The enclosure, presented by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, is circulated for consideration. It has been placed on the agenda of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

W. B. SMITH

ENCLOSURE

1. a. Adequate defense of the Hawaiian Islands is mandatory and must be assured at the earliest possible moment. Over-defense is to be guarded against, since all troops assigned to that mission are not only contained by the enemy without the use of any of his military resources, but the amount of shipping available for other purposes is thus unnecessarily reduced.

b. The Japanese might attempt air and naval raids on outlying islands, destructive air and naval raids on Oahu or combined air, naval and ground operations to seize one of the large outlying islands as a base for an attack on the fortress of Oahu. Japan has the forces available to carry out any one or all of the above operations. (Much of her ground and naval power with cargo tonnage is engaged now in active operations.) If half of her aircraft carriers were employed to carry on air attack to the Hawaiian Islands, the total number of planes would be about 200.

c. As long as the U. S. can dispose reasonable naval force in the Hawaiian area, and particularly, as long as Japan is seriously engaged in the southwest Pacific, it is estimated that any attack on Hawaii will be limited to raids
by aircraft and/or submarines.

2. Status of defense - Ground Forces.
   a. At present the ground forces in the Hawaiian Islands total 45,750. This includes the following major units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Infantry Regiments</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FA Regiment</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tank Bn</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tank Co</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Regiments CA (HD)</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Regiments CA (AA)</td>
<td>6,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous supporting troops</td>
<td>2,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Total: 45,750

   b. Additional troops awaiting dispatch to Hawaii include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Infantry Division (Square)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Regiments CA (AA)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous supporting troops</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filler replacements to bring units now in Hawaii to full strength</td>
<td>10,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Total: 44,250

   c. This will bring the ground forces to a total of 100,000. It is planned that these will be disposed about as follows: (For details see Tab A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On Oahu</td>
<td>74,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maui, Molokai, Lanai</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauai, Niihau</td>
<td>6,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Total: 100,000

   d. War Department believes that the force set up for Oahu (74,000) is sufficient to insure retention of that island against any landing operation that can be launched against it. Its reduction could be accomplished only through exhaustion of supplies.

   e. The garrisons of the other islands will be adequate for security against raids. With sufficient U. S. bombardment aviation based on Oahu (and distributed over other islands), hostile naval forces cannot hope to establish forces on and operate them from the outlying islands.

3. Air Forces.

   a. The air forces in Hawaii include:

   - 43 heavy bombers (Army) (to be increased to 80 by July and eventually to 96)
   - 24 light and medium bombers (Army)
   - 203 pursuit (Army) (to be increased to 225)
   - 67 Patrol Planes (Navy)

   b. These forces provide long range reconnaissance, a
striking force and an interception and attack force.

2. The long range reconnaissance is now being performed by the 67 Navy patrol planes supported by about 24 Army heavy bombers. These are able to cover a 290° sector to a range 700 miles. The remaining 70° is covered by medium range Army and Navy aircraft to a distance of 300 miles. While this does not provide a 100% effective search, it is a reasonable degree of coverage.

3. A minimum of 19 Army heavy bombers remains available for a striking force. If the Navy could furnish 24 additional PBY’s for search purposes, thus relieving the Army B-17’s now employed on this task, the effectiveness of the striking force would be greatly increased. By July, sufficient heavy bombers will be available to continue the support of the Navy search patrol and to provide a striking force of about 56 planes. This is considered adequate.

4. The pursuit strength of 203 planes now in Hawaii is sufficient to combat the number and type of hostile planes that might be expected.

4. The War Department believes that the projected strength is adequate for the scale of attack to be expected. Until the enemy forces are destroyed or contained, no amount of defensive strength can completely guarantee prevention of air raids or damage resulting therefrom. The defending forces set up can make such an operation so expensive as to be a very definite deterrent.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, with the concurrence of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Tab B, par. 11) recommends that the heavy bombers be increased from 96 to 200.

