did not lend itself to differential action because the signal was of such short duration).

10 Distance accuracy (even without correction for velocity of propagation) is improved, due to the accurately regulated "time-spacing" of the received "echo". (This
is described in "Improvements to Remick's Submarine Detection Devices").

11 Distance accuracy is further improved by a better than 95% automatic correction of the "doppler effect". The error remaining due to this effect is thus less than 2 1/2 yards at a distance of one mile. (This is also described in "Improvements to Remick's Submarine Detection Devices").

12 A considerable improvement in distance accuracy, to the point where all errors will total less than 10 yards at a distance of one mile, is possible because the system lends itself to the determination of the velocity of propagation "on the spot". (This is likewise described in "Improvements to Remick's Submarine Detection Devices").

13 Paves the way to remove the limitations in attacking speed by making possible the use of a "PT" boat for the actual attack, at high speed. Such a technique could considerably simplify our convoy and patrol problems. "PT" boats would be more effective because, in possessing greater speed, greater maneuverability, and less size, they would

(a) be better able to avoid torpedoes than a destroyer;

(b) present a smaller target to a torpedo,
either broadside or head on;
(c) be more accurate in depth-charge attack;
(d) represent a much smaller loss of life and equipment, should one be destroyed; and
(e) be considerably more effective because they could cover a greater range and be at the spot before the submarine had time to change its direction or depth.

14 Depth is indicated while the submarine is yet at quite a distance, in the preferred embodiment.

15 Provides the means for nullifying improved "confuser" devices. It is rumored that the enemy has in use a device for rendering incorrect indications on the previous equipment. But whether this is true or not, the enemy will undoubtedly soon be using such a device. The changing times and frequencies of the present invention would prevent the usual variety of such devices from causing a false indication, and would make it practically impossible for one to be built that would do so.

In weighing the advantages of the Panoramic Course Recorder and Attack Director it must be assumed, as is always the case when "necessity is the mother of invention", that improvements in the previous system have occurred or will occur to other inventors.

The Panoramic Course Recorder attains a theoretically
optimum relationship between searching time and path width. With one set of adjustments the searching time is 90 seconds, and the path width is 400 feet at 2 miles or 100 feet at half a mile. This path width is satisfactory in comparison with the size of the submarine, and 90 seconds is fast enough so that several recordings of each submarine is obtained under any condition of ship and submarine speed. If we attempt to halve the path width we double the searching time, and conversely, if we attempt to halve the searching time we double the path width; therefore, these optimum values were chosen.

In view of the optimum relationship, the improvements which may have been, or which may in the future be suggested, are commented upon below in a negative manner.

FOUR SUPERIOR FEATURES of the PANORAMIC COURSE RECORDER, as compared to searching by the previous system of Echo Ranging to which has been added automatic training and a recorder.

Superior features Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 (above) still apply. This possible arrangement will not allow the simultaneous recording of numerous submarines, because panoramic spiral coverage is not possible with the previous system.

FIVE SUPERIOR FEATURES of the PANORAMIC COURSE RECORDER, as compared to searching by the previous system of Echo
to which has been added a recorder, and which has had
an automatic electrically-rotated cylindrical projector of
72 angular elements substituted for the mechanically-rotated
one.

Superior features Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 still apply, and in addition this possible arrangement
would be further inferior to the Panoramic Course
Recorder because of the reduction in radiated
power and signal-to-noise ratio when using the
electrically-rotated projector. 72 angular ele-
ments were suggested as a possibility because it
agrees with the previous practice of training 5
degrees at a time. If, however, a further compro-
mise is made by reducing the number of angular
elements to say 36, still further inferiority
would result due to a 2-to-1 decreased knowledge
of the submarine's angular location.

THREE SUPERIOR FEATURES of the PANORAMIC COURSE RECORD-
ER, as compared to a possible system having all of the optimum
features of the Panoramic device (a situation which is somewhat
unlikely) but which has had an electrically-rotated cylindrical
projector substituted for the mechanically-rotated projector of
the Panoramic device.

16 Range would be quite considerably greater with
the Panoramic device (when using projectors of reasonable size) because of the reduction in radiated power and signal-to-noise ratio when using the electrically-rotated projector. (Several reasons could be cited for this reduction).

17 Angular accuracy would be quite considerably greater with the Panoramic device because of its continuous angular change.

18 Distance accuracy would also be quite considerably greater because of the continuous "time-spacing" between transmission and reception.

The above comments also apply to the Attack Director, but to a much greater degree. In addition, the other systems would experience considerable difficulty in lending themselves to differential action for extreme accuracy of angle determination.

SUMMARY

The superior features of Mr. Romick's devices would

(a) reduce the loss of merchant ships by making it possible for them to avoid submarines (this is especially true if the
ship mounts a gun and is thus a match for a submarine on the surface);

(b) decrease the loss of destroyers during attack;

(c) reduce the cost of the attack by making more efficient use of the depth charges;

(d) provide the means for nullifying the enemy's possible "confusor" devices; and

(e) pave the way for the development of a far more effective technique of attack, using "PT" boats.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VER Y CON F I DEN T IAL

March 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN

It may interest you to read the enclosed about Herbert Hoover. Please return for my files.