This would be a costly diversion of heavy bombers, especially in view of the urgent need for these planes for offensive operations in active theaters.

Operations of the fleet in the Hawaiian region would add to the security of the defense through the additional coverage and warning thus provided and by the threat to hostile surface vessels. The fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor is not a deterrent to Japanese raids, it is an inducement.

7. Conclusion.

a. The Army forces being sent to Hawaii, with the present naval local defense forces, provide a defense which should assure retention of the islands, prevent serious damage to installations therein and permit freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet, subject only to the requirement that sea communications between Hawaii and the West Coast be protected.

b. The Army ground and air forces should be increased to authorized levels as soon as possible after commitments of higher priority have been satisfied.

CinCpec File No.  
A2-11/SP12  UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
A4-1/V2  U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP  
A3/VZ(95)  
Serial 059  
c/o Fleet Post Office,  
Pearl Harbor, T. H.  
Jan. 7, 1942

SECRET

From:  Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.  
To:  Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject:  Airplane Situation, Hawaiian Area.  
References:  
(a) ComAirScoFor Conf.ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed to OpNav.  
(b) ComAirScoFor Conf. ltr. Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941, addressed to BuAero.  
(c) CinCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.  
(d) CinCPAC desp. 050547 of January 1942.  
Enclosure:  
(A) ComPatWing TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 0033 of December 30, 1941.  

1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.
2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft requirements here:

(a) The attack of 7 December will be followed by others. The enemy has exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not maintained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydocks, commercial docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, further, as an ultimate objective the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured with the forces now available to us.

(b) Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, with all due allowance for the advantage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of development. This applies with full force not only to material and to the training, skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, planned and handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its potentialities must be recognized from now on.

(c) Aircraft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long range search, for striking and for local interception. All of these are vital for effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate. It must be assumed that the Japanese will continue to have excellent intelligence reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which provided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot safely be assumed to have
been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain an effective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed attack.

3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any enemy force before it can strike Oahu and to give ample advance warning of any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second. As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)), the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward each day in order to:

(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during daylight on the day he is discovered, and

(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search has reached him.

4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:

(a) **Carrier aircraft may be launched 500 miles from Oahu.** There is definite evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225 and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy carriers of shorter range types for their local defense.

(b) **Carrier speed for the run-in may be 27 knots.** This speed is not unreasonable and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.
(c) It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem again is no deterrent, for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.

(d) Air Search visibility is 25 miles. That is, aircraft during the majority of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more positive than is now possible.

5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, which include perfect visibility, is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if and when reliable radar equipment for airplanes is available, for this equipment will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meeting at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as follows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two for the Asiatic theatre and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) here is 42,
with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures.) This leaves a total on hand of 109 long range planes.

6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain necessary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force, and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering submarine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having on hand for search along at least three times the number of planes that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the other can do more.

7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis:

(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes nor B-17's can go farther with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying any bombs.

(b) 25 patrol planes and 12 Army B-17's are being used daily for search (18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force.) The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such relatively ineffectual planes (VS), VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200 or 300 miles.

8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that only four-fifths of the circle is being covered to a reasonable range, and this with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth
is being covered very poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of task forces on special missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.

9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dangerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scouting Force in references (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advantages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.

10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immediately. Nevertheless, the necessary machinery therefore should be set in motion now at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBY-3 planes now here, is earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as pointed out in the reference, it is relatively easy to do and it will make an important immediate improvement in the picture.

11. The request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total of 200 heavy bombers, with which the Commander in Chief concurred in reference (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will almost
certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack, which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided. The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose, and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be decisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.

12. In all of the foregoing, Hawaiian air defense alone has been considered. Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.

13. Returning to the immediate situation: With present limited numbers of searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of striking force or useful striking force at the expense of search. There is no answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to play the inevitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided. Meanwhile, it is reiterated that any immediate increase for either will vitally improve the present situation.

14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.

/s/ G. W. HINITZ.
ADDENDUM TO J.C.S. 11

MARCH 11, 1942.

The enclosure is the paragraph of J.C.S. 11/1 which was adopted by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the 5th meeting, March 9, 1942, and should be attached to J.C.S. 11 as the last page.

J.C.S. 11, as amended, is being forwarded to the President requesting his approval.

DECLASSIFIED

W.B. SMITH,  
L.R. McDOWELL  
Joint Secretariat.
SITUATION IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS REGARDING JAPANESE POPULATION

While the present Naval local defense forces and the Army forces being sent to the Hawaiian Islands are considered adequate to cope with attacks from without, there still remains the grave threat of inimical action from within on the part of the (approximately) 100,000 residents of Japanese origin.

It is probable that eventually all Japanese residents will be concentrated in one locality and kept under continuous surveillance. It is essential that the most dangerous group, approximately 20,000 persons, should be evacuated as soon as possible. This can be effected either by

(a) Instituting a concentration camp on one of the Hawaiian Islands, such as Molokai.

(b) Transferring the Japanese population to a concentration camp located on the U.S. mainland.

Use of the method (a) above would constitute a tremendous logistics problem, since it would be necessary to transport to the Islands material to build the camp, all supplies for the continued maintenance of the Japanese, and the supplies for the additional troops allocated for their surveillance. The maximum use of the ships so used would not be attained, since they would be empty east-bound.

Transfer of the Japanese residents to the U.S. mainland would eliminate this almost prohibitive additional burden on the already over-taxed requirements of U.S. merchant shipping.

The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff therefore unanimously recommend that:

All Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands (either U.S. citizens or aliens) be transported to the U.S. mainland and placed under guard at a concentration camp in such locality as is most suitable.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHJ, NLR, Date: FEB 1 9 1974
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date Mar. 12, 1942.

From: Comdr. McDowell

To: Captain McCrea

As requested, I am sending you one copy of the letter to the President together with a copy of the mimeographed paper (J.C.S. 11) for your records. (White House).
My dear Mr. President:

In support of a letter on the same subject, and written in a similar vein by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in his letter of January 7, 1942, gave in some detail the situation in the Hawaiian Islands regarding the number of aircraft now available and the additional aircraft requested for what they considered an essential number for air reconnaissance and combat duties.

This letter, together with an appreciation of the Hawaiian defense forces, was presented by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (General Marshall) to the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

In this appreciation there was given a status of ground and air forces now in or awaiting despatch to the Hawaiian Islands, which sets up a ground force of 74,000 men for Oahu, 13,000 for Hawaii, 6,200 to be distributed on Maui, Molokai, and Lanai, and 6,600 to be divided between Kauai and Niihau.

Similarly, the Air Forces are to provide long range reconnaissance, a striking force, and an interception and attack force, which will total ninety-six heavy bombers, twenty-four light and medium bombers, 225 pursuit, and sixty-seven patrol planes.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff also took into consideration the grave danger of having the large Japanese population of the Islands remain at large, particularly the some 20,000 which were thought to comprise the most dangerous element.
In considering the best site for concentration of these Japanese, it became apparent that if they were placed in surveillance anywhere but on the U.S. mainland, there would arise the tremendous logistics problem of moving by sea to the selected site the material for concentration camps and continuing the transporting of food stuffs, etc., for not only the Japanese but the additional troops necessary for their surveillance.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff ask that you approve their conclusions:

(a) That the Army forces being sent to Hawaii, with the present Naval local defense forces, provide a defense which should insure retention of the Islands, prevent serious damage to installations therein, and permit freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet, subject only to the requirement that sea communications between Hawaii and the West Coast be protected.

(b) The Army ground and air forces should be increased to authorized levels as soon as possible after commitments of higher priority have been satisfied.