F. D. R.

Ltr. 3-1-43, to Mr. McIntyre from Hon. John W. McCormack, enclosing ltr. 2-17-43 addressed to Mr. McCormack, from R.W. Hadden, Suite 218, 354 S. Spring St., Los Angeles, Calif. in regard to Herbert Hoover's activities before and during the last war.
March 16, 1943

Colonel McIntrye:

I return to you herewith the confidential papers which the President was good enough to send to me a few days ago. I have read them with great interest.

HERBERT H. LEHMAN

Colonel Marvin H. McIntrye,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
Are you familiar with this chapter in Mr. Hoover's career? X/13
Of course, I do not vouch for the accuracy.

MHM
Office of the Majority Leader  
House of Representatives U.S.  
Washington, D.C.  March 1, 1943.

Col. Marvin H. McIntyre  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

PERSONAL

Dear Marvin:

The within letter is for your personal information and I am sending it to you so that you can read it sometime at your leisure. If any ways near true, it is interesting.

There is no need of answering this letter.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Majority Leader.
Suite 216, 354 So. Spring Street

Los Angeles California February 17th 1943

Hon. John W. McCormack M.C.
House of Representatives
Washington D.C.

Dear Sir;

From my morning paper I am glad to see you have been getting after Hoover. Had the American people known about the real Hoover they certainly never would have elected him to the high office of President.

During the years 1908, 1909, 1910 I held a partnership in a firm of Consulting Engineers in London; was consulting engineer for Shilka Gold Concession, a large London Corporation operating a rich alluvial gold deposit on the Shilka River in Eastern Siberia, and was one of the first geologists to become interested in the Maikop Oil Field when it was discovered in 1909. With my associate, Rupert Way, an English Engineer, who had operated in Russia for many years, we secured a concession from the Tzarist Government for an oil pipe line from Maikop to the Port of Novorossisk. We also secured a number of oil plots, as the Russians called our leases on oil lands. A number of these we sold to Hoover, who immediately started to promote oil companies.

I have before me from my files the record of some fifteen such companies promoted by Hoover in 1910, aggregate capital some $15,000,000. All were liquated before the end of 1912, with a total loss to the investors. He had a crooked associate, a stock broker, and these two rigged the stock market so that the British public, according to the mining and oil journals and London financial papers, sustained a total loss in Hoover promotions and stock market manipulations of between $50,000,000 and $75,000,000. The London and Russian papers warned the public to have nothing to do with these Hoover promotions, but there was a boom on in Maikop, and they did not listen. Only one well produced oil, and it was about the only well drilled, according to the expert the London Financial News sent out to investigate what had been done, and what had become of all the money subscribed. Hoover immediately announced to the shareholders of that company—Oil & Petroleum Producers —that they had struck a "Fountain". He was so ignorant he did not even know oil terminology. What he meant was a gusher. Only a few buckets of oil had been found, but Hoover expected a well, so he performed in his usual manner by organizing a new company to take over Oil & Pet Producers. The latter had a capital of 425 thousand pounds Stg. The new Co, Maikop producers was capitalized at 300,000 one pound shares. All that was distributed among the shareholders of the old company was £73,000 - Hoover and associates took the balance.

On my return to the U.S. I continued to receive the oil and mining journals from London, and I noticed that Hoover was still promoting Maikop Companies, all of them mere "Blue Sky" and not one of which ever paid a cent to the original investors.
During my sojourn in London I had the entrance to the largest of the mining and financial houses in London. Not one of these would dream of employing Hoover, who never was a mining engineer. He left Stanford with merely a certificate in mineral geology. He was looked upon in London as a crooked company promoter, and more than once was in the London Courts on account of his questionable practices.

Wish I had the time to tell you of Belgian Relief swindle, which led to the murder of Edith Cavell the English nurse who had found that Hoover, and his associate Franqui, the Belgian banker who organized Belgian Relief, were shipping Belgian Relief goods by the train load into Germany. Hoover was called on the carpet by Earl Grey, but denied everything. However he immediately flew to Belgium to consult with Von der Lancken, Minister of Foods for Germany, and told him of the leak. Edith Cavell was suspected, arrested and later shot, all to protect Hoover as the London papers said. Brand Whitlock and Hugh Gibson had been instructed to protect her but they allowed Franqui to select the attorney to defend her. He never even appeared at the trial! Whitlock and Gibson, were negligent in their duty, otherwise Edith Cavell would never have been shot. For this murder Hoover was booked on the Streets of London for a banquet which had been arranged to celebrate the anniversary of Belgian Relief was called off by the Government. Hoover was to have been guest of honor.

Well these few remarks on the scandal about whom I could write a book should be sufficient to warn you to keep him out of any connection with Lehman's organization to feed a starving Europe. Hoover is doing his level best to worm in on that.

Yours very truly,

RWH

No one need ever fear a libel suit from Hoover. The crook is too afraid of the truth leaking out. All the above and more, I said over the Radio and in public speeches when he was opposing Al Smith as a candidate for the Presidency. The California Courts contain all the evidence of how he tried to steal General Petroleum and Union Oil with a London Company supposed to have $13,000,000 paid in capital. All that had been paid in was $35 the qualifying fees of seven directors – a one pound each for the transfer was to be effected by an exchange of stock. You may ask Congressman Jerry Voorhis about me.