They also ask that you approve their recommendation:

That such Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands (either United States citizens or aliens) as are considered by appropriate authority in the Hawaiian Islands to constitute a source of danger be transported to the U.S. mainland and placed under guard in concentration camps.

The above is a summary of the complete paper J.C.S. 11, which is furnished herewith.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.

copies furnished Admiral Stark
Captain McCrea,
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of memorandum which the President received from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 3/24/42, the original of which is attached. Copy of memorandum sent also to the Secretary of the Navy.

Under date of March 30, 1942, the following papers were sent to Secretary of Navy as requested by Mr. Dillon in his memorandum of 3/27/42 to Capt. McCrea:
Original of President's memorandum of 2/26/42 to the Secretary of the Navy;
Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff, War Dept. "Notes on Evacuation of Japanese from Hawaiian Islands";
Memorandum for the President from the Attorney General, 2/17/42.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Returning attached papers, the matter mentioned therein has been discussed with Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority, who in turn has taken it up with the appropriate persons in the War Department. Mr. Eisenhower is of the opinion that no further follow-up is necessary at this time, since the Army is already acting on this problem and a considerable number of Japanese are being removed from the Islands for detention in camps in this country.

Attachments

x197
x133
x400 Hawaii
x67 Justice
TO TAKE UP AT CABINET TODAY
Mr. Rowe:

The envelope is not addressed.

Ray Clapper said last night that the A.G. was opposing evacuation on civil liberties ground. Of course, a statement from the President might clear the air.

E. J. Ennis.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. BRADY:

The attached is self-explanatory.
Can you help us out?

[Signature]

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN J. L. McCREA
(Aide to the President)

1. The Secretary asked if you could get more information on the attached. I called the War Department and found that similar correspondence had been sent to them with no additional information. He would appreciate some clarification.

Very respectfully,

John H. Dillon
Confidential Assistant
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Like you, I have long felt that most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other Islands. This involves much planning, much temporary construction and careful supervision of them when they get to the new location.

I do not worry about the constitutional question — first, because of my recent order and, second, because Hawaii is under martial law. The whole matter is one of immediate and present war emergency.

I think you and Stimson can agree and then go ahead and do it as a military project.

Ask the Director of the Budget how we can finance it.

F. D. R.
Notes on Evacuation of Japanese from Hawaiian Islands

1. About 100,000 would be involved.

2. It should be done.

3. Evacuation to an island of the group considered inadvisable:
   (a) It would involve much shipping and much construction (there is now a shortage of both)
   (b) It would require an additional division to be sent to Hawaiian command, with additional shipping requirements - immediately and monthly.
   (c) It would impose a heavy and dangerous burden on local commander, with hazard of Japanese descent on that particular island with its air fields, as initial toe hold.

4. Evacuation to mainland should be carried out utilizing empty ships returning to west coast.

   But

   (a) It should not be carried out until reinforcing troops for scattered islands are mostly in position.

   (b) It should be carried out somewhat at discretion of local commanders to meet labor problem, get friendly but burdensome loyal people out of the way, etc.

   (c) It must be coordinated with facilities to accommodate evacuees in U.S.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

For several weeks there have been increasing demands for evacuation of all Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, from the West Coast states. A great many of the West Coast people distrust the Japanese, various special interests would welcome their removal from good farm land and the elimination of their competition, some of the local California radio and press have demanded evacuation, the West Coast Congressional Delegation are asking the same thing and finally, Walter Lippman and Westbrook Pegler recently have taken up the evacuation cry on the ground that attack on the West Coast and widespread sabotage is imminent. My last advice from the War Department is that there is no evidence of imminent attack and from the F. B. I. that there is no evidence of planned sabotage.

In view of the fact that you may be asked about it at your press conference, or may wish to say something about the steps being taken, I am supplying you with the facts.

I have designated as a prohibited area every area recommended to me by the Secretary of War, through whom the Navy recommendations are also made. The less populated areas are already in effect and the remainder have been designated to be evacuated by February 24. I have also designated a number of restricted areas in which alien enemies may live only under rigorous curfew and other restrictions.

We are proceeding as fast as possible. To evacuate the 93,000 Japanese in California over night would materially disrupt agricultural production in which they play a large part and the farm labor now is so limited that they could not be quickly replaced. Their hurried evacuation would require thousands of troops, tie up transportation and raise very difficult questions of resettlement. Under the Constitution 60,000 of these Japanese are American citizens. If complete confusion and lowering of morale is to be avoided, so large a job must be done after careful planning. The Army has not yet advised me of its conclusion in the matter.

There is no dispute between the War, Navy and Justice Departments. The practical and legal limits of this Department's authority which is restricted to alien enemies are clearly understood. The Army is considering what further steps it wishes to recommend.

It is extremely dangerous for the columnists, acting as "Armchair Strategists and Junior G-Men," to suggest that an attack on the West Coast and planned sabotage is imminent when the military authorities and
the F. B. I. have indicated that this is not the fact. It comes close
to shouting FIRE! in the theater; and if race riots occur, these writers
will bear a heavy responsibility. Either Lippman has information which
the War Department and the F. B. I. apparently do not have, or is acting
with dangerous irresponsibility.

It would serve to clarify the situation in the public mind if you
see fit to mention it.

Respectfully,

(Signed) FRANCIS BIDDLE

Attorney General.
Notes on Evacuation of Japanese from Hawaiian Islands

1. About 100,000 would be involved.

2. It should be done.

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   (a) It should not be carried out until reinforcing troops for scattered islands are mostly in position.
   (b) It should be carried out somewhat at discretion of local commanders to meet labor problem, get friendly but burdensome loyal people out of the way, etc.
   (c) It must be coordinated with facilities to accommodate evacuees in U.S.
Do you want this for your file?

Send to Betsy B. in sealed envelope. 12/16
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Will you take this up with
War, Navy and Justice?

F. D. R.

Original of President's memorandum of 2/26/42
for the Secretary of Navy in re removal of the
Japanese from Oahu to one of the other Islands,
memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff,
War Dept., "Notes on Evacuation of Japanese from
Hawaiian Islands", and memorandum for the President,
from the Attorney General, 2/17/42, a copy of
which has been retained for our files.
February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Like you, I have long felt that most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other Islands. This involves much planning, much temporary construction and careful supervision of them when they get to the new location.

I do not worry about the constitutional question -- first, because of my recent order and, second, because Hawaii is under martial law. The whole matter is one of immediate and present war emergency.

I think you and Stimson can agree and then go ahead and do it as a military project.

Ask the Director of the Budget how we can finance it.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You will recall that on several occasions at Cabinet meetings, I have urged the policy of removing the 140,000 people of Japanese blood from Oahu to one of the other islands in the group. Each time the question has become bogged down because it dealt with the matter of interfering with the constitutional rights of American citizens of Japanese descent. Is not this difficulty now cleared up by your recent order covering exactly this question on the mainland?

Personally, I shall always feel dissatisfied with the situation until we get the Japanese out of Oahu and establish them on one of the other islands where they can be made to work for their living and produce much of their own food.

I know that such a movement involves considerable effort and will require some sizeable means of transportation. However, since our forces in Oahu are practically operating now in what is, in effect, enemy country—that is all of their defense of the islands is now carried out in the presence of a population predominately with enemy sympathies and affiliations. No matter what it costs or how much effort it takes, it ought to be done for the sake of the security of that most important outpost of American defense.

I have taken the matter up with the War Department, but to date have made little progress. I have in my files a long letter from General Emmons arguing against any such wholesale movement of Japanese. Since this was sent to me through military channels, I assume that it, in a general way, reflects the Army point of view.

Have you any suggestions to make on this matter?

Frank Knox
The problem of the evacuation of the Japanese population from the United States to Japan is a matter of the utmost importance. It is essential that action be taken to remove the Japanese from the West Coast and return them to Japan. The evacuation should be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner, and the Japanese should be treated with respect and dignity. The government of the United States should work closely with the government of Japan to ensure a smooth and efficient evacuation process.

Under the provisions of the evacuation agreement, a number of Japanese Americans were selected for evacuation to Japan. I have been designated as the representative of the Japanese government in the United States, and I am responsible for the supervision and coordination of the evacuation. I have been instructed to ensure that the evacuation is carried out in a manner that respects the rights and dignity of the Japanese evacuees.

I am in regular contact with the Japanese government and other officials regarding the evacuation. I am working to ensure that the evacuation is conducted in a manner that is fair and just. I am committed to seeing that the Japanese evacuees are treated with dignity and respect, and that their rights and interests are protected.

For several weeks there have been increasing demands for evacuation, and I am working to ensure that the evacuation can be carried out in a manner that is fair and just. I am working closely with the government of Japan to ensure that the evacuation is conducted in a manner that respects the rights and dignity of the Japanese evacuees.

I am confident that the evacuation can be carried out in a manner that is fair and just, and I am committed to seeing that the Japanese evacuees are treated with dignity and respect, and that their rights and interests are protected.
the F. B. I. have indicated that this is not the fact. It comes close
to shouting FIRE! in the theater; and if race riots occur, these writers
will bear a heavy responsibility. Either Lippman has information which
the War Department and the F. B. I. apparently do not have, or is acting
with dangerous irresponsibility.

It would serve to clarify the situation in the public mind if you
see fit to mention it.

Respectfully,

Attorney General.
My dear Mr. President:

Admiral Nimitz has learned that representatives of some of the departments of the Government have been seeking to promote a relaxation of the Military Governor of Hawaii. On this subject, Admiral Nimitz says:

"The Japanese capacity to inflict damage in this area is still very great. I, therefore, recommend that the Navy Department oppose any change in status quo or any limitation of the authority of the Military Governor."

Admiral King has strongly endorsed this opinion of Admiral Nimitz and I should like to add my personal endorsement also to the view expressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

I am still very gravely concerned over the menace which is presented in Oahu by the large number of unquestionably pro-Japanese who are still at large on that Island. As you know, I have made several strong recommendations that this problem be tackled vigorously but, apparently, little if anything has been done. The assumption that the war in the Pacific is already practically won and that there is no longer any menace of significant proportions to the security of Hawaii is, to my view, extremely dangerous and unjustified. I sincerely hope that the powers now given the Military Governor of Hawaii will not be relaxed at the present time.

Yours sincerely,

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The President
The White House
Date- 3/5/59
Signature- Carl F. Spaar
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

[Handwritten note: Encl. Copy of Knox's letter sent to Ike.]
MEMORANDUM for the President.

You referred to me a copy of a letter from Secretary Knox with respect to the martial law situation in Hawaii. Secretary Knox endorses Admiral Nimitz' recommendation that the Navy Department oppose any change in the status quo or limitation of the authority of the Military Governor of Hawaii.

The Army and this Department have recently concluded an agreement restoring to the courts in Hawaii their jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings except those involving members of the armed forces or persons engaged in any occupation or business under the direction of the Military Governor. Various other restrictions upon the jurisdiction and procedure of the civil courts are to be imposed, including power in the Military Governor to exempt persons from jury service. Our agreement avoids the imposition of military procedures in cases which do not involve security issues. The Department of Justice participated with us in working out the agreement which I have described.

This agreement does not meet all of the points which this Department has raised concerning the extent of military control of Hawaii. None of these points would impair military authority and control where necessary to ensure the safety of the Islands, as a matter of both internal safety and defense against attack.

I have directed Governor Stainback of Hawaii to take every precaution to make sure that no conflict arises between the military and civil authorities. Any differences of opinion which may arise will be the subject of discussion between the War Department and us.

Acting Secretary of the Interior.